



MONASH University

THE ISLAMIC STATE: A NEW WAVE OF TERRORISM?

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the Islamic State, known as IS, and seeks to uncover its position amidst the waves of terrorism. The study initially focuses on the concepts of terrorism and jihadism in the context of terrorism as an expression of social control, just war, and situational action. With this foundation fixed, IS and its surrounding historical, biographical and ideological contexts are explored. The work of David Rapoport is consulted to examine the established first four waves of terrorism and their relation to IS. The fifth wave framework proposed by Jeffrey Kaplan is also explored in terms of its application to IS.

The aim of this study is to determine whether IS ascribes to the existing waves and frameworks of terrorism, or whether its pursuit of statehood and governance constitutes an evolving or uniquely new wave. The thesis attempts to establish whether the pursuit of statehood combined with the culture and ideology of jihadism are catalysts for the evolution of current waves of terrorism, or for an entirely new wave. Superseding terrorism's typical acts of vengeance, shock value and sowing fear through ethnic and religious cleansing, territorial acquisition and domination, the actions of the Islamic State transcend all preconceived ideas and rationales of terrorism.

This organisation's expansion and power, exacerbated by fundamentalist interpretation of the Islamic religion and law, have produced a terrorist faction unlike anything recorded in history. The Islamic State's ideology of jihad, or jihadology, as well as its campaign of nation-building, testify to the evolution and transformation of this organisation from pre-existing theories and waves of terrorism to justifying a new wave on its own.

DECLARATION

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at any university or equivalent institution and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Signature:



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Date: 4th June 2018

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

| | | |
|------|---|--|
| 9/11 | – | Attacks on the United States on 11 th September 2001 |
| ANC | – | African National Congress |
| AQ | – | Al Qaeda |
| AQI | – | Al Qaeda in Iraq |
| IS | – | The Islamic State (to be used interchangeably); otherwise known as IS, ISIL, or Daesh. |
| UN | – | The United Nations |
| US | – | The United States |

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION, CONCEPTUALISATION, THEORETICAL OVERVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

IS is not merely a terrorist organisation and insurgency. It is also a de facto state and has access to political and economic instruments to bolster its nascent state.¹

1.1. INTRODUCTION

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria: what is it, where did it come from and what has it shown itself capable of? These were the essential queries in establishing the framework of this study. Also known as The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) but referred to as IS in this thesis, the organisation is a manifestation of Salafist jihadism through a terrorist group turned proto-state, led by self-proclaimed caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In the Arabic language, those who oppose the organisation refer to it as *Daesh* – a word that ranges in meaning. Journalist and author Graeme Wood identifies that although *Daesh* means Islamic State, it also translates into a number of other terms such as “uncouth” or “distasteful”.² Opposing Muslims have been persecuted, punished and forcibly muted for making this reference.

The origin of IS can be traced back to the early 2000s. Since 2014, it has revolutionised and transformed Syria, Iraq and the Middle East, as well as international perceptions of terrorism and humanity, with radical, unprecedented acts that have shocked the world.³ In 2014, former US President Barak Obama stated:

ISIL (IS) is not ‘Islamic’. No religion condones the killing of innocents and the vast majority of ISIL’s victims have in fact been Muslim. And ISIL is certainly not a state. It was formerly an al Qaeda affiliate in Iraq, and has taken advantage of sectarian strife and Syria’s civil war to gain territory on both sides of the Iraq-Syrian border. It is recognized by no government, nor by the people it subjugates.⁴

However, the organisation functions as a fully-fledged state, providing services, goods, and remuneration for its employees, as well as managing universities, hospitals and numerous other

¹ Hussein Solomon, *Islamic State and the coming global confrontation*, (Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2016): 16.

² Graeme Wood, *The Way of the Strangers: Encounters with the Islamic State* (UK: Great Britain: Penguin Random House, 2017): xii.

³ Peter Welby, “Backgrounder: What is IS?” The Tony Blair Foundation (10 January 2017).

⁴ The White House, “Statement by the President on ISIL,” (Washington DC: 10 September 2014).

public service sectors in its territory.⁵ It was noted by Thompson and Greene, reporting for CNN, that ironically the “IS’s bureaucratic hierarchy looks a lot like those of some of the Western countries whose values it rejects – if you take away the democracy and add in a council to consider who should be beheaded”.⁶

Reigning with an iron fist, IS subjugates and persecutes apostates (those who have denounced or strayed from their perceived pure version of Islam), unbelievers and “infidels”. Apart from westerners and other perceived sinners, IS makes a point of persecuting minority ethnic and religious groups like the Shi’ah Muslims and the Yazidi with forced religious conversion, enslavement and massacre. The genocide perpetrated on the Yazidi’s between 2016-2017 in the IS pursuit of purification, reached a figure exceeding 10,000 murders and kidnappings.⁷

With the extreme enforcement and maintenance of Shar’ia Law, the law of the Islamic Religion derived from the holy Quran and the Hadith, combined with selective interpretations of Sunni Islam, it is evident that for IS, maintaining the value of people’s religion is of greater importance than the value and quality of people’s lives.⁸ This may not adequately explain the willingness of the choices and conversions of some IS diehards, yet it sheds light on their interpretations of religious justification. Paulo Coelho, author of the international bestseller *The Manuscript Found in Accra*, notes:

In a desperate attempt to give meaning to life, many turn to religion, because a struggle in the name of faith is always a justification for some grand action that could transform the world... they become devout followers, then evangelists and, finally fanatics. They don’t understand that religion was created to share the mystery and to worship, not to oppress or convert others.⁹

1.2. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

A comprehensive history of IS is provided in Chapter Two; however, it is important to mention here that IS wishes to turn back time in Syria to the age of the prophet, piety, religion and power. It “aims to form an Islamic state (caliphate) over the region stretching from Turkey to Syria, Egypt to Jordan, Lebanon, and the Levant lands overlooking the Mediterranean sea,”¹⁰

⁵ Nick Thompson and Richard Greene, “IS: Everything you need to know about the rise of the militant group,” CNN (London: UK, 11 August 2016).

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Welby, “Backgrounder: What is I.S?”

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Paulo Coelho, *The Manuscript found in Accra* (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 2013): 44.

¹⁰ Blaise Misztal and Jessica Michek, “An overview of IS threat and U.S. response” (Washington D.C., 25 September 2014).

where the sun rises and where a biblically prophesised event is impending. Evidently, the jihadi organisation's entire premise and rationale is rooted in Islamic and Muslim history.¹¹ Understanding Syria and Iraq's historical contexts is essential in exploring IS, and is undertaken in the upcoming chapter. For now, it must be asserted that, in agreement with Janine di Giovanni (*Newsweek's* foreign correspondent in the Middle East), the sectarian divides, partitions and deceptions of the Arab world have moulded the Middle East into a region branded for its turmoil, terror and unrest. Di Giovanni explains that after the First World War, French and British colonialism partitioned Iraq and Syria into countries forced to imitate European structures, values and mandates. Of equal importance is the consideration of Islam and the Prophet, and the rationale that underscores the existence and operations of IS.¹²

Combined with the momentum of a revolution and its economic capabilities, IS's religious appeal and campaign surged in 2011, following the Arab Spring uprisings. It should be noted that this study is not a religious exploration, but it must be acknowledged that religion is as much an integral part of the IS composition and constitution as the complex and fractionalised Middle Eastern politics and history. IS's Sunni Islamism, expressed through Salafist jihadism, is only comprehensible when considering Islam itself, as the organisation's ideology is a manifestation of Islamic law, tradition and scriptures.¹³ Before any deductions or facts are stated about the group, its own notions and religious history requires examination. IS's entire claim and rationale is ingrained in Islam and the example of the Prophet Muhammad.

Islam is a monotheistic religion, maintaining belief in one God, Allah. It is the second most popular religion in the world after Christianity. The Qur'an is Islam's "word of God", as the Bible is to Christians. The Prophet Muhammad is deemed the last messenger of God, who united the Arab world and ensured that the Qur'an and Islam became one of the world's most predominant religions. Islam maintains the belief in an impending judgement day and a pathway either to heaven or hell. As exemplified in Figure 1.1 below, Islam has two major traditions, Sunni and Shi'ah, but has influenced the evolution and manifestation of many other religions that have adopted and incorporated aspects of Islam, such as the Druze, Yazidi and Sufi persuasions, as presented in figure 1.1 below. The differences between the two major

¹¹ Thompson and Greene, "IS: Everything you need to know about the rise of the militant group."

¹² Janine Di Giovanni, *Dispatches from Syria: The Morning They Came For Us* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017): 2.

¹³ Thompson and Greene, "IS: Everything you need to know about the rise of the militant group."

persuasions, particularly surrounding the Prophet Muhammad’s rightful successor, have ensured civil and ideological strife and sectarianism over the ages.¹⁴ These differences have essentially rationalised sectarianism and bolstered the IS modus operandi, which is not only an exemplar of international terrorism, but their transformation and evolution to focus on terrorising domestic minorities in the pursuit of purity and establishment of a pious state. Islam is as vulnerable to distortion and misinterpretation as many other religions have proved to be over the ages. Nevertheless, it is an expansive and powerful religion, and in the words of South Africa’s father of democracy and equality, Nelson Mandela, “Islam has enriched and become a part of Africa; in turn, Islam was transformed and Africa became a part of it”.¹⁵




Figure 1.1: Understanding Islam

Source: Wood, *The Way of the Strangers: Encounters with the Islamic State*, 126.

1.3. CONCEPTUALISATION: TERRORISM AND JIHADISM

This section of the study explores terrorism and jihadism. It defines relevant concepts and explores the background and historical context surrounding terrorism. Terrorism is synonymous with violence and the intimidation tactics employed to ensure desired political and social influences through the inculcation of fear and panic.¹⁶ Terrorism may be described

¹⁴ Wood, *The Way of the Strangers: Encounters with the Islamic State*, 126.

¹⁵ Nelson Mandela and Jennifer Crwys-Williams, *In the Words of Mandela: A little pocket book*, edited by Jennifer Crwys-Williams. (Johannesburg: Penguin Books, 2004): 53.

¹⁶ Rachel Pain, “Everyday terrorism: Connecting domestic violence and global terrorism”. *Progress in Human Geography* 1, 20 (2014): 3-6.

as a criminal act characterised by the use of aggression and violence against people, their property, institutions, organisations and states. Terrorism forms part of coercive tactics aimed at disrupting societies and intimidating communities, in an endeavour to further and expand the desired agenda, be it religious, political, social or ideological.¹⁷ Jihadism is a religiously founded ideology in Islam that reserves the right or prerogative to oppose, resist, excommunicate and/or execute all infidels, apostates and modern-day political and liberal systems, often through extreme destruction and violence.¹⁸ Terrorism and jihadism oppose and challenge institutions that control the monopoly of power; they therefore prove to be phenomena that are both difficult to prevent and contain, particularly when spurred on by the momentum of revolution in a disgruntled community.

1.3.1. Terrorism

As a point of order, it must be noted that a concrete, exemplar definition of terrorism does not yet exist. The international community has reviewed and redefined the concept of terrorism as much as it has evolved and transformed itself. As of 1994, the United Nations has conceptualised terrorism as;

Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.¹⁹

At the United Nations *International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security* in 2005, Kofi Annan, seventh Secretary-General of the UN, began his speech by declaring that; “terrorism is a threat to all States, to all peoples, which can strike anytime, anywhere.” He went on to explain that “it is a direct attack on the core values the United Nations stands for: the rule of law; the protection of civilians; mutual respect between people of different faiths and cultures; and peaceful resolution of conflicts.”²⁰

Considering this, the criminal and offensive nature of terrorism is implicit, necessitating an understanding of the role of the victim, the purpose of the crime and the consequence of

¹⁷ Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Terrorism 2002-2005” (United States: US Department of Justice, 2005).

¹⁸ Wood, *The Way of the Strangers: Encounters with the Islamic State*, 7.

¹⁹ United Nations General Assembly. “Measures to eliminate international terrorism.” (*84th Plenary Meeting on Resolutions and Decisions*, 1994). Section 1, para. 3.

²⁰ Javier Ruperez. “The United Nations in the Fight against Terrorism.” (United Nations: Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, 2006, January 26).

violence being perpetrated.²¹ Although much of the rest of the world views terrorists and their respective campaigns negatively, these three components require attention, consideration and understanding if any progress in containing and preventing terrorism is to be made. Islam itself is largely concerned with crime and the atonement of it, and maintains a registry of prohibitions and punishments for wrong-doings. But when misbehaviour such as blasphemy, homosexuality, apostasy and aiding infidels befit the punishment of death, it cements an entire religion in extremism and desensitises its followers against violence and absolute punishment.²² Armbrorst expresses that terrorists "...identify their acts not as crimes, but as reactions to a crime,"²³ where they feel the need to retaliate or seek revenge in order to resolve an issue, make a statement or compensate for injustices experienced, and when no legal alternative exists in support of the terrorist's declarations.

A significant contribution by Armbrorst asserts that "criminal punishment is the (lawful) reaction to an unlawful act; vigilantism is the unlawful reaction to an unlawful act; and terrorism is the unlawful reaction to an act (or societal condition) whose lawfulness is contested and therefore cannot be addressed by law".²⁴ Considering this statement alongside the respective historical, socio-economic, political and religious motivating factors, the plight of rebels and terrorists can be regarded as a notion of "one man's terrorist being another man's freedom fighter".²⁵ This notion that should not be overlooked; Nelson Mandela, father of South African democracy, was once considered a terrorist by the apartheid regime and their National party, the very perpetrators of violence and racism that he and his comrades were opposing. Under the banner of the African National Congress and supported by its militia force, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, a number of terror attacks were executed in defiance of apartheid and in reaction to racial atrocities like the 1960 Sharpeville massacre that claimed the lives of 289 peacefully protesting black South Africans. Is that to say that the forefathers of South African democracy were terrorists? To some, perhaps; but to the majority of marginalised and dehumanised black South Africans, they were their saviours. Therefore, the motivations and circumstances that trigger so-called terrorist acts ascribe to subjective, circumstantial and divergent ideologies and perceptions that, although seemingly unrealistic or controversial to the rest of the world, are imminently real and significant to those perpetuating the acts and

²¹ Wood, 110.

²² Ibid, 110-111.

²³ Andreas Armbrorst, "Modelling Terrorism and Political Violence," *International Relations* 24, 4 (2010): 424.

²⁴ Ibid, 416.

²⁵ James Lutz and Brenda Lutz, *Global Terrorism* Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, (2013): 6.

pursuing rebel campaigns.²⁶ Considering this, and in the interest of fairness, it must be acknowledged that perpetrators can sometimes be victims as well.

It must be noted that terrorism is undeniably goal-driven and mission-oriented. Schwenkenbecher suggests four defining factors. First, violence and force, where it is indisputably inherent that some form of violence or the fear of violence is perpetrated against human beings, either directly (the IS massacres of the Yazidi people), or indirectly (as in the vandalism of property or social structures). Second, terrorism is underpinned by political driving forces or influence, and although terrorism can often be accredited to religion, there are usually underlying strategies or agendas aimed at achieving political ends. Thirdly, terrorism maintains a focus of fear and aims to instil it en masse to achieve an objective. Fear is not merely a side-effect of terrorism, but rather is an essential tool to the methodical attainment of a goal. Fourth and finally, it is asserted that terrorism is an avenue and instrument for the attainment of a belief, but is not a belief system in itself, like communism or capitalism.²⁷ However, the IS campaign has interwoven religion and state-building with its belief system and jihad ideology. This jihadology has ensured a violent campaign rooted in purification and purging; it has spearheaded a religious crusade and an ethos of violence and brutality, perpetrated for the realisation of its goal of world domination. Jihadism, combined with the force and impetus of terrorism, has revealed this combination to be global, influential and viral, both in the physical and online realms.

In opposition, Schwenkenbecher asserts that: “terrorism is a strategy or a tactic, a means to an end or a method, but not an ideology, like communism or fascism”.²⁸ Whilst agreeing that terrorism is not an ideology, given the current climate and events, it is no longer possible to completely rule out the idea of a terrorism ideology. Terrorism has evolved so dramatically that there seems to be a *culture* of terrorism emerging, resulting from the convictions of jihadology and its surrounding socio-economic, religious, environmental, and historical contexts. This is explored in upcoming chapters, and will assist in better comprehending terrorism, understanding IS, and exploring and determining whether it has evolved enough to constitute a new wave of terror.²⁹

²⁶ Wood, *The Way of the Strangers: Encounters with the Islamic State*, 208-210.

²⁷ Ibid, 13-14.

²⁸ Ibid, 13.

²⁹ Jeffrey Kaplan, “Terrorism’s Fifth Wave: A Theory, a Conundrum and a Dilemma”. *Perspectives on Terrorism* 2, 2 (2008): 12.

As seen time and again through the annals of history, perceptions become beliefs, beliefs generate ideas, ideas turn into actions, and these actions breed social movements that have the potential to gain momentum and popularity. In no time at all, a social movement can become a culture or way of life, and a new ideology is born. Consider Hitler and Nazism: it took the ascension to power of one man with enough negative sentiments and charisma to mobilise an entire country against the Jews and other perceived “undesirables”, subsequently pioneering the ideology of Nazism and leading to World War II. Nazism was responsible for the holocaust, which claimed the lives of six million Jews.³⁰

1.3.2. Jihadism

Alternatively, it may be asserted that terrorism is a battle of ideologies and perceptions. According to Steinhoff, terrorism can be identified as a manipulation tactic or strategy of influence where the attitudes, behaviours, beliefs, environments and the security of desired targets are manipulated and affected.³¹ With this in mind, the study investigates this view of terrorism as a battle of beliefs, ideologies and perceptions. Payne asserts that the current climate of terrorism is comparable to that of the Cold War, where the ideology of communism was opposed through a cultural war in the mid-90s that utilised propaganda and influence to dissuade people from affiliations to communism. Similarly, IS has incorporated propaganda, manipulative tactics and influence to bolster their campaign, and encouraged a culture of violence to spread fear.³² Confirming this, Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri was reported as stating that the campaign of terror is “a battle of ideologies, a struggle for survival, and a war with no truce”.³³

The extreme Salafi-jihadi ideology underscoring their momentum and resonance internationally is the combined result of Muslim history and the Islamic religion. This amalgamation has intensified ethnic and religious differences – the renowned rationale behind most of history’s great wars, civil or otherwise. Jihad may be understood as a process of excommunication, opposition to and execution of an infidel or apostate. It is expressed as part

³⁰ US Holocaust Memorial Museum, *Holocaust Encyclopedia*. Washington DC: USHMM (n.d.)

³¹ Uwe Steinhoff, *On the Ethics of War and Terrorism* Oxford: Oxford University Press. (2007): 260-261.

³² Kenneth Payne, “Winning the Battle of Ideas: Propaganda, Ideology, and Terror”. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 32, 1 (2009): 109.

³³ Ayman al-Zawahiri, *Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner*. Translated by NJ: TLG Publications, (2006): 111. Laura Mansfield (Old Tappan, NJ: TLG Publications).

of the Sunni-Islam persuasion. Graeme Wood identifies the theorists and founders of jihad as the Egyptians Umar Abd al Rahman (The Blind Sheik) and Abd al Salam Faraj.³⁴ Campaigns of jihad and total destruction have historically reacted against the Western world and the US specifically, for their interference, invasion and portioning of Middle Eastern countries. IS's jihad and pursuit of the caliphate has turned within and led to the persecution of local minority groups, particularly the Shi'ah, Yazidi, Sufis, and the Jews and Christians in Syria and its surrounding areas.

Terrorism has evolved from outright attacks and violence to a calculated combination of religion and ideology, that has influenced and affected people worldwide. IS's expression of jihadism predominantly focuses on militarism and martyrdom, rather than expressing a determination to do good.³⁵ Jihadism and an ideology of violence and martyrdom will be further explored in Chapter Five, alongside the notion of radical devotion to *jihadology*.

According to David Rapoport, terrorism can be categorised into four major waves: the Anarchist Wave, the Anti-Colonial Wave, the New Left Wave and the Religious Wave.³⁶ Exploring IS's campaign and its position amidst the waves and eras of terrorism was the primary pursuit of this study, as IS appears to have transcended the preconceived notions of terrorism and the historical waves. Therefore, Jeffrey Kaplan's fifth wave framework and its relevant theoretical considerations are explored and applied to IS in order to understand the existing body of knowledge surrounding the terrorist proto-state and the wave theory.³⁷ The waves are outlined in the literature review, followed by the methodology of the study.

1.4. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RATIONALE

The problem statement and rationale of this study considered whether IS and its campaign, that stretches from Syria to Iraq, constitutes a new wave of terrorism. In line with Rapoport's waves of terrorism, particularly the fourth (religious) wave, as well as Kaplan's fifth wave characteristics, the study explored whether IS fits in with the existing waves or whether it has evolved enough to constitute a new and unique wave.

³⁴ Wood, *The Way of the Strangers: Encounters with the Islamic State*, 32.

³⁵ Hussein Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*. Switzerland: Springer International Publishing (2016): 18.

³⁶ David C Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Rebel Terrorism and September 11". *Journal of Generative Anthropology* (2002) 8: 1.

³⁷ Kaplan, "Terrorism's Fifth Wave: A Theory, a Conundrum and a Dilemma," 12.

1.5. PURPOSE STATEMENT, QUESTION, AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The purpose of this study is to explore whether IS and its activities have constituted an evolving or new wave of terrorism. The primary research question is:

- Does the Islamic State constitute an evolving or uniquely new wave of terrorism?

As a starting point, the information, relevant history, activities, goals, objectives and motivations pertaining to IS are explored, with the aim of uncovering and expounding on the understanding and comprehension of the organisation's functions. Thereafter, Rapoport's four waves are reviewed and Kaplan's fifth wave characteristics of terrorism are identified, explored and applied to IS. The research sub-questions are therefore:

- What are Rapoport's four waves of terrorism, and where does the Islamic State fit in, if at all?
- What is Kaplan's fifth wave framework, and does it apply to the Islamic State?

1.6. THEORETICAL PARADIGMS OF TERRORISM

The theoretical overview of this section analyses and explores the Social Control Theory, the Just War Theory and the Situational Action Theory, to enhance the conceptualisation and understanding of terrorism. Upcoming chapters will apply and explore wave theory (the theoretical foundation of this study derived from Rapoport and Kaplan's waves). This section, however, considers and applies the aforementioned theories for the purposes of enhanced conceptualisation.

The abundance of definitions of terrorism is often outweighed by the methodological and ideological inaccuracies on which they are founded.³⁸ Watts reiterates this notion, but claims that: "it is an ideological crime yet the terrorist (usually) has no state. It is a crime, yet terrorism does not define a behaviour, merely an ideological position".³⁹ In light of this, terrorism may be understood not only as a fear tactic and violent strategy, but also as the manipulation of

³⁸ Verena Erlenbusch, "How (not) to study terrorism." *Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 17, 4 (2014): 479.

³⁹ Oliver Watts, "The image and the terrorist." *Law Text Culture* 10, 1 (2006): 224.

ideological weapons and influential factors. Considering IS's terrorism as an expression of the aforementioned theories proved both insightful and beneficial.

There are various factors involved in the understanding terrorism, particularly the question of what constitutes war. How has our understanding of warfare changed over time? What constitutes terrorism, and what are the ideological, philosophical and sociological aspects of terrorism and warfare? Turk asserts that: "when people and events come to be regularly described in public as terrorists and terrorism, some governmental or other entity is succeeding in a war of words in which the opponent is promoting alternative designations such as 'martyr' and 'liberation struggle'."⁴⁰

Terrorism proves to be a highly relative topic in that it supports the notion of a battle of ideologies, where conflict and rivalry have surmounted physical, political or religious aspects to include battles of ideas and words, and the stigmatisation of conflicting factions. The ways in which terrorism is defined and explained represent society's ideas, prejudices and stigmas resulting from the influence and propaganda of the stronger conflict party. Consequently, defining terrorism does not necessarily mean that the understanding has been improved. Theoretical exploration is therefore the next step in clarifying misunderstood and overlooked aspects of terrorism and its violence. Taking practical theory into account, it is possible to understand how and why violent and extreme responses result from marginalisation, oppression and even hopelessness.⁴¹

Further, terrorist organisations obtaining nuclear technology is an issue of great global concern. At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, former US President Barack Obama stressed that nuclear terrorism is a critical and momentous threat to the world and global security. Obama referred to IS affiliates as "mad men" who would use nuclear weaponry to quite simply kill as many people as possible.⁴² Although tangible evidence of nuclear capability within IS is absent, it cannot be denied that such power and weaponry is an aspiration, whether in the form of a "dirty bomb" or in the spread of hazardous chemical materials.⁴³ The fact is

⁴⁰ Austin Turk, "Sociology of Terrorism." *Annual Review of Sociology* 30, 1 (2004): 272-285.

⁴¹ Ibid, 272-273.

⁴² Charlie Cooper Whitehall, "IS nuclear bomb is a serious threat, warns Barack Obama," *The Independent* (1 April 2016).

⁴³ Cheyenne Macdonald, "Harvard researcher warns IS may be on the brink of using nuclear weapons: Chilling report highlights risk of dirty bombs, power station sabotage and device detonation," *The Daily Mail* (30 March 2016).

that terrorism and the war against it both wreak devastation. Terrorism is a shocking and extreme phenomenon, and preventative and counter-measures are equally shocking and extreme. According to liberal philosophy, terrorism violates and decays the basic principles of freedom, and counter-terrorism efforts have responded in the same way. For example, the US Patriot Act of 2001 consents to indefinite detention of citizens, tracking the immigration, communications and finances of citizens, and sanctioning the assassination of suspects, all in the name of anti-terrorism.⁴⁴

Such responses attest to the danger and risk of terrorism surpassing the current mainstream capabilities of legal and lawful systems and procedures, indicating that fire must be fought with fire. While it can be argued that terrorism is a terrifying reality, it is becoming increasingly evident that the counter-terrorism measures utilised by governments sacrifice democracy, freedom, and human rights. It therefore appears that the latter is equally terrifying. Although it is not a specific point of interest in this study, the theoretical and philosophical exploration of terrorism is important in developing comprehensive and flexible understandings that embrace all possible aspects, because terrorism is ever-evolving. It appears in the individual, becomes a social movement, and in recent years has manifested at state-building and governmental levels.⁴⁵

Being cyclical, terrorism sustains itself in different forms and according to different ideologies and motivations. In other words, terrorism ebbs and flows like waves. As mentioned previously, the world has experienced waves of political terrorism and waves of religious terrorism. Understanding these waves may prove to be significant in the comprehension, prevention and anticipation of future attacks.⁴⁶ These waves are explored in upcoming chapters, but for now, the theory and definition of terrorism is essential in forming the foundation of the study. For instance, it is worth considering whether all forms of terrorism are criminal in nature. Do terrorists have a just cause?⁴⁷ If one man's terrorist may be another man's freedom fighter, it can be argued that criminality is subjective and context-based. With this in mind, Black's rationalisation of terrorism enhanced this study's understanding of just cause. According to

⁴⁴ Turk, "Sociology of Terrorism," 282.

⁴⁵ Albert J Bergesen and Omar A Lizardo, "Terrorism and world-system theory," In *Transnational Terrorism in the World System Perspective*, edited by R Stemplowski and R Stemplowski, (Warsaw: The Polish Institute of International Affairs, 2002): 9-22.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Jack P Gibbs, "Conceptualisation of Terrorism," *American Sociological Review* 54, 1 (1989): 329-340.

Black, terrorism may be understood as “...unilateral self-help by organized civilians who covertly inflict mass violence on other civilians”.⁴⁸ Terrorism is about far more than opposition to or defiance of other states or nations; there are environmental, political, historical and even social control aspects that explain terrorism’s motivation. Terrorism is unlike typical crime because it punishes the many, including innocents, instead of the few who are responsible.⁴⁹ Taking this into account, the concept of social control brings the study to its theoretical exploration.

1.6.1. Social Control Theory

The Social Control Theory applied to terrorism explains and rationalises it as: “modes of self-help, either to retaliate, settle a dispute or compensate for a previous crime”.⁵⁰ This theory essentially explains the choices and actions taken by people, groups or organisations wishing to assert some sort of control or influence over others, their environments, and their lives. As some measure of social control is fundamental to the conception and execution of terrorism, the rationale and motivation intrinsic to the preference for terrorism over legal alternatives may better be understood with the support of this theory.

In rationalising the above, the public and the state or governing body exercise social control over terrorism by increasing surveillance, instituting inhumane interrogation and detention practices, and legalising previously prohibited military and policing reactions to terrorism. In turn, terrorists are acquiring weaponry and pursuing nuclear power, spreading fear through online social media, and persecuting entire populations for the injustices of those few who, in fact, maintain the most social control. In 2014, approximately 40kg of uranium was stolen from Mosul University. Shortly thereafter, a member of IS, Hamayun Tariq, took to social media and claimed responsibility, threatening that the construction of a dirty bomb was underway and that detonation was imminent. Tariq is reportedly a British explosives expert and an IS empathiser.⁵¹ Although the uranium was established as low quality and inadequate, along with

⁴⁸ Donald Black, “Terrorism as social control,” *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Sociology of Crime, Law and Deviance* 5, 1 (2004): 3-5.

⁴⁹ Turk, "Sociology of Terrorism," 285.

⁵⁰ Armbrorst, "Modelling Terrorism and Political Violence," 416.

⁵¹ Jennifer Smith, “Islamic State has a ‘dirty bomb’ says British jihadi, amid claims 40kg of URANIUM was taken from Iraqi university,” *The Daily Mail* (30 November 2014).

other radioactive and chemical materials in the organisation's chemical weapons cache, and their arsenal of warheads and mustard gas in northern Iraq, the threat was not diminished.⁵²

Terrorism may therefore be explained as a method of social control, which, as well as being a criminological theory, lends itself to terroristic understandings. The Social Control Theory can also be used to explain and explore environments that influence and encourage terrorism. Certain underlying elements, like grievances or injustices, inherently underpin delinquent and felonious sentiments and activities. According to Jones, these constitute certain “strategic environments”⁵³ where there is intentional segregation between the offended and the remainder of the society. Jones further asserts that: “...terrorists make choices to attain a future state or condition, and those choices concern how (concept or way) they will use the coercive or persuasive power (resources or means) available to exercise control over circumstances or a population to achieve objectives (ends) in accordance with their policy”.⁵⁴ Social control is fundamental in the conception and execution of terrorism. It rationalises the motivations and methods of terroristic activity. Instead of regarding behaviour as a crime in and of itself, it is perceived as a necessary reaction to injustices experienced. Acts of terrorism therefore emerge as instruments of social control or change intended to redeem and affirm control where it was otherwise absent.⁵⁵

By using the Social Control Theory to explore and analyse terrorism, the intent and objective consequences of an act are brought to light and together enhance and develop understandings of terrorism and its underlying philosophical and moral dilemmas.⁵⁶ The intent behind acts of terrorism entails motivations that drive both the act and actors. It is impossible to explain the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of terrorism without considering its motivations when the idea of objective consequence emerges, including the effects, significance and outcomes of terrorism, which are equally as important in defining and understanding it. According to Oliverio and Lauderdale, the nature of terrorism is complex, yet it is revealing to consider whether the act was “revolutionary, reactionary or resistance. Each category serves as an analytical departure point that represents: 1) different political ideals, 2) different structures of domination, and 3)

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Frank L Jones, “Toward a Strategic Theory of Terrorism: Defining Boundaries in the Ongoing Search for Security,” *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues Theory of War and Strategy* 1, 1 (2008): 95.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 95.

⁵⁵ Armbrorst, "Modelling Terrorism and Political Violence," 416.

⁵⁶ Annamarie Oliverio and Pat Lauderdale, “Terrorism as Deviance or Social Control: Suggestions for Future Research.” *International Journal Of Comparative Sociology* 46, 1 (2005): 154-156.

proposed paths for change”.⁵⁷ Distinguishing terrorism as revolutionary, reactionary or as an act of resistance, proves to be important in furthering the understanding and exploring the morality, if extant, of acts of terrorism. The morality of a revolutionary act of terrorism may outweigh and differ from the morality of a reactionary act of terrorism, but that is not to say that this moral divergence may be an excuse for terrorism. However, it may better explain its justification.

Social occurrences like terrorism are products of social norms, cultures and individual choice. The realities in which people live and operate are the inventions of moral connotations ascribed to places, other people, events, situations, and social constructs. Society is a construct of one’s perspective on one’s surroundings. It is therefore a product of social control, and is dependent upon and reactionary to situational occurrences that comprise of moral meanings, which are also controlled and regulated by society. As Greisman asserts, terrorism is much like a play, needing both thespians and a receptive audience to be a success. In terrorism, however, the success of spreading fear amongst the desired audience is of more importance than the success of the act itself.⁵⁸ Therefore, the moral composition of the society and the surroundings in which terrorism thrives, are of importance. Reviewing the relationship between terrorism, society, and morality enriches one’s understanding of the phenomenon.

1.6.2. Just War Theory

Just War Theory explores the motivations and justifications for war and attempts to comprehend the circumstances for resorting to it. The Just War theory addresses the justice and morality involved in resorting to terrorism, the conduct of terrorism, and the ending of terrorism, as opposed to the traditional application of the theory to the resort, conduct and conclusion of war.⁵⁹ According to this theory, the basic morals and values of civilisation and humanity are at variance with the aggression and blatant disregard for life that are implicit in war and terrorism. The theory maintains that war is morally justifiable under certain circumstances. The assumptions of the Just War theory have influenced the policies and conventions of war as it is accepted and understood today. Moral and legal institutions have

⁵⁷ Ibid, 155.

⁵⁸ Harvey C Griesman, “Social Meanings of Terrorism: Rectification, Violence, and Social Control.” *Contemporary CrIS* 1, 3 (1977): 302-306.

⁵⁹ Richard Werner, "Just War Theory." In *Routledge Handbook of Ethics and War*. Edited by Fritz Allhoff, Nicholas G Evans and Adam Henschke (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013): 40-43.

established international doctrines and policies that laid the foundation for resolutions such as the Geneva Convention, the United Nations Charter, and the 1899 and 1907 Hague proclamations and treaties on the rules of law and war.⁶⁰

The theory consists of three parts; *jus ad bellum*, *jus in bello* and *jus post bellum*; which collectively address the justice and morality in the resort, conduct and the ending of war. Addressing *jus ad bellum*, which entails the justification for resorting to war, several criteria for determining the justice, morality and responsibility of the resort to war must be met, such as just cause, last resort, legitimate authority, right intention, reasonable chance of success and proportionality.⁶¹

Just cause deals with the resort to war on the basis of just reasoning or righting wrongs. Defence against an aggressor or defence of an international order, punishment of aggression, balancing foreign intervention and humanitarian intervention, are some of the most notable rationales for war and for terrorism. Last resort is a measure intended to ensure that war is resorted to only if no alternate resolutions are available, and all non-aggressive alternatives have been exhausted. Legitimate authority ensures that no one can declare war other than those in authority who are responsible for the public good, and who consult the people and parliament under the existing rule of law and with transparency. Right intention certifies that just cause is the sole motive for war, that credible reasons exist, and that there are no secondary motives involved such as resources or political differences. There must also be a reasonable chance of success in achieving just cause, ending injustices or remedying wrongs. However, an ethical dilemma arises when considering countries or communities that have little or no power or chance of success. Do they have no moral right to defend themselves? The final criterion is proportionality, where the outcomes of war are evaluated in proportion to its losses. The benefits must essentially outweigh the harms.⁶²

Applying the Just War Theory to terrorism is a complicated task. Terrorism is not war, but in austere terms it supports warfare elements such as targeted violence and aggression, (often) political motivation, and reactionary, revolutionary or resistance rationalisation and

⁶⁰ Anne Schwenkenbecher, *Terrorism: A Philosophical Enquiry* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012): 76

⁶¹ Werner, "Just War Theory," 42-43.

⁶² Ibid.

causation.⁶³ In an article written by Giles Fraser for *The Guardian*, Dr Samah Jabr, a Palestinian psychiatrist, dealt with the topic of Just War and its application to terrorism. His rationalisation of the resort to terrorism was not much different to that of the resort to war. People and groups often attempt to right perceived injustices or defend themselves and their just cause. Dr. Jabr asked: “why is the word ‘terrorist’ so readily applied to individuals or groups who use homemade bombs, but not to states using nuclear and other internationally proscribed weapons to ensure submission to the oppressor?”⁶⁴

Terrorist organisations differ across the board. The ANC’s *Umkhonto We Sizwe* attacks during the apartheid regime cannot be compared to the jihad terrorism of today. Nor can the latter be compared with the Korean Missile Crisis under Kim Jung Un, and its ongoing threat of nuclear fallout. Each maintains a different rationale and motivation in their resort to violence, yet some are considered terroristic and others are not. Prejudice and intolerance have solidified bigotry, dogmatism and social divides across the globe. Focus is placed on branding or classifying groups and organisations in an attempt to understand them, yet little focus is placed on empathising and understanding the political, socio-economic and environmental causes and contexts of such resorts in order to deter and rectify them.⁶⁵ A case in point may be made of Osama Bin Laden, who was proudly and publicly anti-semitic, prejudiced and unempathetic. His prejudice and dogmatism have prevailed long after his demise, fuelling the flames of hatred and terrorism that have shaped and influenced groups like IS today.

Considering the second aspect of the Just War Theory, *jus in bello*, or the conduct of war, the manner, responsibility and rules of warfare are explored and stressed. Proportionality and non-combatant immunity are important aspects in regulating the just conduct of war. Proportionality entails that the force used must be proportional to the desired end, that civilian casualties and damage to cultures and infrastructure must be kept to a minimum, and although such measures may be taken, collateral damage may be justifiable in relation to the value of the target.⁶⁶ Does this mean that Just War Theory may essentially entail a rationalisation for the killing of innocent civilians for the greater good? The Geneva Convention of 1977 – a treaty influenced by the Just War Theory – prohibits indiscriminate attacks such as those against non-combatants

⁶³ Ibid, 42-45.

⁶⁴ Giles Fraser, “If we can have just war, why not just terrorism?” *The Guardian* (25 July 2014).

⁶⁵ Richard Webster, “Israel, Palestine and the tiger of terrorism: anti-semitism and history,” *RichardWebster.net* (29 November 2002).

⁶⁶ Werner, “Just War Theory,” 43.

or human shield and hostage situations. According to Schwenkenbecher, "...in war combatants and non-combatants must be distinguished and only the former may be directly and intentionally targeted".⁶⁷ Essentially, non-combatants are innocent, and combatants are legitimate targets; yet even so, certain rules exist to regulate the humane treatment of combatants. *Jus in bello* fundamentally ensures that soldiers, the military, and government agencies involved and responsible for the war use no more force or violence than is necessary. However, terrorists do not wear uniforms or follow military codes, so how is just war or just cause applicable to them?⁶⁸

The final Just War criterion, *jus post bellum*, is concerned with the justice in ending war, with "provisions such as proportionality of the peace settlement, discrimination between civilians, ordinary soldiers and leaders with regard to punitive measures, the punishment of rights violations during the war on either side of the conflict, compensation and rehabilitation".⁶⁹ These are all aspects that are addressed and rectified in post-war proceedings. Peace settlements are particularly important because just as war must be publicly declared, so must the commencement of peace. Such post-war settlements must also ensure that aspects of revenge or retribution are absent, so that resentment and bitterness do not emerge. The rehabilitation, armaments, political structure, and human rights foundations of the aggressor state therefore emerge as significant factors in post-war processes. *Jus post bellum* may not be applicable to terrorism, but it does call for consideration in post-terrorism proceedings. Once terrorists have met their objectives, reached their goals, and spread enough fear and intimidation, what comes next? Once defeated, do terrorists return home?

Applying Just War Theory to terrorism means considering terrorists as a war faction and their opposition, be it civil society, government or the UN, as another. Yet can terrorists be considered a war faction? Terrorists do not wear uniforms, and cannot be distinguished from civilians or non-combatants. In addition, terrorism is typically associated with surreptitious or covert activity. Open conflict, as in war combat, sets combatants against each other in designated environments and under predetermined and established rules of warfare, which provide necessary boundaries and regulations. It specifies details such as who and what

⁶⁷ Schwenkenbecher, *Terrorism: A Philosophical Enquiry*, 76.

⁶⁸ Noémie Bouhana and Per-Olof H Wikström, "Theorizing Terrorism: Terrorism As Moral Action," *Contemporary Readings In Law And Social Justice* 2, 258 (2011): 18 & 48.

⁶⁹ Schwenkenbecher, *Terrorism: A Philosophical Enquiry*, 77-78.

constitute legitimate targets. This is not the case with terrorism, where everyone and everything, legitimate or not, is regarded as a target. Schwenkenbecher asserts that: “engaging in terrorist violence usually accompanies a conscious commitment to the objectives of the violence”.⁷⁰ The actors do not consider themselves to be going about their daily lives and doing their job. Terrorism entails a special kind of dedication and devotion and their direct targets are often not the main targets of their violence and the cause. Whether or not terrorism is morally justifiable is an important point of consideration.

1.6.3. Situational Action Theory

The Situational Action Theory investigates the relation between moral action and crime causation. This theory may also be used to explore terrorism, and attempts to understand and explain why it emerges as an acceptable alternative to legal options.⁷¹ Bouhana and Wikström assert that “the causes of terrorism are found in the individual and environmental factors, which influence a person to see an act of terrorism as an action alternative and that influence their process of choice to carry out such act”.⁷² In essence, individual morality is influenced and possibly even guided by the morality of the environments and contexts in which they operate. Explored in conjunction with the Social Control and Just War Theories, the Situational Action Theory manifests as significant in understanding the interplay between internal and external standards of morality. Understanding such an interplay may prove to be noteworthy to the overall philosophical comprehension of the motivation, rationalisation, and resorting to terrorism.

All actions in life can be defined as either right or wrong, and are consistent with the moral values of a society, however divergent they may be in different places and cultures. The Situational Action Theory, the Social Control and Just War Theories, may collectively be used to explain the causes and motivations of terrorism, essentially, the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of it, which are paramount to its prevention or prohibition. The Situational Action Theory explores crime and terrorism, and attempts to understand and explain why they emerge as acceptable alternatives to law-abiding options.⁷³ Bouhana and Wikström maintain that: “...an act of

⁷⁰ Ibid, 82.

⁷¹ Noémie Bouhana and Per-Olof H Wikström, “Theorizing Terrorism: Terrorism As Moral Action,” *Contemporary Readings In Law And Social Justice* 2, 258 (2011): 9-58.

⁷² Ibid, 54.

⁷³ Bouhana and Wikström, "Theorizing Terrorism: Terrorism as Moral Action," 9-11.

terrorism can be meaningfully defined as a moral action, which results from both rational (deliberation) and experiential (habituation) processes, themselves the outcome of interactions between the individual and the environment”.⁷⁴

This allows for the consideration of elements such as the environmental factors that influence terrorism, as well as the moral and social aspects that control and facilitate it. In addition, the preference for terrorism as an alternative to legal, non-violent measures is important. The interaction between the moral fibre of those who choose terrorism and the moral values of the society or surroundings in which they live and operate, are also of importance. As stated in the Social Control Theory, environmental and moral values influence the facilitation of terrorism, and shape the general consensus on acts of terrorism. Individuals operate and grow based on their surroundings, so the contexts and environments (macro), whether social, religious, political, or familial, inherently influence the individual (micro). If people are easily influenced by the latest fashion or music trends, then it is fair to assume that perceptions of morality, the acceptance of terrorism as an appropriate alternative, and delinquent social and cultural norms have the equivalent potential.⁷⁵ According to Bouhana and Wikström:

Situational Action Theory seeks to explain moral action and crime by elucidating the key processes which lead to acts of crime (and transgressions of moral rules more generally), and the individual and environmental factors, which directly (and indirectly) influence those processes.⁷⁶

Why individuals break rules and laws is best explored in conjunction with moral values and what is generally recognised as being morally acceptable. Bouhana and Wikström propose several points of interest on which the theory is based. First is the notion of human nature and its unwavering desire for the gratification of personal interests; however, human nature and actions are guided and controlled by social rules and order.⁷⁷ Second is the relationship between individual and environmental factors. This may be refined into the understanding that the morality of the individual is influenced by the morality of their context, and vice versa.⁷⁸ Wikström and Trieber assert that according to the Situational Action Theory, “...all moral actions are an outcome of the (causal) interaction between a person’s propensity (to engage in

⁷⁴ Ibid, 12.

⁷⁵ Ibid, 49-50.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 52.

⁷⁷ Per-Olof H Wikström and Kyle H Treiber, “Violence as Situational Action.” *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 3, 1 (2009): 76-78.

⁷⁸ Bouhana and Wikström, "Theorizing Terrorism: Terrorism as Moral Action," 54.

the particular moral action) and his or her exposure to environmental inducements (to engage in the particular moral action)". Therefore:

$$\text{Propensity} \times \text{Exposure} = \text{Action}^{79}$$

In addition, changes in a person's actions stem from changes in their propensity and/or changes in their exposure. This also implies that if one wants to change (or prevent) a person's moral actions (such as acts of terrorism), the aim should be to change their propensity (to engage in such acts) and their exposure (to environmental inducements for such acts).

$$(\text{Change}) \text{ Propensity} \cup (\text{Change}) \text{ Exposure} = (\text{Change}) \text{ Action}^{80}$$

Societies differ in their moral structures, as do individuals. What is perceived by some societies and individuals as morally acceptable is denounced by others. It is therefore apparent that acts of terrorism are moral actions and moral dilemmas. Individual involvement in terrorism is a direct reflection of personal (and environmental or social) moral standing. Whether the moral frameworks and structures of certain societies or communities are indicative of terrorism is a significant point of consideration for future studies and improved understanding of terrorist inclinations.⁸¹

1.7. LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review gives a brief summary of the primary literature explored and utilised in this study. The work of six particular authors, all authorities on Islamic studies, terrorism and IS, was of paramount importance. Hussein Solomon's book *Islamic State and The Coming Global Confrontation* provided a thorough analysis of the Islamic State, its inner-workings, rationales, international relations and operations.⁸⁰ The book is both comprehensive and practical, giving South African examples and cases as examples of the terror organisation's expanse and affect. This source was significant to the study and enabled in-depth exploration of the Islamic State. Solomon's book provides insights into the Sunni/Shi'ah divide and the Islamic State's governmental capabilities, its influence and international relations. Its

⁷⁹ Wikström and Treiber, "Violence as Situational Action," 91.

⁸⁰ Bouhana and Wikström, "Theorizing Terrorism: Terrorism as Moral Action," 58.

⁸¹ Wikström and Treiber, "Violence as Situational Action," 91.

⁸⁰ Solomon, *Islamic State and The Coming Global Confrontation*, 26.

generation of affiliate groups in satellite states abroad, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria are examined, and Solomon further delves into Russia's role and the controversial Assad regime.⁸²

Di Giovanni's book *The Morning They Came for Us*, supplied this study with a narrative of the events and occurrences in Syria since the manifestation of IS, and the historical background and insight into the experiences of survivors and affiliates of IS alike.⁸² Her book provides details and accounts of numerous significant locations from Damascus to Lattakia and Homs, with dates and comprehensive timeframes. The first-hand accounts of experiences give the crisis in Iraq and Syria context and realism.

Finally, Graeme Wood's book *The Way of Strangers: Encounters with the Islamic State*,⁸³ provides specifics and details that illuminate the lives, traditions and stories of key IS empathisers and supporters. Through utilising Wood's book, this study became far better informed not only on Islamic history and the Arabic language, but in comprehending religious rationales and motivations in particular.⁸³ Wood's book illuminates the concepts of Salafism and jihadism, and brings clarity to the understanding of Islam, its different forms and the Prophet Muhammad. Wood's study cases and his relations with IS supporters provide insights into their lives and their rationale for choosing the state and making their *hijrah* (migration to the caliphate). This book covers the history and processes of jihadism.⁸⁴

⁸² Ibid, 41.

⁸³ Wood, *The Way of the Strangers: Encounters with the Islamic State*, 30-35.

⁸⁴ Ibid, 33 & 131.

As previously noted, David Rapoport's articles were integral to this study. In *The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11*, and *The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism*, Rapoport asserts that terrorism's specific motives, means and desired ends can be explained in stages or waves.⁸⁵ In Figure 1.2 below, it is apparent that the four waves of terrorism exist or continue to exist (as in the case of the fourth religious wave): the Anarchist Wave, the Anti-Colonial Wave, the New Left Wave and the Religious Wave.⁸⁶ Whether the organisation conforms to aspects of the existing waves or constitutes an entirely new wave or era of terror, is examined in upcoming chapters.⁸⁷ Rapoport categorised terrorist events in history from the 1880s to the present.



Figure 1.2: Rapoport's Waves of Terrorism

Source: Rapoport, *The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism*, 47-50.

According to Rapoport, the first three waves, the Anarchist, Anti-Colonial and New Left waves, endured for forty to forty-five years. From the 1970s onwards, the fourth or Religious wave is believed to still be in effect, and considering cyclical patterns, is expected to continue

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11," Para 6.

⁸⁷ World Who's Who, "Rapoport David C," Routledge Taylor and Francis Group (n.d)

for another twenty years. Of the four waves, this religious wave is where IS might have the closest fit.⁸⁸

Attempting to bridge the gap between Rapoport’s four established waves and the possibility of a fifth wave of terrorism, Jeffrey Kaplan’s article *Terrorism’s Fifth Wave: A Theory, a Conundrum and a Dilemma*⁸⁹ emerged as a significant source for this study, and was utilised in detail in Chapter Four, where it was applied to IS and considered with notions of ideology, culture and religion. Kaplan refers to Rapoport’s waves, and acknowledges the significance and relevance of each. He then moves on to identify the seventeen fifth wave characteristics, which served as the analytical framework of this study and are shown in Table 1.1 below.

Table 1.1: Kaplan’s fifth wave characteristics

| | |
|-----------|---|
| 1 | Radicalize and break away from established terrorist wave. |
| 2 | Born of hope expressed at the extremes: some emerge after all hope has been lost, others because the dream has been realized. |
| 3 | Physical withdrawal into wilderness areas. |
| 4 | Claim to establish some form of a new calendar (‘the Year Zero’). |
| 5 | Radical quest for purity – racial, tribal, ecological, etc. |
| 6 | Internal compromise impossible resulting in deadly schisms and constant internal violence. |
| 7 | Belief in human perfectibility and chiliastic utopia in this lifetime. |
| 8 | Emphasis on creating new men and women makes old models expendable; thus, the logic of genocidal violence. |
| 9 | Obsession with creating new race places tremendous emphasis on women, who are both subject and object of fifth wave violence. |
| 10 | Children are the vanguard of the fifth wave as they are the least contaminated by the old society (not to mention the old STDs, HIV, and other remnants of the old societies). |
| 11 | Rape is the signature tactic of the fifth wave. |
| 12 | Violence is so pervasive in the fifth wave that it loses its message content beyond the simple assertion that “we exist.” |
| 13 | The effects of ritualized acts of rape and killing, especially for newly abducted ‘recruits’, has the liminal effect of binding the killers to the group while closing the doors for all group members to return to family, the old society, and previous ways of life. |

⁸⁸ Ibid, Para 6.

⁸⁹ Kaplan, *Terrorism’s Fifth Wave: A Theory, a Conundrum and a Dilemma*, 548.

- 14 Fifth wave groups are localist and particularistic, having turned their backs on the international waves from which they emerged.
- 15 Nonetheless, if needed for survival, foreign allies will be cultivated and fifth wave groups will often live in exile in neighbouring states.
- 16 Authoritarian in nature with charismatic leadership patterns.
- 17 Chiliastic in nature, deeply religious with eclectic or syncretic religious tropes assembled and interpreted by the leaders in support of a millenarian dream to be realized through a campaign of apocalyptic violence.

Source: Kaplan, *Terrorism's Fifth Wave: A Theory, a Conundrum and a Dilemma*, 548.

To bridge the gap once more, Anthony Celso's article *The Islamic State and Boko Haram: Fifth Wave Jihadist Terror Groups* reflects on both Rapoport and Kaplan's work and uses the applicable characteristics of Kaplan's fifth wave of terrorism for a comparison between the Islamic State and Boko Haram (BH). Celso maintains that the fifth wave of terrorism is applicable and germane to the study of *takfiri* jihadi groups like IS and BH, whose Islamic radicalism and extremism has turned within, resulting in ethnic cleansing and genocide.⁹⁰

1.8. METHODOLOGY

The qualitative research design used in this study was constructivist and interpretivist.⁹¹ Researchers have a duty and responsibility to expose social injustice, crime and prejudice. This study aimed to inform and embolden people with information and insight into IS, the waves of terrorism and Kaplan's fifth wave characteristics, which have influenced and propelled the evolution of terrorism and the waves.⁹² Accordingly, the knowledge and understanding gained through explored experiences often results in the construction of new ideas, the evolution of beliefs and the generation of improved understanding.⁹³ Although the study does not implicitly incorporate constructivist narratives and theories, constructivism does inform the general approach and topic. The study analyses and explores subjective social constructs of terrorism and the societies and circumstances under which they thrive. Such constructs, biases and beliefs go beyond the realms of clans, society and religions; and into politics, economics and the

⁹⁰ Celso, "The Islamic State and Boko Haram: Fifth Wave Jihadist Terror Groups," 4.

⁹¹ L Cohen and L Manion, *Research methods in education* (London: Routledge, 1994): 36.

⁹² Franzel du Plooy-Cilliers, Corne Davis and Rose Marie Bezuidenhout. *Research Matters* (Cape Town: Juta & Co, 2014).

⁹³ Noella Mackenzie and Sally Knipe, "Research dilemmas: Paradigms, methods and methodology ." *Issues In Educational Research* (Charles Sturt University, 2006): 16.

international arena; constructing or deconstructing the identities and status of entire countries and populations.

Knowledge is constantly changing, evolving and transforming, and considering epistemology, which is the study of knowledge, it may therefore be asserted that this study aims to add to the body of knowledge surrounding the topics of terrorism and IS. In terms of ontology, which is understood as the study of reality, the various ideologies, phenomena and institutions that influence people's realities is of utmost importance.⁹⁴ In the case of this study, the phenomenon of terrorism perpetrated by IS was explored in relation to the assertion that in reality, a new wave of terrorism is well underway.

1.8.1. Research approach and design

As this research aimed to add insight and improve the understanding of terrorism, it could be regarded as basic research. Basic research explores, explains and adds to the understanding of specific phenomena.⁹⁵ This study set out to acquire new information on the phenomenon of terrorism and IS, and may thus be identified as exploratory and interpretivist research, which explores new topics, adds to the existing body of knowledge, improves comprehension and assesses feasibility.⁹⁶

Utilising basic, exploratory and interpretivist research, the study took a qualitative research approach. Qualitative research is “an umbrella term used to cover a wide variety of research methods and methodologies that provide holistic, in-depth accounts and attempt to reflect the complicated, contextual, interactive, and interpretive nature of our social world”.⁹⁷ A qualitative research approach was most suitable for this study as it wrestled with a social phenomenon (terrorism and IS) and social constructs (the waves of terrorism), and attempted to explore, interpret and describe the phenomenon.

Books, journals, and particularly news articles that reported and documented IS attacks, were utilised as secondary sources, to establish the preferred data collection methods of qualitative

⁹⁴ Ibid, 23&32.

⁹⁵ Ibid, 12.

⁹⁶ Karen M Staller, “Qualitative research,” In *Encyclopaedia of Research Design*, edited by N J Salkind (Thousand Oaks: California: SAGE Publications Inc, 2010): 2.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

case studies and historical research. Terrorism, and specifically IS, served as the units of analysis for this study, as they were the focal point and main subject of the exploration.

1.8.2. Data collection, analysis and interpretation methods

Historical research of an exploratory nature was the most appropriate form of data collection. This form of research provided detailed descriptions and investigations of historical events and occurrences. and facilitated the identification of meanings and structures that have emerged over time. With this data readily available, historical research improved the validity and reliability of the study.⁹⁸

Much has transpired over the past four to five years of the Islamic State's declared existence. In order to complete the thesis timeously, a time frame was created and abided by. The applicable history, events and organisations that led up to the conception of the Islamic State were examined together with the 2014 IS declaration and the official start of its campaign, up to and including 2017. To provide a final frame of update, a recent map of territories under IS control was studied in order to establish the group's current standing. This thesis therefore maintained a time frame but was cognisant of current events.

Qualitative case study research of an interpretive nature is intended to progress and polish theories, concepts, definitions, and understandings that involve the reader by relating to familiar events. This enabled and assisted the exploratory nature of the study by encouraging consultation with numerous sources and forms of data. According to Baxter and Jack, "this ensures that the issue is not explored through one lens, but rather a variety of lenses, which allows for multiple facets of the phenomenon to be revealed and understood".⁹⁹

1.9. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Due to the study being based on desktop research involving case studies and historical analysis, no ethical approval was required. However, the researcher was responsible for ensuring that the data and information were accurately interpreted and presented, and that the findings of the study, were authentic and honest.

⁹⁸ Matthew Lange, *Comparative-Historical Methods: An Introduction*. (London: SAGE Publications Inc, 2013): 12-13.

⁹⁹ P Baxter and S Jack, "Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for Novice Researchers." *The Qualitative Report* 13, 4 (2008): 545-548.

1.10. LIMITATIONS, SCOPE AND TRUSTWORTHINESS

Due to the qualitative nature of this study, the fact that the results are not generalisable or transferable is one of its limitations. In addition, as qualitative research is based on interpretation and subjectivity, a possible limitation of researcher bias arises. To avoid the injection of the researcher's own preconceived ideas and prejudices, the data collection, analysis, and interpretation processes were executed thoroughly and without prejudice or partiality. In addition to the aforementioned limitations, the credibility of information available on IS and its activities may be questioned, as deception, misinformation and inaccuracy is probably an essential component of IS's media and propaganda strategies. Beyond that, the information surrounding IS continually evolves and transforms, making it complicated to predict or infer anything about IS, as well as making it increasingly challenging to keep up with the group's developments.

Validity, reliability, and trustworthiness are important aspects in the research process. Staller asserts that "qualitative researchers refer to negotiated validity, trustworthiness, transferability, transparency, and credibility as quality indicators".¹⁰⁰ Reliability is more relevant in qualitative studies, and is ensured through the trustworthiness of information. Trustworthiness is guaranteed through the credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability of the collected, analysed and interpreted information.¹⁰¹

1.11. CHAPTER OUTLINE

Chapter One comprised the introduction, conceptualisation, theoretical and literature overviews, and the methodology. Chapter Two explores IS, its background and inner workings, its leaders and leadership transitions, capabilities, and resources. Chapter Three outlines the literature framework of Rapoport's four waves of terrorism. All four waves are explored, and form the foundation of Chapter Four, which investigates IS and the possibility of it constituting a new wave of terrorism. In this chapter, Kaplan's characteristics of fifth wave terrorism are explored to illuminate ideological, religious, and cultural aspects and their interaction with terrorism. Chapter Five is the concluding chapter. It combines all the findings, and provides recommendations for further study.

¹⁰⁰ Staller, "Qualitative research," 9-10.

¹⁰¹ Yvonna S Lincoln and Egon G Guba, *Naturalistic Inquiry* (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications Inc, 1985): 300-315.

CHAPTER TWO: IS – THE SURROUNDING HISTORY AND LITERATURE

After the First World War and collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Syria and the Middle East were fashioned into artificial countries by French and British mandates.¹⁰²

2.1. INTRODUCTION

Leonardo Da Vinci once said: “our knowledge is the offspring of our perceptions”.¹⁰³ What is terrorism, if not a battle of ideologies and perceptions? The ideologies and perceptions upon which society thrives and functions are hidden, and often disregarded. However, if terrorism is a battle of ideologies, how can that which is right or justifiable be determined, and where does truth and morality come into play? Considering this, the overview of IS introduced in the first chapter needs to be expanded by addressing its relevant history and ideological notions.

IS was described by the Bipartisan Policy Centre as “a jihadist organization that aims to form an Islamic state (caliphate) over the region stretching from Turkey to Syria, to Egypt, to Jordan and to Lebanon, if not beyond”.¹⁰⁴ Solomon effectively dates the origin of the group back to 1999, when Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was established by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. It later evolved into the Islamic State, or IS as it is known today, led by self-professed caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. A further point distinguishing IS from other terrorist organisations is their evolution into an operational and functional “governing entity”.¹⁰⁵ With aspects like governance in mind, the motivations of terrorism cannot solely be attributed to the established aspects like poverty, religion, or even US involvement in the Middle East. Motivations for terrorism are multifaceted and complicated, and if there are to be any positive developments in preventing and combating terrorism, these complexities must be understood. Dimensions such as murderous or violent ideologies, political marginalisation, rebellious and extremist cultures and the repression and disregard of grievances, are all underlying and often unnoticed aspects that fuel the flames of

¹⁰² Di Giovanni, *Dispatches from Syria: The Morning They Came For Us* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017): 2.

¹⁰³ Leonardo da Vinci, “Delphi Complete Works of Leonardo da Vinci,” *Delphi Classics* 1 (2014).

¹⁰⁴ Misztal and Michek, “An overview of IS threat and U.S. response.”

¹⁰⁵ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 1.

terror.¹⁰⁶ It is for this reason that this section of the study focuses on exploring and explaining the origins, leadership, inner workings, theology, methodology and objectives of IS.

IS would not be what it is today without its exemplar and endorser, Al Qaeda.¹⁰⁷ Having recruited an estimated 20,000 followers (on conservative analysis) from more than 90 different countries, the group's expansion and scope of influence is alarming. However, Gulmohamad and other academics postulate that as much as the international community (particularly the Western and Middle Eastern countries) is concerned about IS's expansion, the terrorist group is managing to appeal more people than it appeals to.¹⁰⁸ The attacks on civilians, women and children, hospitals and other essential public service organisations, have resulted in increased opposition and sectarianism within the affected communities.¹⁰⁹ The terrorist group threatens to demolish and dismantle Iraq and Syria, reconstructing them into independent Salafist-jihadi states. With support, and a great deal of success, attributed to the Sunni extremists and their eradication and displacement of Shiite, Yazidi and other minorities.¹¹⁰

This excommunication reinforces the notion of religion, ethnicity and governance stirring the IS wave and movement of terror and distinguishing it from pre-existing waves and understandings. Simultaneously, these distinctions attest to their scope of influence, which has washed over and immersed much of the Middle East, with the presiding tsunami of terror threatening devastation in Africa, Asia, and surrounding areas as much as internationally, in the US and Europe.¹¹¹ Consequently, studying IS necessitates the consideration of the Islamic faith and tradition, as well as an understanding of the surrounding history and prominent events over the ages.

2.2. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY: SYRIA AND IRAQ

Sunni Islamists maintain that the rightful successors to Muhammad were the first four caliphs. Because Allah did not indicate leaders thereafter, anyone of Muhammad's Qurayshi descent worthy, pious and religious enough could be elected by the community and claim the caliphate, (including Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi). The caliph must adhere to the Qur'an, and pursue

¹⁰⁶ The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, Washington, DC (2006)

¹⁰⁷ Colin Tucker, "The Islamic State. Origins, Goals, and Future Implications," Eurasia Centre (2014).

¹⁰⁸ Zana Khasraw Gulmohamad, "The Rise and Fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (Levant) IS," *Global Security Studies* 5, 2 (2014): 1.

¹⁰⁹ Roy Gutman, "In recent months, IS targeted hospitals, doctors, journalists" (11 February 2014).

¹¹⁰ Misztal and Michek, "An overview of IS threat and U.S. response."

¹¹¹ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 1.

Muhammad's example, the *Hadith*.¹¹² Shi'ah Islamists on the other hand, do not believe that a caliph can be elected by the community or assume the role based on anything other than bloodline. They therefore reject the first three caliphs and believe that Muhammad's son-in-law, Ali ibn Abi Talib, the fourth caliph of the Rashidun Caliphate, has the rightful bloodline of succession. Shi'ah Islam has also evolved and modernised over time, following western governmental systems of democracy and modernising Islamic practices, all of which are denounced by both Sunni Islamists and IS.¹¹³

Sunni and Shi'ah tribes have persecuted and oppressed one another for centuries over differences in detail and opinion about God and his message. The Middle Eastern region has been ravaged by civil war, ripped apart by foreign intervention, colonialism, and competition for oil and power and challenged by the complex clan-based structure of Middle Eastern society. Although not a focus of the study, understandings of the intricacies are essential for the recommendations in Chapter Five.

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Syria, Iraq, and the Middle East were divided and sectioned off under European mandates. Syria became a French colony and these foreign colonialists humiliated the Arab world, oppressed its people and culture, and fragmented the region according to western geographical notions of states and borders. The 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement meant that minority groups were governing Iraq and Syria, and since then, each region has been characterised by war and division.¹¹⁴ The difference between the situations of the respective countries are:

- In Iraq – the Sunni minority has control over the Shi'ah majority;
- In Syria – the Shi'ah Alawite minority has control over the Sunni majority.

After the Sykes-Picot agreement, British powers set up a Sunni governing body in the State of Iraq headed by King Faisal, a Sunni and puppet to the colonialists. Iraq became a British colony on 11 November 1920, and years of rebellion and civil unrest followed. Iraq was granted independence in 1932. In 1941, after a failed *coup* by Rashid Ali al Gaylani, the Anglo-Iraqi war broke out. In 1958, the socialist 14 July Revolution and coup erupted, followed by a further

¹¹² Wood, *The Way of the Strangers: Encounters with the Islamic State*, 96-97.

¹¹³ Ibid, 222.

¹¹⁴ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 6

coup in 1963 and another by the Baathist Party in 1968, which paved the path for Saddam Hussein's presidency in 1979. In the same year, Hussein declared war on Iran and the Iranian Revolution erupted. Saddam inflicted chemical damage and mass violations on the Iranian people and the local Shi'ah in Iraq. This led to the 1991 Iraqi uprisings, the first Gulf War, and



Figure 2.1: The sides in the scramble for Iraq

devastating sanctions, which prevailed until the 2003 Iraqi Insurgency operation carried out by the Bush Administration and its allies in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Saddam and his regime were accused of being affiliated to Al Qaeda, and of failing to destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.¹¹⁵

Considering Figure 2.1 above, the multiple parties involved and invested in the power struggle for Iraq were both extensive and complex. The US Iraqi Insurgency operation prevailed from 2003 to 2007, and aroused civil rebellion in the Sunnis and Shi'ah, as well as rampant sectarianism. In 2005, the country's first election took place, and a new constitution was accepted. The Al Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, was killed in 2006, and Saddam Hussein was sentenced to death by hanging for his crimes against humanity. War and violence continued, and the Iraqi government requested complete withdrawal of the US by the end of 2011. However, insurgency and sectarianism continued, and in 2011, the Arab Spring uprisings

¹¹⁵ Di Giovanni, *Dispatches from Syria: The Morning They Came For Us*, 3.

solidified the Sunni/Shi'ah divide. Throughout 2012 and 2013, Sunni Arabs began revolting against the government and the Shi'ah population, protesting against marginalisation and under-representation. Amidst the strife, insurgents from the Islamic State in Iraq captured Mosul, Tikrit and Fallujah in 2014. The social sectarianism in Iraq led to geographical and physical divides of the borders with the Kurds in the northeast, the Sunnis in the west, and the Shi'ah in the south-east. The current government under President Muhammad Fuad Masum and Prime Minister Haider Jawad Kadhim al-Abadi, has promised more devotion to the welfare and well-being of all Iraq's diverse citizenry.¹¹⁶

Unlike Iraq, Syria has seen more governmental stability yet has been ruled by one family and bloodline within the Shi'ah minority since 1971, from Hafez al Assad to the present day under Bashar al Assad. Sunni Islamists are under-represented and still marginalised and oppressed. On 17 April 1946, Syria finally gained independence only to be followed by years of internal strife and military coups. In 1963, the Arab Republic of Syria was established through a Baathist coup.¹¹⁷ Baathism is a nationalist ideology premised on unifying the Arab states and their people. It is identified as being modern and secular in its approach and practices, and is acclaimed for its non-discrimination of other religions such as those practised by Christians, Jews and the Yazidis. Although denounced by many pious Islamic persuasions like the Sunni, Baathism had popular support simply for its desire for revolution. However, the Baathist governing body's operations over the following years proved otherwise.¹¹⁸

Hafez al Assad played a part in the Baathist coup, which was notably comprised of Shi'ah Islamists. Al Assad, Shi'ah Islam, and the Baathists rose to power and Hafez himself became President. He was succeeded by his son, Bashar al Assad, who is currently in his third decade of presidency. Bashar al Assad's dictatorship is rooted in Syria's minority religious persuasion, which follows an Alawite interpretation of Shi'ah Islam. Consequently, the majority of Syrians felt unrepresented and marginalised. Coupled with governmental oppression, its monitoring and sectarianism sparked the Syrian Revolution as part of the greater Arab Spring uprisings in 2011. During the same year, Osama Bin Laden was assassinated.¹¹⁹ Although modern and liberal since its inception, Baathism has impacted Syria's history through continuous war and

¹¹⁶ Wood, *The Way of the Strangers: Encounters with the Islamic State*, 47-51

¹¹⁷ Di Giovanni, *Dispatches from Syria: The Morning They Came For Us*, 2.

¹¹⁸ Wood, *The Way of the Strangers: Encounters with the Islamic State*, 75

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*, 160-161

strife: from the Six Day War in 1961 to the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Syrian occupation of Lebanon in 1976 to the Hama Massacre in the 1980s, and the Syrian uprising and civil war that erupted in 2011.¹²⁰

Authoritarianism, unemployment, human rights violations, and corruption are among the causes attributable to the Arab Spring uprisings that spread across the Middle Eastern peninsula. Since its onset in Syria, specifically against the dictatorship regime, Assad and his government have perpetrated mass human rights violations. Di Giovanni records that in 2012, Baba Amr in Homs was attacked and seized by Assad’s forces who “cleansed” the town of its rebels. Visuals of barrel bombs were seen worldwide, with street fighting, people fleeing and screaming, drowned out by the sound of helicopters flying overhead.¹²¹ IS effectively capitalised on the growing resistance and subsequent conflict, emerging as a forerunner in the revolution and winning support, before capturing Raqqa and Mayadin. The conflict in Syria is a complex situation that needs clarification. Figure 2.2 below demonstrates the different sides in the scramble for Syria.



Figure 2.2: The sides in the scramble for Syria

¹²⁰ Di Giovanni, *Dispatches from Syria: The Morning They Came For Us*, 2
¹²¹ Ibid, 67

It must be understood that, as in the 2011 battle of Aleppo, movements promoting democracy such as those against Assad and authoritarianism, were gaining momentum and acclaim. Considering Figure 2.2 above, it is clear that domestically Assad's support was precarious, but internationally, his authoritarian, minority regime was supported by Russia, Iran, Hezbollah and the Shi'ah majority. In cold war politics, where the US was once again on the side opposing Russia, its ties with Israel and its vested interests and efforts seemingly secured a footing for democracy in this war-torn region divided by minority sectarianism, religious differences and intolerance. Moreover, resistance and the atmosphere of revolution provided IS with the perfect platform for the assumption of power, the eventual declaration of the caliphate, and the ensuing jihad and strife.¹²²

2.3. AL QAEDA AND AL QAEDA IN IRAQ

As noted above, in examining the background and history of IS, Al Qaeda emerges as a paramount and pivotal component. The jihadi terror campaign in the 1980s was a culmination and reaction to growing anti-Soviet sentiments. Al Qaeda's leader, Osama Bin Laden, and his affiliates, were determined to orchestrate a global jihadist unification and rid the world of "corruptive governments" such as their enemies, the US and Russia. Al Qaeda was concerned with revenge against the West. It refined and accelerated the jihadist campaign, endorsing attacks such as those in 1998 on the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) in the US.¹²³ Figure 2.3 shows Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, the fathers of Islamic extremism.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Daniel L Byman, "Comparing Al Qada and IS: Different goals, different targets," The Brookings Institution. (Washington, DC, 29 April 2015).



Osama Bin Laden formed and led Al Qaeda from 1988-2011. A Saudi Arabian and Yemeni, from the wealthy Bin Laden family.



Ayman al-Zawahiri assumed office as the leader of Al Qaeda in 2011 until the present day. An Egyptian Islamist who joined the Muslim Brotherhood as a child.

Figure 2.3: The fathers of Islamic extremism

However, the US counterterrorism reaction was equally extreme and shattering both for Al Qaeda, and their jihadist campaign. The US managed to intercept and disrupt Al Qaeda functions, finances, its leadership, training and other vital networks, rendering it powerless and incapable of executing any further attacks on the US. Although Bin Laden was the foremost target of the US war on terror campaign, Al Qaeda had thrived and expanded under his leadership. As Graeme Wood asserts in *What IS really wants*: “Bin Laden corporatized terror and franchised it out. He requested specific political concessions, such as the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia. His foot soldiers navigated the modern world confidently”.¹²⁴

The death of the revered Osama Bin Laden occurred on 1 May 2001, during the US SEAL Team 6 assassination operation. Ayman al-Zawahiri stepped into the leadership role, but his unimpressive and feeble attempts at filling Bin Laden’s shoes left Al Qaeda’s popularity dwindling.¹²⁵ An Egyptian and successful surgeon, Zawahiri’s ascension almost immediately contributed to Al Qaeda losing ground. His shy temperament, rivalry with IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and increasing unpopularity in the Salafist-jihadi world resulted in the split between Al Qaeda and IS in 2014. Since then, Al Qaeda is no longer the organisation it was known and feared to be, even though Osama Bin Laden is still referred to in honour as “Sheikh Osama”.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ Graeme Wood, “What IS really wants,” *The Atlantic* 315, 2 (2015). Online.

¹²⁵ Byman, “Comparing Al Qaeda and IS: Different goals, different targets.”

¹²⁶ Wood, “What IS really wants.”

Since the separation, Al Qaeda has dispersed into a number of small satellite affiliate groups in regions like Somalia, Syria and Yemen, with its waning power and authority in the jihadist world being its only constant.¹²⁷ However, a few affiliates remain: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, one of Al Qaeda's more powerful affiliates, claimed responsibility for the attacks in Bamako in Mali, in November 2015, and in Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, in January 2016. Another affiliate, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, is a rising power in the port of Al Mukalla on the Gulf of Aden.¹²⁸ Out of this deterioration and during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) emerged. Al Qaeda's dissolution is attributed to infighting, and ideological and structural divisions, bolstered by IS's increased popularity. As such, the origins of IS can be traced back to 1999 in Iraq, when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi established *Jama'at al-Tawhid w'al-Jihad* (The Congregation of Jihad). During the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Zarqawi rallied his jihadist organisation to Bin Laden and Al Qaeda's side. At first, Zarqawi rejected the prospect of joining Al Qaeda, as he not only wished to maintain independence, but he and Bin Laden were split by differences in strategy and goals. In 2004, however, Zarqawi and his affiliates finally pledged their organisation to Al Qaeda, subsequently renaming it *Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn*, or Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).¹²⁹

Although Al Qaeda's jihadi campaign was directed against the US and Iraq, Zarqawi and the AQI made of point of attacking Shi'ah civilians and instigating civil war between the Shiite and Sunni tribes in Iraq, after the Iraqi government had attacked the Sunni town of Tal Afar in 2005.¹³⁰ It is clear that for nearly two decades, strife and sectarianism divided the Sunni and Shi'ah tribes in Syria and Iraq – a divide that occurred in 1963 when the Alawite Shi'ah coup of the Arab Republic of Syria was executed by Hafez Assad and his affiliates. More than five decades later, the Shi'ah government maintains its power through force, which Hafez's son, Bashar al Assad, has continued to exert in bringing the dictatorship into the 21st century.¹³¹

From the onset of the Al Qaeda and AQI association, disagreements were a constant, particularly within the leadership echelons. Where Bin Laden urged for strikes and

¹²⁷ Tucker, "The Islamic State. Origins, Goals, and Future Implications," 2.

¹²⁸ International CrIS Group, *Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State*, CrIS Group Special Report (Belgium, 2016): 3-5.

¹²⁹ Laub, "The Islamic State. The Council on Foreign Relations."

¹³⁰ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 2.

¹³¹ Di Giovanni, *Dispatches from Syria: The Morning They Came For Us*, 2.

advancements into the West, particularly into the US, Zarqawi advocated for civil and sectarian strife and conflict between the Sunni and the perceived apostate Shiite government and population.¹³² Subsequently, the AQI experienced a number of leadership changes as well as numerous internal disputes, which ultimately led to Al Qaeda severing the AQI association with its sectarian violence and conflict instigation. Hostility towards fellow Muslims, Sunni's included, coupled with the US involvement in 2006, resulted in regional chaos and hindered AQI advancement. In addition, the US Air Force eliminated Zarqawi in 2006, following which, reconciliation efforts made by Sunni members further undermined and threatened the AQI momentum.¹³³ Figure 2.4 illustrates the AQI/IS leadership.



Figure 2.4: AQI/IS Leadership

Following Zarqawi's death, AQI was led by Abu Ayyub al Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, who had previously renamed the group The Islamic State of Iraq or ISI, and combined the ISI with the Mujahideen Shura Council.¹³⁴ "Since its inception, the Islamic State has ultimately sought to establish an Islamic Caliphate based on its extreme interpretation of Islam and

¹³² Stanford University, Mapping Militant Organisations: The Islamic State, (2010-2017).

¹³³ Byman, "Comparing Al Qaeda and IS: Different goals, different targets."

¹³⁴ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 2.

Shar'iah law.”¹³⁵ In the pursuit and establishment of an Islamic state, such extremism contributed to the divide between AQ and ISI. According to Solomon, the organisation’s identification as a “state” testified to their grandeur and ambitions of domination. In 2010, Abu Omar and Abu Ayyub were killed in a US-Iraqi raid of the extremists’ safe compounds.¹³⁶

Subsequent to his ascension to the Islamic Caliphate in 2013, the current leader and self-pronounced caliph Baghdadi, once again renamed ISI to ISIS (The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham). This name refers to the territory along the eastern Mediterranean and the Levant, a region stretching across Israel, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. In Figure 2.5 below, it can be seen these ancient and biblical lands are enclosed by the Taurus Mountains in the north and the Sinai Peninsula to the south. The Levant lands are so named because they are geographically located where the sun is thought to rise.¹³⁷




Figure 2.5: The lands of the Levant

Source : <https://www.google.co.za/maps/place/Levant/>

¹³⁵ Stanford University, Mapping Militant Organisations: The Islamic State.

¹³⁶ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 2.

¹³⁷ Laub, “The Islamic State.” The Council on Foreign Relations.

2.4. THE SPLIT AND EMERGENCE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE

The split between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State was long in the making. In a testimony delivered by Daniel Byman in *Comparing Al Qaeda and IS: Different goals, different targets*, he asserts that the divide was the result of “a competition for affiliates, with both trying to spread their model and in Al Qaeda’s case, to ensure its operational relevance”.¹³⁸ According to Gulmohamad, ISIS consisted of a combination of AQI members, the Mujahideen Shura Council and the *Jund al-Sahhaba* (Soldiers of Prophet’s Companions).¹³⁹ Relationships soured during the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings and the conflict in Syria, and ISIS rejected Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. The Syrian conflict in 2011 was a turning point in the jihadist campaign and their allegiances. Following orders from Al Qaeda leader Zawahiri, Baghdadi and his affiliates opportunistically began setting up headquarters and bases in Syria. The political and civil upheaval was the perfect stage for the expansion of ISIS operations and their goals and influence, which effectively stretched from Syria to Iraq. With Syrian forces focused on their domestic chaos, ISIS pursued and gained territory, popularity and support, particularly from Iraqi Sunnis marginalised under the regime and policies of the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki.¹⁴⁰ As much as the chaos invigorated the jihadist campaign, it made a significant contribution to the demise of adherence and loyalty between Al Qaeda and its offspring, ISIS.

Suspicious of Baghdadi and AQI’s loyalty, Zawahiri launched the *Jabhat al-Nusra* organisation, which was intended to serve as the Syrian version of AQI. This establishment, although functioning in the interests of Al Qaeda, was rejected by Baghdadi and his affiliates, who believed Al Qaeda to be more concerned and involved in Syria than in Iraq. Baghdadi, who was expected to show adherence, made a point of belittling *Jabhat al-Nusra*, and in 2013 once again renamed the organisation *Al Dawla al-Islamiya fil Iraq wa al-Sham*, or the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).¹⁴¹ Baghdadi’s expansion thereafter was remarkable, particularly following his public disownment by Al Qaeda, which severed ties with the unruly group in February 2014. Under Baghdadi’s guidance, ISIS forces bulldozed through Iraq, capturing major cities like Mosul and Tikrit, as well as strategic oil processing plants and hydroelectric dams.¹⁴² Shortly thereafter, the Islamic State or caliphate was declared in June

¹³⁸ Byman, “Comparing Al Qaeda and IS: Different goals, different targets.”

¹³⁹ Gulmohamad, “The Rise and Fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (Levant) IS,” 2.

¹⁴⁰ Byman, “Comparing Al Qaeda and IS: Different goals, different targets.”

¹⁴¹ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 2-3.

¹⁴² Ibid.

2014, and Baghdadi rose to claim the caliphate. As Byman asserts, “Baghdadi went from being an annoying thorn in Zawahiri’s side to a serious challenger to his authority and a threat to his organization’s position as the vanguard of the global jihadist movement”.¹⁴³ Once again a renaming took place: in 2014, the organisation simply became The Islamic State (IS) – an indication of two important points according to Solomon: “First, that there are no geographic boundaries. Second, ‘The’ implies that it is singular, the only Islamic State – one to which all 1.5 billion Muslims owe their loyalty”.¹⁴⁴

The split between Al Qaeda and IS is best explained through explaining the relationship between two brothers. Jihadist and IS member Salah al-Din al-Maqdisi, accused Al Qaeda and his brother, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, of deviating from Islam and the Sunni cause, and sympathising with the Shiite Muslims. Salah al-Din and his comrades proceeded to swear fealty to the IS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In reaction, brother Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi revealed the crimes and disobedience committed by IS, and together with Al Qaeda leader Zawahiri, disowned the group and paired with the affiliate group, *Jabhat al-Nusra* in Syria.¹⁴⁵

In February 2014, IS completely split from Al Qaeda, and endeavoured to pursue its goals unilaterally and independently. These goals entailed the establishment of: “... a transnational Islamic caliphate ruled by Shar’ia Law”.¹⁴⁶ Al Qaeda has been largely studied alongside its activities and relations against the US. IS then emerged as the predominant threat towards the Middle East and its stability.¹⁴⁷ Although the respective groups harbour different and even conflicting ideologies, strategies and targets, both maintain a devotion to piety, social and ethnic cleansing, religious purity and a duty to perform and implement violent jihad.¹⁴⁸

2.5. EXPLORING IS AND ITS CLAIM: SALAFIST-JIHADISM

IS’s success and unique profile is attributed to its circumspect Salafist-jihadi orientation. This orientation enabled IS to make notably greater strides towards achieving Islamic unification than its counterpart, Al Qaeda, which had never appointed a caliph. Combined with jihad, the Salafist’s moulded IS into a discriminative and deadly force. Baghdadi rallied more support

¹⁴³ Byman, “Comparing Al Qaeda and IS: Different goals, different targets.”

¹⁴⁴ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 3.

¹⁴⁵ Mary Habeck, “Assessing the IS - al-Qaeda Split: Introduction,” Insite Blog on Terrorism and Extremism, United States (18 June 2014).

¹⁴⁶ Tucker, “The Islamic State. Origins, Goals, and Future Implications,” 2.

¹⁴⁷ Byman, “Comparing Al Qaeda and IS: Different goals, different targets.”

¹⁴⁸ International CrIS Group, *Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State*, 3-5.

and recruited with ease – attributed to his claim of being “the rightful caliph”. His goals of purification and piety were more gratifying than those of Zawahiri, who had led the previous generation of fighters.¹⁴⁹

Salafism is an ostentatiously pious interpretation of Sunni Islam, characterised by violent resistance to infidels and modern political orders. Having roots in Wahhabism (which will be explored later on), Salafism was founded by Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the eighteenth century and remains the state religion of Saudi Arabia. For Salafi’s, the Qur’an, the Prophet Muhammad, and *the Hadith* are the sources of authority and guidance in Islam and life. They condone ancient practices and traditions from the era of the Prophet, such as slavery and the amputation of limbs, and regard themselves as the chosen people of Allah and the Prophet. Salafi’s brand all infidels *kufr*, and are accused by other Islamic religions of intolerance and hostility.¹⁵⁰ They reject modernised versions of Islam as expressed through Shi’ah and Sufi Islamists, and accuse them of *shirk* for their adornment of idols and saints, and for their ideals of nationalism and democracy.¹⁵¹ When combined with the religious and violent motivations enshrined in jihad, Salafist jihadism becomes deadly and dangerous, particularly when expressed alongside political or governmental motivations, and in a region that is ravaged by sectarianism and ethnic and religious divides.

2.5.1. Political and Leadership Profile

April 2007 marked the appointment of a cabinet by the self-assumed governing organisation, IS. Ministries were established, including those for media affairs, health, war, and agriculture, bolstering the group’s governmental identity. A Shar’ia Council was introduced to implement and ensure that Islamic law maintained its relevancy and authority, as interpreted by IS. In addition, the *Dawah* office was established, forming the foundation for political operations. This office serves numerous functions: it maintains a social outreach responsibility and assurance of the spread of pure Islam and containment of immorality. It also plays a significant role in the organisation’s recruitment activities and intelligence gathering functions. The establishment of ministries and government departments clearly indicates the IS organisation’s claimed statehood.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁹ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 6.

¹⁵⁰ Wood, *The Way of the Strangers: Encounters with the Islamic State*, 18.

¹⁵¹ Ibid, 6.

¹⁵² Ibid.

Following the death of former leaders Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Minister of War Abu Ayyub al-Masri in April 2010, Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi made his ascension to power in June 2014. He simply renamed the organisation as The Islamic State – a name indicating their expansive orientation and objectives. It is worth noting that IS is a self-sufficient and self-reliant body that operates on its own terms, with complete unilateralism.¹⁵³ According to Gulmohamad, IS “is not an ordinary *jihadi* group controlled or influenced by al-Qaeda. It has its own conceptions and position... It pledges allegiance to its leader Baghdadi, not Zawahiri”.¹⁵⁴ Baghdadi is a doctoral graduate of Islamic Sciences and an early member of the Muslim Brotherhood; he was previously captured and imprisoned in Iraq during the 2005 US operations and invasion.¹⁵⁵ It is therefore not surprising that Baghdadi is the perceived saviour and champion of Islam.

Capitalising on the chaos of the 2011 civil war in Syria, IS established itself, setting up headquarters in Raqqa. Thereafter, the *takfir*, an Islamic doctrine sanctioning the marginalisation and punishment of apostates and absconders, was politically and tactically implemented. This resulted in the large-scale extermination of divergent Muslims such as the Shi’ah, Yazidi, and secular Iraqis, consequently devastating the Iraqi and Syrian public. In 2014, it finally caused Al Qaeda to distance itself from, and eventually disown IS.¹⁵⁶ Celso asserts that, “Traditionally *takfir* had been confined to excommunicate impious rulers and immoral individuals. Jihadist clerics, however, have progressively legitimated the use of collective *tafkir*, excommunicating large numbers of Muslims”.¹⁵⁷ As an aspect of jihad, *takfir* is an excommunication tactic that IS not only implemented but perfected, excessively using it in the systematic genocide of Yazidi and Shi’ah Muslims who were considered polytheists, as well as civilians who “support immoral governments and sinful beliefs”.¹⁵⁸

To the masses, Baghdadi was a fresh face, whose contemporary approaches and unconcealed objectives were the injection of vitality that the current jihadist generation needed. Baghdadi’s approach has been compared with Hitler’s expansion and invasion tactics, and to Genghis Khan’s terror and destruction. Baghdadi has assembled an organisation with an army that is

¹⁵³ Cole Bunzel, “The Islamic state of disobedience: Al-Baghdadi triumphant,” *Jihadica* (5 October 2013).

¹⁵⁴ Gulmohamad, “The Rise and Fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (Levant) IS,” 1-2.

¹⁵⁵ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 5-6.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 3-5.

¹⁵⁷ Celso, “The Islamic State and Boko Haram: Fifth Wave Jihadist Terror Groups,” 4.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid*.

able to operate and function under the theories and strategies of manoeuvre warfare. This, combined with jihad, maintains manoeuvring based on total destruction of the enemy.¹⁵⁹ Gathering an informed political profile of the group required consideration of more than single prominent figures or political structures, and an in-depth examination of its strategies. According to Solomon, IS's foremost political strategy is the instigation of sectarian strife and polarisation. In Syria's case this involved the Sunni/Shi'ah divide, the targeting of Yazidi and Christian people, and the persecution of secular and modern Muslims. In conjunction with encouraging polarisation and sectarianism, IS "aims to inspire attacks, not plan or organize them,"¹⁶⁰ which has encouraged the eruption of sleeper cells and lone-wolf attacks in countries across the world. Such eruptions are a further result of IS's political strategy, which employs soft power approaches and grooming to recruit and maintain commitment and support.

IS controlled territories, such as those in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen are structurally efficient, and the organisation has managed to develop roads, schools, shops, and public services like water and electricity.¹⁶¹ The organisation has uplifted its surrounding infrastructure and provided state services such as education, health-care, and transportation, improving sanitation, and manufacturing prosthetics for its wounded. IS also managed to free political prisoners from the Tadmur Prison in Syria, many of whom had been Sunni members of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as rebels against the Assad regime. As Solomon asserts, IS "styled itself as the champion of Sunni interests against the ruling minority Alawite sect as represented by the Assad regime".¹⁶² IS operates with political intelligence, in its own regard. Its leadership and governance is multi-faceted and stretches across provincial and local levels, incorporating a sense of autonomy through delegation, where local populations are able to govern themselves and maintain independent economic functions through the establishment of *Shura* councils, which serve as platforms for settling disputes and making decisions provincially and locally.¹⁶³ However, politics and economics are presided over by the militarily oriented jihadi cause.

¹⁵⁹ Stanford University, Mapping Militant Organisations: The Islamic State.

¹⁶⁰ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 18.

¹⁶¹ Tucker, "The Islamic State. Origins, Goals, and Future Implications," 4.

¹⁶² Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 19.

¹⁶³ *Ibid*, 20.

2.5.2. Military and Geographical Profile

Solomon declared that IS “has de facto control over a ‘state’ within the borders of two de jure states – Iraq and Syria”.¹⁶⁴ This means that while it may technically and physically hold control over the region, their claim to statehood is legally unfounded. The significance of this is that it revokes a century-old declaration, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which ultimately humiliated the Arab world, and reduced and partitioned the region under the influence of the British and French. This disregard for pre-established geographical boundaries is precisely the essence of IS’s geographical power and authority. In terms of the organisation’s military capabilities, their arsenal of weaponry is of foremost concern. It forms the foundation of the organisation’s power and is reported to include hand firearms, long-range rocket launchers, homing missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, mortars, technical rockets, tanks and missiles, among other high calibre weaponry.¹⁶⁵ Considering this arsenal, it is not surprising that the organisation clearly favours force over functionality, where military strategy and advancement takes precedence over political or soft-power approaches. In addition, leadership structures are determined by “...military professionalism and not religious faith,”¹⁶⁶ a notion exemplified by Bin Laden era loyalists and veterans.

In light of the 2014 attack on Mosul, where 30 000 Iraqi fighters withdrew against only 800 IS fighters, IS’s capabilities point to their success politically, militarily and geographically.¹⁶⁷ There are two prominent geopolitical factors that their regional success can be attributed to. Firstly, the concept of military ineptitude, where leadership effectiveness and military competence have dwindled under growing corruption and distrust in political and military ranks, in both Iraq and Syria. In these countries, community distrust in the Maliki and Assad regimes spell further governmental instability.¹⁶⁸ Secondly, the concept of Sunni Alienation, where the persecution and marginalisation of Sunni minorities perpetrated by the Shiite majority has encouraged Sunnis to side with IS, and even seek salvation through that organisation. However, amendments have been made to include Sunni tribes and reconcile differences. To an extent, these amendments have assisted in weakening IS’s abilities in the region.¹⁶⁹ Yet Sunni Baathist groups have remained involved and have instigated rebel and

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, 6.

¹⁶⁵ Tucker, “The Islamic State. Origins, Goals, and Future Implications. Eurasia Centre,” 5.

¹⁶⁶ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 27.

¹⁶⁷ Tucker, “The Islamic State. Origins, Goals, and Future Implications,” 7.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Gulmohamad, “The Rise and Fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (Levant) IS,” 2.

guerrilla activities aimed at disgracing and damaging the Iraqi government. If efforts can be made to reason with Sunni communities to initiate ideological change, then the degradation of IS's reputation and appeal may assist in the overall weakening of the organisation on a social scale.¹⁷⁰

According to Solomon, IS has established sleeper cells, rallied comrades, and franchised in more than sixty different countries, most prominently in the western and northern African regions like Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula; Indonesia; Morocco; the Philippines, where Christian-Muslim strife has been exploited; Thailand, where Buddhist-Muslim strife has been exacerbated; Tunisia, where the *Uqba Ibn Nafi Brigade* has pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi; Libya, where the *Al Battar Brigade* has emerged in support of IS; Algeria, where the *Jund al-Khilafah* (Soldiers of the Caliphate) have pledged allegiance; and in Nigeria, where Boko Haram pledged allegiance in 2015, which immediately resulted in aid, support and their military effectiveness. Boko Haram has subsequently evolved into an IS franchise, renamed the Islamic State's Wilayat West Africa.¹⁷¹

IS's military strategy and tactics result from anti-western sentiments combined with Shar'ia Islamic religious interpretations and Salafi-jihadist ideologies. These have been amalgamated to form a dynamic organisation that is multi-generational and founded in both Islamic history and religious discourse.¹⁷² The danger of this combination was displayed in January 2015, when underestimated IS intelligence operatives hacked into and overran CENTCOM, the US military command centre. The group's profile of military prowess has evolved to include intelligence gathering, encryption and spying capabilities, all of which now constitute the so-called "CyberCaliphate".¹⁷³ Considering Boko Haram's transition into the Islamic State's Wilayat West Africa, IS seems to function with logic and military and political sophistication. A quote from Solomon best describes The Islamic State's military profile, modus operandi, and expanse, as he asserts that the organisation thrives both systematically and opportunistically to:

Exploit existing grievances in a particular area, utilise returning IS fighters to serve as a force multiplier for existing local militias who have pledged allegiance to the group and,

¹⁷⁰ Fawaz A. Gerges, "IS and the Third Wave of Jihadism," *Current History* 113, 767 (2014): 343.

¹⁷¹ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 7-9.

¹⁷² Clarion Project, *The Islamic State (IS, ISIL)*, (2015): 15-16.

¹⁷³ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 24.

to ensure command and control from IS central, send one of the senior IS commanders as the leader of the local franchise.¹⁷⁴

2.5.3. Financial Profile

Al Qaeda does not have the financial support and resource capacity that it once had under Bin Laden. IS, on the other hand, has become a financial force to be reckoned with; their financial self-sufficiency ensures their independence. IS is reported to be the wealthiest terrorist organisation ever known, with a net monthly income in the millions, acquired through extortion of businesses and heists from financial institutions such as the Mosul bank. Moreover, the organisation is also sponsored by allied counties and rich nationals from Kuwait, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, who provide both financial and weapons support.¹⁷⁵ The organisation generates further income from arms, drugs and human trafficking, black market trading, kidnapping and robbery. It is estimated that IS has pressurised approximately eight million dollars from its surrounding communities, with this amount excluding profits acquired from the capturing and occupation of numerous oil fields in the Syrian region.¹⁷⁶ As Gerges asserts, “Syria is the nerve centre of IS – the location of its de facto capital, the northern city of Raqqa, and of its major sources of income, including the oil trade, taxation, and criminal activities”.¹⁷⁷ An approximate 60% of Syria’s oil fields and their reserves are controlled by IS. In addition to oil, the group’s other sources of revenue are shown in Table 2.1 below.

Table 2.1: IS avenues of income

| | | |
|---|-----------------------------------|--|
| 1 | Narcotics trafficking | Generates USD 1 billion per annum in trafficking heroin from Afghanistan through IS territories. |
| 2 | Human trafficking | Generates millions by trafficking people and refugees from Syria and Sirte to the Mediterranean Sea. |
| 3 | Organ trafficking | Generates profit from trafficking organs in the already death-ravaged Iraq. |
| 4 | Extortion and taxation | Generates USD 1 million per day extorting money from local business owners and by unfairly taxing communities. |
| 5 | Artefact and antiques trafficking | Generates millions from the looting of dig sites and sale of historic materials and artefacts from Palmyra in Syria. |

¹⁷⁴ Ibid, 30.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, 24-26

¹⁷⁶ Freya Petersen, “Islamic State of Iraq and Levant: An explainer,” Yahoo News (7 January 2017).

¹⁷⁷ Gerges, “IS and the Third Wave of Jihadism,” 343.

| | | |
|----|--------------------|---|
| 6 | Bank heists | Generates millions from central and provincial banks, as in the case of Mosul Bank. |
| 7 | Cotton production | IS controlled Raqqa produces bulk cotton for the region. |
| 8 | Wheat production | IS controlled Raqqa and Iraq produced bulk wheat for the region. |
| 9 | Kidnapping | Generated USD 45 million in ransom payments in 2014 alone. |
| 10 | Sympathy & Support | Donations and support globally from individuals to entire countries such as Kuwait and Qatar. |

Source: Solomon, *The Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 25-30.

2.5.4. Cultural, Ideological and Religious Profile

The main objective of IS has been established as the restoration of the Islamic caliphate or *Khalifa*. This entails the unification of the Islamic people and Islamic states under Shar'ia Law, governed by one caliph who is considered to be Muhammad's successor. Currently, Baghdadi is believed to be the rightful caliph, both self-proclaimed and deemed so by supporting Sunni's and jihadists. Under Baghdadi's leadership, IS has managed to create and perpetuate a fully functional state. However, Baghdadi and IS use indiscriminate violence to achieve goals, both against their own Muslim people and abroad. Baghdadi's deputy, Abu Muhammed al-Adnani, has declared that "The only law I subscribe to is the law of the jungle", a statement that resonates with the IS principle of "total war".¹⁷⁸ The organisation's actions have orchestrated the execution of Muslim minorities or perceived infidels, and Iraqi soldiers. Al Qaeda denounced these actions as counterproductive to unifying the Islamic state. Additionally, IS has demanded that all Muslims swear allegiance to the caliphate and Baghdadi, its self-proclaimed caliph, religious heir, and descendant of the prophet Muhammad.¹⁷⁹ Like any business or government, IS has strategies and operations in place to achieve desired ends. One of the organisation's present objectives is to secure the unification of regions it acquired in Iraq and Syria, particularly Mosul and Raqqa, through the instigation of civil war and hostility between the Sunni and Shiite tribes. Shiites of the debauched Assad regime are believed to be apostates and traitors to Islam and Arab unity.¹⁸⁰

The divergences between the Sunni and Shiite tribes are significant. Shiite, or Shi'ah Islam, constitutes about 10% of the world's Islam, while the remaining 90% encompasses Sunni

¹⁷⁸ Gerges, "IS and the Third Wave of Jihadism," 340.

¹⁷⁹ Tucker, "The Islamic State. Origins, Goals, and Future Implications," 3.

¹⁸⁰ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 41.

Islam, which is subscribed to by IS. Sunni and Shiite disagreements resulted from Shiite Islam deeming the Prophet Ali, and his son Husayn, as the rightful successors to the Prophet Muhammad. Shiites dismiss Baghdadi as being the descendant of Muhammad, a rejection not well received by the Sunnis or IS. The Islamic State is best described and identified by three characteristics: Sunni, jihadist and Salafist,¹⁸¹ all of which define and direct the organisation's functions and activities. As previously stated, jihadism is an Islamic religious term that refers to the duty and responsibility of Muslims to encourage and expand Islam and contest Islam's unbelievers and infidels. Jihad, as expressed by IS, entails excommunication and the execution of infidels and apostates. Extracted from IS's official propaganda magazine *Dabiq*, Issue 15, jihad and the sword are professed to be an integral part of Allah's law. Accompanying a graphic image of a man being beheaded, IS uses radical and extreme Quranic connotations to justify their brutality:

All of this would be done, not for racism, nationalism, or political lies, but to make the word of Allah supreme. Jihad is the ultimate show of one's love for his Creator, facing the clashing of swords and buzzing of bullets on the battlefield, seeking to slaughter His enemies – whom he hates for Allah's hatred of them. A religion without these fundamentals is one that does not call its adherents to fully manifest and uphold the love of the Lord.¹⁸²

Salafism is a sequel to the Sunni orientation, where Islamic law is favoured and applied selectively. Barrett proposes that: "Salafis derive an obscurantist, hyper-literalist, sectarian, fanatical orientation from their non-traditional readings of scripture". This extremist interpretation and approach to Islam has also been referred to as *Wahhabism*. Islamic or Shar'ia Law is drawn from parts of the holy Qur'an and the Hadith, and can be interpreted in a number of different ways, as exemplified by IS.¹⁸³ During an interview with a captured member, Abu Ahmed (his *nom de guerre*), said that hundreds of young men like him, "who were drawn to a Sunni jihad after the US invasion, do not believe that the latest manifestation of the decade-long war remains true to its origins and religious direction".¹⁸⁴

¹⁸¹ Stanford University, Mapping Militant Organisations: The Islamic State.

¹⁸² The Islamic State, *Dabiq* Issue 15: Break the Cross. Jihadology (2016): 80.

¹⁸³ Kevin Barrett, "Sunni, Shi'a, Salafi, Sufi, Shar'ia: A guide for the perplexed," Veterans Today Network (3 December 2013).

¹⁸⁴ Martin Chulov, "IS: the inside story," *The Guardian* (12 November 2014): 4-5.

2.5.5. Media, Propaganda and Recruitment Profile

IS has used propaganda and goodwill to affirm the image of a virtuous and worthy governing body. However, their strategies of justice, law and order are questionable, as they continue to publicly mutilate and crucify criminals and opposition members. Most notably, IS continues to propagate and maintain violent anti-American and Israeli sentiments.¹⁸⁵ Considering this, an exploration of the ideological, cultural, and religious aspects that motivate IS becomes necessary. Senior IS member, Nasser Balochi, made a statement in which he reinforced the reality of a war of ideologies: “This is a war of ideologies as much as it is a physical war. And just as the physical war must be fought on the battlefield, so too must the ideological war be fought in the media”.¹⁸⁶

With connections from Syria to Iraq and abroad, IS has gained supportive allies and in surrounding regions.¹⁸⁷ The organisation has proved to be tactically and strategically resourceful, targeting the poor, vulnerable and disenfranchised regions and communities in and around Iraq, Syria and particularly Lebanon, where civil war and extremism is rampant.¹⁸⁸ IS has consequently superseded Al Qaeda, assuming superiority in the international jihadist movement. It is evident that the organisation maintains effective operations and management within, where reports are produced, recruitment is monitored, social media is utilised and statistics are collected.¹⁸⁹ IS ensures the spread of its ideology, influence and social profile through the use of Facebook, Instagram and Twitter, among others, all of which are used as platforms for instructions and messages on Islamic purity and unification. Solomon records that in a week, IS can produce more than 120 media releases in six different languages – a demonstration of the extent and scope of communicating their ideology.¹⁹⁰

The IS sophistication is undeniable and their appeal understandable, as the caliphate and religious framework present the appeal of serving a great biblical and historical cause. This ensures a strong religious and nationalist identity and cause, to which people flock in the pursuit of belonging to a community and unified campaign. IS not only maintains a vibrant identity, but provides identity to its followers. The corrupt dictatorships that continue to rule over the

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Jessica Stern and J M Burger, *IS: The State of Terror* (London: William Collins, 2015): 147.

¹⁸⁷ Gulmohamad, “The Rise and Fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (Levant) IS,” 1-2.

¹⁸⁸ Gerges, “IS and the Third Wave of Jihadism,” 340.

¹⁸⁹ Tucker, “Islamic State. Origins, Goals, and Future Implications,” 5.

¹⁹⁰ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 22.

Arab world, exemplified in leaders like Assad, have fashioned IS as the pioneer of revolution and the saviour of marginalised Muslim people. This has encouraged further international support and recruitment, as Muslims worldwide (particularly the marginalised) come to defend and espouse their fellow Muslims in opposition of governmental persecution and oppression.

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Social media and the connected, globalised world have played a significant role in furthering IS agendas and have acted as enablers for the organisation by advancing recruitment and encouraging donations. The organisation's Twitter application, for instance, transmits and shares instructions, messages, reports and orders in various languages, together with images and links to IS-related activities and attacks. IS's social media role is threatening to the world's infidels, but appealing to young jihadis and middle-class Muslims who share the ideology, culture and religion enshrined in IS's vision of instilling Shar'ia Law and purifying Islam.¹⁹²

Many scholars and experts believe that the Iraqi /Levant territory and its occupants are self-destructive. Put simply, international intervention is unnecessary as all the separate groups in the region are fighting each other, making the Iraqi region less attractive for tourism, foreign aid and investment. This means that the Iraqi situation is bound to get far worse before getting any better, or any closer to peace. Aggressive intervention, particularly US intervention, is liable to reinforce and emphasise IS and jihadi ideologies and sentiments, which likely means increased terrorist attacks and threats abroad, and further instability in the already disrupted regions and their populace.¹⁹³

2.6. CONCLUSION

IS came into being as a reaction to a Middle East torn apart by strife, western invasion and intervention, government corruption, religious and social marginalisation, tribal sectarianism, ideological extremism and decades of unaddressed grievances. The organisation's ideology has led to its extremist actions that pose a threat to all. Under the Salafist-jihadi persuasion, Muslims must incorporate Islam into all aspects of their lives and culture, and employ all possible measures against threats to Islam and its enemies. This means that a majority of the world's population qualify as ideal and legitimate targets. IS has made the phenomenon of

¹⁹¹ Gerges, "IS and the Third Wave of Jihadism," 342.

¹⁹² Wood, *The Way of the Strangers: Encounters with the Islamic State*, 101-102.

¹⁹³ Tucker, "The Islamic State. Origins, Goals, and Future Implications," 8.

terrorism universal, turning the world into a compromised and threatening place. It relies on violence, brutality, shock value, the vulnerabilities of surrounding regions, sectarian instigation and the malleability of prospective recruits. The following chapter explores and considers IS alongside Rapoport's four waves of terror.

CHAPTER THREE: IS AND RAPOPORT'S FOUR WAVES OF TERRORISM

*Jihadist brutality is magnified by the movement's elitist character and the zealotry of its militants. Pronounced religious fanaticism and group dynamics reinforce extremism.*¹⁹⁴

3.1. INTRODUCTION

Rapoport's four waves served as the theoretical foundation of this study. This chapter is therefore devoted to the exploration and a literary review of the waves of terrorism. In order to make tentative projections about a fifth or even sixth wave, the established waves need consultation and consideration. Although these waves do not implicitly form part of the analysis on IS, they do ground the application of the fifth wave and support the notion of a 'sixth' wave and are therefore important to discuss. Rapoport pioneered the study of the waves of terrorism, and made significant strides and contributions to the topic.¹⁹⁵ He postulates that four waves of terrorism have inundated and engulfed the world. As noted in Chapter One, these are the Anarchist Wave of the 1880s, the Anti-Colonial Wave of the 1920s, the New Leftist Wave of the 1960s and most significant to this study, the Religious Wave, which began in 1979 and is evidently still in effect, as exemplified by IS.¹⁹⁶

As previously noted, the focus of this study is on Rapoport's fourth (religious) wave and Kaplan's fifth wave; however, the first three waves are examined to lay a solid foundation for understanding the history and background of terrorism. In addition, the concept of revolution or revolutionary violence requires attention, as revolution and transformation have subsisted as key concerns and objectives in all four waves, however divergent they may be. Revolutions may be characterised by the budding desire for "national self-determination", where returning the power to the people is the foremost objective, as in the American and French Revolutions. In addition, revolutionary action seeks to ensure the "radical reconstruction of authority," as Rapoport puts it.¹⁹⁷ Accordingly, the Anti-Colonial wave is considered the most successful of all four waves, yet it does not account for the current incidences of terror, specifically relating

¹⁹⁴ Celso, "The Islamic State and Boko Haram: Fifth Wave Jihadist Terror Groups," 4.

¹⁹⁵ World Who's Who, Rapoport David C.

¹⁹⁶ Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11," Para 5-6.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid, Para 7-8.

to IS. Beyond an exploration of the waves of terrorism, the idea of modern terrorism must be re-explored to include IS and the recent developments in its terror campaigns, operations, methods and objectives.¹⁹⁸ An enhanced application of Rapoport's waves to the Islamic State will be made, following the initial introduction and exploration of the waves history, purpose and relevance.

3.2. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY ON RAPOPORT'S WAVES

Freedom from oppression, liberation, nationalism, and emancipation are some of the ideological themes underlying Rapoport's first three waves. However, an upsurge in international empathy towards terrorist movements emerged from the second wave onwards (Anti-Colonial 1920s-60s), finally dissipating into the newly swelling third wave (New Left Wave, late 1960s-90s).¹⁹⁹ The disappearance of international support during the 70s can be attributed to the extreme brutality of the attacks, the targeting of innocents, the scope of influence and internationality, and above all, the manifestation of a unique and contemporary form of terrorism, understood today as state-sponsored terrorism.²⁰⁰ IS, however, exhibits state-building terrorism and not state-sponsored terrorism – an aspect that will be explored in upcoming chapters.

The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism is Rapoport's evaluation of the scale, intensity and prevalence of the phenomenon of terrorism, in conjunction with key historical events and evolutions that are points of departure for each consecutive wave. In understanding the concept of wave theory, Harrow explains a wave of terrorism as a movement or inclination, inclusive of the individual and the collective, which manifests and surges as the result of encouraging feedback and support. This upsurge rouses unified support and provides the essentials needed for major factions to manifest, expand their influence, recruit from abroad, intensify actions and facilitate terrorism domestically and internationally.²⁰¹ Building further on Rapoport's four waves of terrorism, Sedgwick postulates that "Rapoport's anarchist wave might thus be

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, Para 6.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, Para 5-6.

²⁰⁰ Tessaleno Devezas and Humberto Santos, "The Emergence of Modern Terrorism," *Kondratieff Waves, Warfare & World Security* 5, 1 (2006): 245.

²⁰¹ Martin Harrow, "Inside a Wave of Terrorism: The Dynamic Relation Between Terrorism and the Factors Leading to Terrorism," *Journal of Global Change and Governance* 1, 3 (2008): 15.

associated with the industrial revolution, his anti-colonial wave with World War II, and his leftist wave with the cultural and social revolution of the 1960s”.²⁰²

3.3. THE FIRST WAVE: Anarchist – 1880s

Anarchism is synonymous with rebellion, revolution, chaos, and lawlessness; but that is not to say that anarchist actions are not at all affirmative or constructive. The revolutionary actions and events that took place in the Russian Balkans during the 19th century emerge as a focal point in exploring the first wave of terrorism and understanding the interplay between terror, politics, propaganda, and revolutionary shock value. Accordingly, the czars of Russia were notorious for their employment of mercenaries against the Turkish, who subsequently counter-acted with the slaughter of Christians. The Christians consequently revolted, thereby aggravating the rash of rivalry and conflict in the region.²⁰³

The anarchist activities and operations of the Czar’s affiliates were intended to generate support of revolution. As Rapoport puts it, the Czar-instigated mayhem was indicative of “anarchist efforts to put atrocities at the service of revolution”.²⁰⁴ However, research and accounts are indicative of first wave terrorism being essentially civilian and non-combatant discriminate, revealing that the state and bodies of authority were the preferred and thus the legitimate targets. This serves as an interesting contrast to the terrorist attacks of the 20th and 21st centuries, and the current climate of terrorism, where attacks and violence against civilians and non-combatants are the desired agenda.²⁰⁵ First wave terrorism sought to shatter conventions and instigate change. The rebels’ most efficient strategy for achieving this was to target prominent political figures in order to incite change, inspire support and arouse attention.²⁰⁶

Rapoport identifies the first terrorist organisation and how it initiated the first wave of terrorism. Once again, the Russian Balkans served as the stage for the *Narodnaya Volya*, also known as The People’s Will organisation, which emerged and revolutionised existing forms of civil and mass rebellion. The organisation disposed of conventional means of mutiny like

²⁰² Mark Sedgwick, “Inspiration and the Origins of Global Waves of Terrorism,” *Studies In Conflict & Terrorism* 30, 2 (2007): 99.

²⁰³ David C Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism.” In *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, edited by A Cronin and J Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004): 50-52.

²⁰⁴ Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11,” Para 18.

²⁰⁵ Leonard Weinberg and William Eubank, “An End to the Fourth Wave of Terrorism?” *Studies In Conflict & Terrorism*, 33, 7 (2010): 594-595.

²⁰⁶ Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11,” Para 13-14.

pamphlets, gatherings, and demonstrations, and incorporated those that ensured and commanded attention and respect. Terrorism therefore manifested as an appropriate and effective measure for instigating and instilling revolutionary change.²⁰⁷ With the aforementioned in mind, Rapoport postulates that the Anarchist Wave is based upon four key principles:

- Firstly: modern society contains huge reservoirs of latent ambivalence and hostility.
- Secondly: society muffles and diffuses them by devising moral conventions to generate guilt and provide channels for settling some grievances and securing personal amenities.
- Thirdly: conventions can be explained historically and are relative, therefore acts deemed to be immoral now, coming generations may hail as noble efforts to liberate humanity.
- Finally: terror is the quickest and most effective means to destroy conventions.²⁰⁸

First wave terrorism emerged in response to the civilian need for ways to transform and impinge on critical political events, as well as to address governmental shortcomings and vulnerabilities. Similarly, IS emerged amidst gross governmental shortcomings and violations, particularly on the part of the Assad regime, and the civil conflict in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings. IS was seen by the marginalised Sunni community as the saviour and champion of their cause. However, nothing close to deliverance has prevailed. Instead, IS's revolutionary intent transformed into sectarianism, displacement, the genocide of minorities, and widespread terror and violence.

3.4. THE SECOND WAVE: Anti-Colonial – 1920s

The aftermath of World War 1 cultivated sentiments of self-determination and nationalism. The supremacy and legitimacy of the defeated European empires was in a state of deterioration due to the increasing atmosphere of autonomy and independence. Ultimately, colonialism was at the mercy of the preferred nationalism. The 1920s became the stage for the second wave of terrorism, Rapoport's Anti-Colonial Wave. This wave manifested from a desire and need for

²⁰⁷ Ibid, Para 13-14.

²⁰⁸ Ibid, Para 14-15.

national liberation and independence from European colonialists and their impositions.²⁰⁹ Subsequently, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) emerged, along with several other organisations in emancipated states such as Algeria, Cyprus, Ireland, Israel and Yemen, where colonialism had dissipated.²¹⁰ Supporting the notion that nationalism is embedded in all preceding and presiding waves of terrorism, Parker and Sitter rationalised that “the chain of nationalist terrorism stretches unbroken from the 1880s to the present day”.²¹¹

Rapoport’s study reveals that the strategies and operations of second wave terrorism were increasingly unconcerned with activities and targets deemed inconsequential. Bank robberies became less frequent, suicide and martyrdom became less of a necessity. Most significantly, the targeting and assassinations of important political and public dignitaries declined as it was recognised for being counterproductive in furthering the desired cause and objectives. Instead, efforts and activities were directed towards police and other officials of authority, where eliminating the government’s men on the ground proved to be pivotal. In addition, civil and social encouragement and support for terrorist organisations resulted in governmental outsourcing of military troops for the performance of law enforcement and policing. However, ill-equipped and ill-advised military contractors fell short in impeding terrorist developments and counteracting their attacks. In this wave, guerrilla tactics proved to be the most successful and the non-existence of uniforms or distinguishable attire meant the field and rules of war were transforming.²¹²

The main objective during this wave of terror was to lure colonial powers into confrontations they were likely to lose, as IS did throughout their campaign to coerce western involvement, that is, the dispatching of international military and aid workers.²¹³ Guerrilla warfare therefore emerged as a central component in terrorism and rebellion during the anti-colonial wave. However, terrorist organisations often fell short of their original goals. The IRA acquired an Irish state but not the whole of Ireland. In addition, it should be noted that anti-colonial terrorists generally attempted to restrict civilian targeting and fatalities, focusing their energies on prominent figures, organisations, and institutions.²¹⁴ In so doing, rebel forces upheld the

²⁰⁹ Weinberg and Eubank, "An End to the Fourth Wave of Terrorism?" 594.

²¹⁰ Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11," Para 18-19.

²¹¹ Tom Parker and Nick Sitter, "The Four Horsemen of Terrorism – It’s not Waves, it’s Strains," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10, 1080 (2015): 16.

²¹² Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11," Para 6.

²¹³ International CrIS Group, "Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State," 3-5.

²¹⁴ Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11," Para 6.

original principles and purposes of the movement. Rapoport asserts that "...concentrating on purpose rather than means, [transformed] people [into] freedom fighters struggling against government terror".²¹⁵ Consequently, a dilemma in defining terrorism and identifying terrorists emerged. In addition, the negative associations and implications of being a terrorist organisation resulted in amplified social and political burdens and responsibilities. Although the same cannot necessarily be applied to IS, it is worth noting that terrorist organisations across the globe began rebranding themselves as "freedom fighters".

3.5. THE THIRD WAVE: New Leftist – Late 1960s

Appearing in the late 1960s, third wave terrorism is characterised as nationalist and radical in nature and purpose. Weinberg and Eubank assert that "social revolution and national self-assertion were the aspirations of the time".²¹⁶ Rapoport refers to the Vietnam War as the heart and soul of the New Leftist wave, where the strides and successes of the Vietcong against the American superpower inspired not only optimism, but realisation that the Western world had its own susceptibilities and vulnerabilities. With the aspiration of combining anarchism with nationalism in the hope of achieving self-determination, when the Vietnam War ended in 1975 and third wave terrorist organisations dissipated, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) manifested as the third wave's saving grace.²¹⁷

Western imperialism was often referred to by the PLO as an internationalist challenge to the nationalist Arab liberation campaign. In 1968, the organisation released a charter that insisted on the dissolution of the state of Israel and the constitution of a "democratic secular state" that would offer and maintain equal citizenship, rights and freedoms for all, regardless of religious or ethnic orientation.²¹⁸ The PLO's emergence after the downfall of three preceding Arab armies, served to affirm that terrorism was an effective and valuable alternative to typical military approaches. The PLO's existence laid the foundation for Islamic jihad and IS today; "...in spite of most of their inspiration being ideological in nature and grounded on nationalistic and/or ethnic ideals, some new features began to emerge," for instance the addition of religious rationale, international training and cooperation among different terrorist groups, and state sponsorship.²¹⁹

²¹⁵ Ibid, Para 1, 21 &22.

²¹⁶ Weinberg and Eubank, "An End to the Fourth Wave of Terrorism?" 596.

²¹⁷ Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11," Para 6.

²¹⁸ Weinberg and Eubank, "An End to the Fourth Wave of Terrorism?" 596.

²¹⁹ Devezas and Santos, "The Emergence of Modern Terrorism," 245-246.

The New Leftist wave resolutely took on an international identity in which diverse groups of different nationalities came together to share and support the cause, thus cultivating an avant-garde, revolutionary movement. Third wave terrorism therefore evolved and expanded to include the international arena, thereby introducing the concept of “international terrorism”. International attacks began to win favour over domestic attacks. Rapoport asserted that the PLO’s activities were predominantly focused on and against Europe. When international confrontation was not being pursued, the group sought and targeted prominent individuals, particularly in political and international arenas, like governmental officials and Americans.²²⁰

Examples of multi-national or co-operative international terror attacks include the 1972 Munich Olympic Games massacre, and the 1975 OPEC member kidnappings. The extreme shock of the attacks, and the nature of terrorism during this era, gained recognition and infamy for Third Wave or New Leftist terrorism. Airline hijackings were used as a strategy, particularly in the 1970s when more than a hundred airline hijackings took place. Preference for the hijacking strategy can be attributed to the international nature of the act, and that international landing strips were more accessible then than they are today. In addition, the shock value of such attacks coupled with the threat of hostage-taking, resulted in the advancement and acknowledgement of terrorist demands and rationales.²²¹

A further important development in third wave terrorism was the targeting of embassies. In 1979, the Saudi Arabian embassy in Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, was attacked by PLO members. Rapoport reports that more than seventy kidnapping and hostage-type terror attacks occurred in Latin America, Italy, and Spain during the term of the third wave. Kidnapping and hostage-taking during this era proved to be profitable. Not only did hostages provide political leverage and bargaining support, but the typically insured business executive was worth enough to contribute approximately USD350 000 to these operations. The preference for tactics of grandeur like the embassy attacks and aircraft hijackings exceeded first and second wave preferences, like the bank robberies during the Anarchist wave.²²²

²²⁰ Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11," Para 23.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11," Para 24-25.

Referring to Rapoport's research, Devezas and Santos comment on the concept of state-sponsored terrorism by making mention of the Iranian Invasion of 1979. Islamic Prophet Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini used religious and political influence to initiate war against America through the invasion of the US Embassy in Tehran, and the subsequent capture and hostage-holding of fifty-two diplomats for 444 days. The US's feeble and unconvincing response was a display of vulnerability that the radical Islamist world had been waiting for. It resulted in a surge of radical and extremist attacks, in an attempt to humiliate the US and encourage other fanatical organisations to follow suit.²²³

Successes during 1979 fuelled the focus and purpose of the Islamist campaign, where forces were mobilised, funds were outsourced, recruits were trained and weaponry was acquired. This resulted in a heightened Islamic anti-Western organisation, with influence and affiliates in Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. "Such development configures Rapoport's fourth wave. The number of active terrorist groups diminished, in the following years terrorism assumed a strong religious character, and state sponsored terrorism led to the world-political circumstances we live in today."²²⁴ The Islamic State's brand of terrorism goes beyond preconceived notions; their campaign is not only state-sponsored by affiliate Gulf States like Qatar and Kuwait, but it pursues its own state-building and governance.²²⁵

3.6. THE FOURTH WAVE: Religious – 1979 onwards

By referring to organisations like the IRA and PLO, Rapoport illustrates that religion and ethnicity have always been important components in shaping, determining and inspiring the identity and purpose of each wave and its respective organisations and affiliates. The Fourth Wave is the Religious Wave, which was set in motion in 1979, as the third wave waned. The three preceding waves were concerned with revolution and transformation of existing systems of governments and states. Rapoport asserts that "religion has a vastly different significance in the fourth wave, supplying justifications and organizing principles for the New World to be established".²²⁶

²²³ Devezas and Santos, "The Emergence of Modern Terrorism," 246.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 25.

²²⁶ Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11," Para 25.

The fourth wave is notably the most serious and significant wave, where once again the terrorism playing fields were transforming with the increasing use of bio-chemical weapons that claimed the lives of thousands. Numerous extremist-religious terrorist groups emerged during this era. In Japan, an organisation called *Aum Shinrikyo* emerged, which was a melting pot of diverse religions and ethnicities made up of Buddhist, Christian and Hindu members. They released nerve gas on a Tokyo train in 1995, badly affecting approximately three thousand people, and killing twelve.²²⁷ Other examples of terrorist attacks and campaigns took place in Israel between 1994-95, where Jewish terrorists demolished a prominent Islamic shrine and targeted Palestinian and Islamic officials and governmental institutions. One incident saw the death of twenty-nine Islamist devotees in Abraham's tomb. In 1995, the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, was assassinated by radical Jewish-Israeli affiliates. Bearing the aforementioned attacks in mind, Islam emerges as the most influential religion pertaining to the fourth wave.²²⁸

Fourth wave terrorism revealed that religion is just as powerful and influential as politics. Three crucial events were largely responsible for the transformations and developments that propelled the fourth wave. The first of these events was the Iranian Revolution of 1979, where public demonstrations and community mobilisation not only rendered the Shah's armies ineffective, but established that religion was as appealing and unifying as political and revolutionary philosophies.²²⁹ The Iranian Revolution produced a system and community where governance and religion amalgamated to form what Weinberg and Eubank term an "Islamic theocracy."²³⁰ Further, Iranian revolutionaries came to the assistance of Shiite terror organisations in Lebanon, Iraq and Saudi Arabia and began implementing "self-martyrdom" and suicide tactics.²³¹

The second prominent event was the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which when considering the Middle Eastern region, may be equally attributable to the activities and pressures enforced by Muslim resistance in Afghanistan at the time. Accordingly, Weinberg and Eubank point out that "the ill-fated decision in 1979 by the Soviets to furnish military assistance to the secularizing and pro-communist regime in Afghanistan produced violent resistance in response

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Weinberg and Eubank, "An End to the Fourth Wave of Terrorism?" 596.

²²⁹ Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11," Para 25.

²³⁰ Weinberg and Eubank, "An End to the Fourth Wave of Terrorism?" 596.

²³¹ Ibid.

to the Soviet invasion”.²³² Rapoport asserts that “religion now manifested the ability to eliminate a secular super-power”.²³³ Coupled with radicalism and notions of nationalism, religion was used to condone and justify violence and brutality – a notion that bolstered and propelled fourth wave terrorism and organisations like the Islamic State to where they are today.

The prominence of religion is encompassed in the third event, which commenced in 1979 and is related to the Muslim anticipation of the new century and the coming of the redeemer. This anticipation intensified the Iranian Revolution, triggering a ripple effect of uprisings and resistance. As the calendar moved into the new century, the Grand Mosque in Mecca was raided by Sunni Muslims, who, as established in previous chapters, presently constitute the majority of IS. This raid was responsible for approximately ten thousand casualties. Subsequently, states in which Islam predominated, namely, Syria, Egypt, and Algeria, became the birthing grounds for Sunni terrorist organisations. Sunni terrorist organisations, in competition with the PLO, acquired their prestige and reputation mostly from suicide bombings, which took shock and strategic innovation to an entirely new level. Reaffirmation of the sacrificial theme ensured that religious criteria were met and further enhanced by the injection of “shock and extreme innovation”.²³⁴ The 2016 release of *Dabiq*, Issue 15, IS’s official magazine, expresses that:

This is a divinely-warranted war between the Muslim nation and the nations of disbelief. Despite this clarity, many people in Crusader countries express shock and even disgust that Islamic State leadership ‘uses religion to justify violence.’ Indeed, waging jihad – spreading the rule of Allah by the sword – is an obligation found in the Quran, the word of our Lord, just as it was an obligation sent in the Torah, the Psalms, and the Gospels.²³⁵

Unlike occurrences in the third wave, fourth wave terrorism tactics concentrated on foreign government and military institutions. An effective example is the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York and the later attack on the Pentagon. It was to be the first of many, escalating to the 9/11 attacks, the war on terror, and finally the presiding climate of terrorism.²³⁶

Al Qaeda, renowned for its brutality, efficiency, and extremity, evolved under the supervision and nurturing of Osama Bin Laden and the influence of the fourth wave. Al Qaeda aspired to

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11," Para 26.

²³⁴ Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11," Para 27.

²³⁵ The Islamic State, *Dabiq* Issue 15: Break the Cross, 78.

²³⁶ Ibid.

rectify perceived injustices within and abroad, and to unify the Islamic world under Shar'ia Law. Al Qaeda's aspirations were shared by Sunni followers from Africa to Asia, and the Middle East. This common goal transformed not only the face of Al Qaeda, but terrorism as a whole. No longer were recruitments limited to single nationalities or ethnicities. Religion enabled the accumulation of diversified support and resources. It did not, however, prove enough to propel Al Qaeda to where it aspired to be. US involvement in the region posed a significant dilemma to the execution of Al Qaeda activities, and as Rapoport asserts: "eliminating American influence in these states [was] a precondition of reunification".²³⁷ Moreover, the convergence and encouragement of Islamic Sunni resistance groups was crucial in maintaining the fourth wave's momentum, as well as setting the stage for IS, the current champion of the Sunni cause.²³⁸

Beyond that, it can be said with certainty that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 initiated the jihadist campaign, brought Al Qaeda into being and IS as it is known today.²³⁹ To date, Middle Eastern people and specifically Syrian people "...have been abused by Assad and his forces, opposition leaders and lack of leadership itself, the West, China and Russia for supporting Assad, and the radical jihadis that compose IS".²⁴⁰

On reviewing Rapoport's study, although each wave maintains its own "leitmotif; anarchism; national liberation; social revolution; religious transcendence,"²⁴¹ the notion of nationalism manifests across the board. For IS, revolution, nationalism, religious unification, and self-determination are elements that have defined and underpinned the organisation and are applicable to IS throughout. IS's globalised campaign is precisely so threatening because its concept of "nationalism" and its audience of appeal have transformed and expanded to include many extremists, whilst excluding and marginalising the perceived infidels. In *Dabiq* Issue 1, Amirul Mu'minin declared:

O Muslims everywhere, glad tidings to you and expect good. Raise your head high, for today – by Allah's grace – you have a state and Khilafah, which will return your dignity, might, rights, and leadership. It is a state where the Arab and non-Arab, the white man and black man, the easterner and westerner are all brothers. It is a Khilafah that gathered the Caucasian, Indian, Chinese, Shami, Iraqi, Yemeni, Egyptian, Maghribi (North African),

²³⁷ Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11," Para 29.

²³⁸ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 19.

²³⁹ Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11," Para 28-29.

²⁴⁰ Di Giovanni, *Dispatches from Syria: The Morning They Came For Us*, 146.

²⁴¹ Weinberg and Eubank, "An End to the Fourth Wave of Terrorism?" 594-602.

American, French, German, and Australian. Allah brought their hearts together, and thus, they became brothers.²⁴²

3.7. APPLYING RAPOPORT'S FOUR WAVES TO IS

Elements of Rapoport's waves are applicable to IS across the board, but require enhancement in the context of this study, as IS is likely to be the most extreme and radical terrorist organisation encountered thus far. First wave anarchist terrorism emerged in response to the need for avenues to transform critical political events and address governmental shortcomings.²⁴³ A heightened sense of this governmental injection is inherent in IS's activities and objectives, and in its governance. First wave terror encompassed revolution and transformation. IS encourages both in its surrounding regions and has benefited from the sectarianism, strife, civil war, and political distress, as is evident in Syria. However, establishing itself as a governmental body as well as assuming sovereignty, leads to the notion that IS transcends first wave terror.²⁴⁴

The second or anti-colonial wave of the 1920s, brought the desire for national liberation and independence from European colonialists and their impositions. This resonates with IS's sentiments and reactions towards the partitions and impositions of the West, particularly the US invasions, and the historic humiliation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement.²⁴⁵ Second wave terror epitomises nationalism: so does IS. The organisation's governmental structure consists of local, provincial, and national levels, all of which are run under Shar'ia Islamic law and the ideal of Muslim national unity. To say that nationalism and second wave characteristics apply to IS is an understatement. The entire rationale behind the organisation is premised on Islamic and Muslim nationalism and liberation. This is demonstrated in their pursuit of the Islamic caliphate in the Iraqi-Syrian regions.²⁴⁶

With the third new leftist wave of the 1960s distinguished by sentiments of nationalism and radicalism, its applicability to IS is undeniable. Upholding Islamic and Muslim nationalism is a notion that underpins all the organisation's endeavours. Radicalism dominates the organisation's activities, where reactions, particularly to western imperialism, are characterised

²⁴² The Islamic State, Dabiq Issue 1: "The Return of the Khilafah," The Clarion Project (10 September 2014): 7.

²⁴³ Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11," Para 16-17.

²⁴⁴ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 2-3.

²⁴⁵ Weinberg and Eubank, "An End to the Fourth Wave of Terrorism?" 594.

²⁴⁶ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 27.

by extreme attacks and tactics that have expanded to an international scale, redefining perceptions of international terrorism and sleeper cells.²⁴⁷ This radicalism and extremism is even inherent in the organisation naming itself a *state*. Solomon affirms that the assumption of governing as a state entity is a representation of the organisation's 'grandiose' or radical objectives and ideologies.²⁴⁸

Finally, and most significant, is the fourth religious wave that emerged in 1979, which is believed still to be in effect. This fourth wave, as has previously been observed, clearly indicated that religion is as powerful and influential as politics. This notion was exemplified by Al Qaeda, and now IS, which manifested under the influence of the fourth wave. Al Qaeda emerged with the aspiration of rectifying injustices and unifying the Islamic world under Shar'ia Law. Beyond that, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 initiated the jihadist campaign, gave rise to Al Qaeda, followed by IS.²⁴⁹ The organisation is rooted in ancient Islamic history, tradition and religion dating back to the 7th century biblical era of the Rashidun Caliphate in AD 632 and the Mongol Invasion in AD 1258. IS is devoted and premised according to (selective) strict interpretations of the Qur'an, the example of the Prophet Muhammad, and the *Hadith*. Solomon reaffirms this and asserts that IS "justifies each of its actions on the basis of precedents set by Islamic tradition".²⁵⁰

3.8. CONCLUSION

IS is a direct product and culmination of revolution, nationalism, radicalism and religion, all aspects intrinsic to each wave, but extended by the desire for sovereignty. Logically, there is the possibility of a new or evolving wave framework that will facilitate further exploration of IS. The fourth wave's religious terrorism supersedes all the preceding waves in intensity and extremity. Many scholars assert that the fourth wave still has another ten years of influence remaining, as in contrast to the preceding waves, fourth wave terrorism is principally entrenched in the radical Islamic campaign and its anti-Western sentiments. Movements and crusades rooted in religion persist longer than those rooted solely in political or ideological notions and purposes. The fourth wave and the radical Islamic campaign's lifespan depends on successful unification of the Islamic states and establishment of the caliphate. Until achieved,

²⁴⁷ Devezas and Santos, "The Emergence of Modern Terrorism," 246.

²⁴⁸ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 2.

²⁴⁹ Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11," Para 28-29.

²⁵⁰ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 42.

it is difficult to determine when the fourth wave and its religious connotations will expire. For this reason, Chapter Four explores IS alongside Kaplan's framework of fifth wave terrorism.

CHAPTER FOUR: KAPLAN'S FIFTH WAVE FRAMEWORK AND IS

*Centuries have passed since the wars of religion in Europe, and since men stopped dying in large numbers because of arcane theological disputes... Many refuse to believe that this group is as devout as it claims to be, or as backward-looking or apocalyptic as its actions and statements suggest.*²⁵¹

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The climate of terrorism preceding and following the 9/11 attacks assumed a radical, religious, nationalistic and revolutionary nature, inclusive of multiple aspects of Rapoport's four waves. Accordingly, the world and targets of terror are "facing a new and radical threat that [is] distinct from modern international terrorism by its diffuse nature, vague obscurantist objectives, and total lack of proportionality".²⁵² The scope and nature of terrorism has transformed so dramatically that the war against it cannot merely be one of military might, but must be one of ideology as well.²⁵³ Littlewood disagrees with the prospect of a fifth wave emerging any time before 2025; however, unique and evolving political and ideological driving forces are redefining the boundaries and understandings of terrorism, as well as evolving the forms and measures of terrorism itself. Considering this, a fifth wave framework is therefore essential. It is worth noting that Kaplan's fifth wave is also largely anchored in religion.²⁵⁴ In Kaplan's study, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda served as his case studies and are identified as the catalysts for a fifth wave of terrorism. In this study, however, IS is the case study and is explored utilising Kaplan's framework and his references to the Khmer Rouge, who, as supported by Wood, could be regarded as similar to the Islamic State and its pursuit of governance and domination, as well as its campaign of ethnic and religious cleansing.²⁵⁵

²⁵¹ Graeme Wood, "What IS really wants."

²⁵² Geneve Mantri, "Amnesty International Presents ... Homegrown Terrorism: Is There an Islamic Wave?" *Harvard International Review* 33, 1 (2011): 90.

²⁵³ Mantri, "Amnesty International Presents ... Homegrown Terrorism: Is There an Islamic Wave?" 90-94.

²⁵⁴ Jeremy Littlewood, "A Fifth Wave Of Terrorism?" Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society. Ontario: Carlton University (2014).

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

Although this study concurs with Rapoport's four waves of terrorism and their evolution, their applicability to IS and the current climate of terrorism is outdated. With the above quote by Wood in mind, it is generally asserted that IS transcends pre-established notions of terrorism and that its scope and globality, coupled with its amalgamation of religion and governance, is what potentially distinguishes it from other groups and waves. In addition, it is important to consider that IS and its brand of jihad may be a distinct ideology.²⁵⁶

4.2 BACKGROUND AND HISTORY: KAPLAN'S FRAMEWORK

The United to End Genocide organisation asserted that the Khmer Rouge was an organisation both terroristic and governmental. During its four years of power, the Khmer Rouge sought to establish a communist, rural paradise through the facilitation of sectarianism, marginalisation, civil and human rights violations, and mass genocide against all those perceived to be in opposition or disloyal to the regime. From its 1975 onset of power to its downfall in 1979, the Khmer killed and tortured an estimated two million Cambodian people. In hindsight, it was one of the world's most devastating cases of mass genocide and human destructive power; yet at the time the international community's reaction and response was lacking, if non-existent.²⁵⁷ Considering a present time case like IS, will it become another rung on the historical ladder of regrets for humanity, or are practical and effective responses and measures achievable now? Such recommendations are not the focus of this chapter, but nonetheless require exploration and development.

Evolving from an "oppositional terrorist movement", much like the ANC during apartheid, the Khmer honed and perfected regime terror, gaining territorial control and establishing governance, as IS has today. Wood compares IS with the Khmer as parallel cases of "murderous utopianism".²⁵⁸ Neither organisation can therefore be studied as a mere terrorist movement. In January 1979, Vietnamese troops and military forces supported by the Soviet Union, overran Cambodia and conquered Phnom Penh. The defeated Khmer fled into the wilderness and Pol Pot was evacuated by helicopter.²⁵⁹ Not since the Khmer has a terrorist proto-state emerged – until IS – which maintains compelling similarities with the infamous Khmer Rouge. Both the Khmer and IS have demonstrated an obsessive resort to ethnic

²⁵⁶ Jamal Khashoggi, "IS outshines Al-Qaida cruelty". Al Arabia News Channel, Saudi Arabia, (11 January 2014).

²⁵⁷ United to End Genocide, "The Cambodian Genocide," End Genocide (n.d).

²⁵⁸ Wood, *The Way of the Strangers*, 185.

²⁵⁹ Andy Carvin, "The Fall of the Khmer Rouge," (1999).

cleansing: IS has systematically wiped out Shi'ah, Sufi and Christian people, and their atrocities against the Yazidi minority constitute genocide. The only notable difference between the two is that the Khmer acknowledged the United Nations and occupied a seat. IS does not acknowledge the United Nations or any such “infidel institutions”.²⁶⁰ Lam postulates that:

Both came to power after their lands suffered invasions, bombings and bloodshed perpetrated by none other than the US. Both felt legitimized to defend their territory from western powers, and were trained by America's enemies, the Khmer Rouge by North Vietnamese Communist Army and IS by Al Qaeda. Both eventually rejected their ‘big brothers’ and established themselves as independent groups. Both became more emboldened with the withdrawal of U.S. troops.²⁶¹

Accordingly, fifth wave terrorism is premised on the notion and reality that globalisation and advancements in communication and transportation expand the influence, range and scope of terrorist ideologies.²⁶² In addition, the concept of governance and state-sovereignty emerge as significant factors exemplified and pursued by both the infamous Khmer and IS today. What is apparent is that Rapoport's four waves do not account for organisations that have broken away and branched out from pre-existing waves, as exemplified by the Khmer Rouge fifth wave model noted above, and IS emerging and evolving from Al Qaeda.²⁶³ Considering the foundation built by Kaplan's historical rationale of the fifth wave theory, this study now explores and analyses the fifth wave framework alongside IS.

4.3 IS AND THE FIFTH WAVE FRAMEWORK

Kaplan's waves clearly avoid comparing and contrasting fifth wave terror with Islamic and jihadist organisations – a fact agreed by Celso – due to the perceived challenges that accompany the extremist pursuit of the caliphate and Islamic unification. This is precisely why an application to IS is necessary, as jihadist terror has assumed an international and governing identity. Islamic unification, the caliphate and jihadist waves of terror are challenged by localism, power struggles and divisions in the Middle Eastern region. The pursuit of the caliphate has perpetuated war, civil unrest, sectarianism, human rights violations, and assassinations.²⁶⁴ Extreme Islamic ideology is often driven by other radical or popular

²⁶⁰ Wood, *The Way of the Strangers*, 185.

²⁶¹ Andrew Lam, “IS - Echoing the Purges of the Khmer Rouge?” *New America Media: War & Conflict* (4 February 2015).

²⁶² Celso, “The Islamic State and Boko Haram: Fifth Wave Jihadist Terror Groups,” 3.

²⁶³ *Ibid*, 4.

²⁶⁴ Celso, “The Islamic State and Boko Haram: Fifth Wave Jihadist Terror Groups,” 3.

ideologies. Civil war, drought and inadequate governmental authority are some of the contributing factors which, when coupled with racism or extreme nationalism, have the potential to ensure destruction, terror, and oppression on both international and local scales.²⁶⁵

IS is understood to follow Salafist-jihadism and Wahhabism ideologies, which are derived from extreme interpretations of Shar'ia Islamic Law, with no separation of state and religion. Salafist-jihadism entails the restoration of an unpolluted Islam, as it was founded. It rejects materials that are modern, secular, and anti-Islam, from contemporary Muslims to political regimes. In conjunction with Salafist-jihadism the ideology of Wahhabism entails the aggressive and autocratic interpretations of Islam by Mohammed Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and also those of Saudi Arabia's governing policy.²⁶⁶ Supported by Atwan, IS is "the latest evolutionary step in the Salafi-jihadi movement".²⁶⁷ With this in mind, it is apparent that ideology, culture and religion are inter-related components that not only exhibit the collectivist group mentality within organisations, but determine and rationalise choices and affiliations. The notion of belonging or having a sense of community has been mentioned in previous chapters as being directly related to and supportive of IS's force and scope. When combined with the impetus of a trend or popularity, movements like the Salafist-jihadi campaign are further invigorated, amplifying a sense of community and purpose, and thereby attracting more affiliates.²⁶⁸

This study asserts that IS's religiously motivated terror corresponds with Kaplan's fifth wave framework. Religious fanaticism and 'holier-than-thou' military attitudes have propelled IS, jihadism and violence to new and expanded extremes.²⁶⁹ In Celso's article, *The Islamic State and Boko Haram: Fifth Wave Jihadist Terror*, it is agreed that both terrorist organisations and their leaders aspire to purify and purge desired communities in pursuit of paradise on earth, or the caliphate.²⁷⁰ When moving from the fourth religious wave to the fifth wave of terrorism, it is still evident that religion is a significant catalyst and component. IS exemplifies such extremism in its extradition of divergent religionists in what is called *takfir*. Previously utilised in the excommunication of criminals, corrupt leaders and sinful persons, jihadists, predominantly the Sunni, have redefined and justified the mass use of *takfir* against soldiers,

²⁶⁵ Ibid, 4.

²⁶⁶ Clarion Project, *The Islamic State (IS, ISIL)*, (2015): 13-14.

²⁶⁷ Abdel Bari Atwan, "When it comes to 'Islamic State,' the west just doesn't get it," *Open Democracy* (9 July 2015).

²⁶⁸ Dipak K Gupta, "Accounting For the Waves of International Terrorism." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 2, 11 (2010): 4.

²⁶⁹ Celso, "The Islamic State and Boko Haram: Fifth Wave Jihadist Terror Groups," 4.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

divergent religionists and Shi'ite Muslims, for their devotion to the Prophet Ali and his son Husayn. Shi'ites are viewed as polytheists, apostates, and un-Islamic by Sunni jihadists. Former AQI leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, entrenched in the organisation the belief that Shi'ites and Kurds are apostates, polytheists and campaigners for the Jewish cause and establishment of an Iraqi Zionist state, as opposed to the pious Sunni jihadist state preference.²⁷¹

IS's jihad campaign has extended its *takfir* targeting to include attacks on jihadists from other rebel organisations and has acquired significant territories in the name of the Islamic State. In the fifth wave notion, it is asserted that “*takfiri* groups like IS often separate from the larger Islamist movement to create their own unique fifth wave like vision”.²⁷²

Kaplan's fifth wave characteristics are now explored. Table 4.1 below lists the 17 characteristics by which Kaplan identifies fifth wave terrorism (also noted in Chapter One). Exploring these characteristics alongside IS is the foremost task of this chapter.

²⁷¹ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 4.

²⁷² Celso, “The Islamic State and Boko Haram: Fifth Wave Jihadist Terror Groups,” 5.

Table 4.1: Kaplan’s fifth wave characteristics

| | |
|-----------|---|
| 1 | Radicalize and break away from established terrorist waves. |
| 2 | Born of hope expressed at the extremes: some emerge after all hope has been lost, others because the dream has been realised. |
| 3 | Physical withdrawal into wilderness areas. |
| 4 | Claim to establish some form of a new calendar (‘the Year Zero’). |
| 5 | Radical quest for purity—racial, tribal, ecological, etc. |
| 6 | Internal compromise impossible resulting in deadly schisms and constant internal violence. |
| 7 | Belief in human perfectibility and chiliastic utopia <i>in this lifetime</i> . |
| 8 | Emphasis on creating new men and women makes old models expendable; thus, the logic of genocidal violence. |
| 9 | Obsession with creating new race places tremendous emphasis on women, who are both subject and object of fifth wave violence. |
| 10 | Children are the vanguard of the fifth wave as they are the least contaminated by the old society (not to mention the old STDs, HIV, and other remnants of the old societies). |
| 11 | Rape is the signature tactic of the fifth wave. |
| 12 | Violence is so pervasive in the fifth wave that it loses its message content beyond the simple assertion that “we exist.” |
| 13 | The effects of ritualized acts of rape and killing, especially for newly abducted ‘recruits’, has the liminal effect of binding the killers to the group while closing the doors for all group members to return to family, the old society, and previous ways of life. |
| 14 | Fifth wave groups are localist and particularistic, having turned their backs on the international waves from which they emerged. |
| 15 | Nonetheless, if needed for survival, foreign allies will be cultivated and fifth wave groups will often live in exile in neighbouring states. |
| 16 | Authoritarian in nature with charismatic leadership patterns. |
| 17 | Chiliastic in nature, deeply religious with eclectic or syncretic religious tropes assembled and interpreted by the leaders in support of a millenarian dream to be realized through a campaign of apocalyptic violence. |

Source: Kaplan, *Terrorism’s Fifth Wave: A Theory, a Conundrum and a Dilemma*, 548.

4.3.1 Radicalize and Break Away from Established Terrorist Waves

The first characteristic of Kaplan's framework deals with the devolution and revolution of a pre-existing wave or tradition of terrorism.²⁷³ As has been previously established, IS is applicable across all four existing terrorist waves. The first wave of anarchist terrorism was intended to transform critical political events and address governmental shortcomings.²⁷⁴ IS played a pivotal role in the Arab Spring uprisings against the authoritarian Assad regime. IS emerged as a saviour and champion of the people, only later to reveal its true intentions. It encouraged and benefited from the sectarianism, strife, civil war, and political distress, as evident in Syria and Iraq. It used the atmosphere of anarchism and revolution to further its Salafi-jihadist agenda. The second wave of anti-colonialism encompassed the pursuit of national liberation and independence from foreign colonialism and control. The Arab Spring uprising and subsequent emergence of IS were related results and reactions to US and foreign intervention. The IS agenda is consequently one of nationalist intent; it pursues Muslim national unity under the premise of Shar'ia Islamic Law.²⁷⁵

The third new leftist wave was an intensification of the nationalist agenda with injections of radicalism and extremism. Islamic and Muslim national unification is precisely the sought-after agenda of IS. Their pursuits entail extreme violence and radicalism throughout, as can be seen in international terrorist events witnessed worldwide. The fourth wave made it clear that religion is as powerful and influential as politics, and is as open to distortion. This is clearly illustrated by IS's religious justification of their actions and atrocities. IS and all that it encompasses is the product of Islamic custom, history and religious interpretation.²⁷⁶

IS manifested amidst a combination of revolution, nationalism, radicalism, and religion, provoking civil unrest and uprising in the region. Apart from encompassing aspects of all the previous waves, IS has further advanced and evolved from them in its pursuit of governance, the state and sovereignty. The establishment of itself as a governmental body, as well as assuming sovereignty and dominion over all Muslims, leads to the conclusion that IS transcends all pre-existing waves and traditions of terrorism. The organisation's hand on the

²⁷³ Kaplan, "Terrorism's Fifth Wave: A Theory, a Conundrum and a Dilemma," 13.

²⁷⁴ Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11," Para 16-17.

²⁷⁵ Weinberg and Eubank, "An End to the Fourth Wave of Terrorism?" 594.

²⁷⁶ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 42.

helm of governance and its pursuit of statehood therefore requires exploration according to a contemporary interpretation or framework.²⁷⁷

4.3.2 Terrorist Groups Are Born of Hope Expressed at the Extreme

What Kaplan terms as “hope expressed at the extreme” is a complex consideration. Extremism and acts of terror have previously been associated with hopelessness – not hope. Extreme responses are often understandable reactions to extreme conditions or experiences, such as marginalisation and oppression. Reflecting on the Social Control Theory, which is one of the theoretical paradigms of terrorism, it appears that terrorism emerges as a practical mechanism for restoring social control, authority, and independence. After the Arab Spring uprisings, the marginalised Sunni community embraced IS and its revolutionary-branded terrorism in the opposition struggle against the dictatorial Assad regime. When left destitute and hopeless, terrorism is an effective and understandable alternative, and whether employed as a last resort or not, it is a significant point of consideration.²⁷⁸

In the case of IS, terrorism and violence is certainly far from being a last resort – sowing chaos and discord is the objective.²⁷⁹ Not only is the IS ideology, culture and religion based on extreme interpretations, but extremism and shock-value are the aims and intentions of their activities and expansions. Baghdadi, the IS leader, is a sectarian extremist. Consequently, his desired ideology and campaigns encompass Salafism, which is an extreme interpretation of Islam that ordains jihad, excommunication and the killing of non-Muslims and apostates. It may be argued that the extreme extent of resistance and opposition to infidels and modern political orders, is the precise rationale of IS-employed jihad and Salafism.²⁸⁰ IS has further displayed organisation, military sophistication, patience, determination, strategic intelligence, flexibility and opportunism in its Salafi-jihadi campaign. This campaign is bolstered by radical and extreme ideologies, all in the pursuit and realisation of power, purification, and Islamic unification. Extremism is at the heart of IS and the Salafi-jihadist campaign. It was graphically illustrated in an online video released by the organisation in January 2015, showing the beheading of a Kurdish soldier. The declaration that followed emphasised the group’s radicalism and utter disregard for the value of life:

²⁷⁷ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 2-3.

²⁷⁸ Kaplan, “Terrorism’s Fifth Wave: A Theory, a Conundrum and a Dilemma,” 13.

²⁷⁹ Celso, “The Islamic State and Boko Haram: Fifth Wave Jihadist Terror Groups,” 5.

²⁸⁰ Wood, *The Way of the Strangers: Encounters with the Islamic State*, 6-7.

This is the fate of anyone who opposes Islam. Know, oh Obama, that we will reach America. Know also that we will cut off your head in the White House and transform America into a Muslim province. And this is my message to France and its sister, Belgium. We advise you that we will come to you with car bombs and explosive charges and we will cut off your heads...²⁸¹

4.3.3 Ideological and Physical Withdrawal

What Kaplan terms “distancing mechanisms” accounts for physical, ideological and psychological withdrawal.²⁸² The foremost desire to restore the caliphate and Muhammad’s Medina is a direct reflection of dissociation and isolation from the modern world and 21st century. Noting that several IS members are well educated and skilled, as well as the caliph Baghdadi himself, who attended university and achieved a doctoral degree, one would assume that such people would have functioned well professionally in a society. However, considering the Social Control theory, it is possible to understand why these same people have dislocated themselves geographically, ethically and ethnically, to establish organisations that conduct terror and torture as an expression of reasserting control and ensuring the power and stability of their own lives and causes. Celso asserts that “the process of mass conversion and revolutionary agitation requires psychological isolation from modern society and this could account for the dynamics of an Islamist *fifth wave*”.²⁸³

The lives and experiences of IS jihadis, many of whom were previously imprisoned, blacklisted, or had absconded, precipitated their physical withdrawal, social isolation, and disengagement. Hence, assimilating into regular society while awaiting the perfect moment to strike, may require a measure of physical and mental/ideological withdrawal or composure. The marginalisation and persecution of the greater Islamic community for the crimes of the extreme few, has further exacerbated this problematic withdrawal symptom, as IS emerges as an appealing and welcoming family to those already affected, ostracised and persecuted by the Assad regime domestically, and by Islamophobia internationally.²⁸⁴

After nearly three years under IS control and occupation, northern Iraq’s major city, Mosul, was retaken in July 2017. Now recorded as the Battle of Mosul, it took the Iraqi government

²⁸¹ Counter Extremism Project, “IS,” Counter Extremism Project (2017).

²⁸² Kaplan, “Terrorism’s Fifth Wave: A Theory, a Conundrum and a Dilemma,” 13.

²⁸³ Celso, “The Islamic State and Boko Haram: Fifth Wave Jihadist Terror Groups,” 4.

²⁸⁴ Emma Green, “It’s Not Enough to Dismiss Islamophobia,” *The Atlantic* (17 April 2017).

and allied forces nine months to push back and displace the IS forces from what was once their caliphate. “The city had been the last major urban stronghold IS held in Iraq, and defeat there pushes the group back towards its insurgent roots, leaving the militants with just a handful of towns and stretches of sparsely populated desert under their control.”²⁸⁵ Although it cannot be asserted that IS has completely physically withdrawn in the literal sense, it is possible to argue that their desire for statehood independence is a “distancing mechanism” in itself. The *de facto* state rejects the rest of the world and distances itself from the seculars, infidels, apostates, and unbelievers within and without.

The expulsion and persecution of perceived infidel populations like the Yazidis, Shi’ah and Kurds to the countryside, the deserts and beyond, is the principal and most obvious withdrawal and fifth wave component. Ideologically, withdrawal and separation have manifested in relations between IS and the Muslim society, as well as the world, which has sanctioned and cut off the proto-state and its supporters, like Kuwait and Qatar. In considering its recruits, IS operates as an ever-watchful and intimidating organisation.²⁸⁶ Wood’s findings demonstrate that foreign recruits, often being new converts to Islam, are brought into the country under false pretences, and then left stranded under the supervision of the omnipresent “Organisation,” whose objective is to radicalise and indoctrinate pure Islam and Salafism. As a recruitment strategy, being cut off and unable to communicate or contact family and friends back home, these new recruits and converts had isolation forced upon them. Isolation as a recruitment strategy breeds dependency, and IS has used it to secure recruits who are too fearful and far too dependent to contest it or leave.²⁸⁷

4.3.4 Recreation of the “Golden Age” and Genesis of the New Calendar

Following the death of the revered Islamic Prophet Muhammad, the Rashidun Caliphate was established in AD 632, and lasted until AD 661. The Rashidun was the first of four Islamic caliphates and was headed by Abu Bakr, believed to be Muhammad’s closest friend. Medina was established as the capital and is the sought-after promised land. The Rashidun and the three caliphates that followed are believed to epitomise Islam and its Muslims in their purest and holiest form. The holy caliphates of a thousand years past are the desired “Golden Age” of the

²⁸⁵ Emma Graham-Harrison, “Iraq announces ‘victory’ over Islamic State in Mosul,” *The Guardian* (9 July 2017).

²⁸⁶ Jeffrey Kaplan, “The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism?” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19, 4 (2007): 551.

²⁸⁷ Wood, *The Way of the Strangers: Encounters with the Islamic State*, 38.

present. Medina is believed to be the heart of the Islamic promised land, and where Prophet Muhammad and his followers fled during their persecution by the non-believers in AD 662.²⁸⁸ This pilgrimage is known as *hijra*, and exemplifies the historical Islamic emigration from Mecca to Medina. As Wood explains, “Muslims consider that period a golden age and some, called Salafis, believe the military and political practices of its statesmen and warriors – barbaric by today’s standards but acceptable at the time – deserve to be revived”.²⁸⁹

Considering the significance of the Golden Age, it is unsurprising that the calendar requires amendment. IS rejects standard systems and the common calendar, which are associated with apostates and unbelievers. The current system supposedly originates from Miladi dating – a Christian invention. Instead, IS declared the *Hijri* dating system as the most accurate and applicable. Any other dating system would mean that Muslims were following the unbelievers. The genesis of the Hijri calendar took place in AD 622, when the Prophet Muhammad and his company migrated from Mecca to Medina. Islamic tradition and religion follows the Arabian lunar cycle, which observes the months according to the moon; months have no more than thirty days and no less than twenty-nine.²⁹⁰

IS’s revival of the golden era in pilgrimage and in practice is a direct testament to Islamic history and religious tradition. In pilgrimage, the emigration of IS fighters and members to the promised lands of Syria and Iraq, mirror the *hijrah* made by the Prophet and his companions. In practice, the resurgence of ancient practices and punishments like crucifixion, stoning and *takfir*, reveal the organisation’s dedication to purging and purifying the soul according to precedents set in Medina AD 622.²⁹¹ Slavery, an enterprise of seventh century Islam, is also practiced by IS, who justify it with historical evidence of the Prophet Muhammad owning and acquiring slaves. Supported by the Qur’an, the words of the Prophet and Islamic law, Islamic expansion maintains that upon the capture of a city, all men are to be “put to the sword”, and the women and children are free for plundering. The religious and legal justification of slavery attempts to recreate an era of history that is internationally abhorred and no longer considered acceptable in the cause of human rights.

²⁸⁸ Wood, “What IS's leader really wants.”

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Unseen Islamic State Treatise on Calendars: Full Text, Translation & Analysis,” Aymenn Jawad.org (17 October 2015).

²⁹¹ Wood, “The Way of the Strangers,” 64.

A *Dhimmi* pact concerns the economic, legal, and social status of non-Muslims living in a Muslim state or under Muslim protection. The pact is one of surrender and entails the enforced taxation or tributes from those who refuse Islamic conversion but wish to reside in an Islamic state. This pact revives a long-lost practice in Islamic history, and burdens non-Muslims with a liability for practicing their religion, ensuring that they pay heavily for it.²⁹²

4.3.5 Purging of the “Old World” and its Contaminants

Within IS and its rationales, any crime against Allah, his name, his laws, his being, are punishable by death. Actions that violate Allah or the Qur’an are known as *hadd*, and the punishments that follow are without mercy, compromise, or negotiation. What must be understood from the IS perspective is the notion that punishment and jihad are expressions of purging the self of sin and thereby ensuring a place in *jannah* (heaven) with Allah. Achieving *jannah* and the desired “Golden Age” does not come without fifth wave inclinations of purity. Celso explains IS’s objective as one centred on “cleansing of the old decadent order and construction of pious and just society based on Qur’anic principles”.²⁹³ The “old world”, as it is today, is considered by fifth wave groups like IS to be tainted, defiled and diseased, necessitating purging and cleansing.²⁹⁴

Considering themselves superior and pure, IS has treated the rest of the population as loathsome second-class citizens, destroying those who are deemed infidels, ethnically unworthy, disloyal or tainted by the past. IS has thereby routinely and systematically exterminated Alawites, atheists, Christians, Buddhists, Kurds, Shi’ah Muslims, Yazidis and all others who resist or oppose their campaign.²⁹⁵ IS has redoubled their efforts in recruiting young and impressionable new jihadis from within and without, to establish the caliphate in the Sunni promised land, that has essentially been cut off from the rest of the world. In addition, IS denounces “contaminants” such as television and jewellery – believed to be western non-essential materials that taint the mind and soul. Ironically, in his declaration of the caliphate, Baghdadi is seen wearing a Rolex watch, which raises questions of the selective applicability of their version of Islam and Shar’ia Law.²⁹⁶

²⁹² Wood, *The Way of the Strangers*, 19-20.

²⁹³ Celso, “The Islamic State and Boko Haram: Fifth Wave Jihadist Terror Groups,” 4.

²⁹⁴ Wood, *The Way of the Strangers*, 53.

²⁹⁵ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 16.

²⁹⁶ Ammar Benaziz and Nick Thompson, “Is IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s bling timepiece a Rolex or an Islamic watch?” CNN (10 July 2014).

IS desires to purge the “old world” and those with outdated mentalities, an ironic contradiction since IS itself aspires to re-establish an old world and turn the clock back 1 350 years.²⁹⁷ Supported by Donner, “anybody who actively wishes to re-establish a caliphate must be deeply committed to a backward-looking view of Islam; the caliphate has not been a functioning institution for over a thousand years”.²⁹⁸ The Islamic State reveres itself for being a serious entity; it should therefore embark on serious introspection regarding the understanding of “the old world” and “containments”. If so-called simple Western pleasures such as television, cell phones and fashion are banned, then surely the US-engraved machine guns, assault rifles and Bear Grylls knives used by IS are also in the same category of tainted western inventions?

4.3.6 Inability to Compromise and the Resort to Use of Deadly Force

The actions and divisions perpetuated by fifth wave terrorism are indicative of IS’s inability to compromise, and their irrationality in resorting to deadly force.²⁹⁹ The pursuit of perfection and attaining “the state” are factors that exacerbate these inabilities. Following the ascension of IS to power and the capture of Mosul and Raqqa, Syria and Iraq were divided, rife with violence, and subjugated by deadly force. IS was, as Kaplan posits: “without an answer for the fractionalization of the movement save purge and death”.³⁰⁰ Applying the Just War theory to IS falls short, as force is employed as a first option and not as a last resort. This employment of deadly force and violence throughout their campaign, is in pursuit of radicalisation and furthering jihad. It is a devotion to violence, with little consideration for justice and fairness.

Deadly force is employed in a multitude of ways, such as in the coercion or curtailing of government reactions, where civilian populations are punished for the involvement of their government. Additionally, deadly force is employed to instigate government overreactions.³⁰¹ By punishing the population, government, state and security structures are coerced into reactions and responses that are often excessive and misdirected, intensifying sectarianism and fractionalisation. Deadly and extreme force manifests on the battlefield, through IS propaganda and publications like *Dabiq*, as well as within its inner workings and practices. In sentencing

²⁹⁷ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 42.

²⁹⁸ Wood, “What IS’s leader really wants.”

²⁹⁹ Kaplan, “Terrorism’s Fifth Wave: A Theory, a Conundrum and a Dilemma,” 13.

³⁰⁰ Kaplan, “The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism?” 553.

³⁰¹ Seth G. Jones, “Why IS will become more deadly before it dies,” *Business Insider* (22 November 2015).

sinner, IS favours public punishment. According to Islam and the Prophet, sinners must be paraded in public, and their punishment witnessed by a party of believers.³⁰² Historically and currently, punishment entails crucifixion, stoning, beheading, and the severing of limbs.³⁰³

4.3.7 Dedication to Human Perfectibility

As previously mentioned, the pursuit of perfection and purity is a major objective and characteristic of fifth wave terrorism. As exemplified by the Khmer Rouge, transforming and purifying entire generations in one clean swoop was deemed appropriate for attaining perfection. Similarly, IS seeks the purification of all humanity, and achieving this “perfection” in a single generation is their goal. Re-educating and programming society to produce “new” men and women with pious and traditional (outdated) mind-sets, serves as the next step on the way to a perceived clean slate for Islam and its history.³⁰⁴ IS first wishes to purify the community and then purify the faith. The Salafist and Wahhabi ideologies, as well as the *takfir* doctrine, have religiously justified and legitimised this mass cleansing and purging.

Within IS, purification is meant to entail the strict observance and scholarship of Islam. Those who fail to adhere to the Qur’an, who do not pray, who put the laws of men above those of Allah and deny the prophecies of Muhammad, are apostates and require purging and purification. Under *takfir*, they should be met with the sword. IS’s official magazine, *Dabiq*, urges members to “...devote them[selves] to complete destruction.”³⁰⁵ Going beyond the bounds of IS itself, purification extends to the exclusion and purging of “infidels and the idolatrous” such as Christians, Kurdish communities, Shiite Muslims, Sufis and Yazidis.³⁰⁶ For IS, the destruction of divergent branches of Islam is an appropriate and justified pursuit. For instance, the Shiites, whose innovative interpretation of the Qur’an constitutes apostasy. Wood agrees and asserts that it means “roughly 200 million Shi’ah are marked for death. So too are the heads of state of every Muslim country, who have elevated man-made law above Shar’ia by running for office or enforcing laws not made by God”.³⁰⁷

³⁰² Wood, *The Way of the Strangers*, 113.

³⁰³ Jones, “Why IS will become more deadly before it dies.”

³⁰⁴ Kaplan, “The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism?” 553.

³⁰⁵ The Islamic State, *Dabiq* Issue 15 Break The Cross, The Clarion Project, Iraq (10 September 2014): 78.

³⁰⁶ Goutham Kandru, “The Crusades and Crusade Memory,” (16 May 2016).

³⁰⁷ Wood, “What IS really wants.”

The rhetoric of perfection and purification surrounding IS exists within its ranks as well as without. In Mosul in 2016, thirty-eight IS members were publicly executed on suspicion of subversion and infiltration. The suspected informers were believed to have leaked information and locations, which resulted in the death of IS leader Abu Hayjaa al-Tunsi. The thirty-eight were bathed and submerged in acid and their bodies put on public display to deter future traitors and moles.³⁰⁸ Purging and purifying the self is essential to ensure worthiness and Allah's acceptance, so self-immolation and martyrdom are expressed as honourable, religious actions, advancing the theory of pain in pursuit of paradise. Wood alludes to the story of a woman who begged the Prophet for punishment of her adultery and fornication, imploring him to "torture me, purify me". After giving birth, she was stoned to death, and the Prophet declared that her repentance had ensured her a place in *jannah*.³⁰⁹ It is evident that pain, purging and suffering are integral to IS's interpretation and implementation of Islam and its laws.

4.3.8 Genocidal Violence in the Pursuit of a New Society

Article II of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines genocide as mass violent acts focused on a nationality, ethnicity, religious, racial or gender groups.³¹⁰ These acts include:

- a) Killing members of a group;
- b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of a group;
- c) Deliberately inflicting on a group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within a group;
- e) Forcibly transferring children of a group to another group.³¹¹

IS's pursuit of perfection, purity, and utopia is implemented on a magnitude far vaster than previous waves have experienced.³¹² IS has perpetrated violence and abuse on a genocidal scale on Christians, Kurds, Shi'ah and the Yazidi people, as well as all others involved in the conflict. The United Nations and the international community accused IS of perpetrating genocide on

³⁰⁸ Felix Allen, "IS executes its own fighters in a desperate purge of 'spies'," News.com (7 June 2016).

³⁰⁹ Wood, *The Way of the Strangers*, 114.

³¹⁰ United Nations General Assembly, *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*. Treaty Series (9 December 1948).

³¹¹ Ibid.

³¹² Kaplan, "The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism?" 553.

the Yazidi people in August 2014, when the Mount Sinjar and Tal Afar regions near the Iraqi-Syrian border were stormed and captured. Home to half a million Yazidi people, IS's violent perpetrations against this minority included but were not limited to kidnappings, rape, executions and forced conversions, all of which constitute calculated genocide. In the month of August 2014 alone, an estimated ten thousand Yazidi people were either killed or kidnapped. In the Mount Sinjar region, children were the main victims, accounting for approximately 90% of the population that died there in that month.³¹³

Reuters refers to a report published in the *Human Rights Law Review* presenting patterns in IS crimes against the Yazidi minority in Iraq. These patterns clearly reveal “genocidal intent”³¹⁴ in the eradication and cleansing of this minority group. IS perceives the Yazidi as devil-worshippers and unholy, as their religion encompasses several Eastern religions and traditions. Reuters estimates that five thousand Yazidi were rounded up like cattle to the cull, and a further seven thousand Yazidi girls and women were enslaved and traded for sex.³¹⁵ In issue 15 of *Dabiq*, it is declared that genocide, mass-killing and enslavement are part of the holy battle between the Muslim world and the world of infidel disbelievers. As quoted in Chapter Three, *Dabiq* declares that “many people in Crusader countries express shock and even disgust that Islamic State leadership ‘uses religion to justify violence.’ Indeed, waging jihad – spreading the rule of Allah by the sword – is an obligation found in the Quran, the word of our Lord”.³¹⁶ IS even cites Christian biblical references to draw parallels with its own claim: it uses a quote from Deuteronomy – “you must devote them to complete destruction. You shall make no covenant with them and show no mercy to them”.³¹⁷ Such quotes encourage fanatical and genocidal purification in the pursuit of a divine society and land. IS therefore supports an agenda that is rooted in genocide and the eradication of anything deemed divergent.

4.3.9 Violence Becomes a Way of Life

Considering terrorist violence, Kaplan asserts: “when violence becomes a way of life...what meaning is left and what messages are left to send?”³¹⁸ An excerpt from *Rumiyah*, the group's

³¹³ Valeria Cetorelli, Isaac Sasson, Nazar Shabila, and Gilbert Burnham, “IS' Yazidi Genocide,” *Foreign Affairs.com* (8 June 2017).

³¹⁴ Lin Taylor, “Yazidi genocide evidence mounting against Islamic State: legal experts.” Thomson Reuters Foundation (4 May 2017).

³¹⁵ Taylor, “Yazidi genocide evidence mounting against Islamic State: legal experts.”

³¹⁶ The Islamic State, *Dabiq* Issue 15: Break the Cross, 78.

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ Kaplan, “The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism?” 558.

official scholastic magazine, reads: “If it has not yet been established that IS and violence go hand in hand, then let it be done so presently; the Kafirs’ blood is halal for you, so shed it”.³¹⁹ Through *Rumiyah*, the youth is encouraged to employ violence and terror as a state and governmental agency. Violence is used by the military as a tactic in furthering the group’s political agenda and instilling fear in the enemy and the opposition. IS aims to ensure the maximum suffering of its victims and captives and has perpetrated slavery, legalised rape, and, as noted above, the annihilation of the Yazidi, Shi’ah and scores of other ethnicities and populations. Hamid asserts that “in IS’s scheme, such horrid feats...are no longer tolerated as collateral damage but rather rejoiced over as signs of triumph”.³²⁰ This extremism contributed to Al Qaeda’s divorce from IS.

Violence in Syria and Iraq is an ongoing way of life for the residents and for people stranded there. Since the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 against the authoritarian Assad and Baathist regimes, IS has captured and taken control of the capital cities of Syria and Iraq, causing a death toll in the region that was estimated at around half a million people at the beginning of 2016, with approximately six million people believed to be internally displaced. Since 2016, Mosul has been retaken and allied forces are advancing in Raqqa – a formidable achievement unfortunately shadowed by further escalation in the death toll and displacement statistics.³²¹

IS violence is described as indiscriminate, strategic, and organised. IS rationalises and legitimises violence through declared *takfirs* and *fatwas* against perceived apostates and infidels: “The blood of the Kafir is cheap, filthy and permissible to shed”.³²² Celso agrees that “takfir is applied to all opponents including fellow Sunnis and opposing jihadist groups”.³²³ This indiscriminate and unrestrained imposition of *takfir* legitimises the excommunication and execution of anyone who does not subscribe to Islamic State principles. Such religious justification has, however, resulted in Islam being equated with violence and terror, despite the majority of the world’s Islamic people detesting IS and its ideology. This has resulted in further marginalisation and persecution of Islamic communities; Islamophobia and aggression towards Muslims has become a commonplace (yet irrational) reaction in the face of IS atrocities.³²⁴

³¹⁹ The Islamic State, *Rumiyah*, Al Hayat Media Centre (n.d)

³²⁰ Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, “Institutionalized Violence In Muslim World Begets Global Islamist Militancy,” Middle East Institute (31 January 2017).

³²¹ Hamid, “Institutionalized Violence In Muslim World Begets Global Islamist Militancy.”

³²² The Islamic State, *Rumiyah* Issue 1.

³²³ Celso, “The Islamic State and Boko Haram: Fifth Wave Jihadist Terror Groups,” 11.

³²⁴ Green, “It’s Not Enough to Dismiss Islamophobia.”

IS has legitimised and endorsed violence as an appropriate mechanism for rectifying injustices and grievances. However, their acts of terror exhibit little more than blind aggression, revenge, and hatred. Hamid agrees, and postulates that “an entire generation of the *ummah* has grown up in a socio-political environment in which violence is a legitimate way to redress grievances of victimised populations or to exact revenge against aggressors, whether state or non-state entities”.³²⁵ This equates Islam and the Muslim community with violence and hostility, yet resonates with the Social Control theory’s rationalisation for resorting to violent control and force in righting perceived wrongs and pursuing a sense of power.

4.3.10 Focus on the Subjugation of Women and Children

Kaplan identifies the subjugation of women and children as a fifth wave characteristic, through forced marriages and rape, and induction of child soldiers. IS publicly declares the rape of Yazidi women appropriate to the purification and furthering of the Salafi-jihadist campaign.³²⁶ Yazidi and Kurdish women and children, as well as other perceived Muslim infidels, Christians, Sufis, Shi’ah and Buddhists, are the targets of persecution, execution, forced conversion, rape, slavery, human trafficking, child soldiery and forced marriage, as well as for brokerage in hostage scenarios. Such subjugation and slavery are deplored internationally as violating universal human rights, yet IS publicly permits and justifies its atrocities with religious citings from the Qur’an and the Prophet Muhammad. The organisation has released a document dictating the rules and conduct for the enslavement and engagement of captive non-Muslim women and girls, who are deemed “spoils of war”.³²⁷ Because they are easy targets in a masculine dominated war-torn region, women and children bear the brunt of atrocities and persecution, whether easily influenced for recruitment or easily accessible and defenceless as direct targets of aggression.³²⁸

Heza Shankal, a captive Yazidi sex slave, was abducted in Sinjar in 2014. She explains her experience as being one of persecution and horror. Heza and the other Yazidi captives were persecuted for being part of the minority and were regarded by IS as being devil-worshippers and infidels. Heza and others were sent to Raqqa, the caliphate’s capital, as sex slaves. They

³²⁵ Hamid, “Institutionalized Violence In Muslim World Begets Global Islamist Militancy.”

³²⁶ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 42.

³²⁷ Kenneth Roth, “Slavery: The IS Rules,” Human Rights Watch (5 September 2015).

³²⁸ Ibid.

were bought and sold, shared amongst fighters, and brutalised. However, as much as IS should not be underestimated, neither should the strength and will of its victims. Heza and many other Yazidi and Kurdish women have joined armed forces like the Shengal Women's Unit and have returned to Syria to fight against their captors in Raqqa. In a statement made to the *Daily Mail*, Heza declared: "I am carrying this weapon to take revenge on Abu Hassan, Abu Yusuf, and Abu Sa'ad, who tortured me and tortured many mothers".³²⁹

According to di Giovanni, rape is a violation intended to subjugate the victim, whilst empowering the perpetrator. In Islam and the Muslim culture specifically, rape and sexual impurity are taboo. Maintaining virginity until marriage is fundamental to Islamic and Muslim honour. Di Giovanni records crimes against women as young as 14, and notes a spike in suicides committed by women who have been victims of rape.³³⁰ "The taboo of rape for any women is enormous. But for a Muslim woman, who is meant to be a virgin upon marriage, it is the end of life, or the life she was meant to live."³³¹ If virginity and sexual purity are so revered in Islam, and IS considers itself the purest manifestation of Islam, then what rationale is there to excuse robbing women of such a revered virtue? For IS, this is not about purity, it is about power. It cannot declare purity whilst polluting the purity in others.

4.3.11 Procuring Child Soldiers and Child Brides

Kaplan asserts that "children are the vanguard of the fifth wave".³³² Children are the avenue of influence, and they are the future. Whether induced militarily or through forced or organised marriages, children have become a predominant focus in IS strategy for the indoctrination of future generations and the purification of Islam. The Islamic State's pursuit is at the expense of enslaving children, desensitizing them, and moulding them into the next generation of suicide bombers. Yet, child martyrs and child suicide bombers in no way ensure the future of further generations. A shocking story from a refugee camp in Australia reveals the depth of extremism in the development and training of child soldiers. Hadya, the eldest sister of three siblings and aged eleven herself, recounts their experiences in Mosul where IS fighters forced her and her siblings to dismember captured Iraqi soldiers. Hadya recalled: "He came along and

³²⁹ Julian Robinson, "Yazidi sex slave kidnapped by IS vows to 'take revenge' on brutes who tortured her after joining all-female militia to fight in Syria," *Mail Online* (20 July 2017).

³³⁰ Di Giovanni, *Dispatches from Syria: The Morning They Came For Us*, 23.

³³¹ *Ibid*, 29.

³³² Kaplan, "Terrorism's Fifth Wave: A Theory, a Conundrum and a Dilemma," 13.

said, ‘You cut off a foot, you cut off an arm, and you slash his face with a knife. Otherwise I’ll take you away from your mother and kill you all’.”³³³ Hadya’s youngest sibling and brother Shadi, aged five, was forced to stab a captive soldier in the eye – immediately ending his life. Shadi’s emotional and psychological scarring and trauma has led to a degradation of his mental and physical state. Hadya conveyed that shortly after the trauma Shadi experienced, he began setting fires and tried to cut the throat of their nine-year-old sister, Fadi³³⁴

The scope of IS influence over women and children, particularly for militia and marriage, was exemplified when a sixteen-year-old German girl named Linda Wentzel was found in a destroyed building in Mosul, following the advancement of Iraqi security forces and eventual retake of Mosul in January 2017. Initially thought to be a Yazidi sex slave, the young girl admitted being a runaway bride of a Chechen IS fighter, and to be a soldier herself. She is facing trial and a possible death sentence for the killing of Iraqi soldiers.

4.3.12 Rape as a Tactic of Terror and Control

It is widely recognised that rape is employed as a tactic of terror, particularly in fifth wave organisations. The victims of rape are women and young girls regarded as “the spoils of war”. This violation is made religiously permissible by IS Islam and Shar’ia Law. Throughout 2014 and 2015, IS captured and displaced scores of Yazidi and Kurdish people, ripping women and girls away from their families. One of the Human Rights Watch interviewees recounts her experience. Her alias name is Jalila and she is twelve years old. She and her sisters were separated from their family in Sinjar in August 2014 and were taken to Tal Afar and then Mosul. Eventually separated from her sisters, Jalila was taken to a house in Syria where Yazidi and Kurdish women and girls were being held as sex slaves. The child recounts IS members selecting women and girls they desired with the same unconcerned nonchalance one would expect to see in a convenience store. When Jalila was finally chosen this was her experience: “I told him not to touch me and begged him to let me go. I told him to take me to my mother. I was a young girl, and I asked him, ‘What do you want from me?’ He spent three days having sex with me”. Jalila was raped multiple times and by multiple IS fighters. The young girl was

³³³ Peter Reid, “Young children recall how IS forced them to dismember a captured soldier,” *American Military News* (21 July 2017).

³³⁴ Ibid.

owned, gifted and used by no less than seven IS fighters. “Sometimes I was sold. Sometimes I was given as a gift. The last man was the most abusive; he used to tie my hands and legs.”³³⁵

In 2015, a document originating from an IS supported Twitter account, identified as being authentic, revealed the rules and regulations (*fatwas*), for the sexual enslavement of non-Muslim captives. The *fatwa* represents IS’s extreme interpretation of Shar’ia Law, and its assumption that non-Muslim women and girls are little more than cattle. According to Human Rights Watch, “by treating captured non-Muslim women as subject to the sexual whims of those who control them, IS disregards every universal injunction against slavery and rape”.³³⁶ Displayed in Figure 4.1 below, is an exact but slightly unclear copy of the *fatwa*. It shows that the Islamic State is attempting to regulate an unlawful and criminal phenomenon that is internationally abhorred.

³³⁵ Human Rights Watch, “Iraq: IS Escapees Describe Systematic Rape,” Human Rights Watch (14 April 2015)

³³⁶ Roth, “Slavery: The IS Rules.”

ISIL COMMITTEE OF RESEARCH AND FATWAS
FATWAS No. 61, 62, and 64-68

Fatwa Number: 64
Date: 29 JAN 2015

Question: Some of the brothers have committed violations in the matter of the treatment of the female slaves. These violations are not permitted by Sharia law, because these rules have not been dealt with in ages. Are there any warnings pertaining to this matter? May Allah protect you.

Praise be to Allah, prayer and peace be upon our Prophet Muhammad, his household and all of his companions.

One of on the graces which Allah has bestowed upon the State of Caliphate is the conquest of large surface areas of the country and one of the inevitable consequences of the jihad of establishment is that women and children of infidels will become captives of Muslims. Consequently, it is necessary to clarify some rules pertaining to captured prisoners to avoid any violations in dealing with them.

Therefore we say, and may Allah grant us success:

- It is not permissible for the owner of a female captive to have intercourse with her until after she has had her menstrual cycle and becomes clean.
- If she does not menstruate and is pregnant, he is not allowed to have intercourse with her until after she has given birth.
- It is not permissible to cause her to abort if she is pregnant.
- If the owner of a female captive releases her, only he can have intercourse with her and he is not allowed to allow someone else to have intercourse with her.
- If the owner of a female captive, who has a daughter suitable for intercourse, has sexual relations with the latter, he is not permitted to have intercourse with her mother and she is permanently off-limits to him. Should he have intercourse with her mother then he is not permitted to have intercourse with her daughter and she is to be off-limits to him.
- The owner of two sisters is not allowed to have intercourse with both of them; rather he may only have intercourse with just one. The other sister is to be had by him, if he were to relinquish ownership of the first sister by selling her, giving her away or releasing her.
- If the female captive is owned by a father, his son cannot have intercourse with her and vice versa. Moreover, intercourse with his wife's female captive is also not permissible.
- If a father had intercourse with his female captive then gave her away or sold her to his son, he is not longer permitted to have intercourse with her.
- If the female captive becomes pregnant by her owner, he cannot sell her and she is released after his death.
- If the owner releases his female captive then he is not permitted to have intercourse with her afterwards because she has become free and is no longer his property.
- If two or more individuals are involved in purchasing a female captive, none of them are permitted to have intercourse with her because she is part of a joint ownership.
- It is not permissible to have intercourse with a female captive during her menstrual cycle.
- It is not permissible to have anal sex with a female captive.
- The owner of a female captive should show compassion towards her, be kind to her, not humiliate her, and not assign her work she is unable to perform.
- The owner of a female captive should not sell her to an individual whom he knows will treat her badly or do unto her what Allah has forbidden.

Figure 4.1: IS fatwa on rape and sexual slavery

Source: John Shammass, *IS release 'rape handbook' to fighters, with 15 sickening new rules revealed*, The Mirror (2015).

Human Rights Watch presented their findings and report on IS sex slavery in April 2015. The interviews and stories are horrific, as in young Jalila's case. Twenty escapees, women and girls, some as young as 10 years recount the gruelling details of their experiences of being bought and sold, systematically raped, forced to convert and marry IS fighters.³³⁷ Relating to the Social Control theory once again, IS employs rape as a tactic of terror, as a mechanism of oppression and humiliation of entire populations and ethnicities, and as an instrument for the control and subjugation of women, all in the name and glorification of Allah. The reigning Assad government and its forces have also been accused of rights violations equal to those of IS. The Assad regime and its Shabiha policing forces have perpetrated sexual violation and rape against women, along with mass displacement, destruction and dehumanisation of Syrians, Shi'ah and the Sunni.³³⁸ With aggressors and violators on both sides of the conflict, there is little respite for Syrians, Iraqis and any foreigners in either country.

4.3.13 Terrorism is Self-Perpetuating and Multi-Generational

In such extremes as jihadism and terrorism, what has been done cannot be undone, and many who rape, kill, and infringe on cultural and human rights are cut off and detached from the rest of society and from reality itself. This detachment manifests in control issues, anger problems, as well as weak principles and consciences.³³⁹ Considered alongside the Situational Action theory and its attention to the environmental/external factors that influence the individual, there is often no going back. Terrorism becomes a self-perpetuating force, relied upon and maintained by its actors, as they see no alternatives. The inclusion of children results in a multi-generational extension and transformation of terrorism, which is ensured and enabled by the cultural and social prevalence of the phenomenon, becoming the reality and norm for children and further generations.³⁴⁰ IS's vision entails the recreation and purification of modern man, starting with the children who will be the next generation of militants and leaders. As asserted by Bryson, "Children are deemed crucial in the art of war. Not only are they of almost unlimited supply in conflict, but groups like Islamic State use children to secure and train the future generation of fighters and followers".³⁴¹ IS terror is multi-generational; their ideology is fuelled and secured through the indoctrination of impressionable children and youths, who are the

³³⁷ Human Rights Watch, "Iraq: IS Escapees Describe Systematic Rape," Human Rights Watch (14 April 2015).

³³⁸ Di Giovanni, *Dispatches from Syria: The Morning They Came For Us*, 23-29

³³⁹ Kevin Everett FitzMaurice, "Theories of Attachment & Detachment," (n.d).

³⁴⁰ Kaplan, "The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism?" 561-562.

³⁴¹ Rachel Bryson, "Why children are crucial in Islamic State's terror campaign," *The Telegraph* (22 August 2016).

ultimate victims in such terror and destruction. Children and young people are impressionable and easily influenced, especially in war-torn regions, where people are simply trying to stay alive. The IS campaign emphasises violence “not only to protect a marginalised Sunni community, but also to remake society and give direction to a generation crushed under decades of oppressive governance and an unfriendly global order”.³⁴²

The destitute, orphans and children in refugee camps are the most vulnerable targets of recruitment; with little hope, their homes demolished, no schools, and hostile living conditions, they are bribed and attracted by IS recruits with the prospect of amnesty, belonging, wealth, a home, food, education and purpose.³⁴³ Other children of minority or apostate groups, like Yazidis and Kurds, are kidnapped and sent to IS schools where they are given an Islamic indoctrinated education, inclusive of beheading and suicide attack classes, before being sent into the battlefield. The least fortunate of these children are forced into sex and slavery. A United Nations report revealed that the organisation uses children who are ‘mentally challenged’ as suicide bombers, as well as abuses and beats children who resist. The story of a fourteen-year-old Syrian boy caused horror in 2015 when it was revealed that his hands and feet were chopped off when he refused to fight.³⁴⁴ As stated by Bryson, “groups like IS are destroying the past, present, and future in one as the young generation is robbed of childhood, plunged headlong into a world of terror”.³⁴⁵

In 2017, Reuters reported on the “cubs of the caliphate”. This has become a familiar term in reference to the child fighters, soldiers, and jihadis that are indoctrinated by IS. These children range in age from three to sixteen and are Kurdish, Yazidi and Shiite minors. The Sunni Islam militant education instils desensitisation and destruction. After attending IS schools, children are reported as referring to their own family members as apostates.³⁴⁶

4.3.14 Ethnocentrism, Nationalism and Racial Purity

Ethnocentrism is a concept of extreme prejudice and selective interpretation of cultural diversity. When one cultural group judges another according to their own cultural values and

³⁴² International CrIS Group, “Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State,” 27.

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ Jessica Stern, “Islamic State moulds children into new generation of militants,” Child Soldiers.org (8 October 2015).

³⁴⁵ Bryson, Rachel. “Why children are crucial in Islamic State's terror campaign.” *The Telegraph* (22 August 2016).

³⁴⁶ Stephen Kalin, “In Mosul orphanage, Islamic State groomed child soldiers,” Reuters (17 February 2017).

standards, this exemplifies an ethnocentric view. When one culture claims superiority over another culture, this demonstrates an ethnocentric ethos.³⁴⁷ IS has operated and conducted itself as having an ethnocentric, “superior” ideology and campaign. In its treatment of the international community, foreigners, and non-Sunni-Muslims, IS has made its discrimination, intolerance, Salafism, jihadism, radicalism, and nationalism clear. The group has forced its version of social norms and conditions on its own people, limiting life and freedoms and instilling fear through intimidation and strict laws.

Nationalism is a concept regarding the interpretation and pursuit of patriotism, separatism, and independence.³⁴⁸ IS’s entire campaign is a manifestation and expression of nationalism. Its self-appointment to a state role is testimony to their desire for independence and determination. They believe that the encouragement of sectarianism and ethnic atrocities justifies their pursuit of Sunni empowerment and liberation, and most importantly, the unification of perceived pure Muslims. The Yazidi genocide and obsession with purifying Islam and Muslims of all persuasions distinctly reflects their ethnocentric sentiments. Racial purity, being a concept of extreme and selective interpretations of ethnic diversity, has been exemplified in IS’s purging of non-Muslims, like the Yazidi. In Iraq, “de-Baathification” and the Shi’ah ascension to power left Sunni minorities feeling alienated and inferior. Schouela and Mulcair agree that “the resultant sense of alienation and injustice was a predictable product of ethnocentric competition and reversal of political power. Revolting against their demotion, Sunni insurgents, eventually co-opted by al-Qaeda, began to attack Shiite targets, including holy sites and neighbourhoods”.³⁴⁹

Prior to the emergence of IS, Iraq, Syria, and several other Middle Eastern countries had environments of sectarianism and strife. Most relevant to IS, the Sunni-Shi’ah divide is an ethnic-religious impasse that predates the assumption and rule of the Assad regime, constructed by the Shi’ah Muslim majority. IS was considered a redemptive force by the minority Sunni who have been historically marginalised and disenchanted by Syria’s Shi’ah majority. IS is therefore a product of ethnic and racial divergences developed to form the determining factors of their sectarian campaign. One of its predominant strategies is

³⁴⁷ All About Philosophy, “Ethnocentrism.” AllAboutPhilosophy.org (2002-2007).

³⁴⁸ Nenad Miscevic, “Nationalism,” edited by Edward N Zalta (Stanford University, Metaphysics Research Lab, 21 December 2014).

³⁴⁹ Noah Schouela and Cedrick Mulcair, “Part i: The success of IS's narrative,” *The Mantle* (18 December 2015).

nationalism, acclaimed to be the unifying force of a pure Muslim community. Islamic unity and Muslim liberation from the West is the rationale behind the declaration of the caliphate.³⁵⁰ IS's interpretation of Shar'ia Law rationalises and justifies its actions that have been premised on nationalism and ethnocentrism but are practiced through sectarianism.³⁵¹

4.3.15 Selective Reliance on Foreign Allies and Survival

The role of the international community in fifth wave terrorism is pivotal, as survival, expansion and the activities of fifth wave terrorist organisations are characterised by and dependant on the scope and globality of their influence worldwide. Considering IS, the international community plays two pivotal roles: first, in state alliances and support of the organisation, as in Qatar in 2017, and second, in the scope and extent of lone-wolves and sleeper cells that emerge abroad.³⁵² As previously established, IS has encouraged and instigated the emergence of sleeper cells in more than 60 countries. Apart from Iraq, Syria, and the entire Middle East region, IS maintains influence and insurgency in west and northern Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Libya, Morocco, Turkey, and in the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam and in South Africa.³⁵³ In August 2015 at Johannesburg's Oliver Tambo International Airport, five South Africans heading for Syria were detained and apprehended for attempting to smuggle an alleged R78 million in cash to the radical terrorist organisation.³⁵⁴

Not overlooking individual undertakings, certain Arab states have been accused of financing and aiding the extreme Islamic terrorist group and its affiliates, whether through Mosques providing charity boxes inscribed 'Donations for the Muslim Brotherhood' or rich Arab nationals donating from their own purses.³⁵⁵

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar are among a few Gulf States reported to be supporting and donating to IS.³⁵⁶ Although Saudi Arabia is part of the US coalition against IS, it cannot be discounted that the country is predominantly Sunni, and follows the ideologies of Wahhabism. Although the Saudi government declares itself anti-IS, that does not ensure opposition in its

³⁵⁰ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 27.

³⁵¹ Weinberg and Eubank, "An End to the Fourth Wave of Terrorism?" 594.

³⁵² Ibid, 563.

³⁵³ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 7-9.

³⁵⁴ Qama Qukula, "R78 million seized at OR Tambo raises terror suspicions," Radio 702 (21 September 2015).

³⁵⁵ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 26.

³⁵⁶ Ibid, 25.

community and populace. The donations of rich Saudi nationals and the exodus of some three thousand Saudi men to join IS in Syria raises major concerns.³⁵⁷ Qatar, as well, came under heavy scrutiny in 2017 for allegedly supporting terrorism by providing financial aid and weapons in support of radical groups in Syria. Qatar is reportedly affiliated to and supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood, IS, Al-Qaeda and the Al-Nursa Front.³⁵⁸ Beyond that, the international exposure and education, as well as the political alliances of the IS leadership demonstrate the opportunistic, resourceful and unscrupulous scope of their international and domestic relations. The determination and adaptability of the IS regime has ensured the survival of the movement even though most of the world's Muslims have denounced it, and the international community has recognised their actions as genocidal.

The Assad regime is another problematic force, and Russian support is furthering the sectarian divides between Sunni and Shi'ah Muslims, which work to the benefit of IS's campaign of prejudice and division.³⁵⁹ The Assad regime reportedly acquires its oil through IS, and Saudi Arabia agrees that Assad is part of the problem, not the solution. Although Russia finally joined the fight against IS in October 2015, they are believed to be more invested in securing the Assad regime than defeating IS. The Assad regime has perpetrated indiscriminate and violent atrocities against the Sunnis. With Russia supporting and bolstering the Assad regime, the Sunni involvement and support for IS is rationalised. Supporting Assad is not the answer, and Moscow's involvement presents Russia as being on the Shi'ah side of the battle.³⁶⁰ According to Colin Clarke:

There are thousands of Russian citizens fighting with IS, and another 5,000 to 7,000 Russian-speaking jihadists, making Russian the second-most popular language spoken within IS. This means that Sunni jihadist groups have a ready-made, native force to send back home to Russia, where the militants can more easily blend in with local populations while plotting further attacks.³⁶¹

4.3.16 Authoritarian and Charismatic Leadership

Governance bolstered by charisma and rooted in control and authoritarianism, is at the heart of fifth wave terror leadership. Baghdadi is a doctor of Islamic studies, a former prisoner in Bucca during the US invasions of Iraq in 2005, and a veteran of the Salafi-jihadist movement.

³⁵⁷ BBC News, "Islamic State: Where key countries stand," BBC (3 December 2015).

³⁵⁸ Krishnadev Calamur, "What Just Happened With Qatar?" *The Atlantic* (5 June 2017).

³⁵⁹ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 60-61.

³⁶⁰ Ibid, 59-63.

³⁶¹ Colin P Clarke, "Attacks on Russia Will Only Increase," *The Atlantic* (4 April 2017).

Baghdadi's leadership and authority are indisputable, and he is revered by IS members and affiliate Sunni communities. He has fashioned himself as the rightful heir and successor to Muhammad, as well as a direct descendant of Muhammad's lineage and tribe, the Quraysh or Qurayshi Islam.³⁶² The Shura Council ensured Baghdadi's formal appointment as their leader, as well confirming Baghdadi's tribal affiliations and membership in the Quraysh Tribal Council.³⁶³ The authoritarianism of the Islamic State is undeniable, and is attributable to the intensely numinous and charismatic essence of its leadership. Celso asserts that Baghdadi and his deputies "...aspire to mythic status and have loyal followings based on religious and coercive authority".³⁶⁴

In his speech declaring the caliphate in May 2014, Baghdadi was positioned on a pedestal while passionately preaching his doctrine to the devoted congregation. His demeanour was collected, calm and charismatic.³⁶⁵ His sermon was underpinned by religious connotations and references, and his delivery and presentation was of a superior, all-knowing nature. It is no wonder that he is accepted as caliph and a prophet by Sunnis and Muslims across the globe.³⁶⁶ As previously stated, IS's leader Baghdadi is the fresh face of the Salafi-jihadist movement, whose contemporary approach and unconcealed objectives provide the injection of vitality that the current jihadist generation needed.

However, IS should not be considered a static or dependent organisation, for it has certainly asserted itself as dynamic and flexible, both in its operations and leadership structure. IS may be personified as a cat with many lives, for as one revered leader of the campaign is struck down, another with similar authoritarianism and entitlement makes the sacred replacement. In May 2017, it was alleged that Baghdadi had been killed amidst a Russian airstrike in Syria. Although not yet confirmed, the world's most wanted man would reportedly be replaced by one of his Saddam Hussein-era loyalists. Ayad al-Jumaili and Iyad al-Obaidi, both veteran jihadists, are thought to be the most likely successors. The loss of Baghdadi, if confirmed, is not expected to diminish the jihadist campaign; rather, it is expected to intensify and harshen IS activities.³⁶⁷

³⁶² Wood, *The Way of the Strangers*, 96-97.

³⁶³ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 5-6.

³⁶⁴ Celso, "The Islamic State and Boko Haram: Fifth Wave Jihadist Terror Groups," 11.

³⁶⁵ Strange, "Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi addresses Muslims in Mosul."

³⁶⁶ Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, "Islamic State leader says military campaign against his group was failing", social media website produced by Reuters Videos (2014).

³⁶⁷ Hassan Hassan, "Where is 'Islamic State' leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi?" BBC News (4 July 2017).

4.3.17 Religious and Apocalyptic Commitments

Fifth wave terror is intensely religiously oriented, whether in its devotion to religion or in its quest to eradicate it. Religion is manipulated to coerce targeted communities into believing that destruction and horrendous acts of violence and genocide justifiably take place in the pursuit of perfection, purity and paradise.³⁶⁸ Considering IS, “their quest is deeply religious and they utilize selected tropes from established religions to form and communicate their apocalyptic dream”.³⁶⁹ IS is the culmination of three hundred years of Islamic tradition and discourse, that has been manipulated to ensure the purity of Islam and its Muslims, and to justify violence and persecution of the Yazidi people, Christians and opposed Muslims. The IS governance and administration directly encompasses Salafi-jihadist ideologies according to the Sunni persuasion and its religious interpretation. This Salafi-jihadist Sunni orientation is exemplified in the issuing of *fatwas*, which rationalise violence, extremism and force through religion.³⁷⁰ Such rationalisation manifests in IS’s apocalyptic beliefs and commitments, according to which, Armageddon is here and necessitates open conflict and warfare against the apostates and the West, as well as the prophesied ‘Rome’, understood today to be Turkey, which is to be apocalyptically challenged.

Wood’s exploration of Islamic eschatology provides a riveting account of “end of days” signs and events. Baghdadi’s predecessor, Zawahiri, was the first to incorporate apocalyptic notions into jihad. These beliefs are as much sincere as they are beneficial in serving as a recruitment tools for IS. The signs of impending doom will be marked by great natural disasters and illnesses, skyscrapers that reach *jannah*, as exemplified by the Gulf towers, and the prophesied battle of Dabiq in northern Syria. IS maintains that the enemy will unite under eight banners and will be led by Rome (Turkey). Rome will be defeated by the soldiers of Islam, as a precursor to the World War III battle to come – “The Great Slaughter”.³⁷¹

This ultimate battle will pit the last standing Muslims against the rest of the world and once ended, the anti-Christ or *al masiah al dajjal* will rise in Syria or Iraq. Extreme drought will herald his arrival, and he will appear as a saviour to the starving, barren world, *Dajjal* will raise

³⁶⁸ Kaplan, “Terrorism’s Fifth Wave: A Theory, a Conundrum and a Dilemma,” 13.

³⁶⁹ Kaplan, “The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism?” 564.

³⁷⁰ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 43.

³⁷¹ Wood, *The Way of the Strangers*, 252-258.

an army to persecute the world's Muslims. In the final showdown in Jerusalem, 5 000 Muslims will be trapped and surrounded in the city, but Jesus will descend east of Damascus and arrive to wipe *Dajjal* and his infidels out. For 40 years there will be relative peace on earth until the Gog and Magog people emerge and ravage the earth. Wood depicts the end of days as miserable waste- lands, in which skirmishes take place between "regular people," Muslims, demons and sub-humans. Those who remain will wish for death and their wishes will be granted in the end, for repentance and acceptance from God will be granted up to and only until the day the sun rises in the west, and the world is over.³⁷²

As both a recruiting and a sensationalist strategy, IS emphasises its apocalyptic and religious position.³⁷³ The familiar expression of Karl Marx that religion is the opium of the masses can be applied here, as the influence of religion can breed a collective mentality, in this case, notions of perfection and paradise, riches, and many wives. The scope for creative and disparate interpretation of religious scriptures is both significant and complex, and supports the fact that this is not the first-time Islamic groups have sought to bring about the end of the world. However, the Islamic apocalypse entails a specific structure and time frame. Certain things must happen and others not – providing anti-IS organisations and operations with a chance to make predictions about future attacks or IS movements.³⁷⁴ The caliph and IS have been accused of brainwashing the Sunni Islamic community and greater population, of inculcating acceptance of the extreme Salafi-jihadist regime and its desired pure society. The apocalyptic issue is that IS champions itself as the protector and saviour of Muslims, but most of their atrocities and actions are directed at Muslims, not only the Shi'ah, but also the Sunni. Who is to fight in the final battle if there are no Muslims left? From the first issue of *Dabiq* in 2014 to

³⁷² Ibid, 253-259.

³⁷³ Nick Robins-Early, "Inside The Islamic State's Apocalyptic Beliefs: An interview with expert Will McCants," The World Post (26 September 2015).

³⁷⁴ Wood, *The Way of the Strangers*, 259-263.

recent issues in 2017, IS's expressions of destruction and its jihad rationale remain the same, as shown in Figure 4.2




Figure 4.2: Extract from *Dabiq*, issue 1

Source: *The Islamic State*, Dabiq Issue 1, 30-31.

4.4 UPDATE: THE ISLAMIC STATE OR THE STATE OF FAILURE?

Having made a fourth attempt at conflict resolution, the Geneva Peace talks of March 2017, under the auspices of the United Nations, were once again unsuccessful.³⁷⁵ Both the UN and Di Giovanni, who has spent years on the ground amidst the Syrian crisis, estimate a death toll of half a million people, with refugees who have fled Syria at five million, and six million displaced within. These figures do not include the death toll from IS terror attacks abroad.³⁷⁶

The 2017 Geneva Peace talks on the state of Syria and its civil war were mediated by the UN. The talks took place between the Syrian government loyal to the Assad regime supported by Russia, and the opposition that resists the dictatorship and the Baathist regime, comprising the

³⁷⁵ Arhama Siddiqa, "Geneva 4: Talks about talks?" Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies (2017).

³⁷⁶ Di Giovanni, *Dispatches from Syria: The Morning They Came For Us*, 200.

Syrian National Coalition and the Syrian Arab Republic, supported by the US. With Russia and the US once again on opposite sides, these talks proved inconsequential and throughout the year, each faction continued down its respective path of destruction and human rights violations. In the end, who can the civilians turn to when rockets and bullets are flying in all directions?³⁷⁷ Consider this:

- a) Terrorism that is domestic and international: while IS's campaign of violence and terror continues both domestically and internationally, in Syria, the Assad regime and Syrian government are accused, with indisputable evidence, of using sarin gas in chemical attacks on civilians, thus committing crimes against humanity. An international case in point is the recent attack in Las Vegas by affiliate Stephen Paddock, who shot dead 58 people and wounded 515.³⁷⁸
- b) Terrorism perpetrated by the government: on 4 April 2017, the town of Khan Sheikhoun in Idlib, was attacked by a government warplane that released a nerve agent that killed 92 people, a third of whom were children. With the first fly-over and strike reported as early as 6:45am, only minutes elapsed before another three bombs were dropped on the town.³⁷⁹ Despite this incident, Russia continues to support the Assad regime, both militarily and in force.
- c) Russian-invested terrorism: the Syrian Network for Human Rights reported that since September 2015 when it began its intervention campaign, Russia is assumed to be responsible for the deaths of more than 5 000 Syrian civilians, through 700 attacks on schools, markets and hospitals.³⁸⁰ Moreover, since IS's severe losses of territory and soldiers within recent months, many civilians and defecting IS members have fled with their families, seeking sanctuary. People crossing the Euphrates on rubber boats and rafts were gunned down by Russian forces. The Russians also killed 60 civilians fleeing the town of Ashara, south of Deir ez Zor, in 2017.³⁸¹
- d) US-invested terrorism: As for the US, their campaign of "liberation" on 22 March 2017, devastated the Syrian towns of Mansourah and Tabqa, near the IS-declared capital of

³⁷⁷ Siddiqa, "Geneva 4: Talks about talks?" Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies (2017).

³⁷⁸ Belinda Robinson, "IS is STILL saying it carried out the Las Vegas massacre," Express News (6 October 2017).

³⁷⁹ Ole Solvang and Lama Fakih, "Death by Chemicals: The Syrian Government's Widespread and Systematic Use of Chemical Weapons," edited by Sarah Leah Whitson, Human Rights Watch (1 May 2017).

³⁸⁰ SN4HR "Over 5,000 Syrian Civilians Killed by Russia since 2015," Syrian Network for Human Rights (4 October 2017).

³⁸¹ Suleiman Al-Khalidi, "Syrian opposition says Russian jets kill civilians fleeing across Euphrates," Reuters (5 October 2017).

Raqqa. The air strike was carried out by the US Combined Joint Task Force and the allied Syrian Democratic Force. In the process, a school and market were hit, killing 84 people, 30 of whom were children. The US-led coalition and its allies are seen as not effectively minimising civilian casualties in their processes.³⁸² This not only violates humanitarian law, but reduces democracy and the so-called liberators themselves to the same level as the terrorists. This victimisation of innocents has transformed the *War on Terror* into a *War of Terror*.

- e) International ‘blind eye’ syndrome: The international community and organisations established to protect human rights have further added to the state of failure in Syria, by failing to bring the aforementioned factions to justice for the genocide and crimes perpetrated by all parties against the Syrian people and in particular the Yazidi community. Di Giovanni asserts that “diplomacy has failed and continues to. When the Bosnia and Rwanda genocides erupted, the UN and international community stood by and watched”.³⁸³




Figure 4.3: Map of IS-controlled territories (January 2015-2018)

Source: *BBC, Islamic State and the crisis in Iraq and Syria in maps* (10 January 2018)

Since early 2018, IS’s occupation and control over territory has drastically diminished, as illustrated in Figure 4.3 above. Having lost both of its strongholds in July 2017, – Syria’s

³⁸² Ole Solvang and Nadim Houry, “All Feasible Precautions? Civilian Casualties in Anti-IS Coalition Airstrikes in Syria,” edited by Sarah Leah Whitson, Human Rights Watch (24 September 2017).

³⁸³ Di Giovanni, *Dispatches from Syria: The Morning They Came For Us*, 164-165.

provincial capital Raqqa, and Iraq's second capital Mosul – IS's territorial gains have dissipated. Since the start of the coalition against IS, cities and towns under IS control have been systematically liberated. January 2015 saw the successful liberation of Kobane, followed by Tikrit in March, and the Sinjar region in November. In February 2016, the city of Ramadi was retaken, followed by Fallujah in June and Manbij in August, finally leading to the battle for Dabiq in October, which, as the IS official magazine *Dabiq* asserted, is where “one of the greatest battles between the Muslims and the crusaders will take place”.³⁸⁴ As 2017 neared its end, so too did IS within Mosul, which was declared free of IS control in July. Okeirbat was liberated in September, as the battle for the liberation of Raqqa was underway.³⁸⁵

Although IS's initial gains were remarkable, terror does not prevail, and the group's seized territories have dwindled to only a few remaining strongholds, such as Hawija in Iraq and al-Qaim in Syria. Fighting continues for Deir ez-Zor. Since January 2015, IS has lost an estimated 60% of its territorial control, which was once estimated at 80 000 square kilometres across Iraq and Syria.³⁸⁶

In keeping with Kaplan's third characteristic entailing the “physical withdrawal into wilderness areas,”³⁸⁷ reports agree that IS members are on the retreat into the desert and Euphrates Valley. With the scales half-tipped in favour of Assad and the Baathist regime, which now controls 48% of Syria, this is not to say that IS is completely defeated or that the Syrian civil war is reaching its conclusion. On the contrary, sectarianism is still rampant, Sunni and Shi'ah tribes are still divided, and Syria is under a dictator supported by Russia. Meanwhile, freedom fighters supported by the US and Israel, witnessed an Israeli airstrike executed on a Syrian military facility in April 2017.³⁸⁸ This was after the UN had confirmed that the Assad regime was guilty of crimes against humanity and the use of chemical weapons such as sarin gas in government-sanctioned attacks.³⁸⁹

³⁸⁴ The Islamic State, *Dabiq* Issue 1: “The Return of the Khilafah,” *The Clarion Project* (10 September 2014): 4.

³⁸⁵ Agence France Presse, “A timeline of the Islamic State's gains and losses in Iraq and Syria,” *Public Radio International* (19 February 2017).

³⁸⁶ BBC News, “Islamic State and the crIS in Iraq and Syria in maps,” *BBC News* (21 September 2017).

³⁸⁷ Kaplan, “The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism?” 551.

³⁸⁸ Shaun Walker, “With Assad's fate secure, Russia sets its sights on IS fighters in Syria,” *The Guardian* (16 September 2017).

³⁸⁹ Calamur, “Why Israel is worried about Syria.”

4.5 CONCLUSION

IS's theoretical pursuit and implementation of Islam in its purest form: Allah over all else in this material world, is possibly understandable. Putting religion and God ahead of the self, worldly temptations and material concerns, as in the time of the prophets and an age considered purer than that of today. Similar notions have appeared in Western society, such as the phrase "For God and Country". These words attempt to draw people's attention away from the "inconsequential material world" and back to God. Where IS has irrevocably failed is in its implementation of a religious ethos in reverence to the glory of life, of children, trees and land, ancient mosques and shrines. All have been destroyed. IS's interpretation of Islam has elevated religion and duty to Allah above human dignity, kindness, compassion and life. However, reactions and rationales of the rest of the world aren't far off from the terrorist group's own extremism. The persecution and marginalisation of Islamic people at large for the crimes of IS jihadis parallel the groups own persecution of the innocent for the crimes of the infidels and the West.

Kaplan's fifth wave framework reveals terrorism to be at its zenith when executing and resorting to genocidal atrocities. However, terror has now turned within. Fifth wave terrorism as exemplified by IS intends to purge, purify, and perfect the sacred community, culture, religion and ideology of the homeland. This often occurs in nations with challenging conditions in their infrastructure and politics, as in the case of the Khmer Rouge and of IS.

This chapter revealed that applying Kaplan's framework to IS is not only possible, but that the organisation can be explored through all the framework's seventeen characteristics. It has also illustrated that IS is unlike any terror organisation to date. Without its claim to statehood and its territorial claims, IS may not have amounted to much more than its predecessor, Al Qaeda. Thus, their claim to statehood has propelled IS beyond the bounds of Kaplan's fifth wave framework. The following concluding chapter maintains that IS constitutes a uniquely new wave of terrorism that is intertwined with statehood, governance and the ideology of jihadism.

CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION ON IS AND THE SIXTH WAVE OF TERRORISM

*Those who believe, and those who follow the Jewish, and the Christian and the Sabians – any who believe in Allah and the Last Day, and work righteousness, shall have their reward with their Lord; on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve.*³⁹⁰

5.1 INTRODUCTION

It must be recognised that Islam is a powerful and expansive religion. The preceding four chapters provided the historical framework and theoretical foundation, and found that it is possible to apply Rapoport's and Kaplan's waves to IS; however, its expanse and governance are not accounted for. Neither Rapoport's waves nor Kaplan's fifth wave framework address governance or statehood. In light of the previous chapters, it can be said that IS's transformation and evolution represent a new wave of terrorism. The attempts to establish a caliphate and an Islamic state indicate that a new wave is emerging, or at the very least, that the current wave is evolving to include structures of governance.

IS is unlike any terrorist organisation encountered in history. It is a proto-state. Di Giovanni questions whether “wars make states – or is it the other way around? Do states make war?”³⁹¹ It is the contention of this researcher that IS marks the genesis of a sixth Wave of Terrorism with its claim to statehood, its territorial acquisitions, and its terrorism. Defeating IS would only be an initial step; it would not defeat its violent ideology and jihadology.

5.2 FINDINGS: THE SIXTH WAVE OF TERRORISM

This study's primary research question aimed to explore whether IS constitutes an evolving wave or a unique new wave of terrorism. Exploring this study's main question required addressing the two sub-questions: what are Rapoport's waves of terrorism and where does the Islamic State fit in, if at all? Further, does Kaplan's fifth wave framework apply to the Islamic State? When exploring Rapoport's waves of terrorism and Kaplan's fifth wave framework, it became clear that pre-existing waves of terrorism are applicable and have been influential in

³⁹⁰ The Holy Qur'an, Surah 2 Al-Baqarah: The Heifer, 2:62.

³⁹¹ Di Giovanni, *Dispatches from Syria: The Morning They Came For Us*.

shaping IS and jihad terrorism as it is today. As highlighted earlier in the study, IS ascribes to extreme Salafi-jihadism, and their campaign has produced a contagious ideology of violence. “Jihadi-Salafism is a distinct ideological movement in Sunni Islam... The movement is predicated on extremist and minoritarian readings of Islamic scriptures”.³⁹²

IS’s literal translation of the Qur’an purports that refusal of jihad is equal to the sin of disbelief in God. Jihad is presented as a holy and final journey, and as the rationale for the onslaught against apostasy, infidels and idolatry.³⁹³ IS wages jihad both defensively and offensively, dedicated to annihilating all those who oppose Sunni Islam and the state. Shaykh Muhammad Kabbani and Shaykh Seraj Hendricks give the Arabic meaning for jihad as “to strive for some objective”.³⁹⁴ Jihad is about the struggle and the cause, and is applied to everyday life and activities. It is about perseverance and persistence through all life’s challenges and obstacles, which one day will be rewarded with a place in heaven. A vast majority of the world’s Muslims denounce jihad as a violent campaign. Jihad itself is not meant to be the objective, as exemplified by so many IS martyrs. The Shaykhs declare that:

The concept of jihad has been hijacked by many political and religious groups over the ages in a bid to justify various forms of violence. In most cases, Islamic splinter groups invoked jihad to fight against the established Islamic order. Scholars say this misuse of jihad contradicts Islam.³⁹⁵

Although IS’s nation-building campaign may fail, and the devotees and jihadis may retreat into the desert, it is likely that jihadology, the caliphate, and the desire for Muslim state-building will be continued by Salafi-jihadi extremists around the world. The physical manifestations of IS may be destroyed and dismantled, but the essence of jihad and its ideology will prevail as a battle of ideologies. Charlie Winter, a researcher on radicalism and extremism, stated: “the caliphate idea will exist long beyond its proto-state”.³⁹⁶ The caliphate is not a campaign or idea that solely belongs to IS. It is a phenomenon that has existed throughout Middle Eastern history, and thus, the idea of the caliphate will prevail, irrespective of the success or failure of IS.

³⁹² Cole Bunzel, “From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State,” *Analysis Report*, The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World (2015): 7.

³⁹³ Ibid.

³⁹⁴ Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani and Shaykh Seraj Hendricks, “Jihad: A Misunderstood Concept from Islam - What Jihad is, and is not”. Islamic Supreme Council of America (n.d): 10.

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

³⁹⁶ Simon Cottey, “IS Will Fail, but What About the Idea of IS?” *The Atlantic*. (23 May 2017).

The theories explored in Chapter One provided the reasoning for IS constituting a sixth wave of terrorism, characterised by jihadology, state-building and a culture of violence. The Social Control theory rationalises the motivations, choices, and actions taken in order to assert a degree of control over situations, people, environments and/or even the future. The IS sentiment extends beyond complete social control to financial, environmental, and governmental control. The organisation pursues power and domination of others through violence and extremism. Its campaign of jihad is based on ideology, but the rationale for the caliphate is centred on nascent state-building, acquisition, power and control.

The Just War theory contends that morality is the motivation for resorting to war and terrorism. The theory establishes the moral requirements and dilemmas faced in resorting to violence, and these apply to terrorism. Like governments and states, terrorist organisations also contend with moral considerations. If IS has revealed anything in regard to Just War, it is that undoing the ties of morality is their main objective. Desensitising fighters and recruiting children, among many other morally abhorrent pursuits, demonstrates that IS's brand of jihadology is one of immoral pursuit, where life and the greater good are considered reasonable sacrifices in overcoming the infidels of the world. Additionally, in reaction and response to the terrorist threat, Just War theory development and application may be made in the fight against terror. Weighing and determining the ethics and morality of responses to terrorism and ensuring that they are in line with Just War principles, like just cause and proportionality, may inadvertently acquit responding communities and governments of blame and any accusations of disproportionality or excessiveness, thereby strengthening and securing an ethical cause and a moral stand against acts of terror.

Cottee states: "it's not that God has abandoned the *mujahids* in favour of the infidel; rather, it's that trial and torment are inevitable on the path of jihad, and must be endured".³⁹⁷ IS's jihadology and the caliphate cannot be defeated by diplomacy, weapons, or military prowess. Kaplan and Costa believe that a terrorist organisation centred on an ideology of immortality and a campaign of state-building, implies that there is a new, divergent wave of terrorism, a sixth wave.³⁹⁸ Jihadology and state-building have emerged as the significant determinants of IS constituting a sixth wave of terrorism. From young children being recruited into the IS ranks,

³⁹⁷ Cottee, "IS Will Fail, but What About the Idea of IS?" *The Atlantic*. (23 May 2017).

³⁹⁸ Jeffrey Kaplan and Christopher P Costa, "The Islamic State and the New Tribalism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 27, 5 (2015): 935.

to teenagers with no affiliations to the group signing up from across the globe, the emergence of terrorism and violence as a culture warrants further exploration. It is this study's conviction that a link between ideology, culture and religion exists within terrorist frameworks in general, and in IS specifically, propelling a sixth wave centred on ideology and governance.

The Situational Action theory considers the previously mentioned theories in conjunction with situational factors that influence terrorism. It considers that historical grievances, religious prejudices, intolerance, and cultural and social divides in conflicted and colonially-scarred regions like Syria and Iraq, have resulted in a culture and atmosphere of confusion, violence, and insecurity. It is possible that environmental factors can regulate the choice for terrorism and violence as acceptable alternatives to moral and peaceful options. The individual context has left generations feeling insecure and unsure of their place in the country of their birth, and in their society.³⁹⁹

IS's interpretation and execution of terrorism is not only a fear tactic and violent strategy that aims to intimidate and influence desired targets, but the terrorism itself may also be understood as the manifestation of ideological and religious factors that aim to manipulate, scare, coerce and even appeal to desired targets. Terrorism has evolved from outright attacks and violence, to a careful and calculated combination of religion and ideology into a culture, and a campaign that has influenced and affected people worldwide. As stated earlier in the study, IS's expression of jihadism is predominantly focused on militarism and martyrdom, and not a determination to do good.

The future is not set in stone, but with the aforementioned theories in mind, tentative projections of the sixth wave may be made and the assertion proffered that unless ethnic and religious tolerance is fostered and achieved, extremist groups are likely to transform and resurface under different guises and with different convictions and causes. It has been asserted that terrorism is complex and multi-faceted. Kofi Annan claimed that, "terrorism flourishes in environments of despair, humiliation, poverty, political oppression, extremism and human rights abuse; it also flourishes in contexts of regional conflict and foreign occupation; and it profits from weak State capacity to maintain law and order."⁴⁰⁰ Therefore, tolerance and the

³⁹⁹ Bouhana and Wikström, "Theorizing Terrorism: Terrorism As Moral Action," 54-58.

⁴⁰⁰ United Nations General Assembly. "Measures to eliminate international terrorism." (*84th Plenary Meeting on Resolutions and Decisions*, 1994). Section 1, para. 3.

unification of people, organisations and countries are essential in curbing the reach and geopolitical spread of terrorism and specifically, extremism in all its forms, whether politically ideological or religious like Islamic extremism.

5.3 FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

The United Nations identifies five predominant pillars which reinforce the scope and efficiency of counter-terrorism measures. Namely; dissuade, deny, deter, develop and defend, which accordingly intends to:

- a) “Dissuade disaffected groups from choosing terrorism as a tactic to achieve their goals;” in so doing bringing attention and resolution to conditions that are conducive to the choice for and spread of terrorism. This inherently ties in with the Situational Action theory in determining the environmental and surrounding factors that make the terrorism an appealing option.
- b) “Deny terrorists the means to carry out their attacks;” entailing the means and measures implemented to impede, prevent and combat terrorist activity, including domestic resolutions and international consensus on reactions and prevention.
- c) “Deter States from supporting terrorists;” particularly by enhancing the role of the UN and international watchdog associations. As well as educating and encouraging states and communities away from terrorist extremism.
- d) “Develop State capacity to prevent terrorism;” by applying and implementing initiatives and institutions aimed at securing states sovereignty and international cooperation, as well as building states’ capacity to prevent and fight terrorism and secure their domestic interests.
- e) “Defend human rights in the struggle against terrorism” by committing to ensuring mutual respect for human rights, encouraging education and religious diversity and tolerance for all. ⁴⁰¹

In addition to the above pillars, initiatives fostering and focusing on tolerance and education are of the utmost importance. Ignorance can no longer be downplayed as bliss and tolerance itself cannot be achieved without understanding and education. Leading institutions, organisations, countries and role models need to place greater emphasis on advancing cognition

⁴⁰¹ Javier Ruperez. “The United Nations in the Fight against Terrorism.” (United Nations: Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, 2006, January 26): 23.

and understanding of the self and the other, diversity and difference - the eternal potential for harmony and symbiosis between the two. Mankind is known to fear that which it does not understand. This is precisely why the effective and meaningful acquisition and application of knowledge has the potential and the power to advance tolerance and acceptance between those from all walks of life and all regions and religions of the world.

In addition, this study proposes that defeating the IS ideology or *jihadology* would likely be a prominent initial step in curbing radicalism and extremism. Mansoor asserts that “if the caliphate is overrun by Western, Arab, and Turkish military forces it will no longer seem to be riding the tide of fate”.⁴⁰² The last 16 years have seen intensive Western intervention in the Middle East which has left the region riddled with political and social complexities and confusion. The Arab world has been partitioned by the French and British, invaded by the US and Russia, and is indebted to superpower countries that branded them terrorists when Muslim resistance against this meddling first surfaced. Islamic extremism and IS are products of a region monopolised and rummaged through by the Western world. If any improvements are to be seen, applying humanity and decency are the most practical options, as all else has failed to curb extremism and terrorist violence.

When addressing the question of returning IS fighters and defectors, as well as the mass of refugees and asylum seekers fleeing Syria, Anderlini explains the role of the international community in accepting or rejecting these displaced people. Anderlini’s perspective is that perpetrators may be victims as well.⁴⁰³ Some were radicalised in prison, much like Baghdadi himself, and many were groomed and lured online with attractive promises and visions of the state, while “some went to Syria out of compassion for the plight of Syrians at the hands of the Assad regime, and profound anger at the seeming inaction of their own governments”.⁴⁰⁴

IS cannot deny that ceasefires and peace treaties have historically been permissible in Islamic law. The Prophet himself made temporary peace treaties, such as the Treaty of Hudaibiyah in AD 628.⁴⁰⁵ Although not assured in the long run, peace treaties and opening channels of communication cannot have any negative impacts. Furthermore, if IS will not acknowledge

⁴⁰² Peter R Mansoor, “Why IS is Different – And why it matters,” *The Hoover Institution* 29, 1 (2016).

⁴⁰³ Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, “The best weapon to de-radicalise IS returnees? Our own humanity,” *The Guardian* (15 September 2017).

⁴⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁵ Wood, *The Way of the Strangers*, 185.

and recognise international law and institutions, and will not send envoys to the table, then it is time for the international community to attempt to operate according to IS's rules and their religion. Showing understanding and consideration for the sectarianism and religious complexities of IS could open avenues for reconciliation and agreement. Wood references an IS supporter's statement: "if they [the international community] don't let us choose our own government, things will only get worse".⁴⁰⁶ If IS and its supporters want their own state, government, and sovereignty, why not let them have it? If they were to operate in accordance with international norms without infringing on other states and human rights, compromise could be possible. However, it should not be discounted that fundamentalist Islam requires expansion and dominion over others. It is therefore essential that positive, productive measures and actions are equally expansive and inclusive, operating from a basis of tolerance and understanding.

5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY AND CONCLUSION

To further an understanding of IS, it is recommended that the Islamic State, the waves of terrorism, and the religious aspects should be further explored, as this would contribute significantly to the existing literature on IS. Knowledge of the Qur'an, the Prophet's Hadith, and Islam and its laws, is paramount to understanding the threat of IS, Islamic extremism, and terrorism today. Improved insights into the religious and historical backgrounds of Islam would provide a platform for rectifying past and present imbalances, and create an empathetic environment for all. However, the overall impact of the Islamic State and sixth wave terrorism on Islam cannot be ignored or understated. The synonymy of Islam with violence and terror, reduces an ancient and opulent religion to little more than an excuse or manipulation strategy in favour of expansion, dominance and territorial acquisition. Solomon Hussein said that "we live in a globalizing world, where security everywhere is threatened by insecurity anywhere... The state [world] has to give way to a truly global security architecture".⁴⁰⁷

This study's interpretation of Solomon's quote is that humankind has the means to connect, understand and learn from one another, yet people are disabled by their prejudices and differences, which divide the world instead of inspiring compassion and harmony between nations. As a recommendation, tolerance and education should be at the forefront of counter-

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid, 211.

⁴⁰⁷ Solomon, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, 87.

terrorism initiatives and measures. As such, history should be consulted and learnt from, differences should be understood and welcomed, divergent cultures should be studied and celebrated, religions should be respected and considered, and people should seek to uplift and not destroy. Peaceful alternatives to pursuing a cause, be they religious, political, or otherwise, should unreservedly be for the sake of life and the betterment of the world. Another area requiring attention and development for further study is the narrative and context surrounding the clan-based dynamics of Islamic culture and Middle Eastern society. Understanding and informing the research on these inner-workings and traditions is essential.

Further theoretical development and exploration of sovereignty and nascent state-building would benefit the discourse on terrorist organisations aspiring for proto-state expansion and dominance, inadvertently, enhancing Sixth Wave Terrorism Theory.

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