



MONASH University

**‘We Just Want to Help’
Community Disaster Resilience
– Profit in Nonprofits?**

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Abstract

Introduction

The Council of Australian Governments [COAG] and the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction [UNISDR] promote building community resilience to disasters to enable communities to cope with and recover from disasters (COAG, 2011; UNISDR, 2017a). International research supports community directed actions and participation before, during and after disasters (Tiernan, Drennan, Nallau, Onyango, Morrissey & Mackey, 2018). The Australian National Strategy for Disaster Resilience [NSDR] characterises resilient communities as having strong disaster risk reduction strategies, strong social capacity and networks (COAG, 2011). While nonprofit organisations [NPOs] demonstrate many characteristics that define a disaster resilient community, the literature provides little evidence of their involvement in the disaster space. NPOs do not operate for members' profit, but function to achieve the organisation's purpose (ATO, 2016). NPOs such as Lions Clubs, Rotary Clubs and Neighbourhood Houses have long histories of community involvement. While not established to respond to disasters, they have often been heavily involved in communities recovering from disasters and have vast potential to help communities in this space.

Aim

This thesis aims to explore how NPOs may contribute to building community resilience to disasters. To do this, the primary research question asks 'What is the potential role of NPOs in building community resilience to disasters?' To understand the Emergency Management [EM] perspective about how NPOs could be engaged in the Victorian context, a secondary research question asks 'How do those within the EM system see nonprofit organisations, before, during and after a disaster situation?'

Method

The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, theories of Resilience in the Disaster Setting, including the national NSDR, urban City Resilience Framework and

community-based EMV Framework, and social capital theory contributed the research conceptual frameworks. These were used to build the thesis scaffolding, which informs the analysis and results, to identify ‘what matters most to building community resilience’. This thesis used an applied research approach to address the research problem. Qualitative research methods helped identify themes, and case study research explored NPO actions, strengths, barriers faced and enablers during disasters.

Results

Research results illustrated that NPOs contribute many actions to their communities during disasters. Actions have included providing quick access to local assets, physical assistance (water, toilets, food, clean up or shelter), through to contributing long term recovery actions lasting years. Both NPO and EM stakeholders recognised that NPOs had significant strengths, including community connections, local knowledge and motivated volunteers who offered creative solutions to community challenges. NPOs expressed frustration because they ‘just wanted to help’, but barriers blocked their effective participation. This thesis identified possible enablers to resolve these barriers, for example; to build disaster resilience into the funded mandate of NPOs and incorporate NPOs into the EM operating structure.

Discussion

The thesis demonstrates the usefulness of NPOs before, during and after disasters. While incorporating NPOs into EM responses has challenges, thesis results demonstrate that EM policy aspirations to include NPOs in sharing responsibilities around disasters are valid and could potentially strengthen community resilience. However, training, development and funds are required by both government and NPOs to ensure effective engagement and empowerment of these groups.

Conclusion

‘We just want to help’ conclusively enhances the evidence base of NPOs’ contributions to building community resilience to disasters. NPO actions reveal significant profit in

nonprofits by demonstrating how these organisations provide vital support and enable communities to respond and recover more effectively before, during and after disasters. Likewise, NPO community activities place them squarely within EM strategic processes. Used more effectively, as the significant community asset they are, and because they want to help, NPOs could generate savings through risk reduction measures and hasten community recovery from disasters.

Declaration

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at any university or equivalent institution and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Fiona J.B. Roberts

Date: 20th March 2019.

Ethics Approval

Approval was gained by the Monash University Human Ethics Research Committee for the pilot phase, Project 8645. Following the pilot phase, amendments to the Ethics application were sought to:

- Amendment 1: Increase the number of organisations studied; and
- Amendment 2: Enable interviewing of Emergency Management representatives.

Both amendments were approved by Monash University Human Ethics Research Committee, refer paperwork in Appendix 1: Ethics Approval.

Governance

My supervisors Emeritus Professor Frank Archer and Dr Caroline Spencer provided guidance and governance oversight, as well as forming the core of the project's steering group. Oversight was maintained through fortnightly meetings to discuss progress. I, as the PhD Researcher, prepared and circulated meeting agenda and meeting notes for each meeting. Monash University milestones (6-month review, confirmation, etc) also provided governance structure and oversight. Where required, I have received approval from the relevant leadership bodies of the organisations I have approached. Interviewees were asked if they would agree to be interviewed and were given an Explanatory statement and a Consent form to sign, as per Monash University research requirements. Examples of these are available in Appendix 1: Ethics Approval.

Glossary Definitions

Community-based disaster risk management encourages the involvement of local communities in disaster risk management. Involvement may include participation in: community hazard, vulnerabilities and capacity assessments, and or planning, implementation, and monitoring of disaster risk reduction actions (UNISDR 2017).

Community empowerment assumes power is given or transferred, enabling people to participate in actions and decision making that have consequences for them (Luzasiewicz, Dovers & Eburn 2017)

Community engagement is defined by the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience Community Engagement Framework as: ‘The process of stakeholders working together to build resilience through collaborative action, shared capacity building and the development of strong relationships built on mutual trust and respect’ (Attorney-General’s Department 2013).

Coping capacity is the ability of people, organizations and systems, using available skills and resources, to manage adverse conditions, risk or disasters (UNISDR 2017).

Disaster risk management is the application of disaster risk reduction policies, processes and actions to prevent new risk, reduce existing disaster risk and manage residual risk, contributing to the strengthening of resilience (UNISDR 2017).

Disaster risk reduction is the policy objective aimed at preventing new and reducing existing disaster risk and managing residual risk, all of which contribute to strengthening resilience (UNISDR 2017).

Hazard is a process, phenomenon or human activity that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation (UNISDR 2017).

Nonprofit or not-for-profit organisation (NPO): is an organisation that provides services to the community and does not operate to make a profit. All profits must go back into the services the organisation provides and must not be distributed to members (Australian Tax Office 2018).

Resilience is the ability of a system, community or society that is exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions (UNISDR 2017)

Vulnerability refers to conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of an individual, a community, assets or systems to the impacts of hazards. Risk factors can be addressed by strengthening individual, collective and institutional capacities to cope with and/or reduce risks (UNISDR 2017c).
Any other key words use the UNISDR 2017 glossary as a guide

Acknowledgements

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My family for their continual support and love, even when I whinged. Hugh for demonstrating the meaning of focus and for his subtle study tips ('stop procrastinating now!'). Jilly for enabling my procrastination with such wonderful excuses. Hamish ditto, but also for ensuring I had to either study or be a hypocrite. To those we have lost, always in our hearts.

To Fradge, Min, Richard, Greg, Mark, Trudi, Pam, Sophie, Emily, Craig, Amy, Fergus and Charlie thank you for your love and care.

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Jet and Ruby for being under my feet every step of the way...

Thank you to case participants who gave so generously of their time.

Mum and Dad thank you for demonstrating how to contribute.

Acronyms

ABS	Australian Bureau of Statistics
ARC	Australian Red Cross
CFA	Country Fire Authority (Victoria)
COAG	Council of Australian Governments
DHHS	Department of Health and Human Services (Victoria)
EM	Emergency Management
EMA	Emergency Management Australia
EMV	Emergency Management Victoria
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Authority
IFRCRCS	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
LGV	Local Government Victoria
MUARC	Monash University Accident Research Centre
MUDRI	Monash University Disaster Resilience Initiative
MUHREC	Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
NHV	Neighbourhood Houses Victoria
NPO	Nonprofit or not-for-profit organisation
NSDR	National Strategy for Disaster Resilience
SENDAI	The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
VICSES	State Emergency Service (Victoria)
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction

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PROLEGOMENON¹

My Background

I hold an Agricultural Science degree, focused in Economics, and an MBA from the University of Melbourne. I also have a graduate certificate in Business from the Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit studies (QUT) which included subjects on governance of nonprofits, accounting for nonprofits, management of nonprofits, fundraising and social enterprises.

I previously ran my own management consultancy focused in economic and strategy research for agribusiness organisations. I was in that role of nearly 20 years, and during that time I undertook research for such organisations as the Grains, Sugar and Rural Industries Research and Development Corporations, as well as for larger multinationals and private companies. I also volunteered in and built my knowledge about a range of community nonprofit organisations throughout that time (kindy and school parent committees, neighbourhood watch, management of kids' sporting groups, fundraising for charity).

Key Elements of the River

My supervisors enjoyed using the analogy of a river to describe the PhD journey. In recognition of their diligence, I put forward the following. I started in the Disaster space in 2014, completing two Monash University Disaster Resilience Initiative [MUDRI] units as part of a Master of International Development Practice. These units, *Introduction to Disaster Preparedness and Management* and *Disaster Resilience and Community Safety* did much to enhance my interest and knowledge of the Disaster space, introduced me to the MUDRI team and confirmed to me that MUDRI produced strong, useful, applied research. I transferred to MUDRI to undertake my PhD in March 2015; and completed

¹ Prefatory remarks; specifically: a formal essay or critical discussion serving to introduce and interpret an extended work. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prolegomenon>

a further two units, *Responsible Research Practice and Project Management in Emergency and Disaster Settings* and *Research and Evaluation in Disaster Preparedness and Management*. My journey has been fast and slow, as I moved between being a full-time candidate and part-time, depending on life circumstances. Pre-candidature I had the opportunity to undertake a literature review into disaster recovery for the Attorney General's Department (Archer, McArdle, Spencer & Roberts, 2015). From readings in this area, it became apparent to me that it is too late if we start helping people at the recovery stage of a disaster. The action, if it is to help vulnerable communities, needs to start before the disaster. This research study shaped my interest further in community resilience to disasters.

My initial research area became to identify successful and sustainable grassroots community organisations cultivating actions that enhanced their community's resilience to disasters. However, after commencing candidature in 2015 I participated in another MUDRI literature review, funded by the Attorney General's Department (AGD), seeking 'grassroots' examples of community groups building resilience. The review identified very few examples that were not 'top-down' in instigation or driven by government provided resources (Spencer, Majeed, Roberts, McArdle & Archer, 2017). There is little in the peer-reviewed literature on what makes community networks flourish in the disaster space or scientifically based community resilience actions surrounding disasters.

What perplexed me was that NPOs appeared to demonstrate characteristics that defined a disaster resilient community. The literature did not indicate the use or much involvement by these groups in emergency management planning or resilience building exercises. Yet community groups such as Lions Clubs or Rotary Clubs have long, independent histories, and while not established in response to disasters, or specifically for disasters, they have often been heavily involved in preparing for or recovering from disasters. Hence my research evolved to investigate the role of NPOs in contributing to disaster community resilience.

During my enrolment, I have contributed to the following publications:

- Archer, F, McArdle, D, Spencer, C and Roberts, F. (2015). *Literature Review: What does good or successful recovery look like?* Prepared for the Attorney-General's Department, Canberra, ACT. Monash University Disaster Resilience Initiative, Monash University Accident Research Centre, Melbourne.
- Spencer, C., Majeed, S., Roberts, F., McArdle, D. and Archer, F. (2017). *Literature Review Identify 'bottom-up' community development approaches to effective and efficient community engagement in the setting of the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience.* Prepared for the Attorney-General's Department, Canberra, ACT. Monash University Disaster Resilience Initiative, Monash University Accident Research Centre, Melbourne.

I have presented papers at the 3rd Annual Monash Disaster Research Symposium, 2014 'What is good recovery, a literature review', at the 2015 MUDRI Forum on 'What does the literature say about recovery thinking?', MUDRI 2015 Disaster Resilience Forum, *Victoria: Transitioning Emergency Management, keeping up with Change* and on 'What potential do nonprofit organisations have for building community resilience to disasters?' at the 2018 MUDRI Disaster Resilience Forum *Community-based resilience: the community speaks*. I also have a paper accepted to present at the 'Disasters and the Future' World Association for Disaster and Emergency Medicine conference in May 2019.

As part of the requirements of a PhD degree from Monash University I was required to undertake 120 hours of training to enhance my professional knowledge. In addition to MUARC inhouse training, I have undertaken training programs in a wide variety of areas, particularly with respect to evaluation techniques, qualitative and quantitative research, case study design, theme analysis, NVIVO, Endnote, data management, literature review design and research integrity. These programs have formed an integral part of my PhD journey and enhanced the quality of my research. I have attended

industry conferences (Australasian Fire and Emergency Services Authorities Council, Communities in Control, Our Community, Diversity in Disaster) and seminars (MUDRI Forums). I also subscribe to relevant podcasts including: Emergency Management Australia, Econotalk, and newsletters such as: 100 Resilient Cities, Recovery Diva, Third Sector, Zilient, Our Community, Australian Emergency Law, Devex News, Thesis Whisperer and Research Degree Voodoo.

The purpose of this prolegomenon is to introduce myself and to demonstrate that I am aware that my background and experiences impact on my perceptions and biases of this report. I have reported as I have seen it, recognizing that another's perceptions may well be different to mine.

'...Life is an Odyssey...there is something beautiful about the Odyssey because Ulysses is on the boat and then he will have this incredible adventure but then he gets to get back on the boat and move on...Huckleberry Finn's journeys – he gets on that raft he gets off it, he gets engaged and has adventures and when something happens it is about time to get on that raft and move on...'

Walter Isaacson, 2017

1. INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND

1.1 Problem Statement – The Need for this Research

A growing volume of research supports the importance of community participation and community directed disaster mitigation, resilience and recovery (CARRI, 2013a; Cutter et al., 2008; EMV 2017; White et al., 2015). An assertion in the literature states that stronger, more resilient communities are better able to cope with disasters (COAG, 2011). However, limited referenced evidence supports this assertion. The National Strategy for Disaster Resilience [NSDR] (COAG, 2011) characterises resilient communities as having strong disaster and financial mitigation strategies, as well as strong social capacity, networks and self-reliance, they can adapt successfully and are able to function well under stress (COAG, 2011). Yet again, there is little referenced evidence of what characterises community resilience and what should be used to underpin community resilience.

Policy documents, such as the United Nations Hyogo and Sendai Frameworks and Australia’s National Strategy for Disaster Resilience, recognise the importance and value of including the affected community’s voice and active participation in disaster mitigation, resilience and recovery (COAG, 2011; ISDR, 2005; UNISDR, 2015b). However, while growing recognition exists of its importance, initial scans of the disaster literature identify little research about how to successfully facilitate the community to build their resilience and network assets or actual evidence of community-led, self-reliant activities. Likewise, recognition exists at the national level that community engagement appears as a secondary consideration to Australian emergency management organisations (AIDR, 2013).

The Community Engagement Framework, Handbook 6 of the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience, Australian Emergency Management Handbook series (AIDR, 2013), proposes a framework with which the Emergency Services can engage with the community, but it recognises that this is an *‘evolving conversation in education, engagement and building disaster resilience’* (AIDR, 2013, p. 1). Discussions in the

Monash University Disaster Resilience Initiative [MUDRI] Forum in March 2015, highlighted that while stakeholders recognised the importance of community engagement and input, private community members argued that there was little actual engagement in practice. There seemed, from the forum, to be a floundering and misalignment, regarding what was recognised as important in theory (community engagement, community-led or grassroots participation), and what happened in practice (top-down directives). Indeed, the interaction between government and community participants is often conflicted and not constructive (Taylor & Goodman, 2015).

There was surprisingly little research, data or information evident regarding those community groups that are recognised by affected communities as valuable during and after disasters but are not included in emergency management practices or planning. Spencer (2016) referred to ‘the unaligned force’ with organisations such as: Neighbourhood Houses, Community Emergency Planning groups, Safety Insurance Organisations, Other Community Groups, Private Organisations/NGOs listed under this classification (Spencer 2016). A MUDRI pragmatic literature review prepared for the Inspector-General of Emergency Management Victoria [IGEM] that reviewed evidence of government emergency management organisations’ engagement with nonprofit organisations across four countries, identified little research in this area (Majeed, Spencer, McArdle & Archer, 2016). The report suggested formal connections between the government emergency management sector and community sectors were in their ‘infancy’ (Majeed, Spencer, McArdle & Archer, 2016, p. 4).

The Second National Disaster Resilience Roundtable Report highlighted the potentially significant role that NPOs may contribute in disaster management (ARC 2014b). However, a key theme of the Roundtable’s discussions was the importance of raising awareness regarding NPOs’ capacities and capabilities (ARC, 2014b). In recognition of the apparent lack of research, awareness or literature into non-traditional NPOs operating or potentially operating in the disaster space, the problem statement for the thesis is detailed below.

The problem statement for this thesis is that the NSDR posits that resilient communities adapt successfully and function well under stress when they embrace strong mitigation strategies, strong social capital, networks and self-reliance, but what evidence supports these aspirations?

My initial observations, and the research undertaken as part of the MUDRI grassroots community group study, lead to a preliminary scoping of the project and through this, it became evident that there was a knowledge gap in the area (Spencer, Majeed, Roberts, McArdle & Archer, 2017). I had intended to research community groups tackling disaster resilience issues. However:

- there is a lack of scientifically based evidence of long term, successful, standalone grassroots organisations (Spencer et al., 2017);
- funding for grassroots organisations is generally short-term and inadequate (ARC, 2014a);
- there is increasing recognition of the possible importance of the nonprofit area in the disaster space (ARC, 2014b);
- examples of useful nonprofit organisation activity were evident in the Recovery project I participated in, albeit without a strong scientific research base;
- Spencer (2016) has highlighted the lack of recognition of the ‘unaligned’ organisations. These organisations have been ignored, downplayed or were unknown by Emergency Management Services Organisations [EM] and were recognised by Spencer as unaligned also, with Government.

What resonated with me, was that so many of the characteristics that anecdotally define a disaster resilient community are demonstrated by many NPOs. For example: Lions Clubs, Rotary Clubs, Church groups, Sporting groups, Show societies, Hall Committees, Anglicare and The Smith Family. These organisations are embedded in their communities, they have extensive community networks and connections, people know and trust them, they often support the community’s most vulnerable and they are empowered to action, independent of government, to help their communities. Further,

the NSDR encourages shared responsibility across a community, including nonprofit organisations (AIDR, 2013; COAG, 2011). However, the literature has not mentioned or indicated much involvement by these groups in emergency management planning or resilience building exercises.

The government recognises the affected local community needs to be involved in disaster resilience activities, but also recognises this is not being done effectively (AIDR, 2012). Community groups such as Rotary Clubs and Lions Clubs have long histories of community engagement and service to the community. They are also largely independent of government funding and demonstrably self-sustaining. While not established in response to disasters, or specifically for disasters, they have often been heavily involved in preparing for or recovering from disasters. That government and emergency management organisations do not effectively engage and use such nonprofit organisations is a failure to use a key strength of the local community and a missed opportunity for the impacted community to profit from their abilities.

From previous life experiences, I knew of the work of NPOs in the community development space and wondered if they contributed to the disaster space. At the same time there was debate about community-led actions, and the importance of having grassroots organisations tackling community resilience issues. Hence the need for research investigating what the literature says about community-led, community-guided and community-conducted disaster resilience.

1.2 Research Questions

The primary research question is: ‘what is the potential role of nonprofit organisations in building community resilience to disasters?’ The secondary research questions are:

- What does the literature say about community-led (guided, based, centred, conducted) disaster resilience?
- What is meant by nonprofit organisation in the Australian context?

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- What have been the actions of nonprofit organisations (NPOs) before, during and after disasters?
 - Of those actions that were successful, what were believed to be the strengths of NPOs, the enablers that contributed and barriers that hindered NPO actions?
 - How do those within the Emergency Management (EM) system see nonprofit organisations before, during and after a disaster situation, and from an EM perspective, to what degree could nonprofits be engaged in the Australian context?

1.3 Structure of the Thesis

The approach of this research was as an applied research project, which describes the emerging role of NPOs in the disaster sector. Given the lack of documented successful grassroots organisations that have been viable over the longer term, some traditional nonprofit community groups that have dealt with disasters were analysed. The study did not investigate the Country Fire Authority [CFA] or VICSES groups as particular NPO cases, as these organisations already have a legitimate and recognised role in the disaster space. This thesis explains why it is important to understand the role of local level organisations in addressing community resilience to disasters. The research is unique as it appears to be the first in the Australian context, with the study focused on NPO actions in the disaster context, in Victoria.

The research details the valuable contribution nonprofit organisations make to building disaster community resilience. The potential of these organisations to help build resilience to and in recovery from disasters cannot be overstated. However, to grasp the opportunities these organisations present, emergency management need to support, train and incorporate them into their resilience and response planning and actions. This leads to the challenge of defining what type of community engagement is optimal for the community, what level is needed by community members and what is optimal for emergency management stakeholders. The literature at a policy level at times calls for actions to be ‘community-led’, but is that what communities want? Or is it

something more towards community driven with some community participation, and where does 'community-based' fit? This puzzle required a literature review.

The literature available on community-led, community-based resilience to disasters is explored in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 the Joanna Briggs Institute Scoping Study technique was followed to investigate nonprofit organisations' disaster related actions in the peer reviewed and grey literature. This provides an international perspective of what nonprofit organisations do around disasters and the barriers they have encountered. The actions mentioned in the literature of nonprofit organisations, their strengths highlighted in disaster situations, and barriers and enablers to NPOs contributing to such situations are drawn together using NVIVO 12 qualitative software, where articles are coded and thematically analysed. Chapter 4 defines key terms and concepts. The research's conceptual frameworks are then detailed in Chapter 5, highlighting why Resilience in the Disaster Setting, the Sendai Framework and Social Capital Theory were selected as important conceptual frameworks. This is needed to scientifically ground the research and determine whether nonprofit actions fit with current understandings of disaster resilience building.

In Chapter 6 the Methodological approach is detailed, including a discussion on why the case study approach and thematic analysis were chosen. The nonprofit organisations of Lions Club, Neighbourhood Houses Victoria and Rotary Club are examined in Chapter 7, particularly at the local, regional and state levels. The results of in-depth document analysis and detailed interviews with key stakeholders are brought together in case studies to highlight these organisations' actions, strengths, barriers and enablers. Hence knowledge of Australian nonprofit organisations, their characteristics, actions and barriers in disaster settings is developed.

Given their importance and influence over nonprofit actions in this space, in Chapter 8 the Emergency Management perspective is examined, using interviews with the industry experts and reviewing policy and strategy documentation. In Chapter 9 the results from Chapters 3, 7 and 8 are synthesised for a comprehensive analysis of the

barriers and enablers facing nonprofit organisations [NPOs], and their strengths within their communities, before, during and after disasters. Actions and strengths are placed within the thesis scaffolding developed in Chapter 5, to determine their contribution to building community resilience. Barriers to nonprofit organisation actions are examined, building on themes identified in the scoping literature review and in coding interviews of NPO stakeholders. Enablers are detailed to address key barriers to NPO actions. Then in Chapter 10, the Discussion covers the range of issues identified in the research, how NPOs contribute to building disaster resilience communities, what the research contributes to the field, how generalisable is the research and what further research is required. Chapter 11 concludes by recognising that nonprofit organisations can indeed contribute to building community resilience to disasters.

1.4 Conclusion

Community-led resilience was, at the start of my PhD in 2015, a politically popular term. At the time, policies were being re-written or written that favoured ‘community-led’ actions and placing the community in the centre of disaster related actions. Also, at the time, MUDRI was engaged to investigate ‘bottom-up’ evidence of community resilience, that gave me further background into the area. As this Chapter illustrates, there were moves encouraging communities towards engagement and to have some degree of empowerment. Yet with virtually no community-led groups evident, I moved my research focus towards looking at the potential role NPOs could have if they participated in community resilience to disasters.

In order to place my research within the disaster resilience literature, the concepts of community-led resilience in the disaster setting needed to be explored. What does the literature say about it? And why is it so important in the disaster setting? This is the subject of the following chapter, where the literature review into what does the literature say about community-led, community-driven, community-based resilience in the disaster setting is outlined and the results discussed.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW OF COMMUNITY-LED RESILIENCE IN THE DISASTER SETTING

2.1 Why a Literature Review on Community-Led Resilience is Needed

Convenience scoping of the literature and background research as outlined in Chapter 1, discovered little evidence of community groups leading actions in building their resilience to disasters. Given the changing role and expectations of community groups towards greater engagement and empowerment before, during and after disasters, research needed to be undertaken in this area. Hence a systematic literature review of what the literature says about community-led, community-based resilience in the disaster setting was undertaken and this is the subject of Chapter 2.

Disasters and disaster related losses can lead to large-scale consequences for the impacted community, the State and the Nation (The National Academies, 2012). Lives lost, livelihoods financially crippled and longer-term mental health impacts are huge costs resulting from disasters. The total economic cost of disasters continues to grow, and in Australia alone, is expected to reach \$39 billion per year by 2050 (Deloitte Access Economics, 2017). In Victoria, Deloitte Access Economics estimate the total economic cost of natural disasters is to reach \$3.2 billion, up from \$1 billion per year today (Deloitte Access Economics, 2017).

Globally, demographic changes such as population and infrastructure growth into higher risk areas, are aggravating community vulnerability to disasters (McArdle & Archer, 2011, UNDP, 2012). Further, climate change modelling suggests that the seriousness and occurrence of disasters and extreme weather events will grow (COAG, 2011; World Economic Forum, 2018). As the frequency and intensity of disasters is growing and when combined with increasing societal vulnerabilities; disasters are likely to cause the impacted community large-scale losses. These threats may be minimised if disaster risks can be reduced, but this requires a change in the way disasters are prepared for, responded to and managed.

As populations increase in more regional or vulnerable areas, budgetary constraints limit the delivery of services, and climate change impacts on the frequency and intensity of disasters, the way we respond to disasters has to change (Wells et al., 2013). The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 [the Sendai Framework] was adopted in Sendai 2015, at the United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction. It is a voluntary agreement, overseen by United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction [UNISDR], for signature countries, including Australia, to bring down disaster risks and losses (UNISDR, 2015b). The Sendai Framework has shifted the focus of policy makers from managing disasters to managing risk (UNISDR, 2015b). Appropriate risk management and preparedness help to save lives and reduce the impacts of disasters on social and economic factors (UNDP, 2012). The Sendai Framework also emphasises that building resilience is a shared goal across all stakeholders. Stakeholders reducing or preventing hazard exposure, reducing vulnerability and preparing for disaster response and recovery can strengthen resilience (UNISDR, 2017b). Hence enhancing resilience to disasters is a means to reduce the impact of disasters (The National Academies, 2012).

There is significant international recognition of the importance of disaster risk reduction on minimising the impact of disasters. Yet disasters are usually localised, their impact context specific, depending on the impacted community's vulnerabilities, capabilities and exposure (Lukasiewicz, Dovers & Eburn, 2017; Singh-Peterson, Salmon, Baldwin & Goode, 2014). Community resilience is increasingly recognised as an important tool in helping to prepare and minimise disaster impacts, build community coping assets, and reduce the vulnerability of community members to disaster impacts (COAG, 2011; UNISDR 2017a; UNISDR 2018). Considerable discussion occurs at the policy level in determining appropriate resilience frameworks (see Mochizuki et al., 2018 for a review of resilience frameworks) and measurement indices (see Torrens Resilience Institute, 2017 for a review of measurement indices). Involvement by the impacted community, use of local knowledge and networks within communities is often listed as important aspects of these resilience frameworks (EMV, 2017b; UNISDR, 2017a).

Researchers characterise disaster resilience as having interconnectedness and interactivity (Singh-Peterson, Salmon, Baldwin & Goode, 2014). Hence organisations, such as community groups, that contribute to or foster interactivity and interconnectivity support resilience building. Nonetheless, little evidence appears in the peer reviewed literature on actual community groups and their community resilient, grassroots actions, that is not superficial.

This chapter details a literature review undertaken of community-led, community-based resilience in the disaster setting, both within Australia and internationally; and highlights the gap in the research literature regarding grassroots, community-led organisations that contribute to community resilience to disasters. To place nonprofits within this environment, in Chapter 3, a scoping literature review follows the Methodology of JBI Scoping Reviews (Joanna Briggs Institute, 2015) and investigates the literature around the role of nonprofit organisations in disasters.

2.2 Community-Led Resilience In The Disaster Setting Search Strategy

To answer the question of ‘what does the literature say about community-led (guided, based, centred, conducted) disaster resilience?’ a literature review was undertaken. The search aimed to identify actions made by community groups that helped build community resilience before, during and after disasters. It was a systematic review, with the initial search strategy using the key words of: community development, community engagement, community resilience, disaster and BOOLEAN AND and OR terms. The synonyms initially covered efficient, effective, best practice and grassroots. The search was restricted to papers written in English, from 2000 onwards. The search strategy for the initial literature review used PRISMA to ensure a systematic process.

In the peer reviewed literature, there are a range of disciplines that cover disaster research, including medical science, economics, architecture, management, development, social science and agriculture. In a study of 25 disasters, Smith, Wasiak, Sen, Archer & Burkle (2009) identified 789 peer reviewed journals that contained research articles on these disasters (Smith et al. 2009). To ensure a degree of coverage,

the databases searched encompassed EBSCO host including the databases: MEDLINE, EconLit, Urban Studies, OVID MEDLINE, PubMed, PsycInfo, SCOPUS, ProQuest, and SAGE. Open Athens, via the Australian Emergency Management Library, was also used to access databases from a business continuity, specialised emergency management perspective; for example, EBSCO Host – business continuity and disaster recovery reference centre.

Initial search results yielded large numbers, due to the wide range of databases searched and because of the range of definitions search terms covered. Title searches quickly identify the bulk of excluded papers, hence search results were reviewed by title. The resulting abstracts were then subjected to an inclusion/exclusion review. Again, numbers were higher than perhaps conventionally, however the researchers found some abstracts lacked clarity and the article needed a quick review to gain understanding of the relevance of the research. Secondary searching of bibliographies was also undertaken, as well as hand searching the Disaster journal and key researchers' publications. Inclusion criteria for abstract selection incorporated the questions:

- Is the activity predominantly community-led or community driven?
- Is there a model?
- Is there evidence of success?
- Has someone done something (not just told others to do something)? `

The exclusion criteria for removing abstracts and papers were the questions:

- No conceptual model was used.
- In achieving action, Government funding was dominant.
- The action was Government driven.
- There was no evidence of a community actually doing something.

Previous research on disasters highlighted the importance of grey literature. Consequently, Web of Science and Google Scholar were searched, based on the search strategy above. While the grey literature search did not reflect a systematic review,

particularly given Google Scholar's limitations, the grey literature produced far more useful information on grassroots activities than the peer-reviewed journals. The disaster space includes a wide range of information repositories and websites; yet few guides exist as to how to review such literature. Chan and Burkle's (2013) framework and methodology for navigating crisis literature focused on global health and the Clarke, Allen, Archer, Wong, Eriksson and Puri (2014) scoping study on the evidence base of humanitarian assistance evaluations proved unhelpful for this review (Clarke et al., 2014). Quality concerns and limitations for using grey literature were addressed through focussing on industry recognised quality websites and information repositories, ensuring well-defined inclusion and exclusion guidelines, and targeting recognised experts in the field. Some web site search engines do not allow adequate differentiation and the number of hits were large. In these an attempt to search titles for the most likely papers was made. The websites searched included:

Recovery Diva; Community and Regional Resilience Institute (CARRI);
RAND Corporation; Rockefeller Foundation;
UK Resilience; Federal Emergency Management Agency;
Volunteering QLD; Canadian Centre for Emergency Preparedness;
Relief Web; Centre of Disaster Studies – James Cook University;
Prevention Web; OECD Road Map to Resilience;
Foundation for Rural and Regional Renewal;
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies;
Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GRDRR);
United Nations Development Program and UNISDR;
Department of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Development and Local Government;
Asian Disaster Reduction Centre and key researchers' publications.

The grey literature search highlighted the complexity of searching through terms that had multiple meanings and situations that were described by varying vocabularies depending on the discipline. In Google Scholar alone, there were 21,000 articles


retrieved. When the time was reduced to between 2010-2015, the results fell to 14,700. The search strategy was then reviewed, and 'development' and the synonyms 'efficient', 'effective' and 'best practice' were removed. 'Politics', 'government', 'hospital', citations and 'climate change' were not included. The consequent 228 titles were then searched, and relevant papers included in the abstract analysis. The Web of Science search followed the peer reviewed systematic search strategy and yielded 218 titles, once duplicates had been removed. The results obtained may, but not necessarily, have included relevant research documented on the various reputable websites.

Throughout the course of my PhD, I have maintained SCOPUS and Web of Science search alerts for the words defined above. I have followed Recovery Diva, various other podcasts, government websites and the ODI Resilience Scan newsletter to ensure I was monitoring the latest research. A literature review following the process listed above was undertaken in June 2018 for the time 2015-2018 and the 42 new results incorporated into the analysis. Many of these papers were valuable for adding insight and background to the research, however again, when whole papers were analysed specifically relating to the selection criteria, only eight were included. This demonstrates the difficulties encountered in judging the selection criteria from the title of the abstract. Often the whole paper had to be reviewed, before it became evident whether a framework had been used, or if the action was actually community-driven.

The quest to find examples of community groups doing things to build their community's resilience followed a systematic review process, as reported in the PRISMA figure below (Figure 2.1: PRISMA Chart Community-Led Resilience in the Disaster Setting). There were few examples that met the inclusion criteria. While undertaking this process however, it became evident that more generally, without specific examples, the area of community resilience in a disaster setting was developing rapidly. Articles that added to the theory or that helped to inform context, were reviewed separately. Particularly research on definitions, measurements and frameworks were all monitored.


2.3 Search Results of Community-Led Resilience in the Disaster Setting

Figure 2. 1: PRISMA Chart Community-Led Resilience in the Disaster Setting



Source: Original template Joanna Briggs Institute 2015, p. 21

Figure 2. 2: Records of Community Disaster Resilience



Source: Google Scholar search engine only, for community AND resilience AND disaster. This does not reflect the initial search strategy of this research. It is an illustration of the growth in this area only.

* up to 2018 rather than 2019.

The study found significant growth in research in the area of community, resilience and disasters over the timeframe analysed. This is illustrated in Figure 2.2 where the number of titles has increased by tens of thousands over the period. Note the last bar illustrates the number of titles between 2015-2018, obviously missing data from 2019. However, little in the literature emerged on analytically researched, peer reviewed papers illustrating groups building community resilience to disasters. Most papers did not have a model on which to base their research, and the goals of the external funding body often drove the focus of community groups. Papers with examples of communities doing something themselves were anecdotal, subjective and with little scientific rigor (Spencer, Majeed, Roberts, McArdle & Archer, 2017).

This reconfirms that the disaster space is challenging to undertake research in. As noted earlier, the range and number of journals which cover the area, the language and possible sites where relevant papers may be held, make searching for pertinent papers

a time consuming and often unsuccessful task. The rigor of the inclusion/exclusion criteria of this first literature review, that a model needed to be used in analysis, that the action had to be of communities doing something, and that action was not driven by or dictated by government, were thought to be reasonable at the start of the process. However, it made the majority of papers redundant. The majority of actions listed were instigated by government, or in the rare cases where they were community-driven, the analysis usually didn't have a model on which to base the research. The literature review confirmed that evidence of community-based disaster resilience actions was slim. A summary of the papers identified in the literature, meeting the criteria are listed below. But first a definition of community-led, community-based concepts is required.

2.4 What Are Community-Led/Based Actions in the Disaster Context?

In the disaster recovery context, community-led actions mean they are community-driven, with robust community leadership and participation throughout the whole process of recovery, from planning, implementation through to evaluation (AIDR, 2018). This recognises that disaster-impacted populations have a right to determine their own recovery processes and have a better understanding than government or other emergency management stakeholders about what their needs are (AIDR, 2018). For the purposes of this research, community-led and community-driven are taken to be interchangeable. The UNISDR uses 'community-based' terminology to define a process within and for the community that reduce disaster risks (UNISDR, 2017c). For this research the definition assumes solutions and actions come from the impacted population. However, this needs to be defined further as this thesis analyses NPO potential in building community resilience. Hence, judging the impact of these organisations must be of what the actions actually accomplish. The complexity of 'participation' is that there is participation in decision-making and participation in particular activities.

Vallance (2014) is helpful in clarifying this issue, with communities participating in particular actions being the 'what', the 'substance' of recovery. Communities involved in decision-making processes are participating in the 'how', the procedures outlining

what is to be done (Vallance, 2014). The procedural issues involve how engaged a community is, how enabled and how empowered. The procedural issues also are reflected in the barriers encountered by community groups as they try to contribute to the 'what'. More discussion on the definitions, degree of participation and conceptual frameworks around community engagement and empowerment in the disaster space is undertaken in Chapter 4 Disaster Definitions and Concepts. The following section outlines key actions by communities to help their own members, before, during or after disasters that were identified in the literature. Important aspects of the process and the actions are noted where provided.

2.5 Community Actions Found in the Disaster Literature

The key features of the 15 papers identified from the literature review are elaborated in the following paragraphs.

Japanese neighbourhood associations' (Jichikai) actions of practicing escape routes and tying disaster risk management drills to cultural events were believed to save lives during disasters (Ranghieri & Ishiwatari, 2014a). Evidence highlighted that 80% of people rescued in the 1995 Kobe earthquake were saved by their neighbours. Hence, empowering community members to action on disaster risk reduction was a valid and valuable strategy.

Storr and Haeffele-Bach (2010) investigated the value of decentralised bottom-up post-disaster recovery actions after Hurricane Katrina (Storr & Haeffele-Bach, 2010). Successful examples of community-led actions included: local faith-based organisations being a communication and lobbying hub for displaced residents, community stakeholder Habitat for Humanity building or fixing houses, and Broadmoor Improvement Association (BIA) revitalising, reconnecting and planning for their area's recovery (Storr & Haeffele-Bach, 2010). The research highlighted that centralised recovery efforts were likely to be challenging, given the difficulties in utilising local knowledge and motivating collective action (Storr & Haeffele-Bach, 2010). The research suggests that decentralised, bottom-up recovery actions can be robust and may be

complementary to top-down attempts, given the strengths of local knowledge and community connections (Storr & Haeffele-Back, 2010).

Another study by Cherry and Lucas (2016) demonstrated that civic organisations and religious institutions could play a significant role in motivating community members to provide aid and volunteer to help. Grassroots mobilisations of Filipino Americans following Hurricane Katrina, ensured no Filipino evacuees stayed more than a few hours at the Houston Astrodome before being found safe accommodation (Cherry & Lucas, 2016). Government resources were overwhelmed so grassroots organisations, mainly religious institutions, found shelter for 500,000 people around the area. More than 500 local houses of worship sheltered the evacuees (Cherry & Lucas, 2016). The research recommends emergency management stakeholders search for these grassroots organisations in their disaster planning (Cherry & Lucas, 2016).

A 2014 paper highlighted the actions of a religious institution in the aftermath of Pakistan's 2005 earthquake. Mosques were seen to improve livelihoods locally through offering an opportunity as a communication hub, a meeting place of men and a base from which to coordinate actions (Cheema, Scheyvens, Glavovic & Imran, 2014). Such actions included groups organised to harvest or improve a particular person's crop, meetings between aid organisations and the community, collection and distribution of donated goods, spiritual support, caring for vulnerable groups and the mobilisation of people to help look for and respond to community needs (Cheema et al., 2014). The paper recognised that each mosque's role depended largely on the Imam's personality and the perceptions of their community regarding what his role should be. Even where the mosque structure was damaged or destroyed, it remained effective and continued to serve its community (Cheema et al., 2014). This research provides further evidence of the critical role locally-based religious institutions can play in community recovery and achieving disaster risk resilience. The paper recommends developing partnerships with such local organisations, given that they have the trust, local knowledge and local resources needed for successful actions (Cheema et al., 2014).

A study of local faith-based and secular nonprofit organisations along the United States (US) Texas coast, following Hurricane Ike documented their actions after the disaster (Quebedeaux, 2013). Actions included providing relief (shelter, food, medical assistance), and longer-term recovery (for example: help with housing, transport, communication). Some local groups had difficulties due to themselves being impacted, however with speedy donations from foundations, they were able to recover and serve their communities (Quebedeaux, 2013). The study urged all levels of Government to capitalise on these groups' strengths through partnerships and integration and consequently enhance community resilience and speed recovery. Other recommendations included cultivating long-term relationships, sharing data and developing institutional knowledge (Quebedeaux, 2013).

Vallance's paper (2014) illustrates a range of public participation examples as to how communities responded to the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. 'Let's Find and Fix' was a community-led, collaborative initiative that found and temporary fixed houses before winter. These houses had earthquake damage that made them unsafe or unsanitary, but they still had people living in them (Vallance, 2014). 'Greening the Rubble' and 'Gap Filler' are community organisations that created temporary projects on demolition sites. Projects included: pocket parks, outdoor music rooms, educational play spaces (Vallance, 2014). The research suggests that context is the guiding principle for determining what type of decision-making process is used. That complex, highly uncertain situations, like those following a disaster, may benefit from facilitated community involvement (Vallance, 2014).

Spontaneous volunteers are grassroots community members who seek to contribute on impulse. McLennan, Molloy, Whittaker and Handmer (2016) illustrate actions of spontaneous volunteers that included post 2011 Brisbane flood clean up (the Mud Army), search and rescue, first aid and community needs assessment (McLennan et al., 2016). Fundamentally the model illustrated by this research demonstrates a means to extend current emergency management provisions, to better inclusivity, and away from

top-down approaches to embrace greater community oriented and resourced, methodologies (McLennan et al., 2016).

Fitzgerald (2016) outlined the work of the Christchurch Student Volunteer Army [SVA] after the 2010 and 2011 Christchurch earthquakes. The SVA cleared more than 65,000 tons of liquefaction, organised, transported and fed volunteers after the 2010 event. Then 450,000 tons of liquefaction, and community wellbeing support after the 2011 earthquake. The research noted that working with emergency managers was particularly difficult, as there were health and safety concerns. After a failed coordination attempt by officials, SVA were able to regain coordination and power and met health and safety requirements through electronic registration systems. This enabled the SVA to make a substantial contribution to the city's recovery, work within the recovery structure and helped volunteers' and impacted inhabitants' psychosocial wellbeing (Fitzgerald, 2016). There are lessons to be learned from these two papers. However, incorporating spontaneous volunteers into emergency management planning has an array of their own specific complexities, and is not the focus of this paper.

In another paper volunteer activity to a current crisis reflected their past community group activities (Murphy, 2007). Past relationships were a conduit to enable people to contribute. This Canadian disaster occurred when E. coli contaminated the town's water supply. Community groups, such as local sports teams, organising volunteer rosters to distribute water. Rotary Club, Knights of Columbus and the Legion local service club members helped vulnerable people across the impacted community. When ill residents had to be taken to a city hospital, the Service Clubs used their vertical networks with head office, and networks with other chapters to find accommodation for relatives (Murphy, 2007). This was the only paper found that mentioned Service Clubs, yet their past achievements are impressive. Two Service Clubs were included in the case studies.

Community actions following flooding of the Yukon River in Alaska were investigated in one paper. The communities investigated had been impacted previously and the

paper highlighted the usefulness of community group actions, reflecting that community capabilities generally improved following disaster experience (Eller, Gerber & Robinson, 2018). Voluntary organisations offered a broad range of assistance, immediately following the flood and over the longer-term recovery. They were also shown to be able to offer significant assistance to isolated communities, quickly (Eller et al., 2018).

The Hazelwood Mine fire caused smoke to cover the Australian town of Morwell for 45 days. Morwell Neighbourhood House actions were detailed by Whyte (2017). Actions were extensive but included being an advocate for the community during and after the disaster, distributing P2 masks and vacuum cleaners, and providing a platform for the community to discuss their concerns. While recognised for its actions, Whyte (2017) argues that Morwell Neighbourhood House's impact was more than the sum of individual projects. The Neighbourhood House's impact should be judged as a community-led, community empowering structure; a structure that listened to the needs of the community and helped work with them to try to address needs and realise outcomes (Whyte, 2017). In recognition of their grassroots contributions, Neighbourhood Houses were selected as one of the case studies of this thesis.

Maori community-led responses prompted development of a Maori Recovery Network, after the Canterbury earthquakes. Inter-tribal networks facilitated goods storage, transport and distribution. Food, water, baby care products and shelter were all offered to the impacted population (Kenney, Phibbs, Paton, Reid & Johnston, 2015). The paper demonstrated the value of Maori community-led networks linking with emergency management stakeholders; improving recovery capacity and cross-sectorial dialogues (Kenney et al., 2015).

Social learning of a Jewish community was examined before, during and after Hurricane Sandy impacted New York in 2012 (Storr, Haeffele-Balch & Grubb, 2016). Social capital was seen as important to facilitate social learning, to enable communities to learn how to cope in the post-disaster environment. Community actions were facilitated and

coordinated using pre-existing structures such as synagogues and the Achiezer Community Resource Centre. Actions noted included: resources and information provision, storm preparation and warnings, moving vulnerable people, helping with storm damage, obtaining generators, sourcing and distributing kosher food. These organisations raised \$11 million US and distributed \$11 million US, without overhead costs (Storr et al., 2016).

This paper also highlighted the growing literature on and evidence of religious organisations' contributions to community recovery post-disaster, particularly relative to Hurricane Katrina (Storr et al., 2016). This study recognised the possible benefits from civil society organisations in the community helping recovery rather than government assistance. The ability to learn from others' experiences and adopt best-practice quickly in the post-disaster environment is particularly useful. The paper underscored this, through noting that circumstances changed for impacted communities along the timeline after a disaster, enhancing the need for flexibility and adaptability (Storr et al., 2016). Government-led operations are usually inflexible, with regulatory rigidity, and insurance and redevelopment planning constraints that prevent or stifle community actions and prevent social learning and its benefits (Storr et al., 2016).

Moreton's thesis (2016) explored community-led recovery from four different disasters around Australia. Actions of communities and community groups documented were extensive. However, Moreton noted that initially her research did not show communities leading their recovery. The bureaucratic response appeared to disempower, rather than empower the communities. Government officials led the formal decision-making recovery. Yet community-led actions and community leadership were highlighted as having the greatest impact on community recovery, as seen by community members (Moreton 2016). Moreton concluded that actions within the grassroots communities provided evidence that communities do lead their own recovery (Moreton 2016).

A New Zealand community group, Project Lyttelton, enabled community members to contribute to their area's relief and recovery following the Christchurch earthquakes of 2011 (Cretney, 2016). The research supports community-led initiatives and engagements as a part of an integrated disaster response; through illustrating their value during and after disasters and demonstrating their potential in pre-disaster resilience actions (Cretney,2016).

Again, in Christchurch, Carlton and Vallance (2013) compiled an inventory of grassroots organisations responding to the Christchurch earthquakes and compared them with inventories taken in 2012 and 2013. While not following a framework, so not meeting the literature inclusion criteria, the inventory is so rich as to merit inclusion here in discussion of community involvement. The research team used civil society and community interchangeably. Under these umbrellas were social networks, faith-based bodies, nongovernment organisations, and groups that were not part of government or commercial bodies. A subsequent paper (Vallance & Carlton, 2015) recognised that the initial inventory demonstrated that the local community, including community groups, were active within hours of the first earthquake (Vallance & Carlton, 2015). The actions of these groups were highly variable from short-term single-issue actions to longer term projects aimed at advocacy, communication, education and community development. Of those still in existence in 2013 most were active prior to the first earthquake and had added recovery actions to their activities (Vallance & Carlton, 2015).

2.6 Conclusion

Community resilience appears to underpin much of the future direction in preventing or minimising the impact of disasters, before, during and after their event. But community resilience cannot be successfully imposed in a top-down manner; particularly given the difficulties in accessing much needed local knowledge, ensuring local trust and accessing local resource networks. Community-led participation in disaster planning, relief and recovery are demonstrated as being useful (Cherry & Lucas, 2016; Cretney, 2016; Ranghieri & Ishiwatari, 2014).

Moving from top-down control to embrace true community-led participation is difficult and the research illustrates that community-led actions can complement top-down actions (Storr & Haeffele-Bach, 2010). Grassroots organisations offer localised knowledge, community connections and community trust. While the context determines the type of decision-making used, community groups should be incorporated in disaster risk reduction planning, given the advantages and strengths that they offer (Cheema et al., 2014; Cherry & Lucas, 2016; Quebedeaux, 2013).

This literature review addressed the secondary research question 1: ‘What does the literature say about community-led (guided, based, centred, conducted) disaster resilience?’ The review identified a significant gap in the peer reviewed literature regarding community-led, sustainable groups building community resilience to disasters. There were few examples of communities participating in any disaster related activities to that degree. However, where it occurred, the evidence supported that empowering community members to action could be a valuable strategy.

In the past, religious and civic organisations have played a significant role in motivating community members to volunteer and help. All levels of Government were encouraged to forge partnerships with these groups, and develop long-term relationships with them, thereby harnessing their strengths and improving community resilience and speed recovery. The research suggests that context must determine what type of decision-making process is used. But facilitated community involvement may help in disasters, given that they are complex, highly uncertain situations. Other research showed that NPOs that were active prior to disasters were more likely to be sustainable longer term than those that had arisen in response to a disaster. And that past involvement and relationships provided a means to enable volunteer activity.

A scoping literature review undertaken on the actions of nonprofit organisations is described in the next Chapter. Actions noted in the international literature are subsequently placed in the thesis conceptual scaffolding (Chapter 5) to illustrate how actions by NPOs build community resilience.

Community resilience frameworks are examined in detail in Chapter 5: Research Conceptual Frameworks, which emphasise the need for community engagement and empowerment and the use of community networks, knowledge and trust (AIDR 2013, EMV 2017e) to enhance and build community resilience to disasters. If Australian emergency management systems are to apply the theory and use such assets as nonprofit organisations (NPOs) effectively, there needs to be greater understanding of what these are and what NPOs can offer.

3. SCOPING NONPROFITS IN THE DISASTER SETTING

3.1 Scoping Literature Review Background

The literature review undertaken in Chapter 2 illustrated limited examples of community-driven actions that had value to the impacted community, before, during and after disasters. While there were few examples, some of those actions were of nonprofit organisations. To answer the research questions of this thesis, further clarification was required about the nature, role and actions of nonprofit organisations in the disaster setting. A scoping literature review helped define and place nonprofit organisations within the disaster space, and this is the topic of Chapter 3.

A scoping study aims to map rapidly the key concepts, main sources and evidence types available of a particular area of research (Arskey & O'Malley, 2005; Mays, Roberts & Popay, 2001). A scoping study searched the literature broadly and undertook an investigation of the role of nonprofit organisations and their participation in disasters. The approach was based on the *Joanna Briggs Institute (JBI) Reviewers' Manual 2015 Methodology for JBI Scoping Reviews* (Joanna Briggs Institute, 2015). This framework drew on the work of Arksey and O'Malley, adjusted by Daudt et al. (Arsey & O'Malley, 2005; Daudt, van Mossel & Scott, 2013).

3.2 Scoping Literature Review Protocol

Title: Nonprofit organisation activity in the disaster space – a scoping literature review

3.2.1 Objectives of the Scoping Literature Review

As outlined in the JBI framework, the objective of this scoping study was to identify what resilience, relief and recovery activities nonprofit organisations have been undertaking in the disaster space, both internationally and within Australia.

Using PCC to assist designing the search strategy:

P (population) of the study is the nonprofit organisations whose activities relate to a disaster;

C (Concept) identifying what nonprofits have done in support of the community faced with a disaster, scoping review of peer-reviewed and grey literature; and

C (Context) in the context of how that impacts on community resilience to disasters.

The outcome was to describe the emerging and actual roles undertaken by nonprofit organisations in helping community resilience to disasters.

3.2.2 Scoping Literature Review Question

The Scoping Literature Review questions were:

- What nonprofit organisations have been reported as having a role in building community resilience, before, during and after disasters?
- What actions by nonprofit organisations have been reported before, during and after disasters?
- What strengths of nonprofit organisations applied to disaster situations and community resilience, are recognised in the literature?
- What barriers have been identified to nonprofit organisations participating in activities before, during and after disasters?

3.2.3 Methods of the Scoping Literature Review

The organisation must have been nongovernment, and a nonprofit organisation, that did not provide profits to directors or their equivalent, but rather any profits made were directed towards the organisation's mission. The nonprofit organisation had to have been doing something that helped the community prepare for a disaster or assisted during a disaster or supported the community to recover from disaster.

The inclusion criteria isolated the search to papers published after 2000 and in English. The paper had to meet the following inclusion criteria:

-
- Did the study include nonprofit organisations acting in the disaster space?
 - Was there an action described?
 - Did the study contribute background to the nonprofit area?

Exclusion criteria included that the organisation was solely government funded, established and run by the government, and or already focused most of their operations in the emergency management sphere. Definitions were fluid and varied significantly between countries, academic disciplines and between organisations. For example: an organisation may have been defined as a nonprofit organisation, however it received all its funding from government. These types of organisations were not the focus of this study, as we were investigating long-term independently sustainable, or organisations that were largely independent of government funding. There are considerable examples of nonprofit organisations that were unable to function after seed funding and support from Government ceased (see the MUDRI Compendium of Victorian Community-based Resilience Building Case Studies 2015).

The actions of nonprofit organisation were examined to identify their impact on the vulnerable community and on emergency services, where possible. References to what strengths these organisations had, what they brought to the disaster resilience context, what key stakeholders saw as barriers to further actions in this area as well as any enablers to action were also noted. In the selection process, papers were assessed regarding if and how the nonprofit organisation helped the community affected by disaster. The barriers and policy implications of including such groups in emergency management planning were also coded where relevant. Most articles combined a range of nonprofit organisations together to generalise about their actions or barriers. Consequently, the organisations of interest in this study while included, were often combined within a larger, more general group. Given the general relevance of the larger groups, the research was included, where other factors did not exclude the paper from review.

A preliminary search of any existing scoping reviews on the topic of nonprofit activity in disasters was undertaken using the EBM [Evidence Based Medicine] Reviews and the Joanna Briggs Institute EBP Database. The EBM Reviews platform included the Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, the Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effects, (Cochrane methodology register, Health technology assessment, NHS economic evaluation database) and the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials. No reviews were found on the topic.

3.2.4 Database Sources for Both the Peer Reviewed and Grey Literature

The database sources for the peer reviewed literature search were: Scopus (peer reviewed), Web of Science core collection, Global Health, Ovid Medline, Business Source Complete and the portal Proquest. Evidence Aid (Blanchet et al. 2018) argues it would be a miscalculation to ignore evidence, because it is not in a peer-reviewed journal. Grey literature sources searched were: Disaster Lit., Scopus (conference proceedings), Factiva, Newsbank newspapers, COS conference paper index, Grey Literature Report, Open Grey, ProQuest Dissertation and Theses Global, Embase via Ovid, Google Scholar, Web of Science. Included were also papers identified as useful by the researcher, though previous research.

The grey literature appeared to hold some valuable information in this area. While recognising humanitarian research is scattered across ‘thousands of journals, books and websites’ (Blanchet et al., 2018, p. 45), Evidence Aid recommend targeting trusted research repositories (Blanchet et al., 2018). Obtaining the information involved hand searching favoured repositories, websites and publications. The scope of sources made it complex to undertake a comprehensive literature search. Hand searching was undertaken of the websites:

International Red Cross.
My Community.
Philanthropy.com.
Recovery Diva.
CARRI

Australian Red Cross.
Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission.
Philanthropy Australia.
Zilient.org.
New Zealand Ministry of Defence.

National Voluntary Organisations Addressing Disaster.
OARs List (Organisations Addressing Resilience and Sustainability).
FEMA

Hand searching was also undertaken of the bibliographies of key journal articles.

3.2.5 Search Terms for Actions of Nonprofit Organisations in the Disaster Setting

Roles OR actions OR behaviours OR activities OR programs OR engagements
OR programmes OR events OR aid OR assistance.

Not-for-profit organisation OR nonprofit OR charity OR charitable OR third
sector OR philanthropic OR volunteer OR community group OR nonprofit
making OR aid agency OR aid organisation OR NGO.

Disaster OR flood OR bushfire OR wildfire OR tsunami OR earthquake OR
heatwave OR pandemic OR epidemic OR storm OR catastrophe OR emergency
OR cyclone OR landslide OR pandemic OR tidal wave.

AND Resilience

3.3 Results of the Scoping Literature Review


3.3.1 Stage 1: Identify the research question, clarify research concept

The research questions were identified as per section 3.2.2. The research concept was to undertake a broad search of the literature to define and place nonprofit organisations within the disaster space.

3.3.2 Stage 2: Identify Relevant Studies

There were 180 studies initially identified, once duplicates had been removed. The process of selection followed the flow diagram outlined in Figure 3. 1: PRISMA Flow Diagram for Scoping Literature Review Process.

Figure 3. 1: PRISMA Flow Diagram for Scoping Literature Review Process



Source: The Joanna Briggs Institute 2015, p. 21.


3.3.3 Stage 3: Study Selection

Initial screening of the 180 studies identified was through review of abstracts, to determine relevance. One hundred and four full text articles were assessed for eligibility, with forty-three full text articles excluded. These articles were excluded because: they did not have actual examples of actions (13), there was too much government focus (9), the study's focus was not relevant (11) or their definition of nonprofit organisation did not fit this study's (10). These factors could not be identified in the initial review of abstracts. Sixty-one studies were included in the review.

3.3.4 Stage 4: Charting data

The following graphic, Figure 3.2: Review Articles Written Per Year, illustrates the distribution of the scoping study's identified articles over the time frame investigated. Most studies were published from 2012 onwards. The lack of studies between 2001 and 2006 may reflect the review's definitional criteria including resilience. There has been growing awareness and use of the term 'resilience' in the disaster context, with significant growth in the number of articles about disaster resilience from 2007 onwards. The paper written in 1998 was from the researcher's repository of relevant articles.

Figure 3. 2: Review Articles Written Per Year



Source: Scoping Literature Review

3.3.5 Nonprofit Organisations Recognised as Having a Role in Community Resilience

The Scoping Literature Review identified nonprofit organisations in the literature that were recognised as having a role in community resilience before, during or after a disaster. Table 3.1: NPOs Identified in Scoping Literature Review summarises what nonprofit organisations were mentioned in the literature, that met the research criteria. The type of nonprofit organisation, definition and examples of that type of NPO are presented. There are a huge range of organisations that are classified as 'nonprofit organisations', but most would fit within one of Table 3.1's broad classifications. These organisations are discussed further in section 3.4.2 Types of Nonprofit Organisations.

Table 3. 1: NPOs Identified in Scoping Literature Review

TYPE OF NONPROFIT ORGANISATION	DEFINITION	EXAMPLES
Faith Based Organisations [FBOs]	Multi-purpose organisations established by church clergy to help address congregation human services' needs. May have formal or informal linkages with parent organisation or other FBOs (Anheier 2009). May also be local operation providing service in a specific neighbourhood (e.g. soup kitchen) (Anheier 2009).	Salvation Army Celebration Church Tzu Chi Foundation The City Mission, NZ Mary Queen of Vietnam (MQVN) Catholic Church
Community Groups, Service Clubs, Civic Groups, Land care, Community Gardens	Service Clubs offer services to their local community and their members. Some groups address particular needs such as animal welfare, youth	Rotary Clubs, Lions Clubs Club, Boy and Girl Scouts. New Brighton Community Gardens Group
Non-government Organisations [NGOs]	NGOs are nonprofit, voluntary citizens' groups aimed to tackle issues to help the public good. NPO actions may be at an international, national or local level. NGOs are important implementing partners for the UN's Humanitarian operations (Benson, Myers, Twigg 2001).	Oxfam, Save the Children, World Relief
Neighbourhood or Community House, Neighbourhood or Community Centre	Australian locally run organisations that aim to help connect community members to learn, contribute and tackle needs. Each NH is autonomous. Some NHs focus on traditional delivery of services, some focus on community development doing with, rather than doing for (NHV 2017).	Emerald Community House, Morwell Neighbourhood House

Source: Scoping Literature Review

3.3.6 Nonprofit Organisations' Actions Before, During and After Disasters

The literature did not always specify that the actions contributed to community resilience. The selection process became 'what action did the nonprofit organisation undertake before, during or after the disaster?'. As Table 3.2 details, NPOs offering physical assistance, shelter, food, sanitation and water immediately following a disaster were the most common actions identified in the literature. Following these, actions

where NPOs operated networks and coordinated activities that facilitated member participation, reconnecting individuals to their community, encouraging engagement and social cohesion and empowerment, were also commonly listed. Under the summary of ‘acting as communication hubs’, actions of NPOs included facilitating information transfer, lobbying on behalf of their community, providing referral services and enabling connections to assistance. Providing psychosocial support, disaster risk education, training and risk reducing actions were also commonly listed action themes.

The value of these actions were examined within the thesis scaffolding developed in Chapter 5: Research Conceptual Frameworks, to determine whether they contributed to community resilience to disasters. These results were then synthesised with interview findings from the Australian case studies, to see if these NPOs’ actions supported what were found in the international literature, and if, according to the conceptual frameworks, the Australian NPO actions contributed to community resilience to disasters. The results were then discussed in Chapter 9 Synthesis of Findings.

Table 3.2: NPO Actions Reported in the Scoping Literature Review, summarises the results of the scoping literature review in terms of the nonprofit organisation (if noted), their actions that were detailed in the study and the paper from which it came. ‘Before’, ‘during’ and ‘after’ is the terminology used, as it is becoming the more common language around the sector, rather than ‘preparation, mitigation, relief, recovery’. This language is also simpler to understand, which is important in reducing communication barriers (an aspect discussed in Chapter 9: Synthesis of Findings).

Table 3.2: NPO Actions Reported in the Scoping Literature Review

NONPROFIT ORGANISATION	ACTION	REFERENCE
Not stated	Civil society building, community empowerment, community development services, health care, shelter repair, trauma counselling, sanitation and water, emergency relief and aid, disaster response, restoring livelihoods, food security.	Eikenberry, Arroyave & Cooper, 2007
Rotary Club, Knights of Columbus, the Legion, local sports teams,	Water distribution, accommodation provision.	Murphy 2007
Groundwork New Orleans, Evacuteer.org, Celebration Church – Hope Centre Mennonite Disaster Service, Presbyterian Disaster Assistance and Presbytery of South Louisiana	Planted rain gardens that assisted water quality and storm water regulation Built sculptures to signal hurricane evacuation points around New Orleans neighbourhoods. Trained volunteers to help with City Assisted Evacuation Plan. Offered affordable health care, mental health counselling services. Helped New Orleans residents rebuild post-Hurricane Katrina, Risk reduction	Jenkins, Lambeth, Mosby & Van Brown, 2015
Local faith-based groups, Habitat for Humanity, Broadmoor Improvement Association	Communication hub, lobbying voice, building and fixing homes, revitalising, reconnecting, planning for recovery	Storr & Haeffele-Bach, 2010
Jichikai (Japanese neighbourhood Associations)	Practice escape routes, disaster risk management drills included into cultural events	Ranghieri and Ishiwatari, 2014
Faith-based organisations	Emergency services, provide networks that facilitate community member participation, help save community attachments, case management, organization of demolition, quick mobilization and provision of financial and other needed resources	Atkinson, 2014
Faith-based organisations	Provide food and shelter, develop social cohesion, build safety networks, initial contact point for response/ emergency organisations with affected community.	Cheema, Scheyvens, Glavovic & Imran, 2014

	Organise people, communicate priorities, psychosocial support, provided space for community activities (e.g. education), ensured vulnerable groups included	
Faith-based organisations Tzu Chi Foundation (large Buddhist organization)	Helped rebuild 293 collapsed schools in Taiwan.	Chen, Chen, Vertinsky, Yumagulova & Park, 2013
Faith-based organisations Synagogues, Achiezer Community Resource Centre	Resource and information supply, storm preparation and warnings, moving vulnerable people, helping with storm damage, sourcing and distributing kosher food, learning from others and adopting best practice	Storr, Haeffle-Balch & Grube, 2016
Faith-based organisations Filipino American Catholics	Relocated co-ethnics after Hurricane Katrina with host families, helped with paperwork, offered food, clothes and toiletries, operated a crisis triage clinic	Cherry & Lucas, 2016
Faith-based organisations The City Mission NZ	Contributed to initial earthquake response, continued own ongoing homeless programs after earthquake, community input forums, expanded programs facilitating community engagement	Hutton, 2016
Faith-based organisations	Food, water, ice supply, emergency shelter operation, transportation services, legal aid, document recovery, mortgage support, connect to assistance. medical prescriptions, mental health support	Quebedeaux, 2013
Maori Recovery Network	Donations of food and water, baby care products, shelter	Kenney, Phibbs, Paton, Reid & Johnston, 2015
	Donations (goods and money), volunteer management, emotional and spiritual care, management of volunteers, translation services, information, local supply chains, use of kitchens for shelter, food distribution, linkages and monitoring of own vulnerable groups (e.g. Federation of Cuban Women)	Acosta, Chandra & Ringel, 2013
Voluntary nonprofit organisations	Distribution of basic resources, remove debris, long term recovery, house repair, support services, donation and volunteer management, information and referral	Eller, Gerber & Branch, 2015

	services, case management, spiritual care, financial assistance, temporary housing	
GMA Kapuso Foundation, Save the Children, ABS-CBN Foundation, Petron Foundation, Philippine National Red Cross Iloilo Chapter, Taos Puso Foundation	Food and clothing provision, Supplementary food for children, Clean-up equipment and supplies, Cash for work, Temporary shelter, Medical and psychological assistance	Espia & Fernandez, 2015
	Shelter to relief workers, volunteers, evacuees. Prepare, serve and/or distribute food Supply basic and/or advanced medical care, first aid, medical prescriptions, Child care or education. Mental health care, Spiritual care. Compiled and/or distributed personal hygiene kits, toiletries, cleaning supplies, laundry services, showers, Repair and reconstruction services. Community needs assessments, logistics services (moving evacuees, workers). Application assistance, referral services, direct financial services. Manage volunteers and donations, Use of physical assets. Act as ‘community hubs’	Acosta & Chandra, 2013
Existing nonprofits. New Brighton Community Garden	Contributed to functional redundancy, improved care of vulnerable populations, aided cohesion, community engagement and reduced marginalization of vulnerable communities, enhanced social capital of these communities	Hutton, Tobin & Whiteford, 2015
	Emergency shelter staffing immediately after disaster. Provided water, meals, immediate needs, crisis counselling, clothes. In early recovery, food canteen, cleaning kits, food delivery, gift cards. Installed tarps, building repairs, roofing, counselling, tree removal. Mobile shower and laundry facilities. Tools and equipment. Fund raising.	LaLone, 2012
Scouts, Country Women’s Associations, Land care	Managed donated goods, oversaw supply of sanitation and clean water, Long-term environmental recovery	ARC, 2014b
	Risk reduction to volunteers and recipients through induction/training of volunteers,	McLennan, Molloy,

	providing briefings on health and safety and coordinating activities on-site, NPOs reduce risks	Whittaker & Handmer, 2016
Existing nonprofits	When 9/11 disaster happened in New York, existing nonprofit organisations increased volume of standard services/tasks, or created new tasks to support affected community	Campbell, 2010
Numerous NZ Canterbury nonprofits	Single-issue, short term activities such as water supply through to strategic networks with issues covering advocacy, education, legal support, information dissemination.	Vallance & Carlton, 2015
Project Lyttelton	Enabled community participation through: community gardens, timebanking, helping with repairs, food distribution, connections	Cretney, 2016
Women's Health Golburn	Workshops on women's disaster resilience insights	Torrens Resilience Institute, 2017
Toolangi District Community House	Fit for Free - Aim to reduce trauma post-2009 bushfires, improve community connections and resilience, improve psychological and physical health of older community members.	Torrens Resilience Institute, 2017
Quadriders to the Rescue	After Cyclone Yasi, removed fallen trees, rubbish, helped community access homes/businesses	Torrens Resilience Institute, 2017
Combined Churches of Bundaberg and Salvation Army Tom Quinn Centre	Helped rebuild/refurbish 64 homes of vulnerable people	Torrens Resilience Institute, 2017
Men's Sheds, Women's Groups, Racing Clubs, Woodworking, Gardening, Reading Clubs	Arranged fund raisers, social events, nesting boxes for wildlife	Moreton, 2016
LOCAL GROUPS Indigenous Rangers, Rotary Clubs and Lions Clubs	Funding, hands-on assistance, support to impacted people in community	Moreton, 2016
GROUPS EXTERNAL TO COMMUNITY	Coordinated efforts, provided goods, food vouchers, assistance	Moreton, 2016

Lions, Rotary, Blaze Aid, quilting, knitting groups, Men's and Women's groups, Churches, ARC, Salvation Army	Offers of holidays for impacted people, first aid equipment	
Neighbourhood Houses	Drop in support centres, pivotal for longer term recovery. Social events, practical support, counselling	Moreton, 2016
Lions Clubs and Rotary Clubs	Food vouchers, preparing and distributing household hampers, logistical support and food for Blaze Aid team, 'wood chop' day with CFA, locals, fuel vouchers. Tool Library (Lions), Community laundry	Moreton, 2016
Ozark	Care of wildlife after disaster	Moreton, 2016
Samaritan Group – Anglican Church	Organized tool kits for impacted properties	Moreton, 2016
Country Women's Association	Preserves day – preserve fruit, give to impacted community, socialising	Moreton, 2016
Country Women's Association	Community support, lobbying on social issues, Drought Taskforce Committee, distributed funds	Marsh, 2011
Emerald Community House	Dig-in community café. Practice spontaneous community dining, capacity building, safe food handling training, improve linkages with local businesses and other community groups	MUDRI, 2015b
New Brighton Community Gardens, Community Gardens	Bring people together, people contribute labour in return for veggies, workshops on self-reliance	Council of Social Services Christchurch (CSSC), 2014
Morwell Neighbourhood House	Helped during disaster and over long-term recovery. Advocated for vulnerable people. Communicated community's concerns. Trusted source of information, fostered connections. Face masks, vacuum cleaners Social impact valued at over \$600000 in 2017. Improved community health and wellbeing, pride, inclusiveness, resilience and participant independence. Food bank, community lunches	Whyte, 2017 Deloitte Access Economics, 2018

Source: Scoping Literature Study of this thesis

3.3.7 Nonprofit Organisations' Strengths in the Disaster Space

To enable greater understanding of nonprofit organisations, the research also required investigation of what their strengths, while operating in disaster situations, were seen to be. Strength themes were identified in the literature, coded, consolidated where appropriate, and the results tabulated in Table 3.3: Strengths of NPOs In Disaster Situations, Identified in the Scoping Literature Review. The main strengths were identified according to frequency mentioned in the literature and their sources. Community connections and grassroots networks with local people is the most highly recognized strength of NPOs in the literature. This includes recognition of NPOs' ability to know and access diverse and marginalized people. Local knowledge and in-depth understanding of their local problems and resources is the second most commonly recognized strength.

NPO abilities to be creative, flexible and have a highly motivated workforce were also valued as strengths. In total there were eleven key summary strengths identified from the literature. These results are discussed in section 3.4.5 Importance and Strengths of the Nonprofit Sector in the Disaster Setting and further synthesized with thesis interview data in Chapter 9. The strengths of NPOs are important in this research, to investigate if NPOs can contribute to what the theory indicates are needed for building community resilience (Chapter 4 and 5).

Table 3. 3: Strengths of NPOs In Disaster Situations, Identified in the Scoping Literature Review

STRENGTHS	REFERENCE
COMMUNITY CONNECTIONS Community connections, linkages, networks Strong network grassroots, local people Access to diverse, marginalized populations	Acosta & Chandra, 2013; Acosta, Chandra & Ringel, 2013; ARC, 2014b; Benson, Twigg & Myers, 2001; Cretney, 2016; CSSC, 2014; Deloitte Access Economics, 2018; Demiroz & Hu, 2014; Hutton, 2016; Izumi & Shaw, 2012; Ranghieri & Ishiwatari, 2014; Whyte, 2017
LOCAL KNOWLEDGE Local knowledge and insights into community problems Help remember social history	Acosta, Chandra & Ringel, 2013; Acosta & Chandra, 2013; ARC, 2014; Atkinson, 2014; Benson, Twigg & Myers, 2001; Demiroz & Hu, 2014; Hutton, 2016; Izumi & Shaw, 2012; McLennan, Molloy, Whittaker & Handmer, 2016; Redshaw, Ingham, Hicks & Millynn, 2017; Whyte, 2017
CREATIVE, MOTIVATED, FLEXIBLE Creative solutions, highly motivated, flexible and adaptive outreach Motivate from victim to hero/survivor	Acosta & Chandra, 2013; Atkinson, 2014; Benson, Twigg & Myers, 2001; Cherry & Lucas, 2016; Chikoto, Sadiq & Fordyce, 2013; Cretney, 2016; CSSC, 2014; Deloitte Access Economics, 2018; Hutton, 2016; Whyte, 2017
REDUCE RISKS TO COMMUNITY Reduce risks through information transfer, helping vulnerable groups, identifying risks and acting on them	Benson, Twigg & Myers, 2001; Deloitte Access Economics, 2018; Gallagher et al. 2019; Jenkins, Lambeth, Mosby & Van Brown, 2015; McLennan, Molloy, Whittaker & Handmer, 2016; Torrens Resilience Institute, 2017; Whyte, 2017
EMPOWERMENT Can empower communities to tackle own problems, collaboratively, offers framework and process, offer recovery space through participation and empowerment.	Acosta & Chandra, 2013; Benson, Twigg & Myers, 2001; Cretney, 2016; Deloitte Access Economics, 2018; Gallagher et al., 2019; Whyte, 2017,
RESPONSE SPEED	Bajracharya, Hastings, Childs & McNamee, 2012; Benson, Twigg & Myers, 2001; Hutton, 2016; LaLone, 2012; Ranghieri & Ishiwatari, 2014;
TRUST Trust and contacts developed over time contributing positively to community longer term	ARC, 2014; Atkinson, 2014; Deloitte Access Economics, 2018; Hutton, 2016; Whyte 2017,

COST EFFECTIVE	Atkinson, 2014; Benson, Twigg & Myers, 2001; Izumi & Shaw, 2012; Ranghieri & Ishiwatari, 2014;
SUPPORT INDIVIDUAL MENTAL HEALTH and COMMUNITY WELL-BEING Key aspect of social infrastructure Frame for collective norms of mutual support	Acosta & Chandra, 2013; Atkinson, 2014; Cretney, 2016; Gallagher et al., 2019;
COMMUNICATION Advocate for community, vulnerable groups, Seeks answers, disseminate information, Translate government speak to community speak	Benson, Twigg & Myers, 2001; Whyte, 2017;
MEMBER NETWORK FBOs and some Service Clubs may have: - access to donated funds from members - geographically spread members, reducing risk of all members impacted by disaster	Cherry & Lucas, 2016

Source: Scoping Literature Review

3.3.8 Barriers to Nonprofit Organisations Participating in the Disaster Space

If NPOs are to participate more fully in disaster risk preparation and recovery, barriers to that participation need to be overcome. The literature was investigated to see if there were notable barriers, and more importantly how NPOs overcame those barriers in order to participate before, during and after disasters. Barrier themes were identified and coded, and the summary of the findings is outlined in Table 3.4: Summary of Barriers to NPOs Participating Before, During and After Disasters.

Structural barriers were mentioned most often in the literature. Disaster management systems have a range of barriers to NPO participation, as a consequence of such things as dispersed geography, the command and control structure and culture of government agencies compared with the more community engaged, more open culture needed for community development and engagement (Chapter 5 for discussion of these topics). The lack of understanding from government agencies and NPOs, of each other's capabilities and roles aggravates trust issues and results in the inefficient use of resources and a failure to incorporate NPOs effectively in disaster situations. These results were discussed in Chapter 3.4.6 Barriers to Nonprofit Organisations Participating Before, During and After Disasters, and were used to underpin questions asked during NPO representative and Emergency Management interviews. These results were also analyzed within the thesis scaffolding to understand the context facing NPOs in the disaster space.

Finally, this Chapter's scoping literature results were used as a basis for comparison with the Australian research results. Drawing on the results of NPO interviews and emergency management interviews, data was synthesized in Chapter 9. The synthesis was needed to ensure a well-defined picture was gained of how Australian NPOs see and experience their strengths, roles and barriers to action in disasters, compared to the international situation presented in the literature, and how Victorian emergency management stakeholders see NPOs in the disaster space.

Table 3.4: Summary of Barriers to NPOs Participating Before, During and After Disasters

BARRIER	REFERENCE
<p>STRUCTURAL Weak integration or conflict between local NPOs and government disaster management systems as a result of: Geography, Culture, Structure of Emergency Management ‘command and control’ resulting in Government agencies dictate actions, not authentic collaborations, Lack of common norms</p>	<p>Chen, Chen, Vertinsky, Yumagulova & Park, 2013; Acosta & Chandra, 2013; ARC, 2014b; Jenkins, Lambeth, Mosby & Van Brown, 2015; Jackson & Forbes, 2018; Bajaracharya, Hastings, Childs, McNamee, 2012;</p>
<p>NON-RECOGNITION OF NPOs Lack of role definition Little operational guidance for NPO involvement</p>	<p>ARC, 2014; Campbell, 2010; Espia & Fernandez, 2015; Taylor & Goodman, 2015; Acosta & Chandra, 2013;</p>
<p>LACK OF NPO RESOURCES Lack of financial, staff resources Reliance on volunteers Unfunded Mandate</p>	<p>Chikoto, Sadiq & Fordyce, 2013; Bajaracharya, Hastings, Childs, McNamee, 2012; Acosta & Chandra, 2013; ARC, 2014; Olsen, 2012;</p>
<p>LACK OF TRUST Government inflexible due to strict accountability, reporting requirements. Government not trust NPOs can be held accountable. Lack of trust between stakeholders</p>	<p>ARC, 2014; Fitzpatrick, 2016; Hutton, Tobin & Whiteford, 2015; Tseng & Penning-Rowell, 2012;</p>
<p>POOR COMMUNICATION Language barriers</p>	<p>ARC, 2014; Bajaracharya, Hastings, Childs, McNamee, 2012; Fitzpatrick; 2016;</p>
<p>LACK OF COORDINATION BETWEEN NPOs Absence of leadership in community sector Difficulties in managing volunteer surge/donations Competition for funding between NPOs</p>	<p>Acosta & Chandra, 2013; ARC, 2014; Atkinson, 2014;</p>

<p>LACK OF EM TRAINING Inexperience with incident command structure Lack of understanding about emergency preparedness and response Lack of understanding about relevant legislation</p>	<p>Acosta & Chandra, 2013; ARC, 2014;</p>
<p>LACK OF GOVERNMENT RESOURCES Lack of Government resources (time, financial, human) and skills to assist/guide stakeholder engagement</p>	<p>Tseng & Penning-Rowell, 2012</p>
<p>VULNERABILITY DURING DISASTER</p>	<p>Bains & Durham, 2013</p>

Source: Scoping Literature Review

3.4 Discussion of Review Results - Nonprofit Organisation Characteristics

3.4.1 What is the Nonprofit Sector?

Nonprofit organisations, NGOs and faith-based organisations are usually seen as being part of the voluntary sector, the ‘third sector’ or ‘civil society’, although there is little clarity in the definition of these terms (Lewis, 2011). The ‘third sector’ has been described as a ‘loose and baggy monster’ (Knapp & Kendal, 1995 in Corry, 2010). It encompasses NGOs, charities, social enterprises, self-help groups, networks, and clubs (Corry, 2010). The sector may also be referred to as the not-for-profit sector, the community sector, the nonprofit sector or the social sector (Our Community, 2015).

According to Lewis (2011) civil society is the space located between state, market and households. A space that is often negotiated, complex and with blurred boundaries (Productivity Commission, 2010). Civil society includes community organisations, NGOs, religious groups, Service Clubs, professional associations and trade unions (Forsyth, 2011). It is the association that, through shared values and interests, drives collective action (Productivity Commission, 2010). A well-functioning civil society is believed essential for democratic, inclusive and stable communities (Heinrich, 2010). Importantly the third sector/civil society/nonprofit sector needs to be recognized for its special qualities. Qualities that include voluntary participation and stakeholders driven by value-based motivations, and for organisations often independent of ‘institutionalized power structures’ (Corry, 2010, p. 11).

In 1999 the *John Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project* defined the sector as a major economic force, with expenditure of over \$1.1 US trillion and 19 million paid employees across the 22 countries examined (Salamon et al., 1999). The research estimated that 28% of the study’s population volunteers time to NPOs, increasing the total full-time equivalent employees to 29.6 million (Salamon et al., 1999). Nonprofit institutions are a substantial and increasing economic force around the world (UN, 2003).

3.4.2 Types of Nonprofit Organisations

3.4.2.1 *Nonprofit Organisation Definitions*

Given the range and complexity of organisations and definitions, I have selected the United Nations [UN] classification system for nonprofit organisations to help define the organisations I am interested in (UN, 2003). This work provides the most comprehensive analysis of the sector around the world, in addition to being the basis for much of the Australian Bureau of Statistics analysis in this area. The *Handbook on Nonprofit Institutions in the System of National Accounts* recognises that nonprofit institutions across the world have distinctive attributes that separate them from other institutions or government units (UN, 2003). These distinctive features include:

- While NPOs may earn profit, they cannot distribute it to managers, owners or directors.
- NPOs produce goods and services that may be sold at or below market prices or given away.
- NPOs are financed through revenue sources different to for-profit organisations. Funds may come from government, charity, voluntary contributions or volunteer actions.
- The workforce is usually comprised of a significant number of volunteers (over 40%).
- NPOs have limited ability to attract investment capital, hence their capital structures usually carry greater debt than for-profits.
- NPOs are often exempt from income tax and other taxes but have special legal provisions (UN, 2003).

The organisations of interest in this thesis are organisations that are nongovernment and that do not rely on government funding, are not commercial, are self-governing, have a membership that requires some level of voluntary contribution (monetary or time) and that pursue charitable purposes. Fundamentally the nonprofit sector's organisations are separate from the state, have an institutional structure, are self-governing and membership is voluntary (Salamon et al., 1999). Legally in Australia charities are organisations that have a charitable purpose, that is defined in common

law and classified as being: for the relief of poverty, advancement of religion or education and for any other purpose that is beneficial to the community (Productivity Commission, 2010).

In defining what is meant by nonprofit organisation in the Australian context the Australian Tax Office [ATO] definition was taken, which defines not-for-profit organisations as those organisations that do not operate for the gain or profit of individual members. Any profit is used to achieve the organisation's purpose and is not distributed to its members, owners or private people (ATO, 2016). The terms 'nonprofit organisations', 'nonprofits' or NPOs are used rather than 'not-for-profit organisation' for ease of use, it was common parlance at the Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies (Queensland University of Technology) where I studied this sector, and many in the sector use this terminology. While all charities are nonprofits, not all nonprofits are charities (McGregor-Lowndes & Crittall, 2015). The scale, focus and organizational structure of nonprofit organisations is highly variable, to the extent that The Productivity Commission (2010) argued that it was not useful to try to generalize or characterize these organisations.

The range of definitions of like organisations made identifying relevant papers complex. Further, there were no papers that specifically highlighted some of the organisations of interest in this study, for example actions of civic organization such as Rotary Clubs and Lions Clubs. Rather there were brief, vague references, with organisations bundled in with other nonprofit organizations. Where the literature did differentiate between types of nonprofit organisations, it predominantly highlighted NGOs and Faith-based NPOs. The organisations identified in the Scoping Literature Review (Table 3.1: NPOs Identified in Scoping Literature Review), Faith-based Organisations, Service Clubs, NGOs and Neighbourhood or Community Houses are discussed below.

3.4.2.2 Faith-based Organisations

Faith-based organisations (FBOs) are organisations established by religious clergy to help address a range of congregational human services needs, such as homelessness,

food and job training (Anheier, 2009). They include mosques, synagogues, churches, church sponsored service agencies and any religiously affiliated charitable organisations (Atkinson, 2014). Their role is most often considered charitable work, aimed at improving the situation of those in need (Atkinson, 2014). These organisations may have formal or informal linkages with parent organisation or other FBOs, which may supply funding, board membership or staff (Anheier, 2009).

Some faiths have a strong culture of parishioners donating to church organised charities (Kluth, 2013), or that parishioners will contribute to and help others in the community (Cherry & Lucas, 2016). FBOs often provide longer term, specialised services which require staff to undergo professional training (Anheier, 2009). Rivera and Nickels (2014) argue that faith-based organizations, through offering personal empowerment, a sense of control, spiritual services, support for decision-making and social support, have contributed to lowering levels of anxiety and depression in disaster victims (in Rivera & Nickels, 2014, Koenig, 2006, Schuster et al., 2001; Trevino & Pargament, 2007) and contributed to community resilience following disasters.

3.4.2.3 *Service Clubs*

According to the International Classification of Nonprofit Organisations, recommended by the United Nations *Handbook on Nonprofit Institutions in the Systems of National Accounts* (2003), Service Clubs are those clubs offering services to the local community and their members. These NPOs include Lions Clubs and Rotary Clubs and are classified under Culture and Recreation (UN, 2003). Often the missions of these groups are focused on community development and social service provision, rather than specifically on responding to disasters (Demiroz & Hu, 2014). These groups may focus on particular sectors of the community, for example: youth, people with disabilities, women, the elderly, child care, the homeless or animal welfare. However, in the event of a disaster, they may contribute to response and recovery on a temporary basis (Gazley, 2013). These groups offer specific expertise (Gazley, 2013) or resources that are useful to the community during or after a disaster.

3.4.2.4 *Non-government Organisations*

Non-government organisations [NGOs] are organisations that are independent of the state but undertake social-development (for example: relief, humanitarian aid, environment protection) or political pursuits (Lewis,2011). However, the term lacks definitional clarity and NGOs are diverse in size, mission, and area of operations. The United Nations Department of Public Information’s definition of an NGO was used, as a non-governmental organisation, a nonprofit, voluntary citizens’ group organised to tackle issues to help the public good. The group’s actions may be at an international, national or local level (UNDPI, 2018). This provides a general enough definition to enable useable NGO comparisons across country borders, where specific tax or legal related definitions would make comparisons questionable (Anheier, 2009).

3.4.2.5 *Neighbourhood or Community Houses or Centres*

Neighbourhood or Community Houses or Centres are locally run, autonomous NPOs that aim to help connect community members to learn, contribute and tackle needs. Some NHs focus on traditional delivery of services, some focus on community development doing with, rather than doing for (NHV, 2017). More background is provided on Neighbourhood Houses in Chapter 7 Nonprofit Case Studies. To place the research in the Australian context, the Nonprofit Sector in Australia is outlined in the following section.

3.4.3 Overview of The Australian Nonprofit Sector

In 2010 the Productivity Commission estimated there were over 600,000 organisations operating in the charitable sector in Australia (Productivity Commission, 2010). These organisations vary widely in size, composition and mission (Cortis, Lee, Powell, Simnett & Reeve, 2015). Data available on this sector is scant, however, it is estimated that the majority are small (estimated 67%) with an annual income of less than \$250,000, and of these, the majority earned an income of less than \$50,000. Of the firms operating in the sector 16% earned income between \$250,000 and \$1 million and 17% had income over \$1 million (Cortis, Young, Powell, Reeve, Simnett, Ho & Ramia, 2016).

In 2015 Australian registered charities were dominated by organisations performing religious activities (31%), followed by those advancing education (19%) and then advancing social or public welfare (12%) (Cortis, Young et al., 2016). Other NPOs include: sport and recreation, culture, affordable housing, neighbourhood associations, community services, chambers of commerce, credit unions, political parties, trade unions, trade and professional associations and charitable foundations. Most (82%) organisations operated only in one state or territory, 8% in multiple states and 5% had operations in all states and territories (Cortis, Young et al., 2016). In an Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission [ACNC] 2014 study, charities commonly used ‘community’, ‘support’, ‘service’ and ‘provision’ to describe how they achieved their purpose (Cortis, Lee et al., 2015). Most charities (48%) helped the general community, with 6% helping victims of disasters specifically (Cortis, Lee et al., 2015). Victims of disasters were the focus of 70% of small charities (Cortis, Young et al., 2016).

The number of years the organisation has been established contributes to understanding of activities and performance (Cortis, Lee et al., 2015). Older charities are likely to be more financially resilient as they have more established fundraising relationships and strategies, greater financial reserves and higher asset to expenditure ratios than younger charities (McGregor-Lowndes & Crittall, 2015). These factors need to be considered when attempting to encourage ventures into the community resilience space.

3.4.4 Actions Taken by Nonprofit Organisations Before, During and After Disasters

The scoping study sought to address the question:

- What actions by nonprofit organisations have been reported before, during and after disasters?

The literature rarely differentiated between stages in the disaster cycle. However, as a whole and along the disaster spectrum, nonprofit organisations were recognised in the literature as having made significant contributions helping communities affected by disaster (Table 3.5), as the following quote attests.

Table 3.5: Summary of Scoping Study Themes of NPO Actions Before, During and After Disasters

Disaster Risk Awareness, Understanding, Preparedness

NPOs reduce risks (Induction/training of volunteers, provide briefings on health and safety and coordinating activities on-site)
Disaster education, increasing awareness, planning, information transfer

Community Action, take Responsibility

Long-term environmental recovery, Food security, Fund raising events, Helped clean up, Helped rebuild, Ran Recovery support programs, held social events

Community Engagement

Act as 'community hubs', provide networks that facilitate community member participation, decentralize power, help save community attachments, develop social cohesion, enhance social capacity, build safety networks. Improve service accessibility. Help with paperwork (Legal aid, Application assistance, Recovery of documents, Translation services). Ensure vulnerable groups included, improved care of vulnerable populations. Community needs assessments, Contact point for emergency organisations to communicate with affected community. Communicate community priorities. Civil society building

Contribute to functional redundancy, Provide Transportation, Logistics services

Access to local supply chains, use of kitchens for shelter and food distribution. Prepare, serve and/or distribute food. Use of physical assets. Physical assistance: Sanitation and water, showers and toilets. Shelter provision and repair, Emergency relief and aid, Demolition, Tools and equipment, Clean-up equipment and supplies, Mobile Laundries.

Empower Community, Inclusive Decision Making

Organise people quickly, management of volunteers. Manage donated goods. Fund raising events. Provide space for community activities (education, childcare). Community development activities. Referral services.

Restoring livelihoods

Assist fixing fences for farmers. Financial aid, Cash for work, Spiritual care, Health care (trauma counselling, psychosocial support, medical prescriptions)

Source: Scoping Review of Literature

'Nonprofits play a role in response and recovery even when their expressed goal is not responding to disasters. They help with social services that are essential to disaster response and recovery...' (Jenkins et al. 2015, p. 1269)

In 2014 the Australian Red Cross [ARC] facilitated the second National Disaster Roundtable which explored the roles of both traditional and non-traditional disaster management stakeholders (ARC, 2014). The Roundtable recognised that nonprofit organisations had increased in scope and impact in the Australian disaster space, with some moving into non-traditional roles of preparedness and recovery (ARC, 2014). They recognised there are opportunities in engaging with NPOs to help build community disaster resilience (ARC, 2014). As there is a blurring between the roles of community resilience to disaster, community development, community resilience generally and community sustainability, so too there is a blurring of the roles of community organisations that support these objectives (ARC, 2014).

The scoping literature review identified a diverse range of actions by NPOs in the disaster space, as summarised in Figure 3.5: Summary of Scoping Study Themes of NPO Actions Before, During and After Disasters. Hence, this informs the secondary research question three, 'What have been the actions of nonprofit organisations before, during and after disasters?' There were examples of NPOs educating their communities about disaster risks, training volunteers, and contributing to information transfer (McLennan et al. 2016, Jenkins et al., 2015). NPO actions in relief, response and recovery ranged from supply of emergency relief food, water, aid and shelter provision, to managing donations and volunteers, to providing physical assistance such as portable showers and toilets, acting as a communication hub, through to longer-term recovery support activities and holding social functions (Acosta, Chandra & Ringel, 2013; Atkinson, 2014; Cheema et al., 2014; Hutton, 2016; Jenkins et al., 2014; LaLone, 2012; Moreton, 2016).

NPOs were seen to fill in the gaps in the provision of government services (Cherry & Lucas, 2016). To provide a structure on which to build community capacity, engagement

and empowerment (Whyte, 2017; Hutton, 2016) and enhance community well-being and support individual mental health (Gallagher et al., 2019). These actions were built on the strengths of the NPO organisations. To gain insight into these valuable characteristics of NPO organisations, strength themes were identified in the Scoping study, coded and summarised in the next section.

3.4.5 Importance and Strengths of the Nonprofit Sector in the Disaster Setting

The fourth question that was posed at the start of this scoping literature review was: ‘what strengths of nonprofit organisations applied to disaster situations, are recognised in the literature?’ Table 3.3: Strengths of NPOs In Disaster Situations, Identified in the Scoping Literature Review highlights that nonprofit organisations were recognised as having trust and contacts in the affected community, local knowledge and understanding of community strengths and vulnerabilities, community connections, grassroots networks and access and knowledge of vulnerable populations (Acosta, Chandra & Ringel, 2013; Acosta & Chandra, 2013; ARC, 2014b; Atkinson, 2014; Demiroz & Hu, 2014; Hutton, 2016). These strengths mesh with what resilience theory and the NSDR and EMV want in a resilient community; strong networks, inclusive of vulnerable people and local knowledge (COAG, 2011; EMV, 2017b).

There is global recognition of the importance of strengthening, building community resilience to disasters, from a policy and governance perspective (COAG, 2011; UNISDR, 2017a; UNISDR, 2018; Duckworth, 2015). A growing collection of research focuses on defining the characteristics of a disaster resilient community (Arbon et al., 2012; ARUP, 2016; Cutter et al., 2008a; Cutter, 2014; Cutter et al., 2010; Goode et al., 2015; Norris et al., 2008; Torrens Resilience Institute, 2017; Twigg, 2007; Twigg, 2009; UNISDR, 2018; White et al., 2015). Considerable research into frameworks of analysis now exist. The Torrens Resilience Institute (2017) provided a summary of 11 Community disaster resilience measurement indicators, tools or toolkits, that range from aiming to profile a community’s strengths, weaknesses or vulnerabilities, to providing a resilience score or benchmarking evaluation (Torrens Resilience Institute, 2017).

Nonprofit organisations are often highly motivated, flexible, adaptive (Acosta & Chandra, 2013; Chikoto, Sadiq & Fordyce, 2013; Cretney, 2016; Hutton, 2016), and cost effective (Atkinson, 2014; Benson, Twigg & Myers, 2001; Ranghieri & Ishiwatari, 2014). In the United States after Hurricane Katrina, local volunteer, nongovernment organisations were recognised for their flexibility and adaptability (Appleseed, 2006).

Compared to state organisations, NGOs are seen to have greater administrative flexibility, be more cost-effective, and be closer to those in need (Lewis, 2011). NPOs are more likely to be staffed with volunteers who are engaged and have established trust in the community. These volunteers often have a clear understanding of community capability and requirements; which in turn helps with knowledge exchange, the legitimacy of their activity within the community and values (ARC, 2014b). NPOs knowing their community has helped them reduce community risks through identifying risks, running training and awareness programs, or targeting vulnerable groups for assistance (Jenkins et al., 2015; Whyte, 2017). Having the NPO organisational structures in place, and using them, provides a framework to empower locals to tackle their own problems collaboratively (Acosta & Chandra, 2013; Whyte, 2017).

NPO actions are also key to providing social support and community well-being following a disaster (Acosta & Chandra, 2013; Gallagher et al., 2019). Again, these NPO strengths fit with the Sendai Framework and ARUP City Resilience Index recommendations of communities knowing their risks and having the flexibility to change actions when needed (ARUP, 2016; UNISDR, 2015a). Simo and Bies (2007) noted that following Hurricane Katrina small, local organisations were more evident in longer term disaster recovery than larger nonprofit organisations that dominated the relief and early recovery stage. This strength is important, as recovery can take a long time and NPOs that are of the impacted community often contribute in their local community for years after the event (Moreton, 2016). Response speed was noted as a strength, particularly given the impacted community's members are often the first to respond (Hutton, 2016; Ranghieri & Ishiwatari, 2014). Interestingly only one paper, Cherry and Lucas (2016) noted that geographic spread of membership was a strength; particularly

where those members outside the impacted area were able to support affected members with donated funds and aid (Cherry & Lucas, 2016).

The strengths identified in the literature were used to develop thematic headings for later research. They were synthesized with other study findings in Chapter 9, along with the Barriers and Enablers brought to light during the course of the research. This review has demonstrated that NPOs can undertake and have undertaken useful actions in the disaster space, that they have strengths that are valuable in the disaster context. So what is stopping greater NPO participation in this area? The final question of the scoping literature review, regarding the barriers facing NPO participation is addressed in Chapter 3.4.6.

3.4.6 Barriers to Nonprofit Organisations Participating Before, During and After Disasters

The final question to be addressed by this review was:

‘What barriers have been identified to nonprofit organisations participating before, during and after disasters?’

Barriers to nonprofit organisations participating fully in disaster situations were identified in the literature (Table 3.4: Summary of Barriers to Nonprofit Organisations Participating Before, During and After Disasters). A major theme through the papers was that there needed to be better government-non-government collaboration and NPO-NPO collaboration (Acosta & Chandra, 2013; ARC, 2014b; Atkinson, 2014). Further, while the command and control model remained relevant in disaster response, it had failed to incorporate a community voice in the preparedness and recovery phases (ARC, 2014b) and resulted in poor, non-authentic collaborations (Jenkins et al., 2015). Similarly, a report by MUDRI found little evidence of government or Emergency Management sectors collaborating or connecting with community sectors (Majeed, Spencer, McArdle & Archer, 2016).

As NPOs were not recognized or were ignored by emergency management personnel, they were not included in planning processes. Consequently, there was little operational guidance and a lack of role definition for NPOs. Add in poor communication and a lack of trust, particularly because government bodies did not trust NPOs would be held accountable, and the NPOs' 'outsider status' was reaffirmed (Bajaracharya, Hastings, Childs & McNamee, 2012; Fitzpatrick, 2016). NPOs did not have any legitimacy within the emergency management system, linkage opportunities were missed and their ability to contribute restricted and slowed (Acosta & Chandra, 2013; ARC, 2014b; Campbell, 2010; Fitzpatrick, 2016).

A lack of both NPO and Government resources were identified as barriers to NPO participation (ARC, 2014b; Chikoto, Sadiq & Fordyce, 2013; Tseng & Penning-Rowell, 2012). Little, short-term or no resources to spend on building community engagement and training practices resulted in stakeholders lacking the skills, time and human resources to develop contacts and understanding of each other (Acosta & Chandra, 2013). Disaster preparedness became another unfunded mandate for NPOs on top of normal activities (Olsen, 2012). Inexperience with the emergency management system, its structure, language and related legislation were raised in the literature as a barrier to NPO participation (Acosta & Chandra, 2013; ARC, 2014b). There was also recognition of the difficulties of calling on NPOs to help during a disaster when they were the ones that could be impacted (Bains & Durham, 2013).

Along with these barriers, a limited number of enablers were identified in the literature. For example: a community development approach was suggested as more appropriate than the command and control structure evident currently; built on trust cultivated over time and discussions of best practice and resilience (ARC, 2014b). Other enablers found to tackle these barriers, and barriers were identified through the interview process, and are synthesized in Chapter 9: Synthesis of Findings. The JBI scoping study methodology recommends discussing implications for future research and limitations of the scoping study. To aid continuity of the whole thesis, I have incorporated these sections into Chapter 10: Discussion.

3.5 Conclusion

This Chapter's scoping literature review addressed the thesis question 'what is meant by nonprofit organisation in the Australian context?'. An Australian nonprofit organisation is an organisation that does not operate for personal profit or gain, but rather profit is used to achieve the organisation's purpose and is not distributed to its members, owners or private people (ATO, 2016a).

As evidenced by the scoping literature review, NPOs have and can contribute a range of positive actions for communities affected by disaster. The evidence of these actions summarised in this Chapter informs the research question 'what have been the actions of nonprofit organisations before, during and after disasters?'. These actions range across: risk reduction, timely support providing water, food and shelter, providing opportunities to reconnect with their community, through to assisting those affected with recovery and planning for a more resilient community in the future.

The scoping literature review identified a range of strengths of NPOs. These strengths reflect much of what underpins the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience with respect to communities and community involvement. To contribute to a community's disaster resilience, the NSDR encourages qualities such as local knowledge and strong networks and connections. NPOs in the scoping literature review were recognised as having strong grassroots connections and networks, the trust of the community, in addition to being flexible, adaptive, creative and at times empowering. All these strengths have been flagged by researchers as valuable in building community resilience, particularly to disasters. Hence this Chapter addresses the review question 'What strengths of nonprofit organisations applied to disaster situations and community resilience, are recognised in the literature?', which in turn helps inform the thesis question 'What were believed to be the strengths of NPOs?'

Also using the scoping literature review, this Chapter informs the research question 'what barriers have been identified to NPOs participating in activities before, during and after disasters?'. There were found to be significant barriers to NPO participation

in the disaster space, particularly concerning collaboration between NPO and emergency management sectors. Resource restrictions and a lack of understanding of different stakeholders were also key barriers.

This Chapter has placed NPOs in the international research, provided background on the sector and NPOs' place in Australia's economy. However, the review also supported earlier studies that there was a gap in the literature about NPOs. Specifically, there is a dearth of information on the long-term sustainable large Service Clubs and civic groups and other NPOs that contribute to community development; and their role in a disaster setting. This study contributes to addressing this gap. The next step in the process requires understanding whether NPO actions and strengths do contribute to community resilience to disasters.

Mochizuki et al. (2018) lists 35 community resilience measurement frameworks found in their review of the literature. 'Profound ambiguity in the concept' of resilience exists' (Mochizuki et al. 2018, p. 262, Duncan, Parkinson & Keech 2018, Alexander 2013) with many of the associated notions such as: disaster, community, disaster risk, community engagement, and shared responsibility, mired in definitional complexities (Mochizuki et al., 2018; Spencer et al., 2017; Mayner & Arbon, 2015).

To forward my research, sector terms and concepts such as these need to be defined. Then the NPO characteristics and activities identified in this Chapter need be considered within community resilience frameworks that are placed in the disaster setting. Hence crucial community resilience characteristics need to be identified and the most relevant, current and useful research conceptual frameworks selected. These aspects of the research are discussed in the following chapter, Chapter 4: Disaster Definitions and Concepts.

4. DISASTER DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS

4.1 Background on the Definitions and Concepts of this Thesis

Chapter 3 identified NPO characteristics and actions from the literature that should prove useful in the disaster space. This chapter provides definitions of key concepts that form the platform of my research: disaster, disaster resilience, community, resilience, community resilience, disaster risk reduction, shared responsibility, community engagement and empowerment, and explores the literature on factors that impact on my research. How is shared responsibility supposed to work? How do elements such as community engagement and community empowerment fit with top-down management styles? Common terms and phrases are defined and discussed in this Chapter.

4.2 Defining Disaster

The disaster space, perhaps in part reflecting the range of overarching disciplines vested in it, embraces many contested definitions. Mayner and Arbon (2015), after empirical analysis of 128 disaster definitions, proposed that disaster may be defined as ‘the widespread disruption and damage to a community that exceeds its ability to cope and overwhelms its resources’ (Mayner & Arbon, 2015). The definition includes key terms that relate to most of the glossaries reviewed (Mayner & Arbon, 2015), and it is easy to understand.

For my purposes, however, I chose to use the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) definition of disaster. While, like Mayner and Arbon’s definition, it does not include the community’s need for external help, this can be assumed. The UNISDR is also more wordy and complex than the Mayner and Arbon definition. Nevertheless, the UNISDR disaster definition’s use is widespread. It is used as the core definition by the disaster sector; particularly in international conceptual frameworks. The definition was updated in 2017, so is relevant in 2019. The credibility of authors also lends weight to calibre of the definition and how it specifies key elements is useful in a definition.

The UNISDR defines a disaster as:

‘A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society at any scale due to hazardous events interacting with conditions of exposure, vulnerability and capacity, leading to one or more of the following: human, material, economic and environmental losses and impacts.’ (UNISDR 2017c, p. 475).

When disasters happen, current theory suggests optimal outcomes occur when impacted communities are ‘resilient’. But what is the meaning of resilience in the disaster setting? This is the focus of Chapter 4.3.

4.3 The Concept of Resilience in The Disaster Setting

There are many definitions of resilience in the literature, but no generally accepted definition used across disciplines (CARRI, 2013b). Resilience definitions have historically grown from a range of disciplines hence, its meaning is discipline specific (Spencer et al., 2014). For example, ‘Build back better’ was based in Engineering literature referring to buildings after disasters (Spencer et al., 2014). Critical infrastructure resilience is concerned with minimising infrastructure damage (Cutter et al., 2010). When the definition is taken out of the discipline and placed more broadly in the disaster setting, its definition relies on context. Depending in the definition, there is a risk of missing key components of resilience. For example: critical infrastructure resilience does not usually incorporate building community resilience (Cutter et al., 2010). Hence; using a particular resilience definition needs to incorporate appropriate cultural and contextual specificity (Spencer et al., 2014).

In *Definitions of Community Resilience: An Analysis*, the Community and Regional Resilience Institute [CARRI] identifies 46 resilience definitions and argues selection of one relies on the way it is to be used (CARRI, 2013b). CARRI selects the definition ‘community resilience is the capability to anticipate risk, limit impact, and bounce back rapidly through survival, adaptability, evolution and growth in the face of turbulent

change' (CARRI, 2013b, p. 10). Some authors see resilience as a metaphor (Norris et al. 2008), and accept broad, contested definitions of the term. There is general acceptance by researchers that the resilience concept is multifaceted (Cutter et al. 2010). Some authors see resilience as descriptive, which makes it hard to measure and as such contested (Norris et al., 2008; Mayunga, 2007). Where the definition is broad, measurements risk focusing on only some aspects, and not including all key factors (Mayunga, 2007).

In the Australian context, resilience in the disaster setting has been traced back to 2006 (McArdle & Archer, 2011). In 2011 the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (NSDR) was launched by the Councils of Australian Governments [COAG] (COAG, 2011). This document illustrated the move by COAG towards embedding resilience in Australia's disaster management (Singh-Peterson, Salmon, Baldwin & Goode, 2015) and led to all States adopting the term resilience. The White Paper on Victorian Emergency Management Reform (2012) continued the drive of reform based on resilience, and the importance of the community's ability to recover (EMV, 2018a), emphasising improved community engagement and empowerment (State of Victoria, 2012). Here then, is a role for nonprofit organisations imbedded in an impacted community; but they need to be engaged and empowered.

Resilience is a dynamic concept (Singh-Peterson, Salmon, Baldwin & Goode, 2015), enhanced by risk reduction and building community capacity to respond, recover and adapt (Norris et al. 2008, Singh-Peterson, Salmon, Baldwin & Goode, 2015). Although Mochizuki et al. (2018) argue there has been little attempt to conceptualise how the drivers of risk (hazard, vulnerability, exposure) relate to resilience drivers (capabilities, adaption, coping). A 2017 systematic review of academic literature on resilience illustrated the range of interpretations and conflicts around the concept (Kirbyshire, Lovell, Nadin, Roberts, Tanner, & Weingärtner, 2017). The review did not find a consistently agreed definition of resilience, even though the quest for resilience underpins many disaster resilience frameworks (Spencer et al., 2017).

Any definition must be applied in context, therefore for my purposes I need a definition in the context of communities preparing for, experiencing and recovering from disasters. My case studies are focused in Victoria, where the government has established a whole of government approach and Emergency Management Victoria [EMV] use a community resilience framework (EMV, 2015b; EMV, 2017). This framework encourages developing and strengthening linkages between people and the systems that provide support for their community and using community networks to build self-reliance. In order to strengthen resilience, communities are encouraged to develop risk awareness, self-reliance and shared responsibility (EMV, 2015b). Community members are encouraged to learn how to manage risks, working with emergency management, local authorities and other organisations (VICSES, 2016). This approach has been adopted by Victorian State Emergency Services and is underpinned by the Sendai Framework and NSDR definitions (VICSES, 2016), which are in turn guided by the UNISDR definition. I have chosen to use the UNISDR definition, as 'hazard' more specifically reflects the domain I am working in and given its broad adoption by organisations involved in the Victorian emergency management sector (Deloitte Access Economics, 2016; UNISDR, 2015b; EMV, 2015b; VICSES, 2016).

Resilience is defined by the UNISDR as:

‘The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt to, transform and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions through risk management’ (UNISDR, 2017c, p. 502).

Fundamentally, while the term has a range of definitional complexities, as Cooke highlights, resilience helps break open traditional silos and encourages stakeholders to work jointly to achieve a common goal (Cooke, 2018). NPOs, with their mission on community development, extensive networks and local knowledge, support communities to function and contribute to their resilience. The term community is

used extensively in this area of research. Its definition and characteristics are the focus of Chapter 4.4.

4.4 Defining Community

Like disaster and resilience, the term community also has definitional complexities and is seen as evolving with the emergency management discourse (Duncan, Parkinson & Keech 2018). Its academic origins are based in sociology, with concepts embracing a wide range of societal aspects such as: politics, social activity, networks, and neighbourliness, as well as place based, geography and location relationships (Fairbrother et al., 2013). While recognising the definitional challenges of the term, Fairbrother et al. (2013) investigate ‘...community as locality (where people have histories and experience the complexity of social life and organisation), community as a sense of belonging and community as a social network.’ (Fairbrother et al., 2013, p. 190).

Communities are changeable over time, and hence are highly variable, heterogeneous and dynamic (Obbo, 2011; Murphy, 2007). There are often conflicts between communities or within communities due to such elements as labour activity, social status or finances (Lukasiewicz, Dovers & Eburn, 2017; Twigg, 2009). Communities can be overlapping, with more than one existing at a particular time (Fairbrother et al., 2013). Individual members may be members of various communities at the same time; for example, a household, a business, an organisation (Lukasiewicz, Dovers & Eburn, 2017). The NSDR identified communities of interest and communities of place (COAG, 2011); incorporating a sense of belonging, social networks and locality which classify a community according to sociological literature (Lukasiewicz, Dovers & Eburn, 2017).

When a hazard impacts a community, given that communities are generally not homogenous, its impact on community members varies depending on socio-economic conditions (for example: housing, transport access) and individual vulnerabilities (Lukasiewicz, Dovers & Eburn, 2017). Immediately after sudden on-set disasters, the local community is a source of first responders, search and rescue, local knowledge and

volunteers (Goode et al., 2011; Kirbyshire, Lovell, Nadin, Roberts, Tanner & Weingartner, 2017; Lukasiewicz, Dovers & Eburn, 2017). For the purposes of this thesis Obbo's (2011) definition of community as a group of people who share certain interests, a particular role, values and a sense of identity, was used. Irrespective of structural boundaries, a community is believed to be real where it portrays an identity and is seen to be a meaningful resource (Obbo, 2011). Nonprofit organisations, embedded within the impacted community, as part of that impacted community, having knowledge of that community, then have a role or potential role as first responders following a disaster impact and as contributors to identifying and reducing local disaster risks. What the literature says about a community's resilience in the disaster setting is detailed in the next section.

4.5 Placing Community Resilience in The Disaster Setting

A community's resilience is reflected in their ability to respond before, during and after the event (UNISDR, 2017c). Their resilience is underpinned by access to appropriate resources, ability to organise, and understanding of what needs to be done (UNISDR, 2017b). How a community chooses to respond underpins their resilience. For example, choices regarding where homes are built and how, what crops are grown and the degree of infrastructure protection in place, all impact on a community's overall ability to minimise loss and return to everyday life (UNISDR, 2017a). With choice comes the ability to choose to be more resilient; resilience is a dynamic process that can be improved, taught and learned (Pfefferbaum, Van Horn & Pfefferbaum, 2017). The local community, the grassroots, is where resilience drivers need to be nurtured (Singh-Peterson, Salmon, Baldwin & Goode, 2015). Nonprofit organisations, as part of the local community, with members that have working with children accreditation, a legal structure that incorporates insurance of members, a mission to help develop the community, and networks across the community, are key gatekeepers of their local communities. These organisations are where resilience drivers are nurtured.

Underpinning most disaster resilience policies of Australia is reliance on grassroots level action and knowledge. In many cases, this in turn is dependent on adequate funding

from the national government (UNISDR, 2017b). Adequate funding is a major constraint across all areas of these policies and needs to be considered in the context that around 30% of councils in Australia are under severe financial stress (Templeton & Bergin, 2008). The Australian Productivity Commission (the Commission) (2014) defined resilience as:

“The ability of communities to continue to function when exposed to hazards and to adapt to changes rather than returning to the original pre-disaster state” (Productivity Commission 2014, p. xiv).

The Commission investigated the effectiveness of national funding arrangements of natural disasters in 2014 (Productivity Commission, 2014). The report found that current funding arrangements were inequitable, as well as being unsustainable and inefficient. Of disaster funding, 97% was spent on response activities, with biased incentives towards funding recovery (Productivity Commission, 2014). One of the report’s recommendations was to move funding towards mitigation. Reflecting a need to operationalise the Commission’s recommendations, the National Resilience Taskforce was established in April 2018.

Where funding moves to resilience building and disaster preparedness, the Australian Business Roundtable for Disaster Resilient and Safer Communities estimates government disaster response budgets could reduce by 50% (Deloitte Access Economics, 2013). Another example of the benefits of mitigation was provided by Gibbs, Sia, Block, Baker, Nelson, Gilbert, Cook & MacDougall (2015). The Community Fireguard program is estimated to cost \$10,884 per Fireguard group, over ten years (2012 dollars). As a result of Community Fireguard group action, if a major fire were to occur, estimated savings from reducing property damage and fewer lives lost were over \$2 million (Gibbs et al., 2015). These estimates did not include psychosocial cost savings (Gibbs et al., 2015).

While the move to funding mitigation is imperative, some nonprofit organisations are financially restricted and unable to afford to include disaster risk reduction programs in their operations. However, Service Clubs such as Lions Clubs and Rotary Clubs have a world-wide network of members to call on for fundraising, and member program financial arrangements if a disaster were to strike. Further, they have a broad, grassroots volunteer membership base that just want to help their community. Disaster risk identification, training and minimisation fit with their missions of contributing positively to their local communities.

The NSDR highlights that a disaster resilient community has a significant amount of social capital (COAG, 2011). Similarly, Thornley et al. (2014) building on New Zealand's experiences after the Canterbury earthquakes, argue that a disaster resilient community has strong local organisation and collective action happening before the disaster occurs (Thornley et al., 2014). Such a community is not just the sum of individuals' resilience but rather on top of this, the community has cohesion and collective efficacy (Thornley et al., 2014). Community connectedness and a sense of community, pre-existing communication networks and community infrastructure, community involvement and participation, engagement and support of external sources were all seen as factors that contribute to community resilience and improve disaster recovery (Thornley et al., 2014).

Society now holds a degree of interconnectedness that complicates resilience and recovery. Power for communication, electronic tools and transportation, for example, as Shepherd and Kay (2014) highlight, is now a necessity rather than a luxury. System justification theory posits that there is motivation for people to see the social systems in which they participate as not just fair, but capable and competent (Shepherd & Kay, 2015). Shepherd and Kay (2014) suggest that where participants in a system (Community?) see it as too complex and incomprehensible for them to deal with, where they feel they have little personal control, they place greater reliance on the Government. This increases the perceived dependence on government and undermines community engagement and understanding of disasters. Such perceptions are a barrier

to greater community participation in large-scale crisis (Shepherd & Kay, 2014). Aldrich and Myer (2015) argue that the evidence points to social infrastructure rather than physical infrastructure that drives resilience; however, it is the latter that governments often focus on.

Notwithstanding considerable research over the past decade, disaster, resilience and community remain contested terms, so when these terms are combined, there are sizable variations in meaning (Madsen & O'Mullan, 2016; Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche & Pfefferbaum, 2008). Nevertheless, community scale analysis is needed (Madsen & O'Mullan, 2016). Drawing on the literature a disaster resilient community portrays the key characteristics of:

- functions well under stress, it has some redundancy (COAG, 2011; Ove Arup & Partners, 2014; Thornley et al., 2014; Mayunga, 2007). The community has the knowledge and networks to access redundant assets when required (for example they know who has the keys to the Community Hall).
- is successful at adapting to new circumstances. It is flexible, resourceful, responsive and engaged and so can learn and cope when faced with difficult situations (COAG, 2011; Twigg, 2009; Ove Arup & Partners, 2014; Thornley et al., 2014; Mayunga, 2007; UNISDR, 2015b)
- knows, understands and is empowered to act on local risks and is prepared for disasters through adoption of business and personal mitigation measures (for example: insurance) (COAG, 2011; Thornley et al., 2014; Twigg, 2009).
- has a significant amount of social capital. People know their community leaders, who their most vulnerable members are and they are engaged and empowered to work well together and with emergency services (COAG, 2011; Thornley et al., 2014; Twigg, 2009).

A disaster resilient community has strong social cohesion, reflected in a diverse and strong array of social support systems, networks and structures. The community can leverage these social resources and local knowledge to maximum communication and response effect (COAG, 2011; Ove Arup & Partners, 2014, Thornley et al., 2014). Nonprofit organisations, with their strong community networks, and connections throughout the community are a significant part of this social cohesion.

There has been a change of emphasis from response to resilience; preparedness of emergency agency's response to shared, all of community response and now a move to recognising that building community resilience to disasters is about community development. Underpinning the Sendai Framework are thirteen guiding principles, two of which are engagement and empowerment of the affected community (UNISDR, 2015b) (refer Chapter 5.2 for a more detailed discussion).

Following an investigation of mega disasters, the World Bank also recommends empowerment because 80% of people rescued in the 1995 Kobe earthquake were rescued by neighbours (Ranghieri & Ishiwatari, 2014). As with the UNISDR, these areas are key to building community resilience, however these are areas where there is considerable disempowerment by the Emergency Management system (Taylor & Goodman, 2015; Spencer et al., 2017). Those implementing Sendai goals emphasise the need for all layers of Disaster Risk Reduction governance be improved so communities can be engaged and empowered to manage risk (UNISDR, 2017b). These factors are investigated further in the following sections.

4.6 How to Build Community Resilience to Disasters

As risk profiles change over time and are context and locality specific, so too is disaster risk context specific. Local organisations, local governments, representatives of vulnerable groups are central to DRR processes (UNISDR, 2018). The 2018 UNISDR publication *Words into Action Implementation Guide* argues localising DRR is important as:

- Disasters impact locally.

-
- Hazards often impact at the local level, where risk reduction strategies are most effective (for example: building codes, environmental management, community engagement).
 - Local community members are the first responders (UNISDR, 2018).

Risk information is seen as the foundation of risk education and awareness (UNISDR, 2017b). In 2007 CARRI began to study practical means of building community resilience using periodic and systematic conversations with an extensive range of community supporting organisations (White et al., 2015). The dialogues identified a widespread need for resilience building tools and resources (White et al., 2015). The CARRI study highlighted that community resilience needs to be strengthened through community sectors building their own functional strength and recovery abilities. As such government cannot achieve community resilience without widespread community engagement (White et al., 2015). Moreton (2016) argues community-led actions are a core component of community resilience.

Underpinning the Sendai Framework, and Australia's disaster management given the Government's ongoing commitment to Sendai, is that the community is engaged and empowered (UNISDR, 2015a). To encourage this, all levels of government are expected to change their work cultures to encourage community-led opportunities and activities. This also requires legislation to be changed and for Local Government Victoria [LGV], seen as the government level closest to the local community level, to be given financial resources, training and time to facilitate community development; indeed, to be empowered themselves to manage disaster risk (UNISDR, 2017a).

The planning process LGV is undergoing currently identifies areas that need clarification, education requirements and difficulties in communication and collaboration with other emergency management stakeholders (DELWP, 2017). While the move towards greater community involvement is a work in progress, the issues needing clarification in the planning process tie closely with barriers to participation experienced by NPOs. The degree to which a community's involvement is restricted through government culture,

legislation, lack of resources and behaviour, also limits the ability of community stakeholders to share in the responsibility of disaster actions. The shared responsibility concept is considered in Chapter 4.7.

4.7 Shared Responsibility Relating to Disasters

The Bushfire Royal Commission (Parliament of Victoria, 2010) and the Comrie Report into the Victorian Floods of 2010/11 (Comrie, 2011) drove significant change to the Victorian emergency management system (Spencer et al., 2017). The reports considered shared responsibility an imperative and that local communities and local knowledge were critical components through all emergency management phases (Comrie, 2011; Spencer et al., 2017; Parliament of Victoria, 2010). Resilience is a shared responsibility because no one entity can supply maximum resilience; there needs to be interorganisational collaboration (The Natural Academies, 2012).

The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and the NSDR promote shared responsibility, with the NSDR linking shared responsibility to resilience (UNISDR, 2015; COAG, 2011; Lukasiewicz, Davers & Eburn, 2017); although it is not stated who the community stakeholders are, how many or how they are to work together (Singh-Peterson, Salmon, Balwin & Goode, 2014). These frameworks are discussed in Chapter 5.1 and 5.2. According to Emergency Management Victoria shared responsibility *'is a common understanding that communities and organisations have significant roles to play in building resilience before, during and after emergencies. This includes increasing capacity and capability for individuals, households and communities to take greater responsibility for their own safety and resilience levels; together with the appropriate support from emergency services, government, business, industry and nongovernment organisations'* (EMV, 2017b, p. 47).

The ambiguity over roles, direction and participants (Singh-Peterson et al., 2014) aggravates ethical considerations of ensuring communities are resourced and educated adequately to be able to take greater responsibility. Renters for example, may not have the resources or legal right to make appropriate changes to the property they are renting

(Lukasiewicz, Dovers & Eburn, 2017), or may feel they have no voice in safety decisions (Glauberman & Qureshi, 2018). Further, resource constraints are an identified barrier to government officials communicating, training or supporting NPOs in contributing before, during and after disasters (Tseng & Pennington-Rowell, 2012).

While this policy supports NPOs contributing to community resilience in theory, a range of blockages to community-led or indeed community empowered actions, make shared responsibility a difficult concept to enact. Cole, Dovers, Gough & Eburn (2018) highlight a disconnect between the policy discourse on shared responsibility and the government focus of post-disaster inquiries (Cole et al., 2018). And there are tensions between government appearing to play a central role, and communities encouraged to be empowered (Lukasiewicz, Dovers & Eburn, 2017). The updated Australian Disaster Resilience Handbook 2 *Community Recovery* (AIDR, 2018a) emphasises the need for actions to engage the community and being community-led as one of the national principles for successful disaster recovery (AIDR, 2018a). Given the focus on community engagement and empowerment, and the inherent role of NPOs, these aspects are investigated further in the following sections.

4.8 The Concept of Engagement Around Disasters

Engagement is the process of using collaboration, consultation or some degree of community control, to have communities participate in decision making, planning, delivery of services (Harden, Sheridan, McKeown, Dan-Ogosi & Bagnal, 2015). Engagement may improve prioritisation of local concerns and actions, identify local risks and resources, and result in longer term change (UNISDR, 2018; Urbis, 2010). Community involvement also highlights how people manage actions while allowing for their particular constraints and opportunities (UNISDR, 2018). Given context specificity, community organizations, nonprofit organisations, with their support systems and networks, are often key to collective responses (UNISDR, 2018).

Engagement by local community participants is recognised as critical in disaster response, as these people are usually the first responders, particularly where emergency

aid cannot be deployed immediately (Aldrich, 2018; Chandra et al., 2013). Between 60-90% of disaster survivors voluntarily help others after a disaster (AIDR, 2017). The National Strategy for Disaster Resilience Community Engagement Framework defines community engagement as:

‘The process of stakeholders working together to build resilience through collaborative action, shared capacity building and the development of strong relationships built on mutual trust and respect.’ (AIDR, 2013, p. 2).


However following engagement best practice is difficult in the post disaster recovery environment (Vallance, 2011). In a perfect world the State may be able to accept community input, yet New Zealand experiences highlight a struggle by government officials to adequately and speedily connect with impacted communities (Vallance, 2011). Similarly, in Japan, while it was recognised that citizen engagement was key, community organizations needed to be in place and have working relationships with officials prior to the disaster to be most effective (Vallance, 2011). Such pre-existing community groups contributed information, labour, and support (Vallance, 2011). Members of communities have to become engaged (Vallance, 2011) and this is where the value of nonprofits, their strengths, their networks, their knowledge, is evident.

A report reviewing the evidence of government emergency management organisations’ engagement with nonprofit organisations across four countries, suggested formal connections between the government emergency management sector and community sectors were in their ‘infancy’, with little research evident in this area (Majeed, Spencer, McArdle, & Archer, 2016, p. 4). A study of grassroots participation by the World Bank noted that groups of individuals who came together on an ad hoc basis did not have the scale or capacity for ongoing collective action (Izumi & Shaw, 2012). Further, Government funded, community participative projects have been recognised as being short-term, with funding cycles of a year or less, and under resourced relative to the project’s true funding requirements (ARC, 2014a). Community engagement has been recognised as being ‘peripheral’ to Australian Emergency Management’s main-focus;

but the NSDR – Community Engagement Framework states community engagement is now core business; albeit a challenging aspect that requires cultural change (AIDR, 2013).

At the same time, community development activities generally, and those that contribute to the preparedness of communities for the impact of disasters, are increasingly recognised as an important aspect of community wellbeing, both before and after disasters. Community development is a way of working with community members to address needs and aspirations and so improve the quality of their lives. It is a long-term process based on the principles of social justice, inclusion and equality (AIDR, 2018a). The AIDR Handbook 2, *Community Recovery* (AIDR, 2018a) illustrates how a community's development is impacted by a disaster event and then the activities around relief and recovery (Figure 4.1: Disaster Impact and Response Stages on ongoing Community Development). As the diagram illustrates, community development work is a continuing process through time.

Figure 4. 1: Disaster Impact and Response Stages on ongoing Community Development



Source: AIDR, 2018a

When a community is impacted by a disaster event, participation by Emergency Management stakeholders is usually short term. In contrast, NPOs are embedded in community development before an event, and are active in community development after an event, yet EM activities are often those highlighted and well-funded.

In order to be successful, recovery processes need to be community-centred, guided by community priorities, and engaging and supporting of the community to enable them to participate in their own recovery. Local assets, strengths and knowledge are to be used as well as including already established networks (AIDR, 2018a). The NPOs that are the subject of this research, work in community development, as they aim to help their communities. Reflecting on Figure 4.1, NPOs are an obvious, untapped resource in disaster recovery and resilience.

Traditional NPOs (such as Service Clubs like Lions Clubs or Rotary Clubs) have been active in community development and community support since their foundation in the early 1900s. Lions Club members [Lions] have contributed hundreds of millions of dollars (over \$415 million US since 1990) to Lions' 'Vision' global cause. Lions 'Vision' funds education, advocacy work, the development and implementation of projects, increasing community awareness and undertaking fund raising (Lions International, 2018a); indicating a rigorous, comprehensive program for tackling identified issues. Rotary Clubs have contributed more than \$1.8 billion US to eradicating polio since 1979 (Rotary International, 2018a). With a Club in nearly every town across Victoria, empowered by a motivated group of volunteers who just want to help, Service Clubs are contributing to building community resilience; helping to tackle vulnerabilities, without government funding, and with members having to pay for the privilege of helping others.

The potentially significant role NPOs may contribute in disaster management was highlighted by the *Second National Disaster Resilience Roundtable Report*, which called for raising awareness of nonprofit organisations' capacities and capabilities (ARC, 2014b). NPO civil service and community welfare organisations are perceived to

contribute little to enhancing disaster resilience; even though their members live in the community and often do contribute significantly in helping their community prepare and recover from disaster (Deloitte Access Economics, 2018; Eller, Gerber & Robinson, 2018; Singh-Peterson, Salmon, Baldwin & Goode, 2014). Again, the NSDR – Community Engagement recognises the importance of partnering with community, working with their strengths, networks and social capital (AIDR, 2013). However not only do communities need to be engaged for optimal resilience and recovery, they need to be empowered, given power and resources, to enact their own resilience and recovery plans. The concept of empowerment, and its fit with top-down and bottom-up management practices is the focus of Chapter 4.9.

4.9 The Concept of Empowerment Around Disasters

Empowerment assumes power is given or transferred (Luzasiewicz, Dovers & Eburn, 2017), enabling people to participate in actions and decision making that have consequences for them (Luzasiewicz, Dovers & Eburn, 2017). Empowering an impacted community to use their own capabilities to improve their situation can have the added benefit of reducing their feelings of powerlessness and mitigate against trauma (AIDR, 2018a). According to Bob (2011), bottom-up community development is often interchangeable with participatory development, grassroots development, community-based development or people-centred development (Bob, 2011). A bottom-up approach encourages local community groups to be empowered to make positive, sustainable changes to their quality of life.

However, in the disaster area top-down approaches have traditionally been used, where a program is implemented through closely following the original design and managing risk. Top-down community development strategies are characterised by centralised power and lack of consideration for the affected community's views (Fois & Forino, 2014). There are few opportunities for community participation, local empowerment or decision-making transparency (Fois & Forino, 2014). Yet bottom-up actions are essential, given the huge variability in community characteristics (history, demography, infrastructure, risks) and local conditions (The National Academies, 2012).

Unsurprisingly conflicts often arise when assistance is given through top-down approaches, and which restricts local activities (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010; Lukasiewicz, Dovers & Eburn, 2017).

An empowering environment for local participation depends on the nature of the policy and political environment; and needs ways to promote dialogue and solve conflict between parties (Grootaert, 1998). The traditional top-down, chain of command culture of emergency management organisations is not a natural fit with the more adaptive, informal community-based responses (AIDR, 2017). However, there are growing examples and advice on how to fit the two, with less prescriptive procedures, and more guidance, communication and training (AIDR, 2017).

The difficulties in attempting to encourage a more grassroots, community-led approach were illustrated in the case of 'Be Ready Warrandyte' (McLennan, Whittaker & Handmer, 2015). Community participants had difficulty working with and trying to influence the emergency management system (McLennan et al., 2015). However, benefits flowing from their participatory efforts included: improved community connection, opportunities to test more innovative approaches, adding local context and knowledge to government communications, and also '*...lead discussion on topics that needed independence from perceptions of government bias or agenda*' (McLennan et al., 2015, p. 6). A moderate approach was taken to contentious issues, yet how contentious issues are handled, and the robustness of the interactions are important considerations between community and government and the development of shared responsibility (McLennan et al., 2015) and community engagement (Spencer et al., 2017).

The concept of community empowerment around disasters is incorporated in the AIDR's Community Engagement Model for Emergency Management (Figure 5.1, p. 81 for the diagram). The literature illustrates a move in some circles to government supported, community-led actions. For this thesis, I have adopted Fairbrother et al.'s (2013) view that communities can be assisted through both top-down and bottom-up processes, and at the same time (Fairbrother et al., 2013). While others argue that a

bottom-up approach requires different relationships and networks to that of a top-down approach (Chandra et al., 2013), today nonprofit organisations are faced with an environment of both top-down and bottom-up processes, hence they have to find ways to cope with both.

4.10 Conclusion

Community resilience appears to underpin much of the future direction in preventing or minimising the impact of disasters, before, during and after their event. But community resilience cannot be successfully imposed in a top-down manner. The degree of community engagement appears to underpin a number of complexities in the shared response process. Moving from top-down control to embrace true community-led participation is difficult and the research points to the need for established community organisations already operating in the impacted community to proactively develop relationships with relevant government bodies before any hazard event. Unfortunately, resource constraints and a perceived lack of credibility reduce these organisations' abilities to drive this process; there are long-term sustainable, nonprofit organisations operating in their communities that are frustrated with these constraints and just want to help.

This thesis uses resilience theory in the disaster setting, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and social capital theory to frame, support and critique actions and strengths of NPOs and to examine the barriers facing these NPOs when attempting before, during and after disaster actions. The following Chapter provides background on the conceptual frameworks used for this research. Firstly, resilience theory is placed in the disaster setting, followed by an overview of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and how it is fundamental to community resilience. Then social capital theory is investigated to demonstrate its usefulness to this research.

5. RESEARCH CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS

5.1 Resilience in the Disaster Setting

The approach of this research is an applied research project, which describes the emerging role of NPOs in the disaster sector. Chapter 4 defined key words and definitions associated with this research. Chapter 3's findings now need to be placed in the context of a conceptual framework of community resilience to disasters. Chapter 5.1 provides an overview of how resilience is placed within the disaster setting. This thesis uses resilience frameworks: the National Strategy of Disaster Resilience, Emergency Management Victoria's Community Resilience Framework, with its Characteristics of Community Resilience, and the ARUP/Rockefeller Foundation City Resilience Framework [the Rockefeller Framework]. Each of these frameworks are discussed below.

5.1.1 National Strategy for Disaster Resilience

As noted in Chapter 1, in Australia at the policy level, the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (NSDR) (COAG, 2011) underpins community resilience to disasters. The strategy encourages viewing disaster resilience in Australia as a shared responsibility across government, households, individuals, businesses, nonprofits and communities (COAG, 2011; Price-Robertson & Knight, 2012). With the Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience (AIDR) arguing that government's responsibility is not lessened, but instead community influence and participation are increased (AIDR, 2013).

The strategy highlights characteristics of a disaster resilient community as being a community that operates well under stress; is risk aware, adapts successfully, is self-reliant, empowered to enable risk management, and has social capacity (COAG, 2011). However, little in the report quantifies or details these characteristics (Goode, Spencer, McArdle, Salmon & Archer, 2015). The National Strategy for Disaster Resilience: Community Engagement Framework was published in 2013 (AIDR, 2013) and is due for review (AIDR, 2018b). Nevertheless, its Community Engagement Model for Emergency

Management provides a useful illustration of effective community engagement (Figure 5.1: Community Engagement Model for Emergency Management).


The Community Engagement Model for Emergency Management highlights that purpose and context impact on the engagement approach taken, and being circular, the model demonstrates these engagement approaches are all legitimate depending on the situation. The model emphasises, indeed is surrounded by, ‘principles’; which are the community engagement principles needed to underpin any community engagement action (AIDR, 2013). The principles include:

1. Understanding the capacity, priorities and strengths of the community. This includes using local knowledge, taking the time to develop trust and two-way communication, assessing risks and working with established community networks before a disaster happens.
2. Recognising the complexity of engaging with community. Diverse, vulnerable, sectors are embraced and respected, with engagement barriers overcome so all can participate.
3. Partnering with the community to support existing networks and resources. Community members are ‘at the table’, local choices are respected, local action is empowered and emergency management actions build social capital (AIDR, 2013).

The model is based on the International Association for Public Participation [IAP2] Public Participation Spectrum (AIDR, 2013). This tool segments community engagement in terms of the level of public participation, relative to agency input into the decision-making processes. While public participation ranges from being informed through to being empowered to make decisions; the promise to the public from the government body ranges on the spectrum from providing information through to implementing the public’s decision (IAP2, 2014). The original spectrum model demonstrates the range of participation and engagement levels possible and supports that there can be both top-down and bottom-up strategies in place.

As discussed in Chapter 4.9 The Concept of Empowerment Around Disasters, community empowerment is an important aspect highlighted by the Community Engagement Model for Emergency Management (Figure 5.1).

Figure 5. 1: Community Engagement Model for Emergency Management



Source: AIDR 2013, p. 6.

The NSDR Community Engagement Model for Emergency Management reflects the national policy for community participation before, during and after disasters. The National Principles for Disaster Recovery, principle 3 states community-led approaches should be used. Yet while the term ‘community-led’ is used in the NSDR, and the policy encourages community to be ‘at the table’ and empowered, there appears a hesitancy to release power (Duncan, Parkinson and Keech, 2018) and empower community groups.

Australia is a Federation of States, and Emergency Management is a State responsibility. This thesis focuses on the State of Victoria for its case studies, consequently the following section investigates the Victorian Emergency Management Resilience Framework.

5.1.2 Emergency Management Victoria Community Resilience Framework

A 2017 paper by Emergency Management Victoria (EMV, 2017b) presented the Community Resilience Framework for Emergency Management [the CR Framework], which lists characteristics of community resilience that Emergency Managers need to encourage in communities. These are:

- The community is safe and well;

It is a safe place, the community is mentally and physically healthy, with wellbeing high (EMV, 2017b).

- It is connected, inclusive and **empowered**;

The community comprises networks that support collaboration and communication with sharing, learning and reaching out to others in the community.

- The community's economy is diverse and dynamic;

There is a sustainable work-life balance, and employment is accessible and diverse.

- Both the natural and built environment are sustainable;

- The community is rich and vibrant culturally;

- The community is **engaged** and democratic; and

- The community is reflective and aware.

Members are aware of risks facing their community, and work with emergency management and other stakeholders to develop plans, to learn and to take action (EMV, 2017b).

EMV does not quote peer reviewed research as the basis of their report; and while more than 50 organisations contributed to the framework's development, and it was developed in a three stage, collaborative process, it is difficult to critique its development process. The report states the framework's development was influenced by the 100 Resilient Cities Project (EMV, 2017b) and the characteristics do have similarities to aspects of the City Resilience Framework. It also draws on the Victorian Community Indicators project, which sought to develop a community wellbeing measurement framework, based on local government areas (CIV, 2017). Each resilience characteristic has components which potentially may be measured drawing on the Victorian Communities Indicators Project, and this could be useful in future evaluations of actions.

The CR Framework forms the basis of EMV's move to shared responsibility and self-reliance before, during and after disasters and their language in the future (EMV, 2017e). Given the role EMV undertakes in emergency management throughout the State (see Chapter 8 for an overview of the organisation and State EM structure), in addition to the key features aligning with current research (connected, inclusive, empowered, engaged, reflective, aware), this framework is one of the resilience frameworks chosen. A city level framework is reviewed in the next section.

5.1.3 ARUP/Rockefeller Foundation City Resilience Framework

In 2009 Twigg of University College London, authored *Characteristics of a Disaster-Resilient Community*, a project commissioned by ActionAid, Christian Aid, Plan UK, Practical Action, Tearfund, British Red Cross, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The work illustrated what a disaster resilient community may look like and highlighted key resilience elements (Twigg, 2009). This research is frequently quoted and appears to provide a basis for the evolution of community

resilience characteristics. In 2012 co-funders of Twigg's work, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Society [IFRC], funded research by ARUP International Development [ARUP] to identify characteristics of a safe and resilient community, *Characteristics of a Safe and Resilient Community. Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction Study* (IFRC, 2012). ARUP partnered with University College London and Twigg in identifying what characteristics a resilient city would display (ARUP, 2017).

The consultancy ARUP was also funded by the Rockefeller Foundation to develop the City Resilience Framework and Index, which aimed to identify what and who contribute to making a city resilient (The Rockefeller Foundation/ARUP, 2015a). This reflected the understanding that the growing threat of disasters may be addressed through building community resilience to disasters. Indeed, rapid urbanisation concerns drove the Rockefeller Foundation's 100 Cities Project (The Rockefeller Foundation/ARUP 2014). The research identified 4 dimensions, 12 goals, 7 qualities (Figure 5.2) and 52 indicators that contribute to a city's resilience (Appendix 2). The 4 dimensions were identified as: (i) health and well-being of all city members, (ii) economy and society systems enable the population to live peacefully and collectively act, (iii) infrastructure and environment provide critical services, connect and protect the population and (iv) there is informed, inclusive, integrated leadership and decision making (The Rockefeller Foundation/ARUP, 2015b). These dimensions are underpinned by 12 goals that are 'what matters most' (ARUP, 2016, p. 9) when a city is faced with a crisis, whether it is from a chronic problem or an unexpected upheaval (ARUP, 2016). The terminology 'what matter most' is applied to the development of this thesis's scaffold of community resilience characteristics critical in building community resilience to disasters (Figure 5.11).


The resilience goals identified through the ARUP process were:

- 'Minimal human vulnerability;
- Diverse livelihood and employment;
- Effective safeguards to human health and life;

- Collective identity and community support;
- Comprehensive security and rule of law;
- Sustainable economy; Reduced exposure and fragility;
- Effective provision of critical services; Reliable mobility and communications;
- Effective leadership and management; **Empowered** stakeholders;
- Integrated development planning' (ARUP, 2016, p. 26).

The research identified seven qualities of resilient cities (ARUP, 2016). Resilient cities are: Integrated; Inclusive; Reflective; Resourceful; Robust; Redundant; and Flexible (ARUP 2016).

Figure 5. 2: City Resilience Framework – The Rockefeller Foundation/ARUP



Source: The Rockefeller Foundation/ARUP 2015a

While these characteristics are universal, their relative importance varies between cities (ARUP, 2016), reflecting situational context. The focus of the research however, is on urban resilience (100 Resilient Cities, 2017).

The 52 indicators provided a means to record and highlight details of resilience qualities, segmented under reliance goals. Particularly relevant to this project is Goal 11: **Empowerment of stakeholders**. The indicators for this goal include: 11.1 Adequate education for all, 11.2 Widespread community awareness and preparedness, 11.3 Effective mechanisms for communities to **engage** with government (ARUP, 2016) (Appendix 2: City Resilience Indicators).

For the purposes of this thesis scaffold, the key disaster resilience characteristics are concentrated under:

- The community is disaster risk aware (incorporating being reflective and learning from the past);
- The community undertakes disaster risk preparedness activities (incorporating being adaptive to changing conditions, innovative and efficient with resources);
- Assets are robust, well-conceived and can withstand impacts. Community resources and systems are redundant, have spare diverse capacity.
- Communities are active, **engaged**, inclusive, with strong social networks and social interaction. There is communication and coordination within the community.

In conjunction with Resilience in the Disaster Setting, the Sendai Framework was selected for this project to help build the case for NPOs contributing to community resilience. Background on the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction is detailed in the next section.


5.2 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction

A key conceptual framework underpinning this thesis is the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (UNISDR, 2015b). The Sendai Framework is a

voluntary 15-year agreement, supervised by UNISDR, that encourages participating countries to work to reduce disaster risk, and reduce the losses associated with disasters (UN Habitat, 2017). The Sendai Framework represents international consensus on how to best manage emergencies (Duncan, Parkinson & Keech, 2018). The Sendai Framework moves the focus of effort from responding to disasters per se, as in the *Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters*, to greater emphasis on managing and reducing disaster risk (UNISDR, 2017a). The Sendai Framework supports the *Sustainable Development Goals*, the *Paris Agreement* and UN Habitat, and places resilience within a multi-hazard and holistic approach (UN Habitat, 2017).

Community and national resilience are fundamental to achieving sustainable development (UNISDR, 2015b). The seventeen United Nations Sustainability Goals offer a blueprint to a better, more sustainable world. Goals such as Goal 11 Sustainable Cities and Communities encourages inclusive communities, that protect the vulnerable and work to reduce the number of deaths from disasters (UN, 2018). Figure 5.3 Integrating the Sustainable Development Goals and the Sendai Framework illustrates the connections between the Sustainable Goals and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. Both work to enhance resilience and reduce vulnerability (UN, 2017).

Figure 5. 3: Integrating the Sustainable Development Goals & Sendai Framework



Source: UN, 2017

Australia is a signatory to both agreements, and regularly restates Australia's commitment to implementing the Sendai Framework (see Fierravanti-Wells 2017). Consequently, the Australian government is committed to the Sendai priorities for action, which are:

1. Understand disaster risk;
2. Strengthen disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk;
3. Invest in disaster risk reduction for resilience; and
4. Enhance disaster preparedness for effective response and to "Build Back Better" in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction (UNISDR, 2015a).

Among the guiding principles of the Sendai Framework are: engagement from all of society and empowering local authorities and communities using incentives, resources and appropriate decision-making obligations (UNISDR, 2015a). Decision-making is to be inclusive, risk informed and based on a multi-hazard approach, accounting for specific, local characteristics of disaster risks and ensuring to address underlying risk factors cost-effectively through investment rather than relying on disaster response and recovery (UNISDR, 2015a). These principles guide the thesis analysis, with this framework supporting community engagement and empowerment; and recognising the importance of risk reduction actions before a disaster occurs.

Indicators relating to disaster risk reduction and building resilience, measure progress towards the Sendai goals, refer Figure 5.4: Sendai Framework Accountability Monitor (UNISDR, 2015b; UNISDR, n.d.). These targets include reducing the number of affected people, reducing economic losses, reducing damage done to critical infrastructure, and building resilience of critical infrastructure and basic service provision facilities (including health and educational facilities). The targets flow to the grassroots level and include such indicators as disaster emergency plans in place at local level, that embrace engagement of the whole of community (UNISDR, 2017a).

The Sendai Framework is used as it sets out best practice disaster risk reduction and provides lessons from past experiences to tackle tricky problems; from grassroots,

regional, state, national through to international levels. Community resilience is not possible without addressing the risks facing that community (UNISDR, 2017b).

Figure 5.4: Sendai Framework Accountability Monitor



Source: UNISDR, n.d.

The Sendai Framework is founded on best scientific practice, with wide international and Australian political support and links with other major world development priorities. The Sendai Framework’s approach is holistic, focusing on all disaster risk reduction to build resilience.

This thesis aims to explore NPO actions that help to build community resilience. Actions of NPOs found in the literature and drawn from research interviews, provide evidence of NPOs identifying and addressing community risks and hence helping to build community resilience. From the scoping literature review, NPOs were found to reduce disaster risk through disaster education of risks, planning and information transfer (Espia & Fernandez, 2015), trauma counselling (Eikenberry, Arroyave & Cooper, 2007), practicing escape routes and drills (Ranghieri & Ishiwatari, 2014) building safety networks (Cheema, Scheyvens, Glavovic & Imran, 2014) moving vulnerable people (Storr, Haefele-Balch & Grube, 2016) and training volunteers (McLennan, Molloy, Whittaker & Handmer, 2016).

Disaster risk minimisation and resilience theory are useful in helping to construct a scaffold of what contributes to building community resilience to disasters. However, there is growing recognition that investigating social capital theory can also help to demonstrate and build community resilience (Aldrich, 2018) and is critical in disaster risk reduction (Aldrich, 2012; Marlowe et al., 2018). Social networks, social capital have been described as our greatest resource in response of hazards (Dynes, 2006) that change impacted communities from passive, vulnerable victims, to active, capable resources (Dynes, 2006; Elliott, Haney & Sams-Abiodun, 2010). Given NPOs' role as a builder of social capital and a measure of social capital, social capital theory is discussed in the following section.

5.3 Placing Social Capital in The Disaster Setting

The final lens that underpins this thesis is social capital theory. The literature advocates that a resilient system has a significant amount of social capital (Aldrich, 2012; COAG, 2011; Murphy, 2007; Thornley et al., 2014). Social capital may be defined as:

'the set of norms, networks, and organisations through which people gain access to power and resources, and through which decision making and policy formulation occur' (Grootaert, 1998, p.2).

Similarly, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] defines social capital as the networks that assist cooperation within or between groups. Shared norms, understandings and values are included in this (OECD, 2007).

Grootaert's 1998 paper provides examples of how local associations, nonprofit organisations and networks; social capital, have helped local development, the environmental management of common property resources and improved community resilience (Grootaert, 1998). Social capital or social connections were recognised as contributing to community resilience and recovery by 98% of disaster impacted respondents in Moreton's thesis (2016). Of all the forms of capital, social capital is least

damaged or affected by disaster. Hence it forms the basis of how a community responds (Dynes 2015 in Aldrich, Meyer & Page-Tan, 2018).

A disaster resilient community has strong social cohesion, reflected in a diverse and strong array of social support systems, networks and structures. People know their community leaders, who their most vulnerable members are, and they work well together and with emergency services (Thornley et al., 2014; COAG, 2011; Twigg, 2009). The community can leverage these social resources and local knowledge to maximum communication and response effect (COAG, 2011; Ove Arup & Partners, 2014; Thornley et al., 2014). Likewise, Murphy (2007) argues social capital is 'strongly implicated in resilient community emergency management' (Murphy, 2007, p. 305). Increased social capital builds stronger participation and compliance by members, as well as provides knowledge, information and grows trust (Aldrich, 2012). The connections within a community have been linked to social capital (Aldrich, 2018; Putnam, 1995). Indeed, nonprofit organisations are seen as indicators of social capital themselves (Putnam, 2001). Social capital, as opposed to physical or financial capital, can be strengthened with use (Aldrich et al., 2018).

This study seeks to observe the presence of these types of social capital in the disaster setting, rather than measure their intensity. Indicators of the Rockefeller Framework include that disaster resilient communities have proactive, multi-stakeholder collaboration and widespread community risk awareness and preparation. These indicators are social capital characteristics of people who are active participants and have the capacity to take the initiative to work together.

The ABS data conceptualises social capital into bonding, bridging and linking types, with networks developed from family, friends, social groups and organisations (ABS, 2004). Bonding social capital in the ABS framework refers to networks between like groups or people, bridging are relationships between those that have less in common and linking refers to vertical relationships with institutions and those with resources (financial etc) (ABS, 2004). Inclusiveness and being accepted, aspects identified in the

ARUP City Resilience Framework and the EMV framework, depend on the extent of these types of social capital.

However, critics of social capital argue there can be negatives from strong social capital that need to be managed (Aldrich, 2012; Aldrich et al., 2018). While bonding may result in a strong sense of identity and common purpose, too much may lead to exclusion of newcomers (ABS, 2004). Work by Gordon (2004) illustrated that these bonds may change as a result of a disaster. Threats may cause debonding, with connections reforming that are fused tightly into survival-oriented systems (Gordon, 2004). These connections are not considered sustainable longer-term, and cleavage planes occur between groups, finally as reconstruction continues, new social bonds are formed (Gordon, 2004). Social networks evolve during the disaster phases, they are dynamic (Kirbyshire et al., 2017). Consequently, knowing what types of social capital are appropriate for enhancing resilience at particular times, is important (Aldrich et al., 2018).

Volunteers contributing to their community are an indicator of social capital, particularly bridging social capital (Bittman & Wilkinson, 2002). Social vulnerabilities increase the impact of disasters on community members (Aldrich, 2018; Elliott, Haney & Sams-Abiodun, 2010). While social bonding ties help members in normal times, if all their community is impacted, and the only capital they have is bonding capital, then the community is likely to be more severely impacted. Bridging capital, ties outside the community, help to bring in resources (Aldrich, 2018; Elliott, Haney & Sams-Abiodun, 2010). A fundamental concept associated with social capital is trust (Aldrich et al., 2018). Trust leads to better coordination of actions, and as such is important in the disaster space.

There are more than 35 (Mochizuki et al., 2018) different frameworks for analysing resilience. The frameworks needed for this study had to demonstrate the value of NPOs to EM stakeholders and the wider community. In a perfect world, it would be possible to evaluate NPO actions and present dollar values, as proof of their value; which

obligingly Deloitte Access Economics (2018) in their evaluation of the value of Morwell Neighbourhood House has done, albeit not in the disaster setting. Yet evaluations in the disaster space are complex (Blanchet, Allen, Breckon, Davies, Duclos, Jansen, Mthiyane & Clarke, 2018) and measurement of the value of resilience actions in their infancy or development stage (see The Australian Natural Disaster Resilience Index, Parsons et al., 2016; Victorian Emergency Management Community Resilience Index, Parsons, Foster & Redich, 2018), or not fit for Australian purposes, if available at all. The next section further details why the NDSR, EMV, Rockefeller/ARUP, Sendai Frameworks and Social Capital theory were chosen to illustrate how valuable NPOs are to Australia communities, before, during and after disasters and what was taken from these frameworks to develop the conceptual scaffolding for this thesis.

5.4 Why Choose These Frameworks?


As Cutter stated at the Resilient America Roundtable in 2014 ‘The landscape is messy and littered with indices, indicators, variables and approaches! How do we find our way forward?’ (Cutter, 2014, p. 6). One way forward is to investigate how these community resilience assessment frameworks vary. The framework may be hazard specific, for example: earthquakes are the focus of the San Francisco Planning and Urban Research Association SPUR or concerned with all hazards such as with the Sendai Framework (Cutter, 2014; UNISDR, 2015b). Some frameworks focus on pre-existing community resilience (for example: Baseline Resilience Indicator for Communities, [BRIC]), may be quantitative (BRIC) or qualitative (Sendai Framework), may be expensive (PEOPLES Resilience Framework) or focused on the national (Sendai Framework) or local (PEOPLES Resilience Framework, Thornley’s research) level (Cutter, 2014; UNISDR, 2015b; Thornley et al., 2014).

The frameworks for this study needed the capacity for application at the local level. However, while Thorney et al.’s research was useful it was limited in its scope through only interviewing community leaders and through the absence of any triangulation of data (Thornley et al., 2014). Arbon (2014) created an Australian based tool with which to measure community disaster resilience, sectioning each element into connectedness,

risk and vulnerabilities, procedures and resources (Torrens Resilience Institute, 2012; Arbon, 2014). While the toolkit focused on grassroots communities, it required a significant time commitment by participants and input by government and emergency services. Engagement and motivation to continually review the process would be challenging given the time commitment required (Arbon, 2014). Examples and ways forward in building the Sendai Framework across layers of governance, including local government, were examined at the 2017 *Global Platform for disaster risk reduction – from commitment to action* (UNISDR, 2017a) and illustrated the Sendai Framework’s suitability for this thesis.

Illustrating the usefulness of NPOs in contributing to community disaster resilience, a community resilience context was developed based on the selected conceptual frameworks. At the National level the key resilience aspects identified in the NSDR were used, given that this strategy underpins much of Australia’s disaster resilience policy (Figure 5.5: NSDR Contribution to Thesis Scaffold).

Figure 5.5: NSDR Contribution to Thesis Scaffold



Source: AIDR, 2013.

At the urban level, the relevant resilience qualities of the ARUP/Rockefeller Foundation City Resilience Framework were identified and used (Figure 5.6). This Framework was identified as a credible framework of resilience qualities, given the extensive and rigorous literature review, research and consultation that went into its development (ARUP, 2016). The indicators identified are evidence based and arguably current best practice in these types of measurements (ARUP, 2016). Further Melbourne is one of the project's 100 Resilient Cities, so there are benefits for consistency, where Victorian cases were investigated. While the City Resilience Framework is focused on resilient cities, its comprehensive analytical base makes it applicable to both rural and urban Australian communities. Although this framework does not focus on community disaster resilience specifically, the qualities highlighted by the other concepts of resilience are appropriate to counter this lack.


Figure 5.6: City Resilience Framework Contribution to Thesis Scaffold



Source: Key factors taken from ARUP, 2016

At the community level, the study design includes the EMV's Community Engagement Framework for Emergency Management qualities that EMV aims to foster (Figure 5.7); in addition to highlighting the Sendai priorities and where they mesh with NPO actions.

Figure 5. 7: EMV's Contributions to Thesis Conceptual Scaffold



Source: EMV, 2017b.

The Sendai priorities were incorporated, given the internationally recognised importance of the Sendai Framework, and the growing body of evidence of its usefulness at grassroots level (UNISDR, 2017a). Further, the Australian Government has committed to its implementation and so presumably government representatives will recognise its priorities, their importance and will see how there is a natural 'fit' with NPO actions and strengths. Fundamentally this framework is included because of the recognition that long-term resilience includes recognising, managing and minimising disaster risk (UN-Habitat, 2017). The Sendai priorities are incorporated into the research scaffold as drivers towards building community resilience to disasters (Figure 5.8).

Figure 5. 8: Sendai Contributions to Thesis Conceptual Scaffold




➡ Strengthen disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk

Source: UNISDR, 2015a.

They are important in guiding global development, sustainability and disaster resilience policy. But important also, when NPO grassroots before, during or after disaster actions align under these priorities, the true value of the NPOs as facilitators of community resilience to disasters is highlighted. In using the scaffolding, these indicators were then compared to the characteristics that the Australian NPOs have demonstrated through their actions (Chapter 9).

As part of this thesis’s methodology, the case study approach was used to enable a structure to demonstrate the presence of social capital. In case studies, social capital uses diagrams and actions to illustrate network connections at the individual level (people being interviewed) and the community level (organisation’s networks). This thesis argues NPOs play a significant role in cultivating and enhancing social capital, in improving communication, in engaging and empowering the community, and hence given the impact of social capital on community resilience, on building community resilience (Figure 5.9: Social Capital Contributions to Thesis Conceptual Scaffold).

Figure 5. 9: Social Capital Contributions to Thesis Conceptual Scaffold



Source: Roberts, drawing on social capital literature

Much is written of the importance of engaging and empowering the community (see UNISDR, 2017b; EMV, 2017b; AIDR, 2013) in building community resilience. As the IAP₂ spectrum illustrates there are degrees of engagement and empowerment. And the degree of engagement or empowerment reflects the community's ability to participate. To illustrate that these elements need to be considered through-out the before, during and after disaster environment, they are placed around the environment of the thesis scaffolding, as a cross-cutting theme across the other theories. Social capital aspects are highlighted in bold font and underlined across the scaffolding (Table 5.1: Building the Thesis Scaffold).

Using these theories, and the organisations' own terminology, will hopefully place NPOs in the eyes of EMV stakeholders, as the asset they are. Deepening our understanding of NPOs should assist in identifying means to encourage and facilitate their disaster resilience activities. Greater understanding and recognition of some of these longer-established NPOs, and their strengths, will help to identify opportunities to blend NPO activities with more traditional emergency management systems; and so, ensure the profit from using nonprofits is captured for the benefit of the community. The next section brings together the various key elements of the frameworks used to illustrate this thesis's conceptual scaffolding.

5.5 Compilation of Disaster Community Resilience Actions

ARUP used the phrase ‘what matters most’ to highlight the 12 resilience goals that were considered most important when a city was impacted by a disaster or chronic problem (ARUP, 2016). Leavy and Howard (2013) used ‘what matters most’ to identify what matters most to people living in extreme poverty and why. Factors identified were then translated into goals where possible or used to inform the process of framing goals of what needed to be addressed to tackle the problem (Leavy & Howard, 2013). Similarly, the ‘What Matters Most’ framework presented by Goodwin (2010) helps highlight areas that when tackled appropriately, are best able to positively impact the outcome.

Given its usefulness and simplicity of message, I have named the thesis scaffolding **‘What Matters Most to Building Community Resilience to Disasters’** (Figure 5.10). The theoretical frameworks forming this study’s base were outlined in sections 5.1-3. These frameworks’ key factors were loosely grouped, and matched where appropriate in Table 5.1: Building the Thesis Scaffolding.

In some cases, it was an awkward fit between frameworks. For example, where a framework identified a characteristic (flexibility) that was not identified by the other frameworks exactly. Could flexibility be slotted with ‘anticipate and prepare for disasters’ or ‘functions well under stress’? Well maybe. Other elements such as risk awareness, engagement from all of society were consistent across all frameworks.

Table 5.1: Building the Thesis Scaffolding

International: Sendai Priorities+	National: NSDR” Resilience Characteristics	City Level: Resilience Framework*	Community Level: Community Resilience Characteristics ^
<i>Disaster risk awareness and understanding</i>	Risk awareness. Use local knowledge, know capacity, priorities, risks	Reflective. Accepting of uncertainty. risk aware & prepared, learns from past	Reflective & risk aware Accessible resources to help reflect, prepare, respond.
<i>Invest in disaster risk reduction for resilience – risk preparedness and reduction</i>	Communities/individuals take responsibility for action to minimize disaster risks	Robust. Well-conceived & managed assets that can withstand impacts. Alignment across systems, DRR preparedness activities	Sustainable built and natural environment Safe <u>connected</u> community. High wellbeing, people healthy
			Dynamic & diverse local economy. Range of accessible employment opportunities. Sustainable work-life balance
<i>All society <u>Engagement</u> Resilience building a Shared vision</i>	Social capacity <u>Social cohesion,</u> <u>community engaged</u>	Active <u>community engagement</u> Strong <u>social networks</u> Social integration, inclusive,	Democratic & <u>engaged,</u> Can participate in decision making and community activities
<i>Enhance disaster preparedness for effective response</i>	Anticipate & prepare for disasters. Functions well under stress	Redundant. Spare diverse capacity, so have multiple ways to meet a need or function. Innovative, adaptive	Work with EM to plan & take action
		Flexible. Systems can change and adapt depending on knowledge or situational changes.	
<i><u>Empower</u> communities (resources). Encourage stakeholder inclusive decision making.</i>	Self-reliant, <u>local action empowered,</u> Work with <u>local networks</u> prior to disaster. Community members ‘at the table’. Diverse, vulnerable sectors respected. Develop trust, 2 way <u>communication</u>	Resourceful. Quickly find alternatives <u>Engage</u> communities, include vulnerable, strong communication, strong coordination. <u>Empowered</u> stakeholders	Connected, inclusive and <u>empowered.</u> <u>Networks</u> help reach out, support, collaborate & <u>communicate.</u> Culturally rich, vibrant. Diversity celebrated, events accessible.

Source: + UNISDR, 2015b; ° COAG, 2011; * The Rockefeller Foundation/ARUP, 2015a; ^ EMV, 2017b; Bold Underlined Font = **social capital,**

The main themes identified in Chapter 3: Scoping Nonprofits in the Disaster Setting, were matched to the appropriate resilience qualities or priorities (Table 5.2. Scoping Literature Review Themes Fit with Selected Conceptual Frameworks). In this way, themes from the literature (via the Scoping Literature Review) provided evidence of what NPOs contribute to community resilience. This table produced something that was too detailed to have impact and be useful. Hence key aspects highlighted in some way by each of the frameworks, were taken and moulded into a ‘What Matters Most’ scaffolding. The resulting thesis scaffolding is illustrated in Figure 5.10: What Matters Most to Building Community Resilience to Disasters.

The major themes of NPO actions, identified in the scoping study literature (Table 3.5), were then placed within the thesis scaffolding (Figure 5.11). As the thesis scaffolding accommodates these themes, this reinforces the appropriateness of the approach as a way to understand the findings of this thesis and move forward.

As evidenced in Figure 5.11, being disaster risk aware, the community taking actions to reduce disaster risk, the community being engaged to act to prepare for effective disaster response and recovery help strengthen community resilience to disasters. Surrounding these actions is, in an ideal world, an engaging environment with strong communication channels across the community’s grassroots and inclusive of vulnerable, marginalised people. It is also an empowering environment, with strong communication channels between the affected community and government and other stakeholders; and where the government enables empowerment through improving their governance approach (Figure 5.11). When the frameworks are laid out in this fashion, it is evident the importance of engagement and empowerment in underpinning building community resilience.


Table 5. 2: Scoping Literature Review Action Examples Fit with Selected Conceptual Frameworks

<i>International Level: Sendai Priorities+</i>	<i>National Level: NSDR” Resilience Characteristics</i>	<i>City Level: Resilience Framework*</i>	<i>Community Level: Community Resilience Characteristics ^</i>	<i>Scoping Literature Review NPO Actions Examples~</i>
<i>Disaster risk awareness & understanding</i>	Risk awareness. Use local knowledge. Know capacity, priorities, risks	Reflective accepting of uncertainty. Community risk awareness & preparedness, learns from past	Reflective & risk aware Can access resources to help preparation & future response.	NPOs reduce risks. (Induction/training of volunteers, provide briefings on health & safety & coordinating activities on-site). Disaster education, increasing awareness, planning, information transfer
<i>Invest in DRR for resilience – risk preparedness & reduction</i>	Communities take action/ responsibility to minimize disaster risks	Robust Well-conceived & managed assets that can withstand impacts. Alignment across systems, DRR preparedness activities	Sustainable built & natural environment Dynamic, diverse local economy. Range of accessible employment. Sustainable work-life balance	Long-term environmental recovery Food security Restoring livelihoods
<i>All society engagement Resilience building a Shared vision</i>	Social capacity <u>Social Cohesion</u> <u>Engaging</u> with community.	Active community <u>engagement</u> . <u>Strong social networks</u> , integrated. Systems aligned. communities & government <u>communicate</u> & coordinate effectively. Social	Democratic & <u>engaged</u> Can participate in decision making & community activities Safe community, wellbeing high, people healthy, <u>connected</u> . Culturally rich & vibrant. Diversity celebrated.	Act as ‘community hubs’, provide <u>networks that facilitate community member participation</u> , decentralize power, help save community attachments, <u>enhance social capacity</u> , build <u>safety networks</u> . Improve service accessibility. Help with paperwork (Legal aid, Applications, Recovery of documents, Translation services). Ensure vulnerable groups included, cared for. Referral services, Community needs assessments. Contact point for emergency organisations to <u>communicate</u> with affected community.

		<u>integration</u> , inclusiveness		<u>Communicate</u> community priorities. Civil society building, <u>community empowerment</u> , develop <u>social cohesion</u>
<i>Enhance disaster preparedness for effective response</i>	Anticipate & prepare for disasters, functions well under stress	Redundant, Spare diverse capacity, have multiple ways to meet needs, function. Innovative, adaptive	Work with EM to plan & take action	Contribute to functional redundancy. <u>Access to local supply chains</u> , use of kitchens for shelter & food distribution. Prepare, serve &/or distribute food. Use of physical assets. Fund raising events. Physical assistance: Sanitation & water, showers & toilets, Shelter provision & repair, Emergency relief & aid, Demolition, Tools & equipment, Clean-up equipment & supplies, Mobile Laundries
		Flexible. Systems change & adapt depending on situational changes.		Transportation, logistics services. Financial aid, Cash for work, Spiritual care. Provide space for community activities (education, childcare).
<u>Empower communities</u> (resources). <i>Encourage stakeholder coordination</i> <i>Inclusive decision making</i>	Self-reliant, <u>local action empowered</u> , Work with <u>local networks</u> prior to disaster. Community members 'at the table'. Diverse, vulnerable sectors respected. Develop trust, 2 way communication	Resourceful. People quickly find alternatives. Inclusive, <u>Engage community</u> . Include vulnerable groups. Strong <u>communication</u> , strong coordination. <u>Empowered</u> stakeholders	Connected, inclusive and <u>empowered</u> . <u>Networks</u> that help reach out, support, collaborate & <u>communicate</u> .	Organise people quickly, management of volunteers. Manage donated goods. Fund raising events. Provide space for community activities (education, childcare). Provide health care (trauma counselling, psychosocial support, medical prescriptions)


Source: + UNISDR, 2015; ^ COAG, 2011; * The Rockefeller Foundation/ARUP 2015b; ^ EMV 2017b; Bold Underlined Font = **social capital**; ~ Scoping Literature Review

Figure 5. 10: What Matters Most to Building Community Resilience to Disasters



Source: Roberts, drawing on conceptual frameworks

Figure 5. 11: What Matters Most To Building Community Resilience to Disasters~ Incorporating Scoping Review Themes of NPO Actions



Source: Roberts, drawing on Scoping Literature Review Themes Table 3.5

As in the original IAP₂ diagram, the intensity of engagement and empowerment increases with greater community participation, and consequently, so community resilience builds and strengthens.

5.6 Conclusion

The literature review identified a significant gap in the peer reviewed literature regarding community-led, sustainable groups building community resilience to disasters. Community resilience frameworks detailed in this Chapter emphasise the need for community engagement and empowerment and the use of community networks, knowledge and trust (EMV, 2017b; AIDR, 2013) to enhance and build community resilience to disasters. A scaffold of the frameworks chosen to guide this thesis was compiled and Actions of NPOs identified in the scoping literature review (Chapter 2) were placed within the conceptual scaffolding to illustrate how actions by NPOs build community resilience.

The thesis research question is ‘what is the potential role of nonprofit organisations in building community resilience to disasters?’. In order to answer this question, a methodology was developed that captured the key characteristics, actions, strengths, barriers to action and enablers for action of the Australian NPOs in this study. The thesis methodology is detailed in Chapter 6: Methodology.

6. METHODOLOGY

6.1 Introduction to the Thesis Methodology

In order to answer the question ‘what is the potential role of nonprofit organisations in building community resilience to disasters?’ the thesis methodology was developed and is detailed in this Chapter. By undertaking a rigorously structured study of particular Australian nonprofit organisations, this thesis contributes to the evidence base of NPO actions before, during and after disasters. This evidence can be used by decision makers to help place where and how NPOs contribute in emergency management.

6.2 Thesis Primary and Secondary Research Questions

The primary research question is ‘what is the potential role of nonprofit organisations in building community resilience to disasters in Australia?’ The secondary research questions are:

- What does the literature say about community-led (guided, based, centred, conducted) disaster resilience?
- What is meant by ‘nonprofit organisation’ in the Australian context?
- What have been the actions of nonprofit organisations (NPOs) before, during and after disasters?
- Of those actions that were successful, what were believed to be the strengths of NPOs, the enablers that contributed and barriers that hindered NPO actions?
- How do those within the Emergency Management (EM) system see nonprofit organisations before, during and after a disaster situation, and from an EM perspective, to what degree could nonprofit organisations be engaged in the Australian context?

6.3 Research Design for the Thesis

6.3.1 Overview of the Research

The research was inductive, aiming to examine nonprofit, community development focused, grassroots-based organisations and their actions in the disaster space. There

is little evidence in the peer-reviewed literature of the activities of the Australian NPOs in this study, being examined from a disaster resilience perspective (Archer, McArdle, Spencer & Roberts, 2015; Spencer, Majeed, Roberts, McArdle & Archer, 2017). Reflecting this, the study was exploratory and used a qualitative research methodology to examine the NPOs and their interactions with Emergency Management organisations. Qualitative research is often inductive, and places emphasis on words, meanings, experiences and ideas in data collection and analysis; as compared to quantitative research that is deductive and places emphasis on quantity when collecting data (Bryman, 2016).

One-on-one semi-structured interviews were used, within the setting of a case study design. Semi-structured interviews were chosen because while themes provided a general guide to the interview questions, the sequence of questions could be varied, and further questions could be asked where appropriate depending on the significance of replies (Bryman, 2016). Semi-structured interviews were also used in order to provide richer detail and corroborate results (Grootaert & van Bastelaer, 2002; Ostlund, Kidd, Wengstrom & Rowa-Dewar, 2011). Given that the study was exploratory, the interviews were aimed to view the research topic from the interviewee's perspective and to understand how they got to that perspective. King (1994) advises having predominantly open questions with specific actions not general options and avoiding structured interviews (King, 1994). Hence structured interviews were not considered suitable, given that they require a fixed interview schedule, very specific questions and often a range of set answers (Bryman, 2016).

A Reflexive journal was kept as part of the Research Diary to reflect on each interview and on the interactions between researcher and interviewee. The journal technique helped determine what needed to be adjusted for the next interview; but also was used as a formative process through the whole project.

Interviews were transcribed and analysed using thematic analysis; where themes were pursued that described the particular phenomenon (Ayton, 2017). Thematic analysis

was chosen as it enables the researcher to gain a theoretical understanding of the data with respect to the focus of the research (Bryman, 2016). Thematic analysis is a qualitative research method which enables identification, analysis, organisation, description and reporting of particular themes within a data set (Nowell, Norris, White & Moules, 2017). Thematic analysis is also a flexible approach, that is useful in drawing attention to connections, matches and differences of interviewee perspectives (Nowell et al., 2017).

NVIVO 11 and then NVIVO 12 were used to aid coding and thematic analysis, as the software contributes a framework to organise the data. Using the software package is also less time consuming than traditional methods of data management and enhances the accuracy of data analysis (Zamawe, 2015).

6.3.2 Nonprofit Organisation Case Study Development

The main methodological orientation that underpinned the qualitative research components of the research was the case study. This was considered appropriate given the restrictions faced in undertaking research in the disaster sphere; such as that it is often not feasible to undertake randomised clinical trials. The analysis was discovery led, in order to understand the contextual factors that led to NPOs' actions. There were multiple case studies, with the number of case studies informed by the results of Chapter 3. Scoping Nonprofits in the Disaster Setting and the pilot studies. The structure of the cases followed an embedded multiple case study design.

The case study approach is growing in popularity for providing research evidence (Blanchet et al., 2018). The approach was used to illustrate in-depth events and relationships. The phenomenon, how NPOs are involved in community resilience to disasters, was explored through a series of cases, using particular NPOs as the unit of analysis. According to Yin (2014) case studies are a useful form of social science research when the questions to be answered involve 'why' or 'how', the phenomenon is contemporary, and the researcher has insignificant or no control over the events (Yin, 2014). Unlike experimental designs, case studies do not try to control the context (Yin,

1999). Rather, the case study method is useful where the boundary between the phenomenon and its context may be blurred; it offers the flexibility to deal with many variables in contextual conditions (Yin, 1999). In the instance of how NPOs act in building community resilience to disasters, context matters. The NPO's location, their organisational structure, leadership, size, linkages with other organisations and theological underpinnings all matter to the phenomenon being studied. Yin's recommendation to test the theory through replicating the finding in multiple other cases (in Crowe et al., 2011) was followed by investigating the actions of the same NPO in various regions.

6.3.3 Population of the Study

The population of interest was nonprofit organisations (NPOs) that operate in Victoria, that have been in operation for over 20 years, have a mission that included supporting local community development and that have supported disaster action or resilience in the last 10 years. The organisations were chosen due to their experiences in dealing with natural disasters, the characteristics of their responses to disasters, ongoing mitigation actions and the willingness across community organisations for leadership to participate.

The nonprofit organisations focused on were selected based on:

- They are demonstrably sustainable over the longer term. They have been in operation for over 20 years.
- They are not driven by or predominantly funded by government.
- They are not commercial and pursue charitable purposes.
- They operate in Australia.
- They have been active in contributing before, during or after disaster and have evidence of actions.
- Their mission statements or core values emphasise contribution to member communities.

While only three organisations were chosen as case studies, these organisations have over 900 Clubs or Houses across the State of Victoria. All three have significant histories in contributing to their communities, hence it was logical to question their current or potential value in contributing to disaster risk reduction and resilience of their communities. The broad geographical coverage, the consistent underpinning structure and governance, and the number of Clubs and Houses of the selected NPOs across Victoria, adds to their generalisability. Further this research provides evidence that these particular NPOs can potentially and do contribute to community resilience before, during and after disasters.

However, the Productivity Commission (2010) recognised NPOs were hard to categorise, given their number and wide diversity. NPOs contribute through a wide range of activities; hence there may be NPOs that operate differently to the organisations selected as case studies for this thesis.

6.3.4 Sampling for Case Study Nonprofit Organisation Interviews

In the Pilot Study stage, two representatives from each of the two targeted case study organisations were chosen for face to face in-depth interviews. The case studies were chosen with purpose, based on the criteria listed above, because they illustrated useful characteristics and because of industry contacts. The number to be interviewed was reviewed after the pilot study stage was completed. The remainder of the interviews were undertaken over the phone or at the participants' work places. The sample was chosen with purpose to ensure people were targeted with experiences of what the organisation faced during the disaster, and how the organisation interacted with other stakeholders (Bryman, 2016).

I relied on desk top research, organisation websites and industry sources to identify interviewees. I was looking for participants with experience in their organisation so they needed to have worked, in a voluntary or paid capacity, in the organisation and they had worked in the organisation during the time of the disaster.

-
- They were in a position to be familiar with the policies and policy making procedures of the organisation.
 - They were in a position to be aware of interactions with Emergency Service organisations generally, and during the disaster in particular.
 - They were relatively easy to access given contacts, positions and referrals.

The interview process and analysis of interviews occurred concurrently and was iterative, until I reached data saturation for the topic (Bryman, 2016), which guided the sampling decisions. In qualitative research, when negligible new information becomes apparent from the interviews, this is seen as a gauge for ending data collection, and recruiting is stopped (Bryman, 2016; Saunders, Sim, Kingstone, Baker, Waterfield, Bartlam, Burroughs & Jinks, 2018). Additional questions were added due to the iterative nature of qualitative research. These questions related to more detail of overcoming barriers to success and questions of hypothetically how to overcome barriers.

6.4 Bracketing/Assumptions of the Researcher

I entered this research recognising my assumptions that:

- Nonprofits are worthy, and the people employed by or who volunteer in are 'good people'.
- Volunteers in this sector are generally very time poor.
- The nonprofit sector is usually limited by its financial resources.
- I assume NPOs want to help /contribute in times of disaster.

6.5 Frameworks Used to Underpin Research

As outlined in Chapter 5, the frameworks used to underpin this research scaffolding (Table 5.1) were:

- At the international level, the SENDAI Disaster Risk Reduction Framework (UNISDR, 2015b);
- At the national level, the Australian National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (COAG, 2011);

-
- At the urban level, the ARUP/The Rockefeller Foundation Resilience qualities believed to be important for resilient cities. (ARUP, 2016);
 - At the community level, the Emergency Management Victoria Community Engagement Model for Emergency Management (EMV, 2017b); and
 - with Social Capital cross-cutting across the other Frameworks.

Evidence from the scoping literature review confirmed that the scaffolding, based on the frameworks above, accommodated the research findings (Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.11).

6.6 Problem Statement of This Thesis

As a consequence of the lack of research on non-traditional NPOs operating or potentially operating in the disaster space, the problem statement for the thesis was that the NSDR posits that resilient communities adapt successfully and function well under stress when they embrace strong mitigation strategies, strong social capital, networks and self-reliance, but what evidence supports these aspirations? NPOs anecdotally are not used in this setting. The focus of this qualitative study was to examine the role of NPOs in contributing to community resilience to disasters in Australia.

6.7 Research Procedure

Pre-PhD background involved investigating: disaster space characteristics, disaster recovery, models of disaster resilience and current methods of measuring community resilience to disasters. I also built on my previous study and interaction with NPOs (Prolegomenon).

6.7.1 Investigating Community Resilience in the Disaster Setting

- Developed research questions, some scoping of literature.
- Definitional phase, defined the space, definitions of terms, research.
- Discussed with recognised experts in the area.

-
- Developed search strategy for literature review.
 - Undertook literature review investigating grassroots, community-led resilience organisations (Chapter 2: Literature Review of Community-Led Resilience in the Disaster Setting).
 - Investigated theoretical models and research frameworks with which to structure project. Undertook a literature review of social capital in the disaster literature and incorporated into Chapter 4 Disaster Definitions and Concepts and Chapter 5 Research Conceptual Frameworks.
 - Developed own thesis scaffolding (Figure 5.10).

6.7.2 Scoping Nonprofits in the Disaster Setting

- Undertook a scoping review of the literature on nonprofit organisations in the disaster setting following the JBI (Joanna Briggs Institute) methodology for scoping reviews (Joanna Briggs Institute, 2015).
- The qualitative data analysis software NVIVO 11 was used to code information about nonprofit organisation actions, barriers, strengths and enablers. Key themes facing the nonprofit sector were identified.
- Results of the scoping literature study were charted and written up in Chapter 3 Scoping Nonprofits in the Disaster Setting. The themes identified in Chapter 3 were then structured within the Chapter 5 scaffolding and found to be a consistent fit.

6.7.3 Nonprofit Organisation Case Study Analysis

6.7.3.1 *Pilot Case Studies*

In the Pilot stage, two case studies were chosen from prior NPO literature research. The organisations were: Lions Australia and Neighbourhood Houses Victoria. These two organisations were used to trial the process and the questions, to reveal and address any weaknesses and better understand and inform subsequent case studies.

Data on the case study organisations was retrieved from desktop reviews of the target organisations, retrieved from the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission

(ACNC), public databases, relevant websites, organisational documents, records and other relevant materials. Selection of documents used as evidence was based on Scott's four criteria of:

- authenticity, is the document genuine or a copy?
- credibility, is it a sincere attempt by the author to record an accurate account?
- Representativeness, is the record typical and representative?
- Meaning, do I have a clear understanding of the definitions and terms used, the influence of the record's genre (Scott, 2014).

Followed up organisational analysis with in-depth interviews in the field to test the information gained in the analysis. Face-to-face, one-on-one interviews with key personnel augmented desk top research. Field notes contributed to gaining greater understanding and assisted analysis. Personnel interviewed were selected through purposive sampling due to their importance to the research, willingness to be involved and the organisation's prior actions before, during and after disasters. Open ended questions were prompted by themes identified in the scoping literature review.

The data collected was analysed using a combination of inductive and deductive research analysis. The coder was the PhD student researcher who also collected and analysed the data. The literature reviewing process informed the data collection and analysis process. Field notes were made after each interview. Thematic analysis was undertaken on the interview transcripts. The themes were identified through the data, related to the research focus, built on codes that had been identified in the field notes and interview transcripts and contributed to understanding of the theoretical research (Bryman, 2016). Repetition was the main criteria used to identify themes in the data. The coding guide was initially developed from analysis of the literature but evolved through the coding process. Open coding was used in the first analysis to ensure key aspects were identified, followed by selective coding to ensure categories are collected around a core category. Results were managed using NVIVO 11 and then NVIVO 12.

Actions, strengths, barriers and enablers were identified to understand issues faced by nonprofit organisations where trying to contribute to community resilience to disasters.

The two pilot case studies were tested and questions and approach adjusted as a result. The case study approach was reviewed and refined. The pilot trialling confirmed the appropriateness of the test tool.

6.7.3.2 Subsequent Nonprofit Organisation Case Studies

The number of units of case studies was then expanded to encompass 5 different regions around Victoria and one further case study organisation was added. In total 14 interviews of NPO stakeholders were undertaken, as evidenced in Table 7.1.

The procedure in requesting and establishing interviews was designed to help develop trust between researcher and interviewee. As a principle, I approached senior management or equivalent to gain their support to undertake the research and identify interviewees. I phoned the interviewees directly, and emailed an explanatory statement of the research, a consent form to sign and themes of the interview. To assist trust I used pre-understanding of the topic as recommended by Meyer (2001).

The case study interviews were transcribed, analysed thematically and coded using NVIVO 12. The results of these case studies are outlined in Chapter 7.

6.7.4 Gaining an Understanding of Emergency Management Perspectives

Augmented desktop review of speeches, policy documents and relevant literature with one on one interviews of 16 stakeholders in Emergency Management field. Themes discussed included: their perceptions on the role of nonprofit organisations in emergency management, thoughts on barriers and enablers to nonprofit organisations' participation, and potential future direction in Emergency Management strategy. Chapter 8 elaborates further on this section's methodology.

6.7.5 Synthesis of Findings and Discussion

Findings on Strengths, Barriers and Enablers of NPOs were synthesised in Chapter 9. The synthesis approach used was broadly guided by the methods used in 'Chapter 5 Synthesis of Findings' as outlined in Harden, Sheridan, McKeown, Dan-Ogosi and Bagnall (2015). The process was followed as it added clarity, organisation and consistency to this segment of the data analysis, this is discussed further in Chapter 9.

Strengths of NPOs were identified in the international literature, in interviews with NPO representatives and discussed with EM representatives. They were tabulated to illustrate consistency and then resilience research and theory were quoted to demonstrate how these strengths support current theory on community resilience. Actions demonstrated by NPOs were placed in the context of the thesis scaffolding, to demonstrate how well they fit within current resilience guidelines and recommendations. Barriers identified in the literature, through the NPO interviews and discussed with EM stakeholders were discussed in relation to the enablers identified or suggested. Corresponding quotes from participants, were subsequently matched where appropriate, to barriers identified in the literature (Chapter 9). Following Chapter 9, an integrative discussion is detailed in Chapter 10.

6.7.6 Ethics and Governance

As previously noted, appropriate ethics approval was gained and governance and ethical procedures were followed at all times (Ethics Approval and Governance p. v). I have followed the methodology and used the conceptual frameworks to guide the analysis.

6.8 Conclusion

Qualitative research methods were used to investigate the actions, strengths, barriers and enablers to NPOs participating in disaster community resilience. The key challenges of the research were the lack of prior research in this area in the peer reviewed literature, and yet the large amount of accounts in grey literature. Unfortunately, many of the grey literature accounts did not have a rigorous scientific basis. The research was exploratory, using the JBI Scoping Review technique to handle

the quantity of information. Case study analysis, thematic analysis and development of a scaffolding from the conceptual frameworks of: the Sendai Framework, Resilience Theory in the disaster setting using the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience, the EMV community disaster resilience qualities and the Rockefeller Resilience Index qualities underpinned the approach. Social capital theory also contributed to the theoretical scaffolding, cross-cutting across these frameworks.

The research demonstrated the wide range of positive contributions NPOs make to their communities, how they build and support social capital and how their strengths fit with much of what the EM sector wants to embrace to ensure effective community engagement and empowerment before, during and after disasters. An overview of results from these various case studies of selected NPOs is presented in Chapter 7.

7. NONPROFIT CASE STUDIES

7.1 Background to the Case Studies

My experiences with NPOs, combined with study into the nonprofit area, led me to believe that NPOs could contribute significantly to building a community's resilience within the disaster space or just in coping with life's troubles. This belief guided the thesis's primary research question 'What is the potential role of nonprofit organisations in building community resilience to disasters?'. The research to this point had highlighted that evidence-based examples of community participation in the disaster space were limited, as detailed in Chapters 1 and 2. Through scoping the international literature, NPOs were seen to have contributed actions in the disaster space (Chapter 3), and when those actions were placed within the thesis conceptual scaffold, they fit well with what the resilience frameworks were trying to encourage to facilitate building community resilience to disasters, as described in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6 the thesis methodology was outlined to detail how the research was structured to enable answering the research questions and tackling the problem statement. In this Chapter the research lens concentrates on Australian nonprofit organisations that had not been investigated in this space before.

In starting a conversation with NPO representatives, I found questions like 'what actions does your organisation do to build community resilience?' were too vague, and arguably not understood. It became evident quickly that talking around a particular incident and what the NPO did to help before, during and after that incident, led to far more valuable conversations. Often, particularly at Club level, people did not talk about 'resilience' but rather 'helping'. This Chapter looks at the actions undertaken by three NPO organisations when faced with the Victorian Black Saturday 2009 Bushfires, or the 2011 Victorian floods or the 2014 Hazelwood Mine fire. NPO Clubs or Districts located in the impacted area were analysed as case studies to identify and document NPO actions. The NPOs were also investigated to understand if there were any barriers to their undertaking these actions.

Previous work has not detailed in an academically rigorous way, or specifically addressed the actions, barriers and strengths of the NPOs in this study. One recent exception was a Deloitte Access Economics report (2018) that did analyse and value a Neighbourhood House's actions but not in the disaster setting. This study design contributes to remedying that knowledge gap, illustrates the potential benefits of NPOs in building community resilience and hence assists the resource-strapped emergency management sector to strengthen grassroots disaster risk reduction.

Victoria was chosen as the geographic site for cases to reduce the complexities of comparisons across State borders and different legislations. In Victoria legislation states that Local Government (LGV) have a lead role in managing local emergencies and planning Municipal Emergency Management Plans (MEMP) (EMV, 2018c). Australian Red Cross, the Salvation Army and the Victorian Council of Churches, are already part of the Volunteer Consultative Forum (EMV, 2015), and hence were not investigated as part of the nonprofit case studies. The methodology for this phase of the research is detailed below.

7.2 Nonprofit Organisation Case Study Interviews

There are many valuable organisations that could have been chosen for this research, that fit the criteria. Lions Clubs and Rotary Clubs came to mind, had stories to tell and were happy to tell them, so they were chosen. Another organisation that was selected purposively because of stories I had heard about them, was Neighbourhood Houses Victoria.

The fourteen interviews conducted for the Case Studies are outlined below in Table 7.1: Interviews Undertaken as part of NPO Case Studies. Pseudonyms were used for interview quotes to protect the confidentiality of participants. The interviewees had a depth of experience within their organisations, as evidenced by the 'range of past positioned held' within their NPO, that are listed in the second column of Table 7.1. The interviewees were also strong contributors to their communities in other capacities, as the 'other community roles undertaken' attests in column 3 of Table 7.1.

Table 7. 1: Interviews Undertaken as part of NPO Case Studies

INTERVIEWS		RANGE OF PAST POSITIONS HELD	OTHER COMMUNITY ROLES UNDERTAKEN
Lions – regions Lions – strategy 1 Lions club refused	4 1	Past Council Chairperson Global Membership Team Special Area Advisor District Governors Emergency fund manager Local Club representatives	National and International Strategy for organisation. CFA, VICSES, LGV, private sector, self-employed, government, retired from private sector
Rotary - districts	2	Past District Governors, Local Club Presidents	Land care, Men’s Shed, CFA, private sector,
NHV – regions NHV - strategy	6 1	Local Neighbourhood House current or past Managers/Coordinators Strategy and Policy NHV Board representative NHV Network representatives	


The additional experiences and roles brought further knowledge, networks and expertise to these peoples’ skill sets.

7.3 Methodology of Case Study Development

7.3.1 Process of Case Study Development

Figure 7.1: Flow Diagram of Case Study Development illustrates the process undertaken in developing the Pilot Study stage of the Case Studies and the selection criteria used. Two pilot studies were undertaken to test and trial the process, interview questions and themes, using Lions Club and Neighbourhood Houses Victoria [NHV] as the Pilot Studies. Upon review and refinement, the process was deemed appropriate. Ultimately these pilot cases were incorporated into the full results as no substantive changes were made to the theme list. The study was expanded to include five regional NHVs and Lions Clubs Districts that covered the Disaster impacted areas of the 2009 Victorian Bushfires, 2011 Victorian Floods and the Hazelwood Mine fire (Figure 7.4: Map of Victoria Illustrating Thesis Regions).

Figure 7. 1: Flow Diagram of Case Study Development



Source: Roberts, as part of thesis development

To gain understanding and context of the organisations, key case study components were investigated. These are highlighted in Figure 7.2 Case Study Components below. Organisational characteristics add context to the case studies. Their Mission was an organisational selection criteria as I sought organisations with missions around contributing to their community. Member numbers, Club/NHV numbers and geographic locations help provide an indication of potential Statewide networks and the organisations they work with, an indication of their networks within and across communities.

While each local, grassroots Club/NHV is autonomous, they need to be placed within their organizational structure. Significant strengths of the grassroots Clubs' stem from their social capital linkages and processes brought from the next level or State, national or world, representative body (Figure 7.3 Organisational Structure). This was investigated further in the particular cases.


Figure 7. 2: Case Study Components



Unit of Measure – the NPO

Source: Roberts as part of thesis development

Figure 7. 3: Organisational Structure




Source: Roberts using information from organization websites

7.3.2 The Context of the Case Studies

The regions where particular grassroots clubs were analysed within the case study were chosen given the NPO actions around particular disasters and are roughly illustrated in Figure 7.4 below. For the purposes of this study, they have been arbitrarily named Regions 1-5.

Figure 7. 4: Map of Victoria Roughly Illustrating Thesis Regions



Region 1 (green), Region 2 (black), and Region 3 (blue) were all impacted in the 2009 Victorian Bushfires. On February 7th, 2009 'Black Saturday' bushfires in Victoria killed 173 people, damaged or destroyed over 2000 homes and burnt 430,000 hectares of land (VBRC, 2010). The conditions of high temperatures, very dry fuel and strong winds, contributed to exceptionally intense, destructive bushfires (VBRC, 2010). Across the State there were 316 fires. The communities investigated were in the impacted areas of two of the fires that caused the most damage.

Region 4 (pink) was impacted by the Hazelwood Mine Fires. In February 2014 bushfires around the Latrobe Shire caused the Hazelwood open-cut coal mine (the mine) to catch fire (Hazelwood Mine Inquiry, 2014). More than 70,000 people live within a 20-kilometre radius of the mine; with Morwell a town of 14000 people, less than half a kilometre away (Doig, 2015). The mine fire comprised both a major complex fire emergency and, because of the smoke and ash released, a serious public health emergency (Hazelwood Mine Inquiry, 2014). For 45 days the fire burned, sending smoke and ash into the environment over Morwell and surrounds. The ash and smoke caused substantial health impacts on the community, some of which will continue in the future (Hazelwood Mine Inquiry, 2014).

Region 5 (red) was impacted by the Victorian floods of January 2011. In late 2010 and in early 2011, following a prolonged drought, Victoria experienced widespread heavy rainfall and flood events (Water Technology, 2013). The focus of this research, Region 5, was a district with a population of 3000, living in rural and semi-rural communities (Community Recovery Committee, 2011). The area includes active Rotary Clubs, Lions Clubs and Probus clubs, as well as six Churches and a range of sporting clubs. There is a Police Station, CFA, SES Unit and Ambulance in the town (Community Recovery Committee, 2011). In January 2011 this district recorded its largest ever flood event, with nearly 1000 properties inundated and over 80% of the township flooded (Water Technology, 2013).

Interviews of Service Club and NHV representatives in these impacted regions were undertaken. Questions were asked around the themes identified in the scoping literature review, and focused on their organisation's actions, strengths, barriers experienced and possible enablers to overcome these barriers. In this way, actions, strengths and barriers to actions, of grassroots NPOs in multiple locations, facing a range of disasters, could be documented and the multiple 'mini' case studies enhanced the rigour of the results. Given the role played by LGV before, during and after disasters in their particular area, relevant Emergency Management LGV personnel were also interviewed for each of the areas studied, providing further triangulation of the data. Methodologically sound qualitative research requires a variety of methods to reach data saturation (Wray, Markovic & Manderson, 2007). Data triangulation can be using a number of data sources to study a phenomenon in order to check findings (Bryman, 2016).

Whilst speaking with NPO representatives, it became apparent there were exemplars from their experiences and actions during events. These exemplars were highlighted where appropriate in the three NPO case studies presented in the next sections and in Chapter 9 and 10.

7.4 Lions Australia Case Study

7.4.1 Lions Background and Mission

Lions International [Lions] was established in the United States (US) in 1917 and is reportedly now the largest service club in the world (LCIF, 2016). Lions grew out of business clubs, when Melvin Jones asked members '*what if people put their talents to work improving their communities?*' (Jones 1917 in LCIF, 2019b). Lions International's mission statement is: *To empower volunteers to serve their communities, meet humanitarian needs, encourage peace and promote international understanding through Lions clubs* (Lions International, 2016). Clubs' actions are underpinned by the idea of improving their own communities.

Lions Australia is Australia’s largest service club (Lions Australia, 2017a). ‘We serve where we live’, ‘making our communities a better place to live, work and grow’ and ‘community is what we make it’ are core beliefs of Lions Australia clubs (Lions Australia, 2017a).

7.4.2 Lions Structure and Strengths

7.4.2.1 *Linkages Within and Across Lions*

Lions International has 47,000 clubs and over 1.4 million members in 200 countries around the world (LCIF, 2019a). The Lions Clubs International Foundation [LCIF] assists Lions in communities with large scale humanitarian projects. Their Disaster related grants are broken down into emergency grants for those impacted by natural disasters, major catastrophe grants to help long-term rebuilding and disaster preparedness grants which support disaster preparedness, response and recovery (Lions International, 2017c). From its establishment in 1968 through to 2017, LCIF has contributed over \$1 billion US across 13,000 grants (LCIF, 2019). One of the strengths of this structure is that grassroots Lions Clubs have access to financial and technical resources quickly, when they are in need. But also, the peak organisation has information on what is required at the site of the disaster. Dr. Jitsuhiro Yamada LCIF Chairperson in 2016 reflected on this strength when he said:

‘We are a global organisation. When the big earthquake and tsunami hit my country, Japan, Lions from all over the world helped us, and we will not forget it. So, I will also ask Lions of Asia and Lions of America to help our friends in Italy...’ (Dr. Jitsuhiro Yamada, LCIF 2016).

The structure and size of the Lions organisation enables Lions to hold a degree of influence. Lions International was involved in writing the NGO charter for the United Nations. They have consultative status at the UN and support the UN Sustainable goals (Lions International, 2017a). Lions International has a partnership with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies [IFRC] that encourages Lions Clubs to be involved in IFRC disaster preparedness planning and

training (Lions International, 2017c). The organization is addressed by country Presidents and Prime Ministers. Its size gives members the potentially significant ability to lobby and influence, where the central body is engaged.

Lions Australia has 1,200 clubs across Papua New Guinea and Australia (Lions Australia, 2019). Local Lions Clubs are positioned in 19 Districts around Australia and Papua New Guinea and supported by a District Governor (Lions Australia, 2018a). The strength of having such a breadth of clubs is demonstrated by the amount raised by Clubs around Australia. Each year the local clubs of Lions Australia raise between \$25-30 million for community initiatives, last year \$29 million was raised (Lions Australia, 2019).

In the disaster context, there is an emergency awareness program, the Lions Alert Program, that aims for Lions Club members to be organised and available to help where appropriate (Lions Australia, 2017b). This program was designed by Lions Clubs International for use by all clubs around the world, if required. The Lions Emergency response is a means for Lions Clubs' members to provide support either at the international, national, state or local level (Lions Australia, 2017b). Within the Lions Australia structure, each District has a District Emergency Committee, and at the Multiple District level there is an emergency response team that coordinates the Lions Clubs emergency response (Lions Australia, 2017b).

7.4.2.2 Lions Networks Across Victoria

There are over 340 Lions Clubs in Victoria (Lions Australia, 2018b). Grassroots Lions Clubs have the flexibility, local knowledge, local historical precedence and networking relationships to be able to identify and provide help where it is needed (LCIF, 2013; Lions, 2017a). While each Lions Club is autonomous, they have linkages with other Lions Clubs across the State and with other NPOs. The benefits of these linkages are illustrated in the following 'Driver Reviver' example.

A road safety program running with the State Emergency Services Victoria (VICSES), 'Driver Reviver' illustrates linkages between VICSES and Lions and between Lions Clubs

across Victoria (Figure 7.5: 'Driver Reviver') (Lions Crime Watch, 2018). The map highlights where driver reviver sites are, with sites operated over holiday weekends by VICSES or and Lions Clubs volunteers. Coffee, tea, biscuits are offered to encourage a break in driving, a rest and a revive; with the overall goal of reducing accidents and deaths on the road over holiday breaks.

Figure 7. 5: Driver Reviver Map Around Victoria



Source: Lions Crime Watch, 2018

Another example of Lions Australia networks, responding to need includes the Lions Drought Relief Program. This program was established by Lions Club Townsville Castle Hill and in partnership with Aussie Helpers, supports farmers dealing with drought (Mactaggart, 2016). Actions include support for 'Hay Days', where fresh produce, stock feed, vouchers for fuel, the supermarket and pharmacy are given out, along with a sausage sizzle and coffee (Mactaggart, 2016). In another example, in 2006 the Pakenham Lions Club initiated and continues to support the 'Need for Feed' Drought Relief program that supplies stock feed, funds and volunteers to deliver and distribute fodder to farmers following natural disasters (Imhoff, 2016).


As these instances illustrate, the Lions Club organisation offers benefits from international networks, national networks and state-wide networks between Lions Clubs themselves and between Lions Clubs and other organisations. At the grassroots level, Lions Clubs have often been part of communities for a long time, with a shared history, local knowledge and respected name. The following Chapter section 7.4.2.3 illustrates some of those networks and their benefits.

7.4.2.3 *Lions Networks Within their Local Community*

Within two days of fires at Mount Bolton, the Mount Bolton Lions Club had a depot for donated hay on a local property and had hay arriving (Imhoff, 2016). Local members contacted people who had been affected by the fire and distributed the fodder. The fires occurred near public holidays, increasing the importance of local Lions Clubs networks and knowledge, when it was difficult to access government departments (Imhoff, 2016).

The following diagram illustrates some of the connections of Lions Clubs members within their own communities; as highlighted during this thesis' interviews.

Figure 7. 6: Lions Clubs Grassroots Connections



Source: Generated by author from interviews

Across the Lions Clubs members interviewed for this study, the strengths of Lions were suggested to be:

- Local networks, community connections and local knowledge;
- Motivated, flexible, able to find, sometimes unusual, solutions;
- Trusted in the community;
- Low cost;
- Contribute to the community long term, in the community all through recovery;
- Quick response speed;
- Spread of members networks; and
- Access to funds.

These aspects are investigated more fully in Chapter 9. Synthesis of Findings and summarised from the case studies in Chapter 7.7 and Table 7.5.

Internationally the depth of members and the impact of having actions crossing decades, is reflected in the extraordinary achievements of Lions Clubs. The example of the success of one of their focused programs, eradicating preventable blindness is outlined as the first example of Lions Clubs Actions in the next section.

7.4.3 Lions Clubs Actions

7.4.3.1 *Lions Clubs Actions Internationally*

I am your opportunity. I am knocking at your door. I want to be adopted.

The legend doesn't say what you are to do when several beautiful opportunities present themselves at the same door. I guess you have to choose the one you love best. I hope you will adopt me. I am the youngest here, and what I offer you is full of splendid opportunities for service.

Helen Keller 1925, Lions International Convention.

Over **30 million** people since 1990, hundreds of millions of people since 1925, have had their sight improved, restored or saved by Lions Clubs. Helen Keller's 1925 plea for Lions Clubs to support eradicating preventable blindness was taken up as a core mission of Lions Clubs and resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars (over \$415 million US since 1990) being invested in Lions' 'Vision' global cause (Lions International, 2018a). Lions 'Vision' cause funds education, advocacy work, the development and implementation of projects, increasing community awareness and undertaking fund raising (Lions International, 2018a). Indicating a rigorous, comprehensive program for tackling identified issues.

Service Clubs are contributing to building community resilience. Take Lions' Global causes: Diabetes - helping reduce the prevalence and improving life quality of people with diabetes, Vision - preventing avoidable blindness and improving the quality of life of vision impaired people, Hunger - helping all communities to access healthy food, Environment - sustainably restoring and protecting the environment and Childhood Cancer - helping children impacted by cancer to survive and thrive (Lions International, 2018a). In supporting these causes and focus areas Lions Clubs are helping to tackle community vulnerabilities, building resilience.

In another example, when Superstorm Sandy hit the US in 2012, the Lions Clubs International Foundation provided \$210,000 US immediately to Lions Clubs in New York, North Carolina, Connecticut, Maryland and New Jersey (LCIF, 2012). In total these Clubs received \$740,000 US of dedicated donations or provided in grants from LCIF (LCIF, 2013). The Clubs were then able to provide water, food, coats, blankets, torches, batteries and first aid supplies to their communities (LCIF, 2012). The following chapter segment outlines some of the actions around disasters noted in interviews of Australian Lions. The examples also illustrate the different linkages that help Lions Clubs effectively contribute.

7.4.3.2 *Lions Australia Actions*

Illustrating the power of an extensive, pre-established network, Lions Clubs from around Australia were able to raise money and resources very quickly to give to impacted communities.

‘Millions were raised in days. All over Australia, they had all the white goods, clothing, everything needed all organised to go.’ (Archie – Lion).

Again, when trucks of goods got blocked from distributing goods in the fire-impacted area, the Lions Clubs member network was used to gain access. Members of Service Clubs come from a wide range of backgrounds; and these can help representatives gain knowledge and resources. In this case politician members were able to help get members into the fire-impacted area.

‘So, the fires happened, and we had 2 people in our Clubs who were politicians, very fortunately. So, we rang up and asked them ‘what do we need, who do we talk to, contact?’ Because it was huge, the fires in 2009 were in our district...and so we got hold of a few people in the Club, made a few calls and got us in there’ (Elizabeth – Lion).

In another example, Lions who were plumbers were useful in setting up mobile laundries or shower blocks.

‘We built a whole laundry in Marysville. In that situation, we get Lions members, or we pay or organise for people to build it.’ (Elizabeth – Lion).

Lions gave numerous examples of working with other NPOs in their communities. For example, with BlazeAid and Rotary as the following quote attests.

‘BlazeAid, great organisation after the fires – who bought all the equipment for BlazeAid? Lions. Lions bought the trailers, the strainers, wire and all that and gave them to BlazeAid. Because we don’t have the man power, they did, so we gave it to them.’ (Archie – Lion).

'When people arrive to help, who feeds them? Lions, not just Lions, Rotary and the others. Other organisations are there on site, but nobody sees that, nobody hears that because we don't advertise. We don't get on radio and say hey it's us that are doing that'. (Archie – Lion).

7.4.3.2.1 Exemplar - Have a Pre-established Structure

Prior to Black Saturday, Region 1 had strong community ties and established communication networks between NPOs. While the City was not itself impacted (although it had been threatened), it was a key artery to some of the worst fire-affected areas and everyone interviewed had very personal stories.

The pre-established networks were underpinned by the local Council of Churches representatives and practiced through regional activities such as festivals. This was a theme referenced by other interviewees. The literature also supports having pre-established structures of communication and networks in place prior to the disaster occurring as it is difficult to speedily and effectively establish them post-disaster (Vallance, 2011). Coordination of NPOs avoid duplication and encourages more effective utilisation of resources. Region 1's NPO representatives met the day following the Saturday fires (Sunday evening) to organise which NPO local clubs would be responsible for what areas, and where they could be most helpful. Being part of this group enabled the local NPOs to contribute to the response and recovery of the 2009 bushfires. They were 'at the table', not invisible and community efforts could be coordinated.

'instead of having every group like all the Service Clubs see a need and respond to it and it turn out that they were all responding to similar needs, what we did was to introduce the idea of specialisation. For example, the Lions Club helped people who needed transport they needed the vehicles repaired, they didn't have vehicles.... General Motors made Commodores available for a year and through Lions Club and ourselves we helped to distribute those objectively. It meant that mechanics and volunteers could volunteer their time and were coordinated through the Lions Club. And

anybody who had a request for help to do with motor vehicles etc were referred to the Lions Club. So, what we did was we developed a kind of specialisation so that Rotary took on other tasks and they would refer to each other rather than both groups doing the same work. That was a really efficient way of addressing the needs of people. The structure was very effective' (Wayne - CoC).

'weekly meetings of Lions Club, Rotary Club, CWA, local Red Cross Auxiliary, the Masons, pretty much every group that existed in town, the Football Club, the Cricket Club, the Basketball Association we had weekly meetings of all those groups. That was set up immediately after the fire started, on the Sunday - so the fires were still burning' (Wayne - CoC).

Names and contact details for each of the community groups of the area were already known. Hence the speed of response was rapid, '*while the fires were still burning*' (Wayne - CoC). Given their local knowledge, the network was able to quickly identify and gain access to community resources. The high school basketball courts became a material aid centre but also a place where people could come to get a shower and a change of clothes.

'We listed requests for help and needs that we knew of by categories on a whiteboard. Then the various agencies would take on the tasks. That might be distribution of material, getting food supplies to people who were isolated on their properties...they were cut off without power, without water... without phones because ...mobile phone towers were down... There was a ring drawn around the fire grounds by the emergency service teams and the police. If you crossed or came out of that fire zone while the area was still technically a crime zone, you weren't allowed back in. So many people decided to stay on their properties. But they had nothing. So, it was a question of getting supplies to them and we had (access) coverage....'

‘We had convoys of vehicles driven by volunteers wearing the white wristbands which allowed them to go through and take supplies to people.... Things like small generators so they could fire up their fridges and washing machines or whatever. Whatever the needs were, from food to clothing to water in some cases. The various Service Clubs and agencies would take on responsibilities for a particular need; sometimes sharing it but other times it was a single group or a single agency.’ (Wayne–CoC).

The pre-established structure, network of connections highlighted above demonstrates an enabler to overcome duplication of resources of NPO services, improved communication between stakeholders and use of local knowledge to enhance speed of response, targeting need and creatively achieving solutions. It also illustrated what could be achieved when NPOs worked together and were given the legitimacy and opportunity to help.

7.4.3.2.2 Exemplar – Identify and Understand the Need

An issue that had arisen from other events was having to deal with donations of second-hand clothes and other goods that were not asked for or wanted. This ties up resources with volunteers having to sort them, or not having the time, so the donations just get stored, sometimes for years (Moreton, 2016). Because Lions Clubs members were spread across the impacted area, the Lions Clubs members who lived in the fire-affected areas were able to call their District Lions and let them know specifically what was needed in their area.

‘We are usually the first responders to be there. Our members in King Valley, we had our members in Marysville where ever they are impacted. In the Strathmerton, in the V6 area Numurkah area. And they said ‘ok we have some problems’ and the District Governor from there rang the District Governor from here and we just put the call out and said ok who can come and help?’ (Archie – Lion).

Another example of identifying a local need and explicitly targeting that need was the supplying of suits to impacted people.

‘All these people needed suits. 173 people died in that fire, 173 funerals. And locals wanted to attend but they had no clothes and they didn't have anything decent to wear. I got suits up there so they could wear suits to the funerals. You should have seen how quickly that happened. I had people donating some of the most beautiful suits and they said ‘no no .. you take them up there’. These suits were donated from private members of Lions.’ (Elizabeth – Lion).

The structure of the organisation, the networks of members across the world, across Australia and across Victoria; as well as their extensive network of contacts within the impacted community are significant strengths of Lions Clubs. As shown in the examples above, their networks offer speed of response, knowledge of what is required and quick access to a range of free skills. Cost effective actions, understanding of the vulnerabilities of the local community and local knowledge, in addition to pan-Australia support to call on, are significant attributes of Lions Clubs, and other like Service Clubs. Chapter 7.7 summarises the actions of NPOs, including Lions, identified through the case studies before, during and after a disaster (Table 7.6: Actions of Australian Nonprofit Organisations summarises the actions of NPOs interviewed). The following section, Chapter 7.4.4, details the barriers and enablers identified in the research of what NPOs encountered when they tried to help in a disaster situation.

7.4.4 Lions Clubs Barriers and Enablers to Actions

The data from the Lions Clubs interviews follows. Barriers identified in the scoping literature review were used to structure interview questions and are tabled in Column 1 in Table 7.2: Barriers and Enablers to Lions Clubs' Actions. Barriers mentioned by case participants, and their related quotes are listed in Column 2. Examples of enablers used to overcome these barriers were included if they were detailed in discussions or identified through the process, in Column 3.

Table 7. 2: Barriers and Enablers to Lions Clubs' Actions

BARRIERS IDENTIFIED FROM SCOPING STUDY	BARRIERS IDENTIFIED IN LIONS' INTERVIEWS	ENABLERS IDENTIFIED IN INTERVIEWS TO HELP OVER COME BARRIERS
<p>Structural Weak integration or conflict between local NPOs and disaster EM systems due to: Geography, Culture, Structure of EM 'command and control' Government agencies dictate actions, not authentic collaborations, Lack of common norms.</p>	<p>'We might be old, but we are part of the community. This is what frustrates us. What are the barriers and enablers – EGOS. Peoples' egos are one of the biggest problems. I'm in charge, I have a bit of paper.' (Archie – Lions)</p>	<p>'The likelihood in the country towns of Lions Clubs they know who the police and emergency services are. It's likely that they not only know them but they are also a member of CFA, of Lions. At Dookie most of CFA members are also Lions members. Especially the smaller country towns, they belong to a number of community groups...'</p> <p>'there are 19 districts and on average 70 odd Clubs in a district around Australia. Each club should have someone in charge of this sort of thing... the district has a Disaster District Relief Chairman. Over the top of that is a Disaster Emergency Plan'</p>
<p>Non-recognition of NPOs Lack of role definition Little operational guidance regarding NPO involvement</p>	<p>'So, we were up and running right away. But we got stopped, we got stopped because we weren't the Red Cross, we weren't the Salvation Army, we were Lions and we weren't on the list.'</p> <p>'Nobody knows what we do. We are our own worst enemy. Why are we our own worst enemy? Every dollar we get from the public goes back to the public.'</p>	<p>Political will and value 'It depends if somebody knows somebody - it depends on linkages, contacts.'</p> <p>'... So, we had to get to, do a lot of work again to make a lot of phone calls and say we have all this stuff that is needed, you have to listen to us. We have \$3 million, we have all these funds here, we have trucks coming in from all over the country, every single District Governor filling the trucks to bring it over to help and you won't let us distribute what is needed, what our members in the affected area are telling us is needed.'</p> <p>'I was in a meeting...Task force and speaking to her (Christine Nixon), there was a light bulb moment, she was sitting there and said 'so let me get this right, you have a Lion's club in every single town in Victoria? And you can mobilise straight away? Yeah'. So, from then on, we continued to work and we ended up taking over the</p>

		welfare ticket system, and we did a whole lot of other things.'
Lack of NPO resources <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reliance on volunteers - Unfunded mandate 		<p>Lions have well structured finance mechanisms and quick access to cash.</p> <p>'really looked after the Lions money so went to the right places. I had a really good auditing system and what we have learnt from this whole process is that you don't pay money to people, you pay invoices but you won't just give money to people' (Sally – Lion).</p>
Lack of Trust Government inflexible due to accountability requirements Government not trust NPOs can be held accountable Lack of trust between stakeholders	<p>'Legislation is barrier, because it stops us working. We have been cooking steak sandwiches and sausages during a flood. It is raining and it's cold. And someone else will turn up with sandwiches. What will people want? Cold sandwiches or hot food? But they tell us to move on, pull your food van down you are not wanted. And we go down the street, around the corner and think, we will set up here. Then the police turn up, and you think 'oh no, they are complaining'. But the police say 'oh hold on guys, we will take to your food to the people, because we know what they want'. And they drive it down to the island and then the boats take it across to the people'.</p> <p>'We are wanted in the community. But legislation and laws say we are not. We will work with them, we don't want to take control. Once we are there let us help.'</p> <p>'You ask what are the inhibitors, well possible litigation stopped a lot of things. You know we just want to get in there and help. And after you are doing it for a while someone says 'hang on you have to tell so and so, bi law such and such'</p> <p>'I think it should be emphasized that red tape just holds so much volunteer work up' (John – Lion)</p>	<p>SENDAI require all levels of government to improve governance to enable disaster risk reduction by community.</p> <p>'have politicians in our Lions Clubs that's when they're fantastic when it comes to a disaster. Because when Black Saturday happened immediately rang the Lions Club members who were politicians and they were more help to us... got us into meetings immediately so they were very effective'</p> <p>'we are now trying to get every single person in every single Club to get a working with children card'.</p>

	'The Shire did help, but the red tape straddled them' (John – Lion).	
Poor communication		
Lack of coordination between NPOs Absence of leadership in NPO/community sector	'We are there, we are a part of the community, and usually we are the very first there, on site. We would set up a hall, beds, have everything there, cook up hot food, cold, we cook it all. We get it all together and then Red Cross will arrive because of the system that is set up – they do a great job I am not knocking them, but we have everything set up and going and then they turn up and say 'get out because you are not on the list' and they will then move in and take over. Which is terrific, but what I'm saying is let us be involved, we are the first on site, have the connections, we will help you.' (Archie – Lions)	Structure of communication and understanding of skills/assets established before disaster 'if we were invited to participate at a National level, we could support you and we would set up a system where it is there. Each district 19 Districts in Australia has set up and is just waiting for it but that is where it stops because we are not on your national grid'
Lack of EM Training Inexperience with incident command structure, Lack understanding of legislation. Difficulties managing volunteer surge/donations	'...every single club in Australia is autonomous.... so, we are linked but we are all incorporated. . There are some clubs that are very in tune, very connected. And then you have others that are not so connected.'	Lions had warehouse and 32 trucks with donations within a few days of 2009 fires. Also contacts in disaster areas to tell them what was required.
Lack of Government Resources		
Vulnerability during disaster	'I as a Lion, was not able to do much ... because the (family) farm was heavily flooded as well.' (John – Lion).	Some Lions may be impacted given geographic spread, but given that spread, many others can help

Source: Scoping Literature Review, interviews with Lions

This table layout has been used to tabulate the barriers and enablers identified across all NPO interviews.

As Table 7.2 illustrates, one of the key barriers that Lions Clubs experienced was the lack of recognition of Lions Clubs as valid emergency management stakeholders. This was overcome eventually through use of their networks of members who were politicians to gain credibility with the emergency response team. However, as Lions Clubs are not included in the Volunteer Consultative Forum (see Figure 8.1: Emergency Management Governance Structure in Victoria), were a major disaster to happen again, Lions Clubs would likely have to go through a similar process again.

Other barriers to Lions Clubs actions included legislation, egos, and red tape that prevented them from effectively working with other emergency management stakeholders. These issues are discussed further in Chapter 9. The next section illustrates the role Rotary Australia has played before, during and after disasters.

7.5. Rotary Australia Case Study

7.5.1 Rotary Background and Mission

Rotary International was established in 1905 in the US, with a mission of ‘We provide service to others, promote integrity, and advance world understanding, goodwill, and peace through our fellowship of business, professional, and community leaders’ (Rotary International, 2018c). Rotary Clubs around the world focus on the areas of: helping to grow local economies, promoting peace, saving mothers and children, providing clean water, sanitation and hygiene, fighting disease and supporting education.

Rotary Australia’s motto is ‘*service above self*’ (Rotary Australia, 2018). Rotarians use an ethical framework to base their actions, at its foundation are truth, fairness, building goodwill and better friendships and whether that action is beneficial to all affected (Rotary

Australia, 2019). These grassroots, core service-above-self values and the strengths of the organisational structure underpinned my selection of Service Clubs as a component of this analysis.

7.5.2 Rotary Structure and Strengths

7.5.2.1 *Linkages Within and Across Rotary Clubs*

Rotary is an international network of 35,000 clubs and 1.2 million members around the world (Rotary International, 2018b). It is structured into three parts, the Rotary Clubs, the Rotary Foundation and Rotary International. The Rotary Foundation was established in 1917 and has contributed over \$3 billion US to projects (Rotary International, 2018b).

Rotary International actively connects with other organizations to maximise their funding impacts (Grahl, 2018a). For example, for each Rotary dollar given to polio eradication, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation contributes two (Grahl, 2018a). Rotary Clubs also link with ShelterBox to supply shelter and supplies in emergencies and organisations such as UNICEF, World Vision, Red Cross to provide clean water to Lebanese schools (Grahl, 2018b).

Rotary Australia have approximately 30,000 members in 1100 clubs around Australia. These clubs are all autonomous; but network into 21 Rotary Districts, supported by a District Governor (Rotary Australia, 2018). Districts may not follow State borders. The District provides an administrative function, some leadership, coordination, cohesion and training to Rotarians in clubs.

The strengths of Rotary's networks were illustrated by their actions after the Blue Mountains fires in 2013. Using the experience of their members, they identified what they had to do to help; they had to be 'at the table'. This theme of being 'at the table' was a

consistent theme through interviews and is further discussed in Chapter 9 as a major enabler to excluded NPOs in the disaster space.

7.5.2.1.1 Exemplar – Be at the Table

The 2013 Blue Mountain fires destroyed 258 houses, but no lives were lost. The Disaster Aid Coordinator for Rotary Clubs in the impacted District had previously held a high government position and had had the lead role in coordinating disaster response in an earlier disaster. He was asked ‘what is the one piece of advice that you can give’, he answered

‘you have to get a seat at the table. A person is appointed to coordinate the disaster at the State level, in the emergency response phase.

It would either be coordinated by the Premiers Department or the Department of Police and Emergency Services’.

‘You have to get a seat at that table’.

I said ‘how do I do that?’ and he said ‘well you ask’. (Greg - Rotarian)

‘It just so happened that in my own Club there had been a person recently appointed to head up the Premiers Department locally. I phoned him...and he gave me a phone contact. I phoned. I said I’m from Rotary and we’d like to be part of the team.’ (Greg – Rotary).

Rotarians, as with other NPO members, are members of their local communities; also business people, professionals, teachers, trades people, people with a range of skills to call on. In this instance, the District Governor was able to use the specialist skills of a public servant to connect with the appropriate emergency management stakeholders and get a ‘seat at the table’.

'We have a club at Springwood. I had already spoken to a number of members, as they had lost their homes. I rang the President there again and asked to convene a meeting of all the Presidents of all the clubs on the Blue Mountains and the Windsor and Richmond area. That Saturday afternoon we had the meeting at his home. Having those people in the room, who live locally, who had experienced fires before around the area, we had a plan and the prediction of what was going to happen and what we needed to be prepared for, and it was pretty much as a statement of what happened and what we did.' (Greg – Rotarian)

There were daily meetings during the emergency phase. Being at the table enabled Rotary Clubs to **communicate what was needed at the grassroots level**. Having one representative, one liaison, speaking for numerous Rotary clubs was an effective conduit for two-way communication.


Two registers were set up through the Emergency Relief Committee, coordinated by Rotary. One was a goods and services register of both need and goods available and locations. The other was an Issues register, so any issues that emerged through that whole recovery phase were documented and a Rotarian (a retired policeman) looked after it.

7.5.2.2 Rotary Clubs Networks Across Victoria

Figure 7.7 illustrates the spread of Rotary Clubs across Victoria. These networks enable close contact and understanding of grassroots communities. Understanding what is happening at the grassroots level is a significant need in disaster situations; as the following quote from a Rotarian attests.

‘..it really for me highlighted the need for ...Rotary to immediately, within its own ranks, get people who are on the ground providing the knowledge and information.’ (Greg – Rotarian)

Figure 7. 7: Map of Victorian Rotary Clubs




Source: Rotary Australia, 2019

Actions around disaster events need to have knowledge and information of what is happening on the ground, at the local, grassroots level.

7.5.2.3 *Rotary Clubs Networks Within their Local Community*

Figure 7.8 Rotary Clubs Grassroots Connections illustrates some of the connections Rotary Clubs have at the local level, as mentioned in the interviews or through their publications.

Figure 7. 8: Rotary Clubs Grassroots Connections



Source: Generated by author from interviews

The strengths mentioned about Rotary Clubs through the case study analysis included:

- Local knowledge and local connections, local communication networks;
- Trust (11 years with top rating by charity evaluator, Charity Navigator (Grahl, 2018a))
- Nonreligious, non-political, non-government;
- Geographic spread, networks of members;
- Access to donated funds;
- Help community to tackle their own problems;
- Part of the community, not outsiders.
- Use own volunteer skills and resources hence cost effective.

Strengths of NPOs summarised from the case studies are illustrated in Table 7.5, discussed in Chapter 7.7.1 and examined in more detail in Chapter 9.

7.5.3 Rotary Clubs Actions

7.5.3.1 *Rotary Clubs Actions Internationally*

Illustrating the reach and ability of Rotary, as part of the Global Polio Eradication initiative, Rotary Clubs have contributed more than \$1.8 billion US to eradicating polio, helping to immunise **2.5 billion children** since 1979 (Rotary International, 2018b). Other projects, such as offering microfinance or enabling farmers to extend their crop growing seasons (Rotary, 2018a) build community resilience and develop communities. In the case study areas, Australian Rotary is also contributing to building their community's resilience, as outlined in the following.

7.5.3.2 *Rotary Australia Actions*

7.5.3.2.1 Exemplar - Building Social Capital, Incubating Networks

Establishing a new organisation is a high-risk venture, with one in three estimated to fail in their first year (Petty, 2006). This exemplar illustrates the work of Service Clubs, in this situation Rotary Clubs, to help other nonprofit organisations become established in their community and in so doing, build social capital. Help comes in many forms but may include: accounting systems, insurance, guidance on NPO regulations, capital or the loan of a meeting room.

'After our disasters we put effort into establishing a Men's Shed and there's one here that was actually started on my home property.... it's got over 100 men in it now. And throughout Australia we have lots of Men's Sheds which have been assisted by Rotary and Lions and others and that builds capability within an area and it can be used for so many aspects' (Colin – Rotarian).

Men's Sheds are broadly defined as a community-based NPO, available to all men, providing a friendly and safe place where they can work on meaningful projects with other men. Men's Sheds aim to improve the mental health and well-being of their male members. One of the first Sheds was thought to be established in 1998, there are now nearly 1000 around Australia (Australian Men's Shed Association, 2018).

'one of the things that the Men's Shed after the fires in Kinglake did, we were able to have young girls come in and build up a little box for their trinkets and work together on those sorts of things. There's another group that has been building what they call Angel boxes that are boxes that are to be used in relation to cot deaths in hospitals. All these things helped men to build capability and understanding so Men's Shed is very important. In this area it's working with tools, but it's also the networking and the talking over things.' (Colin – Rotarian).

Another example comes from the BlazeAid organisation, an organisation that has become highly recognised and valued for their work around Australia. The organisation was created soon after the 2009 fires but was facing the usual challenging issues of a start-up. Establishing an NPO focused on tackling a particular post-disaster need faces the same issues of any other new start up. Ignorance of how to do it, what is needed, regulations, insurance and certifications required, handling donated funds, all can lead to the collapse of the start-up, regardless of how wonderful the mission.

Rotary Clubs, Lions Clubs, other Service Clubs offer a framework and legitimate business structure under which start ups can be cultivated, educated in what is needed and protected within an insured entity. Rotary Clubs were able to manage funds, establish appropriate financial rigor and get the organisation firmly established.

'...after our big bush fires up here, I set up an arrangement with BlazeAid to be (Rotary) the banker and manage the assets....Rotary has the opportunity as an incorporated body to collect funds and to manage funds from the public and that is a very important aspect, strength...' (Colin – Rotarian)

BlazeAid is a nonprofit, volunteer-based organisation established by Kevin and Rhonda Butler at their woolshed in February 2009.

BlazeAid volunteers help after floods and fires by working with rural families to rebuild or replace fences/structures. Since establishment, BlazeAid has contributed 117,698 volunteer days to clear 8,821 km of fences and rebuild 7,053 km of fences, on over 4,100 properties around Australia. The organisation has training days, information on preparation and has itself established 'BlazeAlert' a farmer network. BlazeAlert aims to be a network of local, well prepared farmers helping other local farmers so if a fire were to start, they could hold its spread until fire services arrive (BlazeAid, 2018).

Helping to incubate and guide these organisations in their infancy, gave the organisations the opportunity to grow to be self-sustaining. So not only do Rotary Clubs contribute to the social capital of their area themselves, they are also building that social capital by helping to grow these highly valuable community organisations. Men's Sheds help the well-being of their members. BlazeAid quickly enables farmers to rebuild their livelihoods. Both these organisations contribute to their community's resilience. Hence these actions by Rotary Clubs have built the community resilience of their region, or in the case of BlazeAid in areas where farmers have experienced natural disaster.

Rotary Club members gave examples of actions that were outside the Emergency Management type of brief but appeared so impactful for psychosocial support. 'Colin' (a Rotarian) had an orchard and took around a bag of apples when he checked on the neighbours. A landscaper from Queensland brought a packet of biscuits when he approached people about helping to salvage what they could from their gardens. The importance to survivors of the fires, of building bird nesting boxes for the local wildlife.

These are some of the actions the local NPOs accomplished. Rotary Club actions are included in Table 7.6, which summarises NPO actions identified during the case study interviews, before, during or after a disaster. The following Chapter segment describes

barriers and enablers faced by Australian Rotary members while trying to help around disasters.

7.5.4 Rotary Clubs Barriers and Enablers to Actions

Communication was seen to be the *'key to every bloody thing'* (Greg – Rotarian). So, lack of communication, or poor communication was a barrier to effective action. The Rotary Clubs' interviews brought home the frustrations of when local knowledge wasn't listened to. There were locals who knew the hills so they would not roll their graders, but local recommendations were not listened to and people from outside the area were used, at what locals considered, higher risk.

In other cases, collaborations were avoided because of the difficulties in working with particular organisations. In another example, privacy laws which didn't enable identification of properties, were raised as a significant barrier to identifying where people were. Consequently, the control centre was not able to advise them on the directions to safety during the fires. This barrier was overcome when a long-term local brought in an 'outdated' map of the area, that listed all local properties. This map was then used to help guide people to safety.

The following table, Table 7.3, lists barriers and enablers noted during Rotary interviews. Column 1 lists the barriers identified in the scoping literature review, column 2 highlights some of the barriers faced by Rotarians in their efforts to help during or after a disaster. In their own words, quotes from the Rotary interviews are taken to illustrate particular barriers. Column 3 provides the enablers that were identified in the interviews that were thought to help overcome the barriers to actions. Again, this column presents direct quotes from interviews of Rotarians as they discussed the issues facing Rotary actions in a disaster setting.

Table 7. 3: Barriers and Enablers to Rotary Clubs' Actions

BARRIERS IDENTIFIED FROM SCOPING STUDY	BARRIERS IDENTIFIED IN ROTARY INTERVIEWS	ENABLERS IDENTIFIED IN INTERVIEWS TO HELP OVERCOME BARRIERS
<p>Structural Weak integration or conflict between local NPOs and EM due to: Geography Culture Structure of EM 'command and control' Government agencies dictate actions, not authentic collaborations, Lack of common norms</p>	<p>'..I was in the bushfire Incident Control Centre for CFA for 5 days...'</p> <p>'I had difficulty getting these people to recognise that some of the people that I recommended, some of our own people who were known to me who were very good grader drivers, bulldozer drivers were capable people, and they should be allowed to be able to operate the machinery. But they insisted on getting in outside people that they knew. I'd said no this guy knows those hills better than anyone and can get his grader over them, and he won't tip his grader over. There were a few problems.'</p> <p>'too many agencies think they own the fire and don't want to work with the others. I am a collaborative person but there are people out there ...we wouldn't even talk to them - bugger you we are working together, but it's about my Territory'</p> <p>'..we have found our local government will have said.."ok we are going to have certain people who are going to help with disaster recovery" and they appoint people within their staff....they might come out 3-4 days later... "actually we can't help until we've seen the extent of the disaster".... It really upsets people to think that someone says they were going to help and they are about, but they don't help'</p> <p>'..some say they (LGV) will only work until 5pm'</p> <p>'it was a Saturday! there was no one there to ask'</p>	<p>'..it is not high on the list of what people think about ...who are responders...but we need to listen and have a better understanding of what the people's needs are.'</p> <p>'I had the opportunity with Victoria Police ...they developed a police mentoring scheme ...help police connect within the communities.. and that also involved working on disaster plans'</p> <p>Being 'at the table' 'local council ...we worked well with. They were all part of it because we were on that same committee. That gave us the opportunity to work in more strongly with the local council'</p> <p>'It's improved but you need to have locals.'</p>
<p>Non-recognition of NPOs Lack of role definition Little operational guidance regarding NPO involvement</p>	<p>'our Rotary is not seen as a first responder. Many of our members will be members of the CFA and SES.'</p>	<p>Be at the table, from the start</p> <p>Have pre-disaster connections</p>

	<p>‘.. there’s not much recognition and there’s not much learning over time and that’s a shame because we do have to keep learning from what does come before.’</p> <p>‘Police road blocks that were in the charge of junior officers who knew little of the community and local geography were used to deny access to capable residents and farmers. In most cases they were they were trying to get both in and out to obtain, supplies of fuel for pumps and water and feed for penned up animals.’</p>	<p>‘it was that we knew from a Rotary perspective, we knew. The local Rotary Club knew and across the district knew, how we could engage’</p> <p>‘The Disaster occurred, and it immediately impacts on the local community’</p>
<p>Lack of NPO resources Reliance on volunteers Unfunded mandate Difficulties managing volunteer surge/donations</p>	<p>‘... people sending things that are not requested. Truck-loads of clothes ... people had to know what people's needs are, ...don't send anything unless it is asked for. Because you've got resources that are scant. and you have to use them wisely. They are not there to unload trucks and no time to itemized things.’</p> <p>Government agencies tended to finish after about 2 years.’</p>	<p>‘With our funds we dealt with our fire needs as they come on board, but they were coming on board over 9 years. We have been identifying these needs for 9 years and they didn't all come out at once.’</p>
<p>Lack of Trust Government inflexible due to accountability requirements</p> <p>Government not trust NPOs can be held accountable</p> <p>Lack of trust between stakeholders</p>	<p>Privacy laws - ‘..one of the greatest barriers right from the start when I was in incident control and I was the only local in there at one stage. I would hear phone calls from people trapped in cars, they didn’t know where they were and other people didn’t know where they were. What I brought in was my old CFA map book which was printed before the privacy laws came in. which meant that we had property names and names and where they lived in those areas. they don’t have it anymore. I would be able to pick up where people were because of what they were saying etc. now it is so wrong that we have lost that capability ..I know that the GPS is 108 m out but as far as locating people where people are I mean it's pretty sad stuff so you had to be useful. so I think the one that I used was a 2002 version of the roads were still the same, the people was still the same, and the farms were the same people would know whose place they would near or something.’</p> <p>‘..very close knit communities ...they “looked after their own” sort of thinking ...an outsider had to be very sensitive to the situation... when people are living through that whole trauma’.</p>	<p>‘Rotary has the opportunity as an incorporated body to collect funds and manage funds from the public’</p> <p>‘we have capability plans and we have insurance’</p> <p>‘we have working with children checks’</p> <p>Rotary are part of the community, trusted.</p>

Poor communication	'communication is the key to every bloody thing'. Poor advice	
Lack of coordination between NPOs Absence of leadership in NPO/community sector	'the first day people came in to feed the firefighters say it was the Red Cross or the Salvos and this woman took umbrage at the fact that there were locals bringing in food including the butcher and she wouldn't accept it because it wasn't made in one of their Kitchens. So it was thrown in the dumpster and it rotted. Almost caused a riot. And the food they were handing out at the time was a bit like airline packs. It was insufficient for the firefighters who had a hell of a time out there.'	'..we work a lot with Lions. We ensure that if Lions were handing out things and we were handing out things then we wouldn't be handing out to the same people. We work together and we know what each other was doing.' 'we work with the Wesley, Lifeline, Lions, Men's Shed, Blaze Aid, Ballarat TAFE, Rotary has clubs and everybody has a District Governor who is responsible for the management of the district. 'we know we need to always liaise with other agencies to ensure our efforts are not inappropriately duplicated, over supplied'
Lack of EM Training Inexperience with incident command structure, Lack understanding of legislation.	Maps used did not have detail required. 'vouchers we found with one town where a truckload of groceries was sent up to the town to help people. I went crook, and others went crook. 'Don't do that because we want the community to survive'.	Get money for vouchers. for the IGA or whatever so they can only be used in that situation and you don't send the IGA broke and ruin a community. I think they have learnt from this'
Lack of Government Resources	'...And a lot of our Council employees in the Council then and I suppose now, they didn't even live in the district and that's a problem with some of the sort of Fringe areas that we're in now'	
Vulnerability during disaster		

Source: Scoping Literature Review, interviews with Rotary

Table 7.3: Barriers and Enablers to Rotary Clubs' Actions highlighted some of the frustrations felt by NPO members when they could not adequately get their knowledge of the area and community across to EM stakeholders. Barriers identified from all stakeholder interviews were summarised in section 7.7.3 Barriers and Enablers to Australian Nonprofit Organisation Actions and in Chapter 9. The next section provides an overview of the third NPO analysed in this thesis, Neighbourhood Houses Victoria.

7.6 Neighbourhood Houses Victoria Case Study

7.6.1 Neighbourhood Houses Background and Mission

The peak body of Community Houses or Neighbourhood Houses is the Australian Neighbourhood Houses and Centres Association [ANHCA]. Individual centres may be called Neighbourhood Houses, Community Houses, Learning Centres or Community Centres, and these are members of their territory or state representative bodies.

Centres are locally run organisations, that aim to facilitate communities to tackle the needs of their particular community. What the organisation does is highly variable, but is driven by a mission to unite communities, to bring people together through learning, through recreational activities and through contributing and supporting their community (NHV, 2017). This broad mission works within a community development framework where individuals and communities are empowered to do for themselves (NHV, 2018a). Principles underpinning the organisation include:

- Community Ownership, with local volunteer members having ownership over decision making.
- Inclusive, fair and equitable Community Participation.
- Empowerment to control own lives, to meet their own needs and aspirations.
- Try to redress structural social disadvantage through fairer distribution of resources.
- Life Long Learning and building resilience.

-
- Networking, connections, alliances and collaboration between people and other stakeholders.
 - To advocate on behalf of community members.
 - Share information, knowledge, skills and life experience.
 - Collective action to transform relationships in community (NHV, 2018a).

Neighbourhood Houses Victoria see community houses as natural places to stage community resilience activities, including community resilience to disasters (NHV, 2017). In 2017 19% of Victorian neighbourhood houses ran a formal activity around disaster emergency preparedness, recovery or resilience (NHV, 2018c). NHVs run programs for vulnerable people in their community, for example: life skills, and provides support and inclusion for those with a disability or in crisis (Deloitte Access Economics, 2018).

7.6.2 Neighbourhood Houses Victoria Structure and Strengths

7.6.2.1 *Linkages Within and Across Neighbourhood Houses Victoria*

There are 1000 neighbourhood houses or centres in Australia, run by 21,300 volunteers and providing services to more than 320,000 people (ANHCA, 2017).


Neighbourhood Houses Victoria provides governance, advice and representation to over 400 centres around Victoria, with at least one centre in every State electorate (NHV, 2018a). NHVs are clustered into 16 networks, which link them at a region level (NHV, 2018a). Networks vary in geographic spread and the number of houses comprising it. The largest network covers an area of 40,049km² in the Mallee, the smallest 229.5km² in Melbourne.

7.6.2.2 *Neighbourhood Houses Victoria Networks Across Victoria*

Figure 7.9: Victorian Neighbourhood House Locations illustrates the location of Neighbourhood House Victoria houses (NHVs) in Victoria and portrays the networking ability, and access across the state of this organisation. Each NHV is part of a network of

houses, with the networks helping with management and governance advice. The network structure also acts as a conduit between the grassroots houses on the ground and what is happening there, and the peak body, and the peak body back down to the grassroots. Where issues have broader applications, such as in the case of disaster risk reduction actions, the networks enable collaboration and testing and transferring of ideas. For example: ‘DON’T PANIC’ was a program developed within a network, that is now shared across Victoria.

Figure 7. 9: Victorian Neighbourhood House Locations



Source: NHV, 2018b

The network structure also encourages communication between NHVs within a region. Where one NHV has had to deal with a disaster in its community, the other regional NHVs not yet impacted learn for their experiences. This encourages other NHVs to undertake disaster risk reduction practices.


7.6.2.3 NHV Networks Within their Local Community.

‘Disaster risk reduction requires an all-of-society engagement and partnership. It also requires empowerment and inclusive, accessible and non-discriminatory participation, paying special attention to people disproportionately affected by disasters, especially the poorest. A gender, age, disability and cultural perspective should be integrated in all policies and practices, and women and youth leadership should be promoted. In this context, special attention should be paid to the improvemen

t of organized voluntary work of citizens’ (UNISDR, 2015b, p. 12)

Grassroots NHVs have strong connections within their local community. Figure 7.10 illustrates the connections mentioned during interviews.

Figure 7. 10: NHV Grassroot Connections



Source: Generated by author from interviews

NHVs often run programs to help the most vulnerable in their community (NHV, 2017) and provide a safe place where they can spend time. As such, they have connections and knowledge of these people, and often those most vulnerable know and trust NHVs.

From the case study analysis strengths of NHVs identified were:

- Knowledge and trust of their community.
- Understanding and access to community's most vulnerable groups/individuals.
- Access to a diverse range of people, who may not otherwise be connected.
- Community connections, linkages.
- Cost effective, able to find creative solutions to problems and develop community capacity.
- Ability to galvanise community to participate, achieve, and tackle disaster risk reduction actions.
- Lobby, advocate, give the community a voice and a platform to be heard.

These aspects are summarised from the case studies in Table 7.5, Chapter 7.7.1, and are investigated more fully in Chapter 9 Synthesis of Findings.

7.6.3 Neighbourhood Houses Victoria Actions

7.6.3.1 *Neighbourhood Houses Victoria Actions Within Victoria*

In an average week 190,520 Victorians visit a Victorian Neighbourhood House. Neighbourhood Houses helped over 3,916 community groups by letting them to use their rooms and in other ways supported another 2,449 Victorian community groups. In 2017 6,654 volunteers contributed an average 71 hours per week, per Neighbourhood House. This is the financial equivalent of over \$27.7 million. Neighbourhood Houses also participated in 3,539 partnerships per month during 2017 (NHV, 2018a).

7.6.3.2 *Neighbourhood Houses Victoria Actions Around Disasters*

7.6.3.2.1 Exemplar - We Find Ways to Keep Going - Engaging the Community

Region 3, like many around the fire zone, has limited road access and one main road going down to the city of Melbourne, where a significant proportion of the population commute to jobs each day. This creates challenges to ensure the community is connected and greater risks of isolation if a disaster were to occur. According to the Sendai Disaster Risk Reduction Framework, the community needs to be engaged to identify the risks facing them (UNISDR, 2018). An engaged community is one where members work together building community resilience capacity (AIDR, 2013). This is an example of a highly engaged community that works with their local Community House. Learning lessons from the 2009 bushfires, the Community House has established a Café that is run regularly to offer a free meal to their community and training for mass food preparation, community dining.

‘So, we try to learn those lessons from King Lake. What are they doing, feeding people on mass, how do you do that successfully? So, we should practice community dining. We should practice relationships with Woolworths’ (Sue – NHV)

Much of the disaster recovery research emphasises that successful recovery requires engaged and empowered communities that lead actions (AIDR, 2018). This NHV demonstrates an example of this through establishing and running a community market.

‘We run the market, startedwith 25 stalls really small.... and now the market is...80 stalls largest market in the Dandong’s.’ ‘It’s giving power to women and small micro businesses to get money to earn and they spend it back here, so they’re building this economic resilience.’ (Sue – NHV).

An example of this NPO reducing risks of the community, is through organising workshops and information sessions on regional disaster risks to raise risk awareness and to discuss

means to address them. The example also demonstrates an NPO tackling a communication issue; programming more time in the session for community discussion and two-way conversation.

'We are putting together an advisory forum, calling it 'Weather wise'...it involves the (VIC)SES, CFA, Council. To... speak about what it is that they do, what are their responsibilities and what the community should be doing. Then the community gets to ask questions and talk about things – we never get to ask questions in these things, just listen.... We had this guy come along to one of the meetings...(to) explain... this is why we have to close a road. Can't let people in because it's not safe and here's why it's not safe... Then we try to tell him that when the road's closed and their kids are up here, they panic. Let people say why I have a problem with that, and I need you to help me and how do we get around that.' (Sue – NHV).

Parents using the childcare centre have to notify the centre of who is going to be responsible for their child in the event the place has to be evacuated. Parents give a commitment that these people are available within 30 minutes of being rung (ECH, 2017c), and hence are forced to think through strategies of coping if a disaster were to occur and they were over an hour away, 'off the mountain' at jobs in the city.

'... parents had to go to a bushfire planning workshop (to qualify) for (entry into our) childcare (centre). Nudging this group to be a little bit more prepared along the way. It's not making them join the CFA. Just getting them to think...to pay attention more during the week before events because it's going to affect child care and my ability to go to work.' (Sue – NHV).

Recognising that the ability to 'keep going' often means identifying alternative means to do things, redundancy of key assets is important for resilience (COAG, 2011; OveArup and Partners, 2014; Thornley et al., 2014; Mayunga, 2007), the Community House is building

redundancy in power supply though installing solar power and having their own backup generators (Sue - NHV).

'We applied for a grant to put solar on our hall. It wasn't just so that the hall could run off grid, it is so that we can keep going. (if power goes out)'
(Sue – NHV).

'We need to keep running the childcare, trying to keep the food going. Those basic Maslow's needs. Staff need to keep working. Child care is really important up here, if talking about the disaster lens, parents need to go back their property and clean up, need a place for the kids to go and my staff need to work because they may not be affected.' (Sue – NHV).

'You find a way to keep going. You work on battery backup off computers. It's about keeping going. We run those scenarios here and work it through.' (Sue – NHV).

This NHV is identifying disaster risks, raising awareness and either working to reduce those risks or to prepare in case they happen. The NHV is also a strong community communication hub that empowers and enables community members to participate, be included and connected.

7.6.3.2.2 Exemplar - Trusted, Empowering, A People's Place

Morwell has a relatively high proportion of more vulnerable people than Victoria as a whole; with medium household incomes lower than average Victorian households, an aging population, twice the Victorian average of people needing disability assistance and poorer health outcomes (Hazelwood Mine Inquiry, 2014). Those with socio-economic disadvantages have fewer resources and hence faced greater impacts from the emergency (VCOSS, 2015).

During the mine fire communication was a significant issue. The Hazelwood Mine Inquiry found information was not provided quickly enough to address residents' concerns, nor was practical advice given on how to deal with the ash and smoke (Hazelwood Mine Inquiry, 2014). There were confusing, contradictory messages and community 'disengagement' (Hazelwood Mine Inquiry 2014).

'Communication was largely one-way with information being transmitted, but not received or understood by the intended recipients. An over-reliance on digital technology, particularly early on, hindered the message reaching all community members. Empathy was also often lacking, particularly from some government spokespeople' (Hazelwood Mine Inquiry, 2014, p. 28).

However, the area has strong community networks, with the local Neighbourhood House already having established trusted, networks through their programs supporting and enabling vulnerable groups. The NHV worked hard throughout and after the event for their community and getting recognition as a communication hub (Hazelwood Mine Inquiry, 2014).

Many residents did not believe they had adequate, reliable information from government bodies (Whyte, 2017). They did not trust the authorities who they believed had abandoned them. The Neighbourhood House had links with the CFA that enabled greater information, from the start of the incident, than was being received from the media.

'I was lucky I had that link (to the CFA). I had information coming to me, that was very different from what the media was getting' (Jane - NHV).

These linkages and information led to further conversations. As concerns rose about health issues no one was talking about, the NHV's committee decided to run an information evening. The NHV used their community networks, phone trees, family, sports clubs,

letterbox drops, Facebook, their social capital, to spread the message there was to be an information evening at the Neighbourhood House.

'I rang them... They rang those in their phone books, we letterbox dropped where we could. But it was so toxic, too toxic to be out for too long at a time. So, we used what we had, and that phone tree is fantastic, and all had linkages with family, sports clubs... and we were able to get messages out. Not right across the 14000 but we were able to galvanise a bit of 'we think there is something going on' (Jane – NHV).

What started as one information session turned into one session a week, for six weeks. Health experts and emergency management representatives attended. These meetings gave the concerned community a platform from which to ask questions about what was worrying them. The NHV enabled the community to have a voice.

'We recorded... information sessions, one a week... recording them allowed us to review them later.... we ... provided a platform for stakeholders to talk about it... we started seeing the community asking more questions, more direct questions, harder questions. And they didn't want to know what was on the printed sheet 'we are not interested in that, we want to know what is happening about the smoke, what are the health impacts?'... so, we could see people becoming more vocal and change in the community, and I think it was because we gave them a platform and you could see it was going across the Valley' (Jane – NHV).

Of concern were the health impacts of breathing in smoke for days. Unfortunately, the general response was 'we don't know'. The Neighbourhood House started to document anonymous health symptoms that were being mentioned and where they were occurring.

'We captured raw material from the community...we clearly understood that the health impacts were the major things...can (you) tell us what the health impacts are going to be? And nobody could – 'we've got no data...we don't know what is in it'. Immediately we were addressing that problem'
(Jane – NHV)

'...whenever anyone mentioned to us about asthma etc... we documented symptoms against location...We were able to map it out'. (Jane – NHV)

The community identified the risk (smoke inhalation) and were empowered by the NHV to try to address the symptoms. Very quickly the NHV got masks to the community.

'while they were trying to figure out what to do, we had masks on the ground. Then they got masks' (Jane – NHV)

'...it came (a Petition) from the House. We got 25,000 signatures' (Jane – NHV).

With an unfunded mandate, the Neighbourhood House became a trusted communication and community hub.

'...trying to be a communication hub but was not given financial assistance to do that.... Transferring the information was easy. The hard thing was the information itself. We were trying to send out 'things that you can do today', constructive things.' (Jane – NHV).

'...There was a lot of talk about health studies and no one could get a straight answer. So, when they (Getup) rang me and their focus was 'what are the long-term health effects and how are you going to know', that is

when I spoke to them. And we did a great little video with them.’ (Jane – NHV).

They were able to translate government speak into community speak and vice versa; enhancing two-way communication.

‘...what we do really, really well, and that is having those connections with community and it is being the community speak to government speak, and government speak to community speak. We can translate that – and so working with us is to the benefit of everybody.’ (Jane – NHV)

Actions by the local Neighbourhood House engaged the community in conversations, NHV was a trusted source of information throughout the emergency and during recovery, and the NPO empowered local residents to work with them to achieve outcomes (Whyte, 2017).

‘We talk about NH as a ‘people’s place’. We have a food bank, we have a community development model that we work together to come up with solutions. Big things that build community capacity, that address social isolation, that address inequality or whatever that may be, and we are at the forefront of that conversation all the time in this community.’ (Jane – NHV).

With these actions, this local NPO is supporting their most vulnerable community members and building their community’s resilience.

7.6.3.2.3 Exemplar - Keep People Travelling Along Alright

The local NHV was not too badly impacted by the flood. Its manager lobbied emergency services on behalf of local businesses to get at least some of the emergency services representatives moved into the NHV. It was centrally located and better able to service the

business community, to better get the businesses back running and hence help the rest of the town.

'The Shire established an emergency services hub. They had Centrelink, insurance, all the emergency IT support services... They were all there at one location,.. on the way out of town because that building wasn't impacted by the floods. But we kept saying to them that the business owners can't be there, where people were standing in line for hours to see people ...you need to get some of these people into the Community House. Businesses can't take 4 hours to stand in line and leave their businesses, they need to go and do what they need to do... to get up and going again.... We kind of stepped on a few toes and I did tell a couple of the people at the Shire what I thought of them... sometimes you have to go outside the box in order to get the job done. So, we did get people and support providers at the House which is in the CBD area. The fact that the businesses were able to do what they needed to do and then duck back within half an hour was much easier for them. Getting the businesses back on track, it's a good platform for the rest of the town.' (Sonya - NHV).

Emergency support services remained for around the first three weeks. The rural area however had people impacted who could not make it in until later. The NHV had to channel these people to the appropriate contacts within organisations.

'We quite literally were open every day because we had people coming in that haven't had any calls from anyone and didn't know what to do or ...whether they were eligible to receive anything... being in a rural area it wasn't just the town that was impacted, it was also the outer lying areas.... people hadn't been into town because they were fixing their own properties... then they had to see people... The support providers moved into the NHV and it was only within the first week that they said 'well here

you go, you guys can take on the volunteers' and ... funnelled everything through the House.' (Sonya - NHV).

The NHV became the organiser and coordinator of volunteers, with an unfunded mandate. There were corporate volunteers and spontaneous volunteers. They also became the manager of donations, establishing a partnership with the local hospital to effectively coordinate and distribute monetary donations.

'People wanted to donate money to the community, so as well as having corporate volunteers coming, as well as people just coming and wanting to be involved in helping.... We did have groups that wanted to donate money. We created a partnership with the hospital to get gift deductibility status. It was a bit of a learning curve because I hadn't dealt with philanthropic organisations before, we were all flying blind' Sonya-NHV).

Lions Clubs worked with NHV to distribute \$20,000 from the Lions Foundation.

'from memory \$20,000 from the Lions Foundation was given to our ...Lions Club. I worked with...who was working through Community House, and that money went to about 10 different families who were probably the worst affected.... That was a real privilege to go around and, not a privilege to see the tears, but it was a privilege to see the gratitude of those people when they receive that help' (John - Lions)

The community identified a risk, after the floods, of termites. There was funding available to residents, coordinated through the Committee including an NHV representative.

'One of our most pressing issues was termites. They may have had termite protection in the past, but it all got washed away. So, we made an application to apply for funding to go towards that. There was myself, a

person from the hospital and one of the Committee of Management. We would ..go through everything to make sure that people were eligible. We wouldn't just give them the cash, they had to provide us with the invoice with the termite work from the actual pest controller'(Sonya–NHV).

The NPOs coordinated donated goods and services.

'We were donated quite a lot of carpet. One of the guys ...knew a carpet place that said 'we've got all this carpet and we want to donate it'. So that was stored at the Community House and ... this lovely guy from Melbourne came up and brought underlay with them. People just had to buy the underlay. They carpeted heaps of houses around the area' (Sonya–NHV).

The NHV worked with Lions Clubs and Rotary Clubs organising events to help community well-being and mental health, often at no charge to participants.

'So, we did do quite a lot of work with the Lions Club and Rotary... We did quite a few events. We had a pamper evening. (we, NHV and Rotary) did this amazing event where we had crowds of people. The Lions Club did a sausage sizzle at no charge ...it was just a great night. We had a male practitioner come up so we linked a bloke's information night/mental health night. The wives just came along as well and had a fun time. We also did a massive night where we had about 300 people come to wear a touch of purple evening... it was a really big successful night again no charge' (Sonya – NHV).

'we tried to do intermittent events at little or no charge will low cut low cost or free to keep people travelling along alright.'

'I think for us it's really basic things. You know looking out for one another, making sure that people are talking to each other.... and we are lucky in that we are a single community and we will quite often say 'I haven't seen someone for a while' and so we will look them up and just touch base with them.' (Sonya – NHV).

Another example of the NHV identifying a community need and working to address it was when there wasn't ready access to the local tip.

'At the time our tip was only open 3 half days a week. I lobbied and lobbied the Shire and kept hassling them and annoying them. 'You need to have that open every day of the week'. When I got that phone call that said 'yes, it is going to be open 7 days a week for the next 3 weeks' that was fantastic.' (Sonya – NHV).

NHV actions identified in the case study interviews are included in Table 7.6: Actions of Australian Nonprofit Organisations; which summarises the actions of all NPOs interviewed, before, during or after a disaster.

7.6.4 Neighbourhood Houses Victoria Barriers and Enablers to Actions

Interviews with local NHVs within disaster impacted areas, and with head office representatives, identified a range of barriers to NHV action in this area. Disaster resilience is just one important aspect of a community that an NHV could be focused on. Currently there are little or no funds allocated to this area. However, where a disaster occurs, NHVs have experienced being expected to fill the gaps in service provision. Hence there was strong recognition of an unfunded mandate by NHV representatives.

Table 7. 4: Barriers and Enablers to Neighbourhood Houses Actions

BARRIERS IDENTIFIED FROM SCOPING STUDY	BARRIERS IDENTIFIED IN NHV INTERVIEWS	ENABLERS IDENTIFIED IN INTERVIEWS TO HELP OVERCOME BARRIERS
<p>Structural Weak integration or conflict between local NPOs and EM due to: Geography Culture Structure of EM ‘command and control’ Government agencies dictate actions, not authentic collaborations, Lack of common norms</p>	<p>‘we weren’t allowed into the area. So, we couldn’t check on how things were.’ (Carol – NHV)</p> <p>The frustration for NH is that we are expected to do that, but they aren’t and I don’t just mean the Council. I mean look at all the stakeholders who whizzed down here, talked at us, gave us all their handouts and whizzed back. They thought they were giving out amazing flyers and we would believe them, and that they had somehow earned the right to tell us what to do. And yet us nonprofits working on the ground, we collected the data and gave it to them, and that was like ‘oh thanks for that information’ and it went into an abyss somewhere. What did they do with it? Why do we have to earn this right to pass on information, but you don’t. And why should we pass on your information? Where is it going?’ (Jane – NHV)</p> <p>‘...no two-way flow of information. There was no evidence of them using the information we gave them. Found it incredibly frustrating that we knew far better than any of them what was going on, on the ground, but they weren’t listening to us. They would provide flyers each session, but we had to say don’t bring them, stop cutting down trees, no one is taking them, they were useless.’ (Jane – NHV)</p> <p>‘.. nobody had any idea what sort of flood was coming until it had arrived. There were people back at town (20km away) ... ringing up the night before saying this is one of the biggest floods coming. Nobody (the authorities) was taking any notice’</p> <p>‘...I was politely told by the local council that that wasn’t my role. Thankyou but no thank you.’ (Jane – NHV).</p> <p>‘there was certainly talk about territory, about their patch and I certainly felt that early in the piece (stakeholders’ territorial).’ (Barbara – NHV).</p>	<p>‘we’ve asked the government for wristbands or some kind of authorization that says I can get in. We’re going to be closed, but soon as it is almost safe. You want to be here setting up so that when it is safe, we can be on the ground with the childcare operating, with food.’ (Sue – NHV).</p> <p>‘What that means is that the Neighbourhood House has to be seen as having value to the Government in the resilience space, for this kind of work. They also have to be seen as having the political will not to be pushed around, that they would create noise if their funding were cut.’ (Sue – NHV)</p> <p>‘However, going back, I would never had called the Council I just would have opened it....’ (Jane – NHV).</p> <p>‘..If we had our time again, we would have a meeting of all the groups and support agencies a lot sooner and would have everyone together...’ (Sonya – NHV).</p>

	<p>'lack of communication between organisations or service providers ...that struck me as I started to go to meetings. They were very much thinking about their own structures and how they work rather than how they could work together. that's just probably in the beginning, but it was one of the biggest barriers (Barbara – NHV)</p>	
<p>Non-recognition of NPOs</p>	<p>'No, the Service Clubs were not included, they were not there' (Barbara – NHV)</p> <p>'The people in the local Brigade don't know what we really do.' (Sue – NHV).</p> <p>'NHV do talk with local government about NHV role. However various local governments have various understandings of NHs, various abilities to understand and willingness to understand or be engaged with NHV and their local houses'</p> <p>'And I would say generally there that nonprofits are undervalued for what they can do and that there is not a lot of understanding or awareness about how they can spring up and what they can do.' (Jane – NHV).</p>	<p>Education: 'The people in the local Brigade don't know what we really do, so our role is also about educating them about what a Neighbourhood House does.' (Sue – NHV).</p>
<p>Lack of NPO resources</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Financial - Time - Staff 	<p>'NH was trying to be a communication hub but was not given financial assistance to do that.' (Jane – NHV)</p> <p>'Little to no support, actually no support, and we got the door slammed in our faces a number of times (particularly the Local Council)' (Jane – NHV).</p> <p>'We have done stuff with Men's' Shed, Rotary, Lions. I know what they are doing, but can I physically get to their meetings. Near impossible. But if we had another team member, that is something I would like to strengthen. So, barrier is lack of time.' (Jane – NHV)</p> <p>'Nobody actually put up their hand and said use Neighbourhood House. They ...rang us and said we are coming. Yes, that is one thing I do remember very well' (Barbara – NHV)</p> <p>'They (government representatives) come and they expect us to sell their goods. You know whatever their program is, it gets funded to have somebody head it up at ...government level ...They come it's okay, but there is no money in it for the local Neighbourhood Houses, but you are expected to support it'. (Sue – NHV).</p>	<p>'We get various little grants along the way, but that is one of the key things going forward. We have AGM soon and key focus is how to expand our income? We have grown this far on nothing, and how do we go forward? Alternative income streams would be useful.' (Jane – NHV)</p>
<p>Unfunded mandate</p>		

	<p>‘There is an assumption of a role for NHV (transfer the government body’s information), but no financial support to do this’</p> <p>‘...there is an expectation from the State government that NHV will step up into these roles, but we are asked to go to more and more things, but it is not paid for. I was at an EM community participation forum a couple of months ago. Sitting with VCOSS, other big players, and I thought – ‘I am the only one who has to pay for this’...’we do it, and we don’t get paid to...’. It is still there, these expectations.’ (Jane – NHV).</p> <p>‘The support providers moved into the Neighbourhood House and ...they said ‘well here you go, you guys can take on the volunteers’ but we weren’t getting any money for it. And then they dwindled off with their support and funnelled everything through the House.’ (Sonya - NHV).</p>	
<p>Lack of Trust Government inflexible due to accountability requirements</p>	<p>‘one of the things that I achieved was at the time our tip was only open 3 half days a week. I lobbied and lobbied and lobbied the Shire and kept hassling them and annoying them. ‘You need to have that open every day of the week’. And so, when I got that phone call that said ‘yes, it is going to be open 7 days a week for the next 3 weeks’ that was fantastic....at the time it was a need that we needed that wasn’t being met’. Argument for not doing it - had to pay wages’ (Sonya – NHV).</p> <p>‘..because of the Privacy Act we weren't able to share information... I can remember going through this little old lady’s unit that had been flooded....a couple of weeks later (after the flood) and she was still walking around on wet carpet. It wasn't good.... she didn't know that she could get support. I remember walking in and the smell and thinking how could this have happened? How is it that this person who has lived in the middle of town could be missed like this?’ (Sonya – NHV)</p>	
<p>Poor Communication. Language Barriers</p>	<p>‘NH was trying to be a communication hub ...The hard thing was the information itself. We were trying to send out ‘things that you can do today’, constructive things (Jane – NHV).</p> <p>‘NHV do talk with local government about NHV role. However various local governments have various understandings of NHs, various abilities to understand and willingness to understand or be engaged with NHV and their local houses’</p>	<p>‘you take those things into consideration whenever you're doing anything. Speak their language. That is what we have learnt, Keep on Message, Hold the Line.’ (Sue – NHV).</p>

	‘And I would say generally that nonprofits are undervalued for what they can do and that there is not a lot of understanding or awareness about...what they can do.’	
Lack of coordination By government	‘we were able to meet on a weekly basis first up to see what could be done... and I remember feeling ... that they were rather disjointed but I thought that this was probably because they had their own agendas and they hadn't had to work in a disaster situation together - this was the local ones’ (Barbara – NHV)	‘We do quite a bit with Lions and Rotary’ (Sonya NHV).
Lack of EM Training	‘There was a lot of discussion about who was actually in charge’ (SES or local Council) (Sonya – NHV).	
Lack of Government Resources	‘..the outside support services ...lasted just four weeks...’ (Sonya – NHV).	
Vulnerability during disaster	<p>Because the (Neighbourhood) house was not damaged, we were able to help’ (Barbara – NHV)</p> <p>‘Those of the community not impacted, they can help bring everyone up, but here everyone was impacted. Then if you look at the CSIRO modelling, they were impacted across the entire Valley.’ (Jane – NHV).</p>	‘21 st Feb. smoke was just toxic, I had a really dizzy head, and I felt like we had just reached a peak. I had had a really bad weekend. CFA ... touched base with me. And I said I couldn’t deal with it anymore – they actually pep talked me through it. They said ‘you just have to keep doing it. We are going to come down, we will be there, what do you need? Sausages? Tomato sauce? What do you need?’. They got me back on the road, so we came back.’ (Jane – NHV)

Source: Scoping Literature Review, interviews

As the table above highlights, lack of resources including funding, time and staff, were seen as a significant barrier to greater involvement in this area. With limited staff and a wide-ranging mission, the lack of time to make connections and improve linkages with other NPOs tied in with this. NHVs felt there was little understanding of what they as an organisation did by EM representatives; and that what they did was undervalued.

7.7 Discussion

7.7.1 Strengths of Nonprofit Organisations

As part of the case study interviews, NPO representatives were asked to list the main strengths of their organisation and to give examples, to discover whether the Australian NPOs' strengths fit with those identified in the literature. Table 7.5: Australian NPO Strengths Identified from the Case Studies, demonstrated through actions or mentioned by stakeholders, summarises the case results, and highlights the strengths identified from NHV, Lions Clubs (L) and Rotary Clubs (R) representatives.

The interviews quickly achieved saturation with respect to key NPO strengths; with little new information on NPO strengths emerging from the interviews conducted. When the other questions also reached saturation, with negligible new information becoming apparent, recruiting for other NPO representatives was stopped (Bryman, 2016; Saunders, Sim, Kingstone, Baker, Waterfield, Bartlam, Burroughs and Jinks, 2018). It was surprising that saturation was achieved so quickly; however, all those interviewed quickly identified community connections, local knowledge, and trust of the community as NPO strengths.

Fundamentally the aspects recognized as the most important strengths in the international literature, community connections, networks and access to diverse populations and vulnerable people, and local knowledge were recognised by every Australian NPO stakeholder interviewed.

AUSTRALIAN NPO STRENGTHS IDENTIFIED FROM THE CASE STUDIES

STRENGTHS FROM LITERATURE	Region 1			Region 2		Region 3		R 4	Region 5		H/O	
	NHV	L	R*	NHV	L	NHV	L	NHV	NHV	L	NHV	R
Community Connections - Grassroots networks - diverse populations - linkages with vulnerable people	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Local Knowledge Insights into community	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Creative, Motivated, Flexible solutions.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Reduce Risks to Community	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Empowerment community tackles problems collaboratively	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Response Speed		X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X	X
Trust of Community Contribute to community long term		X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Cost Effective		X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Support Individual Mental Health and Community Wellbeing			X			X	X	X		X	X	
Communication Advocate, lobby, disseminate						X	X	X	X		X	X
Membership Network Access donated funds. Geographically spread members reduce risk all impacted		X	X		X		X			X	X	X

Table 7. 5: Australian NPO Strengths Identified from Case Studies

(demonstrated through actions or mentioned by stakeholders. 2 interviews were not included as were more general) Source: Case Interviews, documents of actions. NHV Neighbourhood House; H/O Head Office NHV; L Lions Clubs; R Rotary Clubs (R covered regions 1,2,3).*

NPOs having motivated volunteers and being able to come up with flexible, creative solutions to problems was also strongly supported by the NPO responses.

The identified strengths of Australian NPOs fit well with key components of the Sendai Framework, Resilience theory, the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience, the Rockefeller Framework, EMV's Community Resilience and social capital theory. Hence accessing those strengths effectively should enhance a community's resilience.

To further support the case that NPOs can potentially play a significant role in building community resilience in the disaster space, actions of Australian NPOs are examined in the next segment.

7.7.2 Actions of Australian Nonprofit Organisations

The interviews of Australian NPO representatives supported the themes of actions by NPOs identified in the international literature. In this project the NPOs investigated did not directly provide response psychosocial support; as opposed to another NPO, Victorian Council of Churches, that focuses on this area. Hence the area across from 'trauma counselling' was not matched. Otherwise, there were examples of Australian NPOs illustrating the actions raised in the international literature (Table 7.6). I expected I would have to undertake more case studies, however as previously discussed, the level of commonality and saturation was overwhelming, and I chose not to continue them.

Table 7. 6: Actions of Australian Nonprofit Organisations

Actions of NPOs from the literature	Australian NPO examples from interviews
<p>Relief and Initial Recovery Physical assistance Sanitation and water Food Clothing and toiletries Shelter repair</p> <p>Trauma counselling</p> <p>Restoring livelihoods</p> <p>Quick mobilisation to help</p> <p>Communicate priorities Organise people</p> <p>Helped with paperwork Provide shelter for relief workers, volunteers, evacuees Transport (moving evacuees) Manage donated funds</p>	<p>Supplied generators, aqua boxes, set up beds in hall, Shipping container toilet, shower blocks, laundries BBQs, cook up hot food, Distributing donated goods, masks Unplugged gas of air conditioners, replaced heaters, purchased equipment as needed</p> <p>Victorian Council of Churches</p> <p>Supplied resources for Blaze Aid to fix fences, ensured local businesses supported Supplied hay and feed</p> <p>Within 48 hours had food and donated goods, Local asset registers already in place Can get \$10,000 within 24 hours Impacted club members told what needed Community meetings to discuss smoke impacts</p> <p>Helped with paperwork, advised where to go Provided a bed for volunteers</p> <p>Provided transport where needed Managed and distributed funds to community</p>
<p>Recovery Mental health counselling Organise demolition Management of volunteers Help residents rebuild Ensure vulnerable people included</p>	<p>Tree clearing, tool libraries, Managed company, scouts etc volunteers, also months/years after event Landscape helped garden design, trees planted, removed debris Established Men’s sheds in impacted area. Worked with other NPOs to establish a suicide prevention network. Supported course for young adults to understand/cope with impacted family on farms. Checked on vulnerable community members</p>

<p>Communicate community priorities Organise people Provide space for community activities (e.g. education)</p> <p>Help with paperwork Manage donated funds</p>	<p>In community, so know what need Training for mass food preparation, festivals, Childcare so parents can work on recovery, Artist helping with paintings, family days,</p> <p>Helped impacted people fill out forms Managed and distributed funds to community</p>
<p>Preparedness and Resilience Disaster education Risk awareness Induction and training of volunteers Risk planning Community Briefings on health and safety Civil Society building, support community</p> <p>Facilitation of community networks/participation Facilitate Community empowerment Community development services Health care</p> <p>Help save community attachments Build safety networks</p>	<p>Police mentoring scheme, disaster planning Weather smarts seminars, raise awareness CFA training seminars Seminars to identify risks, input into LGV planning Fire awareness workshops, heat safety, Family days, trips to the footy, trips to the Zoo, fundraising events Established Men’s Shed in area, supported networks for mental health, Community dining, community markets, Meetings where community voice is included and valued</p> <p>Gained funding for historic bakery development Men’s health events, family days to bring families together, survey of smoke impacts, Put money in to support local theatre, Suicide prevention networks, training of community members, men’s health events Family days, Australia Day breakfasts, community choirs</p>

Source: Column 1 examples from literature identified in Scoping Literature Review (Chapter 3). Column 2 examples from interviews and documents of NPOs used as case studies (various Lions Clubs, Rotary Clubs, Neighbourhood Houses around Victoria).

NPO actions ranged from physical assistance immediately after the disaster, donation, collection and distribution of goods, providing food, sanitation, water, shelter repair, through to restoring livelihoods through to years of ongoing recovery support. NPOs mentioned speedy responses when needed and targeted, wise responses to help support their community members when vulnerabilities were identified. With so many positive actions, there had to be significant barriers preventing their work from having more impact. These barriers, and some enablers, are summarised in the next section.

7.7.3 Barriers and Enablers to Australian Nonprofit Organisation Action

‘When we ignore capability within locals, they are less likely to be on side with the authorities, sometimes with violence’ (Greg – Rotarian).

Barriers to NPOs contributing to community resilience identified in the scoping literature review were distinguished through coding, and the themes used as a template to code the NPO interviews. Additional barriers were also included in the analysis, where the research identified them. A summary table of barriers identified by Australian case participants is presented in Table 7.7. Column 1 presents the barriers identified from the scoping literature review. The remaining columns summarize interviewee comments. ‘Varies’ indicates where relationships between the NPO and EM sectors vary between participants; for example local CFA or local LGV representatives, or vary with organisations. In a particular study region the relationship between that NPO and the LGV may be good, but poor with CFA or in another region the relationship may be great with one organisation but they don’t do anything with another. Context is important. For example, egos and agencies being territorial were mentioned consistently. As one interviewee mentioned:

‘Too many agencies think they own the fire and don’t want to work with others’ (Colin – Rotary)

Table 7. 7: Summary of Australian NPO Barriers Identified from Case Studies

BARRIERS FROM LITERATURE	Region 1			Region 2		Region 3		R 4	Region 5		H/O	
	NHV	L	R*	NHV	L	NHV	L	NHV	NHV	L	NHV	R
STRUCTURAL BARRIERS												
Command and Control Culture					X	X						
Weak integration, little collaboration, conflict between local NPOs and government EM systems	X	X	Varies	X	X	Varies	X	Varies	Varies	Varies	X	
	X	X			X	X	X					
NON-RECOGNITION OF NPOs												
Lack of role definition. Little operational guidance NPO involvement. Ignored, unknown	X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
LACK OF NPO RESOURCES												
Lack of financial, staff resources	X			X		X		X	X		X	
Reliance on volunteers	X			X		X		X	X		X	
Short term funding detrimental	X					X		X			X	
Unfunded Mandate	X			X		X		X	X		X	
LACK OF TRUST												
Government inflexible due to accountability reporting requirements. Not trust NPOs accountability Legislative requirements, Certification, Insurance.		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
POOR COMMUNICATION	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
LACK OF COORDINATION BETWEEN NPOs												
Absence of leadership												
Difficulties managing volunteer/surge donations												
Competition for funding	X					X						
LACK OF TRAINING IN EM BY NPOs												X
LACK OF GOVERNMENT RESOURCES												
Lack of capacity, funding		X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
VULNERABILITY DURING DISASTER	X							X	X	X		
EGOS, PERSONALITIES, AGENDAS, HISTORY (raised in interviews)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

(demonstrated through actions or mentioned by stakeholders. 2 interviews were not included as were more general)

Source: Case Interviews, documents of actions. NHV Neighbourhood House, H/O Head Office NHV, L Lions (2 covered all fires) R Rotary (R* covered all fire areas)

From the Service Clubs, barriers included the lack of recognition of NPOs as a viable contributor by EM personnel and, to much frustration and anger, EM personnel ignoring local advice.

'... nobody had any idea of what sort of flood was coming until it had arrived. There were people back at (town 20km south of the impacted town) and the River runs past...ringing up the night before ... saying this is one of the biggest floods coming. Nobody was taking any notice until next morning, and they got up and the water was already there...The authorities were not taking any notice of local knowledge. That would be a big barrier... They (the locals) were passing on their local knowledge of many years living on the .. River, it wasn't taken, it wasn't noticed.' (John -Lion).

For local NHVs a significant barrier was often ironically the opposite case. NHVs, already time poor, heavily reliant on volunteers and financially stressed, were pressured to accept a wide ranging 'unfunded mandate' by EM personnel and government.

'They (government representatives) come and they expect us to sell their goods. You know whatever their program is, it gets funded to have somebody head it up at ...government level ...They come it's okay, but there is no money in it for the local Neighbourhood Houses, but you are expected to support it' (Sue – NHV).

Enablers to help NPOs overcome barriers to actions were difficult to identify. Targeted funding would overcome NPO ignorance of EM practices, would help seed communication, recognition, networks and understanding, and provide opportunities to run community resilience programs. Lions and Rotary used their networks to overcome some barriers. Enablers were discussed in detail in Chapter 9, when synthesised with EM, NPO and literature research and linked to specific barriers.

7.8 Conclusion

This chapter investigated actions undertaken by three NPOs around the Victorian Black Saturday 2009 Bushfires, or the 2011 Victorian floods or the 2014 Hazelwood Mine fire. Interviewing the NPO representatives linked to impacted areas, I wanted to discover how NPO actions were believed to contribute to the building of resilience in their communities, how they helped. In this, context mattered. It should be noted that these were the reflections of the interviewees, and the impact of actions have not been measured. In the future it would be useful to design and implement impact evaluation studies.

In undertaking the case studies, I found incredibly motivated, active, resilient people, who just wanted to help their communities. They were proud of what they had achieved, recognised their actions had benefited when people were at their most vulnerable, but modest in their achievements. It was all about what the ‘Club’, ‘House’ or what ‘we’ did.

Their ingenuity in the face of literally bare earth, or flooded plains (– just how many ways can we re-use a shipping container?) was confounding. Speed of response, understanding of their community, using their networks across their communities were strengths exploited to best help their communities. Making members aware of risks, looking out for the most vulnerable, identifying a need and addressing it, gently herding their community to better resilience practices; all were actions illustrating, living what the NSDR is trying to get Australian communities to be.

At the same time, the wry smiles, disbelief and frustration were evident when barriers encountered were discussed; **‘We just want to help’**, ‘we may be old, but we can help’, ‘no body was listening to us’. Cultural differences, ignorance or nonrecognition, poor resources and training, ineffective communication all lead to blocking or slowing useful NPO actions. Often the NPOs were not linked into the EM sector, were not used as the valuable resource they can be, and these barriers appeared most often to stem from organisations related to

the disaster, the EM sector. For many years, these NPOs have been contributing to their communities' development. Their mission and structure, their earned place in the community, empower them to undertake actions that help and contribute to their neighbourhood's wellbeing. The three NPOs have contributed to and are demonstrating social capital. In an environment lacking community-led, empowered groups; the EM sector could benefit greatly from incorporating these groups into resilience practices. With a Club or House in nearly every town across Victoria, empowered by a motivated group of people who just want to help, imagine the disaster risk reduction practices that could be implemented.

During the case interviews, barriers and issues with local council (LGV) representatives arose frequently enough that the LGV perspective on NPOs needed to be examined. LGV representatives from each of the regions were interviewed, and the results detailed in Chapter 8 The Emergency Management Perspective. LGV representatives were interviewed given their lead role in community resilience building and local disaster recovery actions. LGV impacted on NPO actions, attitudes, and the barriers and enablers encountered by NPOs. LGV and other Emergency Management representatives were asked their perceptions of the strengths of the NPOs they had dealt with. The full findings are synthesised in Chapter 9.

*'Disaster risk reduction requires an **all-of-society engagement** and partnership. It also requires empowerment and inclusive, accessible and non-discriminatory participation, paying special attention to people disproportionately affected by disasters, especially the poorest. A gender, age, disability and cultural perspective should be integrated in all policies and practices, and women and youth leadership should be promoted. In this context, **special attention should be paid to the improvement of organized voluntary work of citizens**' (UNISDR, 2015b, p. 12)*

8. THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE

8.1 Why the Emergency Management Perspective was Needed

In undertaking the NPO case studies (Chapter 7), it rapidly became evident that the themes identified in the scoping review of international literature were strongly consistent with what actions Australian NPOs had taken, their strengths and the barriers encountered. Saturation was quickly reached through the interviews of NPOs, where saturation is defined as the coding point where no new codes are found (Saunders et al., 2018). Further, no new data was coming from the interviews that contributed to development of each category's properties (Saunders et al., 2018). Data collection of the NPO interviews was stopped. However, the themes needed to be investigated further, moving away from the NPO's viewpoints. So other organisational perspectives were examined to help validate the results and gain greater understanding of the barriers facing NPOs.

It was evident that other stakeholders involved in actions before, during and after a disaster, including: EMV; LGV; VICSES; Country Fire Authority [CFA]; Australian Red Cross; Department of Health and Human Services [DHHS] and Victorian Council of Churches [VCC], had useful perspectives to share, particularly to confirm the actions and potential strengths and barriers encountered by NPOs. In this project 'Emergency Management' included such organisations as VICSES and CFA, as well as LGV in their legislated roles in emergencies and the NPOs with statutory responsibilities within emergencies, such as the Australian Red Cross (Figure 8.1: Emergency Management Governance Arrangements in Victoria).

The methodology of this phase of the research is outlined in the following section.

8.2 Methodology for Investigating Emergency Management Perspectives

- Background scoping of the Emergency Management System in Victoria. Identification and brief overview of key organisations.
- Public documents/guides of community resilience to disasters as so described by Emergency Management Victoria and Local Government Victoria were examined and compared with my findings.
- Identified influencers and experts in this area, available in the public domain, were targeted to interview. Sources included: independent industry experts, academics, Emergency Management Victoria representatives, CFA and VICSES personnel in community engagement roles, Local Government emergency services or community development personnel in targeted regions, local government Bushfire Recovery personnel, Community Development Officers and Victorian Council of Churches representatives (Table 8.1 and Figure 8.1).

Table 8. 1: Interviews of Emergency Management Stakeholders

INTERVIEWS		OTHER HATS
LGV – regions	6	Council of Churches, NHV, CFA, Hall Committee, Recovery Group, Chairman Municipal Councils EM network, Network representatives
LGV - strategy	1	
Australian Red Cross	1	Was LGV, EMV,
VICSES	1	Community groups
CFA	1	Volunteer
EMV	1	
Disaster Policy ANU researcher	1	
Disaster Consultant	1	
Bendigo Volunteer Centre	1	
Victorian Council of Churches	1	
DHHS	1	

Obtained Ethics approval to conduct 16 interviews of this group (Appendix 1: Ethics Documentation).

-
- Undertook interviews. Themes discussed included: their perceptions on the role of nonprofit organisations in emergency management, thoughts on barriers and enablers to nonprofit organisations' participation, and potential future direction in Emergency Management strategy (Appendix 1: Ethics Documentation).
 - Transcribed interviews using Google Docs voice tool. Coded interviews using NVIVO 12 plus. Pseudonyms were used to deidentify contributors.
 - Analysed results based on themes from the scoping study literature, and other actions, barriers and enablers raised in the NPO interviews and EM interviews.

The results of this methodology are presented in the following sections, with a summary of actions, strengths, barriers and enablers. Results from across the thesis for these elements are synthesised and analysed in Chapter 9. In order to place NPOs within the Emergency Management sector, key stakeholders need to be understood. Background on the key stakeholders is covered in Chapter 8.3.

8.3 Who Are the Key Influential EM Players?

Disaster risk governance is defined by UNISDR as:

The system of institutions, mechanisms, policy and legal frameworks and other arrangements to guide, coordinate and oversee disaster risk reduction and related areas of policy (UNISDR, 2016, p. 15).

UNISDR further notes that good governance is efficient, inclusive, transparent and collective (UNISDR, 2016). The Sendai Framework and Australia's NSDR emphasise engaging and empowering all of society in the affected community to participate in disaster resilience and recovery (Briceno, 2015; COAG, 2011; EMV, 2017b; UNISDR, 2015a), **with public and private sectors guided by well-defined responsibilities and roles** (UNISDR, 2017a). However there does not appear to be widespread actual engagement in

practice (Majeed, Spencer, McArdle & Archer, 2016; Redshaw, Ingham, Hicks & Millynn, 2017), and often, instead, conflict between government and community participants (Taylor and Goodman, 2015).


The Federal government's role in emergency management is to provide national policy development and provision of funding (ADIR, 2018a). In Victoria, the State government develops and upholds the regulations and legislation supporting emergency management and is responsible for funding and running the emergency services. Figure 8.1 Emergency Management Governance Structure in Victoria, outlines principle areas of responsibility. As the list of acronyms attests, there are a range of government departments and organisations involved under the Emergency Management Governance Structure.

Acronyms used in Figure 8.1.

AV Ambulance Victoria	AVCG Australian Volunteer Coast Guard
BOM Bureau of Meteorology	CFA Country Fire Authority
DEDJTR Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport and Resources	
DELWP Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning	
DET Department of Education and Training	DHHS Department of Health and Human Services
DPC Department of Premier and Cabinet	DTF Department of Treasury and Finance
EMC Emergency Management Commissioner	
EMJIPC Emergency Management Joint Public Information Committee	
EPA Environment Protection Authority	
ESTA Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority	
IGEM Inspector General for Emergency Management	
LGV Local Government Victoria	LSV Life Saving Victoria
MAV Municipal Association Victoria	MFB Metropolitan Fire Brigade
PTV Public Transport Victoria	VCC Victorian Council of Churches
VESA Victoria Emergency Service Association	VFBV Volunteer Fire Brigades Victoria
VICPOL Victoria Police	VICSES Victoria State Emergency Service
VMIA Victorian Managed Insurance Authority	VWA Victorian WorkCover Authority

Source: EMV, 2015.


Figure 8. 1: Emergency Management Governance Structure in Victoria



Source: EMV, 2015

At the regional level, coordination of relief and recovery is through the DHHS, while at the local level coordination is through municipal councils (Figure 8.2: The Three Levels of Relief and Recovery Coordination in Victoria).

Figure 8. 2: The Three Levels of Relief and Recovery Coordination in Victoria



Source: EMV, 1997-2018 (2018 section)


Where NPOs want to be involved in contributing to their community before, during and after disasters, they have to become known and understand the operating procedures of key emergency management organisations. The organisations raised in interviews with NPOs are detailed in the following sections. EMV is the overarching emergency management organisation that is discussed in the next section.

8.3.1 Emergency Management Victoria (EMV)

Emergency Management Victoria (EMV) grew in 2014 (EMV 2018b), with a vision for Safer and more resilient communities (EMV, 2018b). Their role is to lead Victoria's emergency management in working with government, business, agencies and communities so Victoria can better withstand, prepare for, respond and recover from emergencies (EMV, 2018b).

EMV is currently under review by IGEM, following two government-led reports, a green and a white paper on EM reform. This process is placing additional workload and uncertainty on EM stakeholders, as they work to try to absorb and meet changes in the sector. Nonetheless, community focused outcomes, emphasising shared responsibility, and facilitating system-wide reform for greater integration are to help EMV to achieve their vision (EMV 2018a) and empower people to make good decisions (EMV, 2018b). EMV (EMV, 2017b) lists characteristics of community resilience that Emergency Managers need to encourage in communities. Resilient communities are: connected, inclusive, empowered, they have networks that support collaboration, communication, sharing, learning and reaching out to others in the community (EMV, 2017b). Members are aware of risks facing their community, and work with emergency management and other stakeholders to develop plans, learn and take action (EMV, 2017b). EMV encourage a shared goal of the sector ‘working as one’ with communities, Government and business (EMV, 2018c).

Figure 8. 3: EMV Emergency Management System



Source: EMV, 2017c

Building community resilience is identified as a core capability for emergency management (EMV, 2018c). Through the Victorian Preparedness Framework, critical tasks include: connecting with people, using local knowledge and working collectively to recognise local context and create local solutions (EMV, 2018c). As Figure 8.3: EMV Emergency Management System above illustrates, EMV aspires to have the community, including business, at the core of their organisation, and through every stage of the disaster cycle.

EMV leads emergency management in Victoria through working with agencies including CFA, VICSES, VicPol, Victorian Ambulance and Department of Health and Human Services (EMV, 2015). These uniformed organisations have grown from paramilitary organisations. The traditional command and control structure, terminology, culture and regulations of such a background sit uneasily with National and State moves towards greater community engagement and input.

8.3.2 Country Fire Authority (CFA)

Following a review in 2015 of bushfire management targets and practices, the effectiveness and quality of community engagement activities were to be monitored by the CFA (State Government of Victoria, 2018). *Safer Together – Achievements* encourages communities to prepare and respond to bushfires by working with CFA to increase understanding of bushfire risk, be involved in planning local fuel reduction programs and aims to improve the capabilities of firefighters to work with communities (State Government of Victoria, 2018). Context matters, and there are some great examples of CFA Volunteers reaching out to the community and engaging with them (see CFA 2018 - *Karen Fire Safety Online - Prevention is Better Than Cure*). As one representative mentioned:

‘Most of my community fireguard groups I have been working with for many many years... I’ll ... facilitate a conversation with them about their plans.... And I will also talk about any sort of local council or legislation changes that might impact on how they might respond on a high-risk day...’

How that looks depends very much on how what the community decides are their primary goals. We have 18 communities that we are working with, another 6 that are coming on board soon. They are all very different.'

(Marian – CFA).

Active fireguard groups are estimated to have a significant influence on the cost of fires and recovery, were a major fire to impact the fireguard group's area (Gibbs et al., 2015). Training these groups in planning and risk management, also flows through to greater fire awareness in their community. Active CFA volunteers also may engage with their community. For example: running education programs with local kinder, primary or high schools, or posting learnings on the community Facebook page, as the following CFA volunteer's comments attest.

'As a volunteer I do a huge amount of community engagement. I will target who I think would be a good fit at the time, who I might think would be a great target audience. We prioritise school kids and we make sure we get to the kinder and prep kids every year. We also do education programs with the two high schools in our area but beyond that every year is different. I do a lot with the maternal health centre. I door knock higher risk areas. We do a lot of social media stuff. We have quite a good following now for our fire brigade page and we have a really active community Facebook page that I post in quite a lot as well. That's in my volunteer capacity.' (Marian – CFA).

However, in the NPO and LGV interviews, there were frustrations raised about personalities in particular CFA brigades that didn't want community engagement or didn't recognise NPO involvement as legitimate. Yet there was recognition by CFA personal that community engagement was core business, was a priority area and that change was happening towards greater engagement and self-reliance (quote following).

'There is a huge amount of movement in that space (community engagement) in CFA, it's a massive, massive priority area. We could use a simple analogy by using my suburb because I know the numbers. There are 12000 people 4000 houses and 3 fire trucks. So if a fire comes, a significant proportion of the township is impacted, then which three houses are going to get those trucks? CFA understand that and understands that community engagement is core business.... massive movement towards self-reliance.' (Marian - CFA)

It appears that the benefits of community engagement are recognised at a policy level, and that some CFA brigades are active in this area, while others are not. Ongoing collaborative relationships require human capital, time and resources (Demiroz & Hu, 2014). Yet the benefits of such relationships include: improved trust, communication, sharing of information and spreading of innovative ideas (Demiroz & Hu, 2014). An overview of the VICSES is provided in the next section.

8.3.3 State Emergency Services (VICSES)

The Victorian State Emergency Services was established in 1950 to partner with government, agencies, communities and business to provide emergency assistance. Part of VICSES's mission is to help develop disaster resilience and community preparedness (VICSES, 2018a). Volunteer-based, VICSES has around 5000 volunteers around Victoria (VICSES, 2018b). VICSES has a *community resilience strategy* which aims to engage communities to become fully prepared, be aware of risks, connected and engaged. There were no negative comments about the VICSES, with examples of regular collaborations between VICSES and NPOs. VICSES services aim to be delivered collaboratively, and community centred (VICSES, 2018c), as the following quote reflects.

'I think we were the very first (Emergency Services) organisation to write a community resilience strategy... The strategy very much focuses on behavioural change ... getting communities to be interested and take

action to make them more resilient to emergencies... how we engage with organisations and ...breaking things down little bit, to move people along the Continuum from not interested to fully prepared. ...So, it's really about communities taking protective action to make things safer and more resilient when they have those acute shocks or even to help them when they have those chronic stresses. ...Our strategy also focuses on our three C, increasing connection, increasing our capacity and fostering collaboration.' (Catherine – VICSES)

A 'Local Knowledge' fact sheet by VICSES (2015) emphasises the value of local knowledge, and lists ways VICSES is building local knowledge access into its structure and programs (VICSES, 2015). NPO representatives interviewed could cite examples of where VICSES had worked with their organisation and comments of VICSES were all positive. A number of NPO representatives pointed out that often their members were also members of VICSES or CFA, or that relatives were involved in these organisations. These representatives only had positive things to say about both organisations.

SENDAI performance targets include local level disaster emergency plans that are produced through whole community engagement (UNSIDR, 2017a). Local government has an important role in this, at the grassroots level, as the following section attests.

8.3.4 Local Government – Emergency Management

There are 79 local government areas (LGAs) in Victoria, employing more than 40,000 people. LGAs range from 11km² in some of the 31 metropolitan councils, to 22,000km² in the 48 regional and rural councils. Annual council budgets span from \$11.2 million to \$629 million (DELWP, 2017). Emergency Management Victoria divide the state into eight regions, with multiple local government areas sitting within one region.

8.3.4.1 *The Legislation*

LGAs, through electoral mandate and legislation, are required to handle local issues and community needs (DELWP, 2017). Amongst the provision of over 100 services, emergency management, and promoting sustainability of their district are some of the Councils' objectives under the Local Government Act 1989 (DELWP, 2017). Local Government Victoria is under the Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning [DELWP], and leads '*relief and recovery efforts at the local level*' (DELWP, 2017, p. 8). The Victorian Government has prioritised enhancing both the capacity and capability of emergency management by local governments in the *Victorian Emergency Management Strategic Action Plan Update 2017-2020* (EMV, 2017e). Interestingly an LGV position paper aimed to standardise language '*...to enable councils to more effectively influence emergency management policy*' (DELWP, 2017, p. 8). The paper aimed to clarify local governments' activities and responsibilities to the emergency management sector (DELWP, 2017). This process is ongoing.

8.3.4.2 *Requirements and Community Expectations*

Local government is recognised as the government level that is closest to the people, the avenue to enable people to have their say (DELWP, 2017). In its covering letter to their Councils and Emergencies Directions Paper Submission, EMV stated 'councils are fundamental to Victoria's emergency management arrangements. The unique skills, knowledge and connections they have are an essential contributor in working towards safer and more resilient communities' (EMV, 2017d, p. 1). Rural councils are now expected to provide an emergency management role that has moved from response to resilience, relief and recovery (Rural Councils Victoria, 2017). Victorian Preparedness Goals emphasise engaging the whole community, enabling them to make informed decisions and empowering them to work together (DEWLP, 2017). Communities are central to recovery and the process is accomplished best when they are enabled autonomy over decisions and decision making, and empowered to lead recovery activities (Urbis, 2010; Hawe, 2009).

However, LGAs have been criticised for floundering in response to disasters (Taylor & Goodman, 2015; EMV, 2017; Hazelwood Mine Fire Inquiry, 2014). As a result of the Bushfire Royal Commission (2012), the Hazelwood Mine Fire Inquiry (2014) and other reviews there has been pressure on LGVs to become more engaged with the community; and there is some evidence of successful examples of this (see The St Andrews Conversations snapshot, Monbulk Emergency Management Group, Latrobe Valley's Community Bushfire Connection).

Financial constraints, geographic spread, lack of training or time, higher priorities and personalities are all limiting factors for further engagement. But countering that are LGV representatives who work with particular NPOs very successfully. They can give examples of actions undertaken by NPOs or by NPOs in conjunction with LGV regional representatives, as the following quotes illustrate.

'... we've had another one (Neighbourhood House) open up here and we've got an excited community group... it's evolving and they're really pro their community...there are so many different opportunities.' (Annette, LGV).

'we have a resilience program running, for example we have organised 'are you ready for summer preparedness days' which all the agencies and various group community groups come along to. Out of that the Neighbourhood House decided that they would go out into the community (at the monthly community markets) and talk to them about preparedness.' (Annette, LGV).

This emphasises the contextual nature of what faces NPOs before, during and after disasters. It became obvious during the course of the NPO interviews, the LGV interviews and interviews with other EM stakeholders, that the emergency management sector recognised the strengths and value of Service Clubs and NHVs in recovery (Table 8.2: NPO

Strengths Identified by Emergency Management Interviews). Given the role of the Department of Health and Human Services in coordinating relief and recovery at the regional level (Figure 8.2), a DHHS emergency management stakeholder was interviewed and policy direction of DHHS regarding community engagement analysed. DHHS background is detailed in the next section.

8.3.5 Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)

The Department of Health and Human Services Victoria coordinates immediate relief and social recovery activities during and after emergencies to protect the wellbeing of all Victorians and provide psychosocial support. DHHS is a state-wide organisation that works with other Victorian government agencies and NGOs, supports councils managing local recovery and coordinates recovery at the regional level (DHHS, 2018a). Diminishing disaster impacts, through fostering resilience, and particularly supporting Victoria's most vulnerable are aims of DHHS's EM policies (DHHS, 2018c). Working with the community is seen as a means to help achieve these policies, as the following quote attests.

'The strength lies within the community and so that is where we should be overlaying new processes. We should be working with existing community structures and we should be doing that well before an emergency' (Hermoine – DHHS).

DHHS also provides funding to NPOs to implement programs building community capacity and supporting more vulnerable people (for example: creating opportunities for community participation and strengthening capacity of community organisations, funding for the Neighbourhood House Coordination program and the Men's Shed program) (DHHS, 2018b).

8.3.6 Established Nonprofit Organisations in the Disaster Space

The three other major players in the EM sector are the NPOs Australian Red Cross, Victorian Council of Churches and Victorian Life Saving. These organisations are already ‘at the table’, as they are recognised as being part of the Volunteer Consultative Forum which was formed in 2013 to enable EM volunteers a voice on the EM reform agenda (EMV, 2015) (Figure 8.1). They are also ‘at the table’ when organisations coordinate relief and recovery; hence provide useful insight into mechanisms and perceptions around the EM sector. Victorian Life Saving was not mentioned at all during interviews, which was understandable as the disasters examined were not near the coast. Consequently, Victorian Life Saving was not included in this thesis. I had difficulty identifying and contacting an appropriate source in the Salvation Army; and also felt the Australian Red Cross and Victorian Council of Churches gave well-rounded perspectives.

Australian Red Cross, facilitating the second Australian Red Cross-National Disaster Resilience Roundtable, flagged the potential for greater NPO participation in the disaster space (ARC, 2014b). The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent has a Community Engagement and Accountability guide (IFRC, 2017), grounded in the philosophy of putting communities central to IFRC actions, and integrating communication and participation (IFRC, 2017). Through evidence-based steps, the guide aims to empower community driven programs. Included in these steps are participation, feedback, and stronger accountability to communities (IFRC, 2017). The ARC is supportive and encouraging of NPOs building their presence in the disaster area, as the following quotes corroborate.

‘Rotary ... the work that they're doing is amazing. They are highly skilled, they are highly connected, very competent bunches of people, who have enormous philanthropic bias. All of their whole function as a Rotarian is service above self. They are amazing’ (Charlie - ARC).

‘...talking to the Rotary clubs of Melbourne about how we can work together, because they have so so much to offer.’ (Charlie - ARC).

ARC documents encourage NPO participation, their ‘Beyond the Blanket’ summary of the Roundtable’s discussions offers some valuable insight into the actions, challenges and issues of NPOs operating in the disaster area (ARC, 2014b) and has been quoted at length in this thesis.

Victorian Council of Churches Emergency Ministries was established in 1977 to provide psychological first aid and emotional and spiritual care to communities following disaster. Their 1600 volunteers are spread around Victoria. In the following quote VCC representatives highlight a benefit of embedded NPO volunteers in a community. While they may be trained to respond to a disaster, those resilience skills can be applied in their community in day to day life. This aspect is relevant with CFA, VICSES, Lions Clubs, Rotary Clubs and demonstrates the potential of specific risk reduction training for NPOs which then flows to general community resilience and development.

‘look at prevention - all our volunteers come from the communities that the emergency is happening in. So, in terms of community capability, community development, community resilience, there is a workforce out there, that are mostly benign, from an emergency point of view. But has skills, abilities, knowledge, attitudes and behaviours that are value adding to communities every day. And we do refresher training...It is building that social cohesion, social capital, health and wellbeing of community’ (Fergus - VCC).

VCC now has an affiliation with emergency services which enables them to influence disaster government policy (ARC, 2014b) to some extent. However, to become a trusted,

embedded partner has been a long-term, educative endeavour; which other NPOs wishing to be at the table need to consider. Current movements in EM policy, terms such as ‘we work as one’ and policies encouraging more engagement of the community aggravate many stakeholders’ confusion over roles. EMV recognises that lack of clarity, as illustrated in the following quotes.

‘Due to the evolution of the emergency management sector, there is a lack of clarity and understanding across government and non-government of roles and shared responsibilities. Some existing arrangements do not support the future needs for the direction of the sector’s reform’ (EMV, 2017b, p. 14).

‘.. I don't understand the shared responsibility model.’ (Rachel – EMV).

So, the emergency management sector is undergoing change and is confusing. Hopefully these changes will encourage greater work with and recognition of NPO roles before, during and after disasters.

Presenters to the National Roundtable on the role of nonprofits in Emergency Management, argued NPOs need to advocate to be part of the conversation (ARC, 2014b). While Government were aware of their role, when a disaster happened, that context became unclear. NPOs were recognised as having well established links in communities, being embedded in the community, with trust cultivated over time, and were knowledgeable of local issues (ARC, 2014b). However, Chapter 7 NPO interviews, and the international literature (Chapter 3.4.6: Barriers to Nonprofit Organisations Participation) identified that NPOs were ignored or overlooked due to lacking legitimate roles, lacking role definition and not being trusted by traditional stakeholders, and these were barriers to NPO actions in the disaster space. To analyse these elements further, EM stakeholders were asked what they thought of NPOs operating in the disaster space. This was not in the

form of a list they could tick off, but rather just a general question they answered. The downside to this approach was that some aspects were not covered because they did not think of them at the time perhaps? The upside of this approach gained their ‘on the spot’ thoughts of key strengths. Their answers are summarised below in section 8.4 and Table 8.2: NPO Strengths Identified by Emergency Management Interviews.

8.4 How does Emergency Management see NPOs in Disasters?

Interviewees were asked how they saw NPOs in the disaster space. Given the number of LGAs, and their wide-ranging attitudes, it is possible there are LGAs that may see things differently to those that I surveyed. The same can be said for other EM stakeholders. However, those interviewed recognised that NPOs had skills useful to community resilience and recovery.

‘NPOs have got a diversity of skills. They have skills and knowledge that are relevant to Emergency Management, but they are different to what CFA people traditionally have.... there is a real synergy between the first responder organisations like CFA and MFB, and the NPOs that can come in a bit later and work in the recovery and resilience space (Marian - CFA).

As they were long term members of the community, they had knowledge and networks, often across the community’s most vulnerable. These networks within the community ensured communication and as that communication was from a trusted source, that people would listen to it.

‘nonprofits are really important. Those community networks are what drives some of those communities and how they recover from emergencies. Their strengths are that they know one another, having the knowledge and faith that the people they talk to, they know they can trust.’ (Mark - LGV).

There was also acknowledgement that such networks could allow speedier recognition of needs and more targeted, relevant relief.

‘A connection within community, is diverse and can be leveraged. And their ability to really talk or understand a community and be able to relay that to emergency people who may not be local. It cannot be underestimated and the efficiencies in working with existing nonprofits is immeasurable. There are just so many advantages for agencies.... Local knowledge, the local connections. It is also a really efficient way to do it. It is always a difficult thing to try to establish new relationships – but the trust is already there, the links are already there. That is just so much easier for everybody.’ (Hermonie – DHHS).

NPO Strengths identified by Emergency Management interviews or in their literature are summarised in Table 8.2. One interview was focused more on Australian policy level, so was not included in the table. As with NPO representatives, community connections and networks, trust of the community and local knowledge were recognised as key NPO strengths by EM representatives.

A gatekeeper that holds the trust of the local community can minimise the time needed by traditional EM agencies to effectively work with the community. Local knowledge by NPOs can contribute genuine understanding of the local situation, local needs and local capacity (ARC, 2014b); and hopefully enable relevant community-led actions. In such a way, local NPOs can reduce risks to the community. Having effective two-way communication between local NPOs and the EM sector, can enable NPOs (as a trusted source) to transfer relevant risk information to their communities, encourage participation in risk minimisation activities or preparedness activities and hence reduce community risk.

Long term commitment to the local community, actively contributing to the local community over the longer term not only builds trust, but long-term community commitment fits with what is known about disaster recovery – it is a long-term thing.

‘they are part of the community, in there for the long term and recovery isn't an overnight thing.’ (Annette – LGV)

As was highlighted in Chapter 7, local NPOs are actively working in their communities on the impacts of the 2009 bushfires, nearly a decade later. Longer term relationships breed trust and can cultivate a range of relationships (Demiroz and Hu, 2014).

The Service Clubs were recognised by some EM stakeholders for their extensive networks of local, regional, national and international members. This was seen as a significant strength when funds or donations were required after a disaster, as well as for messaging and mobilisation of volunteers.

‘They (Service Clubs) are also great at finding money.’ (Charlie – ARC)

Although this would appear to be a little known or appreciated strength generally in the sector, as few others raised it during interviews.

STRENGTHS OF NPOs	LGV ₁	LGV ₂	LGV ₃	LGV ₄	LGV ₅	LGV	LGV HO	EMV	VIC SES	CFA	DHHS	ARC	VCC	DC	BVRC
Community Connections	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Local Knowledge	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Creative, Motivated, Flexible solutions.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Reduce Risks to Community	X	X	X	X			X	X			X	X	X		X
Empowerment	X		X	X		X	X	X			X	X			X
Response Speed	X		X	X				X	X				X		X
Trust of Community Contribute to community long term	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Cost Effective	X	X	X	X	X		X				X	X	X		
Support Mental Health and Community Wellbeing*	X		X	X		X		X		X	X		X	X	X
Communication Advocate, lobby,							X								X
Membership Network	X						X				X	X	X		X

Table 8. 2: NPO Strengths Identified by Emergency Management Interviews

(demonstrated through actions or mentioned by stakeholders; 1 interview was not included as had a broader, policy frame) * not referred to in these terms, but many examples of actions that supported community wellbeing.

Source: Interviews, policy documents. LGV Local Government Victoria; EMV Emergency Management Victoria; VICSES Victoria State Emergency Services; DHHS Department of Health and Human Services; CFA Country Fire Authority; ARC Australian Red Cross; VCC Council of Churches; DC Disaster Consultant; BVRC Bendigo Volunteer Resource Centre.

As part of the interviews of stakeholders in the EM sector, barriers and enablers to NPO participation were discussed. A summary of barriers identified from EM stakeholders is listed in Table 8.3. Potential enablers suggested by EM stakeholders have been synthesised with those of other research relating to barriers and enablers; and discussed in Chapter 9.

Table 8. 3: Summary of Barriers Identified from EM Stakeholders

BARRIERS FROM EM INTERVIEWS

Command and control structure, top-down communication. Not know what NPOs do, what NPOs can offer

EM don't know where best to incorporate/include. Need to meet, volunteers have to understand what needs to be done, what level of ability, interest, flexibility?

Concern for the age of volunteers. Concern over time pressure of NPOs
EM not have funding for longer term engagement

EM too busy to engage. Don't have time or resources. Sometimes EM an 'add on', with few resources and don't experience emergency long term

Different languages of different EM groups, not standardised language

Concerned about rogue groups going off doing their own thing. Frustrating when duplications/cross purposes

Lack of training/understanding of EM roles leads to misunderstandings/tensions
NPOs not understanding where gaps are in EM system, that they can support.

Difficulties in assessing quality and calibre of what volunteers are offering. Don't have time to build relationships/find out who out in regions.
Don't have time to find out contact details etc
Difficult to engage in a meaningful way pre-disaster

May be vulnerable during disaster

Personalities, agendas, history

(demonstrated through actions or mentioned by stakeholders). Source: EM Interviews, documents of actions.

A lack of understanding of what NPOs could offer, which is understandable given the range of NPOs in the community, was raised by EM stakeholders. With it was the difficulty in assessing the quality of what was offered, which ties in with trust between stakeholders. NPOs not understanding the various roles of EM stakeholders was also mentioned, and the consequent misunderstandings.

8.5 Conclusion

The thesis research question addressed in this Chapter is secondary question five:

How do those within the Emergency Management (EM) system see nonprofit organisations before, during and after a disaster situation? And from an EM perspective, to what degree could nonprofits be engaged in the Australian context?

The interview results and literature analysis addressed these questions. At every level, from the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience, the State level of Emergency Management, Local Governments, and policy documents for the emergency management sector; all organisations encourage community engagement and recognise its importance to build community resilience.

There are two fundamental issues. One is the discomfort of emergency management stakeholders of the term ‘community-led’, with recognised tensions between government-led actions and community-led actions (Owen, 2018; Winkworth, 2007). It could be argued that at the NPO level, none of those interviewed had given any indication of wanting to ‘run the show’, merely to be included. The literature review on community-led actions highlighted the dearth of evidence of community groups being empowered sufficiently to drive actions. The ‘together’ response and ‘shared responsibility’ assumes communities have the ability, training and resources to contribute to their own resilience.

Further, as LGV personnel indicated, attitudes towards community involvement range on a spectrum, for a range of reasons. But there is growing recognition that the community voice is important and needs to be incorporated into the EM space. And that upskilling staff and providing engagement tools and skills are an immediate priority (State Government of Victoria, 2018). EMV, in its response to the Inspector-General for Emergency Management’s [IGEM] *Review of Victoria’s Emergency Management Sector*

Preparedness for Major Emergencies, recognises that the reform process of the sector, towards greater connection with communities, is evolving and that there are some positive examples being undertaken (EMV, 2017d). There seem opportunities to learn from others' success stories, on 'how they do it' (*'it's interesting hearing what other people do actually do in the recovery aspects in recovery side.'* - Annette LGV). And recognition that sometimes, community development, community engagement takes time. There is also a lot of confusion over LGV roles and indeed other EM stakeholder roles that need to be addressed.

The EM sector recognised NPO strengths as skills useful to community resilience and recovery. Community connections and networks, trust of the community and local knowledge were recognised as key NPO strengths. A number of barriers were raised repeatedly in discussions. For example: within a very busy work environment, the time and difficulty in assessing NPO abilities and skills, and what they could contribute to actions was seen as a barrier to engaging NPOs. Some EM stakeholders identified that government did not have a clear idea of what groups were out there and again, what they could contribute. Another theme was misunderstanding of roles leading to frustrations, rogue groups and lack of coordination, which in turn led to duplication of efforts.

Given the impact EM stakeholders may have on NPO barriers to action, the EM responses need to be placed in the context of the literature and NPO research. Hence, results from this chapter are incorporated into the synthesis of results in the next Chapter. Why? Because the literature says NPOs have much to contribute and the NPOs just want to help.

9. SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS: STRENGTHS/BARRIERS/ENABLERS

9.1 Introduction to Synthesis of Findings

When investigating whether NPOs have a role to play in community resilience to disasters, NPO and EM stakeholders' perceptions and awareness of NPO strengths, barriers and enablers need to be considered. NPO stakeholder views were documented in Chapter 7, and Chapter 8 identified the policies and perceptions of Emergency Management stakeholders regarding NPOs, their strengths, and issues regarding further engagement with them in the disaster space.

This Chapter consolidates and synthesises all the findings of the research related to these factors. The findings are collated with evidence statements from the interviews. The chapter's format is guided by the 'Synthesis of Findings' Chapter of Harden, Sheridan, McKeown, Dan-Ogosi and Bagnall's (2015) *Evidence review of barriers to and facilitators of, community engagement approaches and practices in the UK* (Harden et al., 2015).

Another key element of this thesis were the actions of NPOs before, during and after disasters. NPOs contributed many actions in the disaster setting; examples of which have come from interviews, literature and research, and have been highlighted in the case studies. These have been investigated in Chapter 7 and summarised in Table 7.6: Actions of Australian Nonprofit Organisations. This profile of the contributions of these three NPOs has not been undertaken before. Actions mentioned in one club or house were often evident in other clubs or houses, aiding data integrity. It was apparent from the interviews that some EM stakeholders were not familiar with specific actions of NPOs, hence further synthesis of 'actions' was not considered necessary for this thesis.

NPO actions in the disaster space did however highlight strengths of the NPOs, and these are the subject of the next section. These findings address the research question of 'What are the strengths of NPOs?'

9.2 Nonprofit Strengths – Synthesis of Findings

The synthesis of study findings identified a range of strengths that were arranged under thematic headings. The strengths from the literature were numerically rated, depending on the quantity of papers that noted particular strengths. Interview data from NPO and EM stakeholders and their own literature, where appropriate, were organised into the table (Table 9.1: Overview of NPO Strengths Identified in the Synthesis). The strengths were then examined from what the literature, the NPOs and the EM stakeholders said about them.

The heading elements on the left-hand side of the table (9.1) are based on Table 3.3, which were the most common strengths reported in the literature. Column 2 is grounded in Chapter 7 and represents the percentage of NPO interviewees that mentioned each strength. Similarly, Column 3 is grounded in Chapter 8 and represents the proportion of EM interviewees who mentioned the particular strength listed. The final column lists the number of papers in the scoping literature review that mentioned particular strengths.

Table 9. 1: Overview of NPO Strengths Identified in the Synthesis

NPO STRENGTHS	NPOs*	EM Stakeholder#	Number of papers identified in the literature^
Community Connections, networks Access to diverse populations, vulnerable people	100%	100%	12
Local Knowledge	100%	100%	11
Creative, Motivated, Flexible solutions	100%	100%	10
Reduce Risks to Community	100%	71%	7
Empower communities to tackle own problems collaboratively	92%	64%	6
Response Speed	75%	50%	5
Trust of Community Contribute positively to community long term	83%	100%	5
Cost Effective	83%	64%	4
Support Mental Health and Community Well-being	50%	64%	4
Communication	50%	14%	2
Membership Network	58%	43%	1

* Response out of 12 NPO Stakeholders; # Response out of 14 EM Stakeholders; ^ papers from the Scoping Literature Review; Chapter 3, Table 3.3.

The strengths that were ranked highly through being mentioned in more papers, were also ranked highly by both NPO stakeholders and EM interviewees. NPO community connections were recognised widely as a strength of NPOs, as were local knowledge and their ability to offer creative, flexible solutions by a motivated group of volunteers.

9.2.1 Community Connections

Of the studies in the scoping literature review that mentioned strengths of NPOs, twelve recognised community connections and networks as a strength (Acosta & Chandra, 2013; Acosta, Chandra & Ringel, 2013; ARC, 2014b; Benson, Twigg & Myers, 2001; Cretney, 2016; CSSC, 2014; Deloitte Access Economics, 2018; Demiroz & Hu, 2014; Hutton, 2016; Izumi & Shaw, 2012; Ranghieri & Ishiwatari, 2014; Whyte, 2017).

‘NGOs can serve as important connectors based on their social or professional ties. These relationships can be leveraged for communication and information dissemination, as well as additional resources...’ (Acosta, Chandra & Ringel, 2013, p. 341).

‘...they have direct links with the grassroots and work with the most vulnerable..’ (Benson, Twigg & Myers, 2001, p. 202).

This result was strongly supported by the Australian interview data. All NPOs, LGV regional representatives and other EM stakeholders recognised this strength and all could illustrate it with an example. Community connections enable NPOs to be well placed to contribute before, during and after disasters; with EM stakeholders describing them as valued, trusted community ‘gatekeepers’ (Catherine – VICSES). Some NPOs are focused on supporting diverse, marginalised or vulnerable people, so they may already have the connections, trust and understanding of these groups.

‘We had a Christmas in July 2009 and we had that in the creek area next to the (NHV) House and the Parkland that runs along the creek.... Lots of

people and organisations supported that. Different churches and Fusion, which is a group that offers kids play hoops and equipment, put on games for the kids. The police came and they had radar games and they would clock the kids on how fast they could run. The fireies came and let the kids climb over the fire engines. It helped to make people more comfortable with the organisations’ (Barbara – NHV).

As they often work with marginalised groups NPOs have opportunities to include disaster risk reduction learnings in their work (Benson, Twigg & Myers, 2001), and often advocate for them (Whyte, 2017). They may employ local residents (Redshaw, Ingham, Hicks & Millynn, 2017) and have a broad range of members that enhance their ability to cross social boundaries and link with isolated community groups.

‘CFA have a free stall (at our market), bring a truck and see more people that day than in months.’ (Sue – NHV)

Community networks and connections are a fundamental strength of NPOs that enable the creation of other community strengths. Strong grassroots networks enable communication to flow both from the NPO and from community individuals in a two-way process. In the following quote, Melinda from LGV, emphasises the absolute importance of networks.

‘so, the strength would be networks of community organisations, because throughout the whole disaster and the recovery your communication is everything, is absolutely, without doubt everything.’ (Melinda - LGV).

Likewise, these networks enable understanding of community resources, needs, risks, concerns. NHVs particularly were noted for their ability to translate ‘government speak’ to ‘community speak’ and vice versa.

'We would help them make appointments. We would send them in the right direction to make an appointment because we had a list of who was offering what through their agencies so we were able to point people in the right direction.' (Barbara-NHV)

Community connections may be formed through joint activities (for example: Rotary Clubs, Lions Club, VICSES support the same field day), enabling NPOs to get to know each other, and their resources, and practice working together. In the process, the community get to know them also, as the following example attests.

'Pretty good working relationship... festival and (markets) it is all about pulling together the community groups to run something, practice building relationships. To practice that communication.....We have a lot of community groups, they can have a free stall so we don't charge for it. It provides a way for them to talk to people who come to the market or (the festival) about what they do....' (Sue – NHV).

Community networks are important from a social capital perspective (Aldrich 2018), where they enhance and support mental health of individuals and the community (Gallagher et al., 2019). In the theories of building community resilience, community connections are encouraged; with engaged, connected and inclusive community networks recognised as critical (COAG, 2011; EMV, 2017b; UNISDR, 2018). Where NPO community networks and connections are accessed effectively, NPOs with such a widely recognised, critical strength, have value to contribute to building a community's resilience to disasters.

9.2.2 Local knowledge

NPO's local knowledge was noted as a strength in eleven of the papers reviewed (Acosta, Chandra & Ringel, 2013; Acosta & Chandra, 2013; ARC, 2014; Atkinson, 2014; Benson, Twigg & Myers, 2001; Demiroz & Hu, 2014; Hutton, 2016; Izumi & Shaw, 2012; McLennan,

Molloy, Whittaker & Handmer, 2016; Redshaw, Ingham, Hicks & Millynn, 2017; Whyte, 2017). According to Redshaw et al. (2017) community organisations intrinsically have a profound understanding of their community (Redshaw et al., 2017).

'They ...have insights into community problems that can impede effective disaster response and exacerbate a disaster' (Acosta and Chandra, 2013, p. 365)

All NPO, LGV and EM stakeholders interviewed recognised the strength of NPOs' local knowledge.

'I think the most important strength is local knowledge and that could be local knowledge about the condition of backroads for example. Before the coroner lifted the barrier on the crime scene, not all convoys to get supplies to people went through official pathways. We used back roads to shift food to Flowerdale. We stayed off the main roads because it was just more expedient. Of-course there were times when we did use the arm bands and we were signed through by the police. But the scale of the thing was so large that sometimes the police manning the barriers were from Queensland or the Federal Police and had no idea about ...the local people or the local structures, so they would often turn away the wrong people' (White – LGV).

'I think there was a realisation by the Salvos down the track that the locals were perfectly capable of doing the job and also knew the local situations. The local situation, the local people so could more actively assess the needs' (White – LGV).

In building disaster risk reduction and hence resilience, local knowledge is crucial. Risks are context specific, depend on local situations, and communities need to be aware of and

prepare for the specific risks facing their community (UNISDR, 2015). An interview notes the importance of using local knowledge and local skills.

‘They insisted on getting in outside people.... I’d said ‘No – this guy knows these hills better than anyone and can get his grader over them, and he won’t tip his grader over’. There were a few problems’ (Colin - Rotary).

Having a resource at the grassroots level that can access up to date local knowledge, as NPOs do, is a significant community asset, before, during and after disasters.

9.2.3 Creative, Motivated, Flexible Solutions

Ten papers from the literature review recognised that having highly motivated volunteer members, that can be flexible, adaptive and creative to achieve solutions was a strength of NPOs (Acosta & Chandra, 2013; Atkinson, 2014; Benson, Twigg & Myers, 2001; Cherry & Lucas, 2016; Chikoto, Sadiq & Fordyce, 2013; Cretney, 2016; CSSC, 2014; Deloitte Access Economics, 2018; Hutton, 2016; Whyte, 2017). Further, NPOs motivating impacted community members to take part in recovery can move them from being victims to being heroes and survivors (Whyte, 2017).

‘they are innovative in identifying emerging issues and trying out new methods’ (Benson, Twigg & Myer,s 2001, p. 202).

‘they can support local coping strategies and mobilise people’s capacities’ (Benson, Twigg & Myers, 2001, p. 202)

‘These organizations (faith-based NPOs) were both flexible and creative in their approaches’ (Atkinson, 2014)

All NPOs spoke of this strength (motivated volunteers, flexible, creative) when describing what they saw NPOs contributed to their community. All LGV regional representatives

and other EM stakeholders mentioned this strength also. There were many stories of NPOs just getting the job done, creatively, as the following example of turning a shipping container into showers illustrates.

'What we did there was we set up portable showers, hooked up a container (shipping container) and converted it. We have plumbers in our Lions Clubs, or if we don't, we employ them, pay them and convert the sheds to showers and change rooms. The blokes can jump in the river but the ladies can't.' (Archie – Lions).

Some actions involved forming alliances with other NPOs to creatively manage limited resources, to the mutual benefit of both, as this example of an alliance between the local church and NHV exemplifies.

'We got funding from Arts Victoria and we employed a resident artist to come in. We didn't have enough space ... (at the Neighbourhood House). The Church just up the road was needing their hall to be restored.... With the money that we paid them to take the artist, they were able to redo their flooring so it worked out well for us and for them. The church had him there and ...and families came and were able to paint something that reflected how they felt. We had 10 murals ... big murals ... you can see them from the road. That was one way we were able to get people to express their feelings and get together. The money we gave the church was used to rip up the floor and get a new floor.' (Barbara – NHV)

And another example of the usefulness of a shipping container (AKA kindy) follows.

'we built a whole kindergarten, (and day-care centre) I had forgotten... The parents needed the kids looked after. The parents were rebuilding their houses. We took two containers (shipping containers) put them in a

paddock, built in between them and made a kindergarten. So, they had a place where they could take the children and they could go and work somewhere...We attached it to the back of the local Neighbourhood House and it is now a permanent structure. And the Historical Society is in there as well. And we formally handed it over to the Neighbourhood House last year' (Elizabeth – Lion).

Disasters are chaotic and messy. Local systems are overwhelmed. Having local NPOs on the ground, who can be flexible and creative, can get things done in innovative ways. The City Resilience framework defines flexibility and resourcefulness as two of the seven qualities fundamental for a city's resilience (100 Resilient Cities, 2017). Motivated, creative and flexible NPOs can be a community asset that helps during disasters and over the longer-term recovery.

9.2.4 Reduce Risks to their Community

In the literature, a strength of NPOs was identified by seven papers as reducing risks to their community (Benson, Twigg & Myers, 2001; Deloitte Access Economics, 2018; Gallaher et al., 2019; Jenkins, Lambeth, Mosby & Van Brown, 2015; McLennan, Molloy, Whittaker & Handmer, 2016; Torrens Resilience Institute, 2017; Whyte, 2017).

'Nonprofits perform diverse services in the community...one... is often risk reduction' (Jenkins et al., 2017, p. 1269).

This strength was recognised across all NPOs and 71% of EM stakeholders. Risks are reduced through information transfer, helping vulnerable groups, identifying risks and acting to mitigate them. One example from an NHV was of a course teaching the use of computers, using fire safety websites and exercises relating to it. There were a range of actions of family days for vulnerable families, such as the following examples.

‘we had some funding and we ... took two 50 seater bus loads down to the Werribee Zoo in June or July.....There were family days trying to get the family to come together, because ... it wasn't just the adults who were feeling insecure, a lot of the younger children were also feeling insecure and had nightmares and things like that.’ (Barbara – NHV).

‘we did continue for over 12 months to try every few months to have some sort of community get together. We would have a football bus where we would go down and go to the football together.’ (Sonya – NHV)

Reducing risks is a pillar of the Sendai Disaster Risk Reduction Framework and is recognised as a means to enhance community resilience (UNISDR, 2015b). NPOs having reducing risks as one of their core strengths, demonstrates their potential in contributing to community resilience.

9.2.5 Empowering their Community

Analysis of the scoping literature review revealed six papers that recognised that the ability to empower communities to tackle their own problems collaboratively was a strength of NPOs (Acosta & Chandra, 2013; Benson, Twigg & Myers, 2001; Cretney, 2016; Deloitte Access Economics, 2018; Gallagher et al., 2019; Whyte, 2017). Whyte (2017) suggested that NHVs offer ‘recovery space’ through listening to community needs, enabling participation of impacted people and empowering them to work together to achieve.

‘Value (of NHVs) must be seen in context of framework and process, it is a community-led, empowering and capacity building framework, listen to what people need and work in partnership with them to achieve outcomes’
(Whyte, 2017, p. 5).

Ninety-two percent of all NPO interviewees recognised this strength in their organisations. Although it was recognised as a strength by around 64% of EM stakeholders. The first quote illustrates how NPOs can empower their communities to become more disaster aware and prepared.

'the CFA were really good. They came to each of the Houses (NHV) and we're able to respond to people's needs, talk to them and make them feel more at ease. I suppose just thinking about different things that you might have in a kit or something that you might have in your cupboard but you know where it is. It might be that you have some list of your documentsit was things that people don't think about when they are put in a situation. So that seem to work quite well.' (Barbara – NHV).

In the next quote, a grassroots Rotary Club identified a need of the community and were able to empower people to address it.

'after our disasters here around ... we put effort into establishing a Men's Shed and there's one here that was actually started on my home property.... it's got over 100 men in it now. Throughout Australia we have lots of Men's Sheds which have been assisted by Rotary and Lions and others and that builds capability within an area and it can be used for so many aspects'
(Colin – Rotarian).

Another example of empowering communities to tackle their own problems and illustrating the creativeness of NPO solutions, is what Lions Clubs can do with a shipping container. In this case they created Tool Libraries, that were placed in Flowerdale, King Lake, Strathewen and Marysville. Towns severely hit by the 2009 bushfires. Deakin University worked with Lions Clubs to fitout the interior of the shipping containers and Lions organised for tools to be donated. Tools could be loaned from the Library when needed.

‘Tool Libraries...(were) really good because people could come and borrow them. They didn't need specific tools all the time but if they had other people coming to help on their property then they could borrow it from the Tool Library. They might need 10 extra shovels or an extra chainsaw or something. There were five Tool Libraries ... one in Flowerdale, one in King Lake, one in Marysville, one in Strathewen and one in Gippsland in Tarralgon. The one in Marysville is still going and the one in Strathewen went to Denali ...but there are still people who borrow things. Deakin Uni (Burwood campus) put all the shelving in them (the shipping containers converted to Tool Libraries). A lot of tool places provided tools and people could come borrow and return, and 10 years on they are still being used’

(Sally – Lions).

NPOs having a legal structure and insurance was a major strength raised by Australian interviewees. This was highlighted by Service Clubs, some LGV representatives and NHV interviewees. NPOs can offer a legal structure, and hence help empower organisations, through which to gain development funding and provide an umbrella of insurance to other community groups; as the following example about NHVs illustrates.

‘NPOs... Community houses they offer a legal structure that is a huge strength to be able to say ‘well we are a legal entity we do have insurance’... community houses are aboutenabling community drivers and that is a massive, massive strength of those places...they can identify people who are out there doing stuff and engage in conversations with those people to say this is what we are, this is what we can offerbecause you are doing an amazing job, you are doing it on your own, here you go, we've got this for you’ (Melinda – LGV).

As the literature revealed, shared responsibility is being emphasised as the way forward in emergency management. In this approach, communities have a role before, during and after disasters, and are to be encouraged to grasp greater responsibility. As a

consequent, NPOs that help empower community members to assume a greater role for their own resilience and recovery actions must be a good thing.

9.2.6 Response Speed

The speed of response by NPOs was recognised as a strength by five papers (Bajracharya, Hastings, Childs & McNamee, 2012; Benson, Twigg & Myers, 2001; Hutton, 2016; LaLone, 2012; and Ranghieri & Ishiwatari, 2014) in the scoping literature review.

‘Members (of a local NPO) closed the tsunami gates by hand, since they could not be operated automatically because of power failures (Ranghieri & Ishiwatari, 2014, p. 67).

‘The members receive regular training and can respond immediately because they are locally based’ (Ranghieri & Ishiwatari, 2014, p. 69).

Particularly in the social capital literature there is mention of community members being ‘zero responders’ (Aldrich, 2018) or ‘first responders’.

Seventy-five percent of all NPOs alluded to response speed as a strength. An example of this that because they were part of the impacted community, NPO response speed was very quick.

‘...ability to respond really quickly and really effectively to their community needs, that is second to none. And it is something in 2014, we saw, while they were trying to figure out what to do, we had masks on the ground. Then they got masks. When they were ‘well we are not sure what to do’ we were ‘well we have information sessions’. So, we were pretty fast with that response.’ (Jane – NHV).

‘We are usually the first responders to be there’ (Archie – Lions)

'You should have seen the mobilisation after the fires. Within one or two days, there were people cooking food for everyone. After two days, we had trucks going down there. I was there when the fires were still burning... and we were delivering hay and talking to farmers. And we had Blaze Aid there, we were feeding Blaze Aid within two or three days we were totally mobilised.' (Elizabeth - Lion)

'We had a warehouse, a free warehouse organised within 2 days within a week there were people raising money all around Australia. We had 32 trucks from all around Australia with physical goods arriving at this warehouse.' (Elizabeth - Lions).

Not all local government representatives saw speed of response as an NPO strength. One LGV participant felt there was a risk of too much speed, which could result in volunteers not having insurance or being covered if they were injured. Additionally, by not having the appropriate certification (Working with Children, Police Checks) there could be risks working closely with vulnerable members of the community. Another point was that decisions made in a hurry during stressful times, may not be the best ones, and it was better to wait and have a clear perspective. Fifty percent of EM interviewees identified speed of response as an NPO strength.

9.2.7 Trust of their Community

Trust of the community was mentioned in five of the review's papers (ARC 2014, Atkinson 2014, Deloitte Access Economics 2018, Hutton 2016, Whyte 2017).

'Nonprofits offer a trusted messenger for marginalised groups' (Hutton 2016, p. 33).

Trusted by the community was also strongly acknowledged as an NPO strength by 83% of all NPOs and 100% of EM interviewees, as the following quotes demonstrate.

'One of the greatest assets Lions has got is local knowledge - local knowledge, trust of the people in the area, because we are part of the community. They see us there all the time, we are there year around. We are not some fly by night, fly in then go - Lions are there all the time.'
(Archie - Lion)

'Another strength of ours is knowing the people, who to call, the phone numbers of everyone. And having relationships with them where you've done something so that they basically know you're real, you're your core values and that you can do anything' (Sue - NHV)

Resilience theory stresses the importance of community trust; with the first principle of the NSDR Community Engagement Model for Emergency Management being to ensure to take the time to develop trust (AIDR, 2013). These NPOs have been in and of the community for a long time. They have been seen contributing to the community and have developed trust over time.

'It is always a difficult thing to try to establish new relationships - but the trust is already there, the links are already there. There is just so much easier for everybody.' (Herminie - DHHS)

As trust cannot just appear overnight, this NPO attribute is a significant contribution to any community engagement; as the above quote recognises.

9.2.8 Cost Effective.

Four papers from the Scoping Review identified cost effectiveness as an NPO strength (Atkinson, 2014; Benson, Twigg & Myers, 2001; Izumi & Shaw, 2012; Ranghieri & Ishiwatari, 2014).

‘(mobilising NPO volunteers) providing a cost- effective way of mobilizing large- scale emergency response capacity’ (Ranghieri & Ishiwatari, 2014)

*‘..carrying out projects at lower costs ... than the government agencies.’
(Izumi & Shaw, 2012).*

All NPO interviewees recognised cost effectiveness as an NPO strength. There may well have been different perspectives on this strength, given that NHV representatives interviewed were paid employees and relied heavily on volunteer help and Lions Clubs or Rotary Clubs were all volunteers. The Service Clubs may also rapidly access donated funds from members across their District, Australia or internationally. However, these were highly valued funds raised from donations and there was a strong element of doing much with little.

‘Someone says ‘what about that’ and then we are like ‘well we can do that’ and we do it on nothing (\$0) and if you can pull something in, well that is an NHV strength.’ (Jane - NHV)

‘Within 24 hours, red tape went out the window. \$10,000 overnight, a phone calland money goes straight into the account. That happens quickly because you need money now. Later you can apply for Lions International Fund, Lions Australia fund, Victorian Lions fund and each district’s fund. So, you have funding at all different levels to assist not only disasters but a lot of other things as well.’ (Archie – Lion)

NPOs are cost effective because their workers are generally volunteers. Rotary Club and Lions Club members have to pay to join these clubs and pay for their own costs in helping others. Given their own membership networks or work histories, they are effective in sourcing donated products and skilled labour. Eighty-three percent of NPO interviewees

recognised cost effectiveness as a strength, while 64% of EM interviewees mentioned it as an NPO strength.

9.2.9 Support Mental Health and Community Well-being

Four papers from the scoping review (Acosta & Chandra, 2013; Atkinson, 2014; Cretney, 2016 and Gallagher et al., 2019) noted that NPOs supported mental health in an individual and well-being in a community. NPOs are a fundamental aspect of social infrastructure and offer a frame for collective support (Gallagher et al., 2019).

‘Nonprofits can help create and perpetuate personal networks which reduce disconnectedness, particularly for vulnerable populations’

(Atkinson, 2014, p. 169)

In this context, where NPO actions are considered, there are many examples of NPOs helping with community well-being and mental health support; albeit without being scientifically evaluated. Perhaps it is unfamiliar terminology or way of expressing this strength, and stakeholders were not yet familiar or comfortable with expressing this. Regardless 50% of NPO interviewees recognised this important strength, and 64% of the EM sector brought up this strength in the interviews. There was mention of community well-being actions, but not spoken of in those terms, as the ensuing quotes highlight.

‘we were able to support them in a different sort of way to some of these agencies. We were able to look a little bit more on the recreational side as well, so we were able to give them some support in feeling as though there was some normality back in their lives. (Barbara – NHV).

‘started with four Rotarians and a couple of Lions and other people. We have a suicide prevention network here as a consequence of the problems associated with our fires. And those problems still go on and Rotary support that. These are all partnerships so people might belong to Rotary

*but they also belong to other things as well which are off to the side.’ (Colin
– Rotarian).*

*‘There were people (fire impacted residents) who weren't so interested in themselves as much as the fauna and flora. One of the projects that we worked on was building nesting boxes.... Ballarat TAFE College and University... came on board and supplied me with over 600 nesting boxes that we put around the place.... Rotary has a very good reputation.... they trust us and that's why the University did it over a long period of time. They (fire impacted residents) said ‘we would rather work on getting our birds and other things looked after. There are some out here (birds) and they've got nowhere to live’.... **they felt so good when these simple things were done. Now it's not high on the list of what people think about, as people who are responders, but we need to listen and have a better understanding of what the people's needs are.**’ (Colin – Rotary).*

There is growing evidence of the impact of disasters on mental health and the importance of psychosocial support (McCabe et al., 2014). As an established social capital structure within the community, NPOs already offer much to enhance community wellbeing. There is so much profit for the community to gain, where this strength and capability of nonprofits is cultivated and supported.

9.2.10 Communication

Two papers raised communication as a strength of NPOs (Benson, Twigg & Myers, 2001; Whyte, 2017). NPOs may advocate for the community and for vulnerable groups that may not have a voice. NPOs can push for answers and disseminate information, as well as interpret government speak to community speak. Another aspect of communication is that some NPOs have a structure of communication and response in place before the disaster occurs. This was not true for all NPOs but where it occurred it was particularly useful.

'they attempt to give disempowered or marginalised people a voice in policy discussions' (Benson, Twigg & Myers, 2001).

This strength was identified by Australian stakeholders. Communication is also an important aspect of an NPO's networking strength. Fifty percent of NPO representatives and 14% of EM representatives interviewed mentioned this as a strength.

9.2.11 Membership Network

One paper in the scoping literature review identified member networks as a strength, particularly of faith-based NPOs (Cherry & Lucas, 2016). These networks refer to the networks within the organisation itself, as opposed to those within the community or elsewhere. As discussed in Chapter 6, these internal networks are a significant strength of larger NPOs. The geographical spread of these organisations reduces the risk of all members being impacted by disaster at the one time. Being part of a network, also appears to facilitate volunteering to disaster aid.

'..being connected to religious and civic groups and networks seem to be the most salient factors when it comes to actually volunteering or financially contributing to disaster aid' (Cherry & Lucas 2016, p. 256).

The Lions Clubs organisation '...have a Club in nearly every town in Victoria...' (Elizabeth - Lion). Neighbourhood Houses host visitors from 97% of all Victorian postcodes (Richard - NHV). This strength was mentioned by all Rotary Clubs and Lions Club interviewees but only the representative from NHV head office. This may reflect the more private sector orientation of Service Clubs, and recognition of the benefits of access to external (to the region) funds and geographic spread of members.

'The organisation itself is an asset, the autonomy, the resources and assets we have individually, right around the country, the resources we can pull in...our members are police, our members are doctors, our members are

mums and dads, our members are politicians. An asset of Lions is the diversity of membership within the community.’ (Archie-Lion).

The geographic reach of membership was also recognised as a strength by six of the emergency management stakeholders. Finally, access to specialist skills of members and the member network were recognised for the significant strength it is.


‘...that's the sort of thing that is often overlooked in an organisation like Rotary and the same thing that applies to Lions. We are an organisation, an International Volunteer service organisation but based on vocations. People's vocations and the dignity of various vocations depending on whatever they may be, are integral to Rotary, we can tap into those specialist skills but it's very under-utilised’ (Greg - Rotarian).

There were many examples of specialist skills donated as part of member contributions highlighted in the case studies. Examples include: a professional landscaper planning gardens and identifying what plants may be salvaged, a plumber plumbing shower facilities, farmers helping with affected farm livestock, mechanics fixing machinery.

9.2.12 NPO Actions and Strengths Precis

The identified strengths of NPOs fit well with key components of the Sendai Framework, Resilience theory in the disaster setting, the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience, the Rockefeller Framework, EMV’s Community Resilience and social capital theory in the disaster space. Hence accessing those strengths effectively should enhance a community’s resilience. The research conceptual frameworks of Chapter 5, with social capital cross-cutting across the key aspects, are drawn on for the thesis scaffolding in Figure 9.1 and Figure 9.2. These Figures use examples of NPO actions identified during case study investigations and summarised in Table 7.6, to demonstrate how Australian NPOs contribute to building community resilience to disasters, and particularly through contributing to a community being engaged and empowered.

Figure 9. 1: What Matter Most to Building Community Resilience to Disasters - Examples from Case Studies (Part 1)



Source: drawing on interviews and this research

Figure 9. 2: What Matter Most to Building Community Resilience to Disasters - Examples from Case Studies (Part 2)




Figure 9.1 (Part 1) and Figure 9.2 (Part 2) were grounded in the ‘What Matters Most’ approach based on the literature, with examples informed by perceptions of interviewees. These figures only highlight some of the actions, as all actions identified in the research would not be able to fit on the Figures. Placed in the thesis scaffolding above, how NPO actions can contribute to building community resilience, before, during and after disasters is illustrated. Through the case study examples, NPOs have demonstrated multiple times, in a range of regions and facing different disasters, their ability to engage the community.

The strengths of NPOs identified in the thesis provide a strong platform on which to undertake these actions. The NPO strength of community connections ensured access to diverse populations, to enable safety briefings and disaster education (for example: fire awareness workshops, weather information meetings). These types of actions fit the red, first aspect of ‘What Matters Most’, that ***the community is aware of the risks they face***. Strengths such as local knowledge of vulnerable people, and that the NPOs were recognised for their motivated volunteers, and their creative and flexible solutions, helped NPOs to tackle the yellow ‘What Matters Most’ aspect, that ***the community takes actions to reduce their risks of disaster***. Examples of NPO actions from the case studies that fit this aspect included NHVs establishing a food bank to support people in need, Lions organising groups to remove tree litter and hence reduce fire risk, Rotary supporting Men’s Shed to provide cooking lessons for older, at risk, widowed men, and Service Clubs supporting vaccination campaigns.

The third ‘What Matters Most’ aspect identified from the conceptual frameworks, was that ***the community acts to prepare for disaster response and recovery***. Figure 9.1 illustrates how NPOs help to address this aspect through one NHV’s creation and facilitation of the ‘Dig In Café’ that practiced community dining and working together with other community stakeholders (for example: the local Woolworths) to build skills in that community that would help if there were a disaster. Another example of an action

that contributes to this aspect was the Lions ‘Asset List’ that lists the local Lions Club members who have equipment that could be useful.

Knowledge of their community, response speed, and empowering their community were all strengths evident in these actions. Through these NPOs, their communities have become empowered to identify local needs and address them (Figure 9.2).

These NPOs have benefited their communities through enhancing social capital. Lions Clubs and Rotary Clubs barbeques supporting NHV social and other events, bring people together, they support community wellness and help community communication channels. The communities have been enabled to address local concerns through NPO actions and the structures they offer, and hence these groups help build their community’s disaster resilience. To facilitate and enable these actions, disaster risk reduction governance needs to improve, for example through having local NPOs ‘at the table’ for emergency management planning (Figure 9.2).

To investigate what barriers are inhibiting NPOs from participating in the disaster space, Barriers and Enablers are examined in the next segment.

9.3 Barriers and Enablers to NPO Actions – Synthesis of Findings

The synthesis of study findings identified a range of barriers and enablers that were organised under thematic headings (Column 1 in Table 9.2). They were further organised by ranking the number of papers that identified each barrier from the work done in Chapter 3 Scoping Nonprofits in the Disaster Setting (Column 2 in Table 9.2).

The enablers presented in Column 3 of Table 9.2 are a summary of suggestions of enablers obtained from interviews, the literature and other relevant work. This chapter segment presents these findings, collated with evidence statements. In this way the secondary questions of ‘what are the barriers facing NPO action?’ and ‘how they may be overcome?’ have been addressed.

Table 9. 2: Summary of Barriers and Enablers Identified in the Synthesis

BARRIER*	# of Papers[^]	ENABLER
<p>STRUCTURAL BARRIERS Command and Control Culture Weak integration, little collaboration, conflict between local NPOs and government EM systems Number and Timing of meetings prevent participation by volunteers or time-poor stakeholders</p>	6	<p>Undertake community mapping to identify local NPO capacity, interests and local community need. Incorporate NPOs in discussions of fit through before, during and after disaster planning. Train NPOs on EM legislation, structures, responsibilities. Establish and develop MOUs between NPOs and government. NPOs to introduce selves to LGV EM officer, present Club capabilities, ensure details updated on council websites, databases. Ask to be at the table. Train EM representatives in community development skills. Fund appropriately. Regular scenario planning/drills across EM sector, including NPOs, to help groups practice collaborations (ARC 2014b) Support development to learn culture and lessons management for all stakeholders (Jackson and Forbes 2018), enable access to resources</p>
<p>NON-RECOGNITION OF NPOs Lack of role definition Little operational guidance for NPO involvement</p>	5	<p>Be 'At the Table', pre-event establish networks. Co-working with other NPOs and EM stakeholders, at a central location (ARC 2015). Consistent value offerings Use a checklist of responsibilities for NPO leaders to identify actions in before, during and after disaster (Acosta and Chandra 2013) Clear roles and responsibilities, clear time frames, targets, indicators (UNISDR 2017b)</p>
<p>LACK OF NPO RESOURCES Lack of financial, staff resources. Reliance on volunteers. Short term funding detrimental. Unfunded Mandate</p>	5	<p>Not raised as issue with service groups, Government place greater emphasis on NHV greater funding on DRR, community resilience and fund longer term programs accordingly. Clusters of NPOs a useful model.</p>
<p>LACK OF TRUST Government inflexible due to strict accountability and reporting requirements. Government not trust NPOs can be held accountable. Legislative requirements Certification, Insurance Lack of trust between stakeholders</p>	4	<p>Develop relationships with EM stakeholders, NPOs get accreditation, NPOs get EM training Strong legal and governance frameworks to manage and enable DRR strategy (UNISDR 2017a)</p>

POOR COMMUNICATION Language barriers One-way communication	3	Consistency of language. EM stakeholders have prioritized this area. Texts, social media, Build stakeholder relationships pre-event (ARC 2014b) Put in place measures to ensure continuity in the face of disasters (ARC 2014b) Put in place communication that enables feedback, greater consultation EM to partner with local schools, community clubs for information, training in disaster preparedness and response (Torrens Institute 2017)
LACK OF COORDINATION BETWEEN NPOs Absence of leadership Difficulties managing volunteer/surge donations Competition for funding	3	Not raised as an issue in interviews. Examples of local NPOs working well together. Rotary example illustrated District Governor as main contact into networks of clubs through Blue Mountains. Examples of strong linkages between need and supply of specific goods addressing need. Examples of handling volunteer surge well (NHV). Use services of e.g. Bendigo Volunteer Resource Centre, ask for targeted donations or vouchers to local businesses.
LACK OF TRAINING IN EM BY NPOs	2	Government to offer training
LACK OF GOVERNMENT RESOURCES Funding. Local government lack of capacity, capability, Insufficient commitment. Learning not systematic	1	Government increase funding resilience, as per Sendai 'sufficient and stable financial resources dedicated to implement strategy (DRR)' (UNISDR 2017a, p3). Mainstream DRR across all sectors (UNISDR 2017a) Develop capacity at local and state level, context based, locally driven, inclusive (UNISDR 2017a). Local and state effective accountability measures (UNISDR 2017a). Empower staff capacity to manage process, communication, evaluations, networks. Clusters/networks of LGV areas a useful model.
NPO VULNERABILITY DURING DISASTER	1	Membership networks outside disaster area
OTHER BARRIERS: EGOS, PERSONALITIES, AGENDAS, HISTORY#		

*Based on themes identified in Scoping Literature Review, Table 3.4; augmented where appropriate with interview comments. ^ Scoping Literature Review; Chapter 3, Table 3.3; # Mentioned in interviews.

There was significant variability of responses regarding barriers which made the usefulness of repeating the structure of Table 9.1 dubious. Yes, command and control was considered a barrier by most NPOs interviewees, but it was contextual. Not all NPOs had issues with all EM organisations, it varied with location, personalities and aspects

they were dealing with. Hence the results of barriers and enablers were summarized in the format above.

9.3.1 Structural/Cultural Barriers to NPO Actions

Six studies from the scoping review (Acosta & Chandra, 2013; ARC, 2014b; Bajaracharya, Hastings, Childs & McNamee, 2012; Chen, Chen, Vertinsky, Yumagulova & Park, 2013; Jackson & Forbes, 2018; Jenkins, Lambeth, Mosby & Van Brown, 2015) found structural barriers prevented actions by NPOs. The command and control culture, government agencies dictating actions rather than attempting authentic collaborations, the different language used and the lack of common norms between nonprofit groups and emergency management organisations made participation by NPOs in actions before, during or after disasters difficult (Jenkins, Lambeth, Mosby & Van Brown, 2015; Bajaracharya, Hastings, Childs & McNamee, 2012).

The top-down EM culture and differences between organisations led to weak or no integration between local NPOs and government disaster management systems (Acosta & Chandra, 2013; Chen, Chen, Vertinsky, Yumagulova & Park, 2013). While the command and control model remains relevant in disaster response, it has failed to incorporate a community voice in preparedness and recovery phases (ARC, 2014b). As a result, collaborations with other stakeholders are poor and not authentic (Jenkins et al., 2015).

From the NPO case studies, the command and control culture were noted of CFA personnel, and also of Emergency Management personnel within local government. All NPOs reported experiencing difficulties in trying to work with more traditional EM stakeholders, sometimes local government, sometimes CFA; which reflects the importance of context.

‘So, we were up and running right away. But we got stopped, we got stopped because we weren’t the Red Cross, we weren’t the Salvation Army, we were Lions and we weren’t on the list’.(Archie- Lions)

‘culturally different... Put up hand, get told ‘what are you doing here?’(Sue-NHV)

‘We have a bit of an adversarial relationship with the local Brigade. It seems like it is cultural. It is not unusual, I hear this at the Monash Forums etc other groups, local Community House wants to do something and the local brigade says no, is not helpful’ (Sue-NHV)

In some regions the relationship with Council representatives was empowering, but with CFA toxic, in other regions the situation was reversed.

‘the CFA ...were really, really, really difficult to work with. They need to have that (command and control) in times of emergency and they need a rigid instruction system’ (Sandra – NHV).

*‘...we are on our shiny white horse and we're here to save the day - well for f**sake we have been here for weeks and doing an exceptional job.... I felt that when the agencies came in, they were very Command-and-Control and were very disrespectful of what was already in existence. They came from that Command and Control position, as opposed to coming in with Community Development workers and really working with existing, building and improving what is already there. Rather than you guys get out, we are here now’ (Sandra – NHV).*

Equally the local government representatives had difficulties at times with the command and control culture of the traditional EM organisations, as the following evidence statements attest. There were frustrations about the disconnect between the command and control culture of EM organisations and the community development, community-based culture needed in the resilience and recovery space.

‘...the command and control structure of EM organisations. Most of the agencies have evolved from paramilitary organisations so it is very much

about decision making going up and down...There is a real disconnect between how these community-based organisations work and how emergency organisations work. I think EMV are trying to break down those barriers a little bit. But it is almost like the culture of the thing... like agencies wanting to have control.’ (Greg – LGV)

‘communication with emergency services and that top-down thing - we know we want to be involved but they’re not letting us.’ (Rachael – EMV).

And some highlighted the role confusion between organisations, which parallels work underway currently on the role of LGV in emergency management.

‘Agencies..are very quick to tap Council on the shoulder and say you are doing it wrong. Other agencies don't have a proper understanding of how it works locally, rather than the Councils having the problem themselves.’
(Greg – LGV)

However, there were also those that spoke of seeing, in some areas, a willingness to move away from the old school command and control style, a willingness to become more collaborative and use a more community development approach.

‘I do believe there is a cultural shift occurring ‘cause when I first started trying to engage with CFA at a regional level it was very much ‘that's not your role, you just stay over there and don't get involved’’ (Sandra – NHV).

‘You can see with EM personnel in council there are ... two schools of thought...old school I will come in I will create a plan we will action that plan when there is an emergency. It's all based on what council know, do and planned for. And then there are the younger ones...had more training in the community development space and... much more aware of all the

different services ...and are much more willing to go and find what is out there' (Richard - LGV).

9.3.1.1 Enablers to Overcome Cultural Barriers

The literature and interviews suggested a number of enablers to narrow the cultural divide and improve collaboration. Undertaking community mapping to identify local community needs, local NPO capacity and interests would aid understanding. As would including NPOs in discussions with the EM sector before, during and after disaster planning. Train NPOs on EM legislation, structures and responsibilities to gain understanding of the EM environment. Establish and develop Memorandum of Understandings between NPOs and government EM organisations. At the local level, NPOs could introduce themselves to the local LGV EM officer, present their Club capabilities well before any disaster event. The NPO should ensure their Club details are always updated on the council websites and databases; and ask to be at the table.

The government needs to fund community development skills training and community development programs appropriately. Emergency Management representatives need to be trained in community development skills. Regular scenario planning and running drills together across the Emergency Management sector, including NPOs, to help groups practice collaborations has proved to be useful (ARC, 2014b). Support the development of a learning culture and lessons management for all stakeholders (Jackson & Forbes, 2018) and enable access to resources to learn from past experiences.

Evidence from the interviews highlights that social capital in the form of political will and network contacts can be a useful enabler for this barrier. When their trucks were blocked by the Salvation Army, because they were not on 'the list', Lions Clubs used the contacts of members (Politicians) to get access to decision makers, and this enabled them to get approval to get their trucks through.

'It depends if somebody knows somebody - it depends on linkages, contacts.' (Archie - Lions).

'... So, we had to get to, do a lot of work again to make a lot of phone calls and say 'we have all this stuff that is needed, you have to listen to us. We have \$3 million, we have all these funds here, we have trucks coming in from all over the country, every single District Governor filling the trucks to bring it over to help and you won't let us distribute what is needed, what our members in the affected area are telling us is needed.' (Elizabeth - Lions).

One NHV felt it was important to consider likely reactions of EM stakeholders, but also keep with the consistent community resilience message, that as a community member the NPO has a right to be involved.

'you take those things into consideration whenever you're doing anything....That is what we have learnt, Keep on Message, Hold the Line.'
(Sue-NHV)

Sue, an NHV Manager, argued Neighbourhood Houses had to demonstrate their value to Government in resilience. And to be seen as an organisation 'not to be pushed around'.

'What that means is that the Neighbourhood House has to be seen as having value to the Government in the resilience space, for this kind of work. They also have to be seen as having the political will not to be pushed around.'(Sue-NHV).

'Different cultures is a barrier because you're supposed to do it this way. 'This is our thing, so you have to do it our way'. When disaster enters a community, then you make the community the centre' (Sue-NHV)

Fitting with the EM community engagement model, she argued that the community must be made central, when impacted by a disaster.

Other mechanisms overcoming barriers were illustrated as exemplars, but emphasised that to be enabled, and active before, during and after a disaster, the NPO had to be at the table. Relevant EM personnel making decisions needed to know the NPO, their capabilities and how to contact them. Having a pre-established network of local NPOs working together (as evidenced in Chapter 7.5.2.3.1) was demonstrated as a highly effective enabler and empowerer of NPO actions. The preestablished network also helped to minimise duplication of services.

9.3.2 Non-recognition of NPOs as a Barrier to NPO Actions

The scoping study identified six documents that acknowledged nonrecognition of NPOs as a barrier (Acosta & Chandra, 2013; ARC, 2014b; Campbell, 2010; Espia & Fernandez, 2015; Fitzpatrick, 2016; Taylor & Goodwin, 2015). Without recognition there is no role definition of what NPOs will or can do. There is no guidance as to how to incorporate NPOs into the EM system. NPOs are consequently alienated from linkage opportunities (ARC, 2014b). The lack of legitimacy of NPOs and perceptions of NPO by EM personal (Campbell, 2010; Fitzpatrick, 2016) have resulted in NPOs being overlooked or ignored by traditional emergency services. And consequently, ineffective utilization of NPOs leading to less than optimal outcomes for the community. Taylor and Goodwin (2015) talk of

‘the negative outcomes of blurred or absent authorising environments. Whatever authorising environments were, or should be, they needed to be as close to the ground and as local and inclusive as possible’ (Taylor & Goodwin, 2015).

From the Australian Service Clubs, barriers included the lack of recognition of NPOs as a viable contributor by EM personnel.

'Nobody knows what we do. We are our own worst enemy. Why are we our own worst enemy? Every dollar we get from the public goes back to the public.' (Archie – Lions)

'We are there, we are a part of the community, and usually we are the very first there, on site. We would set up a hall, beds, have everything there, cook up hot food, cold, we cook it all. We get it all together and then Red Cross will arrive because of the system that is set up – they do a great job I am not knocking them, but we have everything set up and going and then they turn up and say 'get out because you are not on the list' and they will then move in and take over. Which is terrific, but what I'm saying is let us be involved, we are the first on site, have the connections, we will help you.'
(Archie – Lions)

There was much frustration and anger when EM personnel ignored local advice.

'.. nobody had any idea what sort of flood was coming until it had arrived. There were people back at town (20km away) ... ringing up the night before saying this is one of the biggest floods coming. Nobody (the authorities) was taking any notice'

'The authorities were not taking any notice of the local knowledge. That would be a big barrier...They were passing on their local knowledge of many years living on the River and it wasn't taken and it wasn't noticed.' (John, Lion).

NHVs interviewees had a range of experiences, where the House's activities were ignored or not wanted, through to where they were used as a hub for disaster response.

'The people in the local Brigade don't know what we really do' (Sue – NHV).

‘generally, ...nonprofits are undervalued for what they can do and there is not a lot of understanding or awareness about how they can spring up and what they can do.’ (Jane -NHV).

However, in one situation, while the House was ‘at the table’ because of their geographic location, there was recognition that no local Service Clubs were there.

‘No, the Service Clubs were not included, they were not there’ (Barbara – NHV)

Also, that had the NHV not been hosting the Assistance centre, they did not feel they would have been invited to be ‘at the table’. Emergency Management stakeholders also recognised the issue.

‘...another barrier is government at all levels not having a very clear understanding of what groups are out there and what they can do.’ (Catherine – VICSES).

These barriers were also raised in the context of ‘personalities’ and ‘command and control’ ignoring NPOs, but perhaps there were also cases of EM personnel just not being aware of the capabilities and skills of NPOs (ARC, 2014b). EM stakeholders recognised that due to lacking resources, sometimes Government employees were just too busy to engage with NPOs. Or, were not able to assess the qualities and abilities NPO representatives offered to contribute.

9.3.2.1 Enablers to Help NPOs Be Recognised


The literature suggests to co-work with EM stakeholders and other NPOs at a central site would aid recognition and involvement (ARC, 2015). As with Enablers addressing Structural Barriers, community capability and needs mapping, being involved in community emergency planning with the LGV and discussing potential roles with local EM stakeholders would improve recognition.

'so our role is also about educating them about what a Neighbourhood House does.' (Sue – NHV)

The different layers of Service Clubs could be used to focus on the relevant levels of government. The Service Club hierarchy could establish Memorandum of Understanding with the EM hierarchy around what their Districts could or couldn't provide before, during and after a disaster. Consolidation of a well-defined value statement by service organisations would help here. Service Clubs could also ensure the people willing to be involved were familiar with the EM 'lingo', structures and legislation.

With thanks to Associate Prof. Michael Fitzharris for the idea, the following figure illustrates possible roles for NPOs, before, during and after disasters (Figure 9.3). While the long-term recovery benefits of using NPOs are more obvious, albeit with limited funding, given the monetary benefits of resilience actions (Deloitte Access Economics, 2013) there are potentially greater financial benefits from encouraging NPOs to target community resilience building. The stimulus for action in this field is often a disaster, yet with the spread of NPOs across the State and the tie in with community development, there may be enough of a hook to encourage resilience actions.

Figure 9. 3: In a Perfect World – Possible Roles of NPOs Before, During and After Disasters.



Source: modified from disaster framework from AIDR, 2018

The need to establish networks before any disaster was recognised as an important enabler and means to overcome a range of barriers. Establishing such groups before the event ensures capability of effective communication flows, identification of groups that can help and hence not missing NPOs through not knowing about them. A number of EM representatives pointed out that they didn't mean to miss groups, but they needed to be reminded of who was out there and what they could offer.

'My experience tells me that when you have an emergency like Black Saturday or floods or whatever, these organisations will come forward with spontaneous offerings. If we haven't had an opportunity to work out how to use these resources beforehand, I think the work is really all about thinking where their value could be offered. Here are the core functions of Emergency Management and where do you see yourself as an organisation sliding into that? Where the needs are - so where your skill set is and how could you contribute to helping?' (Charlie – ARC)

'the worst thing you can do is to make it up as you go (when facing an emergency). From my experience that is a seriously unuseful way to go. The less decisions you can make in the heat of the battle the better. I'm all about doing investment in the front end.' (Charlie – ARC).

The EM framework encourages NPOs to be 'at the table'. This is hard to do when they are not recognised or remembered.

'It's not that the intent is there to leave them out, it's just that you need the reminder of who is around.... To see what their expectations are, what they have available volunteer wise and things like that... what the group could actually contribute.' (Annette – LGV)

If NPOs want to be recognised by EM stakeholders, they need to proactively remind or demonstrate to EM stakeholders their capabilities and potential assets, prior to any disaster situation. Equally however, EM stakeholders need to be receptive to the NPOs' overtures of assistance.

9.3.3 Lack of NPO Resources as a Barrier to NPO Actions

There were a range of barriers, that were loosely collected under the theme 'Lack of NPO Resources'. These were recognised by five papers in the Scoping Review process (Acosta & Chandra, 2013; ARC, 2014; Bajaracharya, Hastings, Childs & McNamee, 2012; Chikoto, Sadiq & Fordyce, 2013; and Olsen, 2012). The limited or lack of financial resources faced by many NPOs restricts the amount of money that could be spent on disaster preparedness. A reliance on volunteers may lead to sub-optimal outcomes due to not being able to train them effectively or relying on their timetable. Olsen (2012) recognised the unfunded mandate that many NPOs have to deal with. This unfunded mandate was particularly evident with Neighbourhood Houses, as the following quote illustrates.

'They (government representatives) come and they expect us to sell their goods. You know whatever their program is, it gets funded to have somebody head it up at government level. They come it's okay, but there is no money in it for the local Neighbourhood Houses, but you are expected to support it' (Sue-NHV).

And another example, where it would have been nice to be asked:

'Nobody actually put up their hand and said use Neighbourhood House. They ...rang us and said we are coming. Yes, that is one thing I do remember very well' (Barbara - NHV).

One NHV house got told they didn't get funding because the funding body knew the NHV would do the program anyway.

'...I went to them and said 'so why didn't we get funded for this?'. And they said 'we know we don't need to, because even if you didn't get funding you would do it anyway'(Sue-NHV).

Another example of an unasked for, unfunded mandate:

'The support providers moved into the Neighbourhood House and ...they said 'well here you go, you guys can take on the volunteers' but we weren't getting any money for it. And then they dwindled off with their support and funnelled everything through the House.' (Sonya - NHV).

'...there is an expectation from the State government that NHV will step up into these roles, but we are asked to go to more and more things, but it is not paid for. I was at an EM community participation forum a couple of months ago. Sitting with VCOSS, other big players, and I thought – 'I am the only one who has to pay for this'...'we do it, and we don't get paid to...'. It is still there, these expectations.'(Jane-NHV)

'NH was trying to be a communication hub but was not given financial assistance to do that.'(Jane-NHV)

NHVs have a range of programs they try to address; emergency management and community resilience is just one of a collection of very worthwhile areas. Funding in all areas is limited, so limited financial resources is a barrier to future resilience actions.

'in reality..emergency management for most people outside this office, not that it is irrelevant but not a priority. Because they are busy trying to get work on a late train, get home, feed the kids, live their life and pay their mortgage. But in the industry, if we can use that term, we all think emergency management is everything, when it is not' (Fergus – VCC).

Like Lions Clubs and Rotary Clubs members, NHV volunteers are highly valued, but very busy and time poor.

'We have done stuff with Men's Shed, Rotary, Lions. I know what they are doing, but can I physically get to their meetings? Near impossible. But if we had another team member, that is something I would like to strengthen.'(Jane-NHV)

For the Australian NPOs studied, the Service Clubs had different financial constraints to NHVs. Their networks of members, disaster fund access structures already in place and fundraising for the community benefit culture were excellent at obtaining both financial resources and donated goods.

9.3.3.1 Enablers for Overcoming the Lack of NPO Resources

In the literature 'linkage building' was recommended, through NPOs enhancing government partnerships, contracts and agency networks (Hutton, Tobin & Whiteford, 2015). The networks around NHVs have resource saving benefits. Applying for funding or obtaining quotes for services, can be done for the whole area of NHVs. Programs can be run across the network; and knowledge shared about different agencies in the area and what both parties can offer each other. While networks provide governance and management support to Neighbourhood houses, they are also a conduit between what is happening at the grassroots and the peak body, and the peak body back down to the grassroots. Resources developed at the network level can be shared across the State. Both LGV and NHV suffer from being time constrained and cash poor. Clustering helps pool resources, facilitates knowledge transfer of what works and enables the application of greater EM programs across the State.

NPOs need to get valued and promote their value. The Deloitte Access Economic (2018) evaluation of Morwell Neighbourhood House will presumably enable that NHV to promote their value to funding bodies and government.

'We need to value nonprofits, the same way as we value businesses. We can't keep sucking them dry – good people are leaving the sector because they are burnt out.'There has to be more recognition and value of NH organisations, and pay for what they are doing. If we are not doing it right, fine don't fund it, but if we are, pay for it.'(Jane-NHV)

Lions Clubs have well structured finance mechanisms and quick access to cash.

'really looked after the Lions money so went to the right places...a really good auditing system and what we have learnt from this whole process is that you don't pay money to people, you pay invoices but you won't just give money to people' (Sally – Lion).

Having a broad network of volunteers is a significant strength of Lions Clubs and Rotary Clubs.

'I was in a meeting...Task force and speaking to her (Christine Nixon), there was a light bulb moment, she was sitting there and said 'so let me get this right, you have a Lion's club in every single town in Victoria? And you can mobilise straight away? Yeah'. So, from then on, we continued to work and we ended up taking over the welfare ticket system, and we did a whole lot of other things' (Elizabeth – Lion).

An option to enhance communication and optimise resources could be co-working. Co-working is where groups of independent workers (or representatives of organisations), pay a fee to share workspace facilities in order to undertake their tasks (ARC, 2015). This concept is being promoted particularly in the disaster recovery context, recognising the need for cooperation and coordination and the growing number of organisations that are working in recovery (ARC, 2015).

9.3.4 Lack of Trust as a Barrier to NPO Actions

The literature highlighted a lack of trust between stakeholders, with four papers alluding to this barrier (ARC, 2014; Fitzpatrick, 2016; Hutton, Tobin & Whiteford, 2015; and Tseng & Penning-Rowse, 2012). Government was often inflexible due to strict accountability and reporting requirements (ARC, 2014; Hutton, Tobin & Whiteford, 2015; Tseng & Penning-Rowse, 2012). The lack of trust and intransigence of Government was believed to reflect their valid concerns over government accountability requirements and liability fears. Government did not believe NPOs would be held accountable (ARC, 2014; Tseng & Penning-Rowse, 2012) and that in the post-disaster Royal Commission or review, they – Government organisations - would be.

The NPO interviews highlighted a number of instances where NPO actions were curtailed or stopped due to what were seen as legislation or litigation concerns.

‘Legislation is barrier, because it stops us working. We have been cooking steak sandwiches and sausages during a flood. It is raining and it’s cold. And someone else will turn up with sandwiches. What will people want? Cold sandwiches or hot food? But they tell us to move on, ‘pull your food van down you are not wanted.’ we go around the corner and set up. Then the police turn up, and you think ‘oh no, they are complaining’. But the police say ‘oh hold on guys, we will take your food to the people, because we know what they want’. They drive it down to the island and then the boats take it across to the people’. (Archie-Lions)

‘We are wanted in the community. But legislation and laws say we are not. We will work with them, we don’t want to take control. Once we are there, let us help.’(Archie-Lions).

LGV representatives raised the importance of police checks and having working with children accreditation.

'... they (NPOs) just want to get in there and help, and you understand that entirely, but for the person who has injured themselves or someone wasn't happy with you coming to my house and I have young children, you only need one thing and that makes it a lot more difficult. So those factors need to be considered' (Leanne – LGV).

They also mentioned disquiet about volunteers getting hurt while trying to help people during or after a disaster. If these volunteers did not have the protection of an organisation's insurance coverage, then they were vulnerable for medical expenses and loss of income. Another stakeholder highlighted the assurance-based foundation of EM systems in Victoria, where there needs to be someone responsible.

*'arrangements are set out in EMV based on emergencies we have already had. They are designed to provide assurance to Political Masters that an appropriate level of steps have been made and taken, and they are usually based on recommendations that have come out of Inquiries and Commissions...that you're learning the lessons along the way. I think that's the nub of why Rotary, Lions, the CWA and other organisations haven't been empowered. It is because **the people who are writing the arrangements and providing assurances to their Political Masters don't know how to use these skill sets and capabilities...** If you look through the EMV arrangements they are very much assurance based, someone is responsible.'* (Charlie – ARC).

With such requirements, and no knowledge of NPOs, it is unlikely for NPOs to be empowered, as the above quote verbalises. Some enablers to building trust were identified however, and these are outlined in the following section.

9.3.4.1 *Enablers to Building Trust*

Pre-establishment of groups and communication of legal and certification requirements (Working with children, Insurance, Police checks) could be a means of addressing the legislative and certification barriers that have been identified.

'I don't think there are any more barriers other than that (certification) I think the will is there. It is just how it happens and getting those discussions, agreements whatever in place early. Be talking to those Neighbourhood Houses ...Just start to talk and engage with them more about how they work, what they provide, how they think we could help them, what can we do together that sort of thing.' (Leanne – LGV).

The Sendai Framework require all levels of government to improve governance to enable disaster risk reduction strategies by the community (UNISDR, 2017a). But social capital linkages also help.

'having politicians in our Lions Clubs, that's when they're fantastic, when it comes to a disaster. Because when Black Saturday happened immediately we rang the Lions Club members who were politicians and they were able to help to us... got us into meetings immediately so they were very effective'
(Elizabeth – Lion)

There are also moves within both Lions Clubs and Rotary Clubs to be proactive about certification requirements.

'we are now trying to get every single person in every single Club to get a working with children card' (Elizabeth -Lions).

NPOs ensuring legislative requirements are met helps to reduce risks to both NPOs and government, hence lowering barriers to participation.

9.3.5 Poor Communication as a Barrier to NPO Actions

Poor communication between stakeholders was identified as a barrier in three of the scoping review papers (ARC, 2014; Bajaracharya, Hastings, Childs & McNamee, 2012; Fitzpatrick, 2017). The communication problems were due to a range of issues. There were language barriers associated with emergency managers having a different language, communication technologies being diverse or not working at critical times, and messages not being contextualised to the local level or disseminated in a way that penetrates and encourages engagement (Bajaracharya, Hastings, Childs & McNamee, 2012; Fitzpatrick, 2017). As the following quote recognises, different languages were not only an issue for NPOs but also was an issue between agencies.

'It is a different language and not only is it a different language but the way the local government speaks is a bit different to the way state agencies speak as well. Then Emergency Management acronyms and the language use there is a whole other ball game.' (Greg – LGV)

Community organisations are important in communicating with the community, indeed they are seen as essential for engagement and preparedness (Redshaw, Ingham, Hicks & Millynn, 2017). Successful use of community groups can enable two-way communications, leading to transmitting of community needs and engaging communities in resilience or risk reduction training (Torrens Institute, 2017). Karen-Burmese refugees working with the CFA, the Nhill Learning Centre and the University of Adelaide, provides an example of this where community members created a fire safety film targeting the Karen community (Nowell, 2018).

The communication value of community groups was recognised by NPO and EM stakeholders interviewed for this research. However research participants recognised that the lack of communication, or lack of two way communication were barriers to better NPO actions. In the case of the Hazelwood mine fire, the lack of effective communication channels created major tensions. The following highlighted example, illustrates the

anger and frustration of NPO stakeholders over their lack of voice experienced when dealing with government officials during a disaster event.

Communication – ‘Listen! Why Can’t We Talk Too?’

During the Hazelwood mine fire, the local NHV collected data on symptoms of illness, times of impact and where people lived, in a deidentified collection. The residents were concerned about health impacts of living with the smoke for any length of time. The data was given to the government, but there was no evidence of them using the information that was given to them.

This reinforced the belief that Government weren’t listening and didn’t understand what was happening to the impacted community and that communication was all one way.

‘...all the stakeholders that whizzed down here, talked at us, gave us all their handouts and whizzed back... They thought... that somehow they had earned the right to tell us what to do....And yet us nonprofits working on the ground, we collected the data and gave it to them... and it went into an abyss somewhere...Why do we have to earn this right to pass on information, but you don’t?’ (Jane - NHV).

‘...There is an assumption of a role... (transfer the Government’s information) but no financial support... and no two-way flow of information...’ (Jane - NHV).

NPO representatives felt EM representatives usually spoke at them, not listened to them, while EM personnel felt it was more about finding out what NPOs could do, where they could fit.

'I don't think there are too many barriers it's just what is practical what is realistic and the communication of working out what can be offered what do you want to do?' (Annette – LGV)

'what they're interested in and if they're not interested at all then we don't bother them but just so long as we give them information so that they are resourced at least.' (Annette – LGV)

Up dating contact information when roles change ties in with this. Frustrations on both sides were voiced at a 2016 MUDRI forum about changing contacts when jobs changed (MUDRI, 2016). Communities need accurate, timely information to make informed decisions (Fitzpatrick, 2016), as do EM personnel.

9.3.5.1 Enablers to Addressing Poor Communication

LGV representatives pointed out VICSES audits of municipal emergency management planning cover linkages with community groups and updating phone contacts is an audit requirement that every council should get audited on (Mark – LGV).

'...updating phone contacts is an audit requirement under municipal management planning and we get audited on that, and every council as part about MEP plan.... We have listed organisations pages long, but we have to go through regularly and update. It becomes a bit difficult when these groups do change their management structures and if they don't notify us... We put in place...Community Emergency Management Committees, so planning by the community for the community. We invite one member of those committees to sit in on our Municipal Emergency Management planning committee level and they give us their perspective from a community. Generally, these are high-risk communities, and we've got a number of them that formed after Black Saturday. So, we have those contact numbers there as well. And they go back to their small-town

associations, all the hall committees and they sit on all those things and they inform them of what we are doing at the municipal level.’ (Mark – LGV)

Given that ensuring contact lists are up to date is an audited item for LGVs, so more emphasis on this may also be beneficial. Turnover of NPO positions of responsibility, and Council and coordinating bodies not being notified was also noted as a communication barrier. NPOs ensuring their contact information is available to the Council and up to date on the Council website, as well as to other coordinating bodies would help.

‘we try to keep up to date with their contact details and it’s often what I say to the community organisations we can only help you as well as the information that you are giving us. It is about them also communicating. Communication is key to everything.... even with us with our 200 organisations that are linked with us...so yeah communication is a real challenge.’ (Sophie – BVRC).

At the same time, there is a high turnover of emergency management employees, which adds to relationship building and updating challenges. Another barrier raised in the Australian context was the high turnover of Council staff in the EM area; with its resultant impact on communication flows and corporate history.

‘you also get turnover, the amount of turnover of local government particularly in Emergency Management is quite high.’ (Fergus – VCC)

An enabler that has been used in the past to address this issue, to take on the time-consuming task of fielding volunteer calls and the coordination of volunteers, as well as addressing the invisibility of NPOs, is to use organisations such as the Bendigo Volunteer Resource Centre.

9.3.5.1.1 Exemplar - Aiding Communication - Bendigo Volunteer Resource Centre

Identification of 'who to call' was a barrier raised by both NPOs and government stakeholders. Turnover of contacts of Council staff ('they always move around, it is never the same person') and by Council or EM workers of NPO leadership changes ('we go to call someone, it's the wrong number') made keeping contact lists relevant and building relationships difficult. Bendigo Volunteer Resource Centre [BVRC] illustrates one way to address the barrier.

NPOs may not be on the EM staff radar at all, or they may be known but contact details are not up to date. There may be concerns regarding whether participants have insurance or have appropriate certification. The BVRC is an NPO based in Bendigo that provides resources, support and connections for organisations that involve volunteers. They provide volunteers and managers with training and support and help NPOs with volunteer recruitment (BVRC, 2018). In past incidences, where their region has been impacted, BVRC has collected information on volunteers, built communication channels with each of the groups involved in recovery, and identified with them what skill sets were needed. They were a buffer, an intermediary between people keen to volunteer and the Council or EM organisations.

'the CFA, VICSES whatever they are out doing their jobs so the last thing that they wanted to do be doing was answering the phone so that's why we saw that as a vital role' (BVRC)

As BVRC were used to handling people ringing wanting to volunteer, there were forms in place could be adapted to the needs at the time. They asked whether volunteers had 'working with children', police checks, what skills they have and what training had they done in the past. BVRC would also tell them how to get certification. BVRC already works with NPOs in their area. They promote activities when volunteers are needed, hold training and information seminars, and see as part of their mission connecting with these groups.

Another LGV representative spoke of her experiences with facilitating a community emergency plan, and advocated that the process, the conversations, the networks were community resilience.

‘...communication is always a wicked problem...working through a community emergency plan, the plan that you actually come out with at the end is great but the journey to that end product, it's the conversations, it's the networks. They arecommunity resilience. It's a networked community that knows and disaster is disaster because all the rules go out the window... if you have good community communication networks, that's where it starts. That's where the things can actually go forward. Frustration, fear come from not knowing. So, if communities have that network and people know who to talk to and know who the people are who have access to earthmoving equipment or who have access to toilets or to unlock the hall. All the things that make it less painful and less traumatic.... if we can establish those networks prior to disaster I believe then things will go better after the event happens’ (Melinda – LGV).

Another NHV proactively organised a community meeting to discuss weather mitigation. The discussion was structured to safeguard the community’s ability to ask questions and discuss issues, thus enabling more two-way conversations between EM representatives and the local population.

9.3.6 Lack of Coordination Between NPOs as a Barrier to NPO Actions

Three reports from the scoping study noted a lack of coordination between NPOs as a barrier to action (Acosta & Chandra, 2013; Atkinson, 2014; ARC, 2014). However, the only time this was raised in interviews were comments of non-recognised NPO actions being blocked by an officially recognised NPO, as evidenced below.

‘We are there, we are a part of the community, and usually we are the very first there, on site. We would set up a hall, beds, have everything

there, cook up hot food, cold, we cook it all. We get it all together and then Red Cross will arrive because of the system that is set up – they do a great job I am not knocking them, but we have everything set up and going and then they turn up and say ‘get out because you are not on the list’ and they will then move in and take over. Which is terrific, but what I’m saying is let us be involved, we are the first on site, have the connections, we will help you.’ (Archie – Lions)

There were many examples of NPOs working together, although this was also noted as subject to particular Club personalities; and restricted due to time constraints. As evidenced below.

‘We have done stuff with Men’s’ Shed, Rotary, Lions. I know what they are doing, but can I physically get to their meetings. Near impossible. But if we had another team member, that is something I would like to strengthen.’(Jane-NHV).

The interviewed NPO representatives highlighted some exceptional logistical efforts of managing donated goods (Lions Clubs with their warehouse of donations, the Council of Churches coordinated NPO group handling donations, an NHV collecting and distributing monetary donations, an NHV coordinating spontaneous volunteers). There was no evidence from the cases of NPOs not being able to handle donation surges, as was highlighted in the literature as a barrier. However, issues were raised where people donated things that were not requested; and the NPOs did not have the resources to sort through the donated goods. Donated goods were seen to destroy the local economy; with vouchers to local shops a much-preferred option.

9.3.6.1 Enablers to Improving Coordination Between NPOs

A study demonstrated NPOs benefits in extensive collaborations (Eller, Gerber & Branch, 2015). The barriers faced by particular NPOs will be impacted by their environment and organisational characteristics. Egos, working relationships, personalities all may have an

impact (Eller, Gerber & Branch, 2015). However, the NPOs interviewed demonstrated skill and ability in achieving actions with other NPOs.

An enabler to improve coordination would be Government funding additional staff for NHVs to act as interorganisational facilitators.

9.3.7 Lack of Training in EM as a Barrier to NPO Actions

Two papers identified a lack of training in emergency management, in the scoping literature review (Acosta & Chandra, 2013; ARC, 2014). Areas of concern were NPO inexperience with the incident command structure, a lack of understanding about emergency preparedness and response and a lack of understanding of relevant legislation (Acosta & Chandra, 2013; ARC, 2014).

The NPO interviews did not raise this issue. However, LGV and EM stakeholders flagged it as one of the reasons for conflict with NPOs or frustrations with how EM groups were operating during or after a disaster.

'It's community groups not understanding the ... legislated role of particular organisations.' (Catherine – VICSES).

'we would certainly engage them about recovery activities but we would probably make it what our expectations are, having that clear communication of what roles and what agencies are led by what and that working relationship (is far better) than letting them go Rogue or whatever.'
(Annette – LGV).

There was recognition from LGV of anger in the community about how previous offers of help had been handled. This needed to be overcome before community engagement and working together could move forward.

'A natural progression...we started out having conversations with different community members and often the same message....'we want to help but we don't know what we should be doing'.... anger from volunteer groups who are saying 'well we were available but were told that we weren't on the registers so we couldn't help'. So that was where (our work with the community) it stemmed from with us'. (Annette – LGV).

Anger was also seen to stem from misunderstanding agency roles.

'...there could be frustrations of 'well I'm a leader of the community and I will set up a response centre because the council hasn't'. That has happened in this municipality before, where people have taken that into their own hands. Part of working with us is to understand what agency roles are and what support roles can be played... Let's put it into context so they don't feel like they have to do every role and also to know that they can say no. They can say 'no we don't have the capacity', or 'we are burnt out', or 'we don't have the interest to work in extended recovery.' (Annette – LGV)

From an EM perspective, there were barriers to NPOs participating because they did not know the particular EM roles and systems. There were also difficulties in evaluating offers of help and judging the calibre of volunteers' services; particularly within a time pressured situation.

9.3.7.1 Enablers to Overcoming the Lack of EM Training

An enabler to this barrier would be Government funding to train NPO members on what EM training is required. Pre-disaster systems of assessment, training and understanding of what NPOs can offer would also help. While there has been some funding for EM staff in community development training, there is also a need for funding for NHV and other key NPO members for training in understanding the EM sector.

9.3.8 Lack of Government Resources as A Barrier to NPO Actions

Only one paper recognised this barrier in the scoping review (Tseng & Penning-Rowsell, 2012). However, it seemed to relate to a vast number of complexities in the emergency management space.

‘There is a shortage of FRM (Flood Risk Management) operations staff and finance for effectively mitigating flood risk.’ (Tseng & Penning-Rowsell, 2012, p. 262).

There appears to be a misnomer, particularly by Government, that Councils represent the community.

‘what we find is that there are assumptions made about capacity of local government and the connectedness of local government that may not stand up entirely’ (Richard – NHV).

Often Councils do not represent the bulk of the community and sometimes can't represent the whole area given geographical size and low funding base or low priority of Emergency Management of some council emergency budgets.

‘Emergency Management is not a core function of local government and therein lies a challenge. Local government colloquially is usually focused on rubbish and roads. It is not about Emergency Management, so Emergency Management for some small municipalities is not a priority and that is reflected in funding that is allocated into Emergency Management and staffing to co-ordinate that. Those municipalities that are well versed in Emergency Management and have dedicated Emergency Management staff are usually more well versed in the arrangements than those that are not.’
(Fergus – VCC)

As a consequence of LGV employees living outside the region, their contact with grassroots communities was restricted.

'Council areas are very large...and communities are quite different. Certainly, we would be looking for them (NPOs) to help us find out with what the community wants or how best to help them. Rather than just assume if we come and do this, then that's what you need' (Greg – LGV)

EM personnel identified the barrier of time, training and resources required to ensure community networks were established and maintained.

'there just isn't enough manpower/womanpower that's a barrier, I think.

Some of the challenges are around engaging in the before so that the community service organisations and community groups actually have a bit of an idea of their role' (Catherine – VICSES)

'if its not community-based it just falls over. There is so many examples where tiers of government get into a project that seems like a good idea, but as soon as it stops the funding the project falls over' (Richard - LGV).

Funding priorities also were dictated by perceptions of whether an area was high-risk or not.

'Some councils are highly attuned to the fact that they are in a high-risk area and they resource EM really well. With extra staff they've got the time, the resources to go and discover what's out there, to make those connections, come up with a plan of how they are going to bring other organisations and assets into the space.... others are just so under resourced. They can barely get through the basics of Emergency Management let alone have time and staff to go out there and really network, really learn about the other agencies and what resources they've got access to.' (Marian – CFA)

Timing of actions was also seen as a barrier; underpinned by too short-term or inadequate funding. Government funding arrangements turned into a barrier to actions, frustrating LGV employees and community members over funding arrangements that are for only 12 months.

'the Municipal Emergency Management enhancement group. 6 or 7 councils, we all get together quarterly and talk about our issues and how we can advocate on our behalf in Emergency Management issues with agencies... The main one is cost-shifting - we are seen as being closest to our communities, so we can do all the work....will give you some funds for 12 months then will pull the funds, will build the community's expectation that Council will do this with funds, and then will walk away after 12 months and leave you to it. With 2.5% rate capping. We have to try and convince our Counsellors and our senior management why we shouldn't take the funding in the first place.' (Mark – LGV).

There is a sense that government does not value recovery, with recovery funding available for only two years after the event (Young & Jones, 2018).

'recovery is the poor cousin to response, so if you don't have blue or red lights on the top of your car it is really hard to get airplay. I also think that governments know that they are operating on the good will of the people. So, people who want to help will help regardless of whether they will get paid or not' (Fergus – VCC).

'barrier is perception of response versus recovery and the function of recovery is much longer term than response. It is just harder to see and harder to quantify. And you can see that about resilience also... Perception and understanding of what recovery is, the by product is staffing, workforce, funding. The bigger issue is perception and value of recovery' (Fergus – VCC).

While at every level, elected representatives are pressured to quickly reduce disaster impacts, this needs to be balanced against ensuring recovery decisions include community consultation and their priorities (AIDR, 2018a). NPO representatives and 50% of EM stakeholders recognised speed of response as an NPO strength, although one LGV representative didn't mention speed as a strength. It was felt that it was far more important to get the processes (insurance cover for workers, certification) in place before action.

9.3.8.1 Enablers to Addressing Lack of Government Resource

Funding to encourage incorporating emergency management activities into community development at the local government level, resilience activities funded for more than a year, specific disaster resilience funding for NHVs, longer term (longer than two years) recovery funding would overcome many of the barriers arising currently. Research highlighting the benefits of resilience activities estimate that were the Australian Government to spend \$250 million per year on pre-disaster resilience, this would potentially save \$12.2 billion across all government levels, and result in a more than 50% reduction in natural disaster costs by 2050 (Deloitte Access Economics, 2013).

There was mention of the importance of building up the capability of Government representatives in terms of emergency management and community resilience.

'what we are trying to do in terms of building organisational capability is to get the organisations to understand that you just can't put them (Emergency Management) into a nice little funny box off to the side. It needs to be a capability that's... the function of safety. Most councils may have a safety and risk management area, but safety is everybody's responsibility. When we have a big event, you're not going to have 0.2 of people being involved are you?... The Executive teams, the Mayor and Councillors are going to be spokespeople, the roads people are going to be involved in recovery, the natural environment people may be helping out with some of the environmental management stuff' (Greg – LGV)

'it really depends on who's there and what the values are, and what the accessibility is in every area. There are some people who are really involved in ...planning and preparedness and resilience.... But then you've still got people in Local Government who are very old school thinking about Emergency Management. You know you will be told what to do and you need to do that.'

'There are some really fabulous people working in local government, absolutely fabulous around the traps, who take their emergency service roles really seriously and they're the ones that do well.... but the ones that put their head in the sand and don't think it's their job, and don't respond... it's up to the council to step in and support the community... The reality is some LGV guys are better than others'. (Catherine – VICSES).

'Looking at Capability models, incorporating self-assessment of qualitative stuff like interactions with NPOs. LGVs on a spectrum on performance on this issue, some great, some not. Some use a consultant to write their Emergency plans, then when an event happens don't know what to do.'

(Greg – LGV)

The point was made that while researchers, stakeholders who focus on the emergency management sector believe the area to be of significant, where people have not experienced disasters or may never experience them, then that skill set may not be as important.

'it is very hard to keep everybody's skills and knowledge up when they may never experience anything in their working life. (Leanne – LGV)

'some of the challenges around that are that everybody is really busy and the primary role of any of those not-for-profits is not Emergency Management focused because of the busyness of people, it is quite

hard to engage in a meaningful way before an emergency' (Catherine – VICSES).

Clusters of LGV staff from close but different Councils, have been developed following the 2009 bushfires. There are 6 groups of collaborations (clusters or EM partnerships) around Victoria, as well as a State Municipal Council Emergency Management Enhancement Group. With like accreditation, training, administration and agreements in place for how they are paid/funded staff can quickly be moved to areas in need following a disaster. In planning or in emergencies, these clusters share knowledge across municipalities.

Recognition that EM is a discrete function that they have a legislated role in, and that were a disaster to happen, so many LGV roles would be impacted, has helped to improve EM preparedness and response. As a cluster there is more resourcing, and activities (such as the launch of 'social stories') can be rolled out in multiple areas and having people with prior knowledge speeds up the process. These municipal council clusters show constructive ways to overcome limited resources.

9.3.9 NPO Vulnerability During Disasters as a Barrier to NPO Actions

In planning to use grassroots resources, there is a risk that those volunteers may be impacted in the disaster and not be able to contribute as planned. That is a weakness identified in place-based NPOs. The scoping review unearthed one paper that tackled this theme (Bains & Durham, 2013). All NPO interviewees identified this as a significant issue. John had been personally affected, and so could not act in a volunteer role initially, as evidenced below.

'I as a Lion, was not able to do much ... because the (family) farm was heavily flooded as well.' (John – Lion).

Another interviewee was in the Incident Control Centre for the initial response, in their role as a CFA volunteer, so did not start in his Rotary Club role until after the fires were

out. Others made mention that because they had not personally been impacted, or the NHV House had not been impacted, they were able to work in their NPO.

‘As the Community House was fine we were able to use that house as a space for people to come to meet. We became an assistance centre.’

(Barbara – NHV).

However, when the entire community is impacted, as was the case with the Morwell Mine Fire, there is greater vulnerability.

‘21st Feb. smoke was just toxic, I had a really dizzy head, and I felt like we had just reached a peak.’ (Jane – NHV).

‘Those of the community not impacted, they can help bring everyone up, but here everyone was impacted. Then if you look at the CSIRO modelling, they were impacted across the entire Valley’ (Jane – NHV).

9.3.9.1 Enablers to Minimising NPO Vulnerability During Disasters

One of the more significant findings to emerge from this study is that structurally these organisations, Lions Clubs, Rotary Clubs, Neighbourhood Houses, offer a huge benefit. The benefit of the Lions Club (and their like) structure is that it enables Lions Club members impacted to quickly communicate their needs, the community needs, to their extensive Lions Clubs network of financial and resource-rich support, that lies outside the impacted area. Local Neighbourhood Houses impacted may be constrained by staff also dealing with the impact of the disaster, they have few financial or staff resources, but have in place a structure of volunteers and physical infrastructure embedded in the community that are extremely useful as a community hub/base.

‘So... I had had a really bad weekend. CFA ... touched base with me. And I said I couldn’t deal with it anymore – and they actually pep talked me through it. They said ‘you just have to keep doing it. We are going to come

down, we will be there, what do you need? Sausages? Tomato sauce? What do you need?'. They got me back on the road, so we came back.' (Jane – NHV).

This enabler is at once highly context specific, but also applicable across Victoria; where there are strong linkages and community networks that can support each other.

9.3.10 Other Barriers Inhibiting NPO Actions

From the interviews a range of other barriers were mentioned, that had not been identified in the scoping literature review. These are presented in Table 9.3 and discussed below.

Table 9. 3: Other Barriers to Nonprofit Organisations Identified in Interviews.

Council blockages

Privacy, Insurance, 'Red tape', No direct contact, Time taken to respond, Working hours

Not listen to local knowledge

Egos, Personalities, Territorial

Insurance for over 75s

Evolution/change in sector causing huge amount of time trying to keep up with meetings, reports, changes

Geographic spread of LGV, no connections, Not live in area

Donated goods destroy local economy, vouchers to local shops

Turnover of EM, Council staff

Turnover of NPO positions

Source: Barriers identified by interviewees.

9.3.10.1 Enablers Using Legislation, Sendai, NPO structures To Overcome Barriers

Supportive legal frameworks and inclusive, strong and transparent governance systems are believed key to enabling disaster risk reduction strategies (UNISDR, 2017b). Analysis of the major Emergency Management organisations' policy and strategy documents

regarding community input into such strategies indicate a shift towards more inclusive behaviour (Chapter 8). The EM stakeholders interviewed recognised the strengths offered by NPOs and showed a willingness to include these organisations in some aspects. However, there were few examples of sustainable, community-led actions, involving EM organisations. The State-wide exception was ‘Driver Reviver’ programs between VICSES and NPOs. There were some CFA examples on a location by location basis.

While policy and culture are moving towards more community input, other legislative considerations could help to reduce barriers to NPO participation. Some interviewees with experiences in community recovery committees called for flexibility in certain rule applications, a ‘Rule-breaking Code Book’, that comes into play when a situation makes it necessary. To overcome situations where regulations say ‘*you don't have a permit, you can't do this, you can't do that*’. They recognised the need for a ‘book’ that says ‘*okay, if this is happening, Yes, you can do that*’.

‘The disaster comes to town, don't let the emergency people ... further traumatize the people. Tell me why I can't do stuff, help them achieve what they need to achieve because sometimes it's pretty simple. Sometimes the rules are the barriers’ (Sue NHV).

Some barriers were identified in the Australian context, for example: council blocking NPO actions because of privacy concerns, insurance concerns, ‘Red tape’, no direct contact, time taken to respond, working hours and not listening to local knowledge. Other barriers raised from NPOs and LGV staff included the difficulties in working with ‘Egos’, Personalities, people overly concerned about their Territorial patch. LGV representatives mentioned their concerns about older volunteers becoming more vulnerable and placing too much pressure on them. NPOs mentioned the difficulties in getting insurance for over 75's, regardless of how competent and fit those over 75's were.

Learning from what others had done in particular situations was also flagged as particularly useful. The Monash *Compendium of Victorian Community-based resilience*

building case studies examples and encouragement to contribute to this could be a meaningful way to distribute creative solutions (MUDRI, 2015). Further, ensuring there is follow up on Accountability Assessments of EM organisations following an event is another learning opportunity.

9.3.10.2 Need for Consistent Value Offerings

One concern regarding NPOs was building the expectation that all local NPOs can and are willing to work on resilience building. Each Neighbourhood House, each local Lions Club is autonomous. If individual members chose to be active in this space, there are opportunities to work with the emergency services. However, they may choose not to be involved. There were discussions about identifying the core value propositions, core competencies that NPOs could offer to a situation. Consistency of those propositions across all clubs were identified as challenging, and unrealistic. Yet there was thought to be value in engaging with NPOs in emergency management *'at the level they are capable and want to do'*.

'...organisations need to have some level of consistency to become a trusted partner, a reliable source...when you think of Rotary....you think highly skilled, trained, connected and therefore they can do anything from fencing to planting trees to banking or general manager of something.' (Charlie – ARC)

'a challenge for the not-for-profit sector and.. for EM sector, is the catchall phrase in EM ...borne out of EMV... that 'we work as one'...It is a nice motherhood statement, but...when you look at a particular Municipality and see what resources are available at that Municipality... the reason why the likes of Red Cross and VCC are capable of doing what we do at a state, regional and local level, is because we have a state coordination function....when you get an emergency that is on a scale that is beyond a single municipality that is where it becomes tricky because you develop an

expectation ...at state level. The 'we work as one' says look at Lions and NHVs as a key player and a trusted partner but if you're not going to get the same response in Wonthaggi as you are in Wangaratta ...if there isn't a state coordination function specifically designed for Emergency Management...' (Fergus - VCC).

While training and region or district coordination, networking and clustering assist to address this issue; the concept of a consistent value offering is a challenge for any organisation.

9.3.10.3 Age and Time Commitments of Volunteers

Other barriers to NPO participation raised during stakeholder interviews included the age of particular NPO groups and not wanting to overburden these groups.

'the CWA (Country Women's Association) is an ageing group and I'm thinking of ...a really small rural community. It's got CWA but they're such an aging group and they are all on the same committees. They're all getting older so you need to put less and less on them because you don't want to overwhelm them. As they're getting older you need them to be thinking about how they are going to get out safely themselves. You know, looking after themselves first, if there's flooding or there is a heatwave or something like that. So certainly there can be a barrier around there. '(Annette - LGV).

Concerns over NPO representatives being time poor and not wanting to add to their workload was also mentioned by EM stakeholders.

'that consistency of attendance to meetings (is difficult)... they are time poor, a lot of people want a piece of the neighbourhood houses...it's important to make sure they are not overwhelmed.' (Annette - LGV).

There was also mention of meeting times moving to business hours, which prevented NPO volunteers attending, as they had their own paid work to complete.

‘A lot of community meetings are done in the evening, but I have noticed a trend towards business times. those kinds of common ground meetings need to be outside 9-5’. (Hermoine – DHHS)

The extent of reform of the sector, and the implications and time commitments for NPOs, regional LGVs, in fact all emergency management stakeholders, to try to keep up to date with that reform was also a noted barrier.

‘The amount of reform ...and the implications for small NPOs to keep across the reforms, let alone meaningfully contribute to them. The volume of information coming out of EMV (under the guise of the recommendations from the Royal Commission into the Black Saturday Fires) is such that small NPOs...in the sector struggle to keep up let alone those who are not ‘normally’ a part of the arrangements (Fergus - VCC).

There was also recognition, that recovery is an area that needs understanding; particularly about the time recovery can take and the support needed to facilitate it.

9.3.10.4 Personalities, Egos, Agendas, History as Barriers to NPO Actions

Other barriers to come out of the NPO and EM interviews were the impact of personalities, egos, personal or organisational agendas and history. The following quotes provide insight into this issue.

‘We might be old, but we are part of the community. This is what frustrates us. What are the barriers and enablers – EGOS. Peoples’ Egos are one of the biggest problems. I’m in charge, I have a bit of paper.’
(Archie – Lions)

'It comes down to personalities - there's always going to be personalities that make things challenging. If you have the right people in those roles and they have those 'can do' attitudes,...collaborative, get on with it, realise everybody has their place and everybody just wants to contribute and do their best' (Marian – CFA)

'I feel ..it all comes down to the people involved in those different organisations, you can have really good ones or you can have really dated ones.'(Melinda – LGV).

'there are 157 local council areas...they range from absolutely hate each other, can't.. stand to be in the same room together - to - they do everything together, they are incredibly well integrated, collaborative... it is just a joy to work with those groups.... it comes down to personalities.. there really is the full spectrum.' (Marian – CFA).

So this aspect is particularly context specific. It also reflected some of the actions of NPOs. One NPO found it challenging to speak with the CFA, others in Gippsland built showers to help the local CFA and another NPO was supported when they needed it most, by the CFA. But this is not just about CFA, the same could be said about LGA local emergency representatives.

EM personnel moving around the sector, taking their history and politics with them was also recognised, as the following quote illustrates.

'things can go back a long long way...history, politics having a big impact on the relationship between organisations...the pool of EM personnel is very small, ..the same people just move around. They might work for CFA, in the next decade they work for DELWP and then they take their personality, history, baggage with them so that can be an issue' (Marian - CFA)

'there have been other things ...in the way.... the agendas that you don't realise are there within a large response organisation' (Rachel – EMV).

Agencies being territorial was mentioned consistently, across NPOs and EM stakeholders. As the following quotes by Rotary and CFA representatives illustrate.

'Too many agencies think they own the fire and don't want to work with others' (Colin – Rotary)

'I think there can be a bit of snobbery. First responder organisations can think because they have technical skills and knowledge...they are there, that their work is the most important and should be respected the most' (Marian – CFA).

These barriers are complex to overcome. Atkinson (2014) suggested

'The key is for all the players to share a common vision of the recovery effort, and to leave their own particular agendas at the door in favour of a shared purpose that benefits the broader community and even societal interest.' (Atkinson 2014, p175).

Increased professionalism of the sector, training in community development and raising the awareness of the strengths and abilities of NPOs and tying working with NPOs successfully to performance assessments may help.

9.4 Conclusion

Synthesis of the results of the scoping literature review and the NPO and Emergency Management interviews addressed secondary question four, 'of those actions that were successful, what were believed to be the strengths of NPOs, the enablers that contributed and barriers that hindered NPO actions?'

This chapter identified NPO strengths, identified barriers and suggested enablers to NPO actions. The enablers that contributed to NPO actions were complex, but mostly centered on the NPOs' key strengths of community networks and connections, knowing their community and having motivated, flexible volunteers who could find creative solutions to problems. Barriers that hindered NPO actions were predominantly structural, with cultural issues reflecting the history of EM services being of a military, command and control structure. This is an uneasy fit, in the light of community development leanings of communities taking some control or having a degree of influence over recovery directions. NPOs have not been recognized within the EM system, and NPOs need to get a voice and develop a well-defined role description to enable NPOs to participate, 'be at the table' and be empowered enough to take action. Lack of NPO resources to focus on disaster risk reduction or contributing before, during and after disaster, amongst a range of other valid mandates, lack of trust of NPO to be held accountable, and a lack of communication were all significant barriers to NPOs participating before, during or after disasters.

These barriers illustrate that there are explainable reasons why NPOs have not participated more fully before, during and after disasters in Australia. Yet this chapter has also highlighted how great the strengths are that NPOs can offer to any community situation. There are major benefits to the impacted communities where support systems, training and funding can enable NPOs to help their community.

The following chapter summarises and discusses the key findings of this research; and illustrates how NPOs can contribute to building community resilience to disasters. The chapter also discusses the generalisability of the results, what further research would be beneficial and the limitations to the study.

10. DISCUSSION

10.1 Building Disaster Resilient Communities

Disasters are becoming increasingly common and increasingly impactful on the affected populations. Governments do not have the resources to respond and protect citizens as effectively as possible. A realisation is growing that local communities need to be involved and that having them involved before disasters occur, in disaster risk reduction measures, is far more favourable for post-disaster outcomes. This chapter builds on the synthesis of findings in Chapter 9.

This thesis addresses the problem statement outlined in Chapter 1 which includes ‘that the NSDR posits that resilient communities adapt successfully and function well under stress when they embrace strong mitigation strategies, strong social capital, networks and self-reliance, but what evidence supports these aspirations?’ The problem statement was addressed through investigating the role of selected NPOs in the disaster setting; within the conceptual frameworks that resilient communities are those that have strong mitigation strategies, strong social capital, networks and self-reliance (Chapter 5). The NSDR’s concept of resilience was illustrated in the resilience building actions of community NPOs and how their actions and strengths fit within current disaster resilience theories, social capital and the Sendai Disaster Risk Reduction Framework. The use of the case study methodology enabled exploration of the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of NPOs in this space.

This thesis makes a first-time contribution to Australian emergency management by identifying and demonstrating how Service Clubs such as Rotary Clubs and Lions Clubs, and other nonprofit organisations such as Neighbourhood Houses Victoria, actually and can potentially contribute strengths to not only building community resilience but also to building community resilience in the disaster space. While there are barriers to these organisations fully participating before, during and after a disaster, NPOs may be enabled to participate in a greater capacity. Using more of a community development

paradigm approach in the disaster setting may be a useful contemporary framework for NPOs to further contribute in the disaster space.

In Chapter 2 a literature review of community-led resilience in the disaster setting addressed the secondary question ‘what does the literature say about community-led (guided, based, centred, conducted) disaster resilience?’ The literature pointed to community-led engagements being useful in an integrated disaster response; indeed, being useful before, during and after disasters. While there were few examples of this in the literature, the research did suggest that centralised recovery efforts were likely to be challenging, given the need for local knowledge and motivating collective action. Decentralised, bottom-up recovery actions were seen as robust, and complemented top-down attempts, as they contributed the strengths of local knowledge and community connections.

Where government resources have been overwhelmed, NPOs were shown to help motivate volunteers to actions and to donate funds. Given the benefits accruing from these NPOs, the research recommended governments seek alliances, partnerships and cultivate longer-term relationships with these NPOs.

Studies from New Zealand demonstrated the longevity of NPOs established prior to disasters, that incorporated disaster response actions into their mandate. NPOs that were established immediately following disasters, with a single focus, were unlikely to be sustainable. Further, a Canadian study found that volunteers who had connections with NPOs prior to the disasters were more likely to contribute after a disaster. Hence the literature review, albeit from a low base, illustrated the benefits flowing from community actions before, during and after disasters.

The NPOs studied in this thesis, Rotary Clubs, Lions Clubs and Neighbourhood Houses Victoria are longer term contributors to their communities’ development and consequently have the potential to be longer-term, sustainable contributors to their

community, before, during and after a disaster. Acosta and Chandra note this in their 2013 study, as quoted below.

'because NGOs are a permanent part of the community, they are more focused on community development and resilience building during disaster response and recovery' (Acosta & Chandra, 2013, p. 365)

In addressing the thesis secondary question 'what have been the actions of NPOs before, during and after disasters?' this thesis identified many actions of NPOs that interviewee responses suggest successfully contribute to their communities' resilience. The literature and later the interviews identified an extensive range of actions, evidenced in Table 3.2, Table 3.5 and Table 7.6.

Actions from both the national and international literature, detailed in Chapter 3: Scoping Nonprofits in the Disaster Setting, were not often described into before, during or after disasters. However, NPOs helped in relief and response, through supplying physical assistance such as water, sanitation, food and shelter (Acosta & Chandra, 2013; Acosta, Chandra & Ringel, 2013; Atkinson, 2014; Cheema, Scheyvens, Glavovic & Imran, 2014; Eikenberry, Arroyave & Cooper, 2007; Espia & Fernandez, 2015; LaLone, 2012; Quebedeaux, 2013). Disaster preparedness and risk awareness actions included: disaster education, training evacuation volunteers, planning and risk awareness and information transfer (Espia & Fernandez, 2015; Hutton, 2016; Jenkins, Lambeth, Mosby & Van Brown, 2015; McLennan, Molloy, Whittaker & Handmer, 2016).

Resilience and recovery activities by NPOs in the literature included: civil society building, enabling community member participation through providing networks that facilitated involvement, mental health counselling, spiritual care, saving community attachments, community development and support activities, helping residents to rebuild, building safety networks and encouraging social cohesion (Acosta, Chandra & Ringel, 2013; Acosta & Chandra, 2013; Atkinson, 2014; Eikenberry, Arroyave & Cooper,

2007; Cheema, Scheyvens, Glavovic & Imran, 2014; Eller, Gerber & Robinson, 2018; Espia & Fernandez, 2015; Quebedeaux, 2013; Jenkins, Lambeth, Mosby & Van Brown, 2015). Eller et al. (2018) noted the wide range of NPOs involved in providing disaster related services dated back to the nineteenth century in the United States (Eller, Gerber & Robinson, 2018).

Research into the value contributed by NPOs' actions estimated contributions were extensive but likely to be significantly understated in official accounting (Eller, Gerber & Robinson, 2018). This reflected much of the nonprofit sector. Internationally and in Australia, Lions Clubs' and Rotary Clubs' members have to pay to join their Clubs, are expected to pay for all their costs associated with helping (petrol, their accommodation etc) and hence have to pay to help their community. All donations are used for the impacted party, so there is little advertising of their volunteer, unpaid, actions.

In the Australian literature, a Deloitte Access Economics study (2018) of the social impacts of Morwell Neighbourhood House highlighted that on an operating income of less than \$140,000 in 2017, Morwell Neighbourhood House contributed over \$600,000 to the community (Deloitte Access Economics, 2018). Again, this figure was thought to be conservative, given the impact of the Neighbourhood House on the lives of Morwell's most vulnerable residents. The report also recognised there were savings to the government of avoided costs if grassroots groups helped vulnerable community members with prevention resilience actions (food banks, emergency funds, providing a safe place, helping acquire life skills and hence independence) (Deloitte Access Economics, 2018).

One of the secondary research questions of this study was: 'What is meant by nonprofit organisation in the Australian context?' This question was addressed in Chapter 3 Scoping Nonprofits in the Disaster Setting. As defined by the Australian Tax Office, nonprofit organisations (or not-for-profit organisations) are organisations that do not operate for gain or profit of individual members. Any profit is used to achieve the

organisation's purpose and is not distributed to its members, owners or private people (ATO 2016).

NPOs are part of and operate within the third, community, social or nonprofit sector or 'civil society'. This space is seen as the complex space between the State, the market and households (Lewis, 2011). Organisations operating here have identifying qualities including: voluntary participation of workers, stakeholders motivated by values, and organisations often do not have institutionalized power structures. It is believed that this space needs to be operating well, for inclusive and stable communities to function successfully (Heinrich, 2010). Australia has over 600,000 nonprofit organisations; and while data is scant, it is believed most are small with a wide variety of scale, focus and organisational structure evident across the sector. I selected three NPO case studies to further explore the context in the disaster setting.

Another secondary question was: 'Of those actions that were successful, what were believed to be the strengths of NPOs?' The strengths of the NPOs were investigated: in the international and national literature (Chapter 3); as seen by NPOs themselves (Chapter 7); as seen by local government officials in the regions where the grassroots NPOs were active (Chapter 8); and as identified by stakeholders in the emergency management sector (Chapter 8). It was surprising just how consistently NPO strengths were acknowledged, from the literature, and particularly through nonprofit and emergency management stakeholder interviews.

Community connections, strong grassroots networks that accessed diverse and often marginalised populations were noted as valuable in the literature (Acosta & Chandra, 2013; Acosta, Chandra & Ringel, 2013; ARC, 2014; Benson, Twigg & Myers, 2001; Demiroz & Hu, 2014; Hutton, 2016). Local knowledge (Acosta, Chandra & Ringel, 2013; Atkinson, 2014; ARC, 2014; Hutton, 2016; McLennan, Molloy, Whittaker & Handmer, 2016), these organisations' ability to be adaptive and flexible, and for their highly motivated volunteers to find creative solutions were also appreciated strengths. Trust of the

community developed over time through contributing to the community and being part of the community, as well as the ability to empower groups to collaboratively tackle their own problems, were prized as organisational strengths. Their ability to operate under severe fiscal constraints, their cost effectiveness and their abilities in identifying community needs and risks and motivating the public to take actions to reduce such risks were all valued strengths mentioned in the literature (Table 3.3).

These perceived strengths were reiterated in both the NPO interviews (Table 7.5) and in dialogues with emergency management stakeholders and industry experts (Table 8.2). The research identified consistent NPO strengths recognised across all these stakeholders; particularly NPOs' connections and grassroots networks within the community, their local knowledge and the level of trust held by the community for these NPOs (Table 9.1). NPOs were valued for their connections with more vulnerable, marginalised groups, for their motivated workforce and for their flexibility that enabled creative solutions. These strengths and NPO actions identified, needed to be placed within the context of the latest research on building community resilience to disasters. For this reason, Chapter 5 placed the literature findings within the relevant conceptual frameworks, which informed the thesis scaffold and all results were synthesised in Chapter 9.

The thesis research confirmed that 'resilience', as defined by ARUP and other frameworks used in this thesis, is a useful model/theory to aid analysis, understanding and promoting community resilience in the disaster space. In Chapters 4 and 5, conceptual Research Frameworks showed that a strongly connected community with active, inclusive civic engagement and social integration was best able to withstand, respond and adapt to stresses (ARUP, 2017). Inclusiveness, particularly of vulnerable people, was emphasised as a quality of resilient systems (ARUP, 2017). Similarly, the research confirmed that the Sendai Framework is a useful contemporary international framework, applicable in the Australian setting, to guide, examine and evaluate actions

before, during and after disasters, and to monitor progress towards its Global and National goals.

In Chapter 7 Nonprofit Case Studies, three NPOs were examined; Lions Clubs, Rotary Clubs and Neighbourhood Houses Victoria. Neighbourhood Houses are strongly focused on vulnerable, more marginalised Australians, so the potential fit with resilience qualities of inclusion and reducing vulnerability, are evident. Similarly, the NSDR viewed connected, inclusive and empowered networks of NPOs as a means to build resilience (COAG, 2011). As a component of the Australian National Disaster Resilience Index (ANDRI) cooperation and trust are essential in disaster resilience building (Parsons et al., 2016). EMV's Preparedness Framework encourages building community resilience through building on community strengths. Critical tasks in EMV policy include: connecting and supporting local networks and using local knowledge for local needs and solutions identification (EMV, 2018c). The strengths of NPOs identified in the literature and through all interviews then are aspects that underpin a resilient community, according to The Rockefeller Foundation, the NSDR, the ANDRI and EMV. Therefore, the characteristic strengths that these NPOs are known and respected for, are what Australian policy is trying to develop and encourage in Australian society.

Interviews of targeted NPO representatives identified actions in Victorian NPOs that paralleled many of the actions of NPOs highlighted in the literature. Australian NPOs contributed across the disaster spectrum, before, during and after the event (Table 7.6). A discussion of how these actions fit with the theory follows.

'Social ties are the critical aspect of resilience'

(Danial Aldrich 2018).

Communities that have embraced disaster resilience demonstrate strong social cohesion (Grootaert, 1998; Thornley et al., 2014). Social ties are social capital (Aldrich, 2018) with Clubs, like Rotary Clubs and Lions Clubs, contributing to social ties, social

capital and hence resilience (Aldrich, 2018; Grootaert, 1998). The bridging capital of such groups grows trust (Aldrich, 2012) and communication between different members of a community. This is critical in a disaster where the ‘Zero Responders’, the first people accessible to help you, are your neighbours (Aldrich, 2018). Local NHVs are similarly important, particularly as they often work and hence know the most vulnerable people in the community.

The outcomes of the NPOs’ linkages and social ties demonstrate the benefits of such ties for their local community. All types of social capital were used to advantage in the case studies; bonding like with like, bridging those with less in common, and linking capital examples where Lions Clubs members asked for advice and support from members with State authority (Parliamentarians). There are over 340 Lions Clubs around Victoria (Lions Australia, 2018b). The strengths of such geographic spread and numbers; for community communication are evident where Lions Clubs promote a safety issue (for example: let us help you check your fire alarms), in identifying need and in helping those affected where they cannot help themselves.

There is evidence that social capital can grow through deliberate interventions (Aldrich, 2018; Aldrich & Kyota, 2016). Social capital as a concept is useful to help focus on what enables people to act collectively (Madsen et al., 2016). The results of this thesis, the social actions, political aspects of the cases are analysed in the context that social connections, ability to collectively act and community resilience are closely related (Madsen et al., 2016). Psychosocial help following a disaster is critical, given that most injuries or traumas from disasters are psychological rather than physical, with estimated ratios ranging from 4:1 to 50:1 (McCabe, Semon, Lating, Everly, Perry, Moore, Mosley, Thompson & Links, 2014).

NPOs provide a social structure on which to construct social capital, individual mental health and community wellbeing enhancing events. San Francisco Council go so far as to offering money to residents to run street parties, to help build social capital (Aldrich,

2018). Lions Clubs and Rotary Clubs and their ilk, embedded in the community as the people to turn to for a free feed, or a fundraising sausage, and who have the resources, contacts and training to get a Barbie up and running really quickly, encourage others to congregate with them; to celebrate special days, to feed the workers, to bring a community together. The Australian Barbie then, has much to offer.

More Than a Sausage – The Importance of a Barbie

In terms of recovery, Aldrich (2018) argues having social connections nearby helps you to feel normal and supports mental health. Social support helps to reduce the impact, buffers against stressors and speeds up recovery (Gallagher et al. 2019). Further, participation in community, voluntary groups, such as sporting or Service Clubs, aids both individuals volunteering and their community (Gallagher et al. 2019). Hence the Lions Clubs and Rotary Clubs barbeques do indeed offer ‘more than a sausage’ (Lions Australia 2018) to their local communities.

‘...this happened about 10 days...after the floods. It was the 11th of January when the floods came through. The 26th of January is a most important day in Australia, Australia Day. We, the Lions, put on a bacon and egg breakfast in our Lions Park. We do it each year, we have for many, many years. That Park, some of it was under 3 foot of water during the flood....the water went down. They (the Council) tried to get things back as good as they could, ... we supplied the egg and bacon breakfast and we had 500 people come for an egg and bacon breakfast out of 3000 people in the town’
(John - Lions).

‘...we, the Lions, work with the RSL and the Cemetery Trust. We have a Gunfire Breakfast on Anzac Day and the VICSES work out there with lights and that sort of thing. And we do the Gunfire Breakfast at 6 o'clock in the morning...’ (John - Lions).

This thesis used social capital approaches to suggest that the EM sector continue its trend towards engagement and should expand its activities to empowerment of the community, to commence before disaster events, for improved disaster outcomes. There was much discussion in the literature of the benefits of ‘community-led’ actions. However, there are groups like Lions Clubs or Rotary Clubs ‘who just want to help’ but are stifled and have to fight for the right to lend a hand. No NPO representative of these groups spoke of wanting to ‘lead’ anything. And then there were NHV representatives who find themselves thrust into roles for which they have no training or funding, and little support.

EM personnel recognised the benefits of community participation and listening to the community’s voice. Some argued the community was quick to tell the EM sector what they were doing wrong, yet there was no emphasis on actions being community-led, but rather more working together, with the community highlighting what they wanted done. Community-centred or community-led rhetoric was identified in many documents (Chapter 5 and Chapter 8). However, the interpretation of these words is controversial and lacks penetration. It appears the focus of EM operations is more towards community awareness.

Given the lack of evaluation studies available in the disaster space, there is nothing to base judgements on in terms of what works and what doesn’t work, or ‘what matters most’ in building community resilience. The predominant method of evaluations in the Australian EM sector currently is of ‘lessons learnt’ type studies. While there is work that could lead to evaluations of actions in the future, with little available currently, I use presumptive interpretation that the actions of NPOs are of value (Spencer, 2018). I assume replacing fences is helpful and tool libraries are beneficial, based on their use, the gratefulness of recipients and logic that these things are needed.

One of the secondary questions was: ‘of those actions that were successful, what were believed to be the enablers that contributed and barriers that hindered NPO actions?’

These barriers were discussed with a diverse range of industry representatives, the literature examined, and some investigation undertaken of other sectors to identify how others had overcome similar barriers (Table 3.4, Table 7.7, Table 8.3, Table 9.2).

Lay people are the zero responders or first responders. Apart from likely having been contributing to their communities' development and working in these communities over a long period of time, NPO members may well be operational regardless of whether they are recognised by the EM sector or not. However, particularly in an environment lacking community-led, empowered groups; the EM sector could benefit greatly from incorporating these groups into resilience practices. To not incorporate the local NPOs into EM activities, is a missed opportunity to utilise their local knowledge, networks and resource strengths.

However, the cases highlighted frustrating barriers that inhibited NPOs from contributing to their full potential (Table 9.2). Barriers particularly arose around the command and control culture of the EM systems which lead to weak integration, little collaboration, and conflict between local NPOs and government EM systems. Nonrecognition of NPOs, lack of role definition and little operational guidance for NPO involvement all prevented NPO actions. The lack of available resources for both NPOs and EM stakeholders aggravated coordination and engagement issues; as did a lack of trust that NPOs would be held accountable for their actions. Government was seen as inflexible due to strict accountability and reporting and legislative requirements. While NPO actions were blocked at times due to a lack of insurance or appropriate certification, or EM stakeholders not being able to judge the quality of NPO offerings.

The disconnect between government and community, was recognised as a barrier in a recent disaster resilience building paper by Cuthbertson, Rodriguez-Llanes, Robertson and Archer (2019). Interviewees recommended solutions that would improve community-government trust and community ownership over risk management actions (Cuthbertson et al., 2019).

In this thesis, where enablers were identified they were compiled, and results synthesised in Chapter 9, summarised in Table 9.2. For each barrier, enablers were identified and discussed in the context of potentially addressing the particular barrier. Many of the barriers could perhaps have been overcome if there had been funding to enable all stakeholders to get to know what each did, what they offered and what was available, prior to the disaster. Longer term funding for resilience and engagement training and for disaster risk reduction actions that were driven by the community and included NPOs would also enable barriers such as the lack of communication, knowledge or trust to be overcome. Communication networks are critical during and after disasters, but to be effective they have to be established before the hazard and there has to be two-way communication. Interestingly, this was also a recommendation of Stys (2011) in his paper *Nonprofit Involvement in Disaster and Recovery*; as well as his call for NPO roles to be recognised in law and regulations (Stys, 2011).

Finally, the last secondary questions of this thesis were: ‘How do those within the Emergency Management (EM) system see nonprofit organisations before, during and after a disaster situation, and from an EM perspective, to what degree could nonprofits be engaged in the Australian context?’ Given the wide recognition of NPOs strengths, the EM sector interviews were positive about NPOs contributing, particularly to the disaster resilience and recovery space. However there did not appear to be significant clarity or depth of understanding of what NPOs could offer. This is logical given the broad range of NPOs in Australia, and that each local NPO is likely to have different strengths. Again, context matters. Localised community capability mapping is required, and likely to have occurred in some of the more proactive LGV areas and regions.

Given how little consideration or role guidance in EM situations NPOs have been given in the past, confusion over where to place them is understandable. As the following statement illustrates.

'Using nonprofit organisations in the future it is important to have them already engaged but a lot of it comes back to personalities too. A lot of these people are already on our Relief and Recovery committees... We know that they want to help but when's the appropriate time to bring them in to assist us? Depends on the size of the impact from a Council perspective. In relief and recovery at the local level, where we are responsible for it, it's when do we bring these people in? Do we bring them in with people like Victorian Council of Churches, Red Cross when they're doing relief centre exercises? is probably appropriate to bring Lions and Rotary in, just to see what happens in those areas at the same time' (Mark – LGV)

'One of the greatest inhibitors to community disaster resilience building to date has been the challenge of integrating resilience building into the core business of governments and emergency management agencies'
(Fitzpatrick, 2016, p. 61).

The primary research question was 'what is the potential role of nonprofit organisations in building community resilience to disasters?' The research identified NPO actions, strengths, barriers and enablers in the disaster space. Placing the actions within the research conceptual framework and thesis scaffolding illustrated how NPO actions can contribute to building community resilience in the disaster space. An aspect that became evident through the interviews was that in small communities, people who volunteer for Lions Clubs or Rotary Clubs, are also likely to be on the Hall Committee or be an VICSES or CFA volunteer. There are positives and negatives of wearing many hats.

'...I'm not the only one who wears all these different types of hats in a small community, who knows the linkages and so (knows which) facility is available.... Our Secretary and Treasurer spent a lot of time juggling times when people could use that facility (Local Hall)...the positions are

volunteers... We have to raise our own funding. It is a DELWP owned facility with very limited funds coming from them if anything at all.' (Mark – LGV, also Chairman Hall Committee).

'asked for people from the community to be on their boards ... and you've got the same people putting up their hands. ...It is such a challenge...Often you will have people on a nonprofit working really hard for that little group, but they're just thinking they can't stretch themselves. But conversely got people in those organisations and that's their life, and they are wanting to be on every single thing so the representative thing really gets skewed.' (Rachel – EMV).

Where Boards are dominated by the same people, representation of the whole community becomes a challenge (VCOSS, 2015). There are risks of volunteers burning out, or being too busy in one area, to give adequate representation of another. There are sound benefits where highly committed volunteers, passionate about their community and aware of ensuring vulnerable groups are looked after; can mobilise their community and act as a conduit between various NPOs. However, there are also risks, where too much is expected of one person, or they are impacted and there is no one to succeed them or share the roles.

'... Wayne is in everything so people looked to him, because if something happens then Wayne's there, and he will step up. We would be concerned that if something happens to Wayne then is there a backup. Is there succession planning and the same as well for Mary. If something happens to Mary is there backup? ...People have multiple hats and they're in it 'cause they're passionate about it. They're likely to burn out as well which is another thing. Because they are so moved, they are in the community, and it's a local impact. They're likely to be impacted as well. And you're relying on them to step up but their situation may be impacted. They just

have to say 'no I can't get involved'....that is our concern and we wanted it shared... because it's safety in numbers, it's shared knowledge.' (Richard – LGV).

NPO volunteers wearing multiple hats would help communication between groups, and generation of local knowledge. Yet risk is higher if there were a high dependency on one person, and no others with as extensive contacts, community history or knowledge. In addition, new research suggests that involvement in too many voluntary groups is detrimental to the mental health of that particular volunteer (Gallagher et al., 2019).

Another aspect that came through the process was that there appeared to a degree of circular employment within the sector, with employees moving from one EM organisation to the next. While the positives of this were knowledge and history of the sector, the downsides were negative histories, and carrying of personality 'baggage' that some representatives referred to. There was a belief that this could be a barrier to effectively working together.

The research captured the voice of those trying to help, from their point of view. Importantly, the research supported the idea that context was everything. When looking at the grassroots NPO Club or Neighbourhood House, the personalities or culture of that place may be to focus on a particular area, such as raising money through barbeques. Or for an NHV, there are some that are more comfortable in the provision of a service space, for example just providing educational courses, rather than a community development space (Chapter 7). So, it is important not to assume all NPOs would want or have the resources to become involved in the emergency management space. However, many NHVs find themselves in the role of filling in the gaps, after a disaster, and bearing witness of other NHVs' experiences encourages them to be proactive if possible.

Personalities of other organisations may also impact context. In one region the NHV didn't have a strong relationship with the local CFA brigade ('They don't know what we do'). An NHV in another part of Victoria was supported strongly by their local CFA brigade, to carry on in the face of really trying circumstances. In East Gippsland, an NHV got funding to have a shower block built for the 'fireies' (CFA members) to use when they are in town. Hence context is particularly important at the grassroots level.

NHVs do not have specific funding for building community resilience to disasters. Their focus varies between Neighbourhood Houses, depending on community needs and priorities, within a community development framework. Identifying needs and addressing them is a very broad assignment. There are many very worthy program areas and priorities, with emergency management disaster risk reduction just one area. But time poor, financially challenged, NHVs have done some extraordinary things to help their community in times of or after crisis. Imagine what they could do if they actually got paid to do it?

A form of theme identification suggests we ask 'what is missing?' (Ryan, 2003). I considered this in the context that people of this sector genuinely want to help people (as noted in the bias/assumptions section of Chapter 6). As such interviewees were more likely than most to be kind in their comments. Negatives of people or organisations apart from where they were still angry over an injustice ('still on my hate bus'), were not common. Taking this into account, what was missing were significant criticisms. Everybody was 'good hearted' and 'doing their best'. Some thoughts on what were not said then:

- Donations have to be addressing a recognised need, otherwise volunteers could be overwhelmed with wasted goods;
- As more becomes known of the psychosocial impacts of disasters, training of volunteers on how to appropriately interact with impacted people, and training

on self-care of those who want to help needs to be incorporated into preparedness;

- The unfunded mandate reflected an industry wide ‘weakness’. NPOs want to help and will continue to help far beyond their contracts. It is easy for funding bodies to take advantage of this good will;
- Similarly, volunteer NPOs are the gatekeepers of their communities. Those networks and relationships built over time and with huge effort are their organisations’ assets, their local knowledge their organisations’ intellectual property. External parties be they government, consultants, private organisations have to respect, value and indeed pay for accessing these assets. Where there are research projects requiring grassroots participation, this access has to be recognised, valued and paid for, albeit perhaps in kind or through a community-valued contribution. For myself, I hope research participants feel that raising the profile of issues identified in this thesis is adequate compensation.

10.2 So What? Now What?

This thesis has:

- ✓ reinforced the NSDR’s key elements of community resilience as being a community that is risk aware, and empowered to enable risk management, that has social capacity, operates well under stress, and is self-reliant and adapts well;
- ✓ confirmed that ‘resilience’ is a useful model/theory to help analysis, understanding and promoting community resilience in the disaster space;
- ✓ confirmed that the Sendai Framework is a useful framework, relevant in the Australian setting, to support and assess disaster risk reduction actions before, during and after disasters;
- ✓ used social capital theory and social capital approaches to support the EM sector’s moves toward ‘engagement’ and encourage ‘empowerment’ of community activities, before, during and after disaster events;

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- ✓ established that the NPOs are currently contributing many actions, with recognised strengths enhancing community resilience in the disaster setting. Although there are barriers to these activities, there are possible enablers to resolve many of these barriers, specifically to build disaster resilience into the funded mandate of NPOs and incorporate NPOs into the EM operating structure beyond the current limited range of the Australian Red Cross and Victorian Council of Churches;
 - ✓ identified that ‘community development’ could be useful as a conceptual framework in the disaster setting to enhance community resilience;
 - ✓ identified that NPOs have the resources and assets to contribute in the disaster setting and that ‘we just want to help’.

I have addressed the primary research question and expanded the evidence base in this space. If we take the findings as outlined in Table 7.6 of NPO actions, in Table 9.1 of NPO strengths, and in Table 9.2 of NPO barriers and enablers, and use these as the basis for discussion; then the key elements critical to moving forward would be:

- Both the community sector and the EM sector could use the summated lists of actions, strengths, barriers and enablers as a starting point to improve the situation. The action examples could be used to more fully illustrate EMV’s examples of community participation. The examples of barriers facing NPOs could be used in the context of the EM sector’s strategic planning. By addressing these barriers, the EM sector would be proactively removing barriers to their goals of putting the community at the centre of their strategies.
- Building, and funding, emergency management into the mandate of NPOs.
- Making the emergency management sector more aware of the capacities and skills sets available of local NPOs. Resources channelled in developing the community development/emergency management capabilities of representatives, as well as longer term funding of resilience and recovery projects would address some of the resource barriers identified in this study.

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- This research argues for more effective cross-sectional collaboration with local EM and NPOs having structures in place, pre-disaster to feed protocols and information down to the local level.
 - NPOs are empowered for a whole range of other activities that they get up and fund themselves. That skill set, that empowerment in the setting of disasters would be particularly useful.
 - The Victorian NPOs need to be incorporated into the regional recovery plan, or regional resilience plan. The new Victorian Emergency Management Legislation Amendment Bill 2018 regarding Municipal Emergency Management Plans could provide an opportunity to incorporate NPOs more formally in the structure and process, and consequently better utilise this resource.
 - The dimensions of the theoretical scaffolding developed in this thesis are useful for framing the discussion about the role of NPOs in building community resilience to disasters.
 - The sector embraces the principles of community development more strongly, as referred to in Figure 4.1 and Figure 9.3.

Finally, NPOs should be enabled to contribute to their communities, why? Because

‘we just want (and are able) to help!’

10.3 How Generalisable Are the Results?

This study’s case studies were purposively selected to highlight the actions, strengths, barriers and enablers of particular NHVs and Service Clubs surrounding disasters. While each organisation is autonomous, and the circumstances facing each house or club individualised, the structures in place; for NHVs – the networks, clusters, constitutions and guidance from NHV headquarters, and for Lions Clubs and Rotary Clubs – the support and guidance from their local, District, National and International hierarchy, ensure a degree of consistency for active NHVs and Clubs.

There were consistent themes running through all discussions and the data available from the NPOs support these themes. Consequently, the results of this study reflect the actions of active, community development focused Neighbourhood Houses, Rotary Clubs and Lions Clubs around Victoria. While the study was descriptive, the level of saturation obtained in the case studies and interviews suggests that the results may well be transferable and can be generalised to cover other like-minded Service Clubs and NHVs.

Capability and consistency of what Lions Clubs or Rotary Clubs or NHV could offer (their value proposition), were discussed with strategy level participants. The district level offering the consistent value proposition, so effort is sourced from across the district, and similarly with clusters of NHVs, shows promise and would bear further research. For NHVs funding to assist in network development would be useful. For example employing a person to go to other NPOs and LGV meetings, which at the moment is at too high an opportunity cost. Moves by ARC to align with Rotary Clubs, and Lions Clubs to develop a higher profile regional Emergency Management team should also be supported.

The personalisation of response was seen across LGVs and emergency management staff, to the extent it is useful to view responses across a spectrum. At one end were those with no interest in EM, NPOs, or community development through to the other end where they were fully aware of the opportunities NPOs could offer and were keen to include them.

This study's contribution in relation to existing literature, is to build on the Australian knowledge base and provide Victorian examples and tools tailored to the Victorian cultural, governance and economic environment. The focus on the nonprofit organisations in the disaster space has added depth to an area that has had little prominence in the literature.

*'You're in a better position to fire shots and that is good. You have credibility and that is what we need. Certainly, the authorities improved the way they do things and they have started to work together better as we see it. But by golly I saw some very big gaps and we didn't think that was very smart. We all can make a contribution, but we **need to be at the table**, discussing how to do it, so it is done as best it could. Good luck with it, we would be keen to hear how you go and give you all the support we can.'* (Colin, Rotary).

10.4 Limitations

The limitations of the research reflected characteristics of research into disasters. There are few evaluations of effective actions on which to pass judgement on implementation, so I used presumptive interpretation that NPO actions were useful. The case study approach provided a detailed description from which to draw some general relevance and handled the subtleties that sometimes occur in disaster situations. Case studies also enabled multiple sources of data be used and triangulated and hence supported the analysis. As there were three NPOs used as case studies, it is possible that there are other NPOs in the population doing things differently. However, the depth of analysis and level of saturation of interviews countered that limitation.

The research was also constrained by the timing of a full time PhD, the need to undertake interviews within a restricted timeframe and the time poor nature of interviewees. Even when interviewees were enthusiastic to help, often finding time to fit in an hour interview was extremely difficult, and I sincerely thank those who took the time to do so.

The events around the disasters examined is now many years ago. I relied on people's memories and repositories of written accounts from the time. I note this as a weakness. Yet interviewees often did comment along the lines of 'now I looked up my diary/notes/meeting notes of the time'. Where barriers were noted from disaster

actions, some such as cultural differences, were also recognised in inquiries and reviews of the disasters. Changes have been recommended and there is evidence of a move to more community centric programs and dealings. However, some NPO representatives could give recent (in the last year) examples of the intransigence of some LGVs.

The scoping study's search strategy was limited to reports written in English. This would have biased the study towards English speaking countries, although studies written of some non-English speaking countries' disaster experiences, particularly Japan, were included. The research papers predominately had broad definitions for nonprofit organisations. However, the research was still able to highlight in industry wide terms what activities nonprofits have been involved in in disasters, the types of organisations comprising the nonprofit sector, their strengths and the barriers and enablers faced by these organisations in the disaster setting.

10.5 Further Research

The research identified a wide range of actions, strengths, barriers and enablers to actions in Australian NPOs that had not previously been documented. The whole sector would benefit from further research into Australian NPOs and how Emergency Management may work with them, and vice versa, in disaster resilience building. Additional benefits would flow from research building on the initial work of identifying and overcoming barriers of NPOs to disaster resilience participation. Work identifying specific legislative blockages, and means of change, within the context of Sendai recommendations for improvements in governance to manage risk at all levels of government, would be particularly useful.

Further work is required into evaluation of effective actions. Apparently after the 2009 bushfires, in a 'what would work better' discussion between residents, there was a strong feeling that putting sheds up on burnt out properties would have been useful. Perhaps to live in but also to store white goods etc that had been donated, until the fire affected communities had a new residence to put them. It was also felt they would encourage

people to stay in the area (Sally - Lion). Unfortunately, there are few evaluations of the effectiveness of interventions, and this would be a valuable area of future research; perhaps utilising the 3ie framework of impact evaluations (International Initiative for Impact Evaluation, 2019).

It appears those in the EM space see Service Clubs and NPOs as comfortably fitting into a recovery and resilience role. And it could be argued that many NPO members are also members of their local CFA or VICSES brigades, so when a disaster occurs, they are already involved in response. They also have community EM training. More research investigating this phenomenon would be useful; particularly with the background of building community resilience skills.

Recently there has been research on the impact of community group involvement on mental health after disaster (see Gallagher et al. 2019). Placing these NPOs within this context, and also specifically on a gendered and youth basis (Men's Sheds, Country Women's Association) would I believe yield further evidence of the significant value of NPOs in this area.

It would be useful if future research addressed the gaps in knowledge identified through this study. These areas included:

- the dearth of empirical information on the nonprofit sector in the disaster space (Acosta & Chandra, 2013; Benson, Twigg & Myers, 2001; Campbell, 2010);
- how the EM system and stakeholders can cultivate empowerment of community members;
- monitoring progress towards Sendai Framework targets in the Australian context;
- how variations in size, linkages and assets of an NPO impact on their reliability of response (Acosta & Chandra, 2013);

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- further research into other NPOs and their potential in the disaster space, focusing on particular vulnerable groups; and
 - evaluations of how public-nonprofit partnerships perform through the disaster cycle (Boin, 2005).

10.6 Dissemination

I have had the opportunity to present elements of this research at Monash University MUDRI Disaster Resilience Forums, and at the MUDRI Disaster Research Symposium. I look forward to publishing the key elements of this research in an appropriate professional journal in due course. A summary paper is to be circulated to research participants and stakeholders; and I have had a paper accepted (Appendix 3) to be presented at the World Association for Disaster and Emergency Medicine in May 2019.

11. CONCLUSION

Perhaps because they are so busy helping, they don't have time to promote their actions. For whatever reason, very little is written in the peer reviewed literature about what nonprofit organisations actually do before, during or after a disaster. And all money going towards their missions of service and community development, presumably leaves little with which to publicise their deeds.

My thesis was an applied research project using case studies, interviews, and thematic analysis to answer the primary research question of 'what is the potential role of nonprofit organisations in building community resilience to disasters?'. I found in answer to my research question that nonprofit organisations do contribute significantly to building a community's resilience to disasters. This study identified the actions, strengths, barriers and enablers to nonprofit organisations building resilience in their communities, within the disaster space. My analysis found that Australian nonprofit organisations are those that do not operate for profit, but rather any money generated is put towards the organisation's mission and not disbursed amongst directors.

The research uses Resilience theory in the disaster setting, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and Social Capital theory, again placed in the disaster space, to frame my arguments. These frameworks were synthesised into a new research scaffolding that enabled examining of the role and value of NPO actions in contributing to community resilience in the disaster setting. NPOs have undertaken many resilience actions before, during and after disasters. Helping their communities identify risks, working creatively to minimise these, supporting their most vulnerable, and building community wellness are just some of the actions that have helped their communities. Importantly the NPOs demonstrated their abilities in providing engagement and empowerment platforms for their communities.

The interviews demonstrated that the core strengths of NPOs; strong networks, linkages to vulnerable or marginalised people, the trust of the population, their motivated,

flexible and creative members and detailed local knowledge were soundly identified across stakeholders. The analysis showed that these strengths were also aspects valued in the building of resilience and Sendai Frameworks and in social capital theory.

There were frustrations for NPO stakeholders when barriers such as cultural barriers, nonrecognition of NPOs by emergency management personnel, poor communication, lack of resources and lack of trust all prevented or constrained actions that were to help or were helping the impacted community. While government policy calls for community engagement and empowerment, NPOs are demonstrably engaged within their communities. The issue is that they are not engaged effectively with emergency management. This is an area that needs urgent research, training and funding of both NPOs and emergency management to enable and empower these organisations to more effectively meet the challenges of future disasters.

As part of the process a range of enablers have been raised to address the identified barriers. Building disaster resilience into the funded mandate of NPOs; identifying what NPOs are in a region, what they are keen to contribute in the disaster space and how they could be used to encourage community risk reduction measures; and developing effective two-way communication between local EM and NPO stakeholders would be valuable enablers to positive future actions.

My research adds to what is known about nonprofit organisations acting in the disaster space. Specifically, cataloguing NPO actions and strengths raises questions about conventionally held Emergency Management views that ignore or side line community NPOs in the disaster arena. Strong inclusive networks within the community, channels to vulnerable groups, in-depth local knowledge live what the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience policy is trying to promote. It suggests the traditional composition of emergency management activities is problematic because the community voice is not heard.

The contribution of the research to the literature is to demonstrate the usefulness of Australian NPOs in building community resilience in the disaster space, illustrate the barriers often facing NPOs who want to contribute and to highlight some means by which they may overcome these barriers. Given there is little scientifically based, rigorous research in this area, this is a significant start.

As climate change intensifies the number and impact of natural disasters facing Australia, all assets available must be considered to help minimise disaster impact. An example quoted to me was ‘... our Brigade has 3 trucks, with 40,000 houses. If a fire were to threaten our region which 3 houses would you like us to protect?’ Community engagement and prearranged coordination of civic groups have to be incorporated into disaster planning strategies. While not without challenges in fitting within the current emergency management system, this thesis demonstrates the usefulness of NPOs before, during and after disasters. Given the lack of recognition of any NPOs (apart from Australian Red Cross, Victorian Council of Churches and the Salvation Army) within the emergency management context, this research illustrates the strengths that other NPOs could bring to community planning and disaster risk management.

To further incorporate NPOs into EM activities and planning before, during and after disasters will require a multifaceted approach. NPOs need to consider what skills and attributes they can consistently bring to a disaster situation, in a particular region. EM stakeholders need to be trained in community development, engagement techniques and educated as to what NPOs are out there and what they can contribute in an emergency. Established beliefs of older EM stakeholders need to be modified. Updated community contact lists on municipal emergency plans need to be consistently audited and recognised as a key audit aspect. Funding of longer-term recovery and resilience projects needs to be made available.

The results demonstrate that policy level aspirations to include NPOs in sharing responsibilities before, during and after disasters are sound and can potentially

significantly improve EM performance and strengthen community resilience. However, training, development and funds are required by both government and NPOs to ensure effective engagement, empowerment and enablement of these groups.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: Ethics Documentation

Ethics Approval Certificate



Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee

Approval Certificate

This is to certify that the project below was considered by the Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee. The Committee was satisfied that the proposal meets the requirements of the *National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research* and has granted approval.

Project Number: 8645
Project Title: The potential of nonprofit organisations in building community resilience to disasters
Chief Investigator: Emeritus Prof Francis Archer
Expiry Date: 11/08/2022

Terms of approval - failure to comply with the terms below is in breach of your approval and the *Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research*.

1. The Chief Investigator is responsible for ensuring that permission letters are obtained, if relevant, before any data collection can occur at the specified organisation.
2. Approval is only valid whilst you hold a position at Monash University.
3. It is responsibility of the Chief Investigator to ensure that all investigators are aware of the terms of approval and to ensure the project is conducted as approved by MUHREC.
4. You should notify MUHREC immediately of any serious or unexpected adverse effects on participants or unforeseen events affecting the ethical acceptability of the project.
5. The Explanatory Statement must be on Monash letterhead and the Monash University complaints clause must include your project number.
6. Amendments to approved projects including changes to personnel must not commence without written approval from MUHREC.
7. Annual Report - continued approval of this project is dependent on the submission of an Annual Report.
8. Final Report - should be provided at the conclusion of the project. MUHREC should be notified if the project is discontinued before the expected completion date.
9. Monitoring - project may be subject to an audit or any other form of monitoring by MUHREC at any time.
10. Retention and storage of data - The Chief Investigator is responsible for the storage and retention of the original data pertaining to the project for a minimum period of five years.

Thank you for your assistance.

Professor Nip Thomson

Chair, MUHREC

CC: Dr Caroline Spencer, Ms Fiona Roberts

List of approved documents:

Document Type	File Name	Date	Version
Consent Form	consent-form-Lions Club	14/07/2017	1
Explanatory Statement	explanatory-statement-2017	27/07/2017	2
Supporting Documentation	FR Ethics Themes for discussion during Interviews	28/07/2017	V3

Background on Research – Participant information – NPO Interviews



Themes for Discussion during Case Study Interviews

Hello, thank you for taking the time to speak with me today. I am interviewing you for my PhD project investigating what the Potential of Nonprofit Organisations might be in Building Community Resilience to Disasters.

Firstly, have you read the Explanatory statement?

Do you have any questions?

Have you signed the consent form?

The themes that we are particularly interested hearing your thoughts on are:

❖ Your organisation's ACTIONS

- Has your organisation been involved in activities that helped protect your community against or prepare for a disaster? If so what? Would you give me some examples please?
- Has your organisation helped during or after a disaster? If so would you give me some examples please?

❖ Your organisation's STRENGTHS

- What do you see as the strengths of your organisation participating in activities that protect your community before, during or after a disaster?

❖ BARRIERS & ENABLERS

- What did you feel were the barriers restricting your activities in helping your community before, during or after disasters, if any?
- What do you think are the things that helped (enabled) you do the activities you did?
- What do you see as your organisation's role in disaster situations, if at all?
- Thoughts on overcoming barriers discussed

Is there anyone in particular who you feel it would be useful for me to speak with?

Thank you for your time today. If I need to get back to you on some issues, may I contact you please? If you would like a summary of my research, our contact details on the Explanatory sheet.

Background on Research – Participant Information – EM Interviews



Themes for Discussion during Interviews

Hello, thank you for taking the time to speak with me today. I am interviewing you for my PhD project investigating what the Potential of Nonprofit Organisations might be in Building Community Resilience to Disasters.

- Firstly, have you read the Explanatory statement?
- Do you have any questions?
- Have you signed the consent form?

The themes that we are particularly interested hearing your thoughts on are:

How do you (and your organisation) view nonprofits?

- Has your organisation been involved in disaster resilience, response or recovery activities that included nonprofit input in helping your community? If so what? Would you give me some examples please? How did that go? Were the nonprofits useful? Helpful?
- What are your perceptions on the role of nonprofit organisations in emergency management and response? How does your organisation view nonprofits?
- The National Strategy for Disaster Resilience highlights a disaster resilient community as having many characteristics that the nonprofits we have investigated have demonstrated (eg strong community connections and knowledge).

¶

BARRIERS & ENABLERS

Nonprofit representatives have flagged being overlooked, unrecognised as potential stakeholders or conflict with traditional Emergency Management organisations, as some of the most significant barriers to their participating in the disaster space. Do you feel that is correct? Thoughts?

What did you feel were the barriers inhibiting or preventing nonprofits activities in protecting or preparing their local community against disasters, if any?

What do you think are the things that would help being able to utilise nonprofit resources in disaster situations?

- Is there anyone in particular who you feel it would be useful for me to speak with?

¶

Thank you for your time today. If you would like a summary of my research, our contact details are on the Explanatory sheet. For my purposes, I use the Australian tax office's definition of not-for-profit, or nonprofit: 'Not-for-profit (NFP) organisations are organisations that provide services to the community and do not operate to make a profit' (ATO). Any profit is invested in providing services and does not go to members.

Consent Form



CONSENT FORM



Project: 'What is The Potential Role of ~~Nonprofit~~ Organisations in Building Community Resilience to Disasters'

Chief Investigator: Emeritus Professor Frank Archer

I have been asked to take part in the Monash University research project specified above. I have read and understood the Explanatory Statement and I hereby consent to participate in this project.

I consent to the following:	Yes	No
To Participate in the study	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Audio recording during the interview	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
After the interview, the researcher may contact me if they need further clarification	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Name of Participant _____

Participant Signature _____ Date _____

Explanatory Statement



EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

Project: **What Is The Potential of Nonprofit Organisations in Building Community Resilience to Disasters**



Chief Investigator

Emeritus Professor Frank Archer

Co-Investigator

Dr Caroline Spencer

Monash University Accident Research Centre

Phone: 03 99051388

email: Francis.Archer@monash.edu

Student Investigator

Fiona Roberts

Phone : 0402 248922

email: Fiona.Roberts@monash.edu

You are invited to take part in this study. Please read this Explanatory Statement in full before deciding whether or not to participate in this research. If you would like further information regarding any aspect of this project, you are encouraged to contact the researchers via the phone numbers or email addresses listed above.

What does the research involve?

The aim of this study is to investigate the potential role of nonprofit organisations like yours, in building community resilience to disasters.

We are asking study participants to give Fiona Roberts approximately 60 minutes of their time, so she may ask them a series of questions regarding their organisation's actions and experiences with disaster resilience and or disaster response. If you are willing to be interviewed, Fiona would appreciate being able to record the interview, to ensure she captures the full extent of your response. If you don't want the interview to be recorded, that is fine.

Why were you chosen for this research?

We have chosen your organisation because of its long-term contribution to community development and involvement in resilience building activities. We have obtained your contact details from organisational information on the web and on recommendation from industry personnel.

Consenting to participate in the project and withdrawing from the research

The consent process involves your confirmation, establishing an interview time and signing the consent form. You have the right to withdraw from further participation at any stage. However it will not be possible to withdraw data once responses have been submitted and coded. The data from the project will only be reported as group data, and no individuals will be able to be identified.

Possible benefits and risks to participants

Nonprofit organisations such as yours, have contributed much to Australian society at the grassroots level. However there is little in the peer-reviewed literature about the activities of these important organisations. There is also little evidence that these organisations are being utilised effectively or that they are clearly recognised for their contribution in times of disasters. This research aims to go some way to address this oversight, and will also attempt to bring your type of nonprofit further into the community resilience building policy conversation.

We will work to minimise any inconvenience to you for participating in this study. The possible or reasonably foreseeable risks to you from participating in this research are negligible. Fiona will ensure that she has a clear understanding of what information may be attributed to you, and that which is to be anonymous.

Confidentiality

The confidentiality or anonymity of the data we have collected will be managed through discussion with sources. Field notes will be transported securely. Interviewees will be given pseudonyms and codes where appropriate. Information will be aggregated, and if published pseudonyms or other means of participants remaining anonymous will be used. The research will be published as part of Fiona Roberts' PhD thesis. It is likely it will also form part of a published paper and may be a component of a conference presentation.

Storage of data

Results and data will be protected and filed securely, as per the Monash University's *A guide to good research practice*. Data will be collected and stored on a password protected personal computer, and on a password protected external hard drive. Only other members of the research team will have access to this data. MUARC will take reasonable steps to ensure any information is de-identified and destroyed when it is no longer required.

Results

Results will be detailed in Fiona Roberts' thesis, and also are likely to be referred to in journal articles or presented at conferences. A summary statement of outcomes will be prepared and will be available on requests by emailing Fiona.Roberts@monash.edu

Complaints

Should you have any concerns or complaints about the conduct of the project, you are welcome to contact:

The Executive Officer,

Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee (MUHREC)

Room 111, Chancellery Building E, 24 Sports Walk, Clayton Campus Research Office, Monash University VIC 3800

Tel: +61 3 9905 2052 Email: muhrec@monash.edu Fax: +61 3 9905 3831

Thank you,

Chief Investigator Emeritus Professor Frank Archer

APPENDIX 2: Rockefeller Foundation 52 Indicators

INDICATORS	QUALITIES						
	INTEGRATED	INCLUSIVE	REFLECTIVE	RESOURCEFUL	ROBUST	REDUNDANT	FLEXIBLE
1.1 Safe and affordable housing							
1.2 Adequate affordable energy supply							
1.3 Inclusive access to safe drinking water							
1.4 Effective sanitation							
1.5 Sufficient affordable food supply							
2.1 Inclusive labour policies							
2.2 Relevant skills & training							
2.3 Local business development and innovation							
2.4 Supportive financing mechanisms							
2.5 Diverse protection of livelihoods following a shock							
3.1 Robust public health systems							
3.2 Adequate access to quality healthcare							
3.3 Emergency medical care							
3.4 Effective emergency response services							
4.1 Local community support							
4.2 Cohesive communities							
4.3 Strong city-wide identity & culture							
4.4 Actively engaged citizens							
5.1 Effective systems to deter crime							
5.2 Proactive corruption prevention							
5.3 Competent policing							
5.4 Accessible criminal and civil justice							
6.1 Well-managed public finances							
6.2 Comprehensive business continuity planning							
6.3 Diverse economic base							
6.4 Attractive business environment							
6.5 Strong integration with regional & global economies							
7.1 Comprehensive hazard and exposure mapping							
7.2 Appropriate codes, standards & enforcement							
7.3 Effectively managed protective ecosystems							
7.4 Robust protective infrastructure							
8.1 Effective stewardship of ecosystems							
8.2 Flexible infrastructure services							
8.3. Retained spare capacity							
8.4 Diligent maintenance & continuity							
8.5 Adequate continuity for critical assets & services							
9.1 Diverse and affordable transport networks							
9.2 Effective transport operation & maintenance							
9.3 Reliable communications technology							
9.4 Secure technology networks							
10.1 Appropriate government decision-making							
10.2 Effective co-ordination with other government bodies							
10.3 Proactive multi-stakeholder collaboration							
10.4 Comprehensive hazard monitoring and risk assessment							
10.5 Comprehensive government emergency management							
11.1 Adequate education for all							
11.2 Widespread community awareness & preparedness							
11.3 Effective mechanisms for communities to engage with government							
12.1 Comprehensive city monitoring & data management							
12.2 Consultative planning process							
12.3 Appropriate land use and zoning							
12.4 Robust planning approval process							

Source: The Rockefeller Foundation/ARUP, 2015b p. 27

APPENDIX 3: Abstract for WADEM Conference Paper - 'We Just Want to Help'

Introduction

The National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (NSDR) characterises resilient communities as having strong disaster and financial mitigation strategies, strong social capacity, networks and self-reliance (COAG 2011). Nonprofit organisations (NPOs) embrace many characteristics of a disaster resilient community. NPOs do not operate for profit of individual members, profit achieves the organisation's purpose (Australian Tax Office 2016). Community groups like Lions and Rotary Club have long histories, and while not established to respond to disasters, they frequently have heavy involvement in preparing for or recovering from disasters.

Aim

'What is the potential role of nonprofit organisations in building community resilience to disasters?'

Method

An applied research project, using theories of resilience, social capital and the Sendai framework to conceptualise the frameworks and guide the process. Qualitative research methods, thematic analysis and case studies help identify Lions, Rotary and Neighbourhood Houses Victoria strengths, barriers and enablers.

Results

Research demonstrated how NPOs made significant contributions to building communities' resilience to disasters. NPOs facilitate three Sendai guiding principles of engaging, empowering and enabling the community to build disaster resilience. Actions have included raising awareness to disaster risk, reducing disaster risk, helping prepare for disasters, and contributing to long term disaster recovery. NPO strengths included local knowledge, community trust and connections, which matched characteristics listed in the NSDR for a disaster resilient community. However, barriers to participation included: traditional emergency services ignoring NPOs, lack of role definition, and lack of perceived legitimacy.

Discussion

As the first Australia research to analyse scientifically the contributions of these NPOs to build community resilience, before, during and after disaster, it enhances understanding and recognition of NPOs and assists in identifying means to facilitate their disaster resilience activities and place them more effectively within Emergency Management strategic processes. Greater utilisation of such assets could lead to better community outcomes.