

**Deconstructing Indiscriminate Violence:
A Mixed Methods Study in Nightclub Security**

**A thesis submitted in total fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
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by

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Abstract

Violence in and around nightclubs has been the subject of community concern for many years and yet there has been little research into how nightclubs address the risk of violence. The study reported in this thesis explores systems of security in 20 Victorian nightclubs located within an entertainment precinct and how they address violence. Violence was defined as behaviours that include verbal threats, aggressive actions such as pointing or invading personal space, and physical attack that required actual or potential intervention by venue staff. The study grouped the 20 nightclubs into two categories (Levels 1 and 2) based upon reported incidents. The 10 Level 1 venues averaged >4 incidents each week and the 10 Level 2 venues averaged <1 incident each week. The study made comparisons between elements within the security systems that had been developed and introduced into the 10 Level 1 and 10 Level 2 nightclubs in determining which elements appear to be associated with less violence. The study found that venues with higher levels of violence tended to have informal systems, poor management methods and less preventative practices which meant they were weighted toward reactivity in addressing the risk of violence.

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Tony Zalewski

7 March 2013

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Chapter 1 – Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the considerations that have guided the course of this study. This and the following chapters are divided into sections designed to assist the reader proceed through this thesis.

This chapter has five sections:

- Section 1 explains the background to this study, defines violence and introduces the reader broadly to the research area;
- Section 2 outlines the research problem and why this research is important;
- Section 3 presents the aims of this study;
- Section 4 outlines limitations; and
- Section 5 provides a synopsis of the thesis and its direction.

1.2 About this study

This study examines the relationship between levels of violence in nightclubs and security practices aimed to reduce violence. It is not a study of the causes of violence as many authors have comprehensively addressed the area both within Australia and abroad (Archer 1994; Akers 1977; Athens 1997; Bandura & Ribes-Inesta 1976; Collier 1998; Gelles 1987; Graham & Homel 2008; Graham & West 2001; Kelley 1997; Reiss & Roth 1994; Sacco & Kennedy 1994; Stockwell 2010).

For the purposes of this study “violence” is defined by the World Health Organisation (“WHO”) and means the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation (WHO 2002, p. 4). It must be noted that the definition of “violence” includes acts of aggression, conflicts where behaviours may be escalating such as animated acts of pushing, invading personal space, aggressive finger pointing, raised voices, “shaping up” and the like. Many of the incidents reported by respondents in this study disclosed such behaviours, not merely physical

attacks that involved striking another or inflicting damage on property. Graham and Homel (2008) suggest “aggression” and “violence” overlap and are therefore interchangeable. However, for the purposes of this study, “violence” includes acts of aggression as defined by the WHO (WHO 2002).

Security systems at nightclubs are not solely restricted to the efforts of security staff although crowd controllers tend to be central to strategies of guardianship and monitoring of patron behaviour (Graham & Homel 2008; Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012; Hobbs et al. 2002, 2003; Lister 2001; Monaghan 2000; Worksafe Victoria 2007). This means the study of nightclub security involves an examination of issues identified as relevant to violence from a security perspective that includes physical security measures such as CCTV systems and related technologies, nightclub personnel including security staff, and protocols that guide the system such as security policies, plans and procedures (Worksafe Victoria 2007). Often monitoring of crowds and venue-related interventions during incidents such as conflict will involve activity by security staff but can also include other staff in a nightclub system of security (Worksafe Victoria 2007). Typically these staff include licensees and managers who may provide a level of guidance or supervision to subordinate personnel and operational or base-level staff such as bar, “glassies”, promotions and entertainment personnel.

In addition to internal considerations nightclubs are subject to a number of external influences including regulatory compliance. This means systems of security are influenced through organisations such as police who attend venues as part of their routine operational duties, industry regulators and the local community (Graham & Homel 2008). For example, in Victoria police monitor venues and enforce legislative instruments relating to liquor licensing and public order. The Victorian liquor licensing authority also monitors venues and general industry performance and introduces measures aimed at minimising risk or community concerns such as violence; and the local community will often work with venues through licensee Accords to address local problems at the local level (Stockwell 2010).

Typically, and relevant to this study, regulators impose conditions on liquor licences granted to nightclub operators that are often influenced by key stakeholders such as

police, regulators and the community. These conditions are also subject to compliance activity by the regulator and police (Graham & Homel 2008; Stockwell 2010).

There are also related regulatory and industry pressures that may influence a nightclub system of security. These include health and safety responsibilities, various Standards and Guides such as the Australian Standard for Emergency Preparedness (AS 3745:2010) and industry guides involving the management of workplace violence (Worksafe Victoria 2003, 2007).

An investigation of influences that impact directly and indirectly upon a venue system of security are further discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.

1.3 Background to the research

Over the past decade there has been increased attention given to the level of violence in and around licensed premises (Graham et al. 2011; Miller et al. 2012; Stockwell 2010). This has been evidenced on a global scale with various studies directed toward predictors, management and control of violence (Graham & Homel 2008, Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012; Homel & Clarke 1994; Stockwell 2010; Tomsen et al. 1991). Of particular note has been activity associated with nightclubs which are reported to involve higher levels of violence than other licensed venues (Graham & Homel 2008; Miller et al. 2012; Stockwell 2010; Tomsen 2005; Winlow et al. 2001).

According to Graham and Homel (2008), licensed premises are generally categorised into two groups, low and high risk. Low-risk venues are typically private clubs, reception or function centres and restaurants. High-risk venues commonly trade as nightclubs, taverns, pubs or hotels and attract a substantial number of patrons who might attend and leave over varying times during any period of trading (Graham and Homel 2008). In Victoria, “high risk” venues are typically nightclubs that trade past 1am and have been grouped by the regulator into a single liquor licence category for better regulation and monitoring (VCGLR 2012d). High-risk venues are discussed further in Chapters 2 and 3. It has been suggested that the nature of “wet culture” trading and increased patronage at nightclubs introduces a series of specific risks including the potential for alcohol-related harm and violence (Casswell et al. 1993;

Graham et al. 2011; Graham & Homel 2008; Nicholas 2006; Stockwell et al. 1992; Stockwell 2010).

There is a strong body of evidence that shows an association between alcohol consumption to intoxication and violence (Graham & Homel 2008; Miller et al. 2012; Stockwell 2010). This is typified by episodes of heavy drinking involving the young, often during leisure activity at licensed premises including nightclubs (Graham 2005; Wells et al. 1998) and more likely on Friday and Saturday nights (Briscoe & Donnelly 2001). Homel and Tomsen (1992) report that nightclubs in Australia are frequented by many thousands of young people for much of their socialisation and entertainment. Hence it is not surprising that young males are most prominent in data relating to violence (AIHW 2005; Graham & Homel 2008; Teece & Williams 2000) and violent incidents are more likely to arise amongst the young in nightclubs or their surrounds (AIHW 2005; Roche et al. 2007). Of course, this is not new knowledge and, as discussed in the literature review the association between alcohol consumption to intoxication and violence has been reported as problematic within the literature over a number of decades (Edwards, Hensman & Peto 1971; Jeffs & Saunders 1983; Pernanen 1976, 1991; Roncek & Pravatiner 1989).

According to the literature, a number of risk factors have been identified that link alcohol-related aggression and violence at licensed premises including characteristics of the venue itself (Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012; Macintyre & Homel 1997; Quigley et al. 2003; Stockwell 2010; Tomsen et al. 1991). This suggests venues that fail to discourage high-level intoxication or aggression, or adopt permissive attitudes to outrageous behaviours will most likely experience higher levels of violence (Graham & Homel 2008; Quigley et al. 2003; Stockwell 2010; Tomsen 1997).

In most Australian States and Territories there are a number of entertainment precincts such as King Street in Victoria, Queensland's Fortitude Valley, Kings Cross in Sydney and Adelaide's Hindley Street area. These precincts include a preponderance of licensed premises including nightclubs and are visited by a large number of patrons (Graham & Homel 2008; Stockwell 2010). This activity is not dissimilar to experiences in other countries. For example, in Great Britain it is estimated more than 120 million patrons frequent late night venues annually, many of which are located in entertainment precincts (Starkey 1998) and in Canada there can

be more than 30,000 people in major leisure precincts during peak times around Toronto (Purcell & Graham 2005).

This study investigates 20 nightclubs in the Chapel Street entertainment precinct in the Victorian local government area of Stonnington. It is estimated up to 100,000 people visit the precinct each night during peak times (City of Stonnington 2010). There are 66 nightclubs in and around this precinct with a potential total venue capacity of 20,000 patrons during peak trading times (City of Stonnington 2010). This is not dissimilar to the other major entertainment precincts in or around the Melbourne CBD (City of Melbourne 2007).

Despite the substantial patron attendances at nightclubs throughout Australia and abroad, there are still no mandatory industry-specific minimum standards or a best practice framework for a nightclub system of security in Australia. A primary objective of this work is to address this anomaly.

Although the issue of violence and licensed premises can be traced back to the inception of hospitality venues, it has only been of recent times that a formalised and strategic approach to the problem has been taken in Australia and abroad (Graham & Homel 2008; Myers 2001; Miller et al. 2012; Stockwell 2010). For example, within Australia the Geelong area has introduced 25 interventions over the past 15 years in an attempt to minimise problems associated with alcohol-related violence and disorder (Armstrong-Rowe 2008; Miller et al. 2012). Local interventions have also occurred in other Australian jurisdictions including Newcastle, NSW (Jones et al. 2009; Kypri et al. 2011), Surfers Paradise, Queensland (Graham & Homel 2008; Homel et al. 2006), Northbridge, WA (Hughes & Thompson 2009) and Hindley Street, SA (Nicholas 2008). During the early 1980s a number of Canadian municipalities introduced a “municipal alcohol policy” that was later supported by venue training such as the “safer bars” program (Graham & Homel 1997; Narbonne-Fortin et al. 1996). This program focused on the service and availability of alcohol on licensed premises and how the risk of conflict could be minimised through strategic venue intervention. This is discussed further in Chapter 2.

Some jurisdictions throughout the United Kingdom introduced “town centre management” involving partnerships between key stakeholders such as police, local

government, venue operators and other interested parties (St John-Brooks 1998). Multi-agency regulation and community mobilisation efforts were introduced in a number of international jurisdictions including the United Kingdom, New Zealand, North America and Scandinavia (Hobbs et al. 2003; Homel et al. 1992).

Around 1990 there was a growing interest throughout Australia in the various social impacts of public drinking including problems that often surfaced in and around licensed premises through the Victorian Community Council Against Violence (VCCA 1990b).

The Victorian Community Council Against Violence was responsible for the first community mobilisation strategy through the Melbourne-based Westend Forum, a collaboration of key stakeholders with an interest in the King Street nightclub precinct (Dixon 1998). This was followed with a similar approach in Queensland by the Surfers Paradise Safety Action Project (Homel et al. 1997a). Interestingly, since that time most Australian regulatory authorities now identify nightclubs as high-risk operations that require specific risk minimisation and community mobilisation strategies along similar lines to the international and Victorian experiences (Graham & Homel 2008; Stockwell 2010; VCGLR 2012d). In part, an Australian equivalent to the international initiatives also involved Responsible Serving of Alcohol (RSA) training for venue service staff and Community Safety Action Projects (CSAP) or community mobilisation strategies that are now more aligned with licensee accords (Graham & Homel 2008; Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012).

Over recent years the New South Wales Government has introduced a “high-risk” venue strategy with mandatory licensing conditions based upon a venue’s level of reported violence (OLGR 2011). Victoria introduced “lockouts” to prohibit entry at bars during later trading hours to minimise the risk of “bar-hopping” by undesirables and also to impact upon precinct crowd gathering during later hours of trading to address violence and related behaviours (Miller et al. 2012). This was followed by “barring powers” to prohibit known problem persons from frequenting entertainment precincts or particular venues (VCGLR 2012), and Queensland introduced a State-wide 3 am lockout plus phased-out use of traditional glassware for plastics where a venue trades after midnight (Drugs & Crime Prevention Committee 2010; Mazerolle et al. 2012; Palk et al. 2008).

Each strategy sought to address community concerns about late night venue operations, their level of violence and other anti-social behaviours such as damage and excessive levels of noise (Graham & Homel 2008; Nicholas 2008; Miller et al. 2012; Stockwell 2010). The moves often involved a policing, compliance perspective to alcohol-related incidents that were linked to specific licensed premises. Generally this necessitated active monitoring of licensed premises by regulators, often with the imposition of liquor licence conditions upon problem venues (Stockwell 2010).

A key area of concern for regulators and the broad community is how interactions between individuals or groups in or around a licensed environment can become problematic (Graham & Homel 2008). During any period of trading at a venue there are many contacts or interactions between patrons, both within their individual social network and also with strangers. Security staff also interact with patrons at least once during each attendance, usually at the point of admission although patron interactions with internal security staff can be ongoing. Bar and other venue staff will also have frequent and predictable contact during any trading period. This means there are substantial contacts with the potential for conflicts between venue staff and patrons (Monaghan 2000). However, it is just as likely conflicts will arise between patrons themselves, often requiring some form of venue instigated intervention by crowd controllers or other staff. Inevitably some of these conflicts or tensions will lead to violence. As Homel and Clarke (1994, p.1) argue “a major predictor of physical violence was staff intervention with intoxicated persons, particularly refusal of service”.

According to the literature, young people bring into the leisure or entertainment environment common characteristics including immaturity, exuberance and inexperience (Graham & Homel 2008). This suggests that large gatherings of groups, predominantly comprising the young, in a leisure environment creates an increased risk for incidents including the potential for violence. The literature supports this both locally and abroad (Andreasson et al. 1999; Andreasson et al. 2000; Dixon 1990; Graham 1980; Graham 1985; Graham 2005; Graham & Homel 1997; Graham et al. 1996; Graham & West 2001; Hauritz et al. 1998a; Hauritz et al. 1998b; Homel 1990; Homel 1999; Homel & Clarke 1994; Homel et al. 2004; Macintyre & Homel 1994; Norstrom 1998; Parker 1993; Ramsay 1991; Room 2003; Shepherd 1994; Stockwell

1997; Stockwell et al. 1993; Stockwell et al. 1992; Stockwell 2010; Teece & Williams 2000; Tomsen 1997; Tomsen 2005; Tomsen et al. 1991; Wallin et al. 2002; Wallin et al. 2003; Webster et al. 2002; Wells et al. 1998).

Australian research specifically discloses a correlation between later night trading, increased alcohol consumption including intoxication and increased violence (Chikritzhs & Stockwell 2002; Graham & Homel 2008; Hauritz et al. 1998a; Homel & Clarke 1994; Macintyre & Homel 1997 Miller et al. 2012; Stockwell 2010).

The alcohol-violence connection within late-night trading by nightclubs has also received considerable media attention (Graham & Homel 2008; Hauritz et al. 1998c; Miller et al. 2012; Wallin & Andreasson 2005). According to Graham and Homel (2008, p.2) violence at licensed premises cannot be simply viewed according to patron characteristics and their interactions but “must be understood in terms of broader societal attitudes and regulatory systems”. These issues are expanded upon later in this thesis.

As indicated above, this study focuses on nightclubs and their systems of security. In addition to design and venue-specific or situational influences on behaviour such as aggression-based musical entertainment, systems of security are frequently affected by patron-related violence. Specific risks involving violent behaviours are often associated with groups, gender, maturity, intoxication (alcohol and/or other drug), and a multitude of specific individual or group behaviours. The behaviour of venue staff is also reported to regularly contribute to violence (Graham & Homel 1997; Graham & Homel 2008; Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012; Homel & Clarke 1994; Tomsen et al. 1991; VCCA 1990b).

1.3.1 Nightclubs

Bellis et al. (2002, p.1027) defines a typical nightclub as follows: “... at its most basic (it) is an operation that provides loud music, often with a repetitive beat, a dance area that usually has low background light and intermittent bright lighting effects, and a licensed bar”. Hobbs (2003) contends that nightclubs are multi-faceted operations and high-risk due to patronage by a substantial number of young persons, hours of overnight operation, extended opportunity for high-level intoxication and the

frequency of patron attendance. They can also be the foundation for outrageous or extreme behaviours, macho behaviours, sexual promiscuity, illicit drug taking and mass socialisation. Nightclubs are also explained under various themes or “types” that market to a social sector or sub-culture such as dance, lounge, alternative, reggae-rap, heavy metal, hip-hop, upscale or rave. These venue types often involve significant patron variations of gender, age, ethnic representation, behavioural norms and consumption of alcohol or other drugs (Purcell & Graham 2005). Typically venue types, their operational parameters and situational influences will result in variations to their security strategies (Graham & Homel 2008; Tomsen et al. 1991).

Throughout Australia, a nightclub is regulated by its relevant State or Territory authority. The regulators have addressed concerns about alcohol-related violence in differing ways that focus on strict compliance with service of alcohol and any conditions imposed on the venue liquor licence, and in collaboration with other operations in the vicinity through licensee accords (Graham & Homel 2008; Stockwell 2010).

Nightclubs in Victoria have been categorised by the regulator as “high risk” since the late 1990s although not initially through a formal process (VCGLR 2012d). From 1 January 2010 the Victorian Regulator then known as “Responsible Alcohol Victoria” formally introduced a “late night” liquor licence designation for nightclubs that trade past 1 am and provide live or amplified music or entertainment. These venues are required to hold a “late night liquor licence” which mandates a number of operational conditions on the liquor licence. Some of these conditions impose minimum security staffing levels, mandatory training in the responsible service of alcohol, and use of surveillance cameras. The objective of these conditions is for venues to be “grouped into a single category so they can be better regulated and monitored” (DoJ 2009a). By triggering licence conditions in these circumstances an attempt has been made to minimise the risk of alcohol or venue-related violence (Stockwell 2010).

Arguably some of these conditions address generic safety issues rather than seeking to minimise the range of specific security risks that might arise in individual nightclubs. By triggering licence conditions in these circumstances an attempt has been made to minimise the risk of alcohol or venue-related violence (Stockwell 2010).

1.3.2 Personal interest in the area

My personal interest in this area goes back to well over 30 years. Initially from my days as a uniformed police officer attending pub brawls or managing drunken individuals removed from nightclubs, then as a detective investigating serious assaults in and around licensed premises and at one stage working as a part-time crowd controller to supplement a mere police wage! Finally over the past 20 years as a consultant to many hospitality venues including nightclubs seeking to improve their security measures.

Fortunately my work and interest in this area has also involved participation in a number of industry panels and associations, regulatory committees and boards such as Victoria Police licensing services for security trainers and the Victorian Workcover Authority's expert panel that developed the industry guide *Crowd Control at Venues and Events – A Practical Occupational Health and Safety Guide* (VWA 2006, 2007). I have also worked with the Westend Forum, a group headed initially by Ms Judith Dixon who was then Chair of the Victorian Community Council Against Violence (VCCAV).

The VCCAV was a pioneer in addressing issues relevant to violence in and around licensed premises with a particular focus on nightclubs in the King Street, Melbourne entertainment precinct (VCCAV 1990b). Under the auspices of the City of Melbourne's "Westend Forum" Ms Dixon and her team continued to motivate Melbourne's late night entertainment operators to adopt responsible business practices and improve the reputation and safety levels in the precinct. I will elaborate about the work of the VCCAV and the Westend Forum in Chapter 2 where our work was formally recognised with the Australian Violence Prevention Award in 1992.

This early work was invaluable to me in gaining insights from the perspectives of law enforcer, venue operator, security provider and patron. Often I was called upon by industry stakeholders for input and participation based upon my policing, legal and security industry experience.

The work of the Westend Forum was subsequently replicated in a number of other Australian jurisdictions such as Queensland where I worked with the Surfers Paradise

Safety Action Project and also the then-named Office of Consumer Affairs to introduce a similar regulatory and training model to Victoria.

My experiences during industry transition of the crowd control sector through regulation were many and included pre-licensing training for a substantial number of crowd controllers. Some of my best memories involved coping with colourful and often overt resistance to change and new approaches to security by many “old school” bouncers. This period of my life was most rewarding and with my wife Deborah and youngest daughter Hayley (who then was always keen to act as an underage patron in role plays) we travelled around Victoria or interstate most weeks providing short courses in crowd control.

At that time I was also studying for a bachelor of laws, developing our business (Australian Institute of Public Safety) and providing a broad range of security consulting and advisory services including expert witness testimony and reports.

Unfortunately, with many positive experiences come the disappointments of inappropriate conduct by a small number of industry personnel. Often this behaviour has resulted in criminal and civil action, adverse media and reputational damage to the security and hospitality industries. It is pleasing to note these disappointments are far outweighed by the positive aspects of public safety and the crowd control sector of the security industry. When one considers the substantial number of interactions between security staff and patrons attending licensed premises on a daily basis, the number of reported incidents involving inappropriate interactions by security staff can be considered relatively small. However, this is not to suggest further improvements cannot be pursued.

My interest continues today through participation in regulatory and industry panels as well as training, consulting and presentations at various conferences in Australia and abroad. The experience gained has, in my view, provided a practical cross-industry understanding of the complex and often subtle issues involving nightclub security that are not always apparent. Like all researchers I have a particular perspective on the issues being examined. I have, however, attempted to remain objective throughout this study.

1.4 The research problem and why this research is important

There is a strong body of evidence that reports the link between alcohol, violence and nightclubs (Graham & Homel 2008; Mazerolle et al. 2011; Miller et al. 2012; VCCAV 1990b). This in part is attributed to the characteristics of staff and patronage, and the substantial number of patron interactions staff have including a broad range of interpersonal and behavioural issues. These interactions can include misinterpretations and conflicts that are capable of escalation and violence (Graham & Homel 2008). There are also many situational aspects that impact upon workers, patrons and persons in close proximity in dealing with intoxication, emotion, fatigue and any number of differing individual values and perceptions (Stockwell 2010; VCCAV 1990b).

Nicholas (2006, p.2) contends:

While there has been extensive research into the antecedents of alcohol-related violence in and around licensed premises, one gap in the research remains evident. There has been very little research into the role of crowd controllers in reducing these problems.

In a leisure or entertainment environment, crowd controllers primarily secure licensed premises by monitoring the activity of individuals and groups, both inside the venue and in adjacent public space. A major problem faced by the industry is the transient, casual and seasonal nature of crowd control work (Monaghan 2002a, 2002b). Often personnel employed in the sector perceive a limited career path, low wages and difficult or unhealthy work environment (Graham & Homel 2008). In addition, there can be conflicting work objectives compared to the commercial imperatives of venues (Stockwell 1997). These difficulties often surface during recruitment where employers experience problems enlisting persons with appropriate competence to perform the broad range of requisite security functions (Lister et al 2002; Graham & Homel 2008). In addition, bar and support staff often align with a similar worker profile as security staff. This means that many venues have staff with a distinct lack of maturity, life and industry experience to cope with various problems that might arise in the workplace (Graham & Homel 2008).

Although regulation and various community interventions have evolved throughout each Australian jurisdiction, violence involving nightclubs continues to occur at what can be considered unacceptable levels (see Chapter 2). Some jurisdictions have reported short-term reduced levels of violence although eventual increases have been evidenced with common regularity (Hobbs et al. 2003; Homel & Clarke 1994; Stockwell 2010).

Regulatory interventions and various industry activity has not resulted in the introduction of minimum security standards for nightclubs, nor licensed premises generally (Prenzler & Hayes 1998). The level of activity and ongoing problems with alcohol-related violence experienced by many nightclubs throughout Australia suggests that this deficiency be rectified.

Further, the fact that regulation and other interventions have modestly impacted upon the incidence of violence suggests a need for investigation of the successful features of nightclub security strategies. Is it possible to develop a security framework that will minimise the level of violence in and around a nightclub? If so, what features in one venue could be utilised broadly in other venues to achieve similar reductions in violence and hence are considered best practice? This is a primary focus of this study and forms the basis for the research question: *Do nightclubs that adopt a “best practice” security framework have less violence than venues that do not?*

“Best practice” is defined with the Glossary, discussed in Chapter 2 and again in Chapter 3. It is based upon existing knowledge and practices relevant to systems of security in nightclubs and other late-night venues at the time of this study.

The answer to the research question is important as it will potentially shape future regulatory and industry policy. It could also support local initiatives focused on reducing violence in and around nightclubs including precincts and assist venue operators and other key stakeholders such as security providers understand which features of a security system best minimise the risk of violence. Further, this study could assist regulators, police and other interested persons understand essential features of a system of security that minimise the risk of violence, and provide new knowledge to the field.

1.5 Aims

The aim of this study is to consider the relationship between levels of violence in licensed premises and the use of practices aimed at reducing violence. To achieve the aims three areas are examined and discussed:

1. Identify through a literature review practices that minimise the risk of violence in and around nightclubs and other licensed premises;
2. Investigate 20 nightclubs and their systems of security to describe effective approaches to minimising violence; and
3. Present a practice model to industry and other key stakeholders such as regulators for minimising violence in and around nightclubs.

In developing a practice model the research:

- Classifies a number of nightclubs in this study as Level 1 (higher number of incidents) and Level 2 (lower number of incidents) based on their level of violence;
- Identifies practices in those venues that are relevant to minimising the risk of violence internally and externally;
- Examines the relationship between the level of violence in Level 1 and Level 2 nightclubs and the impact of their respective security systems; and
- Identifies and evaluates extraneous factors which appear to influence violence such as location, environment, venue design, activity and supervision of the area and nightclub operating characteristics.

Thus, the research provides information about which practices are most strongly related to less violence and thus contribute to the development of new knowledge in the area of nightclub security and safety.

1.6 Limitations

This study commenced in 2006 and involved 20 nightclubs located in the City of Stonnington (Prahran). During the study (2006 – 2012) a number of initiatives were introduced by regulators, police and government to address concerns about increased incidents of violence in and around late-night licensed premises. These initiatives are expanded upon in Chapters 2 and 3.

New practices for venue compliance with licensing legislation were also introduced including a newly formed Compliance Directorate within the Victorian Commission for Gambling and Liquor Regulation (VCGLR); targeted lockouts; increased powers to enable the regulator and police to tackle problem venues; and a freeze on new applications for venues that sought to trade post-1 am. In May 2008 the Victorian Government also introduced its strategy for addressing alcohol-related harm *Restoring the Balance – Victoria's Alcohol Action Plan 2008 – 2013* (Victorian Government 2008). The Plan focused strongly on public violence and is discussed in Chapter 2.

It was perceived that some of these initiatives would impact upon violence in and around licensed premises although the extent is currently unknown as there is little evidence-based research. In general terms, during the period 2006 – 2010 police statistics on reported assaults revealed a 19% increase across the community, with a proportionate increase in and around licensed premises (Victoria Police 2010). For the years 2010/11 the number of assaults per 100,000 population increased by 12.5% and in 2011/12 by 14% albeit assaults at licensed premises decreased by 4.9% (Victoria Police 2012). In part the decrease was attributed to a number of interventions including work through liquor accords and increased enforcement by operational police on violence and other unacceptable behaviours (Victoria Police 2012). It is important to note there has been no study into the effectiveness of these interventions and in fact Miller et al. (2012) reports crime levels in one study in Geelong have returned to pre-intervention levels. Homel et al. (1997) reported similar increases after initial positive indications for interventions introduced into the Surfers Paradise entertainment precinct, Queensland.

In June 2011 the liquor regulator introduced Venue Management Guidelines for licensees to consider when completing a Venue Management Plan (VCGLR 2011).

Although the guidelines in part could influence nightclub systems of security and thus possibly levels of violence they are generic in content and do not provide detail upon which a venue could operationalise its security requirements. The Guidelines are discussed further in Chapter 3.

Despite these recent initiatives the study remains valuable because there has been no consistent reduction in violence in or around licensed premises. Further, there has been no reported study on the effectiveness of systems of security in nightclubs or other licensed premises which means little is known about features or elements of a nightclub system of security that will potentially minimise the risk of violence or severity of violent incidents. Miller et al. (2012) recently conducted a study that compared the effectiveness of alcohol-related crime prevention measures in Newcastle (NSW) and Geelong (Victoria), the report highlighted that levels of violence could be affected by restricted trading hours, responsible serving practices, police enforcement strategies and other interventions including lockouts. This comprehensive report added to the existing body of knowledge about the effectiveness of various interventions. It is discussed further in Chapters 2 and 3. Although the study did address issues that might impact upon violence in a precinct or venue, it did not investigate elements of a system of security that might have impacted upon the level of violence in and around nightclubs. Similarly, Stockwell (2010) studied best practice by venue operators and regulators in a comprehensive literature review that spanned over the past 20 years. Again, some best practice principles and practices were reported that might impact upon the risk of violence but not in relation to a venue-specific system of security. Hayes-Jonkers et al. (2012) conducted a study in Cairns that compared strategic and operational practices by security staff to best practices discussed within the literature (see Chapter 3). Hayes-Jonkers et al. (2012) identified four publications that discussed some best practices from a venue and security perspective however, the practices were not evidence-based but rather common industry practices where there was a perception such practices might impact upon local problems including violence. A primary aim of this study is to overcome this gap in the knowledge.

Another limitation was the absence of peer-reviewed materials in the area of security systems. Although much has been written about the association between alcohol,

intoxication and violence in and around the licensed environment, there is no literature that discusses elements within a security system. The absence of evidence in this area was problematic and resulted in reference to industry-specific tertiary sources as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.

1.7 Outline of this thesis

This chapter has provided the basis for this thesis. It introduced the research problem and research question. Justification for the research was outlined, aims delineated, definitions used throughout the thesis including reference to the Glossary, and relevant limitations explained.

Chapter 2 is the literature review. The purpose is to identify, explore and critically evaluate studies relative to nightclubs and their security strategies to address violence. The chapter provides an overview of the relevant literature by introducing both historical and contemporary issues relevant to nightclub security and related initiatives in and around nightclubs and entertainment precincts. It also considers other workplaces such as casinos and entertainment events where there are comparable systems of security and safety in dealing with mass gatherings. Some discussion is presented on the application of effective systems and how they might be incorporated into licensed premises including nightclubs.

Chapter 3 discusses regulation relevant to licensed premises including regulation theory and systems of security at nightclubs. It draws on a number of secondary source materials and evidence to make contentions about alcohol, violence and licensed premises. As indicated above, within this chapter reference will also be made to tertiary source materials including industry guides as there is an absence of studies in the area.

Chapter 4 articulates the research methodology used. The purpose and aims of the thesis, and design, sample, data-collection methods and data analysis are explained in detail. This chapter includes a discussion that proposes that venues adopting good practices and then operationalising those practices will have less violence than venues that do not. Chapter 4 further elaborates the research design and approach used, focusing on design selection, its relative strengths and limitations. It explains how and why nightclubs were selected for the study, and the data collection process including

the sample and sampling method, followed by statistical measures used in analysing data including for reliability and validity.

Chapter 5 presents the results of this study. These identify elements in a system of security that are more common across nightclubs, elements that appear to impact upon the risk of violence and whether specific elements are distinguished between Level 1 and Level 2 operations.

Chapter 6 presents a discussion of the strengths and limitations of the study, of unexpected and unusual results, original contributions of this study to the field and the conclusions. Implications for further research in the area are also discussed.

A glossary of terms is attached to the thesis and where appropriate aligns with various regulatory, licensing and industry terminology relevant to Victoria.

Chapter 2 – Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of the literature review is to identify, explore and critically evaluate studies relative to high-risk licensed premises including nightclubs and their security strategies relating to violence. In particular the literature review will focus on the development of current practices that seek to minimise the risk of violence in consideration of perceived safety needs of staff, patrons and others in and around nightclubs. No attempt has been made to list all the material published but rather to synthesise and evaluate relevant literature according to the objectives of this study. To provide some context and structure, the literature was reviewed on three levels – international, national and local (Victoria).

In conducting the literature review it is acknowledged there are differing levels of evidence that are commonly categorised as primary, secondary and tertiary literature (Keenan & Johnston 2002). For example there is differentiation in the evidentiary persuasion between peer-reviewed articles in scholarly journals (primary) and scholarly books (secondary). Brown (2004) suggests peer-reviewed or refereed articles have been read and commented on by other academics. Hence they provide strong evidence in addition to having been “quality controlled” and are therefore the most reliable source available (Brown 2004). There are different levels of peer review such as editorial review usually by an editorial board, review by recognised experts in a subject area, and blind review where the author and reviewer are unknown to each other (Brown 2004). Scholarly books are generally written to provide information for learners about a subject. Writers of scholarly books often summarise or simplify accounts of research which may lead to incomplete information about an original report (Brown 2004). Grogan (1982) suggests primary sources such as journal articles, monographs and the like have not been filtered through interpretation or modified by a second party. He suggests a secondary source is information about a primary source or original information that has been modified or rearranged for a specific purpose and includes bibliographies, some monographs and scholarly books and any index used to locate primary sources. Further Grogan suggests it is not always easy to distinguish between primary and secondary sources other than where modification is evident (Grogan 1982). Tertiary sources are usually twice removed

from the original or fail to meet quality requirements such as guides, handbooks and industry publications (Grogan 1982).

Throughout this and the following Chapters reference will be made to peer-reviewed articles. Where this is not possible the different levels of evidence and any fundamental weaknesses will be acknowledged and discussed as a reference is cited such as a report or research by an industry advocacy body where results might be incredulous (Keenan & Johnston 2002). For example, Drinkwise has provided funding for research but according to Miller and others in a letter published by the Medical Journal of Australia routinely opposes policies that impact upon alcohol consumption and tends to promote industry-friendly programs that are not necessarily evidence-based (Miller et al. 2009). This means the findings provided in these circumstances may not be credible and require critical analysis (Keenan & Johnston 2002). Similarly, the Portman Group (UK) is an alcohol industry advocacy body funded by alcoholic drink producers and thus raises similar concerns about independence and therefore credibility of assertions made relevant to areas of this study (Keenan & Johnston 2002). As indicated above, reference will be made to peer-reviewed articles where possible and alternatively scholarly books as a preference but with caution.

There are a number of scholarly books that address the areas of licensed premises, alcohol, violence and the NTE with two peer reviewed publications providing valuable insight relevant to this study: “Raising the Bar: Preventing aggression in and around bars, pubs and clubs” by Graham and Homel (2008) and “Bar Wars: Contesting the night in contemporary British cities” by Hadfield (2006). Both scholarly books address the regular struggles and tensions between venue operators, government, regulators, police and revellers.

Graham and Homel (2008) initially explain the relationship between consumers and venues before discussing environmental characteristics and the research evidence in minimising alcohol-related violence and the NTE. Their approach is predominately from an Australian context but with some discussion of work internationally mostly from Canada and the UK. Interestingly, in their comprehensive review about alcohol-related violence and harms including its causes and prevention, the authors could find only 13 studies of environmental characteristics associated with aggression in

drinking establishments, eight of which had been conducted by either of them (Graham et al. 1980; Homel et al. 2004). Graham & Homel (2008) present and discuss a number of interventions and practices that were current up to the time of editorial review for publication albeit recent activity in Australia such as lockouts (Miller et al. 2012) and patron barring notices (VCGLR 2012a) for precincts and venues is understandably absent. The authors have extensive backgrounds as lead researchers in Australia and Canada as discussed later in this chapter.

Hadfield (2006) explores, from a UK perspective social control in bars and clubs generally involving police, local communities and the hospitality industry. This scholarly book presents a critique of shifts in alcohol policy and impacts on the NTE including competing interests involving local authorities, central government, the police, the judiciary, local residents and revellers (Hadfield 2006). The book presents a comprehensive discussion of issues for control of the NTE and is divided into three parts. Part 1 provides a historical overview of the development of the night time street and the idea that the night time street is dangerous. Part 2 focuses on social control in public and private places and how areas are managed by frontline staff such as security, managers, bar staff and DJs. Part 3 discusses how policies and rules of the NTE are established and enforced as gained through Hadfield's "insider" knowledge. Finally, Hadfield explains the dichotomy that is based upon poor regulation through the continued grant of liquor licences for larger venues but with little controls through the regeneration of areas, increased levels of binge drinking and risky behaviours (Hadfield 2006). Again, this book presents research summaries and discusses some interventions up to the date of editorial review. For both books, data collection of many studies had concluded over a decade or more ago to publishing. This limitation is noted and identified throughout the thesis where relevant. Both scholarly books refer to a number of theories relevant to revellers and other key stakeholders within the NTE. Again, these theories are discussed where relevant.

This chapter is divided into three sections:

Review of relevant theory. This section explains how the literature review was conducted, including how sources were searched for, and provides an overview of relevant theoretical materials and the contribution of key authors.

Society, licensed premises and violence. This section identifies and evaluates the relationship between society, licensed premises and the problem of violence. It includes a discussion regarding leisure activity at licensed premises, development of the night-time economy and matters associated with nightclubs and violence.

Conclusion. In this section I provide a conclusion to the literature review and summarise various practices relevant to nightclub systems of security.

2.2 Review of relevant theory

It was anticipated there would be a limited amount of material that directly addressed systems of security for nightclubs. This was supported by a search of the literature using key words and key themes as outlined below. Specifically, a study on hospitality security found that there was a “paucity” of information (Niblo 1995); that it was an under-researched area (Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012; Malbon 1999; Monaghan 2002; Webster et al. 2002); and that there was only “small literature on the prevention of violence in the licensed environment” (Homel, 1999, p.15). Further, Graham (2005, p.164) suggests strategies that impact upon violence and therefore security systems such as “effective interventions to reduce violence in licensed premises is sparse”. Haines and Graham (2005) co-authored a chapter in an edited book entitled “Violence Prevention in Licensed Premises” and discussed various interventions aimed at reducing alcohol-related violence. These interventions included community mobilisation, venue specific strategies such as responsible service practices, training of staff and policing strategies. Much content summarises interventions introduced into the licensed environment across jurisdictions with a prominence of studies in Canada and Australia (Haines & Graham 2005; Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012; Stockwell 2010). They discussed the more common or general security and safety issues relevant to licensed premises including situational matters but from a broader perspective of summarising the studies without reference to specific security-related elements or violence minimisation from a pure security perspective. The authors highlighted the absence of credible or evidence-based research into operational security roles performed by crowd controllers or any formal approach to venue-specific security strategies (Haines & Graham 2005; Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012).

Security-related problems in and around licensed venues tend to be addressed in a piecemeal or fragmented approach in various disciplines such as criminology, psychology and sociology (Homel and Clark 1994; MacIntyre & Homel 1997; Monaghan 2002). Most literature focuses on publicly developed crime prevention efforts in and around public spaces such as those imposed by regulators or police relevant to particular local issues (Dingwell, 2006; Graham & Homel 2008). A review of the literature discloses little attention given to the various contributions or strategies incorporated by the private sector for application in private and adjacent public space (Lister et al. 2002) other than the recent study by Hayes-Jonkers et al. (2012) that investigated strategic and operational good practice for private security personnel in the NTE. Unfortunately this study did not delve into elements of a system of security but rather proposed a practice model primarily based upon four reports about industry interventions such as community mobilisation and venue management practices; and qualitative data collection from participants in the Cairns, North Queensland area (Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012). The study including its limitations is discussed further in Chapter 3.

Most nightclubs are privately owned and operated which might also influence the amount of information that is publicly available on systems of security (Palk et al. 2007). According to Yu (2007) the nature of private competitive activity means there is a likelihood that business strategies tend to remain confidential or private to minimise business operational risks; limit potential regulatory exposures for poor performance; protect corporate confidentiality; and in many circumstances result in a commercial advantage for particular businesses. Yu (2007) was discussing these considerations for the protection of intellectual property and corporate information across the private business sector that are not typically available in the public domain. The privacy of private sector activity is well recognised in the public sector by regulatory authorities (VCGLR 2009a, 2012d). For example, liquor regulators across Australia have various methods for compliance and review of venue operations such as use of a compliance or enforcement body other than police. The Victorian 'Civil Compliance Directorate' is attached to the liquor regulator and able to effectively transcend the private boundaries of licensed premises through legislative authority (VCGLR 2009a). Further, Mazerolle et al. (2012) in addressing the impact of lockout legislation discusses the availability of civil remedies including regulatory measures

that can be used as “levers” to impact upon problem behaviours by encouraging venue to adopt recommended practices. Although there is potential segregation between public and private accountability, responsibilities of key stakeholders and the often conflicting business objectives for private operators in public activity, this leads one to ponder whether a venue security strategy is to be viewed in isolation from the outside world? This includes the immediate public or shared environment or whether it should be incorporated in a broader perspective of public safety of which it is one relevant component? These questions will be discussed later.

The proliferation of violence in and around licensed premises has been the subject of growing attention in a number of Western countries (Hadfield 2006; Hobbs et al. 2000; Lister et al. 2002; Miller et al. 2012; VCCAV 1990b). The literature primarily emanates from the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands and Scandinavia (Andreasson et al. 1999; Graham & Homel 2008; Stockwell 2010). Recently, Hughes et al. (2011) conducted a systematic literature review that identified studies exploring an association between physical, staffing and social factors relevant to alcohol-related harms. An aim of this study was to consider the application of various interventions suitable for a European environment. Fifty-three papers were identified that covered 34 studies, mostly from Australia, Canada and the United States (Hughes 2011, p. 37). Most studies were conducted over a decade earlier (Hughes 2011). The study reported a broad range of factors associated with alcohol-related harms based upon physical, staffing and social influences. These influences that potentially increased the risk of violence included a permissive environment to outrageous or unacceptable patron behaviours, irresponsible alcohol service practices, overcrowding, poor cleanliness, and for staff practices (Hughes 2011, p. 41). It was noted findings of the various studies were not always consistent such as aggression was reduced in some environments and not others (Hauritz et al. 1998) and that, for the purposes of implementing practices in a modern European drinking environments, there were limitations. These limitations were founded on the premise of a European drinking culture, including risky drinking that appeared quite different to the other jurisdictions studied (Hughes 2011). This study consolidated much of the published material on the links between alcohol, violence, intoxication and the NTE. However, a major limitation within this study was definitional as conclusions were also drawn based upon studies that involved alcohol-

related harms such as hospital admissions for non-violent injuries and road accidents, which were not necessarily associated with alcohol-related violence. Overall the study provided some supplementary information for this study.

Other studies tended to involve concepts for training of service and security staff through responsible serving of alcohol, “safer bars” programs (Graham 1985) or, of recent years managing intoxicated persons and situational crime prevention (Graham & Homel 1997; Hobbs et al. 2003; Homel & Clarke 1994; Lister et al. 2002; Niblo 1995). Some studies in the UK also focused on various humanistic influences including the behaviour of bouncers and masculinity (Hobbs et al. 2002; Monaghan 2000; 2002). These studies generally attempted to explain violence from a gender, culture and situational perspective but again did not directly address elements or a framework for operational security systems or strategies (Hobbs et al. 2000; Hobbs et al. 2003; Toch 1993; Tomsen 1997; Tomsen 2005; Winlow et al. 2001). The work of Hobbs and Monaghan is discussed further at 2.3.8.

2.2.1 How the literature review was conducted

It was decided firstly to identify key words and themes relevant to the core areas of this study and then review the available literature aligned to those words and themes. The key words and themes were identified and are listed below in this chapter. However, as there was an absence of studies associated with systems of security in a nightclub environment, Chapter 3 contains references to a number of secondary and tertiary source materials that allow the author to make contentions about alcohol, violence, intoxication and licensed premises as applied to systems of security. The structure of both Chapters is outlined below:

Chapter 2

- Review of relevant theory (Section 2.2);
- Relationship between alcohol, licensed premises and violence (Section 2.3);
and
- Conclusion (Section 2.4).

Chapter 3

- Regulation and licensed premises (Section 3.1);
- Systems of security and nightclubs (Section 3.2);
- Best practice in nightclub security (Section 3.3); and
- Conclusion (Section 3.4).

Each section in these chapters has some relevance to security systems in nightclubs including approaches that might impact upon the level of violence. These sections formed the basis for a key word review of the literature. In addition, expansion of primary key words was incorporated to evaluate any parallels in criminological areas of crime prevention, security, public or community safety, violence, alcohol, gender, groups and aggression.

2.2.2 Sources searched

Database searches were conducted relevant to the key themes and key words. . Key words are contained within the glossary of this thesis and included “alcohol, best practice, licensed premises, nightclubs, night time economy (“NTE”), security, security system, venue and violence.” Databases searched were:

Criminology and Law

- AFPD: Australian Federal Police Digest Information
- AGIS: Attorney General’s Information Service
- AIC: Australian Institute of Criminology
- APAIS: Australian Public Affairs Information Service
- AUSTLII: Australasian Legal Information Institute
- CINCH : Australian Criminology Database
- Criminal Justice Abstracts: books and reports
- Home Office UK

Health and Social Sciences

- AUSTHEALTH: Australian database covering health research
- DRUG: Database of the Alcohol and other Drugs Council of Australia
- ETOH: International, covering all aspects of alcohol research, including psychology, sociology, treatment and prevention
- EMBASE: International coverage of many journals not found in other biomedical databases
- FAMILY: Australian Family & Society Abstracts Database Information
- MAIS: Multicultural Australia and Immigration Studies
- MEDLINE: Database of the US National Library for Medicine
- PSYCHLIT: International psychological literature
- PROJECT CORK DATABASE: US database covering all aspects of alcohol problems

Multidisciplinary Databases

- CSI: Consumer Sciences Index Information Archive
- BRITISH: Library catalogue
- KINETICA: Australian Library Holdings
- SOCIAL SCIENCES CITATION INDEX: Sociological abstracts
- SOCIOLOGICAL ABSTRACTS: Subject areas include sociological aspects of medicine, law, violence, the family and group interactions.
- WILSON SOCIAL SCIENCE ABSTRACTS: International coverage including criminal justice and corrections, community health family studies, law and criminology, planning and public administration, policy studies, psychology and psychiatry, social work and public welfare, sociology and urban studies.

Statistical Databases

- ABS: Australian Bureau of Statistics

- AIC: Australia Institute of Criminology
- AIHW: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
- NIBRS: National Incident Based Reporting System (US)
- NSW BCS: New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research

Additional literature searches were conducted relative to key authors in the area. This allowed for an expansion of the literature already reviewed and the generation of further reference lists. Although this systematic process was quite protracted it resulted in a wealth of information and often connected back to the key themes. Further, a review of key authors was examined in the “Social Sciences Citation Index” to identify other leading authors. A series of Boolean searches narrowed irrelevant articles to a manageable and relevant series of groups.

Search results were stored electronically where possible. They were categorised according to theme, author, year, title, source and abstract. This approach proved invaluable as the research proceeded.

2.2.3 Key authors

Key authors were identified whom had conducted studies in a number of countries including Canada, USA, United Kingdom, Sweden, New Zealand and Australia. Although their expertise did not necessarily span across the entire subject area of a nightclub system of security, their work identified the correlation between alcohol abuse, violence and licensed premises including situational issues relevant to the potential for aggression and violence. Often the key authors discussed practices that might minimise or influence the level of violence at nightclubs (Graham 1980, 1985; Graham et al. 1996; Graham & Homel 2008; Tomsen 1997, 2005; Homel 1999, 1990; Homel et al. 2004; Homel & Clarke 1994; Homel et al. 1994; Homel et al. 1997b; Homel & Tomsen 1992; Homel, Tomsen and Thommeny 1991; Stockwell 1997, 2010; Stockwell & Chikritzhs 2009; Stockwell 2010). Studies involving security staff were mostly prominent in the United Kingdom with contributions by Hadfield (2006), Hobbs (2002; 2003; 2005), Lister (2000; 2001), Monaghan (2002a; 2002b; 2003); and

Winlow (2002). The practices discussed are referred to throughout this and the following chapters.

Dr Kathryn Graham

Dr Kathryn Graham is a Senior Scientist and Head of the Social and Community Factors in Prevention Research section, in the Social, Prevention and Health Policy Research Department at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, Ontario. Dr Graham is also an Adjunct Research Professor in the Department of Psychology at the University of Western Ontario and has published extensively in the area with a primary focus on Canada and the United States. Her main research area includes alcohol and violence in and around bars in which she has identified successful methods for prevention and intervention.

Dr Graham founded the Safer Bars program which has received international acclaim and been implemented in a number of countries including Australia. In a Vancouver study it was determined a relationship existed between alcohol, aggression and the physical environment (Graham, 1985). Dr Graham reports that features of the physical environment that contribute to the potential for violence or aggression include poor design, unclean, unfriendly atmosphere, aggressive security staff and irresponsible service of alcohol (Graham 1980, 1985; Graham et al. 1996). These findings have since been supported in other studies including Macintyre & Homel (1997) and Doherty & Roche (2003) where it was found crowded venues tended to be more violent due also to inappropriate pedestrian flows, poor location of entrances, dance floors and bars. In another study involving alcohol and crime (Graham and West 2001), it was suggested that there are a multitude of contributing factors; however, the general effects of alcohol consumption increase the likelihood of aggression when certain situational factors apply, such as young deviant single males, poor venue design and high-level intoxication (Graham & West 2001).

Recently, Graham et al. (2011) studied four types of motives for aggression in an attempt to develop new strategies for preventing violence in high-risk licensed premises. These motives were defined by the theory of coercive actions being: gaining compliance, expressing grievances/restoring justice, attaining a favourable social identity, and pursuing excitement. Incidents of aggression were analysed to identify behavioural indicators. The method involved covert observational visits

during later hours of trading in large capacity bars in Toronto, Canada. Qualitative and quantitative data was gathered for 1057 incidents of aggression that involved 2700 patrons and 806 staff. A list of behavioural indicators was developed to guide researchers in categorising the data. Results suggested that knowledge of behavioural indicators could be used to enhance system development through policies, staff employment practices, staff training and the identification of problems in the early stages. It was reported that prevention of violence can be achieved through reducing identity cues in the environment, engaging staff who do not have identity concerns, and training staff to avoid provoking identity concerns. This study has a number of limitations as observations do not necessarily indicate actual motivations for incidents by aggressors, their thoughts are simply unknown. The observers may also have been unaware of cues for incidents due to the location and activity within licensed premises and hence there is the potential for inaccurate classification and therefore recording of data for the study. However, based upon the literature that the environment can impact upon the risk of violence (Homel et al. 1997; Homel et al. 2004; Wallin et al. 2003), understanding behavioural indicators of motivation for aggression can further assist in risk minimisation for staff working within the NTE (Graham et al. 2011).

Eva Wallin and Sven Andreasson

Eva Wallin and Sven Andreasson have studied interventions that affect levels of violence in Sweden (Andreasson et al. 1999; Andreasson et al. 2000; Wallin & Andreasson 2004a; Wallin & Andreasson 2004b; Wallin & Andreasson 2005; Wallin et al. 2002; Wallin et al. 2003). An innovative longitudinal study (over 10 years) involved an action group from the police, the licensed premises regulator and hospitality staff in Stockholm (Wallin et al. 2003). The objective of this project was to determine the impact of three interventions (community mobilisation, responsible beverage service, and stricter enforcement of existing alcohol laws) upon violence trends and patterns. The objective of community mobilisation was to increase awareness across community groups including the hospitality and healthcare sectors, relevant authorities, community leaders and local politicians through published activity within industry magazines and the general media. Responsible beverage service involved development and delivery of a two-day training course for venue staff including bar and security personnel, and enforcement was aligned with regulatory and police activity that included formal warnings and some licence

withdrawals. The study method was quasi-experimental and involved intervention and control areas including an entertainment precinct with a total of approximately 550 licensed premises (Wallin et al. 2003, p. 271). The study compared the intervention and control areas against police-reported violence. Results showed a gradual intervention effect which eventually achieved a 29% decrease in violent crime. It was found that local community action projects impact upon the incidence of alcohol-related violence at licensed premises (Wallin et al. 2003). This study did not evaluate each of the interventions separately hence it is difficult to determine if any of the three interventions were more likely to impact upon the level of violence. Further, there was a reliance within this study on reported crime. If crime was not reported then the results of the study are potentially unreliable. This has been identified in other studies about problems associated with a reliance on official reporting of incidents (ACPR, 2004; Graham & Homel 2008; Melbourne City Council 1991; VCCAV 1990b). Further, within the context of this study, the drinking and general social behaviours of a nordic community around 10 years ago may well differ from the local Victorian or even an Australian social environment. However, their work provides useful supplementary information for this study.

In Australia Professor Stephen Tomsen, Professor Ross Homel and Professor Tim Stockwell have made a significant contribution to understanding links between violence, alcohol, licensed premises and locality. Their work has been in the areas of criminology, social theory and public order studies.

Professor Stephen Tomsen

Professor Tomsen has published extensively since 1982 and in recent years researched masculinity, policing and the night-time economy (NTE). He has co-authored a number of reports including the issue of masculinity and public drinking violence, the causes of public violence in the licensed environment, and activity by nightclub security staff. His work in the area of violence and licensed premises concludes that much violence can be predicted by situational factors (Tomsen et al. 1991; Tomsen 1997, 2005). In a refereed article entitled “A Top Night: social protest, masculinity and the culture of drinking violence” (1997) Professor Tomsen suggests there is doubt about the link between drinking, violence and social disorder and rather a need for dual considerations of a tie between masculine social identity and heavy

group drinking; and male honour. Professor Tomsen conducted an ethnographic study of actual incidents involving conflict and assaults in licensed premises over a 12 month period throughout 1989 and 1990. His focus was on five highly-violent venues as indicated by police, licensing inspectors and four security officers. Two venues were nightclubs and the other three hotels. He classified the venues as “violent” or “highly violent” depending on the general number and seriousness of incidents. He noted that many incidents involved inappropriate interventions or a repressive atmosphere created by security staff and in others poor management practices such as overt drunkenness amongst patrons. He found that “male honour” was noticeable amongst security staff and patrons where resistance was a normal response to the involvement of local authority figures including security staff. This is further explored in Chapter 3 with discussion about bouncer culture (Hobbs et al. 2005) and the ever-present threat of violence in the NTE by its guardians (Hadfield 2008).

Professor Ross Homel

Professor Homel has published in the area of crime prevention since 1990 with a specific focus on alcohol, violence and public order (Homel 1999, 1990; Homel et al. 2004; Homel & Clarke 1994; Homel et al. 1994; Homel et al. 1997b; Homel & Tomsen 1992; Homel, Tomsen and Thommeny 1991). He worked within the Surfers Paradise Safety Action Project which was the foundation in Queensland for community collaborative efforts to minimise the risk of violence in and around licensed premises (Homel et al. 1994).

Specifically, Professor Homel has co-authored a number of refereed journal articles addressing situational factors relative to the prediction of violence and the impact or role of intoxication. His work has also involved action research, initially as part of the Surfers Paradise Safety Action Project (Homel et al. 1994), then on high-risk licensed premises in Sydney (Homel & Clarke 1994) and later in North Queensland (Hauritz et al. 1998c). His work often involved observational studies which have led him to conclude that a combination of factors in context can be predictive of violence (Homel & Clarke 1994; Homel et al. 2004). Homel et al. (2004) presented an analysis of observational data collected in 1994 and 1996 in the north Queensland cities of Cairns, Townsville and Mackay based upon problem-focused interventions. The interventions included drinking controls, improvements to the social and physical

environment, patron mix and management practices. It was reported that aggression and violence were reduced from the time interventions were introduced. There was no assertion that the interventions caused any environmental or management changes however, the assumption was that the interventions best explained the declines in violence. A regression analysis highlighted four key predictors to minimise violence: fewer Pacific Islander patrons, less male swearing, fewer intoxicated patrons requiring management intervention, and more chairs with armrests (Homel et al. 2004, p. 19). Professor Homel contends that management of violence should be based upon a collective strategy utilising efforts of the community, regulatory authorities, the venue itself and other industry stakeholders such as transport vendors (Homel 1990; Homel 1999; Homel et al. 1994; Homel et al. 1997b; Homel et al. 1997a; Homel et al. 2004; Homel & Clarke 1994; Homel & Mirrlees-Black 1997; Homel & Tomsen 1991). These issues are expanded upon in Section 2.3.

Professor Tim Stockwell

Professor Stockwell has published in the area since 1993 and with Professor Homel argues that traditional education and rehabilitation strategies to minimise the risk of violence in licensed premises should be contrasted with alternative methods of service and venue intervention (Stockwell 1997, 2010; Stockwell & Chikritzhs 2009). In the early 1990s he supervised a Western Australia household survey of 1,160 adults and determined a significant risk of harm was more likely when drinkers were male, single, under 25 years and consumed alcohol on licensed premises Stockwell & Chikritzhs 2009. Further, he proposed that bar staff continuing to serve intoxicated persons was a primary predictor of risk and therefore server intervention strategies were essential (Stockwell et al. 1993).

In another study, Professor Stockwell found there was a correlation between the type of licensed premises and alcohol-related harm (Stockwell et al. 1992). It was reported that nightclubs, taverns and hotels were high risk compared to clubs (private or member-based) and restaurants. The range of potential explanations for these findings included patron profile, hours of operation and the various services provided (Stockwell 1997). Recently, Professor Stockwell summarised the evidence of successful interventions that has been established from studies in Australia and Canada over the past 20 years (Stockwell 2010). He conducted a systematic literature

review of primary and secondary sources and reported that effective interventions were founded upon strategies introduced by venue operators, regulators and the community through community mobilisation efforts based upon five guiding principles. He suggested these principles could be applied in any environment and involved (i) managing the price of alcohol; (ii) managing intoxication from alcohol; (iii) creating harmonious social environments; (iv) setting clear house rules; and (v) creating credible deterrence (Stockwell 2010). These principles are addressed in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis.

Associate Professor Peter Miller

Associate Professor Peter Miller has conducted a number of studies relating to the licensed environment including patron identification scanning and the Australian NTE, the role of alcohol in crime and disorder, community interventions relative to licensed premises, and best practice in venue management and the responsible service of alcohol (Miller et al. 2009; Miller et al. 2010a; Miller et al. 2010b, 2010c; Miller et al. 2011; Miller et al. 2012). In 2012 Associate Professor Miller was the lead author of a major study that compared the effectiveness of alcohol-related crime prevention measures introduced through licensing regulation in Newcastle (NSW) and voluntary programs in Geelong (Victoria) between 2005 and 2010. The study involved two entertainment precincts and reviewed approaches to violence concerns that were introduced by police, local government and the local community through community-based interventions (Miller et al. 2012). Key findings of the study included regulatory or mandatory requirements imposed on licensees were more effective than voluntary programs, limiting venue trading hours had an impact upon the level of alcohol-related crime and that strong enforcement by police appeared to impact upon irresponsible practices (Miller et al. 2012).

A number of other studies in the areas of bouncers and bouncer culture including the role of “bouncers” as “gate keepers” of the NTE have been conducted by Monahan (2002; 2003), Hadfield (2000; 2002; 2006), Lister (2001; 2005), Winlow (2001), and Hobbs (2000; 2002; 2003; 2005). An elaboration of these studies is contained in this Chapter at 2.3.8 and includes discussion on cultures of security and the very different people who are often attracted to work as security staff at nightclubs. The key authors collectively identify that there is a correlation between individuals, their level of

intoxication and the situational environment (Graham & Homel 2008; Stockwell 2010). This suggests that any security framework must include strategies that address each characteristic through multi-component interventions. This is discussed further in Chapter 3.

2.2.4 Theories involving alcohol and violence

Before discussing the various theories that are relevant to alcohol and violence, it is relevant to discuss the three common types of perpetrator for violence identified in the literature:

1. The anti-social predator who identifies and then overcomes barriers to achieve goals;
2. The opportunistic offender who tends to generally align with behavioural expectations but will exploit opportunities to engage in violence; and
3. The provoked offender who is not usually violent but who responds to direct or indirect provocation with violence (Cornish & Clarke 2003a).

Although there can be other perpetrator types such as the recreational fighter who participates in violence as part of a night's entertainment, Graham & Homel (2008) suggest many persons involved in nightclub violence are provoked. This knowledge about perpetrator profile is relevant in the development of a best practice security framework as discussed below in this and the following chapters.

A number of theories have attempted to explain the correlation between alcohol, people and violence over recent years. These include:

- Moral theory;
- Disinhibition theory;
- Selective disinhibition theory;
- Expectancy theory;
- Indirect cause theory; and
- Social learning or deviance disavowal theory.

Moral theory

It has been suggested that “moral theory” is probably the first pre-scientific approach to explain alcohol-related violence (Sykes and Matza 1957). They suggested violence is influenced by an offender’s moral neutralisation capability, i.e., excuses made by individuals to justify their actions. This theory evolved from a study into juvenile delinquency although they suggested it was applicable throughout society. The theory proposes that people are responsible for their own behaviour and that drinking impacts upon moral parameters of individuals which in turn results in a loss of personal control and therefore “immoral” behaviours (Sykes and Matza 1957).

Although it is suggested the theory lacks scientific validity (Rassool 2009), it has been popular amongst healthcare and social service professionals who wish to brand alcohol as the convenient reason for violent acts (Taylor 1993; Graham and Homel 2008).

However, this theory appears of little value in explaining the correlation between alcohol and aggression or violent behaviours of individuals. This is especially so for higher levels of intoxication where there is a strong body of evidence that reports:

- drinking alcohol stimulates the release of endorphins and results in feelings of relaxation and reduced inhibitions;
- cognition progressively deteriorates as further alcohol is consumed, especially with the young. Where there are interactions with others this means an individual’s cognition and their ability to comprehend and accurately deal with problems deteriorates. Where there is a conflict the risk of violence increases; and
- consumption of large quantities can cause blackout where an individual cannot remember activity during the time of high intoxication (Newbury-Birch et al. 2009; Rehm et al 2010).

Disinhibition theory

Disinhibition theory was initially advanced by Berkowitz (1984). He proposed that persons exposed to extensive violence such as violence regularly viewed on television weakens their inhibitions thus resulting in feeling that violence is acceptable. He further suggests that there are a number of psychological changes that occur when a person consumes high levels of alcohol. These changes result in disinhibiting effects such as cognitive misinterpretations or a deficiency in self-awareness, time or the environment. Further, Bushman (1997) suggests that misinterpretation of situations such as social cues by an intoxicated person can lead to an over-reaction to stimuli including the risk of interpersonal aggression and violence as alcohol blocks the brain's ability to contain violence or aggressive behaviour. Similarly, it is suggested that the brain is anesthetised by the body's inability to absorb alcohol as fast as it is ingested (Kinney & Leaton 1991). Of course this presupposes that the brain would, under normal circumstances, suppress violent or aggressive behaviour. The level of intoxication can determine to what extent such inhibiting effects might impact; however, disinhibition alone is not considered a primary reason for violence (Pernanen 1976).

Selective disinhibition theory

Selective disinhibition theory extends the concept of disinhibition theory by contending disinhibition occurs when there is an association between alcohol use and any number of complex social or psychological influences (Parker & Auerhahn 1998). This theory seeks to explain behaviours where a drinker is usually passive or the potential for aggression is repressed. However, when an amount of alcohol is consumed or there is a certain social setting or the absence of such a social setting, their behaviour becomes "selectively" disinhibited.

A major influence on minimising the risk of disinhibited or selectively disinhibited behaviour is the decision by an individual to consume alcohol in the first place or a server's or associate's ability to limit the amount of alcohol available. This is discussed below in this chapter under responsible serving of alcohol.

Expectancy theory

Expectancy theory proposes that an individual will decide to behave according to the anticipated outcomes of that behaviour. Essentially an individual's motivation to certain behaviours over others is determined by the expected outcome (Vroom 1964). Therefore expectancy theory advances individual choice is the basis for behavioural motivations. Vroom (1964) proposed three elements of the theory as expectancy, instrumentality and valence. Expectancy is the belief that individual effort will result in a goal or outcome, usually based upon past experience and an individual perceived ability to control the expected outcome. Instrumentality is the anticipated reward for achieving the outcome and valence is the value of the reward (Vroom 1964). According to Holdford & Lovelace-Elmore (2001) these three elements are influenced by an individual's motivational force. In the context of this study drinking behaviour can be influenced by an individual's beliefs about alcohol-related effects on themselves or others. Where this belief system applies, violent or aggressive behaviour might be excused by the victim or perpetrator due to drunkenness (Gelles 1987). Kaufman Kantor & Asdigian (1997) reported males were more likely to accept that alcohol use results in impulsive and abusive behaviour than females. They also noted the relationship between alcohol and violence is very complicated although there is a clear link between heavy or binge drinking and violence. This study focused on domestic violence where it was reported males who binge drink were three times more likely to abuse their female partners than males who abstain (Kaufman Kantor & Asdigian 1997). A study of 190 men post incident in a bar room environment found that alcohol expectancies may facilitate the occurrence of aggression including the level or severity of aggression between males (Leonard et al. 2003). This study examined personality, anger and alcohol aggression expectancies amongst drinkers where it was reported heavy consumption by participants involved in violent incidents was associated with both the level of aggression and physical harm (Leonard et al. 2003). This is supported by recent studies in the area (Miller et al. 2012; Stockwell 2010).

Indirect cause theory

Bushman (1997) proposed the indirect cause theory as an alternative explanation of the relationship between alcohol and violence. He argues that alcohol

consumption has a psycho-pharmacological effect on an individual and therefore behaviour. He suggests this is because alcohol causes physiological, emotional and cognitive changes that may result in violence although there may be other factors which influence the reason to drink or the rate of consumption and the like (Tomsen et al. 1991). This theory is distinguished from disinhibition theory, which argues that alcohol removes the tendency to suppress violent behaviour, whereas indirect cause theory contends that alcohol actually encourages the likelihood of violence.

Social learning or deviance disavowal theory

Social learning theory (Bandura 1973) in the context of a drinking environment suggests that intoxication and violence is a product of social learning (Lang & Stritzke 1993; MacAndrew & Edgerton 1969). Studies have shown that certain people can act aggressively if they believe they have consumed alcohol rather than actually having consumed it (Lang & Stritzke 1993). From a social learning perspective Bushman (1997) argues there are both pharmacological and learned (expectancy) effects associated with alcohol consumption although these do not form a causative basis without a number of other situational factors.

Room (2005) suggests that to further understand the extent of interactions and violence between parties when high-level intoxication is present requires a broader understanding of how sober people manage those who are intoxicated. For venues this might influence their recruitment preferences, policies for security and bar staff, and gender composition of staff (Homel et al. 1997; VCCAV 1990b).

The theoretical perspectives above focus on alcohol-related behaviours. However, it must be noted that violence can also occur in circumstances when intoxication is not present and is perhaps influenced through situational factors such as venue design, staff behaviour or patron characteristics (Graham et a. 2006; Macintyre & Homel 1997). More recently routine activity theory and situational crime prevention theory provide further insight into the risk of nightclub violence.

Routine activity theory

Routine activity theory was proposed by Cohen and Felson (1979) in an attempt to demonstrate the situational influence on crime. Their study suggested that crime was more likely to occur when three elements were present: a motivated offender (who is tempted or provoked), a likely target (person, object or place), and the absence of suitable guardianship (police, security or parents). This theory was predicated on an analysis of burglaries in the United States where it was contended criminal opportunities resulted from changed lifestyles or “routine activities” where both partners in the home worked however it has also been addressed within the context of alcohol-related violence where a target (intoxicated person) that is not sufficiently protected can be the victim of an assault (Felson & Cohen 1979). This meant that as part of patron routine activity and where there was an absence of suitable guardianship there was an increased opportunity for crime. The theory effectively moved focus from offender motivations to situational considerations or opportunities (Sutton et al. 2008).

In 1986 the “intimate handler” was included in the theory by Felson (Felson et al. 1986). He suggested that the “intimate handler” was someone who would have such influence on the potential offender as to dissuade the commission of the proposed crime (Felson et al. 1986). Later, the role of a “place manager” was added by Eck and Wiesberg (1995) that extended Felson’s intimate handler concept to include a person who controls the location where a crime might be committed or other supervisory role such as a guardian of a victim or the handler of an offender (Eck & Weisburd 1995). In applying the concepts of routine activity theory to this study, the location is presumed to be a nightclub, and control, in addition to the intimate handler, could include security staff, venue managers and other personnel such as bar servers. This theory is particularly relevant to persons responsible for introducing and maintaining a nightclub system of security as it provides the basis for situational considerations including suitable guardianship. Fox and Sobol (2000) suggested place characteristics were particularly important when viewed in conjunction with the notion of guardianship. This is discussed later at 2.3.8.

Situational crime prevention theory

Situational crime prevention theory presupposes rational thought processes and that individuals choose to act in ways that maximise benefits for themselves or others close to them (Cornish & Clarke 1986). An underlying assumption is that, in the right circumstances, people who would not usually commit a crime or act illegally may offend. This could include acts of aggression and violence.

The approach of Cornish and Clarke was modified by Clarke and Homel (1997) where it was contended that the perceived environment was more influential than the actual environment. This was because risks, benefits and opportunities are the domain of thinking by potential offenders, not merely the physical situation that might be present and observable.

To influence offender thinking and therefore opportunity and rational thought, Clarke (1997) suggested that a preventative outcome could be achieved through situational controls that:

- Were directed at specific crimes;
- Involved design or management of the environment; and
- Made crime less attractive, i.e., increase the chances of detection and reduce potential rewards as judged by a wide range of offenders (Clarke 1997).

An additional modification to situational crime prevention theory was introduced by Wortley who proposed that the potential for crime was further influenced by four “situational precipitators” (Wortley 2001). These precipitators were classified as prompts, pressures, permissions, and provocations and “situationally-generated motivation to the unmotivated” (Cornish & Clarke 2003).

Wortley (2001) suggested that there was an unsafe preoccupation with opportunity variables when contemplating offender decision-making in situational crime prevention. In particular, that there were other situational influences, the so-called situational precipitators, that formed the basis for anti-social behaviours (Cornish & Clarke 2003b).

Cornish and Clarke (2003b) explain situational precipitators relative to the potential for alcohol-related violence as:

- Prompts – cues that motivate an individual to behave anti-socially;
- Pressures – feeling compelled to behave anti-socially;
- Permissions – perceiving that anti-social behaviour is generally acceptable; and
- Provocations – responding to signals that provoke a violent reaction.

This move away from situational controls involved a two-stage model that contemplated offending behaviour is the outcome of two situational influences in the following order of priority: precipitating factors and regulating factors (Cornish & Clarke 2003b). This suggests prevention or risk minimisation relating to violence could occur firstly by controlling situational precipitators that prompt anti-social behaviour, i.e., clean venue, clearing of spills or broken glass, avoidance of overcrowding, and appropriate atmosphere as discussed in other studies relative to the NTE and violence (Leather and Lawrence 1995; Quigley et al. 2003); and secondly, by immediate action being taken to demonstrate that there are consequences for inappropriate behaviour (Cornish & Clarke 2003b). In conclusion Wortley argues that controlling precipitators are equally important to regulating opportunities (Wortley 2001).

A major impediment to situational crime prevention theory and the modifications proposed by Wortley is intoxication. It is questionable whether all intoxicated persons are “rational” and therefore capable of perceiving situational controls. As reported by Graham and West (2001) there is a clear nexus between alcohol, crime and violence over time and across cultures. A meta-analysis of experimental research by Bushman (1997) supports the alcohol, crime and violence link albeit there is no evidence to suggest alcohol is the cause of criminal or violent behaviour. It is a contributing factor under the right circumstances (Graham et al. 1997; Hughes et al. 2011; Homel et al. 1992, 1997; Hauritz et al. 1998). Graham and Homel (2008) suggest that the alcohol - violence link to aggression involves a combination of the pharmacological

effects of alcohol; a willing aggressor; a drinking environment conducive to aggression; and a broader cultural context that tolerates alcohol related aggression.

Intoxication appears the common factor for aggression across the literature and can be both a predictor (Graham et al. 1997; Leonard, Collins and Quigley 2003) and an outcome (Miller et al 2012). Interventions that focus on reducing access to alcohol appears to result in less intoxication and subsequently a decrease in alcohol-related violence (Miller et al. 2012). This was strongly reported within the Newcastle study conducted in New South Wales where a number of interventions were introduced based upon high levels of alcohol-related violence (Jones et al. 2009; Kypri et al. 2011).

The theories outlined, however, are potentially useful for nightclub personnel, regulators, policy developers and industry stakeholders as they emphasise the importance of the environment in addressing and minimising the risk of violence in and around licensed premises. In particular, a number of the theories proposed including routine activities theory have moved away from a strong focus on offender or perpetrator motivations to situational influences (Cohen & Felson 1979; Graham et al. 2006; Kennedy & Forde 1999; Sutton et al. 2008). Indeed, if venue operators and other key stakeholders such as security, venue staff, local police and other guardians in the NTE are inept in strategically addressing the risks associated with alcohol, intoxication and violence from a situational perspective the levels of violence and related problems will continue to occur (Cohen & Felson 1979; Kennedy & Forde 1999).

2.2.5 Drugs (other than alcohol)

In recent times there has been a notable increase in the use of other drugs in the NTE (Gerlin 2005). There is little research at present that indicates the extent of illicit or prescribed drug use including the extent of activity in or around nightclubs other than generic assertions/ These assertions about widespread use and possible behavioural outcomes are based upon the specific pharmacological expectancies associated with the relevant drug (ACC 2003). A European study by Bellis et al. (2008) reported high levels of alcohol and drug use in young people who routinely engage in nightlife,

including nightclub attendance. The study focused on use of alcohol and drugs or sexual activity however the NTE link is worthy of discussion. Participants were aged 16 to 35 years across nine European cities. Respondents reported a range of substances the sexual purposes that included 28.6% alcohol, 26.2% cocaine and the use of other drugs including methamphetamine, cannabis, ecstasy and LSD (Bellis et al. 2008).

In Australia, the National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre has conducted studies into illicit drug use and reported consistently that nightclubs are most commonly a source location of both acquisition and use of illicit drugs (Johnston and Jenkinson 2006; Johnston Quinn & Jenkinson 2007). Most common drug use included ecstasy, methamphetamine, cocaine, ketamine, GHB, LSD and MDA (Johnston Quinn & Jenkinson 2007). It was noted that “methamphetamine use, particularly crystal methamphetamine use, has the potential to be associated with considerable harms (i.e. violence and mental and physical health problems)” (Johnston Quinn & Jenkinson 2007, p. 14). This is an area that requires further investigation and is not within the aims of this study.

2.2.6 Primary, secondary and tertiary crime prevention

Further to discussion in the previous section, effective crime prevention including minimising violence involves the introduction of strategies that impact upon the level of criminal activity including consequences of crime such as harm (Graham & Homel 2008; Sutton et al. 2008). Appropriate crime prevention strategies should then reduce the number of criminal offenders and their victims (Sutton et al. 2008). Cameron and Laycock (2002) suggest the focus of any crime prevention measure should be on the causes of crime rather than the impact by significantly reducing or eliminating factors that facilitate crime.

A multi-level crime prevention model that is frequently considered in addressing concerns relating to violence was proposed by Brantingham and Faust (1976) and subsequently enhanced by VanDijk and deWaard (1991). The model comprises three levels, being primary, secondary and tertiary crime prevention measures.

Primary measures are directed at prevention of crime. Often they are designed to impact upon the total population and aimed at minimising the risk of offending behaviour across that population (Sutton et al. 2008). An example of a social intervention is the recent federal government's two year \$20 million "National Binge Drinking" strategy that focused on the costs and consequences of binge drinking (DHA 2011). An objective of this intervention was to minimise the incidents and therefore potential impacts of binge drinking across society. Situational measures also assist in the prevention of crime as previously discussed (Graham & Homel 2008).

Secondary crime prevention measures are more focused on a specific sub-group with a view to reducing the risk of crime (Sutton et al. 2008). Examples of this sub-group include individuals with a propensity for violence or alcohol abuse as was recently evidenced through the Victorian Government's "Risky Drinking" campaign that targets young males aged 18-30 years who might become involved in alcohol-related violence (DoJ 2008). Recently introduced patron "barring notices" by the Victorian regulator is another approach that is believed to minimise the risk of repeat offender (VCGLR 2012a) albeit, at this time there has been no study to determine the effectiveness of the intervention. Barring notices are discussed further in Chapter 3.

Tertiary crime prevention focuses on existing offenders or those who are more likely to offend such as individuals who have previously entered the criminal justice system for criminal indiscretions (Sutton et al. 2008). An example relevant to this study is often evidenced through security industry licensing where individuals with a violent history are disqualified from the crowd control sector. The objective of this intervention is to remove the individual, as a possible nightclub guardian from an operational environment where it is likely a physical intervention might be required (Graham & Homel 2008; Prenzler and Hayes 1998).

Although there are many variations in the literature, the three levels of crime prevention as outlined by Sutton et al. (2008) are approached in the following priority order:

- (i) Situational where interventions are introduced into the immediate environment;

- (ii) Developmental and early intervention that often involves education programs targeted at a specific section of society;
- (iii) Community initiatives including collaborations as evidenced through community mobilisation efforts; and
- (iv) Criminal Justice including enforcement and compliance activity.

This theoretical perspective in crime prevention may be helpful by providing a priority order for interventions focused on a specific audience (Felson & Boba 2010; Pease 2002; Sutton et al. 2008). However, as noted by Dingwall (2006, p.66), this model “does not say anything about the nature of the different types of activity designed to achieve that affect”.

This section has focused on theories that are relevant to nightclub violence. There are gaps in both theory and practical studies and although the links relating to alcohol and violence have been clearly articulated throughout the literature (Graham & Homel 2008; Miller et al. 2012; Stockwell 2010), the application of theories relevant to nightclub violence from a security systems perspective are limited.

2.3 Relationship between alcohol, licensed premises and violence

Some studies argue that the leisure setting where drinking occurs can influence the likelihood of violent behaviour (Graham 1985; Homel & Clarke 1994; Macintyre & Homel 1994; Tomsen et al. 1991). Others focus on social belief theories which argue that expected behaviours including violence arise from social contexts and normative drinking patterns (Bushman, 1997; Lang & Stritzke 1993; MacAndrew & Edgerton 1969). In this part and in the context of the research question I will discuss the relationship between alcohol, licensed premises and violence, the nature of which has been comprehensively discussed in the literature.

To further explore these positions I will address:

- Alcohol and socialisation;
- Leisure activity, licensed premises and the night-time economy;

- Nightclubs and violence;
- Link between alcohol and violence; and
- Perpetrators and victims of violence.

2.3.1 Alcohol and socialisation

The purposeful production of alcohol extends across many cultures and is recognised as a legitimate way of socialising, celebrating and relaxing (Graham & Homel 2008; Stockwell 2010). The World Health Organisation (2004) estimates that in excess of 2 billion people globally consume alcoholic beverages, with public drinking in licensed premises a common practice across most societies. This results in both pleasurable and harmful consequences associated with its use (World Health Organisation 2004). However, the negative impact of alcohol consumption is identified throughout the literature where “studies on violence have repeatedly shown that alcohol consumption precedes violent events, and that the amount of drinking is related to severity of subsequent violence” (Homel & Clarke 1994; Hughes et al. 2011; World Health Organisation 2004).

According to Makkai (1997), alcohol use is both socially integrated and a part of popular cultural activity. Whelan (1999, p. 24) suggests that “Drinking in Australia is socially structured, culturally defined, environmentally influenced, as well as being the result of individual risk factors (such as family situations, socioeconomic status, psychological state) and so on”.

Nationally, the total social cost of alcohol-related injuries and disease in 2004/05 was estimated at \$15.4 billion and was double the last estimate in 1998/99 (Collins & Lapsley 2007). Of this total amount crime was estimated to account for approximately \$1.61 billion which included alcohol-related violence (Collins & Lapsley, 2008, p.12).

Most Australian adults consume alcohol regularly, with many examples of social consumption on a daily or weekly basis (Makkai 1997; Whelan 1999). In 2007 the per capita consumption of alcohol for Australians aged over 15 years was nearly 10 litres (NPHT 2008). By global standards this was considered quite high (NPHT 2008).

Alcohol consumption by the young is well reported and consistently the literature suggests the age group 18-24 drink alcohol on a regular basis including drinking to intoxication (Graham & Homel 2008; Harnett & Thom 2000). A report by the National Centre for Education and Training on Addiction (2007) noted that “binge drinking” by young Australians was a common concern, and about 50% of males and females who consumed alcohol were drinking at risky levels (Roche et al. 2007).

For the young, consumption of alcohol is often considered integral to leisure activity and maturity (McAllister, Moore & Makkai 1991; Williams 2000). Much of this consumption occurs during leisure activity at licensed premises including nightclubs, where according to Harnett and Thom (2000) it is hard to abstain from alcohol consumption in the current leisure setting for the young. A common by-product of alcohol consumption is the risk of conflict, aggression and violence, especially where there is public drinking (Graham et al. 1996; Haines & Graham 2005).

It is suggested that leisure is a high priority for modern youth (Hobbs et al. 2003) and that modern Western culture has resulted in a less formalised social structure, especially in leisure activities (Beck, 1992). Groups of young people often socialise but know little about their own group members or their various behavioural expectations in public settings (Bauman 2001). According to Malbon 1998, 1999) these shifting social influences create individual identity tensions which often permeate when introduced into the public drinking environment. Hobbs (2003) suggests that groups of young people frequenting leisure precincts often turn into informal communities where peer acceptance and status become pivotal to their social experience. These influences equally impact upon security staff as a venue culture of acceptable behaviour, appearance and status develops. Central to this is consumer capitalism where pleasure is gauged on the basis of social acceptance and positive experience becomes the basis for consumer choice (Chaney 1998).

2.3.2 Leisure activity, licensed premises and the night-time economy

Leisure activity is often associated with a drinking ethos such as Australia’s “wet” drinking culture (Homel & Clark 1994; Makkai 1997; Room 1988), the “mixed” drinking culture of the United States, and the “dry” drinking cultures of Scandinavian

countries (Homel & Clark 1994). Much of this drinking culture is aligned to licensed premises where alcohol plays a role in most Western societies (Makkai 1997) and provides a broad range of social activities that are particularly appealing to the young (Morgan & McAtamney 2009).

Cavan (1966) proposes there are four types of bar where public drinking occurs:

1. Convenience bars such as a “drop-in” establishment that is routinely available;
2. Nightspot bars where there is dancing, amplified music and entertainment;
3. Marketplace bars where there is often illegal activity such as drugs, sex, gambling and stolen goods; and
4. Home territory bars with regular patronage that often replicates the local community.

In Australia, public drinking environments are well frequented due to a variety of services offered, not just alcohol Graham and Homel (2008). They suggest that venues provide an opportunity across a broad number of patrons to participate in competitions, games, socialising and partying. In general terms licensed premises are a place of leisure where persons are able to move away from their usual social roles and responsibilities (Roebuck & Frese 1976; Sulkunen et al. 1985).

During the period 1995 – 2006, the number of licensed premises in Victoria grew from approximately 2,000 to around 24,000 (Livingstone 2008). This increase has been attributed to the liberalisation of liquor laws as recommended by the Nieuwenhuysen Report 1985 (Santamaria 1986). Nieuwenhuysen was an economist and his inquiry was sanctioned by the Victorian Government to investigate alcohol regulation with a specific mandate to consider permit flexibility, including the extension of drinking hours, with particular regard to the interests of liquor consumers, employers and employees and the community (Nieuwenhuysen 1986).

Parallel with the substantial growth experienced in licensed premises the estimated cost to the community of alcohol-related incidents including crime, violence, loss of productivity and treatments. Recently it was reported around 15.3 billion (Collins & Lapsley 2008). Liberalisation of liquor laws also occurred in other Australian

jurisdictions with similar growth data in the number of venues, extensions to trading periods and a surge in alcohol-related injuries and diseases (NHMRC 2009). An increase in trading and the growth in licensed premises resulted in the formation of entertainment precincts where a conglomeration of venues has evolved such as Melbourne's King Street precinct (Graham & Homel 2008; Macintyre & Homel 1997; Tuck 1989)).

In entertainment precincts there has been growth of a number of larger venues, multi-purpose operations and "super-pubs" (Hobbs 2003). This has influenced a number of changes to the leisure market through competition and the availability of services and goods such as the range of drinks available, entertainment and promotional strategies to attract patrons (Hobbs 2003). Licensed venues and their larger capacities has resulted in substantial increases of patronage including a higher number of young females, often attracted to mixed drinks and wine in a more "female friendly environment" (Henderson 1993). This means that more persons attend leisure precincts, and access related services such as transport and food contribute to increased activity both on and around licensed premises and impact substantially upon the amenity of the area (Hauritz et al. 1998; Homel et al. 2004)

The growth in the number of licensed premises offering "new" drinks over extended periods to greater numbers of patrons also creates the platform for a number of behavioural and amenity issues such as over-consumption, intoxication, violence and disruptive behaviours (Chikritzhs & Stockwell 2002, 2005; Collin & Godfrey 1997). Although these problems have been evident over many years increased patronage at larger venues and within precincts has gained growing interest with a number of innovative interventions (Miller et al. 2012). These interventions include patron ID scanning, lockouts, reductions in trading hours and the issuing of fines through more in-depth enforcement (Miller et al 2012). . Growth of licensed premises and the creation of entertainment precincts has caused a re-think about established interventions as problems of aggression and violence are all too often witnessed in the immediate vicinity of venues or at the points of entry where conflict often arises between patrons or patrons and venue staff (Doherty and Roche 2003; Homel & Tomsen 1992). Ireland (1993) reported a strong association between alcohol and calls for police attendance at licensed premises. A study by New South Wales Police found

77% of street offence incidents involved higher levels of alcohol with a high proportion around licensed premises (Ireland 1993). In Queensland a similar study reported comparable results to the New South Wales study and resulted in policing changes in and around licensed premises (Arro et al. 1992). The literature is consistent that alcohol is prominent in a large number of violent incidents and antisocial behaviour (Bradbury 1984; Doherty & Roche 2003; Graham & Homel 2008; Ireland & Thommeny 1993). Buss et al. (1995) reported up to three quarters of assaults and offensive behaviours in public places involve alcohol albeit Teece and Williams (2000) suggest that violent incidents at bars contribute to around 15% of all alcohol-related incidents.

The Australian experience is not dissimilar to activity overseas where, based upon problematic behaviours including violence there has been a significant change in attitudes to town planning and the regeneration of areas, especially in most Western countries (Thomas & Bromley 2000). Revitalisation strategies have focused on the transformation of disused or dilapidated areas into vibrant precincts with a major focus on leisure activity (Social Issues Research Centre 1998; Thomas & Bromley 2000).

As part of urban growth strategies and the establishment of large entertainment or leisure precincts, the night-time economy or “NTE” has evolved (Hobbs 2003). In addition to entertainment venues such as nightclubs this “economy” includes a proliferation of food, transport and retail services over extended trading hours (Dixon 1990; Doherty & Roche 2003). St John-Brooks (1998, p.12) argues that the NTE “brings benefits to business, the local community by enhancing the image of the town, generating income for the local economy and creating employment opportunities”. However, any growth activity can also bring negative consequences including crime such as violence (Hadfield, 2006; Hobbs 2003; Wells et al. 1998).

In 2005, Crime Prevention Victoria reported on the potential emergence of security, safety and amenity risks where groups of late night licensed premises were located in leisure precincts (DoJ 2005). Hadfield (2006) in a UK study suggested that often areas within precincts become ‘hot spots’ where excessive violence and other alcohol-related crimes occur such as damage to property. The reports of Crime Prevention Victoria (DoJ 2005) and Hadfield (2006) are further supported through a number of

Australian studies (Hauritz et al. 1998; Homel et al. 1997). For example, the Surfers Paradise Safety Action Project typifies the identification of problem areas within its major entertainment precinct (Homel et al. 1997). The Gold Coast entertainment precinct is situated within the central business district and a major tourist area (Homel 1994, 1997).

As the NTE further develops, the domination of mainstream nightclub operations, their patrons and the level of activity that intersects with routine commercial and community activity will impact upon residual businesses and individuals (Stockwell 2010; Wallin & Andreasson 2005). This will create a new series of tensions and conflicts (Chatterton & Hollands 2000). Central to these concerns is public safety, community disruption and alcohol-related disorder including violence (Homel et al. 1997a).

2.3.3 Nightclubs and violence

Studies in Canada, the United States and Australia reveal a consistent link between licensed premises and the potential for both property crimes and crimes against the person (Graham 1980; Graham & Homel 2008; Haines & Graham 2005; Wells et al. 1998). Prominent in the data are nightclubs or venues that trade over extended periods (Chikritzhs & Stockwell 2012) with a correlation between alcohol-outlet density and the potential for violence (Chikritzhs & Stockwell 2012; Felson 1997; Miller et al. 2012; Scribner et al. 1995).

Other studies support suggestions that the presence of licensed premises creates a higher risk of anti-social and criminal behaviours including violence both in the venue and in the surrounding area (Brantingham & Brantingham 1981; Devery 1992; Felson et al. 1997; Roncek & Maier 1991; Roncek & Pravatiner 1989; Scribner et al. 1995). Livingstone, Chikritzhs and Room (2007) considered whether the number and density of alcohol in outlets impacted upon levels of alcohol-related harm. Their study reported that a number of countries and cultures had already successfully limited the number of places where alcohol could be sold as a strategy to minimise alcohol-related harms. It was suggested this approach also reduces competition between licensed premises with less inclination of venues to breach rules such as serving

intoxicated persons or selling to underage (Livingstone, Chikritzhs and Room 2007). In Britain, until 1981 liquor licences considered to be ‘surplus’ were revoked with venue operators compensated (Alcohol Education and Research Council 2007). In California alcohol outlet density is determined according to population (Smart 1977) and in other US states as determined through need by the local authority (Weitzman et al. 2003). Roncek and Maier (1991) and Smith, Frazee & Davidson (2000) suggest the correlation between alcohol outlet density and violence is clear albeit the studies were aligned with retail or packaged liquor sales. Some researchers have suggested that alcohol outlets represent visible signs of community degeneration, attract undesirables and therefore make the area more attractive to criminal activity (Gorman 2001).

Livingstone, Chikritzhs and Room (2007) propose the effects of alcohol outlet density should be considered two-fold: (i) a proximity effect such as how readily alcohol can be accessed, and (ii) amenity effects or how outlets may impact upon the characteristics of the local community. Barbor et al. (2003) suggests that more venues (whether on or off premises) increases ready availability of alcohol which then increases competition pressures between venues and a potential reduction in responsible practices. Livingstone, Chikritzhs and Room (2007) report amenity implications arise when there is a preponderance of licensed premises as they tend to attract trouble, particularly violence. Specifically, studies in the UK and Australia have focused toward ‘on premises’ outlets and noted problem behaviours involving intoxication, especially when patrons move between venues and precincts or local areas at closing time (Hadfield 2006; Graham & Homel 2008).

The literature relating to outlet density has grown considerably over recent years (Livingston 2008). Livingstone, Chikritzhs and Room (2007) report the major weakness of many studies has been that licensed premises are often not distinguished according to type. For example, a small bar and a large nightclub are treated as an “on premises” venue rather than two separate operations based upon venue characteristics. This has the possibility to mislead as one venue may create few problems whereas another may be a major contributor to crime rates, anti-social behaviours and a perception of safety (Livingstone, Chikritzhs and Room 2007).

Areas around some Australian licensed premises have had up to 25 times more assaults than those without licensed premises (Devery 1992). This study is dated albeit data gathering in recent studies continues to disclose high levels of violence (Doherty & Roche 2003; Graham & Homel 2008; Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012; Teece & Williams 2000). External problems based upon excessive consumption can often arise in the immediate vicinity of licensed premises as groups or individuals move between adjacent venues sharing territory or accessing alcohol outside of venue service or control (Felson et al. 1997; Livingston 2008; VCCAV 1990b). This has been further evidenced through recent studies on preloading (Borsari et al. 2007).

Spooner, McPherson and Hall (2001) suggest that the behaviour of patrons in a venue can be controlled proactively with greater difficulty being experienced externally. Of course, there have been various interventions over recent years with degrees of success (Doherty & Roche 2003; Fleming 2008; Miller et al. 2008; Stockwell 2010).

To address external concerns, there can be a number of strategies implemented. Some are based upon design and others on a series of preventative supervisory and reactive strategies. These issues tend to be addressed through three distinct theoretical concepts: CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design), displacement and defensible space (Deehan 2004; Newman 1972; Sutton et al. 2008).

Controlling behaviours in public space is not just a matter for physical intervention (Graham & Homel 2008). There has been a great deal written about this, with the most prominent focusing on concepts of CPTED (Sutton et al. 2008). The literature claims that crime can be prevented through manipulating the design of individual places and their relationship to one another and the environment (Sutton et al. 2008). For example, Quigley, Leonard and Collins (2003) reported characteristics of a bar provide conditions that promote aggression amongst patrons. Their study involved assessing patrons for aggression and drinking practices against bar characteristics in violence and non-violent bars. Attention was focused on noise, temperature, security staff, gender of workers and various activities available such as competitions i.e. billiards and darts. The study concluded that individuals with aggressive or violent tendencies are attracted to violent bars and that the characteristics of the bars themselves are the strongest predictors of violence. Other studies have reported poor lighting and ventilation (Graham 1980), poor crowd flows that cause crossing and

bumping (Scott & Dedel 2006), and aggressive security staff (Doherty & Roche 2003). However, amongst crime prevention practitioners there remains a conflict of opinion over the motivations of criminals or persons committing offensive types of behaviours (Graham & Homel 2008; Homel et al. 2004; Treno & Holder 1997).

The question regularly posed throughout the literature is whether persons act randomly and therefore uncontrollably (Cohen & Felson 1979; Sutton et al. 2008). For example, proponents of situational crime prevention argue the characteristics of a bar will influence, to some degree tendencies of individuals to violence (Graham 1980; Quigley, Leonard and Collins 2003; Scott and Dedel 2006). However, it remains unclear within the literature to what extent individuals may be predisposed to violence based upon other influences such as biology, social, personality and temperament (Graham et al. 2011). Of course, these individual influences will largely be unknown in the context of a venue seeking to provide a proactive system of security. It is generally accepted that impulse and crimes against the person have a direct correlation whereas crimes against property are more aligned with rational choice (Homel et al. 2004; Treno & Holder 1997).

One of the major criticisms of situational crime prevention is that it “displaces” crime. Displacement is defined as changing offending behaviour through specific or general conditions unfavourable to the offender’s mode of operation (Gabor 1990). Or, persons thwarted from committing a crime or offensive act in a particular place simply go elsewhere or turn to another type of crime (Sutton et al. 2008). There is an argument that crimes involving a loss of impulse control may not have the same displaced basis as property offences (Sherman et al. 1989). Studies of displacement generally assume notional decision-making by perpetrators (Hesseling 1994).

It is suggested that where displacement occurs, only a proportion of the initial potential offenders will pursue their intention to commit crimes or offensive acts (Sutton et al. 2008). This suggests crime prevention measures stop some offenders from carrying out a crime in a particular place. Not all of them will go elsewhere to commit a crime although what proportion is not clearly known (Sacco & Kennedy 1994; Tomsen et al. 1991). Hesseling (1994) reviewed 55 published articles on crime prevention measures in which researchers specifically looked for evidence of displacement. Types of displacement were categorised as spatial, target, offence,

tactical and temporal (Hesseling 1994). Preventative measures potentially influencing or resulting in displacement include increasing the effort to commit crime and increasing risk through surveillance and enforcement. The literature suggests that displacement is a possibility but not an inevitable consequence of crime prevention initiatives (Guerette & Bowers 2009; Hesseling 1994). Further, that if displacement does occur it is generally limited in size and scope (Bannister 1991; Gabor 1990). In the context of this study this means an offender's motivation to commit crime may not necessarily be displaced by intervention such as precinct-based guardianship.

Studies involving public space and crime have established a definite relationship between design and crime rates (Geason & Wilson 1988). A well-known solution was to redesign environments so that certain areas would be under public surveillance at all times (Crawford 1998; Sutton et al. 2008). This means, through openness and activity (natural surveillance), there was a chance persons present were able to observe openly most behaviours that occurred in the designed area. Painter and Tilley (1999) suggest that where redesign is not possible, the surveillance could be substituted with electronic measures.

By addressing principles of CPTED, the potential for displacement including violence in the immediate vicinity of alcohol outlets leads to considerations of defensible space (Sutton et al. 2008). Oscar Newman (1972) conducted an early study in New York of higher crime rates that existed in high rise apartment buildings than in lower housing projects. He concluded that residents assumed no personal responsibility for an area with a large population where effectively they have little personal identity. Newman (1972) proposed four factors in creating and maintaining defensible space:

- (i) Territoriality - assuming responsibility for an area;
- (ii) Natural surveillance - linking between physical characteristics of the area and being able to monitor activity in that area;
- (iii) Image - the physical design and control to create a sense of security; and
- (iv) Milieu - the features of the area that may impact upon security and a perception of safety such as available guardianship.

A tertiary source (industry guide) recently developed in New Zealand was circulated to assist operators of licensed premises to address external security control (AACNZ 2012). Some of the content acknowledges the literature in this area however it should be viewed with scepticism from an evidentiary perspective. The guide provides the creation of defensible space around a late night operation involves:

1. Definition of territorial zones through signage, advertisements and supervising personnel;
2. Maximising surveillance opportunities;
3. Provision of facilities such as car parking, taxi ranks, pick-up and drop-off points and emergency calling points;
4. Adequate or enhanced lighting;
5. Controlled access; and
6. Avoidance of space that is isolated or remote (AACNZ 2012).

External issues tend to be categorised under three key areas: noise breakout (noise emanating from the venue such as music or audible patron activity), patrons entering or leaving the venue, and disturbance by patrons away from licensed premises (Hughes et al. 2011). Typically noise breakout is controlled by regulatory or environmental compliance such as local council planning schemes as discussed in the following chapter.

There are mixed views that excessive noise can impact upon the potential for violence and aggression although it is suggested a combination of factors, including excessive noise can create the foundation for violence (Graham 1985; Graham & Homel 2008; Tolan & Gorman-Smith 2001; Stockwell 2010). A common problem arises where patrons are entering or leaving a venue (Maguire & Nettleson 2003). Their study of violence involved licensed premises in Cardiff, Wales where it was found that staff were involved in 34% of violent incidents and of these incidents 70% involved door staff (Maguire & Nettleson 2003) In particular a sudden increase in patron numbers seeking entry or at closing time increases the likelihood of anti-social and violent behaviour (Homel et al. 1997; Miller et al. 2012; VCCAV 1990b). This is most evident where substantial numbers of patrons are seeking public transport, taxis or

food on leaving the venue (Marsh & Kibby 1992; Purser 1997). This problem can be exacerbated where a common closing time applies to a number of venues in a precinct as diverse patron types utilising the same public space often conflict (Graham & Homel 2008).

Throughout Australia, lockouts have been a recent innovation aimed at minimising the risk of violence (Miller et al. 2012) and often associated with entertainment precincts where large numbers of patrons move between bars or through an area (Felson et al. 1997; Mazerolle et al. 2012). Lockouts have been voluntarily (Miller et al. 2012) or compulsorily (Kypri et al. 2011) introduced to encourage dispersal of patrons from an area upon being refused entry, exiting a venue after a prescribed time or upon being removed from adjacent premises (Mazerolle et al. 2012; Miller et al. 2012; Rundle 2005). Existing patrons are permitted to remain within relevant licensed premises but cannot then leave and later re-enter (Mazerolle et al. 2012). Also known as a “late hour entry declaration” in Victoria a lockout is intended to influence potential anti-social behaviours that tend to arise outside premises including violent and intoxicated behaviour at later trading times, typically early morning hours (Mazerolle et al. 2012). It is reported the strategy also limits the potential for movement by patrons between licensed premises in a precinct hence there should be fewer amenity issues and complaints (Mazerolle et al. 2012; Miller et al. 2012; Rundle 2005).

Miller et al. (2012) reports there is disagreement among industry stakeholders such as police and venue operators about lockouts. In a study that evaluated existing strategies for reducing alcohol-related violence in entertainment precincts in Geelong (Victoria) and Newcastle (New South Wales) a number of interventions were reviewed including community mobilisation through a liquor accord, safe taxi ranks, use of ID scanners, regulatory and enforcement strategies, and lockouts. The methodology for this study included key informant interviews and patron intercept interviews. In a total of 91 key informant responses, 58 reported that lockouts were ineffective compared to 33 who supported the strategy. Overall, the study acknowledged that lockouts impacted in different ways. For example, New South Wales police responders confirmed overt venue hopping had ceased with noticeable improvements in patron behaviour including less street fights. Some industry participants such as venue

operators asserted lockouts benefited later over earlier closing operations as patrons did not want to risk being unable to enter a venue with a lockout. Overall, lockouts within Geelong and Newcastle were one intervention within a mix of initiatives introduced over a number of years that appeared to have an impact on initial levels of violence. Although there were some benefits to police such as improvements in behaviour in public places, lockouts targeted both good and bad venues and failed to directly address problems associated with intoxication (Miller et al. 2012). Earlier, in 2008 the Victorian Department of Justice commissioned KPMG to conduct an evaluation of lockouts that had been imposed by the then Director of Liquor Licensing (DoJ 2008). This report was not based upon a scientific study but rather involved consultations and online surveys to gather stakeholder opinions. Stakeholders included licensees, patrons, Victoria Police, local government representatives, ambulance officers, fire fighters and security industry personnel (DoJ 2008, p. 16). The outcomes, as reported in the study, although dubious as acknowledged by the authors (DoJ 2008, p. 6) disclosed a general trend that reported assaults were reduced across the City of Melbourne, with assault related ambulance transports and hospital admission reductions in comparison to the corresponding period the previous year. Further, police reported less drunk-related callouts and complaints (DoJ 2008). However, in some areas there was actually a small increase in reported assaults between midnight and 2am and similarly small increases in assault related ambulance transports between 8pm and midnight (DoJ 2008). The findings are merely opinions and lack reliability and validity.

Although nightclub and alcohol-related violence is prominent throughout the literature over other licensed premises such as hotels, restaurants and gaming venues (Graham & Homel 2008; Stockwell 2010; Winlow et al. 2001) , there are only 910 nightclubs that trade after 1am throughout Victoria. About 509 of these venues close at 3 am or earlier which suggests that most violence can be attributed to a minority of venues (VCGLR 2012). Graham and Homel (2008) have previously reported that much violence can be attributed to problem or a small number of venues where poor practices are evident including high levels of intoxication amongst patrons.

The Australian observations about levels of violence in and around nightclubs have been similar to experiences in comparable societies such as the UK where Forsyth

(2005, p.6) contends that there has been a general increase in violence and alcohol-related incidents throughout the United Kingdom “contemporaneous with a perceived change in drinking culture” including greater access to alcohol. In part this has been fuelled by the NTE where extended trading times, often over 24 hours, allow for longer consumption periods (Hobbs 2003).

A recent United Kingdom project estimated that approximately 20% of all violent crimes occurred in or around licensed premises, with around 70% of those incidents taking place over the weekend (Friday and Saturday evening), at a total annual cost of approximately £20 billion (Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit 2003). Around 50% of arrests made for alcohol-related crimes occurred between 11pm and 2am (Budd 2003). These figures are comparable to similar reports throughout the United Kingdom where about 20% of all violent crimes are committed in or around licensed premises, whereas the figure for all other businesses tends to fluctuate around 3% (Forsyth et al. 2005). Often the victims of violence are venue staff; however, differences in reporting and individual motivations make this difficult to estimate (Magennis et al. 1998).

Problems in and around licensed premises are often associated with violence yet there are many contributing behavioural factors or “sub-behaviours” that can lead to violence (Graham & Homel 1997). These sub-behaviours can include:

rowdiness such as shouting; bumping and barging; rudeness, such as insults and gestures; arguments; inappropriate or predatory sexual behaviour; indecency; drinking games; disruptive groupings; “table-hopping”; obstructive actions; “macho” posturing and non-compliance with bar-staff (Hollands 2000).

To minimise the potential adverse impacts associated with the operation of licensed premises and avoid regulatory intervention, many have introduced security and safety measures relative to perceived risk and service needs (Graham & Homel 2008; Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012). Often these measures include the employment of designated security staff as crowd controllers who may be required to monitor patron behaviour at designated positions within the venue and externally such as the immediate area near entrances and exits, and ‘safe’ taxi ranks (Homel et al 2004). These measures are

not new (Hobbs et al. 2003; Homel et al. 1991; Monaghan 2003; Samuel 1981). However, globally there has been ongoing development in the regulation and formalisation of crowd control activity since the early 1990s (Graham and Homel 2008; Starkey 1998; Stockwell 1997) with Australian jurisdictions paving the way (Stockwell 2010; VCCAV 1990). Although some jurisdictions have implemented various crowd control strategies at licensed premises they tended to be informal, site or precinct specific and not aligned with any formal regulatory or recognised system (Homel and Clarke 1994; Stockwell 2010). This anomaly has been recently addressed by some regulators. For example, within New South Wales there are requirements for venue management plans by licensed premises experiencing high levels of violence (Miller et al. 2012; OLGR NSW 2010) and the publication of Management Plan Guidelines by the regulator in Victoria (VCGLR 2011). The Queensland liquor regulator requires a RAMP (Risk-Assessed Management Plan) for new licence applicants (OLGR Qld 2009). At a local level, various local government entities also require management plans for licensed premises under planning regulations. For example, the City of Melbourne requires permit applicants to submit details how a venue will manage internal and external activity through engagement of security staff, training of staff in management of inappropriate behaviours and external controls such as queuing, smoking areas and patron-generated noise (City of Melbourne 2007). The City of Stonnington has a similar requirement as discussed in the following chapter.

It has been reported that the development of the NTE and licensed premises as an integral part of that economy has introduced many factors atypical in a business sense (Hobbs et al. 2003; Lister et al. 2000). As a consequence many challenges from a security perspective have surfaced, including whether regulatory intervention is warranted (Graham & Homel 2008).. Hobbs et al. (2003) outline the relationship from a crowd control perspective about activity, interactions and security challenges as:

...night normal rules of comportment become negotiated via the acceptability of varying levels of intoxication, of aggressive sexuality, and of demeanour inappropriate to the concerns of daylight hours. The police enforce the law, but the bouncer operates according to the highly ambiguous cocktail of law, occupational codes, and personal discretion that is underpinned by an

interpretation of what is good and what is bad for business. (Hobbs et al., 2003, p.15)

Parallel to the various influences of the NTE and regulatory controls of the liquor industry there has been an increased opportunity for entrepreneurial initiatives to expand business and the range of potential clients (Davies 1988). As the leisure needs of the public continue to expand there has been the introduction of a new workforce that is predominantly young, casual and seasonal (Graham & Homel 2008). This results in a transitory and therefore potentially inconsistent operation, often with conflicting values for both staff and customers (Graham & Homel 2008).

The fact that these social, venue-specific and individual characteristics co-exist introduces a series of operational risks into the licensed premises environment including immaturity, inexperience and exuberance (Lister et al. 2000). Of course, the presence of young persons in isolation is not necessarily the basis for all operational or security risks. However, there is a strong link between youth and security-related incidents in and around licensed premises including intoxication and violence (Homel & Clarke 1994; Lincoln and Homel 2001).

For licensed premises, the introduction of a security system tends to be founded upon social perception and what measures a venue needs to project to stimulate and maintain consumer interest (Prenzler & Hayes 1998; VCCAV 1990b). Venues often re-invent or re-engineer their operation to meet changing needs of patrons and to remain competitive (Rojek 2000) with a greater focus on safety and security needs (Hobbs et al. 2003).

Often competing interests expose the potential for conflicts between business objectives, management strategies, security imperatives and expectations of patrons, regulators, police and others (Graham & Homel 2008). These conflicts have the potential to result in any number of operational security concerns including regulatory sanctions, image or reputation concerns through to the likelihood of aggression and violence. Most prominent to this is the issue of alcohol-related violence (Graham & Homel 2008; Homel 1986; Sherman 1998).

2.3.4 The link between alcohol and nightclub violence

Violence has also been expressed or justified in different ways such as play fighting, lawful chastisement, physical competition, as part of a communication strategy, or execution of the law such as a lawful arrest (Bowie 1998). This means not all violence is negative nor has negative consequences (Graham & Homel 2008). However, an act of violence can adversely impact upon others thereby resulting in the potential for further violence (Mihalic & Elliott 1996). This means unlawful violence must be addressed especially where it arises in the licensed environment (VCCA 1990b; Graham 1997).

Evidence about the link between alcohol and nightclub violence generally derives from three areas:

1. Ethnographic studies involving populations or targeted communities in relation to drinking activity (Makkai 1997);
2. Studies of individuals that involve experiments (Haines & Graham 2005); and
3. Activity in the drinking environment based upon surveys and observation (Homel & Tomsen 1992).

Perpetrators and victims of violence in and around nightclubs include patrons, venue personnel such as security or bar staff, and others who might attend the licensed premises such as police or liquor licensing inspectors (Graham & Homel 2008; VCCA 1990b). Further, persons in the immediate area such as passers-by, those attending other venues in the vicinity, or food or transport vendors could also be involved in violent incidents (Stockwell 2010; VCCA 1990b).

The literature comprehensively addresses associations between violence, alcohol, intoxication and licensed premises, particularly nightclubs (AACNZ 2002; Budd 2003; Bushman 1997; Crombie et al. 2005; Graham & Homel 2008; Mihalic & Elliott 1996; Miller et al. 2012; Teece & Williams 2000; VCCA 1990b). Some Australian jurisdictions such as New South Wales publicly circulate a list of the most violent licensed venues based upon reported violence over a relevant period as either a Level 1 or Level 2 venue (OLGR NSW 2011). Once a venue has been categorised as Level 1 (19 or more violent incidents) or Level 2 (12-18 violent incidents), a number of

licence conditions are imposed until there has been a reduction in reported incidents and the venue is removed from the relevant category (OLGR NSW 2011). This strategy is further discussed in Section 3.1 under Regulation.

Media reporting often identifies problem venues that experience higher levels of violence, including action taken by regulators (Graham & Homel 2008). However, it is suggested the true extent of violence is rarely reflected in official statistics or reporting (ACPR, 2004; Graham & Homel 2008; Melbourne City Council 1991; VCCAV 1990b).

In the literature it is reported that alcohol-related violence does not occur with equal frequency amongst all licensed premises (Briscoe & Donnelly 2001; Graham & Homel 2008; Stockwell 2010). Briscoe & Donnelly (2001) report that problematic venues are associated with a disproportionate amount of violence. In a study that examined police-recorded assaults on licensed premises in Sydney, Newcastle and Wollongong, it was reported that 12% of Sydney hotels accounted for almost 60% of assaults on hotels premises. In Newcastle it was reported that 8% of licensed premises accounted for around 80% of all assaults on licensed premises and that in Wollongong around 6% of licensed premises accounted for around 67% of all assaults (Donnelly 2001, pp. 1-2). It is also reported that various situational influences can result in higher levels of violence (Felson et al. 1997; Graham et al. 1980; Graham & Homel 2008; Homel & Clarke 1994; Homel et al. 1992). These situational influences are often associated with practices relating to the responsible serving of alcohol (Buss et al. 1995; Graham 1980; Graham & Homel 2008) and where often, in the late night environment violence is associated with high-level intoxication (Briscoe & Donnelly 2001; Chikritzhs 2007; Graham 1985; Homel 1999).

The link between alcohol and violence is also reported anecdotally where hospitality and security staff, healthcare professionals and police allude to their everyday experiences as confirmation (Graham & Homel 2008). A number of studies have specifically targeted various community sectors in an attempt to more reliably gather data about the alcohol-violence link such as studies of emergency room activity (Campbell & Green 1997; Cherpitel 1993), community self-reporting (Kelley 1997) and census statistics (Homel & Mirrlees-Black 1997).

As evidenced throughout the literature aggression and violence is not restricted to Australia nor to licensed premises with many Western societies reporting high incidents of domestic, sexual, occupational, random and alcohol-related violence (Graham et al. 1996; Graham 2006; Hadfield 2006; Heath 1987; Homel et al. 1997a; Love 1999; Norstrom 1998). Interestingly, the statistics and trends do not vary greatly between comparable societies in terms of violence and the link with alcohol and aggressive behaviour (Hadfield 2006; Norstrom 2000). Studies have also shown a nexus between the number of licensed premises, their location, the potential interaction between patrons of competing venues and reported violence (Chikritzhs & Stockwell 2002; Hadfield 2006; Norstrom 2000; Roncek & Maier 1991; Winlow et al. 2001). A constant theme throughout the literature is that intoxicated people are often perpetrators of violence but they also make easy targets hence increasing the chances of being involved in violence (Graham & Homel 2008; Room 1983).

Internationally there is a common link reported between alcohol misuse and violence, with some estimates suggesting up to 50% of all violent crime being alcohol-related (Cramphorn 2005; Lowe & Dixon 2005) and across all cultures (Graham 2006). In some parts of Europe, it has been reported that alcohol is the common factor for most violence (SIRC 2000) and not dissimilar to the Australian experience where in 2007 the Australian Bureau of Statistics reported that of 72% of men who were physically assaulted by another male, the perpetrator was under the influence of alcohol or other drug. Further, 28% of perpetrators admitted to being under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of committing an assault (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2007). The European study resulted in strict regulatory controls to suppress public disorder, reduce hooliganism at sporting events, and curb domestic hostility and violent crime (SIRC 2002). In Scandinavia a research study found a steady increase in male alcohol-related violence, often from the age of 14 years. This has resulted in the development of government policy which includes addressing problems associated with alcohol abuse or access to alcohol in many public environments, the introduction of legislation and various community or agency response strategies such as welfare, counselling and treatment (Pernanen 1991).

It is suggested that there are a number of adverse community impacts that result from alcohol-related violence including greater involvement and the further utilisation of

resources in the criminal justice and healthcare systems (Miller et al. 2012; Sutherland et al. 2002). Primary areas of criminal justice and healthcare often place increased community reliance on social and welfare supports and a burden on the various community services that might need to be actioned (Collins and Lapsley 2008; Miller et al. 2012).

The British Crime Survey (2000) reports that 44% of domestic violence victims were assaulted by a person under the influence of alcohol. A study in the United States suggests that men are 11 times more likely to become aggressive toward their female partner during or shortly after drinking (Fals-Stewart 2003). In another US study it was reported that 45% of offending males and 20% females were under the influence of alcohol at the time they committed a violent act (Roizen 1993).

Public drinking, not necessarily involving consumption in public places, is a social problem affecting all societies (Felson et al. 1997; Miller et al. 2012). Commonly, those who participate are young, male and drink to excess (Budd 2003; Chikritzhs & Stockwell 2002; Donnelly & Briscoe 2003; Graham & Homel 2008). A by-product of public drinking is reflected in the literature which highlights the significant risks associated with public activity and therefore the potential for violence in and around licensed premises (Budd, 2003; Dixon 1990; Forsyth et al. 2005; Graham & Homel 1997; Hauritz et al. 1998a; Hobbs 2003; Homel et al. 1991; Homel et al. 1997a; Miller et al. 2012).

What is unclear within the literature is the extent to which alcohol either facilitates or results in aggression. Could it be argued that aggressive people tend to drink more alcohol or merely have an inability to interact according to social norms or adequately solve problems?

Alcohol misuse in England accounts for approximately one half of all violent crimes (Home Office 2004). Consistently, research in the UK shows that approximately 20% of all violence occurs in or around licensed premises and about half of all alcohol-related assaults occur at pubs or late night operations (Home Office 2004). Of all assaults at licensed premises about 65% are between strangers (Budd 2003).

According to the British Crime Survey (2000), 53% of stranger aggression throughout society is committed by a person under the influence of alcohol. Statistically within

the British Crime Survey (2000) those most at risk of alcohol-related violence fit a general profile of:

1. Single male;
2. Aged between 16-29 years (2001 survey reports 16-24 years);
3. Regularly interacting with strangers;
4. Intoxicated; and
5. Attending at or in the immediate vicinity of a pub or nightclub.

In Australia, a study found that stranger violence accounted for 56.1% of the total violence outside the home for persons aged 14 years and over, with the largest group aged 20-24 years (Teece & Williams 2000). Those who frequent late night venues are more likely to be involved in violent situations than any other place outside the home (Makkai 1997) and Buss (1995) reports that up to 75% of street assault and offensive behaviours involve alcohol.

Although licensed premises or the immediate vicinity are considered a greater risk statistically for acts of violence between persons than in any other “public” environment (Miller et al. 2012), the type of licensed operation is also a relevant consideration (Chikritzhs & Stockwell 2002). It is reported far less violence occurs in and around private clubs, reception centres and restaurants than at pubs and nightclubs (Graham & Homel 2008; Homel et al. 1991). The type of activity in the venue can also impact upon the potential for individual or group aggression with an increased risk being associated with “fight” nights, competition events that primarily involve males such as billiards or darts, or drink promotions that result in high levels of intoxication or merely those environments where there is a higher proportion of males present (Graham & Homel 2008; VCCAV 1990b).

Studies by Homel and Clarke (1994) and Hadfield (2006) suggest there is no single theory that adequately explains the connection between alcohol and violence. This has been supported in studies that specifically involved late night venues (Parker & Auerhahn 1998). A report by the UK Social Issues Research Centre (2000) argues that on the evidence currently available there is no causal link between alcohol and

violence but “rather a complex interaction of biochemical, psychological, situational and cultural factors” (SIRC 2002).

Research in Australia suggests that up to 60% of all alcohol-related offences are committed in the vicinity of licensed premises and is founded upon a combination of factors including environmental and situational issues (Homel & Clarke 1994). It is suggested that the circumstances (situation), not the drinking of alcohol has the greater influence on behaviour (Carpenter & Armenti 1972; Graham & Homel 2008; Hobbs et al. 2003; Tomsen et al. 1991).

Mihalic and Elliott (1996) maintain that most drinking sessions do not end in violence and that most violence does not involve alcohol. The Social Issues Research Centre (UK) proposes that “non-problematic drinking is normal in both statistical and sociological terms” (SIRC 1998). A study in Finland concluded:

The association of drinking with any kind of specifically associated problems, physical, economic, psychological, social relational or other is rare among cultures throughout both history and the contemporary world. (Heath 1987)

The literature suggests that the level of intoxication and in many cases the perceived justification of individuals to act violently is at the core of the problem (Giancola & Zeichner 1997). Chikritzhs et al. (2007) conducted a study in Perth that examined if there was a correlation between later trading hours and alcohol-related violence. The research involved 75 hotels, taverns and nightclubs between 1989 and 1996. It was determined that premises with later trading hours had higher alcohol sales and a substantial increase in the number of assaults. Average alcohol sales by venues with later trading hours was more than 85% greater than by those premises without extended hours. This study suggests there is a link between increased levels of alcohol sales and increased levels of violence (Chikritzhs et al. 1997).

White et al. (1994, p.7) reports that there are potentially two types of individual involved with alcohol-related aggression:

Those who are aggressive whether or not they drink and who happen to drink heavily more of the time ... and those for whom the state of intoxication, the

setting and the provocation interact on a specific occasion to cause an isolated incident of aggressive behaviour. (White et al. 1994)

White et al. (1994) reports that there are too many complexities relating to alcohol and violence and therefore complex behaviour cannot be simplistically explained. PERNANEN (1991) suggests that the research conducted in this area often involves non-representative samples or limitations on data measurement as it is difficult to gauge the relative intoxication levels of drinkers and their hostile behaviour.

Mihalic and Elliott (1996) further suggest:

In the case of violence, factors such as variations in patterns of consumption, drinking locale and cohorts, socioeconomic considerations and cultural variable all contribute to its putative relationship with alcohol. Therefore simplistic assumptions of causality fall short of being valid.

These studies suggest the link between alcohol and violence is more about associations between relevant factors such as personality, level of intoxication, environment and other social or behavioural issues rather than constituting a simplistic causal influence (Chikritzhs et al. 2007; Mihalic & Elliott 1996; PERNANEN 1991; White et al. 2004). Consistently the situational context is reported as being a primary influence on the potential for violence (Deehan 2004; Graham & Homel 1997; Homel & Clarke 1994; Tomsen et al. 1991). It has also been reported there is no clear-cut explanation between the level of drinking and the potential for violence, either as victim or perpetrator (Teece & Williams 2000) albeit recent studies suggest the level of intoxication can align with the severity of damage caused as a result of violence (Stockwell 2010).

A Scandinavian study suggested neuropsychological effects probably contribute to perceptions of identity and self-esteem and therefore the risk of hostility amongst individuals or groups (Lenke 1989). It was reported that

The competitive interaction in line-ups outside drinking places to get inside, and the line-ups waiting for a taxi at closing time create interactional contexts where status and potential loss of face become central concerns. This probably also happens inside drinking establishments. (Lenke 1989)

Although it is reported there is a direct pharmacological impact of alcohol upon the brain that causes a chemically based foundation for the likelihood of violence (Gustafson 1994), Bushman (1997) contends that there is no evidence to suggest the pharmacological effects of alcohol form the basis for violence without other situational factors. This appears the current position within the literature (Graham et al. 2006; Graham & Homel 2008; Stockwell 2010). However, it has been established that alcohol consumption produces various changes in the brain, the central nervous system and hormonal systems which affect physiological and cognitive processes (Giancola et al. 1998). When a person consumes a high level of alcohol their reaction time slows, muscle control diminishes proportionately to their level of intoxication, and various motor skills become impaired (Giancola et al. 1998).

Cognitive impairment can involve primary and secondary levels and appears to be a common theme in alcohol-related violence (Giancola et al. 1998). There can be memory loss and the ability for problem-solving becomes less effective or reliable (Bushman 1997; Forsyth et al. 2005; Graham et al. 1996).

Pernanen (1976, 1991) suggests that high levels of alcohol impede primary cognitive ability by suppressing one's perceptual field. Other impacts such as an inability to fully comprehend the social context or surroundings has been referred to as "alcohol myopia" (Steele & Joseph 1990). Further, the more alcohol consumed, the more intoxicated one becomes, which means the perceptual field further diminishes until such time as the context can no longer be perceived or understood (Steele & Joseph 1990). This results in flashes or fluctuations of distorted reality which means an increased risk of misunderstandings or misinterpretations and therefore a greater likelihood of inappropriate or unpredictable reactions including violence (Pernanen 1991).

Secondary cognitive impairment impacts upon intellectual and linguistic ability (Pernanen, 1976, 1991). Where a substantial amount of alcohol has been consumed, a person will have greater difficulty in thinking logically and speaking (Pernanen 1991). This can result in the individual exercising poor judgement about appropriate behaviours and responses (Bushman 1997; Pernanen 1991).

Primary and secondary cognitive deficiencies can result in the potential for violence in some subjects to other affective influences such as situational factors or the environment (Bushman 1997). It is important to note that impaired ability does not cause aggression or violence as most people who consume alcohol do not become aggressive or violent (Bushman 1997).

2.3.5 Other drugs and violence

It is not the intention of this study to comprehensively review the literature relating to illicit drugs, influences or impacts upon nightclub activity and security systems, extent of use or various distribution methods as other studies have adequately done this (ACC 2003; Aitken et al. 2002; Andreasson et al. 1999; Fagan 1990; Johnston & Jenkinson 2007; Lang et al. 1998; Livingstone et al. 2010; Parker & Auerhahn 1998; Single 1997). However, where the potential for violence is linked with certain illicit drug groups some comment is justified. It is interesting to note that many operational crowd controllers in Australia now consider unpredictable or spontaneous violence more likely to occur where certain types of illicit drug use is involved, with or without alcohol consumption. For example, Miller et al. (2012) reports illicit drug use is regularly identified as a major concern associated with alcohol-related violence in the NTE.

A number of studies suggest there is a complex relationship between violence and substance abuse (ADF 2001; AIHW 2005; DeLaRosa et al. 1990; Miller 1990; NDARC 2005). By comparison to alcohol, understanding the link between violence and illicit drugs has proven more difficult as different drugs produce different effects including a broad range of follow-on or associated behaviours such as violence and aggression (Johnston & Jenkinson 2007). This is particularly relevant as “new” drugs, predominantly amphetamines-based substances, continue to enter the marketplace such as “ice” (the street name for crystal methamphetamine hydrochloride, a powerful synthetic stimulant drug) and the established “party drug” ecstasy (also known as methylenedioxymethamphetamine or MDMA) (Baker & Caraher 1995; DeLaRosa et al. 1990; Johnston & Jenkinson 2007).

Amphetamine is a collective term given to amphetamines, dextroamphetamines and methamphetamines, all of which act similarly in the body and are characterised by producing neurochemical and molecular changes in the brain (AIHW 2005). Of these, methamphetamines is considered the strongest and more likely to cause paranoia and the likelihood for aggressive behaviour (AIHW 2005). Reported effects of “ice” in terms of use and withdrawal include a propensity for depression, anxiety and paranoia hence the likelihood of spontaneous violence and aggression (NDARC 2005).

Ecstasy is a popular stimulant related to the drugs mescaline and amphetamine however its effects are not considered as potentially dangerous for spontaneous violence (NDARC 2005). Ecstasy is reported to lower inhibitions and relaxes the user with common behaviours including increased awareness, energy, feelings of pleasure and often intrusion on others in the vicinity (NDARC 2005). Intrusion can result in annoyance of others, the rejection of advances, misunderstandings and therefore the potential for conflict, aggression and violence (ACC 2003; Johnston & Jenkinson 2007).

Another drug that has a prominent link with violence and regularly attributed to security staff are the steroids.

2.3.6 Steroids and security staff

“Steroid” is an umbrella term for various synthetic substances including the more commonly known “anabolic steroids” (ACC 2003). Users of steroids report they are able to train longer and harder, reduce recovery time, overcome strains and other muscular injuries more readily, build a better body shape, and therefore enhance athletic performance (ACC 2003). Steroid, in its various forms, is prohibited by the World Anti-Doping Agency and by protocol, the Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority (WADA 2006). Steroid is also a proscribed drug in all Australian jurisdictions including Victoria (ACC 2003).

In addition to physical side effects such as hair loss, hypertension and fertility problems there are also a number of psychological impacts reported, including increased aggression (“roid rage”), mood swings, paranoia, irritability and depression (ACC 2003)..

The literature suggests that steroid users generally fall into four categories: athletes seeking to enhance their performance, body builders seeking to increase muscle mass and definition, individuals in the security industry, and adolescents wanting to improve their body image (ACC 2003).

Historically the link between steroids and the security industry has been most evident for many years (Evans-Brown et al. 2012; Monaghan 2003). Justifications for individual use by security staff include a perceived need for suitable body image, strength and mass (Monaghan 2003; VCCAV 1990b). A Victorian study by Aitken et al. (2002) found individual motivations of injecting steroid users were attainment of increased muscle size (91%), improved strength (66%) and enhanced appearance (78%). Further, the same study found that 40% of all users were involved in competitive bodybuilding (Aitken et al. 2002), a pastime of many crowd controllers (Hobbs et al. 2003). In 2006 the Daily Telegraph reported that Dr Peter Stewart, a New South Wales registered doctor, was found guilty of medical malpractice for over-prescribing steroids to hotel security staff. Dr Stewart was banned from prescribing, possessing or administering anabolic steroids or androgenic steroids and acknowledged that most of his clients were hotel security staff, some of whom travelled two hours for a consultation (Bevan 2006).

Drug Testing

Two Australian States (South Australia and Western Australia) have formally addressed concerns of alcohol abuse and illicit drug use in the security industry by introducing targeted alcohol and drug testing of crowd controllers (*Security and Investigation Agents Act 1995* (SA) ss. 23J, 23M; *Security and Related Activities (Control) Act 1996* (WA) s. 79B). The legislation in both jurisdictions was founded upon concerns about the impact of alcohol and drugs in the workplace including the potential for security-initiated violence based upon illegal use of steroids. In May 2006 the *Security Industry Amendment (Patron Protection) Bill* (NSW) was introduced into the New South Wales Parliament by the Hon. Gordon Moyes and a second reading in 2007. The Bill proposed testing of security staff working as crowd controllers, but did not seek to capture other sectors of the security industry. A number of policy objectives were outlined in the Bill including:

to ensure that crowd controllers are not under the influence of alcohol or drugs while working, because of the lack of judgment and increased levels of aggression associated with many of these substances ... to facilitate increased reporting to police and the Security Industry Registry of assaults committed by crowd controllers ... to ensure that crowd controllers are part of the solution to violence in licensed premises, as opposed to being part of the problem in a significant percentage of incidents (Moyes, 2006, p.2)

In brief, it was proposed there are a complex range of variables that are present on licensed premises including the various risks that might be faced by both patrons and venue staff (Moyes 2006). On that basis, it was advanced that “if crowd controllers are drug affected their ability to defend themselves is markedly reduced, as is their capacity to use ‘verbal judo’ to reduce disputes that can lead to violence” (Moyes, 2006, p.7). Although drug testing has not been formally introduced, the legislation requires master licence holders (security industry employers) to prepare and implement a fitness for work policy that includes information on alcohol and drug in the workplace (*Security Industry Act 1997* (NSW) s. 39B).

Currently Queensland is reviewing its legislation and considering the introduction of compulsory drug testing albeit it has not been introduced at the time of this study (*Security Providers Act 1993* (Qld)). However, Schedule 2 of the legislation prohibits persons who have been convicted of certain drug offences (*Security Providers Act 1993* (Qld)). Victoria recently introduced some licensing amendments to the *Private Security Act 2004* but did not include a drug testing requirement. However, a recent recommendation from the Victorian Coroner included drug and alcohol testing for crowd controllers following serious incidents (Coroners Court Victoria 2011).

2.3.7 Perpetrators and victims of violence

Central to issues of violence and venue staff are crowd controllers with a disproportionate involvement of young males as both victims and perpetrators (Collins, 1989; Naffine 1996; Tomsen 2005). The occupation of crowd control has increasingly been demonised in society, often through the media (Winlow et al. 2001; Monaghan 2002a). Examples of serious incidents that resulted in adverse media

reporting of crowd control operations in Australia include the death of former international cricketer David Hookes in 2004 (Coroners Court Victoria 2004). Hookes died following an altercation with security staff after removal from licensed premises where he was struck by a crowd controller some distance away from the Beaconsfield Hotel in St Kilda, Melbourne (Coroners Court Victoria 2004). Similarly, Brett Forbes died outside Pabs Tavern, Jan Juc, Victoria in 1999 during a violent struggle with security staff (Coroners Court Victoria 2002). In 2002 Donald Moore died after being pushed by a crowd controller at the Holland Park Hotel in Brisbane (ABC News 2002). In 2003 David Coddington died after being kicked in the head by a crowd controller at the Colmslie Hotel, Brisbane (ABC News 2006). Coddington's and the other cases listed above are not dissimilar in explanation of participant behaviours to many altercations as discussed within the literature between security staff and patrons (Monaghan 2003; VCCAV 1990b; Winlow et al. 2001) as they typically involve:

1. high levels of patron intoxication;
2. confrontation in or around an access or exit point; and
3. a verbal conflict that escalated to violence.

Other excerpts from media reporting include the death of Domenic Esposito in 2005 (Jaspan 2007). He was ejected from the Ramsgate Hotel, Henley Beach, South Australia. Outside the venue a crowd controller grabbed Mr Esposito in a headlock and forced him to the ground. Witnesses alleged that despite calls from onlookers to stop, the crowd controller continued to hold Mr Esposito for approximately eight minutes until he lost consciousness and died of asphyxiation. The crowd controller was convicted of manslaughter, Justice Michael David said the crowd controller's actions were "totally out of proportion" with the threat he faced (Jaspan 2007).

In March 2005 Daniel Trimble died after being pushed down stairs by a crowd controller at a hotel in Bundaberg, Queensland (ABC Online 2005). In May 2006 three crowd controllers were charged with murder over the alleged misuse of force against a patron, William Amaya, after an ejection from licensed premises in Toowong, Queensland (Bentley 2009) and in July 2011 a number of crowd controllers at Crown Casino in Melbourne restrained a patron Anthony Dunning on the casino floor after an altercation (Deery & Anderson 2012). Mr Dunning allegedly died as a

result of positional asphyxia. These examples resulted in death on each occasion however, there has been regular reporting of violence by security staff throughout Australia (Murphy & Meade 2006). For example, Marcus McDonald was punched by one of two crowd controllers after being ejected from an Irish Bar in Melbourne in October 2004 (Deery 2004). The crowd controller who threw the punch (Antoine Amad, 25 years) caused Mr McDonald to strike his head on the ground that resulted in a fracture and blood clot. Amad pleaded guilty to recklessly causing serious injury and the court noted that surveillance video showed “Amad attacking a hapless drunk without provocation” (Uebergang 2006). A similar case occurred on the Gold Coast in February 2007 when a 21-year old male patron (rising Sydney surf star Sam Page) celebrating his birthday was punched by a crowd controller after being removed from a late night venue. Page suffered a fractured skull and bleeding to the brain after falling to the ground (Stolz 2007).

The trend for bouncer violence is not restricted to the local jurisdiction but extends globally and historically in a predominantly male workforce (Hobbs et al. 2003; Homel et al. 1991; Homel et al. 1992; Monaghan 2000; Starkey 1998), although the representation of non-security staff such as bar or support personnel in statistics relating to nightclub violence is more likely as victim than perpetrator (Hobbs et al. 2003). Hadfield (2006, p. 129) reports “the most important predictor of victimisation is exposure to risk” often associated with socio-demographic activity such as area frequented, lifestyle and time.

Researchers have long struggled with explaining the phenomenon of male violence with various studies linking alcohol, masculinity, culture, power relations and status, often with an interplay between each (Archer 1994; Briscoe & Donnelly 2001; Collier 1998; Collins 1989; Fagan 1990; Hobbs et al. 2000, 2002; Marsh & Kibby 1992; Monaghan 2002a; Monaghan 2003; Tomsen 1997; Tomsen 2005). The justification for violence by security staff appears more related to individual choice rather than a lack of impulse control (Hobbs et al. 2003; Monaghan 2003).

2.3.8 Security staff, culture and violence

A review of the literature reveals a number of studies involving bouncers, bouncer culture, physicality and violence in the United Kingdom (Hobbs et al. 2000; Hobbs et al. 2002; Monaghan 2002a; Monaghan 2003; Toch 1993; Winlow et al. 2001). A

study in Canada suggests more research is needed on bouncers as they are central to most matters of security and risk in the NTE (Rigakos 2004). There are no reported studies on bouncer culture in Australia albeit a number of publications address bouncers but within the context of their presence in the NTE, operational interactions with patrons and others that might impact upon the risk of violence in and around licensed premises (Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012; Prenzler & Hayes 1998; VCCAV 1990b).

Winlow et al. (2001) conducted a covert ethnographic study in the UK by placing a participant (researcher) within the occupation. In part, the study sought to understand the social and cultural context of bouncing and the type of individual who might be attracted to this unusual and often dangerous type of employment (Winlow et al. 2001). The study method was considered an appropriate way for investigating deviant cultures and institutions by getting in deep (Liebow 1967) and exploring bouncer culture including violence from a bouncers perspective (Winlow et al. (2001). It was perceived by the researchers that any ethnographer within a study involving bouncers would have to exhibit the same aptitudes as the bouncers to gain true empathy and therefore see the world as they saw it. The covert researcher had previously worked as a bouncer whilst a student and therefore had relevant industry knowledge and a high chance of acceptance by his security colleagues. This proved invaluable in both recruitment and subsequent acceptance by operational bouncers. Ethical and safety issues were debated and determined within this potentially high risk study, especially as the risk of violence is ongoing such as intervening during fights or removing an intoxicated person. The study found recruitment into bouncing was primarily based upon an individual's physical ability to fight and/or inflict violence. It was reported that "these men are bonded by violent potential which is in itself a culturally informed aspect of self" (Winlow et al., 2001, p.540). There are a number of limitations associated with this study and although the researchers have attempted to justify the methodology the risks to the covert bouncers and the institution are obvious. Lancaster (1991) identified that situational dangers can arise due to unforeseen circumstances albeit the circumstances of violence were foreseeable in this study. That aside, there is the danger of the covert bouncer losing perspective and becoming too involved. This study, although well justified by the researchers is limited and of little value. It is not representative of bouncers generally and provides a

singular perspective. As reported by Monaghan (2000) the disparaging depiction of bouncing generally, although not totally divorced from reality is more aligned with social stereotyping than any detailed ethnography.

Monaghan (2000, p.2) in a UK study confirms that “for door staff, competency primarily involves around physicality and a mental toughness that denotes a willingness to risk one’s own body in performance” as the sector often attracts those with physical skills based upon martial arts, boxing or other fighting prowess. In his ethnographic study, Monaghan (2000) was seen as a door supervisor by his ethnographic contacts at five city-centre licensed premises in South West Britain. Contact bouncers within the study numbered 60, were mostly white males and usually aged in their early 30’s. There were four females in the study. The qualitative data aligns with assertions of Winlow (2001) in that the exercise of force and physical interventions is seen as normal within the bouncer’s workplace however, it is indicated further research is needed. In the context of this study, Monaghan’s article provides supplementary information only.

Winlow et al. (2001, p.541) suggests that “being a bouncer allows a demonstrative cultivation of a hyper-masculine persona” where impression management and body language implies hostility should an individual fail to comply with venue rules. For both the perpetrator and the victim, clashes can potentially have fatal consequences or result in serious injury (Hobbs et al. 2000).

The pursuit of size and body build has long been recognised in parts of the industry as an essential preventative or deterrent strategy (Monaghan 2002a). However, this is arguable when one considers the broad range of strategic security functions required in modern operations (Graham 1985; Graham & Homel 2008; Homel and Clarke 1994). For example, Graham and Homel (2008, p. 133) suggest that the staff role needs to be redefined “as guardians, not guards or enforcers.” In part this has been attempted through regulatory intervention where Prenzler and Hayes (1998) studied the attitudes of nightclub managers and the regulation of crowd controllers. The method was qualitative and although the validity of the study is debatable by merely interviewing senior practitioners, some recurring themes arose. These themes included doubts about the quality of training such as conflict management, communication skills and risk minimisation over a relatively short period of time i.e.

two or three days (Prenzler & Hayes 1998). In 2006 Worksafe Victoria (Victorian Workcover Authority) published an industry guide entitled “Crowd Control At Venues and Events: A Practical Occupational Health and Safety Guide.” The guide focused on preventative strategies to minimise operational risks including violence. For example, Part 3 addressed crowd control risk solutions including dealing with potentially aggressive, abusive or violent behaviour. Although this publication was not a direct result of any particular study, the expert panel was cognisant of research in the area, in addition to recommended best practice (Worksafe Victoria 2006). A second edition was published in 2007 (Worksafe Victoria 2007). Regulation and training is further discussed in Chapter 3.

Hobbs et al. (2000) suggests that typically, venues employ larger males, not larger teams to overcome perceived problems as security staff symbolically imply force (violence) as a core competence to dissuade inappropriate behaviour by patrons. Studies in the UK suggest the body build is also relevant to security team interactions as physical mass is often aligned with acceptance by the group, prestige and status (Courtenay 2000; Winlow et al. 2001; Monaghan 2000). Crowd controllers who are not physically large are commonly referred to as “muppets” and often relegated to work in less hazardous environments, away from late night venues (Monaghan 2000). Interestingly, “masculinity” and the need for body image can also be required of female security staff who might be expected to control female patrons in a similar way to their male counterparts through actual force, assertiveness or an implied resort to violence (Monaghan 2000; Monaghan 2002a).

Connell (1995) suggests that over time a settled team of crowd controllers will form a social group with a hierarchy of control, influence and motivation based upon perceived team or individual objectives. Where violence involving security staff occurs, the group will often see an attack against an individual team member as a symbolic assault against the group and their ultimate authority (Connell 1995). Often such incidents result in swift and excessive retaliation by the group (Foucault 1977). Experienced crowd controllers also report a general desensitisation to violence as it is normalised as part of routine work activity (Hobbs et al. 2000) and in some circumstances a failure by a crowd controller to inflict retaliatory force can result in group or individual rejection by peers (Toch 1993).

Given the general reputation of crowd controllers in the late night venue scene, it is worth noting that some potential targets of violence are avoided (Hobbs et al. 2003). A study of London-based crowd controllers felt that highly intoxicated patrons were more an embarrassment that potentially impacts upon the perceived masculinity of security staff should violence be inflicted against a person considered totally defenceless. The general view of respondents was to strategically remove and disengage rather than subject the person to what the rest of the team might see as “unwarranted” or “bad” violence (Monaghan 2000).

The fact that violent acts are subject to individual discretion highlights the subjectivity of violence based upon an analysis of the situation in comparison to the defensibility associated with any physical action (Athens 1997). Monaghan (2000) suggests that the identification of suitable targets for crowd controller violence includes a range of unacceptable behaviours such as failing to comply with requests by security staff, inappropriate gestures or comments, physically not cooperating during an ejection from the premises, and physical assault on anyone.

The location where force might be used is often a critical factor in the decision-making process (Hobbs et al. 2003). The presence of witnesses, CCTV cameras and an absence of other security staff will generally impact upon the decision to inflict violence (Hobbs et al. 2003; Monaghan 2003). For example, an unoccupied backroom or passageway might be more acceptable than the dance floor or front entrance (Hobbs et al. 2003). Further, Monaghan (2003) suggests there are a number of other factors associated with security work that involve decisions to use force. He suggests the fact that security staff may of themselves be in danger and also dangerous during any period of routine work often means that security staff may forcibly resolve incidents or problems as part of an established workplace practice and culture.

The UK studies above (Hobbs et al. 2003; Lister et al. 2001; Monaghan 2003; Winlow et al. 2001) all suggest that force is a predominant consideration within the bouncer culture. The Australian experience does not suggest the same physical considerations and culture are present generally, perhaps because the industry has been regulated since 1990 in Victoria (Dixon 1998) with mandatory training that includes communication skills, conflict management, working as part of a team, and managing difficult people since that time (*Private Agents Act 1966 (Vic)*). Regulation

within the UK system does not have the same maturity and does not apply fully across the industry sector (Hobbs et al. 2003).

The UK Health and Safety Executive contend that 27% of workplace safety incidents in the hotel and catering industry are reported with less describing violence as it is considered part of the job (HSE 2001). The Health and Safety Executive is a non-departmental public body. It is responsible for regulation and enforcement of workplace health and safety along similar lines to the Australian OHS authorities (HSE 2001). There appears a significant underreporting of incidents in licensed premises as “community perceptions of violence are often vastly different from what the factual information shows” (VCCAV 1990b), hence the true extent of violent incidents in late night venues is generally unknown (Graham & Homel 2008).

A review of incidents referred to earlier in this section where death or serious injury has occurred reveals the following pattern:

1. The incident occurred outside the premises or in the course of ejection near an exit;
2. Serious injury was inflicted by security staff on a patron;
3. The patron was highly intoxicated;
4. The patron was unknown to the security staff;
5. The principal security staff were young and generally under 28 years but more likely under 25 years;
6. The experience of the security staff was generally under two years service;
7. The security officer was male; and
8. At the time of the incident other security staff were present.

From a policy perspective, this pattern highlights a specific risk associated with crowd controller interventions and the need to have clear guidelines about managing intoxicated persons, ejections and external activity. Clearly, the development of an appropriate system of security involves strategically addressing each element of the above pattern.

Leading from the humanistic issues addressed, the literature consistently reveals a range of environmental and situational factors that impact upon the potential for violence in nightclubs (Braun & Graham 1997; Casswell et al. 1993; Chikritzhs & Stockwell 2002; Clarke & Homel 1997; Dixon 1998; Fisher 1993; Greenfield 1992; Hauritz et al. 1998b; Homel et al. 2004; Miller et al. 2012; St. John-Brooks 1998; Stockwell 2010).

2.3.9 Societal and situational factors

It has been reported that both societal factors (which influence social thinking and norms) and situational factors (the directly observable measures that are present or introduced into the current leisure setting) contribute to the potential for violence (Graham & Homel 2008; Homel et al. 2004; Tomsen et al. 1991). This is supported by the literature and by experienced field staff (Dixon 1998; Fagan 1990; Graham et al. 1996; Hobbs et al. 2003; Monaghan 2003; VCCAV 1990b) although research tends to provide generic rather than specific explanations.

In addition to violence, societal and situational factors can impact upon the likelihood of other crimes being committed such as property crimes, i.e., vandalism and graffiti (Homel et al. 2004; Tomsen et al. 1991). These problems are often addressed through social education strategies involving the media and situational crime prevention (Clarke & Homel 1997; Homel et al. 1997a; McIlwain & Hauritz 1996; Tomsen et al. 1991).

Social education generally informs through the development of understanding as outlined in Section 2.2.4 above which seeks to explain relevant theories such as disinhibition theory, selective disinhibition theory, expectancy theory and the like. Alternatively, consequences that attach to inappropriate behaviours are believed to also form the basis for impacting upon the level of violence in and around nightclubs (Graham & Homel 2008). Consequences are often displayed through signage at licensed premises such as financial penalties that are imposed where over-intoxication is detected or the recently introduced “banning notices” introduced in Victoria for unacceptable behaviour at licensed premises (VCGLR 2010). Although societal factors can impact upon the risk of violence, Campbell (2005) suggested that often

governments will take risks and then manage the resulting consequences. For example, in 1986 the liberalisation of liquor laws of Victoria was not based upon research that included addressing the risks of alcohol abuse, violence, general social impact or other potential consequences but rather was founded upon a political aim to make Melbourne a viable 24-hour city (Nieuwenhusen 1986). In 2008 responding to a media interview in *The Age* about increasing levels of violence, Nieuwenhusen was quoted “This is definitely not what I had in mind. I was looking to promote more European, civilised style of drinking, but we seem to have been swept away by a wave of binge drinking. These places that disgorge thousands of people onto the streets are inherently dangerous” (Rood 2007). Other than societal interventions such as community education and regulatory controls there has been regular work at the local level to address violence. Most prominent has been work in the areas of situational crime prevention (Sutton et al. 2008).

Situational crime prevention comprises measures aimed at reducing opportunity for crime with a specific focus on the circumstances that lead to offences rather than speculation about motives for offending behaviour (Clarke 1997). Criminological theory and various intervention techniques involving situational crime prevention strategies has gained momentum since early 1990 including, where relevant, a focus on alcohol, violence and nightclubs (Hauritz et al. 1998b; Homel et al. 1997a; McIlwain & Hauritz 1996; Melbourne City Council 1991).

Clarke and Homel (1997) contend that situational crime prevention departs from conventional criminology as it focuses on opportunity reduction for identified crime (in this study violence); the setting for crime rather than the offender (matters relevant to nightclubs and the NTE); and preventing crime rather than detection or punishment (measures to increase the effort, increase the risk, reduce the rewards, reduce provocations and remove excuses). This means that to minimise the potential for violence in and around nightclubs there must be careful analysis of the various situational factors that are present, followed by targeted treatment or management strategies for each factor (Sutton et al. 2008).

Various regulatory interventions on problem venues have sought to encourage nightclub operators to improve their security systems through “show cause” activity that could result in the cancellation or suspension of a liquor licence (VCGLR 2012).

The basis for these improvements has included a requirement to address venue-specific or situational factors to minimise the level of violence and related anti-social behaviours (Graham & Homel 2008).

The more notable situational factors that can impact upon the potential for violence have been well documented under five key considerations as outlined in Figure 1 (Graham et al. 2006; Graham & Homel 2008; Quigley et al. 2003).

Patron characteristics	Venue characteristics	Social environment	Staffing characteristics	Wider environment
heavily intoxicated greater proportion of males presence of males in groups, especially strangers to one another heavy drinkers younger patrons, including those that are underage greater proportion of unkempt patrons and patrons from marginal groups patrons exhibiting signs of being less agreeable, more impulsive and angry	queues or line-ups outside the building patrons hanging around outside venue at closing queues of public transport venues with larger capacity poorly maintained and unpleasant decor unclean or messy poor or low levels of lighting crowding that inhibit movement around the venue, including around the bar frequent patron movement higher noise level poor ventilation and high temperature inadequate or uncomfortable seating inconvenient access to the bar	heavy drinking and high levels of intoxication generally permissive environment with high levels of rowdy behaviour expectation and aggression will be tolerated hostile atmosphere macho culture patron boredom underage drinking presence of competitive games dancing sexual activity, contact and competition drink promotions limited availability of food other illegal activities, such as drug dealing	high proportion of male staff lowly staff to patron ratio lack of responsible serving practices refusing service to already intoxicated patrons drinking by staff greater number of staff adopting confrontational approach to venue management aggressive security staff poor coordination of staff poor monitoring and control of minor incidents limited ability to control of defuse situations lack of professionalism by security staff serving several drinks to patrons at closing younger security staff	high density of licensed premises high levels of movement in and out of premises entry and injection practices for aggressive patrons unfair or confrontational entry practices conflict between social groups emerging from or congregating around venues poor management of cluster points such as bus stations, taxi ranks, food outlets congestion points as crowds leave venues (especially at closing time)

Figure 1: Risk factors and licensed premises

Source: Graham et al. 2006; Graham & Homel 2008; Quigley, Leonard & Collins 2003

The risk factors outlined above provide a first-rate overview of the situational factors that venue operators need to consider. However, there is an absence in the literature of an overarching framework, the parameters of a security system and how any of the above elements should be operationalised, such as how queues outside a nightclub should be managed, what access control strategies need to be introduced to prevent

undesirables entering, how physical interventions need to be conducted by security or other venue staff or how the lack of professionalism by security staff is to be addressed internally by venue operators or externally by the regulator. This is central in this study.

2.3.10 The importance of context

Healy (2005) contends that context is essential when seeking to merge theoretical concepts into practice, and that every theory might not be relevant to the context of a work practice.

Based upon the current literature discussed in this section there are three emerging theoretical factors that appear to impact upon the risk and therefore level of violence in nightclubs:

1. Personal factors – those traits or characteristics of the individual;
2. Situational factors – the measures that are present or introduced into the current leisure setting; and
3. Societal factors – the broad societal factors that influence social thinking and norms.

These factors will need to be addressed by venue operators, security specialists and those responsible for policy development and regulatory controls to ensure an appropriate strategy is devised based upon the current evidence and incident trends.

Figure 2 consolidates current thinking as explained in the literature about factors relative to the likelihood for violence in a “Violence Contribution Model”. It is proposed based on the literature that addressing these three factors in an appropriate context from a nightclub security perspective minimises the risk for violence.




Figure 2: Violence contribution model

In the literature it is reported that there is a link between excessive consumption of alcohol and aggression (Chikritzhs & Stockwell 2002; Finney 2004; Graham & Homel 2008; Miller et al. 2012; Plant, Plant & Thornton 2002; Stockwell 2010; Wells & Graham 2003; Williams 2000) and that social attitudes to binge drinking and high-level consumption of alcohol are more aligned with social norms, especially the young (Graham & Homel 2008; Hammersley & Ditton 2005; Roche et al. 2007). It is also reported that relevant situational factors will increase or contribute to the likelihood of aggressive behaviour (Briscoe & Donnelly 2001a; Chikritzhs et al. 2007; Graham et al. 2006; Graham & Homel 2008; Miller et al. 2012). If that is the case, can interventions relative to the general activity of nightclubs such as alcohol service practices, liquor licence conditions or security controls have an impact upon the level or likelihood for violence?

These issues are further explored in Chapter 3.

2.4 Conclusion

A review of the literature confirmed minimal research about operational security strategies aimed at the prevention of violence in nightclubs (Haines & Graham 2005; Monaghan 2002; Niblo 1995) although there is a wealth of material on crime prevention in public space that includes space adjacent to licensed premises (Dingwell 2006; Sutton et al. 2008). The key authors have conducted studies focusing on social, situational and personal influences associated with drinking culture, aggression and levels of violence. Of particular interest has been the work of Graham and Homel (1997, 2008) and more recently Miller et al. (2012) how interventions such as community mobilisation, venue design, and training of staff can influence levels of violence.

Within the licensed environment Graham (1980; 1985) has focused on training staff in responsible service of alcohol, understanding patron behaviours through the “safer bars” program and Homel with collaborators over a number of studies that involved interventions including methods commonly recognised under situational crime prevention (Graham & Homel 1997; Graham & Homel 2008; Hobbs et al. 2003; Homel & Clarke 1994; Homel et al. 1994; Homel et al. 2004).

Some studies have suggested that violence can be minimised where venue operators adopt good practices to minimise high-level intoxication (ACPR 2004; ; Goldsmith 1989; Graham 1980; Graham & West 2001; Haines & Graham 2005; Hauritz et al. 1998a; Homel et al. 1997b; VCCAV 1990b). Others have focused on addressing situational factors such as good practices in venue design, selective patron mix and the type of entertainment provided (Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012; Macintyre & Homel 1997; Roberts 1998). Inconsistent or inappropriate attention relevant to these factors can contribute to the potential for increased conflict and violence (Clarke 1997; Clarke & Homel 1997; Homel et al. 1997b; Tomsen et al. 1991). In other studies it has been suggested that implementing responsible and accepted risk management practices that introduce a degree of consistency between the venue operation and its business objectives will impact upon the level of violence (Homel & Tomsen 1991; LGMB 1997; Paterson 2000; Reason 2000; Webster et al. 2002; VCCAV 1990b).

However, within the licensed environment and specifically the NTE there has been no study that investigates the association between levels of violence and elements within a system of security that might impact upon the level of violence.

Recently, the study by Miller et al. (2012) sought to measure and better understand the link between alcohol consumption and associated harms in and around licensed premises through studies of interventions in Newcastle (NSW) and Geelong (Victoria). The interventions involved regulatory activity such as the imposition of conditions on licensed premises in Newcastle and community mobilisation involving voluntary programs at Geelong but again did not delve into elements within a system of security that were associated with levels of violence.

The theoretical foundations outlined within this chapter about associations between alcohol, intoxication and the risk of violence have not been fully progressed. As reported by White et al. (1994) no single theory can account for all violence by all persons in all circumstances. The various models and studies discussed suggest that alcohol plays a causal role in violence and that interventions designed to impact upon this link will minimise the risk of violence. However, studies also show that there are a number of subtleties associated with violence, of which alcohol can be present but not be a causal factor for violent behaviour (Homel 1992). This was formally proposed within routine activity theory where Felson & Cohen (1979) suggest that crime, including violence is part of a normal and modern lifestyle. In other words, daily routine activities may expose individuals to violence, not necessarily the presence or consumption of alcohol. This is supported by recent studies where it is reported not all people who drink become violent (Graham & Homel 2008; Homel 1992) albeit the level of intoxication can increase risk (Graham & Homel 2008; Miller et al. 2012; Stockwell 2010) and if routine activity involves a night lifestyle, regardless of gender, age or ethnicity the risk is further increased (Briscoe & Donnelly 2001; Chikritzhs & Stockwell 2002; Graham & Homel 2008).

The theoretical implications of the studies discussed in this chapter suggest that policy makers, researchers and industry stakeholders cannot view crime control and alcohol control measures independently and that there should be multi-component interventions (Wallin et al. 2003). Any segregation is artificial as evidenced by Miller et al. (2012) in the Newcastle Geelong study where a combination of interventions

including crime (violence) control and alcohol availability resulted in reductions in crime including violence and, at least in Newcastle a perception of improved public behaviour in and around the entertainment precinct.

Of course, a key consideration within any theoretical framework are the licensed premises themselves and what policy implications might apply that effectively acknowledges appropriate practices and controls poor practices at the local level. High crime areas do not always experience higher levels of violence at every venue within the area and thus the profile of patrons and levels of local activity are equally important considerations as various interventions might be contemplated (Graham & Homel 2008; Miller et al. 2012). This leads to an examination of strategies that a nightclub might introduce to further minimise situational risks in and around its operation. The Violence Contribution Model (Figure 2) draws the theoretical perspectives discussed in this chapter together.

Chapter 3 looks more specifically at nightclub security systems, the various elements or features of a system of security including influences on the development and application of a security system from external and internal perspectives. This includes regulatory and community influences and interventions.

Chapter 3 – Regulation and Systems of Security at Nightclubs

Systems of security in nightclubs are influenced by a number of factors both internal and external. Internal influences include venue-specific requirements by business operators and how they view the attractiveness of the venue for their potential patronage. External influences are usually based upon regulatory requirements and how the regulator views a particular venue or the industry sector generally. These regulatory requirements often reflect government policy based upon key stakeholder concerns such as police, neighbouring businesses and the local community.

This chapter is divided into four sections:

Regulation and licensed premises. In this section I review the impact of regulation upon licensed premises with a particular emphasis on violence in and around nightclubs. This includes discussing ongoing initiatives that have been introduced to address community concerns about violence.

Systems of security and nightclubs. This section identifies various approaches adopted by industry in developing systems of security at nightclubs. It draws together the relevant risk, security and safety strategies that are most prominent in terms of preventative and reactive security strategies;

Best practice in security at nightclubs. In this section I discuss best practice for nightclub security systems in Victoria including input from the regulator, academics and industry in seeking to minimise the risk of violence in and around nightclubs; and

Conclusion. In this section I draw together regulations and various practices in nightclubs that have led to best practice for nightclub security.

3.1 Regulation and licensed premises

In Western societies, government generally bears responsibility for the provision of public safety including controls associated with the sale and supply of alcohol (Hill & Stuart 1998). This is usually addressed through regulation where defined policy objectives are identified such as minimising the risk of alcohol-related violence. Regulation typically involves the application of laws, rules, codes of practice and

enforceable undertakings by venue operators with the regulator (ANAO 2007; VCGLR 2011).

In recognition of harms associated with alcohol abuse, most Australian jurisdictions have introduced “harm minimisation” as a primary objective of their liquor legislation (Chikritzhs et al. 2007) with most regulators introducing measures to address alcohol-related violence (DoJ 2010b; Graham & Homel 2008; Loxley et al. 2005).

The literature consistently reports that positive regulatory activity can impact upon the level of violence in and around licensed premises (Graham & Homel 2008; VCCAV 1990b). Such activity includes engagement with licence holders by government, industry education and encouraged legislative compliance (Graham & Homel 2008). As articulated by Burdach and Kagan (1984), the method of stakeholder engagement is important as perceived inequity by business operators in the application of legislative instruments will most likely fail to achieve community and regulatory objectives.

Within the licensed environment regulatory activity has been most evident in the area of late night trading by nightclubs and entertainment precincts where nightclubs are most prominent (Haines & Graham 2005; Miller et al. 2012). However, it must be noted that nightclubs do not exist in isolation (Graham & Homel 2008). They are also affected by the activities of the local environment, social norms, practices of regulators in addition to a broad range of policing and cultural influences (Burns & Coumarelos 1993; Chikritzhs & Stockwell 2002; Graham & Homel 2008). This means to impact upon any link between alcohol and violence requires a consistent message between key industry stakeholders such as regulator, law enforcers, security industry providers and operators of venues themselves (Craze & Norberry 1994; Graham and Homel 2008; Hadfield 2006; Hobbs et al. 2000).

In this section I will discuss regulatory influences on licensed premises. This will include:

- Overview of regulatory theory;
- Regulatory practices that are aimed at alcohol-related violence; and
- Regulation of licensed premises in Victoria.

Regulatory theory

Regulation theorists suggest modern approaches focus on a concept of deregulation. However, it is often suggested specific industry sectors experiencing problems such as frequent violence exist in a domain of “responsive regulation” (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992). Responsive regulation theory suggests that cost-effective strategies must meet the needs of the State, community, industry and particular business through collaboration and ongoing communication (Sigler & Murphy 1988).

The various regulatory approaches to licensed premises in most Western societies reveal some distinct differences in attempts to transcend the split between autonomous regulation and deregulation (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992). These differences often relate to a specific regulatory style with outcome preferences ranging from a punitive approach to cooperation (Rees 1988). The literature suggests that successful responsive regulatory strategies in a contemporary commercial environment have evolved based upon:

1. Agreements between key stakeholders with clear boundaries or parameters of acceptable or expected activity;
2. Enforceable conditions for breaches of accepted or expected activity;
3. Clearly defined sanctions that align with the level of infringement; and
4. Input from the community including industry in regulatory decision-making and future directions (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992).

The literature advances three common approaches to regulation theory:

1. The “enforcement” model (Schaefer & Lamm 1992);
2. The “responsive regulation” model (Braithwaite 1992); and
3. An “educational” model that argues that there is a distinction between the “informed” regulator and the “uninformed” business (Robens 1972).

Enforcement model

The “enforcement” model is founded upon the belief that a business will not comply with legislative requirements unless the anticipated penalties associated with breaches far exceed the costs of compliance (Schaefer & Lamm 1992).

However, Grabowski and Braithwaite (1986) suggest that strict enforcement by a regulator involving sanctions for violations can result in uncooperative business behaviours and a subculture of non-disclosure.

The enforcement model is not widely accepted as an appropriate method to address the issue of alcohol-related violence from a proactive position. This is because individual venues that prove problematic are often subject to strict enforcement strategies post-incident (Graham & Homel 2008; OLGR NSW 2011). Although this approach is aimed at punishing individuals responsible for venue operations or the possible removal of a venue liquor licence such action can take considerable time for outcomes to be achieved (Hill & Stuart 1998). This was most evident in recent proceedings against Bar 20 in Victoria by the regulator where The Australian newspaper reported the outcome of proceedings exceeded two years (Buttler & Laughton 2010).

Responsive regulation model

Responsive regulation theory proposes a move toward self-regulation or personal responsibility (Braithwaite 2002). This means there is less intrusion by regulators but often the influence or pressures of industry associations or other industry stakeholders such as other licensees (Graham & Homel 2008).

Braithwaite (2002) suggests the best approach for regulators is to escalate from a position of minimal interference through to high intrusion contingent upon the actions or responses of the parties being regulated. For example, a regulatory authority could proceed from a position of providing advice or guidance about legislative compliance and then where non-compliance or consistent breaches are detected escalate to levels of persuasion through to punitive measures as required (Braithwaite 2002).

In Australia, the various State and Territory legislative instruments provide for intervention by the regulator on problem venues (Graham & Homel 2008). In these circumstances, a regulator is firstly able to discuss issues of concern such as increased levels of violence compared to like venues and achieve agreement as to actions a venue might take to address the concern such as employing more security staff, monitoring problem areas at the venue or training of staff (Burns et

al. 1995; Doherty & Roche 2003; Graham & Homel 2008). Where such concerns are not adequately managed or incidents continue, a stronger level of intervention can then be applied (Braithwaite 2002).

This approach is depicted through the responsive regulation theory pyramid as outlined in Figure 3.




Figure 3: Responsive regulation theory pyramid

Source: KPMG as modified by Zalewski 2012

Graham and Homel (2008) suggest that an essential element of responsive regulation requires an understanding of specific industry characteristics including in-depth knowledge about industry culture and the various practices adopted by venue operators. However, Braithwaite (2002) in discussing responsive regulation for larger businesses asserts that a primary issue for non-compliance is not an intention by business operators to breach rules but rather an inability or incompetence to comply. Graham and Homel (2008, p.252) further suggest this “to be even more true for an industry that employs mostly casual, young and experienced staff”.

Educational model

The educational model is based upon the work of Robens during the early 1970s. The Robens Report (1972) recommended widespread reforms in the area of workplace health and safety. Most of these reforms have been adopted by State and Territory workplace safety regulators throughout Australia since 1985 and form the basis for the pending national harmonisation of workplace legislation commencing in most Australian States and Territories in 2012 (Safe Work Australia 2012). Robens (1972) suggested that the role of regulators must include a robust focus on industry education and advice. Within this model it was proposed that the regulator be a “consultant” to the “uninformed” business which is reliant upon guidance as to how it should comply with regulatory expectations (Robens Report 1972). Relevant to this study, the liquor regulator in Victoria (as do all other Australian regulators) publishes a number of guides for industry (VCGLR 2012a, 2012b, 2012c). For example, guidelines for responsible liquor advertising and promotions that provide standards for licensees (Victorian Department of Justice 2009b). The guide explains authority of the regulator to ban certain practices whilst also describing responsible approaches to advertising and promotion (Victorian Department of Justice 2009b). Similarly, the regulator recently re-developed intoxication guidelines to assist licensees serve alcohol responsibly (VCGLR 2012b). These guidelines explain signs of intoxication, the relevant legislative controls, how to prevent intoxication, and responding where an intoxicated person is detected (VCGLR 2012b).

Although theorists often distinguish between the three models, Sigler and Murphy (1991) argue that industry practices often combine these approaches depending on regulatory objectives and the behaviour of business or industry sectors.

Studies have shown that the effectiveness of strategies aimed at reducing the risk of alcohol-related violence such as responsible service of alcohol, liquor accords and community mobilisation is reliant upon a strong and timely enforcement component (Graham & Homel 2008; Miller et al. 2012; NDRI 2007; Trifonoff & Nicholas 2008). In part this is based upon strong evidence that legislation aimed at prohibiting irresponsible practices by venue operators is not always sufficient to encourage compliance, even with the threat of harsh penalties for breaches (Briscoe & Donnelly

2001; Trifonoff & Nicholas, 2008). This was highlighted by Miller et al. (2012) in discussion about the impact of mandatory conditions (Newcastle) compared to voluntary actions (Geelong) in minimise the risk of violence. In Miller's study (Miller et al. 2012) it was reported that informal conditions were more successful than voluntary activity.

Typically, primary regulation for nightclubs involves liquor licensing and town planning for the business operation (Graham and Homel 2008). There may also be specific controls upon individuals working at licensed premises such as security licensing for crowd controllers (Prenzler & Hayes 1998) and other regulatory influences including workplace health and safety responsibilities for all staff (Worksafe Victoria 2007).

3.1.1 Regulatory practices aimed at alcohol-related violence

Many countries (e.g. Australia, Canada, Denmark, UK, Finland, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, USA) have introduced a number of policy or regulatory interventions aligned with this study (Graham & Homel 2008; Hadfield 2006; Hobbs et al. 2003; Homel 1997; Stockwell 2010).

Crombie et al. (2005, p.2) argues that "The challenge for governments is to achieve a balance between the economic benefits, social and health benefits and the prevention of harm to individuals, communities and society". These interventions have evolved over time; however, the World Health Organisation (WHO) has grouped them into seven core elements:

1. education and information;
2. fiscal policy;
3. drink driving;
4. legislation;
5. controls on advertising;
6. safer drinking environment; and
7. services for heavy drinkers (Crombie et al. 2005).

Education

Education forms the basis for all alcohol policy (Graham & Homel 2008). However, there is little evidence to support the notion that education substantially impacts upon drinking behaviour by patrons in nightclubs, unless influenced by other internal venue factors such as staff serving behaviours (Graham 1985; Lupton 2005).

Fiscal policy

Fiscal policy involves the imposition of excise taxes on alcohol (Crombie et al. 2005). It is suggested that it may have some influence on consumption rates and therefore alcohol-related problems including violence (Crombie et al. 2005). Fiscal policy of most governments results in funding various community responses to alcohol-related problems and the impact upon health and other supportive resources. For example, Australia and New Zealand pricing policy has targeted low-alcohol beverages to make these drinks more attractive (MacLellan 2006). However, there is little evidence to support the notion that fiscal policy has a substantial impact upon consumption rates and alcohol-related problems, in particular where groups are interacting and drinking in nightclubs (Graham & Homel 2008). Chaloupka et al. (2002) reported that increases in the price of alcoholic beverages significantly reduces alcohol consumption. The study summarised economic research that has examined the impact of full price purchases of alcoholic beverages against drinking activity by teenagers and young adults. However, it was also reported that the upper 5% of heavy drinkers may not be responsive to price (Manning et al. 1995; Kenkel 1996). Of course, price differential has been attributed in part to preloading practices by patrons who consume alcoholic beverages prior to entering licensed premises (Borsari et al. 2007; Miller et al. 2012).

Drink driving

Compliance with drink driving laws through random breath testing (“booze buses”), high detection rates and severe penalties has impacted to some degree upon the likelihood of offending behaviour associated with alcohol abuse (Delaney et al. 2006). The study reviewed existing research into drink-driving enforcement within Australia and overseas and concluded that enforcement

efforts have contributed to a reduction in casualty crashes and the incidence of drink-driving. However, the research found there is a remaining group of drivers who are not influenced by enforcement strategies (Delaney et al. 2006). Industry polls suggest that few patrons in nightclubs are designated drivers and often utilise alternative forms of transport which means enforcement of drink driving laws has little impact upon venue-based alcohol abuse and related security problems. Of course, industry polls are unreliable and do not provide credible evidence although they are indicative, at least in the venues that conduct them, of general local trends. A number of drive driving programs have attempted to encourage anti drink driving including the Gold Coast City Council's "Skipper Program for Designated Drivers" that provides soft drinks to the designated driver of a group and encourages safe transport away from venues (Gold Coast City Council 2012). A similar program is offered within Geelong (Geelong Regional Liquor Licensing Accord 2007).

Legislation

Legislation aimed at controls on practices that encourage or facilitate violence amongst patrons has had some impact over time (Graham & Homel 2008). However, there is no clear data to suggest legislative measures alone will result in a reduction of alcohol-related violence, the unlawful presence of underage persons, service to intoxicated persons or other irresponsible venue practices such as prevention of overcrowding (Homel 2000). A review of the literature reveals limitations in this approach and a general move away from "strong" enforcement to a more cooperative or partnership approach through community mobilisation (Homel 2000) and other interventions such as lockouts, patron ID scanning and the like (Miller et al. 2012)

Advertising

Controls on advertising are a recent initiative in Australia (Victorian Department of Justice 2009b) and more prominent in Norway and Sweden where there is a greater prohibition on advertising, especially alcohol beverages containing more than 2.5% volume (Andreasson et al. 1999). Self-regulation or more liberal approaches in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom rely to a greater extent on codes of practice and industry/media advertising controls (Stockwell

2010). Interestingly, Sweden and Finland have introduced advertising restrictions to segregate alcohol and leisure activity in addition to limiting open access to alcohol at events where children might be present (Andreasson et al. 1999). It is reported this approach will impact upon the source of sponsorship, over time result in a cultural shift to more responsible consumption and minimise the potential for incidents that arise in connection with alcohol abuse (Andreasson et al. 1999).

Safer drinking environment

A safer drinking environment is proposed in most Western countries (Cunningham 2006; Graham & Homel 2008; MacWhirter 2009). A number of Australian regulators have introduced guidelines intended to assist with this objective (DoJ 2009; NSW Government 2009; OLGR Qld 2012; VCGLR 2012a, 2012b, 2012c). For example, in addition to licensing requirements such as the engagement of crowd controllers where there is live entertainment, the Victorian regulator introduced design guidelines in 2009 to facilitate improved safety for patrons and staff (VCGLR 2009). This tertiary source introduced principles and practices to “minimise antisocial behaviour and negative amenity impacts” (MacWhirter 2009) through the adoption of a number of design practices recommended in the literature (Graham & Homel 2008). The publication addressed external and internal issues as outlined in Figure 4.

External issues	Internal issues
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Entries, exits and queuing • Footpaths, laneways, car parks and public space 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Patron activity areas • Toilets • Outdoor drinking, dining and smoking areas • Common areas

Figure 4: Internal and external safety considerations

Source: Design Guidelines for Licensed Venues (Victoria)

Services for heavy drinkers

From a community health perspective it is reported that there is a need for early intervention on “heavy drinkers” (Lupton 2005). This approach is enhanced where there are adequately trained bar and service staff, the enforcement of legislative requirements on serving intoxicated persons, and broad community education (Lupton 2005).

It is suggested that the application of the seven interventions, appropriately introduced and enforced significantly impact upon the risk of violence (WHO 2004). These interventions form part of best practice discussions in Section 3.3.

In recent years Western societies have tended to align in their approaches to regulatory controls on licensed premises (Cunningham 2006). For example, recent regulatory interventions in the United Kingdom were introduced through a more comprehensive *Licensing Act 2003* (UK) and supported by the PubWatch programs (Cunningham 2006). The Act was introduced to effect a major change and liberalisation in the regulation of licensed premises across England and Wales although there has been concern raised about control and potential problem behaviours (Hadfield 2006; Hobbs et al. 2003). Legislators argued the Act was founded upon extensive community consultation and substantial political debate as it allowed for discretionary extended trading hours that could possibly impact upon adjacent residences and businesses (United Kingdom Parliament 2003). The new Act effectively provides a single licensing strategy under the control of local government for a more localised and focused liquor strategy (United Kingdom Parliament 2003). The Act also consolidates six established regulatory areas: sale of alcohol, public entertainment, theatres, cinemas, late night refreshment premises and night cafes into a single “premises licence” (*Licensing Act 2003* (UK)).

It was suggested that some of the former legislation dated back to Henry VIII (noise from Westminster alehouses) and did not reflect the thinking of a modern and vibrant society, in particular to regulate entertainment and late night venues (Home Office UK 2012). The objectives of the new Act included a strong focus on the prevention of crime, disorder and public nuisance whilst seeking to ensure public safety at licensed premises (United Kingdom Parliament 2003). These order and safety principles are reflected similarly throughout Australia whereby the police or neighbours can apply for restrictions on licensing conditions or oppose the continuation of a venue trading (see Table 1: Australian regulatory approaches to harm minimisation).

In New Zealand, the regulator is the Ministry of Justice. Pursuant to legislative authority an Alcohol Advisory Council of New Zealand (AACNZ) is required to report on relevant matters to the Minister for Health (*Sale of Liquor Act 1989* (NZ)). The primary objective of the Council is “to encourage and promote moderation in the

use of liquor, to discourage and reduce its misuse, and to minimise the personal, social, and economic consequences of the misuse of liquor” (ACCNZ 2005). The AACNZ argues that “liquor laws, while embodying principles to be applied consistently throughout the country should be sufficiently flexible to cope with changing social conditions and with specific requirements of local circumstances” (AACNZ, 2003, p.15). In particular, current thinking suggests that key stakeholders should be involved in the decision-making processes associated with granting and renewal of liquor licences as rates of violence and legislative breaches continue to increase (ACCNZ 2005).

Australian approaches to regulation of licensed premises has involved a substantial change in thinking about safety and security measures over recent years (Graham & Homel 2008). This has included mandatory requirements for problematic venues with higher levels of violence through the imposition of licence conditions in New South Wales (OLGR NSW 2008) and state-wide lockouts at 3am in Queensland (OLGR Qld 2008).

Early approaches to regulation sought to raise government revenue through licence fees and discourage abuse of alcohol and drunkenness but have been replaced (Stockwell 1994). In part early regulation was based upon little if any attempts to minimise risk or impose obligations upon licensees to improve safety or security strategies on their premises but rather to encourage profitability, the expansion of hospitality businesses, assist with tourism and respond to the diverse and often varying needs of the public (Davies 1978).

It was suggested that curbing of the potential for intoxication and alcohol-related harm were not historically seen as objectives to be addressed through liquor legislation but rather was the responsibility of each venue (Savas 1971). This approach is based upon perceptions of more than 30 years ago with a slow but clearly focused course of operational enhancements and risk minimisation principles implemented across the hospitality and liquor industry since, and articulated in contemporary legislation (Savas 1971). These principles are currently found in legislative objectives as outlined in Table 1.

Table 1: Australian regulatory approaches to harm minimisation

Jurisdiction	Primary Legislation	Regulator	Harm minimisation
Australian Capital Territory	Liquor Act 2010	Office of Regulatory Services – Dept of Justice and Community Safety	Objects of Act include “to minimise the harm associated with the consumption of liquor” s9(a)
New South Wales	Liquor Act 2007	Office of Liquor, Gaming and Racing	Objects of Act include “to minimise harm associated with misuse and abuse of liquor (including harm arising from violence and other anti-social behaviour)” s3(2)(a)
Northern Territory	Liquor Act	Licensing Commission, Dept of Justice	Objects of Act include “so as to minimise the harm associated with the consumption of liquor” s3(1)(a)
Queensland	Liquor Act 1992	Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation	Main purposes of Act include “minimising harm, and the potential for harm, from alcohol abuse and misuse and associated violence” s3(a)(i)
South Australia	Liquor Licensing Act 1997	Office of the Liquor and Gambling Commissioner	Objects of Act include “to encourage responsible attitudes towards the promotion, sale, supply, consumption and use of liquor, to develop and implement principles directed towards that end (the “responsible service and consumption principles”) and minimise the harm associated with the consumption of liquor” s3(1)(a)
Tasmania	Liquor Licensing Act 1990	Revenue, Gaming and Licensing Commission	Implied through s46A “Licensee to ensure responsible service of liquor”
Victoria	Liquor Control Reform Act 1998	Victorian Commission for Gaming and Liquor Regulation	Objects of Act include “to contribute to minimising harm arising from the misuse and abuse of alcohol” s4(1)(a)
Western Australia	Liquor Control Act 1988	Department of Racing, Gaming and Liquor	Objects of Act include “to minimise harm or ill-health caused to people, or any group of people, due to the use of liquor s5(1)(b)

Australian regulatory strategies

A number of Australian governments have introduced legislative responses to address alcohol-related violence with a particular focus on late night venue operations (see Table 1: Australian regulatory approaches to harm minimisation). Consistent with their legislative obligations, liquor licensing regulators have also imposed a number of liquor licence conditions on nightclubs and the publication of regulator-endorsed guidelines (VCGLR 2012a, 2012b, 2012c). In Victoria nightclubs have “high-risk” conditions attached to their liquor licence which include amenity considerations, surveillance cameras and engagement of security staff (Victorian Department of Justice 2009a). To encourage compliance with these conditions some nightclubs

implement strategies that include development of operating procedures or policies for their operation as encouraged by the industry regulator (VCGLR 2011).

Specific approaches to alcohol-related violence

Each jurisdiction in Australia has adopted different approaches to alcohol-related violence. Prominent activity has occurred in Queensland and New South Wales.

Queensland

Recent introductions include:

- Lockouts for all venues in Queensland from 3am;
- Drink safe precincts that include enhanced police responses, improved transport and traffic control, management of crowds including footpath queues, and collaborations between key stakeholders such as community groups, security, licensees and the police;
- Banning legislation that allow the courts to ban individuals from licensed premises as part of bail conditions or sentencing; and
- “Move on” powers for police who require people to leave an area and not return for a specified period of up to 24 hours (*Liquor Act 1992 (Qld)*).

The Queensland regulator also requires new liquor licence applicants and existing operations seeking a variation of their licence to provide the regulator with a Risk-Assessed Management Plan (RAMP) (OLGR Qld 2009). Amongst other things, the plan requires the applicant to provide information about the procedures and practices it will adopt to deal with unduly intoxicated and disorderly patrons on the premises, amenity including patron behaviour in and around licensed premises, and community and industry consultation (*Liquor Act 1992 (Qld) s. 51*).

New South Wales

The New South Wales “Safer nights out” publication was developed due to increasing concerns about alcohol-related antisocial behaviour and violence (NSW Government 2009). It was widely circulated for the guidance of all

licensees although alignment with the guidelines is voluntarily NSW Government 2009.. The publication suggests three separate safety activities for consideration:

1. Basic strategies, which are not required under legislation but are routinely considered to complement sound business operations;
2. Good practices, which are considered effective in addressing a range of safety related risks that are common to many types of licensed premises; and
3. Additional and extended strategies, which are potentially more complex and challenging and therefore may be applied to address significant risks specific to the circumstances of an individual venue, precinct or location (NSW Government 2009, p.2)

The guide identifies a number of the venue-related characteristics and factors that may contribute to alcohol-related violence. Areas for consideration by licensees include:

- access and egress;
- design and furnishing;
- presentation of the venue;
- entertainment and food service (where applicable);
- service behaviours of staff;
- patron characteristics;
- premises factors such as public transport, street safety and the like;
- density of licensed premises;
- compliance monitoring and enforcement by regulatory authorities; and
- cultural expectations by the community and industry (NSW Government 2009, pp.5-9)

For each of the above considerations, there is an elaboration in detail advising licensees and others responsible for the system of security at a venue how relevant factors are to be implemented.

The New South Wales regulator has also introduced a range of mandatory licence conditions for problem venues experiencing significant levels of violence over a 12 month period (OLGR NSW 2011). Once designated as a Level 1, 2 or 3 venue, special licence conditions are imposed (Rees 2008). The measures focus on anti-social drinking and alcohol-related violence and involve the regulator providing education and support in addition to conducting routine risk-based inspections as depicted in Table 2 (Rees 2008).

Table 2: Mandatory conditions for problem venues in NSW

Level 1 (19 or more incidents)	Level 2 (12-18 incidents)	Level 3 (8-11 incidents)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A mandatory 2 am lockout of patrons (except members of a registered club); • Cessation of alcohol service 30 minutes prior to close; • No glass containers to be used after midnight; • No shots and drink limit restrictions after midnight; • 10 minute alcohol sales time out every hour after midnight or active distribution of water and/or food; and • One or more additional security measures. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cessation of alcohol services 30 minutes prior to close. • No glass containers to be used after midnight. • 10 minute alcohol sales time out every hour after midnight or active distribution of water and/or food. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provided with additional support from the Office of Liquor, Gaming and Racing to strengthen alcohol and security management

Source: Adapted from information by OLGR NSW (2011)

From 1 January 2012 the New South Wales Government introduced a “three strikes and you’re out” scheme for consistently irresponsible venue operations (*Liquor Act 2007* (NSW) s102A). Venues that commit prescribed offences such as permitting intoxication, violent behaviour and illicit drug use on the premises will have their details entered on a public register (OLGR NSW 2011). Once an initial strike has been imposed conditions such as requirement for a plan of management, use of breakable plastic containers, RSA officers, and training can be mandated (Souris 2011). Where three strikes have been recorded the regulator

can impose a penalty including licence suspension for up to a year, licence cancellation, or disqualification of a licensee for a period of time (Souris 2011).

Like Queensland, the New South Wales legislation also provides for banning orders (*Liquor Act 2007* (NSW) s78), urgent closure for reasons of public safety (*Liquor Act 2007* (NSW) s82) and lockouts *Liquor Act 2007* (NSW) (s87).

Activity in other Australian jurisdictions includes the following strategies:

Australian Capital Territory

The Australian Capital Territory regulator provides a “Liquor Practice Manual” for the advice of all licensees, applicants for liquor licences and staff of the regulator in the interpretation and compliance of the *Liquor Act 2010* (ACT) (ORS 2011). Mandatory requirements under the Act that may impact upon the level of violence include:

- Responsible service of alcohol training (ss. 189 and 257);
- Compliance with and amending the Commissioner approved Risk Assessment Management Plan (RAMP) including arrangements relating to security (ss. 88-92); and
- Maintaining an incident register which details incidents of violence or anti-social behaviour in and around the venue, the ejection of patrons from the venue, medical assistance provided after midnight and before closing, and when false identification is seized (ss. 131-132).

Northern Territory

The Northern Territory Licensing Commission provides a range of publications that provides guidance to industry including:

- Code of practice to assist in the responsible promotion of alcohol;
- Behavioural signs of intoxication;
- Drink spiking;
- Camera surveillance; and
- Liquor tasting events (Northern Territory Licensing Commission 2008).

South Australia

The Office of the Liquor and Gambling Commissioner has introduced publications for industry about:

- Promoting the responsible supply and consumption of alcohol;
- Determining intoxication and managing disorderly behaviour;
- Introducing a precinct focussed radio network known as Street Link that allows for venues to share information about incidents and concerns;
- Introducing safe taxi ranks in Adelaide which include monitoring by security staff to minimise conflicts between persons seeking transport; and
- Conducting safety audits in the West End and East End of Adelaide to identify areas of risk including design and activity by persons (Office of the Liquor and Gambling Commissioner 2013).

Tasmania

The Department of Treasury and Gaming (Liquor and Gaming Branch) provide industry guidance about:

- Promoting responsible service of alcohol;
- Surveillance standards for venues operating between midnight and 5 am;
- Self-assessment checklist for licensees to ensure legislative compliance including issues relevant to security and documented procedures involving security activity; and
- Documented procedures for the barring of patrons (Department of Treasury and Gaming 2013).

Western Australia

The Department of Racing, Gaming and Liquor provides guidelines for:

- Responsible service of alcohol;

- Membership of licensee accords that are aimed, amongst other things, at minimising the risk of alcohol-related violence in and around licensed premises; and
- Nightclub self-assessment checklist that includes considerations to supervision and management, mandatory training, responsible service of alcohol, code of conduct and Venue Management Plan that includes security requirements (DRGL WA 2013).

Like Queensland and New South Wales, Victoria appears to have introduced a more extensive approach to anti-social behaviour including nightclub violence through licence conditions and various enforcement measures by both Victoria Police and the liquor regulator's Civil Compliance Unit including a 'star rating' system that effectively measured venue performance against compliance with a range of potential sanctions for problematic venues (VCGLR News Autumn 2012).

3.1.2 Regulation of licensed premises in Victoria

In Victoria licensed venues are currently regulated pursuant to the *Liquor Control (Reform) Act 1998* (Vic) through the Justice Department's Victorian Commission for Gambling and Liquor Regulation (VCGLR). Security staff, including crowd controllers operating at nightclubs, are regulated under the *Private Security Act 2004* (Vic) by the Victoria Police Licensing and Regulation Division. Other potential regulatory influences that can impact upon licensed premises include:

- Town planning;
- Building codes;
- Emergency services;
- Equal opportunity;
- Noise regulation;
- Occupational health and safety;
- Dangerous goods;
- Industrial relations;

- Workers compensation; and
- Tobacco and smoking.

In consideration of the purposes of this study, regulation of licensed premises and security staff are particularly relevant as both regulatory agencies have introduced strategies based upon concerns over excessive levels of violence (VCGLR 2012; Victoria Police LRD 2010).

Historically, changes to regulatory practices of the liquor industry have continued to be made over recent years (Graham and Homel 2008). A major review of the former *Liquor Control Act 1968* (Vic) occurred in 1986 (Nieuwenhusen 1986). The review specifically addressed issues of security and safety at licensed premises and determined there should be additional legislative focus on minimising alcohol misuse, abuse and related operational issues including violence by establishing a Co-ordinating Council to advise the Minister (Nieuwenhusen 1986).

A new Act was introduced, the *Liquor Control Act 1987* (Vic); however, it did not emphasise harm prevention but rather introduced the concept of “community interest” considerations as being relevant to venue licensing (Stockwell 1994). This meant that where operational problems arose with troublesome licensed premises, action was taken by the regulator based upon a community interest argument (VCCAV 1990b). Community interest action by the regulator often involved incidents of excessive drunkenness, acts of violence on or around the premises and regular amenity complaints including noise and disruption (Livingstone et al. 2010). Proceedings were heard and determined by the regulator, the then-named Liquor Licensing Commission pursuant to section 101 of the Act where a venue was required to show cause why a penalty should not be imposed (Liquor Control Reform Act 1998 Part 6).

Community interest activity by the regulator gained momentum after publication of a report by the Victorian Community Council Against Violence entitled “Inquiry into violence in and around licensed premises” (VCCAV 1990b). The VCCAV was a Victorian Government initiative and chaired by Ms Judith Dixon, a former politician with considerable expertise in community-based projects. In 1989 the Council was given the task of investigating and making recommendations to the Victorian Government about strategies to reduce levels of violence in and around licensed

premises (VCCAV 1990b). The VCCAV proposed violence at licensed premises was a “community interest” issue. Therefore, licensees were obliged to proactively minimise the risk of violence or face regulatory intervention (VCCAV 1990b).

The VCCAV initially examined the issue of patron violence; however, it soon became apparent that a substantial number of assaults were committed by bouncers or crowd controllers and other venue staff (Goldsmith 1989; VCCAV 1990b). This finding led to strategies being developed with a view to minimising violence by working with local traders to improve the reputation of the area; regulating crowd controllers through a police monitored licensing, training and enforcement regime; and addressing problems with patrons (VCCAV 1990b).

During submissions to the VCCAV about the activities of crowd controllers and patrons, it was asserted that up to 47% of violence committed in or around licensed premises was attributed to security staff (VCCAV 1990b). Comments such as “there are blokes who just use violence to get a means to an end” and “many a time problems have arisen from irresponsible, aggressive and uncooperative bouncers” were commonplace (VCCAV 1990b, p. 17).

Following its public consultations, the VCCAV recommended regulation of crowd controllers along similar lines to other sectors of the security industry (VCCAV 1990b). Key recommendations were:

1. Licensing of all crowd controllers whether employed in-house (proprietary) or through a security firm (contract);
2. Disqualification of persons with prior assault and drug trafficking convictions within the past 10 years;
3. Wearing of identification to ascertain staff identity after an incident. This strategy was believed to introduce a further layer of accountability;
4. Signing on and off duty in an Incident Register to add further accountability; and
5. Accredited training (VCCAV 1990b).

The Victorian Government accepted the various recommendations and amended the then applicable legislation *Private Agents Act 1966* (Vic) to introduce a system for occupational licensing of persons employed as crowd controllers. Section 3 of the Act defined a crowd controller as “any person who is paid principally to maintain order at any public place”. This included any licensed premises or any place where the public had access irrespective of whether an admission price was paid. In addition, persons convicted of drug trafficking or assault within the previous 10 years were disqualified from licensing and included any offence involving violence or the potential for violence such as stalking, domestic violence or serious threatening behaviour, whether related to security work or not (*Private Agents Act 1966*). It was perceived that by removing undesirables performing crowd control duties the rate of violence would be reduced (VCCA 1990b).

The impact of regulation for security staff proved problematic (Homel 2002). This was evidenced by the minimal withdrawal of persons with a violent history working at licensed premises as many venues employed disqualified security staff as “duty managers” or “promotions staff” (Prenzler & Hayes 1998). This has also been evidenced in other jurisdictions. For example, a recent media report about a police operation in Hobart suggested around 50 per cent of crowd controllers working in nightclubs were unlicensed and in many cases were ineligible for licensing based upon adverse criminal history (eNews 2006). Although media reports need to be regarded with some scepticism as it does suggest that there may be an issue with implementation of regulations regarding criminal records of security staff.

Similar experiences have been noted in other jurisdictions including the United Kingdom (UK Parliament 1998). In 1998 during a Parliamentary discussion on the introduction of national standards through legislation for door supervisors, Dr Phyllis Starkey argued there were ongoing problems with regulation of security staff at the local level including prohibiting undesirables from entering or remaining in the industry (UK Parliament 1998).. An example, proposed by Dr Starkey involved a survey of 476 crowd controllers in Merseyside where it was revealed that three had murder and manslaughter convictions; two were out on bail; 32 had weapons and firearms convictions; and 101 had convictions for assault (UK Parliament 1998, p. 353). Dr Starkey proposed that national legislation would overcome the weaknesses in

local schemes of over 100 councils attempting to regulate local security staff with notable inconsistencies in backgrounds checks of applicants and training (UK Parliament 1998, p. 354).

In Victoria revised legislation for the security industry, the *Private Security Act 2004* (Vic) was enacted to address ongoing concerns about security staff and levels of alleged criminality by introducing additional provisions to prohibit persons convicted or charged with prescribed offences (*Private Security Act 2004* (Vic) ss. 25-26). New South Wales introduced similar legislation, with both jurisdictions reporting immediate results on eligibility of some individuals to work as a crowd controller or security guard (Houlihan 2007). In 2006, Victoria disqualified 500 crowd controllers and security guards, with New South Wales disqualifying 221 for the same period (Houlihan 2007). Relevant serious criminal offences where crowd control licence holders were convicted included rape, manslaughter, armed robbery, drug trafficking and assault (Houlihan 2007).

In 1998, a newly structured *Liquor Control (Reform) Act 1998* (Vic) was introduced. The objectives of the Act included a focus on harm minimisation arising from misuse and abuse of alcohol (s. 3). This was thought to improve controls on supply and consumption, ensuring the supply of alcohol and premises does not disrupt community life including the restriction of supply as required, to facilitate diversity of licensed premises that reflect community expectations and to contribute to the responsible development of the liquor and hospitality industries (*Liquor Control (Reform) Act 1998* (Vic)).

The Act, like most comparable legislation and jurisdictions, seeks to regulate venues and proscribe certain behaviours by licensees and staff (*Liquor Control (Reform) Act 1998* (Vic)). However, it does not specifically address the issue of security albeit the regulator imposes conditions on venues, not necessarily the actions of individuals relating to security activity (VCGLR 2012). This suggests that the activities of hospitality staff generally remain unregulated other than for mandatory training in responsible serving of alcohol (RSA) for designated staff and pre-licensing training for crowd controllers (*Liquor Control (Reform) Act 1998* (Vic); *Private Security Act 2004* (Vic)). The RSA training is usually a condition of a venue liquor licence, in particular for high-risk licensed premises (VCGLR 2012). There remains an absence

of competency requirements for operators of venues, managers and supervisors other than the mandatory one day licensees 'First Step' training course (VCGLR 2012d).

This regulatory approach suggests a system of security for any nightclub may lack minimum security requirements other than those considered essential for regulatory or legislative compliance or that may be influenced by industry or regulator published materials such as the Venue Management Guidelines (VCGLR 2011). This anomaly is discussed further in the remaining parts of this chapter.

3.2 Systems of security and nightclubs

Since 1990, various practices have been introduced into nightclub operations based upon public and private sector activities throughout Australia (Prenzler & Hayes 1998). Firstly, the VCCAV made recommendations to the Victorian Government to reduce the level of violence in and around licensed premises through various interventions including regulation of crowd controllers, community mobilisation and increased activity by regulators (VCCAV 1990b). As discussed in Section 3.1, these recommendations became the basis for a regulatory framework that included the licensing and training of crowd controllers in Victoria as nightclubs were prominent in violence data (VCCAV 1990b). Since the Victorian initiative, each Australian State and Territory has introduced a similar regulatory framework for security staff (eGovernment Resource Centre 2008).

It appears that increased accountability including developments in litigation has further contributed to improvements in nightclub security systems with a greater focus on preventative rather than reactive strategies (Graham & Homel 2008). Various security practices have been specifically mandated by some regulators and various initiatives by venues although Graham and Homel (2008, p.196) suggest that "Most of these efforts have not been formally documented, fewer still have been evaluated and only a handful have been evaluated with sufficient rigour to draw conclusions about the effectiveness".

Below I will discuss systems of security generally and approaches to security in nightclub operations. This will include how elements of those systems can potentially

impact upon the risk of violence. This section of the chapter is divided into four subsections:

1. Systems of security;
2. Influences on the development of a system of security;
3. Nightclub systems of security; and
4. Common elements in a nightclub security system.

In discussing systems of security in a crowd control environment and various elements within these systems, reference is made to secondary and tertiary sources. There are no reported studies or peer reviewed articles (primary sources) on this subject. Although there is a large body of knowledge about the various interventions to minimise the risk of alcohol-related violence, the interventions have not addressed specific security or safety factors that might comprise or be introduced into a nightclub system of security other than recent interventions involving lockouts and patron ID scanning (Miller et al. 2012). A core aim of this study is to overcome this anomaly.

3.2.1 Systems of security

Systems of security are typically explained in the public domain such as the Australian Government's Protective Security Manual (Commonwealth Attorney General 2005) and the Standards Australia publication AS4421:2011 Guards and Patrols. Contributions have also emanated from the private sector and generally involve guidance materials from industry associations including the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) and the Australian Security Industry Association Ltd (ASIAL). There have also been collaborations between public and private entities that are relevant to this study such as the New York Police Department and the New York Nightlife Association (NYNA 2007) and the previously mentioned Westend Forum (Dixon 1998). These materials can influence the structure and features of a nightclub system of security as described below. However, as outlined above the various approaches to security discussed in this section and introduced across the security sector are not based upon studies including evaluations as to their effectiveness. Rather, such practices have evolved over time as to what appears to work in establishing a secure environment (Graham & Homel 2008).

Australian Government's Protective Security Manual

The Protective Security Manual outlines government policy, standards and guidelines in protective security environments. Although application of the guidance provided in the manual generally applies to high-risk government departments, it is often referenced by private sector security providers protecting high-risk public operations such as embassies, airports and intelligence agencies to ensure their systems of security meet government standards (Commonwealth Attorney General 2005).

The Protective Security Manual contains, amongst other things, guidance about:

- The security control environment which addresses appropriate allocation of responsibility and accountability for protective security staff, security policy and procedure manuals, and training of staff with a security responsibility;
- Security risk management including the process for risk reviews in a changing security environment, formal planning that details the treatment of identified risks;
- Security control measures that range from risks in the classification of information, controls over documentation, and methods for recording of visitors and staff access; and
- Security monitoring and reporting processes such as workplace surveillance, use of protective technology, and incident recording and reporting systems (Barrett 2001)

AS4421:2011 Guards and Patrols

This recently released standard revised the 1996 publication and reflects contemporary practices in the Australian security industry (Standards Association of Australia, Committee EL-031, Intruder Alarm Equipment and Installations 2011). Although this standard is not specifically structured for crowd control operations it can assist in the development of a system of security whether proprietary (in-house) or contract (security firm).

The standard comprises four sections:

1. Scope and general – outlines the scope of the document, references and definitions;
2. Governance – includes considerations relevant to insurance, premises, contracted work, standard operating procedures, organisation of information, contracts and quality management;
3. Terms of employment – provides guidance about staff selection, terms of employment, security licensing, identification, uniform, equipment and training; and
4. Operations – outlines functions of an operations control room, communication methods, record-keeping, and various security strategies (SAI Global 2011).

Industry associations

Membership of industry associations is generally optional in both the hospitality and security industry however, Queensland (*Security Providers Act 1993* (Qld) ss. 10(3)(B), 21A) and Victoria (*Private Security Act 2004* (Vic) s. 26(3)) have introduced mandatory schemes for membership of approved industry associations by security firms (OFT Qld 2008). The New South Wales security industry regulator mandated industry association membership by security firms until 2011 when it was decided to revoke the requirement as the jurisdiction moves from a co-regulatory model in favour of the NSW Police assuming a principal regulatory role (NSW Police Force SLED 2011). At the time of writing this thesis other domestic jurisdictions have not introduced the requirement and in any event, there has been no requirement for industry association membership where there is an “in-house” security team such as security staff employed directly by a nightclub (OFT Qld 2008). Benefits of industry association membership include adherence with an industry-based Code of Practice, adoption of good business practices, submission to an industry-based complaints management system, and participation in professional development activities such as industry-based training (OFT Qld 2008; Prenzler & Sarre 1998).

The two prominent industry associations active in Australia are the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) and the Australian Security Industry

Association Ltd (ASIAL) (OFT Qld 2008). Both organisations provide general information to their members based upon security risk management practices contained within the Protective Security Manual and AS4421:2011 (ASIAL 2013; ASIS 2013). These materials do not provide sufficient detail about the specific elements or features a venue operator or security provider may need to consider to achieve a reduction in violence however, the associations provide advice about governance and structure associated with commercial security operations (ASIAL 2013; ASIS 2013).

New York collaboration

The New York publication “Best practices for nightlife establishments” collaboration provides guidelines for venue operators in the development of documented policies, employee probity checks, and establishment of appropriate relationships with the local police. However, the guidelines are generic and do not provide specific detail about how elements or features of a security system might be identified or operationalised including those that may impact upon the risk of violence (NYNA 2007).

Other work environments

Practices in like environments such as healthcare, gaming and critical infrastructure security can also provide guidance in system development as discussed below.

As outlined in the glossary, a “system” is defined as “a group of interacting, interrelated, or interdependent elements forming a complex whole”, while a “system of security” is defined as “a system involving ‘security’ strategies that typically comprise a security management plan, physical security resources, personnel, standard operating procedures, and a strategy for system review”.

Typically, a system of security for any business involves the protection of relevant assets, these being people, property and proprietary information (Fischer & Green 2003). Fischer and Green (2003) have authored several editions of a text book “Introduction to Security” over many years however, it is not a scholarly book but rather a generic industry guide influenced by industry bodies. For example, the text does not contain information about nor critically reviews studies or other relevant

work in the security sectors. The text provides generic information that assists in understanding a security system and general components such as physical security, access control and the like in an industrial setting (Fischer & Green 2003). There is little context applicable for the development of a nightclub security system which requires an in-depth focus on people-related risks including aggression and violence albeit formalised systems of security area encouraged (Fischer & Green 2003; Worksafe Victoria 2007).

From the findings of the VCCAV in 1990, it is well recognised that human activity forms the basis for an effective system of security in nightclubs (VCCAV 1990b). According to Talbot and Miles (2008), an appropriate framework that includes awareness of security risks will result in an appropriate security culture throughout the organisation. They reported that “once people become aware of the threats it is in their nature to react to it” by seeking to solve or treat risks (threats) to the organisation or its people (Talbot & Miles 2008, p. 16).

Professor James Reason has published on systemic issues, including human error, since the 1980s (Reason 1990). Much of his work has focused on “high reliability” organisations such as air traffic control centres, nuclear power plants and the medical domain. Reason contends that a “safety culture is an informed culture” and considering the similarities between safety and security there are persuasive reasons for the adoption of Reason’s arguments (Reason 1990, p. 767).

Reason (2000, p.768) argues that “the human error problem can be viewed in two ways: the person approach and the system approach”. The person approach relates to errors by individuals such as deviating from common practices based upon carelessness, recklessness or negligence. The system approach accepts there is human fallibility associated with work activity. This means errors are consequences not causes and defences need to be built into the system of work (Reason 2000). Further, Reason (2000) suggests method for managing human errors distinguishes between the two approaches. The person approach focuses on human behaviour through training or the introduction of refined or new procedures. The system approach relies on defences or features that avoid reliance on human discretion. This could include technological innovation such as an alarm with a strict response strategy rather than allowing for individual choice or discretion as a reaction (Reason 2000).

Central to Reason's assertions is the importance of an "informed culture" among the workforce hence

those who manage, operate and apply the security system have current knowledge about the human, technical, organisational and environmental factors that determine the effectiveness of that system as a whole. (Talbot & Miles, 2008, p.62)

Reason also proposes that the following four sub-cultures contribute to an informed culture:

- Reporting culture for incidents involving workplace errors or near misses;
- Just culture where blame is suitably attributed for workplace incidents;
- Flexible culture where people are able to adapt to immediate workplace changes; and
- Learning culture where workers are able to convert the lessons learned from workplace activity into workplace system enhancements.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) support "Human interactions within a system often are the hardest to predict and is usually the root cause of many costly risks" (Perera, 2010, p.16).

Within the Australian security industry, it is commonly recognised that "human factors" are the weakest link and often attributed to systemic failures (Wolpert 2007). Human factors include excessive workload, a lack of situational awareness, inattention to various roles and responsibilities, fatigue, incompetence, stress, aging, poor communication, distractions and the various impacts of design or workplace activity (Worksafe Victoria 2003). These weaknesses are also reflected in many other occupations or professions including those identified as high risk such as policing, military operations and the various essential services professions and, as Wolpert (2007, p.46) contends, "most organisations are *typical* and therefore have system deficiencies not *effective*" as indicated in the structure shown in Figure 5.




Figure 5: Typical and effective work systems

Adapted and modified from Wolpert 2007

From an operational security perspective and the application of common security principles, lessons can be learned from other work systems (Worksafe Victoria 2007). It has been suggested that there are ongoing fallibilities in the nightclub environment where many systemic problems will be difficult to avoid (Graham & Homel 2008; Worksafe Victoria 2007). These include specific characteristics of crowd control such as the casual nature of employment, the relative immaturity of operational staff, and problems regarding competence of supervisors and managers to ensure best practice is introduced in the system (Graham & Homel 2008).

Nightclub systems typically comprise access control, compliance with any conditions attached to a liquor licence, monitoring patrons, removing individuals for unacceptable behaviour and incident reporting (Worksafe Victoria 2007).

3.2.2 Influences on the development of a system of security

Three key factors influence the development and implementation of a system of security for any workplace. They are:

1. Laws specific to the workplace such as for Victorian nightclubs in this study the *Liquor Control Reform Act 1998* (Vic) as they are licensed premises. Licensed premises also have liquor licence conditions that are mandated

pursuant to the Act or subordinate Regulations and, as outlined above, high-risk conditions that are applicable to nightclubs (VCGLR 2012d);

2. Other relevant regulatory, statutory or legal influences including occupational health and safety, contracts or arrangements between parties, trade practices, anti-discrimination legislation, security regulation, planning permits, and the like (Prenzler & Sarre 2008; VCGLR 2012d; Worksafe Victoria 2007); and
3. Common industry practice such as application of standards and industry guidelines (Prenzler & Sarre 2008; VCGLR 2012d; Worksafe Victoria 2007). Common industry practice can also be founded upon information gained through community mobilisation as generally evidenced through Accords that result in enhancements or adjustments to the system (VCGLR 2012c).

The following is an elaboration of these three key factors as relevant to this study and research question.

Liquor laws

Each Australian State and Territory has legislation that regulates the supply and consumption of alcohol at licensed premises. The legislation also expressly or implicitly requires some attention to security. For example, the *Liquor Control Reform Act 1998* (Vic) provides that licensees:

- Take note and align with objects of the Act relating to harm minimisation and avoidance of risk associated with supply and consumption of alcohol (s4). This includes a mandate that undesirables are not permitted to enter or remain on the premises;
- Take steps external to the licensed premises that protect the “amenity” of the local environment. “Amenity” means the quality of an area is “pleasant and agreeable” (s3A(1)). Nightclub operators typically have queue control, patrols during a night’s trading, and crowd dispersion methods on cessation of trade;
- Comply with the venue liquor licence and any conditions that might be attached to such licence. Nightclubs are typically licensed as “late night” operations, have mandatory patron capacities and high-risk conditions automatically imposed that include, when live or recorded amplified music is

provided, appropriate camera surveillance, erection of signs advising patrons about the surveillance system, and employment of crowd controllers that aligns with the industry *span of control* (VCGLR 2012d); and

- In addition to complying with general requirements such as the responsible serving of alcohol (s26 and s108), not serve underage (s123), prevent the presence of intoxicated violent or quarrelsome persons in licensed premises (s114), and ensure that they comply with any additional conditions attached to a liquor licence such as a mandatory lockout (s58B).

Other regulatory and legal influences

There are a number of other regulatory and legal influences that encourage venues to introduce and maintain an appropriate system of security. Central is workplace safety as prescribed by Occupational Health and Safety law. Duties are typically owed by employers and employees to take reasonable care for the safety and welfare of others including staff and patrons (Worksafe Victoria 2007).

The hospitality industry in Victoria is the single largest employer of young and inexperienced workers (Worksafe Victoria 2006). According to the Victorian Worksafe Regulator many of the injuries that occur in this industry are preventable (Worksafe Victoria 2007). Occupational violence is specifically addressed as a workplace risk due to the type of work that includes dealing with patrons who might be affected by alcohol or other drugs (Worksafe Victoria 2006). This resulted in the development of a Guide entitled “Prevention of Bullying and Violence at Work” (2003) followed by an industry-specific Guide entitled “Crowd control at venues and events: a practical occupational health and safety guide” (2006, 2007). The crowd control guide is discussed further in this section.

Other Australian States and Territories have similar approaches to hospitality operations including Workcover New South Wales which published a supervisors training manual in 2003 for the hospitality industry. The manual contains guidance for managing security issues and violence including triggers for

aggression and methods for managing aggressive behaviours (Workcover NSW, 2003).

Legislative requirements for the licensing of security staff can also influence a nightclub system of security. For example, the *Private Security Act 2004* (Vic) amongst other things requires individuals performing any crowd control function to be licensed. A pre-licensing requirement is training and successful completion of a nationally recognised Certificate II course (Victoria Police LRD 2010). Once licensed, crowd controllers operating at any workplace must display suitable identification, complete an incident register, and sign on and off duty. Inappropriate or previous criminal behaviour by applicants can prohibit an individual from licensing and therefore operating as a crowd controller (Healey 2006).

It is often suggested that the threat of litigation or prosecution can also impact upon various activities including security practices in nightclubs and has assisted in the development of a more proactive approach to security and safety strategies (Graham & Homel 2008). Litigation is typically based upon allegations of negligence where plaintiffs (persons initiating a civil action) seek compensation for breach of a particular duty owed by the venue or in many cases the contract security firm through its staff (Prenzler & Sarre 2008). Trends including the number of personal injury cases involving nightclubs revealed little noticeable change, with a major law firm still receiving an average of two enquiries each week in Victoria (Woolacott 2006). Although this is not evidence for the purposes of this study, the information discloses a trend worthy of future consideration relevant to risk assessments in nightclub operations.

Common industry practice

Common industry practice often aligns with industry specific standards and guidelines, usually within the jurisdiction (Worksafe Victoria 2006). Recommended practices may also be made known through membership of industry associations, newsletters circulated by the regulator or industry representatives, or between stakeholders such as other nightclub operators (ASIAL 2012; VCGLR 2012).

Although there is an absence of standards or guidance materials in Western jurisdictions about nightclub systems of security, generic standards have been developed in the United Kingdom for door staff and guidelines for nightlife establishments in the United States (Hobbs 2003). However, these standards and guidelines do not detail elements of a nightclub system of security that are relevant to violence or provide guidance to minimise violence generally. As discussed above, most security practices at nightclubs are influenced by regulators with a particular focus on liquor licensing conditions and licensing of security staff.

The UK Standard, entitled “BS 7960:1999 – British Standard Code of Practice for Door Supervisors / Stewards” provides recommendations for the infrastructure, staffing, operation and management of organisations. It was released in 1999 and according to the British Standards Institute applies to about 100,000 persons performing crowd control duties across the United Kingdom (British Standards Institute 1999).

The Standard does not provide detail about routine operational activity such as staff induction, span of control, management of difficult people or controlling violence. Compliance with the Standard is not compulsory nor aligned with conditions that might be attached to the nightclub liquor licence (Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit 2003).

The absence of appropriate standards or guidelines means industry looks to other industry sectors for guidance such as occupational health and safety in relevant sectors, comparable security standards elsewhere such as the Australian Standard for Healthcare Security (AS4485.1 & 2 – 1997) or to the literature.

Similarly, Australia does not have a Standard for nightclub security although there are guidelines for crowd control developed by the Victorian workplace safety regulator and discussed below (Worksafe Victoria 2006). Further, the Victorian liquor regulator recently introduced guidelines for venue management plans (VCGLR 2011).

Frequently venue operators seek the assistance of security firm providers or consultants who specialise in the area to assist with the development of a security

system (Worksafe Victoria 2006). Where there are no guidelines relating to the competence of persons providing advice or developing a system, there is inconsistency that can then lead to the development of “different” systems (Fisher & Green 2003; VCGLR 2012d).

Victorian Workcover Authority Guidelines

Early 2006 saw intervention by the Victorian Workcover Authority (VWA) in the crowd control sector based upon an increased number of incidents reported by security staff at nightclubs and other licensed venues (WorkSafe Victoria 2006). The VWA sought to improve security and safety in licensed premises by developing guidelines in crowd control (WorkSafe Victoria 2006). The VWA consulted widely with the crowd control sector of the security industry in developing generic materials for the information of persons associated with crowd control (WorkSafe Victoria 2006).

The VWA perceived there were substantial deficiencies in both knowledge and motivation in the identification and development of suitable security strategies, particularly in late-night operations. The project to develop guidance materials commenced early 2006 and involved widespread industry consultations including forums and workshops (Worksafe Victoria 2006). An industry expert panel was established with representatives from employer and union groups, security industry, hotel and nightclub associations, Victoria Police, security and liquor industry regulators, and the author (WorkSafe Victoria, 2006, p.42).

The project was aimed at making the workplace safer for patrons and security staff as they were seen at the frontline of workplace risks including aggression and violence (Martin 2006). Further, it was anticipated that the introduction of guidelines would assist in reducing the range of violent and unsafe incidents common to the workplace (WorkSafe Victoria 2006). The project was conducted over eight months and resulted in publication of guidance materials to assist key stakeholders address general issues relevant to a system of security. A particular emphasis was placed on informing host employers (persons using crowd controllers such as a nightclub operator) and security firms (persons hiring out crowd controllers to host employers) (WorkSafe Victoria 2006).

The VWA guidance materials focused primarily on the risk of violence in four core areas of controlling entry; monitoring and communication on crowd and individual behaviour; engaging potentially aggressive, abusive or violent behaviour; and physically managing aggressive, abusive or violent behaviour (WorkSafe Victoria 2006). The guidance materials also highlighted the importance of a safety and security risk assessment in the development of a system of security and work (WorkSafe Victoria 2006). The VWA project leader contended that “This document is all about challenging the industry. Change needs to occur as the current practices need review” (Howard 2006).

A second edition was released by the VWA in 2007. These materials continue to be utilised by industry today, although they provide recommendations and general considerations relating to systems of work in a crowd control context and not mandatory elements that might encourage best practice strategies (WorkSafe Victoria 2007).

Physical design of premises

Studies report that design has a substantial impact upon the potential for disruption, aggression and in many circumstances violence although there is no direct link to suggest that physical features cause violence (Graham & Homel 2008; St. John-Brooks 1998). It is often asserted that good design features minimise the opportunity for crime and violent behaviour and conversely that bad design such as unattractive, poorly maintained and deficiencies in layout can lead to a higher incidence of violence (Graham & Homel 2008; Macintyre & Homel 1997; Pernanen 1991). In October 1993 the Pear Tree Hotel in Greater Manchester (London) was closed due to a protracted history of violent incidents. It was later re-opened after a complete re-design and change of trading name. The hotel attracted a different, less aggressive patronage, experienced a major downturn in violent incidents and was later acknowledged as a “model” venue by the regulator and local community (St. John-Brooks 1998). Central was physical design, re-branding for a “new” identity, and change of patronage (St. John-Brooks 1998). Changes in crowd management were evident which tends to support the importance of physical design and venue management practices to

reduce violence (St. John-Brooks 1998). This was also discussed by the VCCAV in 1990 and by a number of researchers subsequently (Graham & Homel 2008).

From a security and safety perspective the underlying principle for good design is openness allows for clear observations to be maintained by staff throughout the venue (Liquor Licensing Commission Victoria 2007; Sutton et al. 2008). Linked to this underlying principle is the concept of natural surveillance, i.e., individuals are able to monitor most activity that occurs in or around the premises and hence the design can act as a deterrent, as detection for inappropriate behaviour is increased (Macintyre & Homel 1997).

Other studies suggest that where patrons are generally uncomfortable through poor ventilation, a layout that creates crowd crossing or bottlenecks with bumping or shoving, and an over-crowded area that can irritate or frustrate patrons increases the risk of violence and other crime (Graham & Homel 1997; Macintyre & Homel 1997). In addition, St. John-Brooks (1998) asserts that insufficient bar serving areas creating crowding or excessive delays, overheating or excessive sound or lighting, poor-quality fittings that can be damaged, and inappropriate placement of equipment do little to minimise the risk of violence. Interestingly, it has been suggested that patrons tend to drink more and accelerate their rate of consumption when discomfort is present which then leads to issues relating to drunkenness as outlined above (Felson et al. 1997). In a study by Homel et al. (2004) into the design and layout of licensed premises it was reported that suitable lighting, comfortable tables and chairs, appropriate ventilation, general cleanliness including female toilets all had a positive impact upon patron behaviour and led to a reduction in violence (Homel et al. 2004).

Venue operators often have to decide between a traditional or an open floor plan design (Liquor Licensing Commission Victoria 2007; VCCAV 1990b; Worksafe Victoria 2007). A traditional floor plan commonly involves two or three bars in an area appears to be more popular as it allows patrons to experience variations of atmosphere in the venue through separation including rest (Liquor Licensing Commission Victoria 2007). This often reduces boredom and unnecessary distraction from potentially damaging social activity (Graham & Homel 2008; Homel et al. 2004). The disadvantage of a traditional approach is that direct and

ongoing observation by venue staff is limited, even with the best placed surveillance system, convex mirrors and strategic patrols (Liquor Licensing Commission Victoria 2007; Homel et al. 2004), whereas an open area allows for “natural surveillance” which assists in both proactive and reactive security measures to incidents (Licensing Commission Victoria 2007; Homel et al. 2004).

Proactive measures allow for early intervention which can limit the potential escalation of an incident involving other patrons (Licensing Commission Victoria 2007; Worksafe Victoria 2007). However, an open plan design can impact upon the privacy needs of some patrons who may prefer a secluded area for themselves and their friends (Licensing Commission Victoria 2007). It can also result in an escalation of an incident or in a change in crowd mood where an act of aggression is in full view of most patrons (Licensing Commission Victoria 2007; St. John-Brooks 1998). It is reported that a combination of open plan design using physical barriers or creating a perception of space differential such as through carefully placed fixed mesh partitions can achieve sufficient division of areas to create an impression of activity segregation with patrons and yet allow for ongoing observations by venue staff (Graham & Homel 2008; Macintyre et al. 1997; MacWhirter 2009).

MacWhiter (2009) suggests that design features need to incorporate lines of sight for staff to directly monitor high activity and risk areas. This means bar and other venue staff should not have to physically turn to monitor areas but generally look forward to be facing entrances and exits, high traffic areas, dance floors, toilet entrances and the like (MacWhiter 2009). Similarly, the various static positions for security staff should also be selected to ensure enhanced monitoring through direct lines of sight (Worksafe Victoria 2007). Some areas are statistically a higher risk inside a venue. For example, estimates suggest that up to 50% of incidents occur in or around toilets hence the need for design measures and strategic placement of staff to be incorporated into a collective venue security strategy (St. John-Brooks 1998). Dance floors and other areas where there is the potential for bumping and stranger interactions also require a primary focus of security staff (Homel et al. 2004; Licensing Commission Victoria 2007; Worksafe Victoria 2007).

A recent publication by the Victorian Department of Justice highlighted the importance of design and how it can facilitate improved safety for patrons of licensed venues (MacWhirter 2009). The guidelines explained good design practices that included considerations to:

- Entries, exits and queuing;
- Footpaths, laneways and car parks;
- Dance floors, bar areas and circulation space;
- Outdoor drinking, dining and smoking areas; and
- Lighting, climate and noise (MacWhirter 2009)

The Department of Justice (Victoria) document proposes that violence reduction can be achieved through shared responsibilities such as those recently evidenced in community initiatives and Accords that involve key stakeholders including venue operators, security staff, police and the local community (DoJ 2009a). Of course, this tertiary source comprises opinion and various views of industry stakeholders. It is not based upon evidence albeit some of the content aligns with studies on venue design and the risk of incidents including violence (Graham & Homel 2008).

Community initiatives and accords

Although individual nightclub operators have achieved some success in minimising the level of violence at individual venues, the early 1990s saw a change in thinking for nightclub security systems throughout Australia (VCCA 1990b). This was partly influenced by work in the area of problem oriented policing in the USA and UK (Goldstein 1990; VCCA 1990). Problem-oriented policing saw changes to policing in the early 1980s in which reactive activity by law enforcement personnel was replaced with the development of community-based strategies aimed at prevention of problems such as alcohol-related violence (Lang et al. 1998). This approach placed less reliance on use of the criminal justice system including law enforcement and an increased focus on key stakeholders such as local businesses contributing to the reduction of a particular problem (Goldstein 1979).

In the area of entertainment where there was often a cluster of nightclubs and other licensed premises, there was a noticeable shift toward precinct-specific or localised strategies through community mobilisation that involved licensee Accords (Graham & Homel 2008; Miller et al. 2012). This shift meant that localised problems were addressed at the local level rather than the traditional expectation that law enforcement and other government agencies would tackle anti-social behaviour and other venue or precinct-related problems through criminal justice processes including prosecutions (Lang et al. 1998). The shift also saw a change in liquor licensing strategies with a more proactive form of regulation (Graham & Homel 2008). This shift encouraged participation by licensees in liquor Accords and the adoption of good practices to minimise antisocial behaviour in conjunction with other Accord members (Graham & Homel 2008; Rundle 2005).

Community mobilisation programs have continued to grow in most Western societies (Graham & Homel 2008). These programs include PubWatch, Nightsafe, Clubsafe and Town Centre Management in the UK (St. John-Brooks 1998). In the US the NYPD in collaboration with the New York Nightlife Association introduced the best practice guide as discussed above (NYNA 2007). Canada introduced similar safety programs including the Safer Bars Programs (Graham & Homel 1997) and Sweden implemented a number of Safe Community projects (Room 2003).

In Australia collaborative efforts such as Accords have been introduced in each State and Territory to minimise risk and address local community problems including violence (Doherty & Roche 2003). It has been suggested the Accords were established as an alternative to inadequate legal regulation of licensed premises and burgeoning violence problems (Hauritz et al. 1998b). Lang and Rumbold (1997) report to minimise violence and other anti-social behaviours it is important for licensees, police, local council officers and others in the area such as transport operators to meet and address local issues at the local level. The projects essentially involve identifying issues of concern in a particular locality, considering the range of response options to impact upon those concerns, and then empowering local communities to minimise or eliminate the concerns

(Giesbrecht 1992; Hauritz et al. 1998b; Homel et al. 1994). Many of these projects have a formal evaluation stage that often results in a refinement of the initial plan and introduces new innovations such as development of training for licensees (Lang et al. 1998). Some studies have shown substantial reductions in local problems such as violence. For example, Rumbold et al. (1998) reported Geelong's assault rate declined to 63% of the pre-intervention violence rate when compared to other Victorian metropolitan areas. In 2012, the Victorian liquor regulator published Forum and Accord Guidelines to encourage further voluntary participation within local communities in addressing alcohol-related harms (VCGLR 2012).

The idea of community mobilisation evolved from strategies introduced in the United States during the 1980s (Greenfield 1992). These programs were generally designed to combat alcohol and drug problems through a localised Community Action Project (CAP) where a common objective was to develop holistic community strategies to minimise problems based upon community-focused research and action (Greenfield 1992). This approach was considered an innovation in crime prevention methodology and moved away from individually aimed problem solving to collective action featuring research and responsive community activity (Room 1990). Giesbrecht (1992, p.2) provided an elaboration for the idea of CAP as:

... we may be experiencing an evolution in bringing together research and action, involving changing and likely overlapping scenarios; separate and different; different and partly combined; and combined action throughout. (Giesbrecht 1992)

Giesbrecht (1992) explained "separate and different" as two distinct functions between researchers and action persons working in isolation from each other. "Different and partly combined" is described as attempting to bring some commonality of purpose to different areas of focus and expertise whilst some level of isolation remains and "combined action throughout" involves recognition of the various components of the CAP, the importance of collaboration throughout each stage and component to ensure successful completion of the project (Giesbrecht 1992). Although a number of procedural issues can arise in a

CAP, it is suggested that the approach of “combined action throughout” sustains relevant motivation of parties involved and has proven to result in more acceptable outcomes (Casswell & Gilmore 1989).

However, according to Lang et al. (1998), there are four potential problems associated with community mobilisation. Firstly, there are different and often conflicting motivations of key stakeholders. In this regard, licensees might see cooperation as an essential component to avoid regulatory intervention and therefore the sustainability of the business whereas healthcare professionals and police are presumably more focused on reducing the incidence of violence generally. These “motivational inconsistencies” can impact substantially upon the relative success of the program including the gathering of appropriate data upon which to justify the allocation of future efforts and resources. Secondly, there are the difficulties associated with training of community members in core aspects of the program such as implementing an appropriate intervention strategy that aligns with funding and program objectives. Thirdly, there are problems faced by evaluators where variations or implementation stages of a project are outside their influence. Fourthly, there is the ability to achieve objectives including deficiencies in methodology, interference at the political or operational level, or conflicts between participants (Lang et al. 1998).

Lang (1998) further suggests problems that might arise can be overcome provided the project is located in a sector that is relevant to the various stakeholders as this will minimise potential conflicts that might arise and assist in targeted intervention by all stakeholders. In this regard the sector should be nightclubs as opposed to other hospitality venues such as restaurants and hotels that do not generally trade overnight or involve high risk activity that is usually associated with a nightclub (Chikritzhs et al. 1997). This approach will possibly minimise segregation between members as one key stakeholder is not necessarily seen as the primary driver for the project to the exclusion of others such as might be perceived in a project with a law enforcement or liquor licensing regulatory foundation (Lang et al. 1998). Giesbrecht et al. (1993) argues that a health promotion framework is a suitable foundation that captures the stakeholders at a

local or community level and would be seen as meeting a community need provided key stakeholders are supportive.

The innovation of CAP as applied to the problem of nightclubs, other high-risk licensed premises and violence further came to prominence in Australia during 1991 in the Westend Forum project (Dixon 1998) and subsequently, in a more formalised approach through the Surfers Paradise Safety Action Project (Homel et al. 1997a; Homel et al. 1997b; Nash 1998). Similarly to Hauritz et al. (1998), Homel (1999, p.18) argues that the application of CAP for licensed premises arose “perhaps as a response to the vacuum created by an inadequate regime of legal regulation” although it is arguable whether mere regulatory intervention encourages anything more than the intentional suppression of reportable trading activity by licensees (Graham & Homel 2008).

Implemented in 1993 the Surfers Paradise project somewhat refined the CAP approach and defined the strategy as “Community Safety Action Project” (Hauritz et al. 1995; Hauritz et al. 1998b). The positive outcomes of minimising crime and social or community disruption by involving key stakeholders soon became apparent and was replicated widely throughout the nation (Graham & Homel 2008). This includes:

- Alcohol and Violence Project (Fremantle, WA);
- Eastside Sydney Project (Sydney, NSW);
- The St. Kilda Project (St. Kilda, Vic);
- North Queensland Projects 1994 – 1996 (Cairns, Townsville and MacKay, Qld);
- Kings Cross Licensing Accord (Kings Cross, NSW);
- Geelong Local Industry Accord (Geelong, Vic); and
- Newcastle/Hamilton Precinct Liquor Accord (Newcastle, NSW)

Westend Forum

As briefly outlined in Section 3.1, the Westend Forum was established on a recommendation of the Victorian Community Council Against Violence (Dixon

1998; Graham & Homel 2008). Its objectives were to establish a good neighbourhood forum to minimise the levels of violence in the west end of Melbourne and also to enhance the attractiveness of the precinct as a preferred leisure and recreational area (Dixon 1998; Graham & Homel 2008). Funding was provided through the Victorian Government Neighbourhood Program and the Melbourne City Council took a lead role in the program which was launched in June 1990 (Melbourne City Council 1991).

Key stakeholders included representatives from local government, the Centre Against Sexual Assault (CASA), the nightclub industry, the Australian Hotels Association, Victoria Police, Federated Liquor and Allied Industries Union, a community representative, and a member of the VCCAV (Dixon 1998; Melbourne City Council 1991). A project officer with considerable experience in community development was also appointed (Melbourne City Council 1991).

The forum focused on a number of community concerns about excessive incidents involving violence and related crime (Dixon 1998). The excessive number of incidents created a negative public perception of the precinct, raised fears of safety and adversely impacted upon establishment of “legitimate” complementary businesses (Dixon 1998). Key issues to be addressed included:

- Availability of private and public transport;
- Car and taxi parking;
- Street lighting and security of open spaces and public areas;
- Vandalism and aesthetics of the area;
- Good and bad management policies and procedures for advertising, alcohol and security;
- Patron behaviour;
- Policing policies and practices; and
- Media coverage and public image of the area (Dixon 1998).

The forum sought to collaborate with relevant stakeholders to review current practices, evaluate possible enhancements, implement any required changes and

then review the effectiveness or otherwise of the new approach (Dixon 1998; Melbourne City Council 1991).

As part of the review, there was a specific focus on violence and security issues in and around the 48 licensed premises in the King Street area (Dixon 1998). Of those licensed premises 34 traded until 7 am (Melbourne City Council 1991). The forum felt a significant impact could be achieved on a number of concerns through an integrated approach as the complexity of issues soon became more apparent, including different views between venue operators on how issues would be addressed, such as patron violence adjacent to venues and the control of patrons removed from a nightclub in the precinct (Dixon 1998).

As a community approach of this scope was unprecedented in Australia, the Westend Forum relied heavily on experiences from overseas. It was noted that projects outside the jurisdiction were more focused on specific issues such as drugs or vandalism than a holistic range of concerns involving a major leisure precinct involving violence (Room 1990). The project was conducted over two years and reported in December 1991 (Dixon 1998).

Achievements of the project included the development of a Code of Practice, responsible serving of alcohol training, and training in operational practices such as aggression management (Dixon 1998). There was also an increased community awareness of the work conducted in the precinct, and planning for enhanced and specialist training for staff such as staff safety and violence towards women (Melbourne City Council 1991). Although there were many positive perceptions associated with the Westend Forum, the only evaluation of the project was qualitative and suggested short-term improvements only (Dixon 1998; Graham & Homel 2008).

There was no evidence to suggest long-term effectiveness of the program although there has been a gradual change in the number of incidents and therefore public perception of the precinct over recent years (Dixon 1998). Homel (1999) suggests that despite the lack of evidence the project is acknowledged for its achievements, especially the high degree of interagency and community cooperation.

Surfers Paradise Safety Action Project

The Surfers Paradise Safety Action Project was first implemented in 1992 and adopted a similar community-based approach to the Westend Forum (Hauritz et al. 1995; Hauritz et al. 1998b). The project was funded through the local council to promote a level of local ownership (Homel et al. 1994). It targeted alcohol-related violence and street disorder in the main precinct of Surfers Paradise that comprised 27 hotels and nightclubs at the time (Hauritz et al. 1995; Hauritz et al. 1998b).

It was reported that adverse publicity for this high tourist area had impacted upon its future sustainability due to public concerns about the safety of the area, especially during times nightclubs were trading (Hauritz 1995). The project involved a multi-agency approach including police, licensees, security providers, Liquor Licensing Department, local government, Queensland Department of Health, Griffith University, community groups, local transport providers and local traders (Homel et al. 1994).

The project leaders were cognisant of the successes reported by the Westend Forum and replicated many of its strategies (Homel et al. 1994). Three key strategies were introduced:

1. Establishment of a community forum along similar lines to the Westend Forum including a targeted safety audit;
2. Risk assessments of high-risk licensed premises and a subsequent Code of Practice for venue operators that sought to minimise venue and precinct risks; and
3. Introduction of a proactive strategy to minimise the risk of violence. This involved training of security staff and monitoring by police and the liquor regulator (McIlwain & Hauritz 1996).

In addition, two further strategies were introduced to encourage licensed venue staff to adopt good practices (Homel et al. 1994). Firstly, mentoring of venue operators and managers by George Frantzeskos, a successful licensee of late night Melbourne venues who had been involved in the Westend Forum and

secondly, training of venue operators, managers and security staff by the author, an approved trainer also involved in the Westend Forum (Homel et al. 1994).

Evaluations of the project in the initial stages revealed a number of positive outcomes in terms of incident reduction and security practices (Homel et al. 1994). A risk assessment checklist was developed and eight licensees were interviewed pre- and post-introduction of a Code of Practice in August 1993 to determine their perceptions of the impact of the project (Homel et al. 1994; Homel et al. 1997a). The licensees reported substantial reductions in high-level intoxication and incidents of serious aggression or violence. It was also reported that improvements were evident in the manner in which security staff handled troublesome patrons or conflicts (Homel et al. 1997a).

Further, teams of students used a structured observation plan at 18 nightclubs prior to commencement of the project in 1993 and again in 1994 after the key features had been implemented (Homel et al. 1997a). It was reported that for every 100 hours of observation arguments declined by 67.6% from 7.1 to 2.3 incidents, verbal abuse by 81.6% from 12.5 to 2.3 incidents, and physical assault by 52% from 9.8 to 4.7 incidents (Homel et al. 1997a). Security personnel and Queensland police also reported declines in street incidents in and around the precinct as the project proceeded (Homel 1999; Homel et al. 1997a).

The Code of Practice and training of staff addressed the risks associated with patron intoxication, binge drinking and server intervention strategies (Homel 1999). Although female rates of drunkenness were generally constant, there was a sharp decline in male drunkenness from 40.2% to 13.8% (Homel 1999). This impact was attributed to house policies to limit intoxication, improved staff competence in responsible serving of alcohol, active intervention where intoxication was detected, and greater interactions between staff and patrons seeking to minimise the likelihood of alcohol abuse (Hauritz et al. 1998a). The Surfers Paradise Project was considered a success overall. However, it was not without its problems, including resistance by some licensees, changes in staff and competing self-interest (Homel 1999).

Problems with community initiatives

A number of detractors have surfaced in community initiatives (Boots et al. 1995; Homel et al. 1994; Midford et al. 1995). The most common problem is that once a funding period has concluded the resources are often removed which means the effectiveness, and often the motivation for continuing the project declines (Midford et al. 1995). Further, it is often difficult to fully quantify the impact of a project in a community (Homel et al. 1994). An evaluation of the COMPARI project (Community Mobilisation for the Prevention of Alcohol-Related Injury) concluded that there was no evidence whatsoever of a positive impact although there was increased community awareness of alcohol-related harm (Boots et al. 1995).

According to Boots et al. (1995), a collaborative strategy can also have a negative impact and fail to achieve its objectives where there is an imbalance in power or input. Projects have little chance of success where a top-down approach is taken such as government or a regulator informing a community of decisions made without their involvement (Boots et al. 1995; Davis 1997). According to Homel (1999), a successful project requires:

strong directive leadership during the establishment period; the mobilisation of community groups concerned about violence and disorder; the implementation of a multi-agency approach involving licensees, local government, police, health and other groups; the use of safety audits to engage the local community and identify risks; a focus on the way licensed premises are managed (particularly those that cater to large numbers of young people); the “re-education” of patrons concerning their role as customers of “quality hospitality”; and attention to situational factors, including serving practices that promote intoxication and violent confrontations. (p.25)

What was not addressed in the various projects were the necessary technical security measures that should be introduced into the operational environment and assessed as to their effectiveness or otherwise. For example, the literature often suggests security staff should be competent in matters relative to managing intoxicated persons, conflict management and physical skills where intervention

is necessary. However, the literature does not provide any guidance or detail about these measures but rather encourages the discretionary application of strategies including physical measures by industry personnel who often have been the basis for community concerns in the first place (Holder & Giesbrecht 1990; Homel et al. 1994; Lang & Rumbold 1996).

The Future of Community Mobilisation in Australia

Most Australian jurisdictions have continued with community mobilisation in various forms under the concepts of a “forum” and “accord” (Graham & Homel 2008; Haurtiz et al. 1995; Miller et al. 2012; Stockwell 2010). It is generally accepted that a forum is a partnership or collaboration involving the relevant regulatory agencies and licensees in a particular area (Graham & Homel 2008; VCGLR 2012c). An accord leads from a forum and prescribes relevant objectives and strategies as agreed between the parties such as lockouts or agreed trading times (Nixon et al. 2005; VCGLR 2012c).

Research into specific localised strategies has resulted in a range of conflicting outcomes although most indicate reduced levels of reported violence (Graham & Homel 2008). However, some Accord outcomes have revealed a regression to pre-mobilisation levels especially in perceptions of safety by residents and business operators (Haurtiz et al. 1998b; Homel et al. 2004).

In summary reported limitations in the literature include:

1. Where involvement is optional problem licensees can remain problem licensees due to a lack of motivation or commitment to the project (Dixon 1998; Homel et al. 1997a);
2. A business operator or nominee may be so overloaded that they are unable to commit appropriate time to a project such as attending meetings. This often occurs with a casual workforce such as security or hospitality personnel (Welsh & Mayell 1998);
3. A private business operator may not be prepared to meet the financial burden associated with loss of productivity in committing to the project (Welsh & Mayell 1998);

4. Conflicts may arise between business personnel or personnel between businesses who see priorities associated with the project differently (Dixon 1998);
5. The philosophy of some agencies or individual staff might be at variance with the philosophies of the project (Welsh & Mayell 1998);
6. The involvement of relevant police may be hampered by their organisation in obtaining suitable shifts to attend meetings or individual officer transfer/promotion can take key police personnel away from a project (Welsh & Mayell 1998); and
7. A lack of appropriate funding to secure suitable resources to progress the project appropriately (Homel et al. 1994).

It has also be suggested that good operators are being punished or are wasting time by participating in projects that effectively do little if anything to improve their already established “good” business (Homel et al. 1994). Further, some operators take the view they are assisting their competition to compete on a level playing field and remove some of their advantageous points of business difference (Homel et al. 1994).

Industry practice supports the argument that systems of security are dynamic and based upon external influences such as regulatory changes, situational issues and organisational requirements (Graham & Homel 2008 VCGLR 2012d)). However, a review of the current literature reveals there remains an absence of appropriate evidence-based materials upon which one could develop an effective system of security.

3.2.3 Nightclub systems of security

A nightclub system of security is generally evidenced through activity of crowd controllers at the entrance to a venue, installation of surveillance cameras, placement of stanchions and ropes outside a venue to control queues, and crowd supervision or monitoring involving security and other staff in the venue (Winlow et al. 2001; Worksafe Victoria 2006). However, contemporary approaches to nightclub systems of security involve a number of interacting or interdependent elements that are based

upon planning, design, utilisation of physical and human resources, and system review. These can be both overt and covert depending on the situational needs of the venue (Worksafe Victoria 2006).

Contemporary systems of security involve preventative (proactive) and reactive strategies (Fischer & Green 2003). As discussed in Section 3.1, there has been much work done in the area of regulation of licensed premises such as the introduction and enforcement of strict compliance measures by regulators against problem venues, imposing licence conditions to increase the number of security staff, or decreasing trading hours (Graham & Homel 2008; Stockwell 2010). However, since the early 1990s approaches to violence in and around licensed premises throughout Australia have generally moved from reactivity that focused on responses to unacceptable behaviour by individuals to the proactive management of potential situational factors that could lead to violence (Graham & Homel 2008; Stockwell 2010).

Built into these preventative strategies are a range of operational response methods involving venue staff including crowd controllers (Hauritz et al. 1998a; LLC 1994; Worksafe Victoria 2006). A preventative approach in crowd control is not dissimilar to strategies promoted throughout the security industry generally where systems are developed through a security risk assessment and become formalised through protocols (Fischer & Green 2003; Talbot & Jakeman 2008).

Systems of security typically involve three common elements: physical, personnel and protocols (Fischer & Green 2003). These elements are often referred to as the security triangle and form the basis for any security strategy as each must be present to comprise a “system” as outlined in Figure 6.




Figure 6: The security triangle

Source: Fischer & Green 2003

Physical security measures comprise tangible items as either hardware (i.e. barriers, stanchions, bollards, grills, window bars, locks and security doors) or technology i.e. closed circuit television (CCTV), alarms, access control technology, metal detection, X-ray and patron identification systems (Fischer & Green 2003).

Personnel is the introduction of human resources that are essential in making a security plan work. It includes determining a staff hierarchy and competence requirements for individuals with a direct or indirect security responsibility. Commonly, selection and training in general security and safety functions suitable for the environment is a relevant consideration in this area (Fischer & Green 2003).

Protocols are documented security policies, plans and procedures. Without protocols there is limited basis for consistent or appropriate operational performance. In addition, there would be a loss of operating consistency which creates a risk in itself. Protocols are usually developed based upon the structure of the system of security, the various staffing levels and commercial requirements of the venue operator (Fischer & Green 2003).

Core considerations for the development of a nightclub security system are:

- Mandatory requirements such as aligning with conditions of a liquor licence (VCGLR 2012d);

- Common elements such as access control, crowd monitoring, control of incidents and incident reporting (Graham & Homel 2008; DoJ 2011; Stockwell 2010);
- Situational issues influenced by venue design, patron characteristics and the local environment (Graham & Homel 2008; DoJ 2011); and
- Commercial imperatives of business operators based upon a perception of risk including potential reputational influences (Graham & Homel 2008; SAI Global 2006).

There are four common approaches adopted throughout industry:

- Use of the “defence in-depth” approach (Fischer & Green 2003);
- Alignment with the elements outlined in a “first class” system of security (LLC 1994);
- A situational approach adopting common industry practice (Graham & Homel 2008); or
- Adoption of an existing system.

Defence in-depth

The defence in-depth approach involves four distinct operational principles: deterrence, delay, detection and response (Fischer & Green 2003). These stages assist to minimise the risk of identified security-related vulnerabilities in a priority order of:

1. *Deterrence* by introducing observable measures that indicate the chance of detection is high (Fischer & Green 2003; SAI Global 2006). Comparably, crime prevention practitioners refer to “guardianship” as a factor that minimises the risk of offending behaviour (Sutton et al. 2008). In a crowd control sense deterrence occurs through placement of security and other staff in appropriate areas of concern or high activity, or if placement is not possible through routine attendance such as patrols of toilets or a smoking area; overt placement of CCTV (surveillance) equipment to monitor and/or record crowd movement and behaviour; and venue design that supports the

concept of “natural surveillance” through openness (Graham & Homel 2008; Hadfield 2006; Monaghan 2000, 2002). A deterrent effect can also be achieved through discrete segregation of patrons as is regularly evidenced in larger venues that have designated trading areas or activities such as public bar, gaming, restaurant and nightclub operations (Graham & Homel 2008; Hadfield 2006). In these circumstances, patrons are “deterred” from seeking entry or prohibited from entering certain areas due to variations in the profile of patrons, whether age or appearance or merely because of the type of entertainment offered (Graham & Homel 2008);

2. *Delay* flows from deterrence and is aligned with detection (Fischer & Green 2003; SAI Global 2006). From a preventative approach a delay often results in the potential perpetrator not gaining entry to a venue means any disruption to the environment is avoided (Fischer & Green 2003). In the context of crowd control this means a violent patron should not be able to escape an area without having to pass by at least one security post or monitored area (Fischer & Green 2003; SAI Global 2006). For the patron to avoid a security post or monitored area in these circumstances “delays” the escape and introduces an excess of time that potentially benefits security staff to introduce an effective detection and response measure (SAI Global 2006);
3. *Detection* commonly involves physical or staff measures introduced through “zones of control” which result in both early and higher detection opportunities for designated staff (Fischer & Green 2003; SAI Global 2006). Physical measures in crowd control include use of equipment such as patron identification scanning to detect recorded individuals who have been banned due to previous unacceptable behaviour, alarms on emergency exits or private doors that activate audible or visual warning devices where there is unauthorised use, and technology that identifies unusual crowd/individual movements through a CCTV monitoring system (Graham & Homel 2008; SAI Global 2006; Worksafe Victoria 2007); and
4. *Response* involves the introduction of appropriate, safe and time efficient activity by designated staff where an incident occurs (SAI Global 2006).

Response can include attendance by internal security or venue staff, support from external security personnel or police (SAI Global 2006).

From a risk management perspective, defence in-depth strategies and addressing vulnerabilities are often used interchangeably (Talbot & Jakeman 2008). Over the past decade, there has been a greater focus by late night venues and their security providers on preventative or proactive rather than reactive security strategies as outlined in Figure 7 (Graham & Homel 2008; Miller et al. 2012; DoJ 2011).




Figure 7: Defence in depth as applied to late night venues

In part, the proactive rather than reactive approach to crowd control evolved from a landmark case heard before the then-named Liquor Licensing Commission, Victoria in 1994 (LLC 1994). In that case a “first class” system of security was adopted by the regulator and became the basis for introduction of conditions on a number of Victorian nightclub liquor licences.

First class system of security

A first class system of security evolved from expert evidence provided to the Liquor Licensing Commission Victoria in the 2004 Tunnel nightclub case (LLC 1994). The nightclub was located in Melbourne’s King Street nightclub precinct and attracted a substantial male “football-type” patronage and had a reputation for frequent incidents of violence involving patrons and staff (LLC 1994).

The operator of the Tunnel applied to the then-named Liquor Licensing Commission for a variation of its liquor licence to increase patron capacity from 560 to 700 (LLC 1994).

Evidence was led by the author about a critical review of the current system of security that applied at the time including management practices that resulted in the introduction of enhancements (LLC 1994). Although the application for a patron increase was opposed by Victoria Police the application was successful based on its recently revised system of security and the promising immediate results in reducing incidents of violence (LLC 1994).

Based upon the evidence provided Commissioner Horsfall determined there was “in place a first class crowd control system and a program for the on-going review of that system and the further education of the crowd controllers and staff” (LLC, 1994, p.2). In making its decision, the Commission acknowledged the operation had considered a number of relevant matters that potentially impacted upon security and safety issues in and around the venue including:

- Layout and furnishings;
- Movement and circulation patterns of patrons;
- Exit location and control;
- Toilet access and availability;
- Nature of patronage including characteristics considered suitable for admission;
- Nature of entertainment and the potential impact upon individual and crowd mood;
- Amenity of the area;
- Police and community concerns about the venue, patron activity and the potential impact upon neighbouring and similar operations;
- Street offences in nearby areas;
- Compliance with practices recommended by the Victorian Community Council Against Violence; and
- Strategies to avoid a repeat of incidents (LLC, 1994, p.3).

Expert evidence was given by the author regarding the development of the venue's "new" system of security and an elaboration of its essential proactive security features under 15 key themes:

1. The licensee engages an independent security and crowd control consultant;
2. There was a criterion for selection of crowd controllers;
3. Strategic location of security posts to monitor patrons;
4. Video surveillance and recording (including audio in selected spots);
5. Radio communication;
6. Liaison with police;
7. Alarm systems for incidents;
8. Instructions to crowd controllers both written and oral;
9. On-going training, review and maintenance of the program of crowd control and further education of crowd controllers;
10. Maintenance of an incident register;
11. Evacuation procedures for fire and other emergencies;
12. First aid training and facilities;
13. Procedures and training for underage persons;
14. Procedures and training for responsible serving of alcohol; and
15. Male and female door personnel (LLC, 1994, p.3).

Components of the "first class" system were accepted in subsequent civil actions such as the Victorian Supreme Court in the *Club Italia* case where a deficient system of security was deemed the basis for injuries sustained by a police officer who was injured whilst responding to violent behaviour of patrons at licensed premises (*Club Italia (Geelong) Inc v Ritchie* (2001) 3 VR 447).

Situational approach

Doherty & Roche (2003) suggest a situational approach to addressing alcohol related problems in and around licensed premises involves five broad considerations: venue characteristics, social environment, staffing characteristics and the wider environment. They reported these considerations need to be contemplated in developing strategies to address the harms associated with consumption of alcohol in and around licensed premises (Doherty & Roche 2003).

A situational approach determines the specific security needs of an organisation through a security risk assessment that is contextualised for the particular workplace (Fisher & Green 2003; Talbot & Jakeman 2008). A security risk assessment has seven stages as outlined in Figure 8.




Figure 8: Risk assessment process

Source: ISO Standard 31000:2009 Risk Management

This approach to risk management encourages a systematic analysis of security risks for workplaces including licensed premises (Fischer & Green 2003). It is contingent upon context, i.e., nightclub operation. The standard does not provide information about security risks but is applied to any area of work (SAI Global 2009). From a security perspective, the ISO Risk Management standard is

supported by a security risk management handbook (SAI Global 2006). This tertiary source entitled “HB167:2006 Security risk management” was developed by an expert panel comprising academics, emergency managers, police and risk specialists (SAI Global 2006, p. 2). The handbook provides a broad outlined of security processes and considerations in developing and reviewing a contemporary system of security including alignment with other relevant standards where applicable (SAI Global 2006). Like other tertiary sources the handbook is not necessarily based upon studies or evidence but rather security-related practices that appear to minimise risk (SAI Global 2006, 2009). Using standards, guides and handbooks (Fischer & Green 2003; SAI Global 2006, 2009) in the context of a nightclub operation a risk assessment is based upon a number of fundamental questions which include:

- What can happen and why (risk identification)? In the context of this study aggression and violence can arise in a number of differing circumstances. This can include conflicts between patrons, conflicts between security and other venue staff and patrons, and conflicts between security and other venue staff themselves. A particular area of relevance is the potential location of conflict as this can influence resource allocation such as conflict in the venue car park or queue, where resources may not be as readily available as internal security coverage;
- What are the consequences? For this study consequences are contingent upon the risk and can include breaches of relevant legislation such as liquor licensing or workplace health and safety, unlawful acts between parties such as assault, financial costs to compensate individuals or repair damage, and reputational damage;
- What is the probability of their occurrence? Probability will be affected by a number of characteristics including patrons, staffing and the environment. For example, where activity is limited there is less likelihood of conflict between parties; however, where a venue is approaching its patron capacity and trading has occurred over a number of hours there is an increased likelihood of violence; and

- Are there any factors that mitigate the consequence of the risk or that reduce the probability of the risk? In these circumstances, the adoption of good practices such as appropriate access control to admit suitable patrons, responsible serving of alcohol, strategic placement of staff to monitor and intervene as required and management presence to minimise the risks associated with violence.

Once the context and areas of risk have been determined, a system of security is developed that incorporates risk treatment strategies from a preventative and reactive position (Fischer & Green 2003).

Adoption of an existing system

Some venue operators may introduce a security framework and features that is a replication of an existing system (LLC 1994; Worksafe Victoria 2007). As outlined above, systems are generally based upon a risk assessment (Fischer & Green 2003; SAI Global 2009). This means developers of venue security strategies will usually contextualise the system based upon venue specifications and suitable proactive and reactive features such as the placement of surveillance cameras, engagement of suitable staff and other situational factors including patronage (LLC 1994).. Adoption of an existing system can be risky because it means situational issues relevant to the specific environment or venue have not been necessarily thought through (LLC 1994).. As discussed above, the literature strongly suggests that situational issues need to be considered in the context of minimising risk including violence in and around licensed premises (Graham 1985; Miller et al. 2012; Purcell & Graham 2005; VCCAV 1990b)

Other considerations

There are a number of other matters that require consideration and will assist in the development of a nightclub system of security (Graham & Homel 2008; SAI Global 2006; Worksafe Victoria 2007). They include:

- Governance;
- Access control;
- Excessive consumption of alcohol and drunkenness; and

- Selection and training of venue staff.

Governance

The importance of an appropriate management strategy is well identified (Graham & Homel 2008; Prenzler and Hayes 1998; VCCAV 1990b). Research from the United Kingdom suggests that management skills and the management approach to security operations had more influence on levels of violence in venues than any other factor (MCM 1990). In Australia it is suggested that problems in licensed premises are often aligned with an absence of suitable leadership, irresponsible beverage service and poor security standards (Goldsmith 1989; Graham & Homel 2008; Prenzler & Hayes 1998; VCCAV 1990).

One of the four recurring allegations identified by the VCCAV about the adequacy of security arrangements in licensed premises was “management do not exercise adequate responsibility for the activities of security staff” (VCCAV, 1990b, p.54). An absence of a documented security management plan and supportive operating procedures that encourage consistent and appropriate management strategies can impact substantially upon the potential for incidents including violence (Fisher & Green 2003). Specialists in the area explain inappropriate venue management practices are often influenced by the competitive nature of business and an absence of a well-constructed compliance strategy such as a Code of Practice (Hauritz et al. 1998a). Management practices that tolerate offensive language, harassing behaviours and breaches of liquor laws further increase the risk of violence and other anti-social behaviours (Graham et al. 1996).

The VCCAV (1990b) identified a number of management approaches that represent “good” and “bad” practice in terms of reducing or increasing the risk of violence (see Table 3).

Table 3: Good and bad management practices

Good Practice	Bad Practice
• Sensible admission and “door” practices	• Antagonistic “door” practices
• Supervision of patron numbers	• Overcrowding
• Quality entertainment	• Poor entertainment/violence videos
• Variety of spaces and activities	• Poorly planned interior design
• Cleanliness, excellent services	• Poor standards of cleanliness & service
• Trained, accountable security staff	• Untrained, unaccountable security staff
• Responsible alcohol policies	• Alcohol gimmicks, serving drunk patrons
• Cooperation and liaison with local police	• Antagonism to/poor police relationship
• Management presence	• Absentee management

Source: VCCA Vb, 1990, p.47

The VCCA V (1990b) contend that the above practices are merely a guide and venues might develop and implement specific strategies suitable for their environment. What is not within the literature or industry guidance materials are system development or security management strategies or plans and then how to operationalise them. When one links the expectation of appropriate practices back to the relative unknown competence of managerial security staff there appears a dichotomy as there is also an absence of prescribed or required competence in setting up venue security plans and supportive procedures (Graham & Homel 2008; VCGLR 2011). This means venue security plans tend to be developed, if at all, informally and reactively to incidents at the venue or comparable environments VCCA V 1990b; VCGLR 2011). If these plans are developed informally the operation is high risk irrespective of the regulatory and management measures that might be expected or introduced (Worksafe Victoria 2006).

It is suggested that good venue practices, regulatory influences and guidance, various compliance requirements through conditions on liquor licences, and understanding the broad range of security issues can impact upon the potential for violence (Graham & Homel 2008). In the operational environment security risk management requires a comprehensive analysis of relevant influences, both venue specific and societal (Fischer & Green 2003; Graham & Homel 2008). This also requires an appropriate governance structure as commonly advanced through risk management strategies (Talbot & Jakeman 2008).

Access control

In security operations access control is considered an essential feature for effective crowd control (Worksafe Victoria 2007). It is well reported that trouble stopped at the door means reduced level of trouble inside (Homel et al. 2004; VCCAV 1990b). Often screening of patrons seeking admission requires security staff to make spontaneous decisions based upon dress, group size, intoxication, history or venue capacity (Graham & Homel 2008; VCCAV 1990b). The Worksafe Victoria guidance note for crowd control highlights the importance of an access control strategy to ensure potentially troublesome or intoxicated persons are prevented from entering a venue or event (Worksafe Victoria 2006). Gender also is a relevant consideration at the point of access as some studies argue that strategies aimed at balancing up gender will result in less conflict and therefore less violence (Graham 1985; Homel 1999; Mihalic & Elliott 1996; VCCAV 1990b).

To tackle the issue of gender inequity, a number of venues have sought to move away from strategic access control measures to formal applications for an exemption under equal opportunity legislation (EOCV 2006). For example, during 2005 two Melbourne late night venues (Chaise Lounge and F4) obtained exemptions from the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission to control access of un-partnered men and women seeking to enter the venues to maintain a gender balance (EOCV 2006). During the applications, submissions were made by the venue operators regarding the risk of violence within a dominant male patronage (EOCV 2006). It was noted that both venues attracted a younger male patronage, typically the highest category for spontaneous violence (Graham & Homel 2008). To address concerns regarding any potential for discrimination three primary conditions were imposed by the commission:

1. Neither nightclub could refuse entry to a person based upon their gender, only defer their entry pending the gender imbalance;
2. Same sex couples were considered “partnered” for the purposes of entry to avoid discrimination against persons identified as gay or lesbian; and

3. All staff of both venues had to be trained in equal opportunity legislation (EOCV 2006).

There is no evidence at this time whether the strategy has had a positive impact upon conflicts in and at the entrance to either venue.

Excessive consumption of alcohol and drunkenness

As previously outlined, excessive consumption of alcohol and drunkenness can engender crime and other anti-social behaviours in the venue and in the amenity of surrounding areas (Forsyth et al. 2005; Graham 1980; Sacco & Kennedy 1994). Special promotions such as “shots” of high alcohol drinks or “happy hours” can lead to alcohol-related violence (Homel & Clarke 1994).

Such practices are often controlled through regulatory intervention and responsible serving of alcohol training (Graham 1980; Graham 1985; Graham & Homel 1997). Groups rather than individuals are more likely to attend licensed venues commonly resulting in accelerated drinking through “shouting” or purchasing drinks for the group in turn (Graham 1985; VCGLR 2010a). This influences group members to drink according to the pace of the quickest drinker thereby increasing the potential for intoxication of the other group members (VCGLR 2010a).

The literature discloses the following problems to detect or intervene on high-level intoxication due to the following:

1. Patron capacities at nightclubs including low lighting make individual observations within a crowd less likely (Graham & Homel 1997; Norstrom 2000; VCCAV 1990b);
2. The staff span of control might be deficient in terms of suitable numbers of staff to monitor the crowd (Graham & Homel 2008; Stockwell 2010);
3. Placement of staff in the venue might result in “blind zones” whereby little if any attention is focused on certain areas (Graham & Homel 2008);
4. Group purchases of alcohol tend to minimise the risk of individual detection at service points or bars until high-level intoxication is most

evident as a patron might consume numerous drinks before re-attending a bar for service (Graham 1985);

5. Unless service staff actively seek to detect high-level intoxication at the point of service, a person may continue to consume alcohol until detected behaving inappropriately (Graham 1985; Graham & Homel 2008; VCCAV 1990b);
6. The social group may intentionally seek to conceal an individual's high-level intoxication (Graham & Homel 2008);
7. The venue design might be counter-productive to general detection by inhibiting crowd observations (DoJ 2011; Worksafe Victoria 2007); or
8. Security and other staff may not see themselves as protectors rather than enforcers in proactive or risk minimisation practices (Graham & Homel 2008).

Selection and training of venue staff including security staff

Selection and training of venue staff including security staff is often considered central to most behavioural issues in and around licensed premises (Deehan 1999; Dixon 1990; Dixon 1998; Hobbs et al. 2002; VCCAV 1990b). It has been suggested that attitude and behaviour of venue staff will influence the social setting and therefore the potential for violence (Barbour et al. 2010; Fisher 1993; Graham & Homel 2008; Russ & Geller 1987). Training of security staff is generally provided pre-licensing (Victoria Police LRD 2010). However, in Victoria there has been a recent introduction of ongoing and refresher training that is aligned to licensing of crowd controllers (Victoria Police LRD 2010).

Although regulatory strategies for crowd controllers were first introduced in 1990 in Victoria, other jurisdictions locally and abroad have also developed comparable training schemes (Graham & Homel 2008; Hobbs et al. 2000). For example, the UK Local Government Management Board commissioned a report "Local Authority Door Supervisor Registration and National Occupational Standards" and subsequently introduced "door supervisor" training (LGMB 1997). The regulatory scheme for security staff throughout the UK is

administered at local government level, with a general consistency of content based upon the LGMB report. Core content of the training involves the following themes:

- Law such as regulatory requirements, intervention and removal powers;
- Interpersonal and social skills;
- Physical skills involving restraint;
- First aid;
- Emergency procedures such as fire, bomb threat and civil disturbance; and
- Issues relevant to identification and management of persons affected by alcohol or other drugs (LGMB 1997).

The delivery of training varies between local government areas with the City of Westminster, Greater Manchester and Essex accrediting training providers. Attempts have been made to introduce a national approach although this has not occurred at this time (Lawrence et al. 1999; St. John-Brooks 1998). Less rigorous approaches apply in North America and Canada with a greater focus on server intervention rather than security staff (Graham & Homel 1997).

3.2.4 Developing a nightclub system of security

For development of a nightclub security system there are common elements that apply in all nightclubs such as the need to have an overarching security management plan that is supported by a number of standard operating procedures (Worksafe Victoria 2006). Standard operating procedures provide step-by-step instructions of how to perform specific workplace tasks such as how to manage intoxicated or difficult persons (Fisher & Green 2003). However, there will also be situational issues based upon venue design, patron characteristics and the type of entertainment provided that will result in variations to a security strategy between venues (Fisher & Green 2003; Graham & Homel 2008; Stockwell 2010).

The following studies highlight situational issues that should be considered in the development of a nightclub security system:

1. Liquor outlet density (Chikritzhs et al. 2007; Donnelly 2006);
2. Characteristics of patrons (Quigley et al. 2003);
3. Staffing characteristics (VCCAV 1990b; Homel 1999; Homel et al. 2004);
4. Premises failing to discourage aggressive behaviour (Quigley et al. 2003);
5. Design of venue (Macintyre & Homel 1994; Macintyre & Homel 1997); and
6. Venue management methods (Homel & Clarke 1994; Homel et al. 2004).

It is suggested that an appropriate documented security strategy will provide the basis for operational consistency (Reason 2000). These protocols and other guidance materials such as safety posters or advisory memorandums provide a benchmark upon which staff can align (Worksafe Victoria 2007).

Based upon the literature and industry guidance materials there are five recognised steps in the development of a system of security (Fischer & Green 2003; Worksafe Victoria 2007). These steps flow sequentially as depicted in Figure 9.




Figure 9: Steps for developing a system of security

Leading from the security risk assessment are four operational requirements (Fischer & Green 2003):

1. Development of a Security Management Plan;
2. Introduction of physical security requirements and personnel, whether security or other staff, with a “security” responsibility to meet objectives of the plan;
3. Development of standard operating procedures to guide venue personnel in common tasks such as access control and managing intoxicated persons; and
4. Introduction of a review strategy to further improve the system.

Security Management Plan

A Security Management Plan forms the basis for all security-related roles and responsibilities for staff including crowd controllers (VCGLR 2011). The plan does not ordinarily explain how to perform specific functions, as this is achieved through Standard Operating Procedures or SOPs (Fisher & Green 2003; VCGLR 2011).

There is no standard structure, design or content for a Security Management Plan (Fischer & Green 2003). However, the Victorian regulator issued guidance materials for the development of venue management plans in 2011 (VCGLR 2011). The publication identifies seven sections that should be addressed by venue operators as outlined in Figure 10.

General Information	Security	Queuing, overcrowding and patron management	Minors	Intoxication	Alcohol promotions and advertising	Amenity
Premises Name	Security cameras	Incident register	Prevention of minors entering	Identification of intoxication	When offered Promotions	Noise
Licensee	Managing aggression or unruly patrons	Patron capacity	Identification of minors	Identification of disorderly conduct	Special events	Music
Business type		Maintaining internal thoroughfares				Management of minors who enter
Maximum patrons		Entry and exit points	Removal of undesirables	RSA	Generators	
Peak trading times		Access points to bars			Access and egress for smoking	Patrons entering and/or leaving
Other licensed premises		Access and egress for smoking	Process to manage complaints	Managing litter outside		
Age demographic of patrons					Food provided	

Figure 10: Considerations in developing a security management plan

Source: Responsible Alcohol Victoria 2011

As indicated above, these guidelines merely provide an outline of areas venue operators might consider in the development of a formalised system of security (VCGLR 2011). The publication does not explain how any of the areas might be designed or structured and there is no information or guidance as to how such an approach might be operationalised by the venue (VCGLR 2011). The guidelines are also silent on the following:

1. Scope and objectives of the plan;
2. How the objectives will be achieved;
3. Responsibilities of staff such as duty managers, security staff, bar and support staff;
4. Jurisdiction of staff for internal and external areas;
5. Control of the property internally or externally;
6. Positioning of security posts;
7. Patrol times and methods;
8. Crowd monitoring strategies;
9. Management of emergencies;
10. Communication strategies between staff and a hierarchy of control;
11. Activity on cessation of trade;
12. General operations such as essential equipment, safety needs for individuals or groups and specific risks that are common across industry;
13. Incident reporting;
14. Induction training and professional development of staff;
15. Post-incident actions; and
16. Updates and amendments to the security plan.

The plan is typically used by a venue to explain its security arrangements to regulators and the police, often including issues relevant to:

- Liquor licence conditions;

- Guiding any contract security provider as to its expectations regarding security issues;
- Inducting new staff about the venue's security strategy; and
- Providing a basis for selection of technology and hardware and the development of standard operating procedures (VCGLR 2011).

Once a Security Management Plan has been developed physical and personnel resources need to be identified to assist in meeting the objectives of the plan (VCGLR 2011; Worksafe Victoria 2007). These areas were discussed above.

Review of security strategy

There are no guidelines or standards relating to when a security strategy should be reviewed however the Australian Standard for Healthcare Security (AS 4485.1-1997) recommends that a healthcare provider should review its security strategy every two years (Standards Association of Australia. Committee HT/8, Health Care Facilities – Security 1997a).

In many workplaces the system of security is reviewed frequently such as post-incident during a “hot” debrief, after a serious incident, where there is an obvious deficiency such as staff confusion about a particular operational requirement or when there has been a change to the workplace staffing, design or regulatory system (Fischer & Green 2003).

As evidenced in this section, there are a range of approaches to and many influences on a nightclub system of security. Some venues approach security informally with little training or influence from management (Graham & Homel 2008). Others have more formalised approaches that are often aligned with regulatory expectations such as guidance materials and conditions on liquor licences (Graham & Homel 2008). These inconsistent and discretionary approaches can create a number of potential risks from both a security and safety perspective. However, with these systems there can be a number of practices that align with industry best practice (Graham & Homel 2008).

The concluding section of the literature review will examine and discuss best practice in security at nightclubs in Victoria.

3.3 Best practice in nightclub security

Best practice should result in consistently superior outcomes to similar operations that do not adopt best practice (Bogan & English 1994). In a nightclub environment this means techniques and methods considered to be best practice need to be identified, contextualised for the operational environment and implemented in the operation of the venue to maximise security objectives. Munro (2004) argues that best practice should be based upon rigorous research. However, the absence of studies in the area of nightclub security systems means many practices are not evidence-based but rather have evolved over time and are founded upon what appears to work. Stockwell (2010) reports that best practice emanates from different perspectives of (i) venue operators, (ii) liquor regulators, and (iii) community mobilisation efforts. This was discussed in Section 3.2.

Hayes-Jonkers et al. (2012) conducted a study in Cairns (Queensland) that assessed the role of private security in the NTE in reducing alcohol-related violence in comparison to practice models available literature. Their article was published in *Security Review*, a peer reviewed journal. The authors noted “there is a disconcerting lack of research concerning issues of private security personnel specific to the NTE” (Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012, p. 326). The study identified one report that documented practices of security staff in the NTE (Victoria Police LSD 2007). Three other reports were identified that addressed community mobilisation methods including best practice recommendations for security personnel (Downtown Late Night Task Force 2009; Roberts 2004; Stockwell 2010). The authors noted these were the only available publications containing strategic or operational practices for security personnel (Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012). There were no peer reviewed materials.

The Canadian report by the Downtown Late Night Task Force (2009) was developed to assist the City of Victoria formulate a plan to maintain a vibrant and safe downtown area including activities associated with the NTE. The Task Force conducted information gathering meetings with interested stakeholders, reviewed the literature and conducted local area downtown observations. The primary goals of the Task Force work to identify issues of disorder, options for resolving community concerns, and considering the best collaborative measures to minimise risk

(Downtown Late Night Task Force 2009). Stakeholders presented a number of concerns that included excessive intoxication, violence, excessive noise, and drink-driving. The role of venue staff was analysed including that some security personnel contribute to violence through poor behaviours. The Task Force recommended a number of interventions including longer periods of work for security staff to manage crowds cessation of trade and mandatory pre-licensing training for security staff. There was little reference to the literature including the work of key authors in the area. The report was of little value provide supplementary information only.

Roberts (2004) conducted a literature review of secondary sources including published academic research, government publications, policy documents and reports by advocacy bodies with an aim of identifying good practices in the management of the NTE in the UK. The report focused on planning considerations and related practices for future policy development from an environmental perspective (Roberts 2004). The report was not founded solely on scholarly articles, especially in the area of security practices but rather was based on a combination of opinions of self-interest groups such as The Portman Group (Roberts 2004). Again, the report provided some useful supplementary information only.

The study by Professor Stockwell (2010) and referred to by Hayes-Jonkers et al. (2012) was discussed within the literature review under key authors. Professor Stockwell's study identified a number of good operational practices that included documenting best practices that have been reported to reduce levels of violence. These practices included features within a security system that included safety audits, in-house security plans, employment of female security staff, and monitoring of staff performance (Stockwell 2010:Appendix).

The Victoria Police LSD (2007) is the Victorian regulator for the security industry and has now been re-named Victoria Police LRD (Victoria Police Licensing and Regulation Division (2010)). The booklet entitled 'Towards 'Best Practice' for Effective Management of Intoxicated Young People in Entertainment Venues in Melbourne' was not based upon any research evidence but rather developed through a series of key stakeholder and industry consultations about measures that were considered useful in managing the risk of intoxication and related anti-social behaviours. The methodology involved a literature review and interviewed key

stakeholders including Victoria Police, security industry representatives, personnel from entertainment venues, and the Australian Drug Foundation. Although the authors asserted a literature review was conducted there were no references cited within the booklet nor a bibliography presented. However, in presenting a “best practice” model, much of the practices identified and studied within this thesis were identified as common industry practices

Overall, a number of practices suggested by Hayes-Jonkers et al. (2012) align with some of the practices that were the subject of this research and discussed in this and the following chapters of this thesis. Key practices discussed in the booklet (Victoria Police LSD 2007) included:

- A formal risk assessment to be conducted by an experienced and competent private security provider (p. 9);
- Training and licensing of crowd controllers with a greater training focus on drugs awareness, negotiation and communication skills and possibly to include on-the-job sessions with mentoring of new industry entrants (p. 10);
- Appropriate management within the workplace, noting that where licensees and security staff had to be licensed there was no licensing or qualification requirement for a duty manager who was responsible for core operational aspects of licensed premises including security (p. 11); and
- General protocols for the venue that included liaison with police and other services such as transport providers (p 19).

Collectively the four publications referred to by Hayes-Jonkers et al. (2012) identified most the practices that were the subject of this study and as this study was conducted in Victoria, best practice considerations in the following section are confined to the jurisdiction including legislative requirements. This section has three subsections:

1. Sources of best practice for nightclub systems of security;
2. Barriers to implementing best practice; and
3. Best practice in nightclub security.

3.3.1 Sources of best practice for nightclubs

Sources that potentially influence best practice for nightclub systems of security can be direct or indirect as outlined in Figure 11.

Direct Sources	Indirect Sources
Legislation Liquor licence conditions Regulator guidelines Industry guidelines The literature Experts and security specialists	Court or tribunal proceedings Benchmarking Industry-specific innovation

Figure 11: Sources of best practice for nightclub security

A direct source is based upon an industry specific requirement that is aimed at encouraging the adoption of minimum performance in a particular area (VCGLR 2011). This includes legislation, conditions imposed on liquor licences, regulator and industry guidelines, the literature and guidance from experts or specialists in hospitality security (Graham & Homel 2008; Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012; VCGLR 2011). Indirect sources can also provide best practice guidance such as outcomes from court or tribunal proceedings (LLC 1994; VCCAV 1990b), benchmarking against similar business systems (Homel et al. 1997), and industry specific innovation such as newly developed equipment and technology (Miller et al. 2012).

Direct Sources

Legislation

The relevant legislation for this study is the *Liquor Control Reform Act 1998* (Vic) and the *Liquor Control Reform Regulations 2009* (Vic). Relevant to this study are recent legislative responses to address community concerns about alcohol-related violence that include:

- Lockouts of a permanent or temporary nature for licensed premises in an area or locality (s58 of the Act);
- Barring orders issued against persons for a designated period that prevent the person from entering or remaining on licensed premises (s106 of the Act) or through a liquor accord ban (s146 of the Act) or an exclusion order issued by the Court (s148 of the Act); and

- Standards for security cameras utilised in licensed premises (reg. 7 and 8 of the Regulations).

Liquor licence conditions

Conditions imposed on a venue through its liquor licence are common for nightclubs as discussed in Section 3.2 This is because they are considered high risk and therefore require mandatory controls associated with security, service of alcohol and amenity (VCGLR 2011). Recently, “enforceable undertakings” were introduced by the Victorian Government and effectively have become conditions attached to a venue (*Liquor Control Reform Act 1998* s133F). An undertaking by the licensee is agreed to and accepted by the regulator (VCGLR 2011). Typically, where operational problems have arisen such as excessive incidents of violence and it becomes apparent the regulator may initiate disciplinary or show cause proceedings, entering into an “enforceable undertaking” avoids formal proceedings by allowing a venue to improve its system of security over an agreed period (VCGLR 2011).

Regulator Guidelines

In Victoria the liquor regulator has specifically addressed alcohol-related violence with a number of industry guidelines. These guidelines include advice on determining intoxication (DoJ 2010a), responsible liquor advertising and promotions (DoJ 2009b), barring powers (VCGLR 2012a), and demerit points for problem venues (VCGLR 2012d). The security industry regulator enforces a licensing regime that includes mandatory pre-licensing training and probity of industry applicants (Victoria Police LRD 2011).

Industry guidelines

Industry associations provide support and input at local and national levels. The Australian Security industry Association Limited (ASIAL) and Australian Hotels Association (AHA) provide a range of information sessions, training programs and guidance materials in support of their members (AHA 2013; ASIAL 2013). These are usually based around areas of security risk management, management and various innovations that might be developed by their members. As mentioned above, there are also industry guidelines developed by the regulator of workplace

safety such as the Victorian Workcover Authority's publication *Crowd control at venues and events* (Worksafe Victoria 2007).

The literature

The literature can provide reliable information to industry, including venue operators, based upon scientific research. For example, lessons learned about the risk of violence based upon venue design (MacWhirter 2009) or patron demographics (Teece & Williams 2000) and demographic and staff characteristics (Briscoe & Donnelly 2001; Hadfield 2006; Hobbs et al. 2000) could form the basis for procedural development and staff training within a nightclub system of security. As indicated above, although this thesis has focused on primary and secondary sources often tertiary sources are accessed by industry in developing practice models (Downtown Late Night Task Force 2009; Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012; Roberts 2004; Stockwell 2010).

Experts and security specialists

A number of venue operators engage the services of external experts to assist in the development or enhancement of their security system. As outlined for The Tunnel case, the regulator considers engagement of external expertise a good practice as it allows for a level of independent review (LLC 1994). It also ensures that individuals who have broad industry knowledge about contemporary approaches to security contribute to system enhancement, usually based upon their training, skill and expertise (Sarvary 1999).

Indirect Sources

Indirect sources emanate from common industry practice as discussed above. These influences are not based upon any evidence-based research or influence by the regulator but rather are practices adopted by industry in reaction to events or incident trends. Influences include legal proceedings, benchmarking and industry-specific innovation.

Court or tribunal proceedings

Information that arises from court or tribunal proceedings can impact upon a system of security. For example, in *Anastasiou v Chubb* the Victorian Supreme

Court considered whether a security guard was introduced to a safe system of work. In that case the plaintiff security guard attempted to remove an intoxicated person from the shopping complex after the patron had been ejected by crowd controllers from licensed premises into the shopping complex. The court found the employer did not have appropriate protocols or training in place; nor an agreement between the employer and the licensed venue as to how ejected intoxicated persons would be handled. The plaintiff was awarded \$720,000 in damages (*Anastasiou v Chubb Security (Australia) Pty Ltd* [2008] VSC 211).

In the *Club Italia* case a member of the Victoria Police was awarded \$460,000 for damages after being attacked by drunken youths at licensed premises (*Club Italia (Geelong) Inc v Ritchie* (2001) 3 VR 447). In that case the crowd controllers and venue operators failed to act on earlier indiscretions by the youths but instead continued providing them with alcohol until a number of violent incidents resulted in a further call for assistance by police. The Victorian Supreme Court held that, amongst other things, there were deficiencies in the system of security including venue management, responsible serving of alcohol and control of intoxicated persons. The court determined that a duty was owed by a venue to operational police called to assist in managing a disturbance where the venue had effectively contributed to the incident (*Club Italia (Geelong) Inc v Ritchie* (2001) 3 VR 447).

Benchmarking

Benchmarking against other venue operations can result in system enhancements (Graham & Homel 2008). Commonly, discussion occurs at Accord meetings where licensees and venue operators are able to discuss approaches to their security needs including management of violence, often in conjunction with police, local government representatives and other stakeholders such as food and transport vendors (Miller et al. 2012). The Victorian liquor regulator also emphasises benchmarking opportunities within its Forum and Accord Guidelines under benefits associated with membership (VCGLR 2012c, p. 4) and, according to the then Chairperson of the Victorian Commission for Gambling and Liquor Regulation “The value of communities developing practical local solutions to

local alcohol-related problems should never be under-estimated”(VCGLR 1012c, p. 1).

Industry-specific innovation

Industry specific innovation can potentially influence a venue system of security and public safety generally such as the recent introduction of patron identification technology commonly known as patron ID scanners (Miller et al. 2012). Systems commercially available have similar capability in that they effectively capture data about each patron entry to a venue through identification scanning and a “live” image capture at the point of entry that is then recorded onto a database. Miller, Sonderland and Palmer (2012) within the Pubs and Clubs Project conducted a literature review of specific interventions in Geelong between 2000-2010. They reported, amongst 25 interventions that had been introduced over the past 15 years Geelong conducted a voluntary pilot trial of ID scanning. The trial commenced in 2007 with final integration of the system in November 2009 where police and licensed premises were connected through an ID scanner network. ID scanners were installed at “high risk” venues in Geelong and programmed to recognise 154 different types of identification globally. Although well received by licensees and police there has been no independent evaluations of their impact at this stage (Miller, Sonderland and Palmer 2012). ID scanning has attracted interest in other jurisdictions such as Queensland where the liquor regulator published an ID Scanner Guide with recommended practices that included the protection of individual privacy (OLGR Queensland 2012) .

3.3.2 Barriers to implementing best practice

It is reported there are a number of barriers to implementing best practice in licensed premises. These barriers include:

- Low participation rates in Accords or other voluntary programs where best practice strategies are commonly discussed (Stockwell et al. 1993);
- Conflicting views between venue operators, regulators, police and other key stakeholders as to factors that may contribute to alcohol-related violence (Graham & Homel 2008; Prenzler & Hayes 1998; VCCAV 1990b);

- Inability to establish strong lines of communication between licensees, police and the local community to collaboratively address alcohol-related problems (Macquire & Nettleton 2003);
- Poor management practices by failing to introduce suitable policies and procedures to address serious violence problems (Graham & Homel 2008); and
- Lack of understanding of good security practices that should be in place to address alcohol-related problems at venues (Graham & Homel 2008; VCCAV 1990b).

3.3.3 Best practice features

Best practice in nightclub security is achieved by consolidating those approaches to violence reduction which appear most effective (Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012; Stockwell 2010). Bogan and English (1994) suggest that best practice maintains quality and is often instigated as an alternative to compliance with legislative requirements. Best practice often involves benchmarking a system against other industry providers that are seen as effective in the management of their security issues, although there can be limitations as discussed above (Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012; VCCAV 1990).

Internationally there is little best practice material or standards to assist venue operators develop or enhance their systems of security (Graham & Homel 2008; Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012). However, there has been work to address and minimise alcohol-related violence in a number of jurisdictions locally and abroad (Graham & Homel 2008; Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012; Miller et al. 2012) including various approaches in Victoria as discussed in Section 3.1. Further, security system practices and elements are discussed within the following chapters as highlighted during the semi-structured interviews with respondents from the twenty nightclubs.

Best practice elements

Common security practices were outlined in Section 3.2 and as previously discussed, there are generic guidelines (VCGLR 2011; Worksafe Victoria 2011) for a system of security in licensed premises. There are no previous studies in the area other than the

study by Hayes-Jonkers et al. (2012) and hence nightly practices globally and indeed throughout Australia including Victoria are based upon number of factors, usually associated with a perception of risk, regulatory compliance requirements, and adoption of recommended practices. However, in addition to the above there has been some acceptance in Victoria about practices in security based upon administrative cases (LLC 1994), litigation (Club Italia (Geelong) Inc v Ritchie (2001) 3 VR 447) and the booklet 'Towards 'Best Practice' for Effective Management of Intoxicated Young People in Entertainment Venues in Melbourne' (Victoria Police LSD 2007). This means, for the purposes of this study and a review of the various approaches taken in Victoria to nightclub systems of security the following are current best practice elements:

1. security risk assessment;
2. security management plan;
3. availability of security management plan for the information of staff;
4. external expertise in security;
5. criteria for selection of crowd controllers;
6. strategic positioning of staff;
7. use of video surveillance;
8. radio communication between key staff;
9. formal liaison policy with police;
10. alarm or early warning system for incidents;
11. written procedures for security and other venue staff;
12. ongoing security related training;
13. maintenance of a crowd controllers register;
14. emergency procedures;
15. first aid facilities and training;
16. training and written procedures for underage persons;
17. training and written procedures for responsible serving of alcohol;

18. male and female door staff; and
19. formal induction of new staff.

It is acknowledged that not every element will have the same impact upon the risk of violence as discussed below. For each element I will express the level of potential effect as direct impact, indirect impact, some perceived direct or indirect impact, or little if any impact. The discussion provided for each element is not based upon any study other than where referenced and includes content outlined within the article by Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012 and the four publications referred to in that article that explain industry consultations. The discussion is provided for the purposes of context and within the authors own industry expertise hence it is not evidence-based. These tentative expressions provided will be subsequently tested through the study surveys and semi-structured interviews.

1. Security risk assessment

Risk was defined in Chapter 1 as “the effect of uncertainty on objectives” (SAI Global 2009). From a security context this means strategies that are specifically introduced to promote freedom from crime, danger, anxiety or fear (Fischer & Green 2003). The first step to managing security issues is to conduct a risk assessment (Kovacich & Halibozek 2003). However, a common consideration is cost-effective risk management alternatives that are “designed to avoid, reduce, spread or transfer identified risks” (Fischer & Green 2003; Fischer & Janoski, 2000, p.12).

As there is an absence of industry-related materials to guide nightclub operators in risk assessments, consultants or security specialists are often engaged to assist in developing a suitable system based upon use of surveys, a review of incident data and discussions with key staff about operational trends and experiences. Ortmeier (2009, p.176) contends that,

Subjective information as well as objective measurement instruments such as security surveys is an essential first step of a planning process designed to identify and assess the threat posed by each risk source.

As staff are central to minimising a number of security risks including violence, considerations at the assessment stage usually include:

- Local environment;
- Personal requirements outlined in the liquor licence or planning permit;
- Number and characteristics of patrons including those from higher risk groups;
- Potential gender balance;
- Situational factors including venue design and external influences;
- Times of operation such as overnight trading;
- Issues relating to responsible service of alcohol;
- Ability to maintain ongoing observations of patrons throughout the venue; and
- History of the operation including of similar venue types (Graham & Homel 2008; SAI Global 2009; Worksafe Victoria 2007; VCCAV 1990b).

2. Security management plan

As outlined in Section 3.2, a security management plan is an essential resource that guides key stakeholders about the approach to security by the venue (Fisher & Green 2003; Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012; VCGLR 2011). Victoria now has Management Plan Guidelines but without any elaboration for venue implementation (VCGLR 2011).

3. Staff access to security management plan

As suggested by Reason (1990), effective organisations have an “informed” staff culture which means the security management plan and other relevant protocols are available to staff.

4. Licensee engages a security and crowd control consultant

Consultants typically take responsibility for developing a venue security strategy based upon a formal risk assessment. From this risk assessment protocols evolve that include a security management plan, guidance on the selection of appropriate physical measures, staff to address security issues and operating procedures (Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012). The staff member who then becomes responsible for

the system will determine the success or otherwise of the security strategy. Successful systems often align with the competence and relative focus of the consultant on the level of preventable violence as outlined in Chapter 2. This competence will also impact upon the appropriateness or otherwise of the various protocols that are introduced in the operation. For example, the level of acceptance by management of the consultant's recommendations, the relative input of the consultant, the comprehensiveness and appropriateness of security strategies, and similar protocols. In particular, it is contended that the development and implementation of an appropriate security management plan that is central across all business operations will correlate with the level of preventable violence at the nightclub. These issues will be investigated through surveys and interviews by seeking to establish the parameters and focus of any consultations.

5. *There was a criterion for selection of crowd controllers*

It is expected there will be a direct impact upon the level of preventable violence as the interpersonal skills of security staff are essential in both proactive phases (motivation and commitment to positive crowd control measures such as maintaining a security post, ongoing monitoring of patrons, suitable temperament for crowd control work) and reactive phases (responding to incidents or potential problems in a suitable and justifiable manner). For example, a crowd controller with appropriate communication, problem solving and conflict management skills should be able to manage most hostile incidents where there is an ability to communicate. Problems will arise where security staff lack competence in these essential areas or do not have the experience or inclination to strategically manage difficult situations. Inappropriate selection can also occur where there is a lack of suitable staff for employment. Typically, late night venues have less potential candidates than other areas of security operations where there are more predictable work hours, less problems or risk, and better rates of pay. A number of venue operators also prefer a larger male for their security needs which creates a gender imbalance but also results in a bouncer or "enforcer" perception (Goldsmith 1989). This can result in negative peer conditioning about how interactions should occur and the use of force. Selection also involves competence, suitable age, life and/or work experience, ethnicity, suitably licensed

for crowd control and employer strategies to overcome unexpected absences for key staff. Individual qualities deemed suitable for crowd control across the industry are based upon interpersonal skills with a strong focus on communication, problem solving and presentation (Worksafe Victoria 2007). The various approaches of venues including the parameters of their recruitment criteria will be investigated initially through the surveys and then in-depth in the interviews. Further, there will be an opportunity to compare and contrast the actual or perceptual differences between venue operators and those involved in providing contract security services.

6. Strategic location of security posts to monitor patrons

It is expected that there will be a direct impact upon the level of preventable violence as the presence of staff is essential in both proactive (prevention) and reactive (response) strategies.. Although technology such as CCTV can contribute at some level to risk minimisation, it is generally seen as a post-incident tool. Deficiencies for strategic placement may arise if there is a deficient span of control or ratio of crowd controllers to patrons. Although many crowd controllers are employed in a number of environments there is no legislative or other requirement for a nightclub to employ any security staff unless it is a condition of a liquor licence. Typically in Victoria, high-risk conditions require an appropriate span of control. The fundamental principle requires that the ratio should be reasonable to ensure there is appropriate monitoring and supervision throughout the venue. In Australia the span of control is calculated as “2 crowd controllers for the first 100 patrons, followed by 1 crowd controller for every 100 thereafter”. The span of control was first proposed by the author and accepted by the regulator in The Tunnel case proceedings in 1994 (Liquor Licensing Commission Victoria). In essence, if a venue contained around 500 patrons, the minimum recommended number of crowd controllers would be six. Leading from the span of control is strategic placement or put simply, resources should be positioned where they are best needed. Strategic placement or positioning not only allows for venue coverage with a focus on high-risk areas such as bars, dance floors and high traffic areas but also provides for crowd controllers to communicate with each other (hand signal, radio or time) to maximise any potential intervention strategy. It is generally accepted this results firstly in some

level of deterrence as the chances of detecting unacceptable behaviour are high with patrons, there is an ability by security or other venue staff to detect problems in the early stages, and finally creates an adequate response time to react where incidents arise including the presence of support staff to minimise the risk of an escalation (VCCAV 1990b).

It should be noted that strategic placement or positioning is affected by venue design. For example, a large open room with no partitions is easily monitored whereas a room with partitions will generally require more personnel or roving patrols to establish the same security level of monitoring or deterrent effect. In smaller operations or those where staff numbers are limited, it is common practice to introduce both static or fixed positions (posts) in addition to roving patrols. Many venues further enhance their security impact through effective communication strategies involving other staff such as duty managers, bar staff, promoters and glassies or bussies. Evidence will initially be gained through the surveys that consideration is made by the venue for strategic placement. However, interviews will determine the extent and depth of application in this area.

7. Video surveillance

There is a perceived direct impact upon the level of preventable violence in terms of current and future operations. It is reported throughout the criminological literature that crimes of violence often involve a lack of impulse control whereas crimes against property are based more on rational choice (Archer 1994; Collins 1989; Dixon 1990; Haines & Graham 2005; Hauritz et al. 1998a; Hauritz et al. 1998b; Sutton et al. 2008) and therefore surveillance strategies will not necessarily have a substantial impact upon violence reduction. However, a number of experienced security providers contend that where a venue introduces an overt surveillance system with signage that includes external surveillance opportunities at approach and access points, there is some positive impact regarding the risk of violence by some including crowd controllers and the more aware patrons (Rigakos 2004). Surveillance systems are commonly used to determine individual and/or group patron movement throughout a venue including primary entrance and exit points. The recording and monitoring system

is generally placed in a secure office. However, rarely is a staff member assigned to monitor live activity. In practice, captured vision is often used as a post-incident record that might facilitate an investigation by police, the regulator or the venue itself. Surveillance vision can also be used as an internal debriefing or training tool for staff although very few actually take advantage of this resource.

There is variation in the retention of vision at nightclubs, often influenced by computer capacity where vision is loaded directly onto a computer system or tape availability where video tapes are used. Some operations capture vision continuously whether trading or not whereas others, usually in compliance with a liquor licence condition, capture vision for 30 minutes before and 30 minutes after authorised trading periods. Most operations tend to retain vision for between 14 and 28 days. Some operations utilise a video register. The register provides for entries about incidents, whether certain vision must be retained pending other action past the usual retention date, notes about duplications or requests for a copy of vision from authorities or others such as lawyers. Specific incidents captured on video are often entered in the Crowd Controller's Register and cross-referenced to extracted vision. This provides an audit trail for post-incident actions. Surveillance capability for venues is also weighted against privacy and various legislative requirements such as the *Surveillance Devices Act 1999* (Vic) whereby vision cannot be captured in designated areas such as change rooms, toilets and similar "private" places. The data collection will firstly confirm the parameters of any video surveillance system and in-depth interviews will establish specific details and uses associated including benefits and detractions.

8. *Radio communication*

There is a perceived direct impact upon the level of preventable violence as communication between all venue staff is essential. Typically during trading, venue staff are involved in direct observations and interactions with patrons, serving alcohol and other beverages at various bars or service points, clearing glasses and rubbish from designated areas, attending to spillages and other potential hazards throughout the venue including toilets and external areas, and responding to various or possible incidents. To effectively perform these functions a venue communication strategy is essential and is often based upon

portable radio communication rather than reliance upon hand signals, timed patrols or personal face-to-face approaches between staff. Radio communication also facilitates the introduction of contingencies where incidents occur and countermeasures are required.

Typically, venues provide security staff and management with radio communication; however, contemporary practice also involves radio communication with bar staff, support staff such as bussies (glass and rubbish collectors), entertainment staff including DJs, and other designated staff such as promoters or customer service personnel. There are no standards regarding the quality of equipment installed in venues. This has resulted in variations ranging from unreliable and deficient devices in some venues through to high quality sophisticated systems in others. Most venues have strategies for staff communication such as codes and other protocols in addition to methods for testing, re-charging of batteries, securing equipment and fault rectification. The data collection will firstly confirm the parameters of any radio communication system. The in-depth interviews to be conducted will establish specific details about the extent of use by venue staff including the effectiveness of the current communication and perceived impact upon the system of security and violence in the venue.

9. Liaison with police

There is a perceived direct impact upon the level of preventable violence in both a proactive and reactive sense. Proactively, police experience can assist in the development of specific violence minimisation strategies such as giving advice about violence trends in the area, and identifying perpetrators from other venues and high-risk groups or individuals. Further, police may routinely or in response to a call for assistance attend and deter potential trouble-makers. In a reactive sense, police may provide a level of operational support for venue staff in managing incidents. Historically, there has generally been a positive relationship between the hospitality industry and policing; however, this has not always applied in the nightclub sector (VCCAV 1990b). Some police officers consider that nightclub activity and their related problems unnecessarily impact upon officer workload and take their focus away from general community policing

responsibilities. Conversely, some operators are suspicious of police-led initiatives such as imposed security or alcohol service standards and tend to avoid calling for assistance or encouraging police attendance.

Further, some venues consider the presence of a police uniform contrary to the hospitality venue atmosphere sought to be promoted. In Victoria, police attending licensed premises are required to submit a report to their regional commander who is responsible for all licensed premises in the area. If a venue seeks to have regular police attendance this can create the perception of operational problems hence licensees tend to avoid such attendance where possible. Some venues require management authority to call for assistance and others have developed strict guidelines as to the circumstances warranting a request for police attendance. The data collection will firstly confirm the parameters of any arrangement with police and the in-depth interviews will identify specific details including problems that might arise from a venue perspective.

10. Alarm systems for incidents

There is a perceived direct impact upon the level of preventable violence in both a proactive and reactive sense. Alarm systems utilised during trading times in nightclubs vary and are generally used in access control (to prevent patrons in the venue opening doors for friends outside the premises) and emergency response through a duress system (warning of violence, robbery, fire/smoke or other possible hazards such as excessive heat in equipment or refrigeration malfunction). Commonly access measures involve protection of emergency exit doors that are not typically manned and the installation of blue strobe lights to minimise the risk of unauthorised access by patrons previously removed or considered undesirable to gain admission or re-admission to the venue. In these circumstances a blue strobe light is easily observed by bar, support and security staff thus creating a higher level of crowd control by allowing the venue to determine who has access to the area. In some venues, alarms also involve a series of lights that indicate to security and management that support is required in specified areas of the venue. For example, a green light might indicate security is required in the public bar and a yellow light that attendance is required in the gaming room and the like. The data collection will firstly confirm the existence

or otherwise of an alarm system and the in-depth interviews will identify the effectiveness of the system in addressing security concerns.

11. Instructions to crowd controllers are both written and oral

There is a perceived direct impact upon the level of preventable violence in both a proactive and reactive sense. Most venues provide some form of documented policy or expectation about key security measures to security staff. This enhances venue security and safety by introducing a level of operational consistency. It also reduces the likelihood for confusion by individuals or between venue staff. In addition, oral instructions often supplement established documentation and usually identify current or immediate security and safety needs of the venue (Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012). The data collection will firstly identify how instructions are provided throughout the venue and the semi-structured interviews will investigate the effectiveness or otherwise of the current strategy.

12. On-going training and system review

There is a perceived direct impact upon the level of preventable violence proactively and reactively. As outlined in Chapter 2, training and development opportunities for security staff operating at a venue will involve formal and informal opportunities. In addition, it would appear it is mainly the larger venues that adopt a professional development program or internal training strategy for their staff (Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012; VCCAV 1990b). Smaller venues appear to rely on pre-licensing training of security and other staff. (Jones 2006; King 2004). The data collection will firstly confirm whether there is a training strategy for crowd controllers and other venue staff. The interviews will investigate specific details of how programs are developed and by whom; deliver methodology; ascertain the duration, frequency and opportunities for staff to attend training; and ascertain what methods are in place to ensure the program remains relevant and current.

13. Incident register

There is a perceived direct impact upon the level of preventable violence proactively and reactively. The importance of an incident register is often misunderstood. In Victoria, the *Private Security Act 2004* (Vic) requires every

venue to maintain a Crowd Controller's Register to record incidents. Most other Australian jurisdictions have followed this initiative.

Incidents that must be recorded involve physical interactions such as forcible contact in or around the venue or where a crowd controller restrains or ejects a person. The benefits of the register include data gathering about trends and incidents. For example, an examination of the register over the preceding months may indicate patterns for incidents such as gender, age range, timeframes and a number of other situational variables that indicate that there is a substantial increase for certain types of incident. Based upon this data, the venue is then able to implement a security strategy to minimise risk. Data from a register can also impact upon induction methods and further training or other development strategies at the venue. Often data captured at one venue can also influence the security strategy at comparable operations due to patron profile. The data collection will firstly investigate the extent of reporting. The interviews will establish how data is managed and incorporated into any induction or professional development program at the venue.

14. Evacuation procedures for fire and other emergencies

It is contended that there will be an indirect impact upon preventable violence. Australian Standard 3745:2010 applies to buildings where there is public assembly including nightclubs. Security staff, as part of their pre-licensing training, are instructed in the Australian Standard and general responses in emergency situations including "civil disorder" as contained in the Standard. Civil disorder includes violence. Prudent operators plan for individual conflicts that typically might not invoke emergency practices or an emergency response. However, as there is the potential for crowd violence, the crowd control strategy will require planning for loss of control during a brawl and how those involved might be isolated to minimise the risk of violence. Although the standard is generally used for the purposes of building evacuation and addressing the risk of fire and bomb threat, it provides the basis for preplanning along similar lines to common industry practice for security staff. The data collection will firstly identify whether the venue aligns with the Australian Standard and the in-depth interviews will investigate the extent and operationalisation of the Standard.

15. First aid training and facilities

It is perceived there will be little if any impact upon preventable violence although training in first aid will raise awareness about matters relevant to hygiene, injuries, blood and other bodily fluids to minimise exposure to individuals in the workplace. This “good practice” will be noted in the survey instrument for the purpose of identifying completeness of a security management plan.

16. Procedures and training for underage persons

It is contended that this area will have a direct impact upon preventable violence. Specifically as young persons are statistically a higher risk for violence (perpetrator or victim) and risk taking behaviours as outlined in Chapter 2 (Collier 1998; Connell 1995; Hauritz et al. 1998a; Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012). This issue will be investigated initially through the surveys to determine the extent and parameters of any procedures and then extrapolated during the interviews.

17. Responsible serving of alcohol

As discussed in Section 3.2, there is evidence that the programs work, particularly when backed by strong enforcement measures, although training can be disregarded to achieve a more profitable operation (Doherty & Roche 2003). This can lead to continued service to intoxicated patrons thus increasing the potential for a range of alcohol-related harms including violence (Andreasson et al. 2000; Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012). Although late night operations attract high-risk liquor licence conditions, there are broad variations between operational practices in responsible serving of alcohol. This area will be investigated initially through the surveys to determine training in responsible serving of alcohol and then the focus and application of the training in the venue operation will be investigated during the interviews.

18. Male and female door personnel

It is contended that appropriate gender representation will have a direct impact upon preventable violence. It is often suggested that the gender identity of staff should reflect the actual patronage at the venue (Graham & Homel 2008; Hayes-

Jonkers et al. 2012; VCCAV 1990b). When The Tunnel nightclub introduced a specifically selected female door security staff member to screen patrons there were substantial reductions in conflict, violence and related incidents.

Female security staff are generally seen as less challenging to male patrons, establish a “softer” and more appealing venue appearance, and are less likely to be the subject of spontaneous violence by hostile individuals VCCAV 1990b). The data collection will firstly confirm whether there is a venue requirement for engagement of female and male door personnel. The in-depth interviews will identify how the strategy is operationalised and issues relevant to its effectiveness.

19. Induction of staff

The manner of staff induction is perceived to have a clear impact upon the level of violence at a venue (Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012). As outlined by Reason (2000), the creation of an informed culture is essential to incident reduction and in the context of this study to minimise violence. Davis (1994) contends that induction is the most important process for new workers and should include access to relevant operating procedures and other materials that form the system of work.

A number of these elements have flowed from “good practices” identified by the VCCAV (VCCAV 1990b) or based upon finding in proceedings (LLC 1994; *Club Italia* 2001). Further, industry consultation and the establishment of good practices have occurred through industry collaborations including operators involved in the Westend Forum and more recently Accords (VCCAV 1990b; Graham & Homel 2008).

3.4 Conclusion

It is consistently reported that violence can be minimised through implementation of the following:

1. Formalising the system of security to align with recommended practices (Fischer & Green 2003; Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012; Reason 2000; VWA 2006, 2007; Wolpert 2007);

2. Inducting and training of all venue staff (not just security personnel) in matters considered critical to security with a major focus on prevention rather than detection or reaction and thus establishing an informed culture (Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012; Healey 2006; Paterson 2000; Prenzler & Hayes 1998; Russ & Geller 1987; Reason 2000; VCCAV 1990b);
3. Targeted policing through venue inspections to provide a level of external monitoring that in turn encourages the adoption of and alignment with appropriate industry practices (VCCAV 1990b);
4. Regulatory interventions including placement of conditions on liquor licences to again encourage adoption and alignment with industry best practice (VCCAV 1990b; VCGLR 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d); and
5. Community mobilisation to collectively implement and maintain appropriate practices that are specific to the venue and its position in the planning and local environment (AACNZ 2002; Andreasson et al. 1999; Boots et al. 1995; Braun & Graham 1997, Casswell & Gilmore 1989; Cope 1995; Dixon 1990; Giesbrecht et al. 1990; Hauritz et al. 1998b; Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012; Homel 1990; Homel et al. 1997a; Lander 1995; Lang et al. 1998; Makkai 1997; Measham 2004; Midford et al. 1995; Miller et al. 2012; Stockwell 2010).

Although the literature addresses both specific and broader security and venue operational issues, the evidence suggests violence in and around any nightclub needs to be addressed through a combination of security approaches that are contextualised for the particular venue (Graham & Homel 2008; Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012; Miller et al. 2012; Stockwell 2010). This suggests a need for both the implementation of generic or common security strategies that can be suitably customised for a particular operation, and venue-specific initiatives that are suitable for the particular environment (Graham & Homel 2008; Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012).

Finally, there is little if any research on the question of what practices in a system of security work best to reduce violence in and around nightclubs (Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012). Indeed, there is little scientific basis for understanding the problem hence a need for a study to provide evidence of what operational security practices are associated with reducing the frequency and seriousness of violence in these

circumstances. This leads to the research question “Do nightclubs that adopt a best practice security framework have less violence than venues that do not?”

Chapter 4 – Methodology

4.1 Introduction

The aim of this study is to identify the association between security practices and levels of violence in nightclubs.

Chapters 2 and 3 provided an overview of the current literature relevant to violence in and around licensed premises including nightclubs. They highlighted there are many issues that need to be considered in the development of an effective security strategy. These issues can apply internally to the operation such as resourcing, venue management and staff competence whether security or others such as bar attendants, and externally including how a venue might monitor and control areas where there is the potential for conflict or violence immediately adjacent to the venue. As highlighted throughout the literature, external controls can be more problematic and often involve collaborations with other venues, transport operators, food vendors, police and regulators (Chikritzhs & Stockwell 2002; Graham & Homel 2008; Miller et al. 2012). Use of lockouts, additional police patrols and increased guardianship of areas have had some impact (Miller et al. 2012; Stockwell 2010). However, there is a need to further explore security issues such as elements or factors that might influence the behaviour of individuals and groups in and around licensed premises, especially where such a system might be able to minimise the risk of violence.

This chapter builds upon the previous two chapters and provides an overview of the methodology used in the study. The chapter is divided into six sections:

- Section 1 summarises the research question and aims to identify elements of a best practice framework that will be most effective in minimising the risk of violence;
- Section 2 proposes a research question generated from existing theory and knowledge about practices that appear to strongly impact upon the incidence of violence;
- Section 3 describes the research design and approach used for the study. This includes the methodology, rationale for using this methodology and discussion of the relative strengths and limitations of the methodology;

- Section 4 describes how nightclubs were recruited for the study, the determination of level 1 and level 2 risk categories, and the selection and participation of respondents;
- Section 5 describes the data collection including the sample, sampling methods and statistical measures, and discusses issues of reliability and validity; and
- Section 6 provides an overview and summary of the chapter.

Currently, studies of violence and licensed premises can be categorised into three common themes:

1. Alcohol and intoxication;
2. Community mobilisation; and
3. Situational measures.

As outlined in Chapter 2, there are many studies of the causes of violence including its correlation with alcohol consumption (Acher 1994; Akers 1977; Athens 1997; Bandura & Ribes-Inesta 1976; Collier 1998; Gelles 1987; Graham & Homel 2008; Kelley 1997; Reiss & Roth 1994; Sacco & Kennedy 1994). Other studies relating to violence at licensed premises identify problems associated with situational aspects (Graham & Homel 2008; Hayes-Jonkers et al. 2012; Homel et al. 2004; Miller et al. 2012). These include permissive attitudes to intoxication and/or aggression, poor management, inappropriate venue design, negative perception caused by lack of cleanliness and ventilation, and hostile atmosphere (Graham & Homel 2008; Homel et al. 2004; Macintyre & Homel 1997; Malbon 1998; St. John-Brooks 1998; Webster et al. 2002). The literature also suggests that the ecological environment may have a greater influence than individual characteristics on security-related issues (Braun & Graham 1997; Graham et al. 1996; Haines & Graham 2005; Homel et al. 2004; Miller et al. 2012; VCCAV 1990b; Wells et al. 2009). For this reason, the more specific areas of inquiry in this study are distinguished in terms of how much is known about the particular research question.

4.2 Research question and statement of procedure


As discussed in the previous Chapters, nightclubs and entertainment precincts are frequented by a substantial number of patrons and other members of the community. Associated with this activity are links between nightclubs, intoxication and violence. This highlights a need for the identification of minimum security standards to guide industry and other key stakeholders including regulators. There is an absence of research about systems of security and their effectiveness in and around nightclubs. As discussed above, some State and Territory jurisdictions throughout Australia have introduced guidance materials that recommend “good practices” such as responsible serving of alcohol, suitable venue design and strategies for the creation of safer bars. However, there has been no specific study focused on security systems including essential elements that underpin a security strategy and how such a system of security might minimise the risk of violence.

The research question addressed in this thesis is:

Do nightclubs that adopt a “best practice” security framework have less violence than venues that do not?

The answer to this question is discussed in this and the following chapters.

Two definitions flow from this question: “best practice” and “violence”. “Best practice” for the purpose of this study comprises the formal introduction of five key elements as outlined below:



These elements were discussed in Chapter 3. “Violence” is defined by the World Health Organisation (2002) as outlined in Chapter 1 and reported by the 20 venues.

4.2.1 Statement of procedure

As outlined above, this study has identified an absence of research in the area of nightclub security systems. The shortcoming has possibly contributed to a variety of regulatory and industry interventions for nightclubs to minimise the level of violence in various jurisdictions that are not necessarily evidence-based. To explore this issue further the following procedure was adopted for this study:

1. Develop research question;
2. Confirm key elements for a nightclub system of security from current knowledge;
3. Identify a suitable sample;
4. Identify measures of violence as reported by venue staff and Level 1 (more incidents) and Level 2 (less incidents) nightclubs to be studied;
5. Explain the research design for the study;
6. Identify how the nightclubs were selected for the study and which staff roles are required for participation;
7. Explain the method for assessing venue security systems;
8. Explain data collection methods; and
9. Describe how data was analysed for the study.

4.2.2 Key elements of a security system to be investigated

Although there are a number of elements present in any system of security for a nightclub, some of these elements are considered more important than others in minimising the risk of violence. For example, emergency preparedness including fire evacuation is an essential element of any nightclub system of security. However, emergency preparedness would not have the same impact upon the risk or frequency of violence as staff strategically placed throughout the venue to monitor patron behaviour. Similarly, it is anticipated that first aid training and first aid facilities would not have the same influence on violence reduction or the risk of conflict, aggression or violence as the presence of male and female door personnel who determine suitable patrons for admission.

Based upon the literature and knowledge available, the elements considered essential and therefore requiring further investigation in this study are:

1. security risk assessment;
2. security management plan;
3. availability of security management plan for the information of staff;
4. external expertise in security;
5. criteria for selection of crowd controllers;
6. strategic positioning of staff;
7. use of video surveillance;
8. radio communication between key staff;
9. formal liaison policy with police;
10. alarm or early warning system for incidents;
11. written procedures for security and other venue staff;
12. ongoing security related training;
13. maintenance of a crowd controllers register;
14. emergency procedures;
15. first aid facilities and training;
16. training and written procedures for underage persons;
17. training and written procedures for responsible serving of alcohol;
18. male and female door staff; and
19. formal induction of new staff.

Each of the elements was coded as a variable for the purposes of statistical analysis. It was intended to examine the relationship between the practices of the venues and the level of violence. Further, it was determined that an analysis of variables between Level 1 and Level 2 venues would allow for an understanding of specific differences that might apply to operations that were problematic (level 1) as opposed to those that were relatively trouble-free (level 2).

A fundamental consideration of every relation between variables is magnitude (size). Magnitude or size relates to the measure of strength between two variables (Walter 2010). For example, if every level 2 venue in this study had completed a documented security risk assessment in the development of a system of security, one could conclude that the magnitude of the relation between the two variables is very high in this sample. One could then argue one variable (level 2 venue) is based on the other (documented risk assessment). This is expanded upon below in Section 5.2 during the analysis of data.

4.2.3 Measure of violence in and around the nightclubs

There is no state-wide database or information gathering system by either the liquor licensing regulator or Victoria Police that would assist this work. Although Victorian legislation requires crowd controllers and/or venues to report prescribed incidents, including the removal of patrons from venues, the industry under-reports, or on most occasions does not report other than in serious circumstances where there may be injury, complaint, police involvement or the potential for future litigation (Moyes 2006).

The rationale for non-reporting or under-reporting by venues is that it assists a self-exposed construction of an adverse operating history that might impact upon the ability of a venue to continue trading through regulatory intervention (Graham & Homel 2008; Prenzler & Hayes 1998). Other reasons include pressure of time, lack of management commitment to reporting, misunderstanding of legislative reporting requirements and lack of motivation. Data from the police would not reflect the true level or number of incidents as only reported, not actual incidents would be known (Hobbs et al. 2003). It is assumed that two issues would assist to reduce this problem. Firstly, under guarantee of anonymity venues might be inclined to accurately disclose their true operational history including incidents of violence; and secondly, interviews with cooperative front line staff would result in the most likely accurate data.

Definitions were then developed to assist in the identification and subsequent categorisation of Level 1 and Level 2 venues. A Level 1 venue was defined as having over the past 12 months experienced on average a number of violent incidents each

week with the violence involving actual violence or threats of immediate physical violence such as escalating behaviours that involved pushing, invading another’s personal space and the like; and these incidents usually involved security staff and/or required intervention by those staff, i.e., physically intervening, strategically communicating with those involved such as defusing an aggressor, calling for back-up by others at the venue, or calling police for assistance.

A Level 2 venue experienced on average one or less violent incidents each week. The definitions are graphically illustrated in Table 4.

Table 4: Definitions for Level 1 and Level 2 venues

Level 1 Venue	Level 2 Venue
Experienced on average a number of violent incidents each week that required an actual or potential staff intervention.	Experienced on average one or less violent incidents each week that required an actual or potential staff intervention.

A potential staff intervention includes circumstances where staff decided not to intervene due to personal safety concerns, or the incident quickly resolved, or the location was outside the venue and staff were not inclined to intervene based upon venue policy or a perception of risk. In other circumstances the police, neighbouring venue staff the participant’s associates or others intervened. An analysis of reported incidents by each venue resulted in a mean for Level 1 venues of 4.5 incidents each week and the mean for Level 2 venues that was less than one (.08) and therefore a clear distinction between the venue categories (See Table 5 and further discussion below for an elaboration).

As patron capacity varied between the venues it was decided to manipulate the reported incidents comparative to venue size, thus a venue with a capacity of 600 had its reported violence reduced by 50% to align with a venue that had a capacity of 300 patrons.

It was not a primary consideration as to whether violent incidents occurred in the venue or externally, provided there was some connection to the venue. For example, patrons seeking entry and/or being turned away and becoming aggressive, or patrons involved in an incident in the vicinity after leaving or being removed from the venue

were included. If there was no clear connection between a violent incident and a particular venue the incident was not recorded. However, all external incidents were noted in the data as the frequency, location and seriousness of those incidents would potentially impact upon the development of an enhanced “best practice” model.

It was anticipated there may still be difficulties in establishing the true extent of violence at some venues due to under-reporting for the reasons outlined above. There are also difficulties identifying the nexus between venues and incidents where patrons have effectively moved to a remote location in the nightclub precinct. That aside, it was decided that the most effective approach was to engage key stakeholders so they would have nothing to gain by under-reporting.

There needed to be a simple unambiguous definition to avoid confusion about violence. After consideration of the various definitions available including legislative, common law, regulatory such as Victorian Workcover Authority information on workplace violence, and security guidance materials, it was decided to adopt the WHO definition as outlined above in Chapter 1. It was also decided to provide example statements to further minimise the risk of misinterpretation. This definition, reproduced below, was provided to each participant as part of the explanatory statement:

Violence as defined by the WHO means the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation.

Examples of violence are:

1. Striking, kicking, scratching, biting, spitting or any other type of direct physical contact;
2. Using, threatening or producing knives, guns, clubs or any other type of weapon such as a drinking glass;
3. Pushing, shoving, tripping, grabbing or resisting another person;
4. Any form of indecent physical contact such as touching a female’s breasts or rubbing against another person;

5. Sexual harassment or stalking that causes fear in the victim; or
6. Using direct or indirect verbal threats or aggressive behaviours such as intentionally invading someone's body space or making gestures such as a threatening fist or finger drawn across the throat.

As outlined above, actual reporting entered in the Crowd Controller's Register would not necessarily convey an accurate picture of incidents including violence. It was anticipated that a number of difficulties would also present in surveying staff. These included:

1. Venue managers may not be fully aware of all incidents occurring in and around the venue as they might be distracted by other managerial responsibilities;
2. Managers might wish to convey a different perception about the venue that is more positive;
3. Crowd controllers can become desensitised to violence and might actually consider some violent incidents as non-violent such as verbal aggression and escalating or challenging behaviour; and
4. Bar and support staff might be more sensitive to aggression and violence and might consider non-violent behaviour as more serious and violent.

Further, it was considered that relative age, gender and experience might also be factors affecting perception hence the importance of a simple unambiguous definition applied to a cross-section of personnel was considered essential. It was decided to prepare an overview that briefly explained the definition of violence due to the potential problems outlined above for each participant and attach that to the survey instrument (see Appendix A).

Central to initial data collection was the survey instrument. This instrument was designed to gather a data set of information including the level of violence to designate participating venues as level 1 or level 2 venues based upon their responses to Question 30: "On average, how many incidents occur at the venue each week?"

- 1 = none (incidents are rare)
- 2 = 1 or 2
- 3 = 3
- 4 = 4 or 5
- 5 = 6 or 7
- 6 = more than 7

It was decided to divide the nightclubs into level 1 and level 2 venues by taking the 10 with the most incidents and the 10 with the least incidents. Coding of the level 1 venues was 1-10 and of the level 2 venues 11-20. A meaningful difference was evident between level 1 and level 2 venues when violent incidents for each venue were analysed (see Table 5 below). A description of the sample is provided below in this chapter; however, to determine the level of violence for each venue the following staff were surveyed:

1. Licensee;
2. Duty manager;
3. Security manager or coordinator;
4. Crowd controller; and
5. Bar person.

Based upon responses by the five staff for each venue, an average was determined. Subsequently this average was confirmed during the semi-structured interviews where a representative from each venue who had most knowledge about incidents and the system of security discussed the survey responses and average for the venue. Each average was deemed accurate by the venue representative. Table 5 below reveals the mean for violent incidents by venue each week.

Table 5: Average number of violent incidents at venues

Category	Venue Code	Interview Response	Mean on Surveys
Level 1	1	3	3
	2	4	5
	3	4	5
	4	4	5
	5	3	3
	6	4	4
	7	5	7
	8	5	6
	9	4	5
	10	5	7
Level 2	11	2	1
	12	1	<1
	13	2	1
	14	1	<1
	15	1	<1
	16	1	<1
	17	1	<1
	18	1	<1
	19	1	<1
	20	1	1

After adjustment according to their patronage most level 1 venues averaged 4-5 violent incidents each week although two of the 10 venues reported more than six violent incidents each week. Level 2 venues typically averaged one or less incident each week, with the mean being less than one (.08%). The survey instrument and semi-structured interviews elaborated on incident data by exploring additional factors including time, gender of those involved, intoxication and incident location. These factors are discussed below in this chapter.

4.3 Research design and approach

According to Becker and Bryman (2004), there are five levels of research design: exploratory, descriptive, explanatory, longitudinal and experimental. The design provides a blueprint for the collection, measurement and analysis of data in providing answers to a research question.

In an *exploratory* design, the researcher attempts to diagnose the dimensions of a problem, or tests a practice or concept that often generates a new idea or practice. A *descriptive* design focuses on the elements of a strategy by measuring their characteristics, use, extent and where they may be used. *Explanatory* design is a type of design where the researcher seeks to identify cause and effect relationships that are

relevant to the presence of dependent and independent variables. A *longitudinal* design is similar to an explanatory one but it is undertaken while the phenomenon is taking place and thus looks at change over time. An *experimental* design aims to test a hypothesis. This design uses an experimental group and a control group and is used when there is considerable knowledge about the subject area (Burns & Grove 2005; Hunter & Leahey 2008; Shadish et al. 2002).

The design for this study is best described as descriptive. A descriptive research design is important because it allows the author to describe phenomena and infer relationships between variables and, in this study, elements of a system of security between level 1 and level 2 venues. According to Burns and Grove (2005), in descriptive studies it is important to select a sample that is representative of the larger group being studied. The study should provide an accurate portrayal of characteristics relevant to a situation or group (Selltiz et al. 1976).

Descriptive studies often use survey and semi-structured interviews (Walter 2010). Rubin and Babbie (2005, p.307) contend surveys assist in the collection of original data of a population. Monette, Sullivan and DeJong (2005) argue a survey instrument provides a broad research opportunity. The use of surveys in this study is expanded upon below in Section 4.2.

Ideally the current study would involve an experimental design with a number of randomly selected high-risk licensed premises that had a sterile internally-developed system of security. Of course, the nature of a highly casualised, transient and mobile industry does not allow for such a study.

Further, an experimental design would be difficult to implement or sustain due to the following:

1. The competitive nature of nightclubs means that venue popularity and therefore patronage can change substantially, sometimes over a relatively short period of time. For example, the Melbourne-based venues “Salt Nightclub” (internal violence resulting in multiple deaths outside the premises involving Asian gangs) and “Beaconsfield Hotel” (death of high profile former international cricketer David Hookey who was assaulted by a crowd

controller) saw both venues decline in popularity from peak attendances to subsequent closure over a matter of weeks;

2. The predominance of casual employment and the transient nature of personnel and job opportunities throughout the industry results in high staff turnover, especially at the entry and operational base levels; and
3. The timeframe that might be required for an experimental design.

A number of measures were taken to overcome the lack of experimental design. This involved the following approach to identifying the basis for an enhanced practice model:

1. Detailed analysis of the security system for each venue followed by a category-specific comparative analysis of security features of different venues;
2. Identification of commonalities between venues for each category and the subsequent identification of specific features irrespective of category; and
3. Identification of “primary” and “secondary” security features relative to the venues that influence frequency and seriousness of violence.

In consideration of the aims of this study, a mixed methodology, with some quantitative and some qualitative methods, was considered the most appropriate strategy, utilising a survey questionnaire and semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders. This design was considered to provide a practical approach to this “green field” area of research into nightclub security operations.

Quantitative methods allow for a numerical examination of interactions between variables. It gathers data from the representative sample being studied and can be generalised to other situations, in this case nightclub operations. Responses gained from the survey instrument formed the basis for quantitative analysis in this study. Qualitative methods are used to study social and individual phenomena, processes and experiences. These include experiences and the language used to describe these experiences (Walter 2010). Responses obtained during the semi-structured interviews provided an illustration of common approaches to the subject and are included in the

results chapter. Validity and reliability are central to the study design as outlined below.

A mixed methods approach is strongly supported in the literature (Caracelli & Greene 1993; Creswell 2003; McNeill & Chapman 2005). Muijs (2004, p.9) contends that “Mixed methods research is a flexible approach where the research design is determined by what we want to find out rather than by any predetermined epistemological position”.

Anderson (1994) contends that there are three advantages in using a combination of methodologies. First, research is concerned with theoretical and practical knowledge and studies that combine methodologies increase the likelihood of addressing both. Second, each methodology can build upon the strengths of the other. For example, qualitative measures emphasise understanding and practical application in the context of work and can provide a broader base for quantitative measures and generalisation. Finally, qualitative and quantitative methodologies provide distinct but complementary information about the phenomena of interest.

In the current study quantitative methods are particularly suited to determine elements of a venue system of security. Similarly, quantitative methods may, depending on the size of the sample, allow for generalisation about incident trends, incident profile, times of risk and offender/patron/staff involvement in incidents. From this one is able to determine differences between level 1 and level 2 venue systems, the characteristics of persons involved in incidents, the types of incident relative to profile and incident time trends. Quantitative methods could also explain phenomena such as factors that influence recruitment of staff or that impact upon staff performance when dealing with conflict. This will allow for the generation of statistical data and the prediction of scores on one variable such as differences in management practices from a level 1 to a level 2 nightclub or the impact of documented venue protocols on incident rates.

Qualitative methods are more suited for in-depth studies as the number of variables in quantitative methods are potentially limited (by the researcher). However, there may be the need for a more detailed investigation of variables. The justification for a qualitative approach in this regard is widely reported, allowing for in-depth

explanations whilst tapping into multi-dimensionality of concepts (Sherman & Reid 1994; Yin 1994). This is particularly relevant to the various subtleties associated with human behaviour including staff perceptions of safety, security and risks in the workplace. Additional information desired as a result of the surveys would be elicited through the semi-structured interviews.

To expand further, the survey strategies used in the study are designed to identify key features central to each nightclub system of security and assess the relative impact of violence minimisation strategies. Follow-up semi-structured interviews then further explore the security features and how these features might impact upon violence. It is contended that the interviews will assist to identify the systemic influences and individual behaviours that are often associated with spontaneous acts of violence, which would be difficult to incorporate into a quantitative survey tool. The interviews would also allow for an elaboration of answers provided by respondents during the survey phase. As there was also an absence of suitable data from other studies upon which to build, the various perceptions of experienced operators was essential to this study.

The approach allows for me to contrast various situational characteristics of nightclubs with violence problems with those of nightclubs that had few violence problems, i.e., level 1 and level 2 venues. Unlike the work of Purcell and Graham (2005) and Wells, Graham and West (1998), whose main aim of research was to observe aggression and violence in nightclubs, this design avoids any reliance on observations of violence or other incidents as it could prove hazardous to observers and also create an artificial perception since security staff or others were aware of the study observers. It is important to note that the study seeks to identify system characteristics that may impact upon violence rather than the root causes of violent behaviours.

Yu (2004) argues that a variety of research methods and the use of triangulation provides confidence through multi-source substantiation. According to Pelto and Pelto (1978), a “multi-instrument” method provides “triangulation” of multiple sources. Triangulation is defined as “a vehicle for cross validation when two or more distinct methods are found to be congruent and yield comparable data” (Moebius 2002).

4.4 Data collection

The overall study design for this project is descriptive. The main focus of this study is security systems at 20 nightclubs in the City of Stonnington (Chapel Street entertainment precinct). The data collection stage took approximately 12 months to complete. This period allowed a study of operational patterns and systems of security for each of the nightclubs.

4.4.1 Administration

A comprehensive administration strategy was implemented for the duration of the study. This included development and subsequent use of the following:

1. Electronic communication log;
2. Covering letter for participants;
3. Explanatory Statement; and
4. Consent Form.

The electronic communication log was utilised to enable tracking for relevant communications (telephone, email, letter, fax or face-to-face) throughout the study. The communication log also provided for action items to ensure any follow-up inquiries were addressed as required.

The covering letter for participants was attached to the survey questionnaire and the explanatory statement. The letter explained the importance of the research and why potential respondents were invited to participate. The letter also explained that participation in the study was voluntary, with the option to withdraw at any time, and that confidentiality was assured (Appendix B). The covering letter complemented the content of the Explanatory Statement.

Although verbal consent was provided by each respondent prior to participation, written consent was obtained before completion of the questionnaires or participation in the semi-structured interviews. Once consent was obtained participants were

briefed on the process that was to follow and on each occasion clarification, if required, was offered.

Bias

Where respondents opted to complete the survey questionnaire face-to-face or participate in the semi-structured interviews there could be a perception of bias, in particular, in circumstances where the researcher was involved in explanations and clarification of issues. It was also felt that respondents might have been inclined to provide “favourable” answers or comments based upon a perception of what should be provided within a security strategy rather than give a correct account of what actually existed in their venue’s system of security. Although it could be argued that an independent person should administer the surveys this would not be practical, especially as time, cost and expertise in the specialist area would impact adversely upon the study objectives. Even if there was actual bias or a perception of bias, the fact that the strategy involved a multi-method approach and triangulation would minimise any serious impact upon the integrity of outcomes.

There were three distinct steps taken in the data collection:

Step 1 – Survey of 100 designated persons from the 20 nightclubs;

Step 2 – Conduct of follow-up semi-structured interviews for elaboration as required; and

Step 3 – Inspection of security system documentation from the nightclubs.

Step 1 – Survey instrument

As outlined above, the survey instrument was designed to gather a large data set of information relevant to systems of security at the 20 nightclubs. It was intended to establish, amongst other things, which elements were present in each venue’s system of security and then how they were operationalised. Data collected would include features of the nightclub security system, venue-specific strategies related to operationalising the security system, details about venue incidents and demographic information. Part 4 of the survey instrument sought information about the respondent.

It was considered more advantageous to provide a self-administered survey that was simple in format and could be completed without too much writing, thus saving time and increasing the chances of completion. The instrument comprised fixed-alternative questions such as multiple choice or yes/no responses with elaboration if required. Respondents were able to decide whether to complete the survey in person, by mail, by telephone, or electronically through an email attachment. The actual mode of completion is outlined in Table 6.

Table 6: Survey modes of completion

Completion type	No.
Direct (face-to-face)	47
Mail	12
Telephone	15
Email	26

As outlined above, for each venue staff roles were selected for participation across five core operational areas:

1. Licensee;
2. Duty manager;
3. Security manager or coordinator;
4. Crowd controller; and
5. Bar person.

High completion rates are attributable to the strong support for this study by key stakeholders including venue operators. A number of respondents acknowledged the broad approval of individual venues and the potential positives relative to security systems that would flow from this study.

Piloting of survey

The survey instrument, a questionnaire, was pre-tested on three security firm operators and three licensees not involved in the study. It took between 20-30 minutes to complete. The pre-test respondents were asked to provide feedback about the content of the instrument including terminology. They were also requested to make suggestions about how to improve the design of the questionnaire. This resulted in some minor modifications to its wording;

however, the format, sequence and general content remained unchanged. The pre-test respondents appeared to have no difficulty with terminology and various expressions proposed, other than requiring some clarification of the definition of “violence” outlined on the survey document.

It was decided to include explanations about violence as outlined above in this chapter to maximise understanding. The fact that the questionnaire was easy to understand and simple to complete, with minimal writing required, was acknowledged by pre-test respondents.

All respondents were provided with contact information for the researcher and the principal supervisor which allowed for a convenient and immediate post-participation method of communication. All survey responses were saved electronically and regularly backed-up by the researcher.

Voluntary participation was assured through distribution of a consent form before respondents were provided with the actual questionnaire. Participants were free to withdraw from the survey at any time. There was no known direct pressure on individuals to participate, or even to continue once they started answering the survey questions. Anonymity was also important for both the nightclub and the individual respondents. As outlined above, this was guaranteed and reinforced by covering letter, consent form and explanatory statement.

Respondents were not required to provide any identifying information at any stage. However, those respondents who wanted to receive a report with the results of the study or receive feedback were invited to contact Monash University. Overall, 100 participants from the 20 nightclubs completed the survey instrument. No respondent has contacted the University for feedback about the study although this is possibly because feedback has been provided during progress presentations to the Stonnington Licensee’s Accord. It is assumed that nightclub representatives then provided feedback to their respective team members including those who participated in the study.

The survey instrument was circulated and later collected by an undergraduate criminal justice student over a four month period. The rationale for using an undergraduate student was to minimise bias at this stage of the study as a number

of nightclub staff had prior knowledge of or dealings with the researcher and current author.

Step 2 – Semi-structured interviews

The semi-structured interviews followed on from the survey and further allowed an investigation of the elements of each nightclub's security system. This strategy confirmed many assertions made in the survey, in addition to providing greater detail about each element, including an elaboration of the implementation of the security system by each venue. It also provided an opportunity to determine and further investigate the impact of incidents compared to what might have applied prior to operationalisation.

The interviews would generally take around 15-30-45 minutes to complete, considering the pre-interview information that was provided to respondents in preparation. One representative from each venue participated in the semi-structured interviews. This person was selected due to their in-depth knowledge of the venue system of security.

The primary objective of the interviews was to record, analyse and interpret the individual experiences, opinions and perspectives of nightclub systems of security. While the interview procedure used a semi-structured format guided by specific areas, it was also open-ended in nature to be responsive to emerging topics and themes. Discussion questions were drawn from responses to the survey questionnaire, which had been coded in prior analysis.

Care was taken to minimise the risk of methodological disadvantages associated with interview bias as it was possible the interviewer could inadvertently influence the respondent through non-verbal cues such as signalling "correct" or preferred responses. In addition, the interviewer was cognisant of the possibility that respondents might seek to impress by giving desirable rather than true answers to overcome deficiencies in a venue's security system.

On balance, the interview strategy was particularly helpful in gaining a richer and more detailed picture of the various operations.

3. Inspection of documentation

During visits to each venue documentation relating to systems of security was inspected where interviews were conducted on the licensed premises and documents were available. Typically, this involved operating procedures, incident registers and training or staff records. The aim of the document inspection was to gauge the parameters, comprehensiveness and appropriateness of resources. The inspections are a method of reinforcing various assertions made in the survey responses relevant to each system of security, hence providing some supportive or corroborative evidence. It would also allow the researcher to review each system for comparative purposes in both categories of level 1 and level 2 venues and how the system of security applied in each case.

A number of obvious deficiencies surfaced relating to reliable or accurate record keeping by some venues. For example, where the responsibility for recording keeping was shared there appeared inconsistency in reporting practices with some staff more particular about records including the quality of content and retrieval.

In particular, this involved security-related incidents; while many were not recorded, and where entries were made, the content provided little information of value to facilitate post-incident investigations or inquiries.

For consistency, a brief documentation check list was used that identified the following:

1. Security Management Plan;
2. Standard Operating Procedures;
3. Staff induction records;
4. Staff training records including certificates;
5. Crowd Controller's Register;
6. Other Register such as OHS Register of Injuries or CCTV Register; and
7. Other relevant documentation such as display of the venue Liquor Licence and mandatory signage.

Table 7 provides a summary of documentation reviewed at each venue.

Table 7: Summary of venue documentation reviewed

Venue	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	✓	✓	✓	✓ ^	✓	✓	✓
2		✓* #		✓	✓	✓	✓
3			✓	✓ ^	✓		✓
4				✓	✓		✓
5	✓	✓* #		✓ ^	✓	✓	✓
6		✓ #		✓ ^	✓		✓
7		✓* #	✓	✓ ^	✓	✓	✓
8		✓* #		✓	✓		✓
9	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
10		✓* #		✓ ^	✓		✓
11	✓	✓		✓ ^	✓	✓	✓
12	✓	✓*	✓	✓ ^	✓	✓	✓
13		✓		✓	✓		✓
14	✓	✓* #	✓	✓ ^	✓	✓	✓
15	✓	✓	✓	✓ ^	✓	✓	✓
16	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
17		✓*		✓ ^	✓		✓
18	✓	✓*	✓	✓ ^	✓	✓	✓
19		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
20	✓	✓	✓	✓ ^	✓	✓	✓

* Did not have a documented procedure for aggression and/or violence.

Did not contain step-by-step instructions but rather policy statements or behavioural expectations.

^ RSA training certificates only as required by regulator.

While the results are discussed in detail in the following chapter, it may be noted that level 1 venues typically had a less formalised system of security than the level 2 venues.

4.5 Data analysis

In determining measures to be undertaken in data analysis Weinback and Grinnell (1998, p.108) suggest the following considerations:

- Sampling method;
- Distribution of the dependent variable within the population;
- Type of measurement of the independent and dependent variables;
- Statistical power of a test; and

- Robustness of a test.

There are two types of statistical test, parametric and non-parametric. A parametric test makes assumptions about the parameters or defining properties of the population distribution from which data is drawn, whereas a non-parametric test makes no such assumptions. In this descriptive research design where statistics typically involve measures of central tendency (mean, median and mode), and measures of dispersion (standard deviation, variance and range), the requirements for a parametric statistical test align as variables are at the interval level of measurement with normally distributed dependent variables.

Describing the data

Descriptive statistics summarise the population data that is obtained from the sample (Alston & Bowles 2003). The pattern of answers obtained for each question is described through frequency distributions. Frequency distributions display the number of responses relevant to each category of the relevant variable. They also indicate the percentage of answers relevant to each category. From these responses a pattern becomes evident within each variable.

The initial task (univariate analysis) for this study effectively involved the examination of each single variable with a focus on three characteristics: distribution, central tendency, and dispersion. It is not uncommon to analyse all three for each variable (Mann 1995). The distribution is a summary of the frequency of individual or ranges of values for a variable. The central tendency of a distribution identifies the centre of a distribution of values, usually through the “mean” (average of the total values), “median” (middle of the total values), and “mode” (the value that occurs most frequently).

Central tendency is also used to visually display the results of this study. Dispersion is the spread of values around the central tendency through two measures, range and standard deviation. The “range” is simply calculated by subtracting the lowest value from the highest. This can prove problematic as an “outlier” can exaggerate the range whereas “standard deviation” is more reliable as it shows a set of scores relative to the mean of the sample.

Comparing the sample groups

As outlined above, the study involved 10 level 1 and 10 level 2 venues and a review of their systems of security. Cross-tabulation is frequently used in survey research, which is the process of creating a contingency table (frequency tables of two variables presented simultaneously) (Fox 1997). The chi-square test of significance is useful as a tool to derive information about the extent to which the results may have occurred by chance. Obtaining a non-significant test result means that no effects were discovered and chance could explain the observed differences in the elements. In the current study, an interpretation of various frequencies was useful as discussed in the following chapter.

The level 1 and level 2 venue systems were compared on a range of relevant variables including risk assessment, security management plan, management strategies and operating procedures. The results of this analysis will highlight those elements that appear to be related to the risk of violence and those that might merely be considered a good practice but for which no clear relationship with the level of violent incidents has been established. This issue was further explored using regression analysis as outlined below.

Use was also made of regression analysis to help determine whether associations between venue practices and violence could be explained by other factors such as the age of patrons or the number of male as opposed to female patrons.

Validity and Reliability

A vital aspect of all research is the need to ensure findings have truth value, are applicable in other contexts, consistent and represent the views of the participants (D'Cruz & Jones 2004). O'Leary (2005) argues that truth value is best achieved where the researcher acknowledges and manages any potential subjectivity. Validity and reliability are the tools for evaluating methodological precision.

Validity is regularly assessed with reliability or the degree to which a measurement gives consistent results. Walter (2010, p.71) contends that validity is "the extent to which our data or results measure what we intended to measure" and reliability is "the consistency of our data or results if the data collection or analysis was repeated" (Walter 2010).

In the current study, data was gathered using a questionnaire survey followed by semi-structured interviews. The survey instrument was developed by the author but administered by an undergraduate student across all nightclubs and staff. Follow-up semi-structured interviews were the responsibility of the author and conducted using a basic checklist to ensure relevant areas were addressed that required clarification and also that the investigation remained focused on relevant issues. Bryman (2004) argues that validity in these circumstances means the measure actually appears to measure what is in fact sought to be measured. For this study the validity of the instrument is supported by the similarities evidenced between respondents as outlined above in this chapter. The questions were unambiguous and clearly defined. Both validity and reliability in the study was further improved through sampling of the different staffing levels at each venue from licensee through to security manager and eventually an experienced bar person.

Initial development of the survey instrument was informed by the research questions and subject to the pilot study as outlined above in Section 4.5. It was slightly modified as discussed above and again critically reviewed before circulation. This approach aligns with common practice for “content validity” (Grinnell 1993). “Content validity” is a form of non-statistical validity that involves “the systematic examination of the test content to determine whether it covers a representative sample to be measured” (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997, p.114). Hewitt et al. (2004) suggest that a panel of experts reviewing specifications can improve content validity. In the current study a high level of expertise was brought to bear that included a pilot of the survey questionnaire by three security firm operators and three licensees. These personnel were able to review the survey questionnaire and in determining the proposed respondents comment about whether this approach covered a representative sample of the industry sector.

According to Yarnold and Soltysik (2005), reliability pertains to the “representativeness” of the result found in a specific sample of the entire population. It suggests how probable a similar relation would be if the experiment was replicated with other similar samples drawn from the same population.

One approach to determine reliability is to measure responses to the same area discretely at two separate times, for example in this study during the administration of

the questionnaire surveys or between the administration of the surveys and the conduct of the semi-structured interviews. This allows one to compare the results of the two separate measurements and if there is no substantial change conclude that the approach has a high level of reliability. Further, one is also able to identify factors for two variables where a strong correlation is expected. For example, if every level 2 venue had a documented security risk assessment one could conclude that the magnitude of the relation between the two variables was very high in this sample. One could then argue that one variable (level 2 venue) is based on the other (documented security risk assessment).

The qualitative data further strengthened the study. In particular, the five staffing levels of licensee, duty manager, security manager or coordinator, crowd controller and bar person allowed for an in-depth comparison of statements made regarding a given nightclub to confirm the general accuracy of assertions made in the responses to the survey questions and also in the semi-structured interviews by other venue staff. This means that the study could reliably argue that the elements alleged to be present by staff in a given nightclub were confirmed through survey, interview and inspection of documentation where relevant.

The inclusion of qualitative responses will also provide an explanation of relevant areas of the quantitative data. This approach provides this study with a further elaboration of subtleties often unknown in the operation of a nightclub system of security. For example, qualitative data may have indicated a negative or affirmative response to whether venues engaged male and female door staff whereas qualitative data reveals why a negative or affirmative response was provided. As indicated above, this is considered one of the more prominent strengths of this study.

Analysis of qualitative data

The study involved both quantitative and qualitative data although there is a strong focus on quantitative analysis and the generation of statistical outcomes. The survey questionnaires and the semi-structured interviews also allowed for an elaboration of initial answers by respondents. Many authors argue that there are no settled criteria for the analysis of qualitative data although outcomes are usually provided as thematic or illustrative (Grbich 1999; Kellehear 1993; Lincoln & Guba 1985). In the current

study the qualitative data provided is illustrative and supports commonalities established throughout the quantitative data.

Qualitative methods allow for the gathering of data without having fixed or specific categories although in this study there were parameters incorporated within the data sources. It was considered important that respondents were encouraged to provide in-depth information relative to their particular security strategies as there had not previously been a study in this area. The purpose of the qualitative data in this study also allowed for respondents to illustrate or explain any usual or confounding issues (Patton 2002).

The semi-structured interviews provided a better opportunity for respondents to freely discuss their systems of security including informal processes that were not necessarily identified or considered by them during the survey stage. As the semi-structured interviews flowed from the surveys specific themes became common and assisted the author further in understanding the parameters of each nightclub security system.

It was decided to code qualitative data according to venue and respondent under key themes that aligned with the semi-structured interview checklist. This approach was invaluable when retrieving responses to elaborate on quantitative data gained through the questionnaire survey.

An overview of the structure for qualitative data coding and subsequent retrieval involved the following steps:

1. Align and code responses to the survey questionnaire where elaboration is required;
2. Code according to emerging themes, i.e., explanations as to incident locations, venue response to incidents, elements within the system of security and so on;
3. Identify and review variables for consistency and accuracy; and
4. Retrieve qualitative comments that reflect themes rather than seek to incorporate all comments in the thesis.

An analysis of responses based upon the above steps revealed a number of common themes. These themes are discussed in the following chapter and include comparisons between the level 1 venues and then between level 1 and level 2 venues.

4.6 Sample: Nightclubs participating in this study

It was decided to study venues in a specified area or precinct as there was an increased likelihood of similarity in terms of patronage, local activity, venue operations, enforcement by police and local government, and various “local” security and safety strategies. Melbourne has four prominent post-1am trading municipalities with a preponderance of nightclubs – Melbourne, Port Phillip, Stonnington and Yarra. Each area has an active Licensee’s Accord and Local Government planning policy in place.

The City of Stonnington is located a short distance south-east of the Melbourne CBD. It covers an area of approximately 25 square kilometres and takes in the suburbs of South Yarra (part), Prahran, Windsor (part), Toorak, Armadale, Malvern, Kooyong and Glen Iris (part). It is primarily residential with some commercial and industrial land. The estimated population remains around 100,000. The City has a prominent late-night entertainment precinct in and around its main thoroughfare of Chapel Street. Overall the City has in excess of 500 licensed premises. Chapel Street is more than two kilometres long and runs north-south through the suburbs of South Yarra, Prahran and Windsor. These suburbs have a total of 377 licensed premises of which 66 are nightclubs. It is reported that over 100,000 people frequent the entertainment precinct each evening during peak times (Stonnington 2010).

A revised Council Planning Scheme was introduced in 2005. Amongst other things, Clause 22.10 outlines Licensed Premises Policy with a key focus on economic development and considerations relevant to new applications or the expansion of existing licensed premises. The policy outlines the importance of licensed premises to the area but also recognises problems that can accompany late-night activity such as noise and other amenity issues. Objectives of the policy include management of amenity conflicts between licensed premises and other uses such as residential, retail and commercial (Stonnington 2005).

The Stonnington policy also provides that applications for new venues or expansions of existing licensed premises must provide “details of proposed management of the premises including an emergency procedure management plan, crowd control, responsible serving of alcohol, external areas allocated for smokers and a waste management plan” (Clause 22.10-4:2).

In 2010 the Council introduced further measures based upon a study that investigated saturation levels for late-night licensed premises trading in the Chapel Street precinct. This study considered, amongst other things, the cumulative impact of additional venues in the area and also concerns associated with alcohol-related violence overnight (Stonnington 2010). It was contended the majority of violence and anti-social behaviour occurs outside venues in public areas (Stonnington, 2010, p.2). The study proposed Council should consider saturation points and the potential cumulative impact on the area when assessing planning permit applications for licensed premises. The higher risk venues were defined as:

Venues most likely to be associated with alcohol-related harms (e.g. hotels, bars and nightclubs operating after 12 am) will be defined as a Source of Potential Harm venues (SPH). (Stonnington, 2010, p.3)

Based upon the study, Council adopted the following policy position:

Operating hours: that there be no more planning permits issued for premises operating after 1am;

Patron capacity: that no more planning permits be issued for new premises where the patron capacity is more than 200 patrons and that there be no additional planning permits issued increasing patron numbers to more than 200 patrons;

Congregation: that no more planning permits are issued for premises operating in identified congregation spots after 1am; and

Venue design: that planning permit applications must address relevant elements outlined in the guidelines for licensed venues.

(Stonnington, 2010, p.3)

From these local requirements one would expect there to be a formal approach to security by the majority of licensed venues in the Stonnington entertainment precinct and in particular the nightclubs as they are also subject to liquor licensing “high-risk” conditions. This is discussed below in this and the following chapter.

After some preliminary enquiries to gauge the likelihood of participation by some nightclub operators it was decided to approach the City of Stonnington through its Licensee’s Accord.

A project officer from the City of Stonnington took responsibility for arranging a presentation by the author at a Licensee’s Accord meeting. In total the Licensee’s Accord has regular attendance by approximately 55 venues. These include most of the nightclubs. The Accord has been actively involved in various strategies to enhance community safety and has three aims:

1. Encourage the implementation of best practice in the management of licensed premises;
2. Promote responsible standards of behaviour by patrons and protect their safety; and,
3. Maintain high standards of behaviour in and around licensed premises (Stonnington 2009).

The Liquor Accord (Stonnington, 2009, p.3) had developed a 17-point Action Plan to improve safety in the Chapel Street precinct. This included reducing the risk of violence (see Appendix “E”).

A further risk arose in the area of ongoing regulatory initiatives to address violence as this activity could also have had an impact on venue operations and therefore the frequency of violence. The recent introduction of a more intrusive review of venue operations through the introduction of the Civil Compliance Directorate of Liquor Licensing Victoria may have also impacted to some degree. In part some venues sought to rigidly comply with their regulatory obligations rather than become subject to a more rigorous enforcement model. It is also important to note that the following initiatives introduced during the study might also have impacted upon the risk of violence in and around nightclubs:

- *Compliance Directorate* - 40 Compliance Inspectors were appointed by the Director of Liquor Licensing to monitor licensed premises throughout Victoria. A major function of the Directorate is to ensure each venue complies with the Act and also encourages responsible and appropriate drinking;
- *Advertising and Promotions* – Restrictions on advertising and promotions that result in banning notices issued by the Director of Liquor Licensing;
- *Designated Areas* – The Director of Liquor Licensing can declare an entertainment precinct a designated area due to an excessive number of violent incidents or anti-social behaviour. Once an area is designated, Victoria Police are empowered to ban individuals from the area or licensed premises for up to 72 hours for prescribed offences including drunkenness, assault and failure to leave licensed premises. On 19 December 2007 areas of South Yarra and Prahran including all venues within this study were included;
- *Liquor Licensing Forums and Accords* – The City of Stonnington Licensee’s Accord commenced in 2004; however, during the study period a number of local initiatives were introduced including training in aggression management and general compliance strategies with changes to liquor legislation;
- *Additional Powers for the Director of Liquor Licensing* – Additional powers included banning of inappropriate alcohol promotions, suspending liquor licences for up to five days, and issuing breach notices for venues that fail to comply with the legislation;
- *Targeted Lockouts* – Otherwise known as “late hour entry declarations”, lockouts are an initiative to encourage patrons to remain on licensed premises after a designated time (usually 1am) and does not allow new patrons to enter from the lockout commencement time. The City of Stonnington venues including those in this study were subject to targeted lockouts;
- *PMP Guidelines* – As discussed in Chapter 2; and
- *Patron Banning Notices* – These are designed to identify and prevent known trouble-makers entering nightclubs for a specified period.

No modifications were reported by any of the sample to their systems of security at the time of data collection although there were regular reports of more intense compliance activity by Victoria Police and the Compliance Directorate.

4.6.1 Sampling method

The venues selected for this study are in many respects representative of Victorian nightclubs generally, whether located in the central business district or in a metropolitan or rural area. This is because Victorian nightclubs are subject to the same high-risk liquor licensing conditions, have similar hours of operation that attract high-risk conditions by trading past 1am, provide amplified music, have a similar staffing structure that includes a licensee/nominee, duty manager, bar, service and security staff and general alignment of age between staff and patrons.

Two immediate questions arose regarding the method of sampling. It was anticipated that views about the number of violent incidents (the risk measure used in this study) may vary between individuals. This may be due to different perceptions based upon their individual knowledge or beliefs of individual venue performance, therefore impacting upon the potential classification of relevant operations and the method of data collection, i.e. how could a venue security system be best studied? It was decided to investigate across experienced venue staff rather than merely focus on venue operators or security managers, as this would provide a more accurate account of each venue system of security.

After a presentation to approximately 70 personnel at the Stonnington Accord approaches were also made to Liquor Licensing Victoria and Victoria Police. There was unanimous support for the study.

It was not unexpected that concerns would be raised by some of the nightclub operators about their participation in the research. Questions asked by operators concerned their potential public, regulatory or industry exposure to reputational and compliance risks should the study discover operating deficiencies, breaches of law, an above average number of incidents compared to other venues, and others.

To address these concerns the following measures were taken:

1. Anonymity was guaranteed for all respondents who chose to participate in the study; and
2. Undertakings were given by the City of Stonnington, Victoria Police and Liquor Licensing Victoria (now VCGLR) to support the project, including an assurance of anonymity of respondents.

In total 33 venues volunteered to participate; however, not every venue aligned with the criteria for a nightclub. Some venues were restaurants with patron capacity in excess of 250 that continued to trade overnight, well after the usual dining periods had concluded. Some of these venues effectively transitioned into a de-facto nightclub although without the general infrastructure and appearance of a nightclub. As these venues were not licensed as nightclubs they did not attract high-risk liquor licence conditions, hence their often limited or basic systems of security proved unsuitable for participation in this study.

After a detailed analysis of each potential venue, a total of 20 nightclubs of various patron capacities and profiles that traded post-1am were selected. They each met the criteria for a nightclub including having similarities in liquor licence conditions, location, entertainment provided and system of security.

Based upon the average number of violent incidents reported by those interviewed in each venue in the survey, 10 nightclubs were categorised as level 1 and 10 as level 2..

The selected nightclubs varied in maximum capacity from 150-900 patrons. Collectively the maximum patron capacity for each of the 20 venues was 6,864 with an average of 343 patrons. The maximum patron capacity for the level 1 nightclubs was 3,550 with an average of 355 patrons per venue. The level 2 venues totalled 3,314 patron capacity with an average of 331 patrons per venue. Most venues had a patron capacity of between 200-350 patrons and five venues had a capacity in excess of 600 patrons, with the largest a capacity of 900. No venue kept data about the time patrons might enter and remain at a venue although all venues indicated their capacity was not their entire patronage overnight as some nightclubs were more commonly trading as “destination” venues whereas others were frequented by patrons as a “starting” or meeting point prior to moving to a destination venue. This impacted upon their

overnight patronage, with typically higher levels of overnight patronage reported at starting venues.

Finally, none of the participating venues was jointly owned or operated. This was important for the study in order to ensure that each participating venue's system of security was independent of influence by another venue or venues. For example, if three participating venues were co-owned it is possible that the data gained from those three venues would be replicated hence creating a possible bias in the overall results.

Participants from the venues

Of the 20 venues, the selected personnel (participants) were experienced and had some level of system control or influence such as licensees, duty managers, security supervisors and others with operational experience of at least 12 months. These personnel were considered appropriate for the study rather than base-level or inexperienced staff who might have had less than 12 months experience, especially as some relatively new personnel might only work one night a week or, in some case two or three nights in a month and not always the busy nights. It was anticipated the selected personnel would bring both experience and operational knowledge as they were more likely to be exposed to a broader range of operational issues that might arise during trading and understand the actual extent and operationalisation of the security system. In addition, one would expect these personnel to have a more extensive work history in hospitality and/or security, often in what is commonly seen as a casualised employment sector at the entry or base level. For the purposes of this investigation selected staff across each venue were coded as:

1. Licensee;
2. Duty manager;
3. Security manager or coordinator;
4. Crowd controller; and
5. Bar person.

It was decided to survey across the staffing levels of each venue to gain a broad understanding of the staff's perceptions. For example, if the study merely examined systemic issues from the perspective of licensees or duty managers it is possible the

study would be misled due to desensitisation to incidents, protection of the venue or individual reputation and the like.

Once the filled in survey questionnaires were received from each venue, semi-structured interviews were conducted with a representative from each venue who could elaborate on the venue's system of security. It was anticipated that the best representative would be a duty or security manager. Each representative from a venue volunteered, based upon an inquiry as to which staff member was best positioned and had intimate knowledge to elaborate on the venue's system of security. This was an important selection for the venue and also this study as the representation would effectively summarise the system of security albeit comparisons could be made by the researcher about general accuracy of assertions against the other survey respondents. In general terms there was little deviation from collaborative assertions gained within the survey instrument in regards to the system of security that applied to each nightclub. Further, estimations regarding incidents were also relatively consistent between the survey instruments for each venue, and the categorisation of the nightclubs as a level 1 or level 2 venue based upon the level of violence.

Table 8 shows the title of each person interviewed from each of the 20 nightclubs.

Table 8: Title of respondent accountable for security

Category	Venue Code	Title
Level 1	1	Security Manager
	2	Security Coordinator
	3	Duty Manager
	4	Duty Manager
	5	Security Manager
	6	Security Manager
	7	Security Manager
	8	Duty Manager
	9	Security Manager
	10	Duty Manager
Level 2	11	Security Manager
	12	Security Manager
	13	Security Manager
	14	Security Manager
	15	Duty Manager
	16	Security Manager
	17	Security Manager
	18	Duty Manager
	19	Duty Manager
	20	Security Manager

Venue profiles

As explained above, nightclubs were categorised in this study as level 1 and level 2, following the completion of the survey by participants and dependent on the average frequency of incidents reported by those surveyed. The level 1 venues proportionately reported a higher incidence of violence. The following provides an overview of the profiles of the nightclubs in both the level 1 and level 2 categories:

Liquor licence

Each nightclub was licensed by the Victorian regulator (Liquor Licensing Victoria) pursuant to the *Liquor Control Reform Act 1998* (Vic) (the “Act”) and held a “Late night (on premises) Licence”. This licence authorises the licensee to supply liquor for consumption on the licensed premises subject to any licence conditions or designated responsibilities under the Act. The licences did not allow removal of alcohol by patrons from the venue.

As outlined in Chapter 3, holders of a “Late night (on premises) Licence” must comply with mandatory “high-risk” conditions. These conditions are:

- Install and maintain a suitable surveillance recording system;
- Erect signs advising patrons there is a surveillance recording system in operation;
- All staff must complete a responsible serving of alcohol course within two months of commencing employment; and
- Crowd controllers are to be employed in numbers that meet the industry “span of control” and be present 30 minutes before the start of entertainment being provided until 30 minutes after closure.

For some operations there may also be additional conditions imposed relating to amenity, such as external security patrols and responsibilities associated with external areas, for example, patron smoking areas adjacent to the venue. Only two venues in this study had such a condition – one was level 1 and the other level 2. Overall, their systems were not distinguished from the others in terms of risk, elements of their system, or the number or location of incidents.

In addition to conditions imposed by the regulator for a “high-risk liquor licence” there are also a number of common requirements that apply to all licensed premises, such as mandatory signage warning patrons about intoxication, proof of age documents, safety and the availability of free water.

A liquor licence also authorises hours of trading for each venue. Each of the 20 nightclubs traded post-1am. Six operated to 3am and the remainder were approved to trade to 5am, 7am or at any time in accordance with a 24 hour liquor licence for the premises. Authorised trading hours are not actual trading hours and in general terms it was only the larger venues that traded until 7am. Most venues that were authorised to trade post-3am only traded where a sufficient number of patrons were present.

Venue location

All of the venues except two were located on Chapel Street. The other two had entrances that abutted adjacent streets. These two venues were in close proximity and within 100 metres of Chapel Street. Hence, all the venues were located in the Chapel Street precinct.

Queuing

All venues had provision for queuing and used stanchions (poles and ropes) or similar for the orderly arrangement of patrons seeking admission. Some had signage to guide “members only” or “visitors” if an alternative queuing direction was available from the main entrance. Six of the venues used alternative queuing directions. Four were level 1 and two level 2. Typically these were all above the average patron capacity for the study and were not distinguished from the other venues by the number of incidents or the frequency of violence. It was also noted that rarely did a violent incident involving queuing patrons occur in or around a queue.

Patron demographics

A breakdown of age for the 20 nightclubs in this study revealed that the largest patron group was 18-24 years of age (30%), followed by 25-30 years (25%), and 31-35 years (15%). Not surprisingly this means 70% of all respondents

consistently had a patronage that was under 35 years of age and 55% of venues had a patronage that was an average of 30 years of age and under. These venues traded regularly to 7am. The remaining venues with a generally mature patronage were more likely to close at 3am even if their liquor licence authorised trading past that time.

A breakdown of gender revealed a higher proportion of male patronage for the level 1 nightclubs, with five (50%) of the level 1 venues consistently reporting a larger proportion of males (two having 60% and three having 70% male patronage) and four (40%) reporting an approximately equal proportion of male and female patrons. Only one level 1 venue reported a higher proportion of female than male patrons. Of the level 2 venues four (40%) reported a larger proportion of males (three having 60% and one having 70% male patronage).

As outlined in Chapter 2, the literature consistently reports nightclubs are frequented by the young. Most of the nightclubs in this study marketed themselves to this age demographic although two “alternative” venues sought a more mature and diverse clientele. Interestingly these two venues were level 2 according to the number of reported incidents but had formal systems of security as discussed above.

Qualitative data gathered from the nightclub operators on marketing efforts to determine patronage included the following responses:

We target to the 18-23 set and get volume through two key concepts: destination and entertainment. In other words, we attract patrons to stay later because we provide a good range of entertainment options. Over time this leads to repeat business as most of our current patrons become regulars.
(level 1: 1.1)

Although our capacity is not as big as some, using promoters to meet our younger patron profile is an effective way to ensure we have the right mix as we have different themes on Friday, Saturday and Sunday evenings. The right mix for the right night equates to less problems. (level 1: 3.1)

We are a gay club. Most of our patrons are mature and attend due to word of mouth or our advertising through the gay community. We need to market appropriately to ensure our patron profile is both sex-specific and of an appropriate age. (level 2: 12.1)

Marketing is an important part of our operation right up to the point of entry. We need consistency throughout our brand and without a suitable strategy we would end up attracting the “wrong” type of patron who would then possibly create problems within the club. Although we generally have younger patrons we feel our management of the venue minimises risk and patrons quickly learn what is acceptable behaviour and what is not. (level 2: 16.2)

No venue reported any specific strategy as part of their marketing campaigns to address violence or unacceptable behaviour. Most promotional materials such as venue brochures, website advertisements and documented invitations merely outlined “management reserves the right of entry” or similar. Explanations about this omission in the qualitative data included:

No room to include warnings about unacceptable behaviour. (level 2: 12.1)

Do not want to create a negative impression of the venue. (level 2: 16.2)

Patrons know that violence is not tolerated. (level 1: 4.1)

We want to attract patrons with a short simple message, not frighten them off. (level 2: 6.2)

These quotations from the interviews indicate that overall nightclub operators tend to have specific marketing strategies in place to promote their venue including the use of promoters for different “theme” nights to ensure their preferred patronage is attracted. Commonly patrons attracted are young with the majority (70%) being 18-30 years.

Table 9 depicts characteristics of level 1 and level 2 venues according to average patron age, gender, venue capacity and closing time.

Table 9: Characteristics according to patron age, gender, venue capacity and closing time

Category	Venue Code	Patron Age	Gender	Capacity	Closing
Level 1	1	25-30	60% M	900	24/7
	2	25-30	60% M	500	24/7
	3	18-24	50/50	414	6 am
	4	18-24	50/50	300	7 am
	5	18-24	70% M	307	3 am
	6	18-24	60% M	300	3 am
	7	18-24	60% M	409	3 am
	8	21-30	More F	170	3 am
	9	18-24	70% M	190	5 am
	10	25-30	70% M	260	2 am
Level 2	11	31-35	60% M	400	5 am
	12	18-24	70% M	210	3 am
	13	25-30	60% M	450	5 am
	14	31-35	60% M	375	3 am
	15	18-24	60% M	324	7 am
	16	46+	More F	320	7 am
	17	41-45	50/50	500	7 am
	18	31-35	60% M	175	3 am
	19	18-24	60% M	150	2 am
	20	25-30	60% M	210	3 am

The data displayed in the table is indicative of deficiencies in the system of security as discussed below in this chapter.

Staff demographics

The study investigated the demographics of staff (age, gender, current role, experience) to gain an insight into venue staffing structures and characteristics.

- *Age* – It was expected that excluding business operators and supervisors, such as duty managers, young people would be significantly overrepresented among the staff. This was confirmed in an analysis of operational security, bar and support staff, who were an average of 22 years, whereas the 20 respondents from management (licensees and duty managers) were an average of 40.5 years.
- *Gender* (all staff) – 82% male and 18% female with most female representation in bar and support roles. Only one female was a licensee and two were duty managers. Of security staff 90% were male and 10% female;
- *Current role* – 70% licensee and 30% duty manager; and

- *Average years of experience* (licensees and duty managers) – 6 years.

These figures reveal that there is little difference in characteristics between the relative age of patrons or venue staff other than in the area of management. It is unclear whether this impacts on the risk of violence.

Incident data

Incident data is held by many of the venues and may guide operators of nightclubs in their handling of specific security requirements. This can include physical security measures, personnel, allocation or placement of resources, training and supervision, and procedural development or enhancement. Although this area is not necessarily directly related to the research questions it is worthy of inclusion as this data provides context relative to the nature of the sample.

Seven incident factors were addressed in the study:

1. Incident time;
2. Gender of patron(s) involved;
3. Average age of patron(s) involved;
4. Intoxication as a possible factor;
5. Use of weapons;
6. Location of incident(s); and
7. Response by venue staff to internal and external incidents.

1. Incident time

Respondents from the 20 venues indicated most incidents occurred within the last two hours of trading. Level 2 venues contended that about 50% (N = 5) of violent incidents occurred at closing time with the other 50% (N = 5) in the period of 1-2 hours before closing. Of the Level 1 venues, 40% (N = 4) indicated that most of their violent incidents occurred at closing, with 60% (N = 6) suggesting these occurred 1-2 hours before closing. This suggests most incidents occur toward the cessation of trading, a period where intoxication of patrons is possibly higher.

2. Gender of patron(s) involved in incidents

Although there is a gender balance in most venues, respondents reported 25% (N = 5) of violence was always male with 75% (n = 15) asserting violence mostly involved males. There appeared no appreciable difference between Level 1 and Level 2 venues, with Level 1 venues reporting 70% violence mostly involving males and 80% of Level 2 venues. The qualitative data revealed some interesting operational insights into the causes of violence including the following:

Girls start fights, it is as simple as that. There are very few times males start fighting over anything more than a female. (Level 1: 1.1)

The majority of fights inside venues are caused by females whereas it is not always the case outside. Although they might not actually fight, their guys often have to defend their honour or their behaviour causes conflicts between males who might be seeking a partner for the night. (Level 1: 3.1)

It appears to be a boy thing and you have to defend your girlfriend, even if there is nothing to defend. I could count on one hand the times violence occurs that did not involve this at some stage. (Level 2:14.2)

My experience has been that females often stir up males which then leads to violence. Most weeks there are arguments between groups of males because one was offended when his girl was approached by another. Most times the male who approached the female did not know she was accompanied. If the security staff are doing their job they intervene before things get ugly. (Level 2:15.1)

3. Average age of patron(s) involved in incidents

The average age of persons involved in incidents in both Level 1 and Level 2 venues was 18-24 years in 70% of incidents (n = 14) and 25-30 years in 30% (n = 6) of incidents.

However, cross-tabulation analysis revealed 60% (n = 6) of violence in Level 1 nightclubs was committed by persons who were considered to be in

the category of 18-24 years as opposed to 30% (n = 3) in Level 2 venues. This supports other studies where the 18-24 years category was found to be the most prominent in violence statistics, as discussed in Chapter 2. However, it should be noted that some of the venues marketed themselves to a more mature patronage which therefore makes incident analysis according to age problematic.

4. Was intoxication a factor during incidents?

Sixty-five per cent (n = 13) of respondents reported that patrons were generally intoxicated (not drunk) during incidents; 10% (n = 2) reported that patrons were drunk; and 20% (n = 4) reported that patrons were drug affected. No respondent reported that patrons involved in incidents were generally not affected by either alcohol or drugs. A comparison of Level 1 and Level 2 venues revealed similarities between them, although none of the Level 1 venues reported that patrons might have been drunk. This is possibly due to an understanding of relevant legislative terminology where “drunk” as opposed to “intoxicated” persons are forbidden from licensed premises.

5. Use of weapons

Two questions were provided regarding weapons: (i) were weapons used, and if so, (ii) what type of weapon. All venues reported occasional use of weapons during incidents. Ninety-five per cent (n = 19) of venues contended that weapons were used 25% of the time and one Level 1 venue suggested that weapons were used almost every time. Where a weapon was used, 80% (n = 16) contended that it was typically a glass drinking vessel. The qualitative data supported the assertions above, including that most violent incidents where a weapon was used in the venue appeared to involve spontaneous attacks rather than pre-planned violence.

6. Location of incidents

Respondents were surveyed as to whether the location of incidents was internal or external to the venue. 85% (n = 17) of venues reported that most incidents took place outside the venue, whereas 15% (n = 3) contended that

most incidents took place inside the venue. Cross-tabulation analysis revealed that all Level 2 venue incidents generally occurred outside the premises, whereas Level 1 venues reported 30% (n = 3) generally occurred inside with the remainder occurring external to the venue (n = 7).

7. Response by venue staff to incidents

The location of the incident impacted upon the venue response. If an incident occurred inside the venue, staff would handle the incident 95% (n = 19) of the time. One venue reported that management had to be called for all incidents at the venue including internal issues. The responses to external incidents differed considerably. 55% (n = 11) of venues reported that they handled the incident, 40% (n = 8) called police and one venue called management for guidance as part of their incident response policy. The qualitative data revealed that venues see external incidents as difficult and the actual distance away from the building will determine whether staff become involved.

Table 10 outlines the responses by venue representatives given in the survey.

Table 10: Summary of incident data per venue

Category	Venue Code	1. Incident Time	2. Gender	3. Av. Age	4. Intox	5. Weapon	6. Location
Level 1	1	Last hr	M	25-30	Intox	1in4	External
	2	Last 2 hrs	M	18-24	Intox	1in4	External
	3	Last 2 hrs	M	18-24	Intox	1in4	External
	4	Last 2 hrs	M	18-24	Drunk	1in4	Internal
	5	Last hr	M	18-24	Intox	1in4	External
	6	Last 2 hrs	M	18-24	Intox	1in4	External
	7	Last hr	M	18-24	Intox	1in4	External
	8	Last 2 hrs	M	25-30	Drugs	2in4	External
	9	Last 2 hrs	M	18-24	Intox	1in4	Internal
	10	Last hr	M	25-30	Intox	1in4	External
Level 2	11	Last hr	M	31-35	Intox	1in4	Internal
	12	Last 2 hrs	M	18-24	Drunk	1in4	External
	13	Last hr	M	25-30	Intox	1in4	External
	14	Last hr	M	31-35	Intox	1in4	External
	15	Last hr	M	18-24	Intox	1in4	External
	16	Last 2 hrs	M	46+	Drugs	1in4	External
	17	Last 2 hrs	M	25-30	Drunk	1in4	External
	18	Last hr	M	31-35	Intox	1in4	External
	19	Last 2 hrs	M	18-24	Drugs	1in4	External
	20	Last 2 hrs	M	25-30	Intox	1in4	External

Overall, incident data from the survey and the semi-structured interviews revealed that

- Incidents occurred later during trading periods and usually within the last two hours of trading. This is supported by other studies including Briscoe and Donnelly (2001a); and Wells and Graham (2003);
- Most violence involved males although females were sometimes seen as the cause or a common contributing factor to incidents. This is supported by AIHW (2008); Graham & Homel (2008); and Monaghan et al. (2002b);
- The average age of patrons involved in incidents was under 30 years with 70% in the 18-24 years bracket. This is supported by other recent studies including AIHW (2008); and Teece and Williams (2000);
- Intoxication or drunkenness was considered a common factor in most incidents of violence. This is supported by various studies including Graham

and Homel (2008); Stockwell 2010; VCCAV (1990); and Wells and Graham (2003);

- Weapons were used during violent incidents up to 25% of the time with a drinking vessel being considered the more likely weapon. This is supported by Finney (2004);
- The majority of incidents occur outside venues but in the immediate vicinity. This is supported by Haines and Graham (2005); and
- Responses by venue staff to incidents differed depending on the location. If the incidents occurred inside the venue, then venue staff generally managed them. If the incident occurred outside the venue, nearly half (40%) of the respondents elected to call police rather than intervene.

Risk on venues

As outlined above, level 1 venues are operations that averaged a number of violent incidents each week over the previous 12 months. The mean for level 1 venues was 4.5 incidents each week. It must be noted that the definition of violence includes acts of aggression, conflicts where behaviours may be escalating such as animated acts of pushing, invading personal space, pointing, raising voices, “shaping up” and the like. Many of the incidents reported by both level 1 and level 2 venue respondents disclosed such behaviours, not merely physical attacks that involved striking another, usually with hands or feet.

These venues are important to this study because they:

1. Provide an understanding about their systems, various security features and any actual or perceived deficiencies;
2. Allow the development of a comparative table between the security system and various security features of each venue by category i.e. level 1 or level 2;
3. Assist in an analysis between primary and secondary features in determining what appears to work and what does not to minimise violence; and
4. Provide an operational basis for determining patterns of incidents based upon regularity of incidents in comparison to the various security deficiencies identified.

A level 2 venue did not experience any more than one violent incident most weeks on average albeit the data gathered revealed a mean of <1 with three level 2 venues reporting an average of one incident each week thus totalling no more than 104 incidents over the previous 12 months, with many not involving any physical violence whatsoever. As outlined above, these venues would also provide an understanding about their systems, various security features and any perceived deficiencies. This included a comparative analysis of the systems of other level 2 venues and also of those listed as level 1. In addition, this would result in the identification of features, if any, and a comparison of level 1 and level 2 venue security systems. One could then consider whether the level of violence is rightly attributed to a venue system of security or whether it is actually influenced by other factors, such as the various demographics associated with a nightclub, including the venue's patron profile, location or other confounding factors including local crime rates and substantial crowd movements or social activity as is often evidenced within entertainment precincts.

Methods for assessing venue security systems

The method used in the study for assessing the existence of security elements, such as the number of violent incidents, is based upon the results of the survey and the semi-structured interviews. During the semi-structured interviews requests were also made for any documentation that might support or further expand upon assertions made by the respondents. This resulted in the production of a broad range of documentation by some of venues including:

- Comprehensive documentation that addressed all or most best practice criteria;
- Documentation that addressed some of the best practice criteria;
- Documentation that was not fit for purpose such as a folder containing emails, notes and copies of posters for RSA and minors; and
- Absence of documentation.

A checklist was used to note the degree of alignment with best practice criteria. At the time of data collection, the Victorian regulator's venue management plan guidelines

(2011) had not been published and it is unclear whether venues within this study have since adopted the guidelines.

4.7 Summary

The aim of this study is to identify elements and practices in nightclub systems of security that minimise the risk of violence.

The research design is descriptive and utilises mixed methodology, drawing on both quantitative and qualitative approaches. The primary method is quantitative, utilising a survey questionnaire with a potential elaboration of responses through conducting semi-structured qualitative interviews. This approach allowed for a contrast of various situational characteristics between the nightclub systems of security.

The independent variable for this study is the risk categorisation for each venue, whether level 1 or level 2, and the dependent variables are those features which are considered essential to an effective venue system of security.

Data was collected through three methods: questionnaire survey, semi-structured interview and inspection of venue documentation. These methods were used to confirm and expand upon information gathered so that a range of data from statistical to illustrative was presented. Using this multiple methods approach increases the validity of the data collected.

The data was analysed statistically to provide answers to the research question. The data was also reviewed to determine the most significant variables in relation to elements of a security system for both level 1 and level 2 nightclubs.

However, it is possible that level 1 venues have more violence not because they do not use best practice principles but because they have other risk factors. In other words, the reason for their being dangerous may not to do with best practice but with, for example, having uncontrollable areas external to the venue, more male patrons, later closing times, more young patrons or a higher number of patrons and being in a high crime area. In order to determine whether these factors might explain the

relationship between risk and best practice it is necessary to compare the venues on these other variables.

Whilst the methodology has limitations as outlined above, overall the data collection method and the resulting data are considered both reliable and valid in consideration of the research question.

Chapter 5 – Results

5.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the results of the research. As outlined in the previous chapter, these findings have been derived from information gained in a questionnaire survey administered to venue staff holding five different positions in each of the 20 nightclubs to provide an overview of the venue system of security, its security practices and incident characteristics. These positions were licensee, duty manager, security manager, experienced crowd controller and experienced bar person. Following the survey, semi-structured interviews were conducted with the person deemed most responsible for security in a nightclub. In most circumstances this was the duty manager or security manager. As explained in the previous chapter, the views expressed by the most reliable source have also been supported by other information, such as venue protocols or thematic analysis based upon a comparison of the results of the survey and the semi-structured interviews.

This chapter is divided into three sections:

- Section 1 provides answers to the research question;
- Section 2 discusses implications that arise from the answers gained; and
- Section 3 provides a summary of this chapter.

The aim of this study is to determine whether nightclubs that adopt a best practice framework have less violence than venues that do not.

The results are important because they identify those elements in a system of security that appear to impact upon the frequency of violence across different nightclubs and reveal whether these elements distinguish between level 2 and level 1 operations.

In Chapter 3 it was explained how the study investigated whether venues that adopt a best practice security framework will have less violence than venues that do not. Some nightclubs participating in this study had well documented systems of security but these systems were not operationalised through formal staff briefing, a training strategy or implemented across the venue. Other venues had a security plan and operating procedures which were not freely available to staff. In others there was an

absence of a plan or of operating procedures although there was some attempt made to operationalise informal (non-documented) security strategies. Hence, it is contended that both the existence of a documented system and the subsequent operationalising of that system are essential for an effective security system to address and minimise the risk of violence. This is part of best practice as outlined in Chapter 3.

5.2 Answer to the research question

Data gained from the survey revealed the following results. Where relevant I have included comments provided during the semi-structured interviews.

Overall the correlation between the number of security practices put in place by the venues and the number of incidents of violence as shown in Table 11 was statistically significant. The more security practices used, the fewer incidents of violence.

Table 11: Correlation between incidents and security practices

Incidents/measures	Correlations	On average, how many incidents occur at the venue each week?	Number of security measures
On average, how many incidents occur at the venue each week?	Pearson Correlation	1	-.764**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	20	20
Number of security measures	Pearson Correlation	-.764**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	20	20

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The venues which were defined as level 1 had more male patrons and a younger patronage, both variables which could impact on levels of violence. A regression analysis (see Table 12) indicates that even after taking account of the age and gender of patrons there is still a significant relationship between the number of violent incidents (the risk level) and the number of security practices used. The dependent variable was the number of security measures.

Table 12: Regression analysis – security measures, incidents and gender

Model		Unstandardised Coefficients		Standardised Coefficients	<i>t</i>	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	10.247	2.586		3.963	.001
	On average, how many incidents occur at the venue each week?	-1.736	.662	-.725	-2.620	.019
	What is the gender breakdown of your patrons?	-.182	.309	-.095	-.588	.564
	What is the average age of patrons attending the venue?	.077	.372	.058	.207	.839

a. Dependent Variable: number of security measures

Outlined below are the relationships between the level of risk of the venues and the use of the various security practices.

5.2.1 Security risk assessment

It would be difficult to introduce a system of security without some consideration as to the identification, evaluation and analysis of common and situational risks that might be present. It was explained above that security-related risks for any nightclub involve both generic (common as recognised throughout industry) and specific (situational to the relevant venue). Conducting a security risk assessment is the starting point to determining an appropriate system of security. There are a number of industry guides available to assist venue operators including the VWA (Victorian Workcover Authority) *Crowd control at venues and events: a practical occupational health and safety guide*.

To determine if there was a formal risk assessment conducted as the basis for a venue's system of security the responses provided in the survey questionnaire were averaged and confirmed through the semi-structured interviews with the person who had most knowledge about the venue system of security, i.e., the duty manager or security manager. In each case the survey responses by venue staff were not substantially different to those of the duty manager or security manager although it was not unexpected that some bar and operational staff lacked historical knowledge of details of the security system, such as whether a risk assessment had been conducted and how risks identified were subsequently addressed and operationalised. It became more apparent during the semi-structured interviews that those responsible for the

system had a greater level of knowledge as to each system’s depth, such as essential security features and application of the system across the organisation.

To the question “Has there been a documented Security Risk Assessment conducted?” 35% (n = 7) of respondents answered in the affirmative, and 65% (n = 13) answered with “no/don’t know”. The overall frequencies are outlined in Table 13.

Table 13: Has there been a documented Security Risk Assessment conducted?

		Frequency (N)	Per cent	Valid Per cent	Cumulative Per Cent
Valid	yes	7	35.0	35.0	35.0
	no	13	65.0	65.0	100.0
	Total	20	100.0	100.0	

A cross-tabulation of responses from level 1 and level 2 venues revealed that 80% (n = 8) of level 1 venues had not conducted a security risk assessment, whereas 50% (n = 5) of the level 2 venues had done so (see Table 14).

Table 14: Venue risk level - Has there been a documented Security Risk Assessment conducted?

			Has there been a documented Security Risk Assessment conducted?		Total
			yes	no	
Venue risk level	Level 1	Count	2	8	10
		% within Venue risk level	20.0%	80.0%	100.0%
	Level 2	Count	5	5	10
		% within Venue risk level	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	7	13	20
		% within Venue risk level	35.0%	65.0%	100.0%

Fisher’s exact test : .175 (not significant)

The results suggest that the majority of level 1 venues have not adequately developed their security system. For example, a number of venue operators were unaware that a risk assessment might influence the development of their security structure. Some believed this was unnecessary provided they attended industry meetings to understand “good” industry practices or maintained a management presence during trading hours. Many did not appear to understand or formally consider situational issues that might influence the system of security for their operation.

The qualitative data highlighted this lack of understanding where no documented security risk assessment was conducted, as shown in the following quotations:

I didn't know one should be done. We have some operating procedures and my managers are always around. (level 1: 2.1)

Before this (study) I never knew this was done. My understanding was you got a security firm to supply staff and they controlled the patrons. (level 1: 3.1)

The owner is very much cost driven and attempts to minimise any unnecessary expenditure. Obviously security is not one of the big picture items here although we do have a good security firm. (level 1: 6.2)

Our management team attend all Accord meetings, link in with the regulator where possible and are very experienced in venue operations. (level 2: 17.2)

I think we sort of did it as the operation has evolved, if there is an incident we look at how we can prevent it occurring again. (level 2: 19.2)

Comments from venues with a documented security risk assessment included the following:

This is an important part of our security and safety planning. Without it we could not possibly have a good security system. (level 1: 1.1)

We had a consultant (name provided) review our system a couple of years back. We now induct and train staff against the plan and documented procedures that resulted from the risk assessment. It seems to work quite well. (level 1: 5.2)

You can't build a house without a plan and our plan comes from the risk assessment. (level 2: 12.1)

The risk assessment listed all our potential exposures and from it we have developed a good (but not perfect) system. (level 2: 16.2)

5.2.2 Security management plan

As outlined in Chapter 2, a security management plan provides a blueprint of how the venue approaches security and safety including control of areas adjacent to the venue such as external queuing, management of car parks and control of taxi ranks. The plan should provide a succinct outline of all matters relevant to security including how the operation addresses the risks associated with violence.

To ascertain if there was a documented Security Management Plan at the venue each respondent was asked the question “Do you have a documented Security Management Plan?” in the survey, which 55% (n = 11) of respondents answered in the affirmative and 45% (n = 9) answered with “no/don’t know”. The overall mean is outlined in Table 15. If three out of five respondents believed that the venue had a security management plan then this was recorded as a “yes”.

Table 15: Do you have a documented Security Management Plan?

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Per cent	Cumulative Per cent
Valid	yes	11	55.0	55.0	55.0
	no	9	45.0	45.0	100.0
	Total	20	100.0	100.0	

A cross-tabulation of responses from level 1 and level 2 venues revealed that 80% (n = 8) of level 1 venues did not have a security management plan, whereas most level 2 venues (90%, n = 9) did have such a plan. This difference is statistically significant, in other words, it was unlikely to have occurred by chance.

Table 16: Venue risk level - Do you have a documented Security Management Plan?

		Do you have a documented Security Management Plan?		Total	
		Yes	no		
Venue risk level	Level 1	Count	2	8	10
		% within Venue risk level	20.0%	80.0%	100.0%
	Level 2	Count	9	1	10
		% within Venue risk level	90.0%	10.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	11	9	20
		% within Venue risk level	55.0%	45.0%	100.0%

Fisher’s exact test: .003 - significant

It was pointed out in the methodology chapter that level 1 venues were more likely to have young patrons and to have more male patrons, both factors which may relate to increased levels of violence. It could be that these factors explain the lower levels of violence rather than the presence of a documented security management plan.

As explained above, regression analysis can help to determine whether the relationship between two variables is independent of other variables. In other words, it can explain whether it is the presence of the security management plan which is associated with the lower levels of violence or the age and gender of patrons. Table 17 shows that after taking into account average age and gender of patrons the *p* value or level of significance is .051, which is very close to the conventional level of significance.

Table 17: Logistic Regression – Security Management Plan and its relationship to high or low risk, taking into account age and gender of patrons

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1	SMP to	-5.135	2.635	3.796	1	.051	.006
	Ave Age	.056	.566	.010	1	.921	1.058
	Gender	-1.118	.778	2.065	1	.151	.327
	Constant	9.493	4.279	4.923	1	.027	13269.684

As part of the analysis of the operationalisation of a security management plan, respondents were asked where the security management plan was kept at their venue. It is assumed that venues with a better method for operationalisation would have their security management plan available for staff. The location of the plan was said to be as follows:

- Manager’s office 30% (n = 6)
- Staff room 10% (n = 2)
- At the bar 5% (n = 1)
- Cashier 5% (n = 1)

An analysis of the level 1 and level 2 venues revealed that one level 1 venue kept its security management plan available at the bar, and three other level 1 venues kept their plans in the manager’s office. Sixty per cent (n = 6) of the level 2 venues kept their security management plan in the staff room (n = 4), at the bar (n = 1) or with the cashier (n = 1), and 30% (n = 3) had the plan stored in the manager’s office. This

suggests availability and therefore operationalisation of the plan is more common in level 2 venues (90%, n = 9) than in level 1 venues where 40% (n = 4) of plans were effectively not readily available to staff.

Explanations from those venues that had a security management plan and made it available to staff included the following:

The plan has to be accessible to staff that's why it is placed in the staff room. Everything we do flows from it and it is a constant reminder to staff about our system of security. (level 1: 5.2)

The plan is the basis for our security approach and helps everyone including the police understand how we approach security issues. Since we had it introduced I think our security effectiveness has improved dramatically. (level 2: 12.1)

Our team need to know what is expected, the plan does that. (level 2: 18.1)

Staff turnover demands it is accessible at all times. It also shows we are serious about security. (level 1: 20.1)

5.2.3 External security consultant

A common practice that occurs with some regularity throughout industry is the engagement of an external security consultant. This allows a venue to have an external independent review of its system and, provided the external security consultant has appropriate competence in the late-night scene this should enhance the venue's security strategy.

In response to the question "Does your venue employ an external security consultant to advise on security strategies?" the following responses were noted (see Table 18).

Table 18: Does your venue employ an external security consultant to advise on security strategies?

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Per cent	Cumulative Per cent
Valid	yes	7	35.0	35.0	35.0
	no	13	65.0	65.0	100.0
	Total	20	100.0	100.0	

A cross-tabulation of responses from level 1 and level 2 venues revealed that 20% (n = 2) of level 1 venues engaged an external security consultant, whereas 50% (n = 5) of level 2 venues did so (see Table 19).

Table 19: Venue risk level - Does your venue employ an external security consultant to advise on security strategies?

		Does your venue employ an external security consultant to advise on security strategies?		Total	
		yes	no		
Venue risk level	Level 1	Count	2	8	10
		% within Venue risk level	20.0%	80.0%	100.0%
	Level 2	Count	5	5	10
		% within Venue risk level	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	7	13	20
		% within Venue risk level	35.0%	65.0%	100.0%

Fisher's exact test : .175 – not significant

Qualitative data revealed the following for some of the venues that did not utilise an external security consultant:

Cost prohibitive (level 1: 3.1)

I suppose we should but our security company says it is not necessary. (level 1: 8.1)

Our duty manager is an ex-lawyer and looks after all that stuff. (level 2: 14.1)

We have little trouble, a good management team, and keep up-to-date with all the trends through our owner who works with the police on security problems. (level 2: 15.1)

Some of the venues that engaged a security consultant provided the following responses:

He has developed a great system that resulted in a substantial reduction of violence. The police are also far happier with the operation. (level 1: 1.1)

It is a costly but wise investment in my view. The headache of keeping current is his, not mine. (level 1: 5.1)

We did it when the police threatened to close us down. It has been worth it and our approach to security is now far better than it was, and continues to improve.
(level 2: 12.1)

I think it is essential, just to keep ahead of problems. (level 2: 16.2)

5.2.4 Selection of crowd controllers

Criteria for the selection of crowd controllers varied between venues. However, there was a general theme followed by operators of most level 1 venues that security staff had to be male, sizeable so as to deter trouble, and physically capable should an incident occur that required physical intervention or patron control such as an ejection from the venue. In total 70% (n = 14) of the nightclubs had clear criteria. Of those six were level 1 and eight were level 2. The four level 1 venues that did not have clear criteria still had basic requirements although they were reliant on their contract security provider to supply “appropriate” staff (see Table 20).

Table 20: Venue risk level - Does your venue have a criteria for selection of crowd controllers?

			Does your venue have a criteria for selection of crowd controllers?		Total
			yes	no	
Venue risk level	Level 1	Count	6	4	10
		% within Venue risk level	60.0%	40.0%	100.0%
	Level 2	Count	8	2	10
		% within Venue risk level	80.0%	20.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	14	6	20
		% within Venue risk level	70.0%	30.0%	100.0%

Fisher’s exact test: .314 – not significant

The qualitative data revealed some interesting approaches to staff selection where there were clear criteria:

Our staff are the face of the venue. We employ in-house door staff, a male and a female and put a lot of time into them. All our other security staff come from (security firm name withheld) but like our last security company they are having trouble getting the right people, no-one wants to work in nightclubs like the old days. Our management team work closely with our security staff to ensure over-

reactions don't occur, especially by some of our security staff who might have little crowd control experience. (level 1: 3.1)

In my opinion the bigger these guys are the better. People will not muck up if they know the big bloke is going to grab them, believe me it works. (level 1: 7.1)

We actually employ talkers not muscle. We have good patrons and have few problems because of this policy. (level 2: 18.1)

We don't have that many security staff in the venue because we are not that big. However, we are very careful who we select. We want talkers and well presented people. Our customers like to be treated well, not bullied or intimidated by a body builder with a big ego. (level 2: 19.2)

In response to the question “Are staff strategically positioned around the venue?” respondents on behalf of 80% (n = 16) of venues said that they had a strategy in place, including respondents speaking on behalf of each of the ten level 2 venues. The four remaining venues (all level 1) justified placement based upon patron capacity and activity. Responses by representatives of venues without a strategic positioning policy included the following statements:

We move staff around depending on the night, entertainment and patronage. Theme nights mean sometimes there is a late crowd and others they come early and leave early. I decide on the night where my people will stand. (level 1: 2.1)

There are too many variables involved for this placement bullshit. You have two on the door and then I just let my guys walk around looking for trouble. They do a good job considering. (level 1: 5.2)

I don't have security positions as the main room is where all the trouble is and I have my guards near the bars and dance floor. That's where it all happens. (level 1: 6.2)

Further, in response to the question “Do you utilise other staff for security types of responsibility?” most respondents indicated that management could be called if required but not bar or support staff. Specific explanations included the following:

They are too busy. Also they are not trained, licensed or experienced enough. Most are Uni kids and it would not be fair to them or me. (level 1: 4.1)

Some do report things they see but that is not very often. I tell the bussies to contact security but usually security detect problems anyway like drunks or fights. (level 1: 5.2)

We are a small venue on one level and even though bar staff could in theory help out they don't. They are young and probably would just get in the way. (level 2: 12.1)

They (non-security staff) are told to stay out of the way for their own safety. (level 2: 14.1)

Liaison with Police

In response to the question “Does your venue have a formal liaison policy with police?” representatives on behalf of 50% (n = 10) of venues stated they had a formal policy. This means that 50% (n = 10) of venues did not have a formal policy in place. The content of policies that were in place varied. However, in general terms police were only called to the venue on the authority of management or the licensee. Three venues asserted that the duty manager was the only person authorised to call police. If police attended the venue on routine patrol or for a specific reason without being called, all venues required door staff to delay and ask police to wait at the entrance whilst management was called. Alternatively some police are referred to or directly escorted to the duty manager.

A comparison of statements of respondents from level 1 and level 2 venues revealed that only 20% (n = 2) of the level 1 venues had a policy in place, whereas 80% (n = 8) of the level 2 venues did so (see Table 20).

Table 21: Venue risk level - Does your venue have a formal liaison policy with police?

			Does your venue have a formal liaison policy with police?		Total
			yes	no	
Venue risk level	Level 1	Count	2	8	10
		% within Venue risk level	20.0%	80.0%	100.0%
	Level 2	Count	8	2	10
		% within Venue risk level	80.0%	20.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	10	10	20
		% within Venue risk level	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%

Fisher's exact test : .011 – significant

When the age and gender of patrons is taken into account, using a logistic regression analysis, the differences are shown to lie outside conventional levels of statistical significance (see Table 21).

Table 22: Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a	Risk level	-5.372	3.374	2.535	1	.111	.005
	Q.40	.590	.484	1.484	1	.223	1.804
	Q.39	.559	.659	.719	1	.397	1.749
	Constant	4.895	3.104	2.487	1	.115	133.659

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Risk, Q.40, Q.39.

Explanations given by representatives from venues without a policy included the following:

Don't need one, I tell staff they must contact me or the Duty Manager, there is no discretion. (level 1: 6.2)

Management need to be involved with the police no matter why they are at the club. They put in a liquor report (Licensed Premises Incident Report) to the Licensing Inspector every time they come here and even though there might be nothing wrong, the report may not be written that way. Another venue that was shut down last year was only aware of a couple of police objections but when it went to Liquor Licensing there was over 50. (level 1: 7.1)

My staff are all told, police equals management, no exceptions. That does not need to be written anywhere in my view. (level 2: 11.1)

Early warning system

In response to the question “Does your venue have an alarm or warning system for incidents?” respondents for 65% (n = 13) of venues said that they had a system in place (see Table 22).

Table 23: Does your venue have an alarm or warning system for incidents?

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Per cent	Cumulative Per cent
Valid	yes	13	65.0	65.0	65.0
	no	7	35.0	35.0	100.0
	Total	20	100.0	100.0	

A comparison of statements of respondents from level 1 and level 2 venues revealed that 50% (n = 5) of level 1 venues had such a system, whereas 80% (n = 8) of level 2 venues did so (see Table 23).

Table 24: Venue risk level - Does your venue have an alarm or warning system for incidents?

			Does your venue have an alarm or warning system for incidents?		Total
			yes	No	
Venue risk level	Level 1	Count	5	5	10
		% within Venue risk level	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
	Level 2	Count	8	2	10
		% within Venue risk level	80.0%	20.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	13	7	20
		% within Venue risk level	65.0%	35.0%	100.0%

Fisher’s exact test : .175 – not significant

Commonly an early warning system applies to larger venues which spread over several levels and with a number of emergency exits. As most venues utilised radio communication between key staff such as management, bar and security, the majority of venues used their early warning system to detect unauthorised use of an exit door. For example, a patron may open an emergency exit at a rear laneway or similar to permit a friend to enter the nightclub un-screened.

Written procedures for staff

In response to the question “Are there written procedures for security and other venue staff?” respondents on behalf of 60% (n = 12) of venues indicated that there were written procedures in place (see Table 24).

Table 25: Are there written procedures for security and other venue staff?

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Per cent	Cumulative Per cent
Valid	yes	12	60.0	60.0	60.0
	no	8	40.0	40.0	100.0
	Total	20	100.0	100.0	

A comparison of responses from level 1 and level 2 venues revealed that only 40% (N = 4) of the level 1 venues had written procedures in place, whereas 80% (n = 8) of the level 2 venues did so (see Table 25).

Table 26: Venue risk level - Are there written procedures for security and other venue staff?

			Are there written procedures for security and other venue staff?		Total
			yes	no	
Venue risk level	Level 1	Count	4	6	10
		% within Venue risk level	40.0%	60.0%	100.0%
	Level 2	Count	8	2	10
		% within Venue risk level	80.0%	20.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	12	8	20
		% within Venue risk level	60.0%	40.0%	100.0%

Fisher’s exact test : .085

The difference between level 1 and level 2 venues for having documented procedures in place is within a .10 level of significance but again is outside the .10 level if age and gender of patrons are taken into account.

As indicated in Chapter 2, documented procedures are considered a good practice and essential in a venue operation. During interviews with the venue operators or their representatives, an examination was made of venue procedures where relevant. Their content varied considerably, with some venues producing a comprehensive portfolio of policies and procedures. Others produced procedures that were more aligned with venue expectations or rules. For example, in one venue a procedures document contained “Staff will not smoke whilst on duty” and on a subsequent page “Bar staff are not to serve intoxicated patrons” (level 1 3.1). These examples were more

common across high-risk than level 2 venues although some level 2 venues had similar documentation. It was noted that a number of venues had no procedures addressing high-risk areas of their operation including managing violent, difficult or intoxicated persons or managing persons behaving unacceptably.

The qualitative data provided some further insight into the origin of some venue procedure documentation, as shown in the following quotations:

These procedures were inherited from the former operator, to tell the truth I haven't read them. (level 1: 3.1)

We had a consultant (name withheld) write them last year. Each staff member gets to read the document and then signs a form that is placed in their personnel file. They must acknowledge on the form they will comply with them. I'm not sure where the document came from but my bar manager reviewed it a couple of years ago. (level 1: 6.2)

We actually did not write our procedures. A mate of mine gave me his and we re-badged them. Are they OK or shit? (level 1: 7.1)

Security training

In response to the question “Is there ongoing security-related training provided to staff at the venue?”, respondents for 55% (n = 11) of venues replied in the affirmative (see Table 26).

Table 27: Is there on-going security-related training provided to staff at the venue?

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Per cent	Cumulative Per cent
Valid	yes	11	55.0	55.0	55.0
	no	9	45.0	45.0	100.0
	Total	20	100.0	100.0	

A comparison of responses from level 1 and level 2 venues revealed that only 2% (n = 2) of the level 1 venues had ongoing security-related training, whereas 90% (n = 9) of the level 2 venues did so (see Table 27).

Table 28: Venue risk level - Is there on-going security-related training provided to staff at the venue?

			Is there on-going security-related training provided to staff at the venue?		Total
			yes	No	
Venue risk level	Level 1	Count	2	8	10
		% within Venue risk level	20.0%	80.0%	100.0%
	Level 2	Count	9	1	10
		% within Venue risk level	90.0%	10.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	11	9	20
		% within Venue risk level	55.0%	45.0%	100.0%

Fisher's exact test : .003 – significant

As discussed above, level 1 venues were more likely to have young patrons and to have more male patrons, both factors which may relate to increased levels of violence. It could be that these factors explain the lower levels of violence rather than the on-going security-related training provided to staff at the venue. As can be seen in table 29 there remains a significant relationship between security training and the risk level of the venue after taking into account gender and age.

Logistic regression analysis – risk levels, age and gender of patrons

Table 29: Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a	Risk	-8.173	4.173	3.836	1	.050	.000
	Ave Age	.787	.748	1.107	1	.293	2.197
	Gender	-1.297	.804	2.601	1	.107	.273
	Constant	12.003	5.201	5.326	1	.021	163222.161

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Risk, Q.40, Q.39.

As in the procedures discussed above, there was substantial inconsistency between the content, duration and delivery of security-related training. Most venues did not have a formal approach to training and merely delivered reminders about existing venue policy or new initiatives from the regulator and police during staff meetings. Often training in new initiatives was based upon venue attendance at the Liquor Accord.

Some comments made during the interviews by representatives of those venues with a security-related training strategy included:

We try to have regular staff meetings and that's where we do the training. (level 1: 3.1)

This is a difficult area of our business due to staff turnover. It is costly to develop and then deliver anything that might be considered "training" however we do our best, mostly at staff meetings. (level 1: 4.1)

We do RSA training and also had the police come in and speak with staff about their responsibilities in dealing with intoxicated patrons including ejections. Last month we took our door staff through strategies for incidents outside the venue. (level 2: 12.1)

None of the venues maintained training records although two level 2 nightclubs (venue 11 and venue 15) kept minutes of staff meetings. These minutes also noted attendance and agenda items. None of the venues conducted formalised assessments of staff competence post-meeting or at any other time.

Training and written procedures

In response to the question "Is there training and written procedures for underage persons?" respondents on behalf of 75% (n = 15) of venues reported that training was provided and written procedures were available (see Table 29).

Table 30: Is there training and written procedures for underage persons?

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Per cent	Cumulative Per cent
Valid	yes	15	75.0	75.0	75.0
	no	5	25.0	25.0	100.0
	Total	20	100.0	100.0	

A comparison of responses from level 1 and level 2 venues revealed that 90% (n = 9) of level 2 venues had training and procedures, whereas only 60% (n = 6) of the level 1 venues did so (see Table 30).

Table 31: Venue risk level - Is there training and written procedures for underage persons?

			Is there training and written procedures for underage persons?		Total
			Yes	no	
Venue risk level	Level 1	Count	6	4	10
		% within Venue risk level	60.0%	40.0%	100.0%
	Level 2	Count	9	1	10
		% within Venue risk level	90.0%	10.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	15	5	20
		% within Venue risk level	75.0%	25.0%	100.0%

Fisher's exact test : .151 – not significant

Comments made during the interviews by representatives of venues with training and written procedures for underage persons included the following:

We acknowledge that minors will attempt to gain entry however our access control policy is inflexible, no photo ID no entry. To further enhance this all staff are regularly advised of this policy, new staff are trained against it and we often refer to Liquor Licensing Victoria posters about suitable ID. (level 1: 3.1)

This is one of our problem areas and the rule here is anyone who looks under 25 years must produce photo ID, no exceptions, even if they are known to door staff. (level 2: 14.1)

Our staff all attend a briefing on minors as part of their induction. It is also discussed during RSA training and the security staff are taught this at the Crowd Control courses. I don't think we can do anything more but keep reinforcing what is required. (level 2: 19.2)

Responses by representatives of some venues without training and written procedures for underage persons included the following:

The posters say it all, I point them out to everyone and we also reinforce at staff meetings. (level 1: 1.1)

We don't really train our staff but there are posters from Liquor Licensing outlining acceptable forms of identification. We just follow that. (level 1: 2.1)

I don't think it is necessary. RSA training makes it very clear that minors are not permitted in the club and if they don't have ID they don't get in. (level 2: 17.2)

Male and Female Door Staff

In response to the question “Are there male and female door staff?” representatives of 60% (n = 12) of the nightclubs stated they had both male and female door staff (see Table 31).

Table 32: Are there male and female door staff?

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Per cent	Cumulative Per cent
Valid	yes	12	60.0	60.0	60.0
	no	8	40.0	40.0	100.0
	Total	20	100.0	100.0	

A comparison of responses from level 1 and level 2 venues revealed that 80% (n = 9) of level 2 venues had male and female door staff compared to 40% (n = 4) of the level 1 venues (see Table 32).

Table 33: Venue risk level - Are there male and female door staff?

			Are there male and female door staff?		Total
			yes	no	
Venue risk level	Level 1	Count	4	6	10
		% within Venue risk level	40.0%	60.0%	100.0%
	Level 2	Count	8	2	10
		% within Venue risk level	80.0%	20.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	12	8	20
		% within Venue risk level	60.0%	40.0%	100.0%

Fisher's exact test : .085

This difference is outside the conventional level for statistical significance.

Comments made in the interviews on behalf of some of the venues with male and female door staff included the following:

It works well, in fact our girl is the face of the operation and there are few problems because she is a talker and not a “door bitch”. (level 1: 3.1)

We need to have a female on the team considering about half our patrons are female. There are possible problems of male security handling intoxicated

females so we need female security staff to ensure our female patrons are safe.
(level 2: 12.1)

This is an interesting area because years ago I rejected having females but today we swear by them, they defuse more incidents than our guys. (level 2: 17.2)

Comments made in the interview on behalf of some venues that did not have male and female door staff included the following:

This might be controversial but females bring more problems in my opinion because they can get very moody and are hard to keep employed. (level 1: 4.1)

For our operation it is unnecessary, a gay club with a strong male patronage does not need female door staff, we need good looking and good talking males.
(level 2: 15.1)

Formal Induction of Staff

In response to the question “Are persons working at the venue inducted formally including training and provided access to written procedures?” respondents on behalf of 50% (n = 10) of venues contended that they had an induction strategy in place (see Table 33).

Table 34: Are persons working at the venue inducted formally including training and provided access to written procedures?

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Per cent	Cumulative Per cent
Valid	yes	10	50.0	50.0	50.0
	no	10	50.0	50.0	100.0
	Total	20	100.0	100.0	

A comparison of responses from level 1 and low-risk venues revealed that 80% (n = 9) of level 2 venues inducted staff compared to 20% (n = 2) of the high-risk venues (see Table 34). This was a statistically significant result although after taking age and gender of patrons into account the level of significance was outside .10.

Table 35: Venue risk level - Are persons working at the venue inducted formally including training and provided access to written procedures?

			Are persons working at the venue inducted formally including training and provided access to written procedures?		Total
			yes	no	
Venue risk level	Level 1	Count	2	8	10
		% within Venue risk level	20.0%	80.0%	100.0%
	Level 2	Count	8	2	10
		% within Venue risk level	80.0%	20.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	10	10	20
		% within Venue risk level	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%

Fisher's exact test : .011 – significant

A regression analysis of the relationship between formal induction of staff and risk level of the venue taking into account age and gender of patrons was not statistically significant. Although there is a relationship between the variables as a whole i.e. practices after taking into account the other factors.

Table 36 Logistic regression analysis of the relationship between formal induction of staff and risk level of the venue taking into account age and gender of patrons

		Variables in the Equation					
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a	Risk	-2.151	1.828	1.385	1	.239	.116
	Ave Age	-.131	.429	.094	1	.759	.877
	Gender	-.233	.472	.244	1	.621	.792
	Constant	4.188	2.487	2.836	1	.092	65.901

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Risk, Q.40, Q.39.

Comments made in the interviews by representatives of some of the venues contended that they had an induction strategy included the following:

Induction is important and so are our procedures to ensure staff do not get it wrong especially those from the security company because some of them also work at other clubs. (level 1: 1.1)

Without an induction it would be mayhem. Even with an induction our best intentions are not always followed. (level 2: 15.1)

Responses on behalf of some venues that did not have a formal induction included the following:

We just don't get the time to include a full venue induction. I suppose we sort of have one through the security supervisor but that is only for security staff. Other staff are told to report security problems to security staff. (level 1: 7.1)

There is so much turnover in this industry we would have an induction every night of the week. The duty manager introduces staff to our rules and hopefully they are smart enough to follow them to the letter. If they don't their employment with us will be a short journey. (level 2: 11.1)

I hear you but in the real world formal induction is difficult within this industry. We just manage them closely. (level 2: 19.2)

Table 35 summarises the responses relating to each of the key questions above, categorised for level 1 and level 2 venues, with the result expressed according to Fisher's exact test for significance.

Table 37: Summary of venue responses

Question	Level 1		Level 2		Fisher's Exact Test
	Yes	No	Yes	No	
Has there been a documented security risk assessment conducted?	2	8	5	5	.175
Do you have a documented Security Management Plan?	2	8	9	1	.003
Does your venue employ an external security consultant?	2	8	5	5	.175
Does your venue have a criteria for selection of crowd controllers?	6	4	8	2	.314
Does the venue have a formal liaison policy with police?	2	8	8	2	.011
Does your venue have an alarm or warning system for incidents?	5	5	8	2	.175
Are there written procedures for security and other venue staff?	4	6	8	2	.085
Is there ongoing security-related training provided to staff at the venue?	2	8	9	1	.003
Is there training and written procedures for underage persons?	6	4	9	1	.151
Are there male and female door staff?	4	6	8	2	.085
Are persons working at the venue formally inducted including training and provided access to written procedures?	2	8	8	2	.011

5.3 Summary

Key features of a security system for this study were categorised under 19 elements as outlined in the questionnaire survey. These elements need to be contextualised for each venue operation. However, this was not evident in this study with anomalies between all venues, whether level 1 or level 2.

An examination of the venue profiles revealed common characteristics in a number of areas including location, queuing, patron and staff demographics, and incident data.

Common incident-related themes emerged in the data that indicated more likely times, participants and the location of violence. In brief, this means that violence is more likely to occur in the last two hours of trading irrespective of the authorised trading hours of a nightclub. As indicated in the literature review, participants of violence are generally intoxicated younger males aged between 18-24 years. This study revealed the majority of incidents occur outside or external to the venue but in the immediate vicinity.

It is clear from the study that there are fewer violent incidents when venues make more use of best practice principles. This is at statistically significant levels overall and for many of the individual areas examined.

In determining their security requirements 80% of level 1 venues failed to conduct a formalised security risk assessment, did not have a documented security management plan nor sought external assistance in developing or maintaining their security strategy. 60% of level 1 venues also had serious deficiencies in their documented procedures. The level 2 venues generally addressed these key risk areas. The deficiencies in the level 1 venue systems ranged from an absence of relevant documentation, failing to formally address issues of managing intoxicated persons or intervening appropriately on incidents of unacceptable behaviour or aggression. This suggests that the majority of level 1 venues have not adequately developed their security system as compared with the best practice framework.

Staff recruitment and training revealed inconsistencies between venues with more problems identified in level 1 venues, such as an absence of gender representation that aligned with patronage, poor induction and little opportunities for professional development.

Although it is evident that level 1 venues generally had less formalised systems, other risk factors were taken into account, including venues with a higher number of male patrons and younger patronage. This was to determine if there were confounding issues. In other words, the reason for their being dangerous is not to do with best practice but with more male patrons or younger patrons. The regression analysis as presented in Table 12 revealed a significant relationship between the number of violent incidents and the number of security practices used.

The results outlined in this chapter answer the research question.

Chapter 6 – Discussion and Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the implications of the study for industry application. It also comprises an overview of the conclusions and considers the various strengths and limitations that applied to the research. This chapter has the following sections:

- Strengths and limitations;
- Discussion relating to theoretical implications and how the findings fit within the existing literature;
- Findings;
- Other issues worthy of consideration;
- Summary of conclusions;
- Suggested “Best Practice” framework;
- Original contributions and future research directions; and
- Conclusions.

The thesis has attempted to identify elements within a nightclub system of security that minimises the risk of violence. This was done by first examining the literature including practices associated with licensed premises i.e. nightclubs, alcohol consumption including intoxication, violence, approaches to security by venues, and various interventions in Australia and abroad. Interventions included regulatory activity such as conditions placed on liquor licences, mandatory closing times and lockouts. Other interventions were founded upon community mobilisation through liquor accords that often led to safe transport options, improved guardianship of areas around venues, stricter enforcement measures, precinct risk assessments and various technologies introduced into nightclubs such as patron ID scanning, CCTV and communication across venues and precincts.

It was apparent during the study that this area was under-researched and that the literature provided a theoretical discussion about violence risks and the likelihood of violence. The literature generally did not address potential industry or venue-specific security strategies to treat and operationalise systemic responses to violence from a

proactive or reactive perspective. A primary aim of the study was to address this anomaly with an evidence-based approach, using descriptive methodology involving 20 Melbourne nightclubs.

Although the nightclubs were situated in the City of Stonnington Chapel Street Entertainment Precinct in many ways they are representative of Victorian nightclubs. This is because Victorian nightclubs are subject to the same high-risk liquor licensing conditions, have similar hours of operation that attract high-risk conditions by trading past 1 am, provide live entertainment or amplified music, have a similar staffing structure that includes a licensee/nominee, duty manager, bar, service and security staff, and generally market to the young.

6.2 Strengths and limitations

Strengths

In general, the design of this study assisted to achieve the aims in answering the research question. The results were able to disclose common differences between level 1 and level 2 nightclubs on a range of variables including key features of a best practice security framework as level 1 nightclubs had higher levels of reported violence than the level 2 venues. These systemic differences within venues with more violence were:

- Absence of a Security Management Plan in most Level 1 venues;
- No formal policy for liaison with police;
- Marginal number of formal policies or procedures to guide staff in their routine duties i.e. managing intoxicated or difficult people, access control, guardianship through monitoring practices and the like;
- Minimum security-related training for venue staff including the strategic management of intoxicated or difficult persons;
- No formal induction of venue staff so they understood various operational expectations, roles and responsibilities for working within the venue system of security; and

- No formal process for review to ensure the system aligned with current industry best practice.

The response rate of staff from the 20 venues was considered a strength of the study, involving a total of 100 respondents through five staffing levels from management to operational security and service staff. There was also a general consistency between venues in each level hence there were common systemic deficiencies in the level 1 nightclubs that were not always present in the level 2 venues. Similarly, more good practices were present in the level 2 venues irrespective of patron capacity or other situational influences such as venue design, general management and formalised protocols as was evident when averages were calculated compared to the level of violence.

Some responses produced expected results such as significant correlations between level 1 venues and the absence of a security risk assessment and security management plan. Similarly, there were expected correlations between level 2 venues and staff induction with more formalised approaches to the development and implementation of a security system.

Other results were outlined and discussed in Chapter 5. These results answered the research question although there was a possibility that other issues, such as patron demographic confounded the picture and contributed to violence in some way. However, a regression analysis (see Table 12) indicated that even after taking into account patron age and gender there is still a significant relationship between the number of violent incidents and the number of security practices used. This supports the argument that best practice elements are more common in the level 2 than level 1 nightclubs.

In summary, the study has succeeded in its aims of investigating nightclub systems of security and elements that are critical to the introduction of a best practice framework. The best practice framework is considered essential to managing the risk of violence in and around venues. This was confirmed through a comparative analysis of data pertaining to level 1 and level 2 nightclubs, which indicated that a best practice framework is an essential requirement for all nightclubs, both established and proposed.

Limitations

The thesis has several limitations, as discussed in each chapter and summarised below:

- The study addressed the association between levels of violence and nightclub systems of security. However, the study investigated security systems in isolation and did not investigate the impact of practices between venues such as immediately adjacent operations within a precinct with or without different patron profiles and security systems including how they might collaborate to minimise security-related risks. This could be considered in future research;
- A number of industry and venue-specific initiatives were introduced during the study period by regulators (demerit points), police (increased enforcement including penalty notices) and government (freeze on new post 1am liquor licences in Victoria) that could potentially impact upon levels of violence although these initiatives did not necessarily affect nightclub systems of security that were the subject of this study. A further study might disclose the impact of these initiatives on levels of violence;
- New practices such as lockouts, management plan guidelines and barring notices for problem patrons were introduced. Again these initiatives could have impacted upon the level of violence at some venues although these initiatives were introduced post data collection; and
- There is always the potential misinterpretation of questions in the survey questionnaire albeit on balance the semi-structured interviews did not disclose obvious problems in this area.

The small number of venues involved in the study was a limitation. However, for the reasons outlined in Chapter 4 under the headings reliability and validity, being able to draw on five staffing levels was found to be appropriate for the data analysis given the stark contrasts between operational roles. It is asserted therefore that the sample comprised sufficient industry and venue representation to provide clear knowledge about systems of security in level 1 and level 2 venues, at least in the Victorian context.

The structure of the survey and the semi-structured interviews were not considered limitations in this study. There was a high degree of consistency between respondents speaking on behalf of the venues. These also aligned with the outcomes associated with level 1 and level 2 categories.

On reflection questions relating to technological innovation could have been included in the survey. Although partly explored during the semi-structured interviews there was clear evidence of an industry move towards access control using patron identification technology and improvements in CCTV systems that included incident vision recovery and movement detection to improve incident analysis. Again, these areas could be the subject of future research.

6.3 Discussion

Firstly I will discuss the theoretical implications of this study and how the findings fit within the existing literature.

This thesis has shown there are many aspects to be considered in managing the level of violence in and around licensed premises. A system of security at any venue is merely one part of broader considerations including social tolerance to alcohol consumption; social acceptance of disorderly behaviour including intoxication; the influence of locality, crime rates and entertainment precincts (where relevant); and venue practices including governance, operational supervision and RSA. The literature review disclosed a strong body of evidence-based knowledge developed over many years across jurisdictions locally and abroad relating to alcohol and violence. The studies presented within this thesis align with the growing literature that emphasises three key influences on the risk of violence: societal, situational and personal. Relevant to entertainment precincts in particular, this is highlighted by Miller et al. (2012) where it was reported that entertainment precincts create unique challenges and tensions in the social environment where the responsibility for ensuring safety and security of the community includes venue operators, venue staff, police, regulators and ultimately the local community itself.

How an appropriate level of safety and security is achieved and maintained is subject to a number of interventions including strategic use of personnel, venue practices, technology and enforcement methods to encourage compliance from both a voluntary and mandatory perspective. Miller et al. (2012) reports that voluntary actions by Geelong venue operators in adopting recommended good practices do not achieve the same outcomes as mandatory compliance in minimising violence as was evidenced in Newcastle. This is an issue that requires further consideration by regulators and policy-makers.

Stockwell (2010) reports best practice for reducing levels of violence in and around licensed premises including those operating within the NTE is through introduction of evidence-based strategies involving venue operators, regulators and the community. He suggests that many documented interventions have been crisis-driven and yet there are multiple factors that interact in creating the risk of violence. These include individual characteristics, alcohol and drug use, venue operations including management practices and service of alcohol, the level of guardianship, and social or physical measures present that might create stress or frustration to those whom are present in or around the venue. He also suggests that the influence of alcohol intoxication should not be underestimated in any approach to violence reduction. Further, any strategy must therefore include assessment of intoxication levels in addition to creating an environment that is not stressful, causes any frustration and sociable for individuals and crowds generally. Again, relevant considerations for regulators and policy-makers in determining appropriate practices for industry.

A key area that does not gain much attention within the literature was venue management. Although the VCCAV (1990b) suggested appropriate management practices were a key to impacting upon levels of violence and more recently Hayes-Jonkers et al. (2012), venue management practices regarding alcohol service and conditions associated with venue liquor licences are well documented but there is little about suitable venue management practice from a security perspective. This includes the operational responsibilities and performance of duty managers, senior security and other staff at venues in relation to security strategies. This anomaly needs to be addressed through future research. Monaghan (2000; 2003; 2004) in part addressed this area but through cultures of security, the very individual people who

work in security, routine activities associated with bouncers as opposed to how security operations might be integrated within a broader venue specific security strategy. Of course, this could form the basis of a study in itself, especially within the Australian environment.

6.4 Findings

The research question sought to determine whether there was an association between venues that adopt a best practice security framework and those that did not. This led to an investigation of 10 level 1 and 10 level 2 nightclubs and their systems of security. The literature provided a substantial amount of information about the association between alcohol, intoxication and violence but had little to say on systems of security that might impact upon violence in and around nightclubs. This absence of literature required an examination of activity by regulators and other key stakeholders to determine, firstly, what was common industry practice and, secondly, what was best practice in security by nightclubs.

The following is a summary of the results as they relate to both the research question and further areas for exploration.

- Of the elements considered to be best practice in security to minimise violence, the level 1 nightclubs consistently failed to implement critical elements one would expect in a best practice framework. For example, although a security risk assessment is considered essential in the development of any system of security, 80% (n=8) of level 1 venues failed to formally assess risks specific to security and violence. This partly answers the research question in that most venues that have higher levels of violence do not adopt a best practice framework, at least from a risk management perspective;
- A consistent theme emerged that nightclubs with higher levels of violence had informal rather than formal security systems. This included an absence of protocols, external engagement of persons to introduce security expertise and no clear instructions for security or other venue staff about the risk of violence; and

- Staff were not formally inducted as part of a venue strategy to create an informed culture in seeking to address the risk of violence.

6.5 Other issues worthy of consideration

A number of issues emerged in the study that are worthy of further consideration as they did not relate directly to the research question. These issues were:

- A general lack of understanding by venue operators of contemporary approaches to systems of security. Although this was evident in both level 1 and level 2 venues it was more apparent in the level 1 venues. This absence of knowledge extended to a number of duty managers and security staff;
- Although cost is a relevant commercial driver, many operators took considerable risk by failing to invest in staff induction or development. Many tended to meet minimum staffing levels only, mostly in satisfaction of regulatory expectations which meant the venue operation was more weighted toward reactivity, which increases rather than minimises risk;
- Selection of individual crowd controllers including of a suitable gender for the venue was often the responsibility of security providers rather than venue management. This was more evident in the level 1 operations with a number of venue operators providing a basic profile for venue staff suitability and little, if any, contact with newly appointed security staff once they commenced work;
- There was a common avoidance of interactions with external stakeholders such as police and the liquor regulator even though many were members of the licensee's Accord few reported they took advantage of speaking with the authorities about venue-specific issues. Again, avoidance was more prominent in the level 1 venues, with many requiring any contact whatsoever especially during trading periods to proceed through management. When the venue was not trading venue operators infrequently sought any interaction with police or the liquor regulator;

- There was an absence of formalised data gathering to identify trends associated with incidents and little time spent on incident analysis or debriefing of staff post-incident. Even in cases where serious injury occurred to patrons or staff, venue operators did not always take a lead role in incident management and incident review strategies; and
- Training, whether formal or informal, was not generally evident in the level 1 operations including induction or professional development in core areas of the operation.

6.6 Summary of conclusions

What do the findings suggest?

The findings suggest that systems of security that align with a best practice framework as described below will result in reduced levels of violence. This framework should include:

- Documented security risk assessment;
- Documented security management plan;
- Documented formal liaison policy with police;
- Ongoing security-related training for staff;
- Formal induction strategy for new staff; and
- Documented procedures for security and other venue staff including managing aggression, underage and intoxicated patrons.

Although not statistically significant in this study, good practices should also include:

- Engagement of an external security consultant to bring security expertise into the operation;
- Clear criteria for selection of crowd controllers;
- An appropriate gender balance of staff and patronage, especially for female patrons; and

- Introduction of technology to manage access to the venue, such as patron identification for limiting presence of known trouble-makers, and also to control secondary and emergency doors.

What implications does this study have for nightclub security systems?

This study confirms the need for nightclub operators to ensure their systems of security are formalised through the introduction of risk-based protocols. This includes a security policy, security management plan and standard operating procedures. Such protocols should assist to highlight the importance of a proactive rather than reactive approach to the risk of violence.

While the system of security at any nightclub is ultimately a responsibility of the venue operator, there are implications for the following:

- *Security providers* such as security firms that provide crowd controllers to nightclubs. This is because security firm operators placing their staff in a workplace with a deficient system can expose the security firm and its staff to a number of risks. These deficiencies could also potentially expose patrons and others in and around the venue such as police, vendors and passers-by to risks including violence;
- *Regulators* where trading conditions can be imposed such as those discussed in this thesis for problematic venues where there is an increased risk or history of violence. This approach will ensure there is greater consistency across the sector in terms of appropriate security practices;
- *Policy makers* who might be tasked with introducing sector-specific responses to violence problems in and around licensed premises whether an individual venue or venues within an entertainment precinct; and
- *Legislators* who need to understand best practice in systems of security. This includes the need for appropriate training in a competency-based environment that is also accredited by regulators to ensure industry consistency, compliance relating to various rules and regulations for both security and venues generally and enforcement in a best practice framework.

6.7 Suggested best practice framework

Founded upon this study the following best practice framework is recommended. It comprises six elements:

1. Risk assessment;
2. Security management plan;
3. Physical security;
4. Personnel;
5. Standard operating procedures; and
6. Review.

Each element needs to be contextualised for the particular nightclub operation as each can be influenced by situational factors such as a venue located in an entertainment precinct as opposed to a venue operating in a suburban or regional area.

6.8 Best Practice Framework

Risk Assessment	Security Management Plan	Physical Security	Personnel	Standard Operating Procedures	Review
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review existing system of security • Identify gaps between the current system and best practice framework • Consider external and internal risks/hazards • Consider risks associated with location of venue, i.e., precinct, commercial or residential location and level of activity • Consider risks against venue design • Consider liquor licensing and planning rules and compliance risks • Consider industry trends, recent venue incident data, staff turnover, complaints, warnings from regulator or police, penalties issued • Consider staffing levels vs. span of control • Consider harm minimisation approach for licensed premises 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Must contain introduction, security policy, objectives of plan and authority • General information, i.e., licensee/nominee, licence type, venue capacity, trading times, and expected trading peaks by day/night, availability of food, anticipated age demographic and theme nights • Operational issues including security, patron capacity and management, minors, intoxication, alcohol service and promotions, amenity and weapons • External issues such as neighbouring licensed premises, transport services and operating times, taxi rank, common risks and hazards • Attachments, i.e., liquor licence, CCTV plan, queuing plan, staff induction checklist, and industry guidelines. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hardware such as locks, safes, secure and safe entrances/exits • Technology including CCTV, alarm (intruder, duress and special use), patron identification system • Other equipment such as stanchions or bollards with straps for queue control, portable radios for staff comms, and crowd barriers • Signage to guide patrons, i.e., members or guest lines, lockout announcements, use of patron identification system, operation of safe taxi rank, amenity requirement such as “respect our neighbours” or parking advice 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organisational chart • Position descriptions • Selecting and vetting • In-house or contract arrangements • Pre and post-shift responsibilities • Security or other mandatory licensing • Identification requirements • Induction training • Mandatory training, i.e., RSA, first aid and emergency preparedness • Training (internal and external) against role including pathways relevant to role; • Monitoring performance against venue system of security • Discipline 	<p>Site specific as required but includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accidents, injury and illness • Aggression, violence and unacceptable behaviour • Cash handling and other security risks • CCTV, surveillance and crowd monitoring • Drugs and drink spiking • Emergency preparedness • Incident reporting • Intoxication • Minors • Noise control • Opening and closing the venue • Perimeter, access and amenity • Responsible serving of alcohol • Site specific technology • Weapons • Workplace safety 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Determine review requirements, i.e., annually, post-incident, design changes, staff turnover, etc. • Review current system against industry trends, change in operating authority, incident data, staff turnover, complaints, warnings from regulator or police, penalties issued, etc. • Review against new government or industry policy, i.e., Alcohol Action Plan

6.9 Original contributions and future research directions

The study has identified a number of issues relating to nightclub systems of security and elements within a framework that appears to impact best upon the risk of violence. A number of areas specific to nightclub security systems in this study had insufficient literature upon which to base a relevant comparison other than the link between alcohol, intoxication and violence. For example, there has been no previous study or assessment of the elements of a nightclub security system that form best practice or how a nightclub system should be formalised. This means that there is a need for further exploration of issues relevant to violence from a security systems approach in both this and other jurisdictions.

The findings have some support in the literature as applied to alcohol, intoxication and violence. However, the issue of the NTE and the problems associated with nightclubs has long been known with little research carried out into how one might minimise the risk of violence through a venue specific security strategy. The literature acknowledges that most violence is the domain of a few venues and yet, other than regulatory responses, there is no evidence-based research into venue security operations. This study begins this process however further work needs to be done.

This thesis has made a number of original contributions to the field.

Development of a system of security

The processes associated with development of a system of security for a nightclub has now been articulated through a “best practice” framework. In addition to this study, the framework has encompassed results of studies that identify effective strategies and methods under consideration for a nightclub-related assessment. For example, external and internal risks/hazards are generically reported in the literature including problems allied with individuals or groups, intoxication, queuing, transport, and regulation (Graham & Homel 2008). Further, risks associated with lockouts, preloading and enforcement strategies (Miller et al. 2012); and guiding principles in a situational context for RSA, managing intoxication, and creating credible deterrence in a general sense (Stockwell 2010). The impact of design and contemporary physical security measures that contribute to reduced levels of violence has also been included within the best practice framework (LLCV 2007). In addition, the role of personnel

and their respective competencies with a particular focus on management and security staff, followed by system review considerations.

The role of security personnel has been discussed in detail in Chapter 3 within the existing literature (Hobbs et al. 2000; Monaghan 2000; Monaghan 2004). However some further discussion is worthy of summary relative to “bouncers” within security systems, the findings of this study and the existing literature. As Reason (2000) reported many incidents within a system can be attributed to human error or poor performance for a variety of explanations and hence the importance, within the context of the literature and findings of this study for key stakeholders and especially venue operators to ensure:

- (i) an adequate span of control i.e. staff to patron ratio;
- (ii) positioning of staff in and around the venue to maximise crowd guardianship;
- (iii) utilisation of experienced staff in key roles that included supervision, access (door) control, and interventions where problems arise;
- (iv) staff interact appropriately to establish rapport with patrons well before any potential or actual problems arise;
- (v) a high level of consistency is maintained across the security and broader venue team about critical issues such as RSA, tolerable levels of intoxication, admission of undesirables, and a hierarchy of control;
- (vi) avoidance of practices that may impact upon atmosphere or create difficulties for venue staff such as staff drinking while working, tolerating off duty security staff in the venue, or failing to clear used drinking vessels and the like;
- (vii) crowd monitoring practices are introduced and maintained by relevant staff including management, security staff, RSA officers, bar staff, bussy’s and the like so that unacceptable behaviours are controlled in the early stages;
- (viii) in addition to RSA, all staff are trained in managing intoxicated or difficult persons including how to control and defuse situations;
- (ix) staff are also trained in general security awareness which includes avoidance of socialising with patrons and others during work performance,

managing cash and other assets appropriately, and exit management as part of ensuring a secure environment.

The work of Hobbs, Lister and Monaghan on cultures of security was discussed in Chapter 2, with a focus on “bouncers” as gate-keepers in the NTE. This important security function in Victoria is based upon pre-licensing training and probity checks and yet there continues a trend of security-related violence as discussed in Chapter 3 including media reporting. Mandatory training does not apply across the sector in the UK hence perhaps the different cultures between somewhat similar societies. This could be the subject of further research. As Lister et al. (2002, p. 2) reported “there exists a profound gap between the trained and lived realities of the role.” The experiences within this study suggest the Australian approach is not dissimilar to the UK in that classroom-based training alone is not necessarily an appropriate induction of security staff to the subtleties associated with venue-specific security requirements. Hence the need for induction by competent persons within the workplace to ensure the business objectives of individual venues and community expectations for strategic management of problems including the risks associated with violence are adequately addressed. Against the training background remain the concerns of security culture. Indeed, the experiences within this study revealed a broad acceptance for physicality and the threat of escalating physical measures amongst security staff at nightclubs should initial directions given to problem patrons not be followed. Policy-makers and regulators alike need to consider how further measures might be introduced that impact upon this security culture including on-the-job training measures, strategic management and whether the current licensing system for base level operations alone is sufficient. Perhaps licensing with associated training for supervisors and managers is one consideration along similar lines to higher level qualifications in policing and other disciplines in the fields of public safety.

Violence Contribution Model

As outlined in Chapter 2, the Violence Contribution Model consolidates current knowledge within the literature about factors relevant to the likelihood of violence. Three factors of societal, situational and personal (individual) taken in context for the particular environment indicate whether the risk of violence is more or less likely.

This model could be used by industry, police, regulators and policy-makers as the basis for considerations in the development of a system of security in a nightclub in relation to violence i.e. each area must be addressed appropriately in context of the particular venue. In addition, the Violence Contribution Model can also guide industry training including venue inductions as essential areas that need to be addressed in context to minimise the risk level of violence in nightclubs.

Combination effects of this study

The combination of drawing together the literature relative to alcohol-related violence, various interventions such as regulation to address problems associated with alcohol abuse into an analytic framework is distinctly different to any of the literature.

The inter-relationships between the various studies reported within the literature and the findings of this study suggest new policy approaches need to be considered in further reducing the incidence of alcohol-related violence. Of particular importance are the findings of this study that suggest venues having formalised systems in an appropriate context will have less incidents including violence than venues that do not. At present there is no regulatory requirement nor liquor licence condition in Australia that imposes such a requirement. This is particularly relevant for future contemplation by regulators and policy-makers as a further requirement for “high risk” problematic venues.

Policy implications

This thesis has identified essential features for a nightclub system security in minimising risks associated with violence. Given the history of violent incidents at nightclubs and the general increases of violent crime throughout society the findings of this study are important and may contribute to less violence across nightclubs and licensed premises generally.

The findings are also important for planning and licensing decisions by regulators, law enforcement, government and policy-makers generally. They are equally important for local community responses to alcohol-related issues and industry where the evidence is clear that formalised systems will impact upon levels of violence as public safety becomes more prominent in considerations for licensing and general regulatory strategies.

As discussed in Chapter 3, responsive regulation theory proposes a move toward self-regulation or personal responsibility (Graham & Homel 2008) and yet the New South Wales security industry regulator has withdrawn its co-regulation model (NSW Police 2011). The current regulatory approach for licensed premises in Australia across the domestic jurisdictions appears to provide some opportunities for self-determination but within a defined framework (see Figure 3: Responsive regulation theory pyramid). In New South Wales an excessive level of violence at a particular venue will result in regulatory intervention (see Table 2: mandatory conditions for problem venues in NSW). In Victoria, problems associated with high-level violence usually result in an escalating approach of police enforcement, licensing warnings and “show cause” proceedings. The escalating approach by the Victorian regulator appears consistent with the responsive regulation theory pyramid albeit it is unclear whether such avenue is adopted as a matter of course. This is a matter that could be reviewed by the regulator in defining its response to problematic venues.

The findings of this study suggest that the level of violence at nightclubs can be minimised when an appropriate security framework is introduced. For example, responsive regulation to violence concerns could involve a requirement for implementation of a formalised security strategy by a venue followed by independent monitoring of compliance against a best practice security framework. This should provide confidence to key stakeholders that appropriate measures have been introduced to minimise the risk of alcohol-related violence, at least in the initial approach by management of a problematic venue. Where non-compliance is detected or the level of violence does not reduce in a predetermined time frame, other action might be warranted such as “show cause”, the imposition of other conditions, or a reduction in trading hours. Of course this is a determination to be made by the regulator.

As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, in Victoria a number of policy interventions have been introduced by the liquor regulator in an attempt to minimise the level of alcohol-related violence in the NTE. This included a freeze on new licence or post 1am venues and introduction of a 2am lockout. There has been strong industry resistance to these policy decisions, in particular lockouts with the regulator effectively withdrawing from proceedings imposing blanket lockouts for late night venues around

Melbourne. More recently lockouts have been introduced in regional centres and suburban Frankston. However, the regulator has also been able to have lockouts accepted by venues as part of settlements in “show cause” proceedings. Along similar lines the regulator could consider the imposition of a best practice security framework for problematic venues. Of course, the difficulty for the regulator is only problem venues will be encouraged to accept the lockout and best practice security framework. This highlights a major policy challenge for the regulator and also the government seeking to reduce alcohol-related violence in this context.

Should the government introduce legislation aimed at mandatory imposition of a best practice security framework as a condition of liquor licensing, it is possible there will be strong resistance, especially where auditing or enforcement against the framework is contemplated. Nevertheless, the evidence presented from this study suggests that without the routine introduction of a best practice security framework into high risk licensed premises, the problems of alcohol-related violence from a venue perspective will merely continue. Hard policy decisions are required in this regard.

The following future research directions are provided for further consideration.

Development of supervisors and managers

The data shows a need for development of supervisors and managers in the area of security systems, how risk is best addressed and then managed in a nightclub environment. There is no mandatory training for individuals in this area other than pre-licensing training for crowd control licensing which means that often supervisors or managers lack knowledge about basic crowd control requirements in which they direct licensed personnel. This problem was most evident in the level 1 venues which are considered to be the industry’s most problematic operations. A further study could review the specific needs in this area, especially competencies that duty and security managers require in their endeavours to maintain a safe and comfortable environment in and around a venue.

Employment pathways

There is a strong link between a security and a hospitality role in the late night venue scene and yet no recognised or established pathways upon which to develop a career in the area. For example, pathway training in the nationally endorsed training

packages provides pathway guidance in an industry sector but not between industry sectors, such as a pathway for a security supervisor into a venue management role or similar.

Recognised pathway opportunities in late-night operations may impact upon the casual and transient nature of staffing that currently exists. Anecdotal evidence suggests the casual and transient nature of the industry contributes to a high level of operational inconsistency and human error and hence increases risk. This is an area that could be further explored.

Lockouts

Lockouts and other regulator-based practices were introduced in a number of jurisdictions in response to concerns about the level of violence at nightclubs often associated with venue-hopping patrons during later periods of trading. This is an area where industry and the community could also benefit from further investigation. At present there have been few studies into lockouts albeit there have been two in Queensland. Palk et al. (2008) conducted a mixed methods study and Mazerolle et al. (2012) compared levels of violence between two entertainment districts in Queensland. Miller et al. (2012) reported that lockouts were one intervention amongst a number of others in the Newcastle Geelong study. According to Mazerolle (2012) there were immediate reductions in violence however, Queensland has a statewide 3am lockout for all licensed venues. Other Australian States and Territories do not have jurisdiction-wide lockouts and as suggested in the literature other factors that address alcohol-related violence need to be considered in context with lockouts (Mazerolle et al. 2012; Miller et al. 2012). As indicated within Chapters 2 and 3 lockouts are a relatively new initiative aimed at reducing the incidence of alcohol-related violence and associated problems. It is an area that is in need of further study from a controlled long term perspective as lockouts are merely one factor in a multiplicity of strategies to regulate the NTE in reducing alcohol-related problems.

In particular, it is unclear whether a state-wide mandatory lockout has an impact upon levels of violence and associated problems or whether venue or precinct-specific lockouts are more suitable as currently applies in some areas of Victoria. Further, one might question whether lockouts are of any benefit over effective screening practices

by venue staff and local area guardianship by security and police. This could be the subject of further research.

Emerging technologies

There are a range of emerging technologies in nightclub operations. Most prominent is patron identification scanning and CCTV as a post-incident investigative tool. Patron identification scanning is aimed at deterring crime such as assault in nightclubs as discussed in this thesis. Some technologies link patron identification to their CCTV systems and others require manual manipulation to identify problem patrons against recorded vision. Irrespective of how a system is configured this technology has not been subject to a study to determine the benefits or otherwise of the technology in preventing or reducing crime including violence.

Similarly, although there have been studies into CCTV and public space with reports of modest impacts on crime, such as vehicle crimes in car parks. There has been no study into the uses and impact of CCTV in nightclubs and adjoining public space. As high-risk venues in Victoria have a mandatory condition on their liquor licence for CCTV recording, and the Victorian liquor regulations provide specifications for recorded vision, a study into their effectiveness would benefit key stakeholders.

6.10 Conclusion

The study has examined the relationship between levels of violence in nightclubs and security practices aimed to reduce violence. It examined systems of security at 20 nightclubs, taking into account the perspectives of those responsible for the system of security (licensees and managers) and those working in a security system (crowd controllers and venue staff).

The study revealed the need for venue operators, those responsible for regulating nightclubs and other key stakeholders such as policy makers and security providers to encourage the introduction of a formal rather than informal security system as a best practice security framework. A best practice security framework is achieved through the conduct of a documented security risk assessment that then links to the introduction of documented protocols that include a security management plan and

operating procedures as discussed above. On the basis of a best practice framework security staff can then be recruited, inducted and further trained against the protocols to minimise the risk of aggression, conflict and physical violence. Presently, this integrated approach is not evident within industry, although the various studies discussed throughout the thesis have identified a range of approaches to securing the licensed environment. The approaches included many of the practices identified within the “best practice” model of this study but not formalised nor integrated within a venue management strategy. Indeed, most of the level 2 venues and some of the level 1 venues in this study also adopted best practice elements but not in a formalised or consistent way.

The study found that problematic venues tended to have informal systems of security. This means incident management was weighted toward reactivity rather than proactivity when violence was probable. These systemic deficiencies were evident in the level 1 venues hence increased incidents of violence.

Overall, taking a systemic perspective, the research revealed which features and practices in a system of security were strongly related to less violence. This study has therefore contributed to new knowledge in the area of nightclub security and safety.

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Legislation

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Liquor Act 2010 (ACT)

Liquor Control Act 1988 (WA)

Liquor Control Reform Act 1998 (Vic)

Liquor Control Reform Regulations 2009 (Vic)

Liquor Licensing Act 1990 (TAS)

Liquor Licensing Act 1997 (SA)

Private Agents Act 1966 (Vic)

Private Security Act 2003 (NT)

Private Security Act 2004 (Vic)

Sale of Liquor Act 1989 (NZ)

Security Industry Act 2003 (ACT)

Security Industry Act 1997 (NSW)

Security and Investigation Agents Act 1995 (SA)

Security and Related Activities (Control) Act 1996 (WA)

Security Providers Act 1993 (Qld)

Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic)

Glossary

Where appropriate the following definitions will align with various regulatory, licensing and industry terminology relevant to Victoria:

<i>“best practice”</i>	for the purposes of this study means practice that appears to effectively minimise the risk of violence as outlined in Chapter 3 – Part 3.
<i>“bouncer”</i>	see “crowd controller”
<i>“crowd control”</i>	means overt or covert strategies aimed at preventing, minimising or reacting to individual or group behaviours that impact upon or disrupt the order of an environment. Includes both designated security staff (crowd controllers) and any other responsible person.
<i>“crowd controller”</i>	an individual who performs specific ‘crowd control’ functions.
<i>“doorstaff”</i>	see “crowd controller”
<i>“framework”</i>	a basic conceptual structure.
<i>“high-risk licensed premises”</i> (HRLP)	means licensed premises that operate as a nightclub by trading after 1 am and provide amplified or live music or entertainment (as defined by the Victorian liquor regulator)
<i>“nightclub”</i>	see “high-risk licensed premises”
<i>“night-time economy”</i>	(NTE) also used interchangeably with “late night economy” (LNE) as described in some of the literature. This includes a wide range of leisure, cultural attractions and entertainment including cinemas, sports, restaurants, hotels and nightclubs plus ancillary services such as transport, food and retail typically operating at night.
<i>“operationalise”</i>	in the context of this study means to formally introduce a security strategy to relevant venue staff, train against the strategy and use the security plan as the basis for all security-related functions proactively and/or reactively.
<i>“precinct”</i>	means a cluster or group of licensed premises, often associated with an entertainment district or hospitality zone
<i>“risk”</i>	means the “effect of uncertainty on objectives” (ISO 31000:2009 – Risk Management) as relevant to a nightclub operation, regulatory or community safety strategy.
<i>“security”</i>	means strategies introduced to promote freedom from risk,

	danger, anxiety or fear.
<i>“situational”</i>	means the measures that are present or introduced into a physical setting. In this study in or around licensed premises.
<i>“system”</i>	means a group of interacting, interrelated, or interdependent elements forming a complex whole.
<i>“system of security”</i>	means a “system” involving “security” strategies that typically comprise a security management plan, physical security resources, personnel, operating procedures, and a strategy for system review.
<i>“venue”</i>	used interchangeably with “HRLP” and “nightclub”
<i>“violence”</i>	means the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation (World Health Organisation).
<i>“WHO”</i>	means World Health Organisation

Appendices

Appendix A – Invitation to Participate in Research

MONASH University



Invitation to Participate in Nightclub Security Research Project

Endorsed by the City of Stonnington Licensee's Accord

A research study involving City of Stonnington venues is being undertaken to determine whether there is a link between systems of security at late-night venues and the risk of violence. It is not a study of the causes of violence but rather to what extent security strategies might impact upon the likelihood of or seriousness of incidents. Monash University has authorised this research project.

Studies to date involving violence and licensed premises comprise three key themes: alcohol and intoxication; community mobilisation; and situational influences. This is the first project to investigate the influence a venue system of security and its features might have upon violence.

The primary researcher is Tony Zalewski. Tony wishes to speak with key stakeholders within the late-night venue scene including nightclub operators, venue managers, security and hospitality staff. Participation is voluntary however you are urged to participate in this worthwhile project.

What will participants be required to do?

Respond to a number of written questions and participate in a semi-structured interview about the system of security and incidents in and around your venue.

How much time will it take?

In total, approximately one and a half hours at times and places convenient to you. The survey takes about 20-30 minutes. At a later time the interview occurs and takes about an hour.

Is there any risk to a participant or their venue?

No, it is not anticipated there will be any risk. You and your operation will remain totally anonymous and only referred to by a coded reference (pseudonym). Meetings with the researcher are conducted outside of operating hours and there is no need for any workplace observations.

What is the benefit of the research?

This research will provide evidence about the extent of violent incidents and potentially benefit the industry, regulators and community to further understand the impact of security strategies upon the risk of violence in and around nightclubs.

The research will also allow venue operators to consider the study outcomes in further developing or enhancing their system of security. This may include the development of minimum security standards and good practices for their workplace.

Where can I find out more?

The City of Stonnington Licensee's Accord supports this project and will appoint a Liaison Officer to work with venues and personnel who would like to participate. We urge you to be involved in this ground breaking research by registering your interest at the next meeting of the Accord.

Further inquiries

Further inquiries about this research should be directed to Tony Zalewski (BH) [REDACTED] (Mobile) [REDACTED] or (E) [REDACTED]

Nightclub Security Research Project

Endorsed by the City of Stonnington Licensee's Accord

Research structure

Note – The source of any information provided during the research remains anonymous. Only researchers will know the identity of individuals and venues.

1. Participating venues and staff

Identify minimum of 20 nightclubs (late-night venues) to participate in the research project. Each participating venue to provide five staff to complete a short survey and then interview including licensee, duty manager(s), senior bar and security staff.

2. Surveys and interviews about incidents and venues

Circulate surveys and conduct interviews of key stakeholders to determine which nightclubs (late-night venues) are 'high risk' or 'low risk' – the research will address the system of security at each venue, patron profile, where incidents typically occur (inside and outside), who is involved, when incidents occur, and some facts about incidents such as whether weapons are involved, if people are generally intoxicated, who tends to become involved, and are those involved typically from the venue.

3. Data analysis

Analyse each venue system of security against incidents and identify correlations (if any) between variables and also any confounding variables such as demographics or patron profile. Note incident trends by location, person, time, involvement and any other emerging themes.

4. Features of venue security systems

Map security features that appear to be common and distinguished between 'high risk' and 'low risk' or between categorised venues and their patron profile, location, security system and/or staffing/management levels.

5. Identify and investigate security features

Isolate and review elements that appear to impact upon the risk of violence and how they are operationalised. Consider the appropriateness or otherwise of existing and emerging strategies including 'good practices' and their effectiveness.

6. Best practice model

Develop a best practice model that can be used in controlled circumstances to assess its effectiveness within an operational context.

Further inquiries about this research should be directed to Tony Zalewski (BH) [REDACTED] (Mobile) [REDACTED] or (E) [REDACTED]

Appendix B – Explanatory Statement

MONASH University



EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

for research participants working in the late-night venue scene

Research - *Deconstructing indiscriminate violence and high-risk licensed premises: A mixed methods study in nightclub security*

The purpose of this research is to determine whether there is a link between systems of security at nightclubs and the risk of violence. It is not a study of the causes of violence but rather to what extent security strategies might impact upon the likelihood of or seriousness of incidents. The research project is being conducted by student researcher Tony Zalewski who is studying for a PhD. Tony is being supervised by Associate Professor Chris Trotter from the Department of Social Work.

To proceed with this research we are contacting key stakeholders within the late-night venue scene i.e. nightclub operators, venue managers, security and hospitality staff. These key stakeholders will be asked to respond to a number of open ended written questions (survey) and also participate in a semi-structured interview which will take, in total, approximately one hour. There will be minimal inconvenience and no discomfort for participants. It is not anticipated participants will experience any side effects.

Participation is voluntary and participants are able to withdraw at any time. Those withdrawing will be asked to attend an exit or debriefing session. Participants are also able to avoid answering questions which are considered too personal or intrusive.

This research will potentially benefit the industry, regulators and community to further understand the impact of security strategies upon the risk of violence in and around nightclubs. It will also possibly identify any confounding variables such as demographics or level of patron activity.

Participants will be informed of the overall results if they wish by making application to the University. Feedback will also be provided to the City of Stonnington Licensee's Accord and other industry Accords or Forums when the research is completed.

Other than the thesis that will emanate from this research, the outcomes may also be published in scholarly journals and industry publications. Outcomes may also be discussed at relevant industry or professional conferences or workshops. However, at all times anonymity of participants will be maintained. To protect the privacy of participants, research records will be securely stored and participants and/or their venues will be referred to by pseudonym.

All records gathered during this research will be retained for five years from the date of completion. Access to these records will be limited to persons involved in the research and destruction will be under controlled conditions to further protect the privacy of participants.

If you have a complaint concerning the manner in which this research (*CF08/1814 – 2008000899: Deconstructing indiscriminate violence and high-risk licensed premises: A mixed methods study in nightclub security*) is being conducted, please contact Executive Officer, Standing Committee on Ethics in Research Involving Humans (SCERH), Building 3e Room 111, Research Office, Monash University VIC 3800 (Tel: +61 3 9905 2052, Fax: +61 3 9905 1420 Email: scerh@adm.monash.edu.au).

Should there be any inquiries about this research or in an emergency please call Associate Professor Chris Trotter (BH) [REDACTED] or Tony Zalewski (BH) [REDACTED]

Appendix C – Consent Form

MONASH University



Consent Form For Person Participating In Research Project

Research - *Deconstructing indiscriminate violence and high-risk licensed premises: A mixed methods study in nightclub security*

Participant: _____

Investigators: Tony Zalewski and Associate Professor Chris Trotter

1. I consent to participate in the project named above, the particulars of which include a survey and interview have been explained to me. A written copy of the information (explanatory statement) has been given to me to keep.
2. I authorise the researcher or his or her assistant to use with me the survey and interview referred to under (1) above.
3. I acknowledge that:
 - (a) the possible effects of the survey and interview have been explained to me to my satisfaction;
 - (b) I have been informed that I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without explanation or prejudice and to withdraw any unprocessed data previously supplied;
 - (c) The project is for the purpose of research; and
 - (d) I have been informed that the confidentiality of the information I provide will be safeguarded subject to any legal requirements.
- (3) I consent/do not consent to interviews being audio-taped (if consent given I acknowledge that copies of transcripts will be returned to me for verification if required); and
- (4) I will be referred to by pseudonym in any publications or presentations arising from the research.

Signature _____ Date _____
(Participant)

Signature _____ Date _____
(Witness)

24 May 2008

Appendix D – Survey Instrument

MONASH University



Survey

Deconstructing indiscriminate violence and high-risk licensed premises: A mixed methods study in nightclub security

This survey will take around 20-30 minutes to complete, we thank you for your assistance.

The study seeks to ascertain what practices are associated with minimising the risk of and degree of violence in and around late-night licensed premises? We wish to investigate whether the likelihood or potential for violence is affected by certain security strategies within a nightclub operation and can a security strategy reduce the frequency and seriousness of violence? The research does not seek to ascertain the causes of violence but rather what strategies impact upon the potential for violence. It should be noted the research is not restricted to the efforts of security staff in isolation but rather an investigation of security issues within a late-night operation that may impact upon the potential for violence.

For this research violence is defined as "the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation."

How to complete the survey

This survey is divided into sections. Please complete all sections with your most appropriate response. You will be instructed how you should complete each section such as tick a box or circle a number. You will also be encouraged to provide additional information if you desire.

Once you have completed the survey, please return it to a research officer who will then ensure it is securely stored.

Your answers will remain confidential.

We thank you for your assistance in this important project.

Project Team Only

Code: _____ Date Out: _____ Date In: _____
Checked: _____ Data Entry By: _____ Date of Entry: _____
Complete: Yes No _____

24 May 2008

SYSTEM OF SECURITY - tick the correct box

Q1 Has there been a documented *Security Risk Assessment* conducted at the venue?

Yes No Don't Know

Q2 Do you have a documented *Security Management Plan*?

Yes No Don't Know

Q3 Where is the *Security Management Plan* kept?

Manager's Office Staff Room Don't Know Other: _____

Q4 Does your venue employ an external security consultant to advise on security strategies?

Yes No Don't Know

Explain: _____

Q5 Does your venue have a criteria for selection of crowd controllers?

Yes No Don't Know

Explain: _____

Q6 Are venue staff strategically positioned around the venue?

Yes No Don't Know

Explain: _____

Q7 Does your venue have a video surveillance system with recording?

Yes No Don't Know

Explain: _____

Q8 Does your venue utilise radio communication between key staff?

Yes No Don't Know

Explain: _____

Q9 Does your venue have a formal liaison policy with police?

Yes No Don't Know

Explain: _____

Q10 Does your venue have an alarm or warning system for incidents?

Yes No Don't Know

Explain: _____

Q11 Are there written procedures for security and other venue staff?

Yes No Don't Know

Explain: _____

Q12 Is there ongoing security-related training provided to staff at the venue?

Yes No Don't Know

Explain: _____

Q13 Is a Crowd Controllers Register maintained?

Yes No Don't Know

Explain: _____

Q14 Are there evacuation procedures for fire and other emergencies?

Yes No Don't Know

Explain: _____

Q15 Is there first aid facilities **and** training of staff in first aid?

Yes No Don't Know

Explain: _____

Q16 Is there training and written procedures for underage persons?

Yes No Don't Know

Explain: _____

Q17 Is there training and written procedures for responsible serving of alcohol?

Yes No Don't Know

Explain: _____

Q18 Are there male and female door staff?

Yes No Don't Know

Explain: _____

Q19 Are persons working at the venue inducted formally including training and provided access to written procedures?

Yes No Don't Know

Explain: _____

INCIDENTS - tick the correct box

Q20 Thinking about incidents at your venue, what time do they mostly occur:

- last hour of trading 1–2 hours from close 2–3 hours from close
 3–4 hours from close Anytime _____

Q21 Who is usually involved?

- Always male Mostly male Always female
 Mostly female Other: _____

Q22 What is the average age of persons involved in incidents?

- 18 - 24 25 - 30 31 - 35
 36 - 40 41 - 45 46 or older

Q23 Persons involved in incidents are usually?

- Intoxicated (not drunk) Drunk Drug affected

Q24 Are weapons of any kind usually used in incidents?

- Almost every time 25% of the time 50% of the time
 75% of the time Every time

Q25 If a weapon is used, typically what is it?

- Glass drinking vessel Bottle Chair
 Knife Firearm Other: _____

Q26 Most incidents usually occur

- Inside the venue Outside the venue

Q27 When an incident occurs inside, venue staff usually:

- Handle the incident Call the police Call management
 Monitor the incident Avoid intervention Other: _____

Q28 When an incident occurs outside the premises, venue staff usually:

- Handle the incident Call the police Call management
 Monitor the incident Avoid intervention Other: _____

Q29 On average, most incidents at the venue are:

- Minor (no injuries) Moderate (some injuries) Serious (injuries)

Q30 On average, how many incidents occur at the venue each week:

- None (incidents are rare) One 2 - 4
 5 - 7 8 - 10 More than 10

DEMOGRAPHICS - tick the correct box

Q31 Are you? Male Female

Q32 What best describes your current occupation?

- Licensee Duty Manager Bar Manager
 Security Firm Operator Security Firm Supervisor Other: _____

Q33 What age bracket do you fall into?

- 18 - 24 25 - 30 31 - 35
 36 - 40 41 - 45 46 or older

Q34 How long have you worked in the industry? (hospitality and/or security)

- Under 1 year 1 - 2 years 3 - 4 years
 5 - 6 years 7 - 9 years 10 or more years

Q35 Within which area is your venue located?

- Chapel Street Within 100 metres of Chapel Street
 More than 100 metres from Chapel Street

Q36 How long has your venue traded under its current name?

- Under 1 year 1 - 2 years 3 - 4 years
 5 - 6 years 7 - 9 years 10 or more years

Q37 What are the trading hours of your venue?

Licensed Hours

Open at _____ Close at _____

Actual Trading Hours

Open at _____ Close at _____

Q38 What is the patron capacity of your venue?

- Less than 100 patrons 200 - 300 patrons 301 - 400 patrons
 401 - 500 patrons 501 - 600 patrons More than 601

Q39 What is the average age of patrons attending your venue?

- 18 - 24 25 - 30 31 - 35
 36 - 40 41 - 45 46 or older

Q40 What is the gender breakdown of your patrons?

- 50% male - 50% female 60% male 70% male
 80% male 90% male More female

This form should be returned to Tony Zalewski in the attached envelope at your earliest convenience, additional inquiries can be made with Tony on 8327 2610 or 0412 335 317

Appendix E – Stonnington Accord Action Plan

ACTION PLAN

The Stonnington Liquor Accord has developed the following Action Plan to help maintain and improve the safety in the Chapel Street precinct. Members are committed to these actions as part of their commitment to the Accord, however, the majority of the Actions are only applicable to Licensees of nightclubs and bars.

- Engage a consultant to undertake a precinct audit to assess street violence and security operations;
- Investigate the opportunity to provide education seminars for the community regarding venue operation and personal safety;
- Provide ongoing training and support to improve knowledge and skills of management staff;
- Prepare and implement a communication plan to publicise positive actions undertaken by Liquor Accord members;
- Appoint a dedicated RSA Officer to provide guidance and support to staff when enforcing serving of alcohol regulations;
- Develop a new Code of Conduct for the Liquor Accord members; and,
- Develop marketing protocols for external promoters to ensure all venue guidelines are adhered to and to ensure unsafe drinking practices are not encouraged.
- Investigate ID scanners for patron / offender monitoring and to ensure underage patrons are not permitted entry;
- Provide a shared radio band for staff to improve communication and safety outside of venues;
- Provide ongoing training and support to improve knowledge and skills of staff;
- Implement an incident recording system to assist in reducing anti-social behaviour;
- Undertake maintenance and surveillance of the immediate area outside a venue;
- Develop a patron Code of Conduct to educate and improve patron behaviour;
- Discontinue the selling of multiple measure on first pour spirits;
- Consider the use of shatterproof glassware;
- Investigate a no pass out policy with strict exemptions that may include personal overheating and escorting fellow patrons to transport; and,
- Ensure that all staff have a current RSA certificate before commencing employment at a venue.

Appendix F – Example of Nightclub Liquor Licence

Special conditions below are typical ‘high-risk’ nightclub conditions.

Late night (on-premises) Licence

Licence No. 1

Subject to the provisions of the Liquor Control Reform Act 1998 and any conditions specified in the licence, the licensee is authorised to supply liquor up to and including 31 December 2010

Licensee

Address
for service
of notices

Licensed
premises
address

Trading as

TYPE OF LICENCE

This licence is a late night (on-premises) licence and authorises the licensee to supply liquor on the licensed premises for consumption on the licensed premises during the trading hours specified below.

AMENITY

The licensee shall not cause or permit undue detriment to the amenity of the area to arise out of or in connection with the use of the premises to which the licence relates during or immediately after the trading hours authorised under this licence. The licensee shall ensure that the level of noise emitted from the licensed premises shall not exceed the permissible noise levels for entertainment noise as specified in the State Environment Protection Policy (Control of Music Noise from Public Premises) No.N-2.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS

All staff engaged in the service of liquor on the premises, will complete a "Responsible Serving of Alcohol" training course, approved by the Director of Liquor Licensing within 1 month of commencing employment.

The Licensee shall install and maintain a surveillance recording system able to clearly identify individuals, which shows time and date and provides continuous images of all entrances and exits, bars and entertainment/dance floor areas. The surveillance recording system must operate from 1 hour before the start of the entertainment being provided until 1 hour after closure. A copy of the recorded images must be available upon request for immediate viewing or removal by Victoria Police or a person authorised in writing by the Director of Liquor Licensing, or otherwise retained for at least one month. The positioning of the cameras is to be to the satisfaction of the Licensing Inspector. This condition must be complied with at all times by the Licensee whether or not there is live or recorded amplified music (other than background music) at the premises.

Signs, as described below, are to be displayed in all areas subject to camera surveillance. Such signs shall read: "For the safety and security of patrons and staff this area is under electronic surveillance."

Crowd controllers, licensed under the Private Security Act, are to be employed at a ratio of 2 crowd controllers for the first 100 patrons and 1 additional crowd controller for each additional 100 patrons or part thereof. One crowd controller is to be present outside the premises to monitor patrons arriving at and departing the premises from _____ or the time of opening of the premises if later than _____ until 1 hour after the sale of liquor ceases