Prosocial Power Europe?

The European Union as a Military Actor

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Abstract

The first decade of the twenty-first century saw the rapid development of the new European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) that also included a military dimension and thus embodied the emergence of the European Union (EU) as a military actor on the international scene. This phenomenon had a major impact on the literature concerned with understanding the international role of the EU. For some authors, the birth of the EU as a military actor looked like the beginning of the end for both ‘civilian power Europe’ and ‘normative power Europe’. For others, the emergence of the EU as a military actor meant the birth of the EU as ‘real power Europe’ on the international scene.

Using a different perspective, this thesis shows that the existing interpretations of the international implications of the EU’s rise as a military actor missed the most significant aspect of this phenomenon because of their focus on means and the underlying assumption that means determine ends. This thesis uses the social scientific perspective developed by Alexander Wendt in the context of his social theory of international politics to argue that the rapid development of the EU as a military actor in the first decade of the twenty-first century supported the transition of the international system from a Lockean security culture to a Kantian security culture. In contrast to a Lockean system, where military actors do not completely exclude the use of violence in the settlement of their disputes, in a Kantian system, military actors do not only exclude settling disputes by violence (the principle of non-violence), but they also help each other in the event of an attack on any one by a third party (the principle of mutual assistance).

The Wendtian perspective focuses on actors as the drivers of cultural continuity and change in the international system and sees the Kantian transition as the main challenge for the contemporary international system. The Kantian transition in turn depends on prosocial actors that act as friends in relation to the Other with respect to the use of violence. Accordingly, studying the emergence of the EU as a military actor in the light of the Wendtian perspective involves testing the EU against the model of the Wendtian prosocial actor. The analysis performed in this thesis shows that in its first ten years as an emerging military actor the EU behaved primarily as a prosocial actor and thus supported the Kantian transition in the international system.
Statement of Originality

I declare that this thesis is my own work and has not been previously submitted in any form for a degree or diploma in any university. To the best of my knowledge, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Mihai Cristian Brasoveanu
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Introduction

The first decade of the twenty-first century saw the rapid development of the new European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) that also included a military dimension and thus embodied the emergence of the European Union (EU) as a military actor on the international scene. The imminent launch of the ESDP was first announced by the St. Malo Declaration adopted by France and the UK in 1998. The actual launch of the EU’s new security and defence policy took place in June 1999, in Cologne, and was followed by many important decisions relating to the development of appropriate capabilities and institutions. At the end of 2001, the EU declared the ESDP operational and in 2003, the EU launched the first ESDP operations, including the first EU military operations. Between 2004 and 2009, the EU launched four new military operations and at the same time continued to work on the development of ESDP capabilities and institutions, including in the military area.

The birth of the EU as a military actor had a major impact on the literature concerned with understanding the international role of the EU. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, this literature was still dominated by ‘civilian’ conceptualizations of the EU as an international actor, embodied in notions such as ‘civilian power Europe’ (Duchêne, 1972; 1972; 1973) and ‘normative power Europe’ (Manners, 2002). Both the idea of civilian power and that of normative power described the EC/EU as an influential global actor that relied at least primarily if not exclusively on non-military means in its interactions with other actors on the international scene. This focus on the non-military nature of EC/EU means was not surprising considering that the first European Communities were established in the 1950s in the economic field and until the last decade of the twentieth century the development of the EC/EU was overwhelmingly concentrated in the sphere of economic activity.

However, a significant part of the literature on the international role of the EU saw any ideas of the EU as international actor as fundamentally flawed because the EU could not be seen as a real actor unless it acquired a military dimension. Hedley Bull attacked François Duchêne’s concept of ‘civilian power Europe’ (Duchêne, 1971; 1972; 1973) and described it as a ‘contradiction in terms’ (Bull, 1982). This argument was continued later by Robert
Kagan (2002; 2003), who saw no basis for thinking about the EU as a global power for as long as it was not capable of military action. A similar argument came from Robert Cooper (2003a, b), who built on Kagan’s reasoning to urge the EU Member States to develop the EU’s military dimension because that was the only way in which the EU could become a real global power.

The rapid development of the EU as a military actor in the first decade of the twenty-first century raised new questions about the international role of the EU. Most scholarly reactions to the emergence of the EU as ‘military power Europe’ reflected on the consequences of this development for the dominant conceptualizations of the EU as international actor, namely François Duchêne’s notion of ‘civilian power Europe’ (Duchêne, 1971; 1972; 1973) and Ian Manners’ idea of ‘normative power Europe’ (Manners, 2002). For Karen Smith (2000; 2005) and Ian Manners (2006), the birth of the EU as a military actor looked like the beginning of the end for both civilian power Europe and normative power Europe mainly because they saw the acquisition of military capabilities as incompatible with the more ‘civilian’ conceptualizations of the EU.

On the other hand, the development of the EU as a military actor had a totally different meaning in light of the ‘non-power Europe’ arguments put forward by Hedley Bull (1982), Robert Kagan (2002; 2003) and Robert Cooper (2003a, b). Although these authors did not refer directly to the EU’s emergence as military actor, their arguments about the EU’s non-military character had significant implications. Since their arguments were centred on the idea that the EU could not be an international actor unless it developed a military dimension, it followed that the emergence of the EU as a military actor meant the emergence of the EU as a ‘real’ power on the international scene.

Thus, the three main reactions to the development of the military dimension of the EU included a reaction that saw the end of the idea of ‘civilian power Europe’, one that foresaw the death of the notion of ‘normative power Europe’, and one that announced the birth of the EU as a real international power or, by analogy to the other concepts used in the literature, as ‘real power Europe’. All three reactions rested on an underlying focus on means and a tendency to see means as determining ends. The heart of the arguments of both Karen Smith and Ian Manners is the idea that the development of the EU’s military means destroys the civilian character of the EU as an international actor, given by the EU’s reliance, exclusively or at least overwhelmingly, on non-military means. On the other hand, the arguments developed by Hedley Bull, Robert Kagan and Robert Cooper were underpinned by the same idea that means determined ends because they made the acquisition of military means appear
as necessary and sufficient to transform the EU into a global power behaving like ‘real’ powers such as the United States.

One of the contentions underlying this thesis is that the focus on means and the assumption that means determine ends and implicitly behaviour undermines all three major scholarly reactions to the development of the EU as a military actor. Acquiring military capabilities enhances the EU’s capacity to act, but by itself it does not say anything specific about the international role of the EU, about how the EU is likely to behave on the international scene as a new military actor. The EU may use its military capabilities to attack or to threaten to attack other actors, but it may also use those capabilities in a purely defensive manner, only to defend itself in the event of an attack by another actor. More importantly, the EU may also use its military capabilities to provide defence assistance for other actors. Consequently, it is not possible to say that simply having military capabilities says anything about how those capabilities are going to be used. Therefore, the main question to be asked about the international significance of the EU’s emergence as a military actor is not whether the EU has acquired military capabilities, but what the EU does or intends to do with those capabilities.

Using a different perspective, this thesis shows that the existing interpretations of the international implications of the EU’s rise as a military actor missed the most significant aspect of this phenomenon. This thesis uses the social scientific perspective developed by Alexander Wendt in the context of his social theory of international politics to argue that the rapid development of the EU as a military actor in the first decade of the twenty-first century supported the transition of the international system from a Lockean security culture to a Kantian security culture. Wendt used the labels ‘Lockean’ and ‘Kantian’ only figuratively, to refer to security cultures based on the role of rival and on the role of friend, respectively. In the Lockean system, military actors do not completely exclude the use of violence in the settlement of their disputes. In contrast, in the Kantian system, military actors do not only exclude settling disputes by violence (the principle of non-violence), but they also help each other in the event of an attack on any one by a third party (the principle of mutual assistance).

The main contention of this thesis, that in its first ten years as a military actor the EU supported the Kantian transition in the international system, rests on the social theory of international politics developed by Alexander Wendt (1999), one of the main figures associated with the rise of constructivism in International Relations. However, the term ‘constructivist’ is not really an accurate description of this thesis because the thesis relies on certain parts of the Wendtian framework that are in turn underpinned by two major theoretical frameworks from the field of social psychology. One is the self-categorization theory
developed by John C. Turner and his colleagues (Turner et al., 1987) and the other is the symbolic interactionist tradition rooted in the work of George Herbert Mead (Mead, 1934; Blumer, 1969; Stryker, 1980). Consequently, this thesis is more accurately described as a project of applied social psychology located at the intersection of International Relations and EU Studies.

In light of the Wendtian perspective, saying that the EU supports the Kantian transition in the international system means that the EU behaves as what Wendt called a prosocial actor on the international scene. The Wendtian notion of prosocial actor refers to an actor that observes the two basic principles or rules of the Kantian culture: non-violence and mutual assistance. Therefore, saying that the EU supports the Kantian transition means that the EU observes the rules of non-violence and mutual assistance in its interactions with the Other on the international scene. In the context of this thesis, the term ‘Other’ is used in a generic manner to refer to any actor engaging in interaction with the EU in any given situation. This term does not refer to an actor that is the opposite of the EU, in one way or another. The term ‘Other’ implies only that the other actor is a separate entity, distinct from the EU in the sense of being separate from the EU. The Other may be the opposite of or identical with the EU Self, but it is still the Other because it is separate from the EU.

In the process of offering a new interpretation of the EU’s development as a military actor and the implications of this phenomenon for the international system, this thesis also contributes to the development of the Wendtian social theory of international politics by expanding Wendt’s underdeveloped model of prosocial actor. Although his social theory of international politics provides a global model of the international system, Wendt was primarily concerned with the effects of the structure of the international system, understood as the security culture of the international system, on the main agents in the international system, namely the states. Wendt’s world is the world of states, not because states are the only actors that matter, but because states play the main role in the regulation of violence and because, in Wendt’s view, the regulation of violence is the most fundamental problem of the international system and of the social world in general.

Wendt started out with the main focus on the effects of structure on agents in the international system, but ended up by further translating this focus into a focus on behaviour as the main driver of both structural continuity and structural change in the international system. In light of the symbolic interactionist tradition underpinning the Wendtian perspective, both structures and agents are produced and reproduced through process or behaviour. The continuous reproduction of certain identities and their associated security cultures depends on continuous behaviour that expresses those particular identities and not
other identities associated with other security cultures. When applying his framework to the contemporary international system, Wendt further narrowed his focus to prosocial behaviour or behaviour that follows the principles of non-violence and mutual assistance. In Wendt’s world, the main challenge facing the contemporary international system is the Kantian transition from a system of ‘live and let live’ to a system of ‘one for all and all for one’ and prosocial behaviour is the driver of that transition.

Nevertheless, the Wendtian model of prosocial actor was left underdeveloped. The Wendtian prosocial actor is a concept that rests on the notion of collective identity and on the relationship between prosocial behaviour and collective identity. While the latter is extensively discussed in the context of the Wendtian framework, the former was left by Wendt at the level of a ‘first cut’ or a ‘preliminary discussion’. Accordingly, a complete model of the Wendtian prosocial actor requires primarily the further development of the discussion of collective identity that underpins this model.

Against this background, this thesis first expands the Wendtian notion of prosocial actor, before showing that in its first decade as an emerging military actor the EU fit the Wendtian model of prosocial actor and therefore supported the Kantian transition in the international system. The thesis expands Wendt’s discussion of the pivotal notion of collective identity by stepping beyond the Wendtian framework and looking at the corresponding notion of social identification developed in the context of Turner’s self-categorization theory. The result, provided in chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, is a completed model of the Wendtian prosocial actor that can then be used to test any actor on the international stage, including the EU, in terms of the relationship between the actor under consideration and the Kantian transition in the international system. Any actor that fits the model of Wendtian prosocial actor supports that transition.

The thesis starts with an overview and critical discussion of the main reactions in the literature concerned with the international role of the EU to the development of the EU as military actor. Chapter 1 starts with a presentation of François Duchêne’s concept of ‘civilian power Europe’ (Duchène, 1971; 1972; 1973) and a discussion of Karen Smith’s argument that the acquisition of military capabilities is incompatible with the idea of ‘civilian power’ (Smith, K. E., 2000; 2005). The first chapter then turns to Manners’ concept of ‘normative power Europe’ (Manners, 2002; 2006; 2008; 2009) and his latter argument that the rapid development of the EU as military actor was undermining the ‘normative potential’ of the EU (Manners, 2006). The third of the first chapter looks at the idea of ‘non-power Europe’ stemming from Hedley Bull (1982), Robert Kagan (2002; 2003) and Robert Cooper (2003a, b) and the converse suggestion that the emergence of the EU as military actor marked the
birth of the EU as a real international power. Chapter 1 also highlights the relationship between these arguments and the larger debate on hard vs. soft forms of power, which has been going on in the field of International Relations since the early 1990s.

Chapters 2 and 3 build up a model of the Wendtian prosocial actor as the theoretical model used in subsequent chapters to test the EU as military actor. Chapter 2 first outlines the Wendtian model of actor by discussing the problem of reference objects and the notions of corporate agency and corporate self. The second chapter also applies the different ideas developed in the context of the Wendtian framework to the case of the EU as military actor on the international scene. The third chapter complements the model of actor presented in the second chapter by discussing a particular kind of actor, namely the prosocial actor which in Wendt’s world acts as the main driver of the Kantian transition from a security culture of ‘live and let live’ to a security culture based on ‘one for all and all for one’. The third chapter does this mainly by discussing the psychological process of ‘collective identity’, or social identification, and the relationship between prosocial behaviour, collective identity and the Kantian transition in the context of the Wendtian social model of the international system.

Chapter 3 also outlines the methodological implications stemming from the Wendtian model of prosocial actor when using this model to test real-world international actors and thus completes the preparations for the analysis of the EU as military actor, undertaken in the three subsequent chapters. The Wendtian perspective focuses on actors as the drivers of cultural continuity and change in the international system and therefore applying it to the real world international system involves conducting case studies of individual actors present on the international stage. However, Wendt’s world is the world of military actors and therefore the case studies based on the Wendtian perspective are ‘topical life stories’ that focus on only one slice of the life of an international actor, namely the military dimension.

On the other hand, what Wendt saw as the main challenge for the contemporary international system, namely the Kantian transition to a security culture of ‘one for all and all for one’, depends on prosocial actors that act as friends in relation to the Other with respect to the use of violence. Accordingly, studying an international actor in light of the Wendtian perspective involves testing that actor against the complete model of the Wendtian prosocial actor developed in chapters 2 and 3. The model of the Wendtian prosocial actor is based on the two fundamental principles or rules of friendship, namely non-violence and mutual assistance, and therefore testing an international actor against this model implies studying the images of Self emanating from the behaviour of the actor concerned. Such analyses involve both documents and actions. Documents play the fundamental role in the life of an organisation because they literally constitute the ‘mind’ and ‘thoughts’ of that organisation.
Nevertheless, the documentary analysis must be complemented by the historical analysis of practice because documents are primarily intentions of action and not real actions.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 apply the method outlined in chapter 3, based on the methodological implications derived from the Wendtian model of prosocial actor, to the analysis of the first decade of the EU as an emerging military actor. Together, chapters 4, 5 and 6 constitute a study of the images of the EU Self in relation to the Other with respect to the use of violence, stemming from the documents and actions of the first ten years of the military history of the EU. Chapter 4 covers the period from the adoption of the St. Malo Declaration in 1998, announcing the imminent launch of the ESDP, to the moment when the EU declared the ESDP operational, at the end of 2001. The fourth chapter covers all the ESDP-defining documents adopted by the EU in that period, including the declarations of Cologne, Helsinki, Feira, Nice and Göteborg, as well as the relevant provisions of the Treaty on European Union before and after the enactment of the Treaty of Amsterdam.

Chapter 5 turns to the evolution of the EU as military actor in 2003, a special year that saw the launch of the first ESDP operations, including the first EU military operation. However, the year 2003 was also the year that saw the outbreak of major intra-EU and transatlantic crises in the context of the US-led invasion of Iraq, as well as the adoption of a key ESDP-defining document, namely the first EU security strategy. The first part of the fifth chapter focuses on EU behaviour in the context of the Iraq crisis, while the second part discusses the first EU military operations in the Western Balkans and Africa and the third section analyses the concept of the ESDP laid down in the European Security Strategy (ESS).

Chapter 6 looks at the period that followed after the special year of 2003 and starts with a discussion about the new military operations launched by the EU in the Western Balkans and Africa between 2004 and 2010. The second section of the sixth chapter focuses on EU behaviour in the context of the most prominent military events of that period, namely the US-led military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Finally, the third section of the sixth chapter analyses the post-Lisbon consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, enacted on 1 December 2009, as well as the five-year review of the ESS conducted by the EU in 2008.

The analysis shows that in its first ten years as an emerging military actor the EU supported the Kantian transition in the international system because the dominant image stemming from the military documents and actions of the EU was the representation of the EU Self as a friend of the Other. The analysis also shows that EU friendship was not without limits, but images of the EU as a rival of the Other were restricted to the case of non-state rivals. In the case of its state rivals, the EU presented itself as a friend or at least as an actor
that was ready to become their friend once they stopped their threatening behaviours. The main threat to the image of the EU as a friend of the Other came from images of the EU Self as a neutral actor and as a reluctant friend, produced and reproduced especially in the context of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, respectively. In the context of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the image of the EU as a friend of the Other was also weakened by the fact that it was an indirect image, stemming from the individual actions of some EU states and not from actions taken at the EU level.

Besides showing that in its first years as an emerging military actor the EU behaved as ‘prosocial power Europe’ and therefore supported the Kantian transition in the international system, this thesis also introduces a normative dimension of the notion of ‘prosocial power Europe’. In light of the Wendtian perspective underlying the thesis, the continued development of the EU as ‘prosocial power Europe’ is a desirable phenomenon and therefore the EU should focus intensely on preserving and enhancing the prosocial character of its military dimension. This normative aspect stems from the relationship between prosocial actors and the Kantian transition in the international system, and from the basic assumption that the construction of an international system in which military actors act as friends towards each other is a desirable outcome. If the development of the EU as a military actor continues to go hand in hand with the development of the EU as ‘prosocial power Europe’, than the rise of ‘military power Europe’ will become closely associated with the Kantian transition in the international system.
Chapter 1: The Rise of Military Power Europe

The beginnings of the debate about the question of what kind of actor the EU is in the international system can be traced back to the writings of François Duchêne in the early 1970s (Duchêne, 1971; 1972; 1973). This debate was continued most notably by Hedley Bull (1982), Ian Manners (2002; 2006; 2008; 2009), Robert Kagan (2002, 2003) and Robert Cooper (2003a, b) and continued to be intense in the first decade of the twenty-first century (Stavridis, 2001; Larsen, 2002; Nicolaïdis and Howes, 2002; Whitman, 1998; 2002; Youngs, 2004; Diez, 2005; Smith, K. E., 2000; 2005; Orbie, 2007; Pace, 2007; Scheipers and Sicurelli, 2007; Sjursen, 2006a, b; 2007). This literature has been dominated by two major concepts, the older concept of ‘civilian power Europe’ devised by François Duchêne (1971; 1972; 1973) and the more recent notion of ‘normative power Europe’ promoted by Ian Manners (2002; 2006). However, the first decade of the twenty-first century also saw the emergence of the EU as military actor and a shift in the literature towards the question of the implications of this phenomenon for concepts such as civilian power Europe and normative power Europe. By analogy to the earlier conceptualizations of the EU as international actor, the first decade of the twenty-first century marked the rise of ‘military power Europe’.

This chapter provides a review and discussion of the literature on the impact of the EU’s evolving military dimension on the international role of the EU, as well as a discussion of the two major conceptualizations of the EU as international power. The chapter starts with a discussion of the notion of civilian power Europe and analyses both the original concept developed by François Duchêne in the early 1970s (Duchêne, 1971; 1972; 1973) and Karen Smith’s attempt in the 2000s to ‘knock off once and for all’ the idea of ‘civilian power EU’ as incompatible with the emergence of the EU as military actor (Smith, K. E., 2005, p. 1). The second section turns to the notion of normative power Europe and discusses Ian Manners’ original concept from the early 2000s (Manners, 2002) and the later revision conducted by the same author in the later 2000s, when the continued rapid development of the EU as military actor appeared to Manners as the beginning of the end for normative power Europe (Manners, 2006).
The third section outlines the opposite reaction that stems indirectly from the arguments proposed by the main critics of the notions of civilian power Europe and normative power Europe. Such notions represented contradictions in terms for Hedley Bull (1982) and a psychology of weakness or non-power for Robert Kagan (2002, 2003), a criticism also echoed by Robert Cooper (2003a, b). Their criticism was based primarily on the argument that military power underlies any form of power and therefore the EU cannot be seen as a power, and perhaps not even as an actor, until it acquires military power. Therefore, for the critics of civilian power Europe and normative power Europe the development of the EU as military actor can only mean the emergence of the EU as a ‘real’ or ‘true’ power.

1.1 The death of civilian power Europe

In the literature on the international role of the EU, the first major reaction to the rapid development of the EU as military actor was the perception that the birth of military power Europe was the death of civilian power Europe. The concept of civilian power Europe was introduced in the early 1970s by François Duchêne (1971; 1972; 1973), whose main concern was with defining what ‘Europe should do’, an enterprise that also involved in his view an inquiry into ‘what it can do’ (Duchene, 1972, p. 33). He eliminated from the outset the possibility of the European Community (EC) becoming ‘military power Europe’, as well as the scenario in which Western Europe acquired a regional sphere of influence (Ibid., pp. 37-38). In a later inquiry, Duchêne also set aside conceptualizations of the EC as a ‘European super-power’ and as a ‘neutral Community’ (Duchêne, 1973). For Duchêne, the alternative to nationalism and neutralism in international politics was the ‘policy of collective action’ that was behind the creation of the EC (Ibid., p. 15). He arrived in this way at the conclusion that the only option for the future development of the EC was to become a civilian power.

As Smith (Smith, K. E., 2005) noted more recently, Duchêne did not provide an explicit definition of his idea of civilian power Europe. Nevertheless, the meaning of this concept appears quite clearly in his discussion of the influence potential of Western Europe. Duchêne saw the potential of Western Europe to acquire ‘great influence’ in the fact that it was ‘endowed with resources and free of the burden of a load of military power’ (Duchêne, 1972, p. 43). Duchêne argued that the nuclear inhibition of war empowered ‘forms of collective identity which previously had far less influence’ (Ibid., p. 47). In this category of other ‘forms of collective identity’ he also included cultural example, social movements, pressure groups (sub-national, national and transnational) and economic capacity (Ibid.). At the same time, he contended that the lack of military power was no longer the ‘handicap it
once was’ (*Ibid.*). Although this discussion suggests an exclusive concern with means, the reality is that Duchêne had more than just means on his mind. When he identified the ‘inner characteristics’ of the EC, Duchêne pointed to the EC’s civilian *ends* and means and its ‘built-in sense of collective action’, which he saw as the imperfect expression of the ‘social values of equality, justice and tolerance’ (Duchêne, 1973, p. 20).

Against this background, Duchêne presented ‘Europe’, meaning more precisely Western Europe united as the EC, as a ‘large political cooperative formed to exert essentially civilian forms of power’ (Duchêne, 1972, p. 47; 1973, p. 19). He also described Europe as a ‘civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed force’ (Duchêne, 1973, p. 19). All these elements reveal that Duchêne’s notion of civilian power refers to any kind of power that is not military in nature. Thus, civilian power Europe, as used by Duchêne, becomes ‘non-military power Europe’. Nevertheless, Duchêne did not argue against the development of *any* EC military means. In fact, the military/defence integration of Western Europe was indeed among his central concerns (Duchêne, 1971). This preoccupation with the development of the military/defence dimension of the process of European construction highlights the fact that Duchêne’s concept of civilian power Europe does not really refer to an entity without *any* military means. The description of the EC as an actor ‘long on economic power and short on military power’ (Duchêne, 1971) is the key to understanding more fully Duchêne’s idea of civilian power Europe. What this concept really does is to give pre-eminence to economic power, a form of civilian or non-military power in Duchêne’s view, over military power. Accordingly, civilian power Europe becomes a reference to an entity that relies primarily on economic means in interactions with others and has only minimal, or at least few, military means at its disposal. Moreover, the latter play only a secondary role or a role of last resort.

In this context, Duchêne suggested that the main interest of the EC in the international arena was to ‘domesticate’ relations between states, including among the EC Member States and between them and states outside the EC (Duchêne, 1973, pp. 19-20). For Duchêne, the policy of collective action behind the creation of the EC was the alternative to the nationalism and neutralism prevalent in international affairs (*Ibid.*, p. 15). Therefore, he also called upon the EC to be a ‘force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards’ and avoid falling victim to the power politics practiced by powers stronger and more cohesive than the EC (*Ibid.*, pp. 20-1).

In the early 2000s, the situation was very different from the early 1970s, because the image of the EU as an actor ‘long on economic power and short on military power’ (Duchêne, 1971) suddenly seemed to be rapidly vanishing away. In 1999, the EU launched
the development of an ESDP underpinned not only by civilian capabilities, but also by military capabilities (Council, 1999a, b). Not surprisingly, in this context one of the major questions was whether the EU could still be viewed as a civilian actor once it started to acquire a military dimension. Karen Smith (Smith, K. E., 2000; 2005) contended that civilian power could not exist in the presence of military power. Smith took as her starting point the fact that the debate over Europe as civilian power or military power continued into the 1990s and the 2000s, even after new and significant steps had been taken towards the development of the ESDP, including the decision to set up the so-called EU battle groups (Smith, K. E., 2005, p. 1). Against this background, Smith’s objective was simply to ‘knock off once and for all’ the idea of ‘civilian power EU’ as incompatible with the emergence of the EU as military actor (Ibid.). Smith’s argument was based on the claim that continuing to characterize the EU as a civilian power stretched the term civilian ‘past its breaking point’ and at the same time induced ‘excessively rosy-eyed’ views of the EU as an international actor and closed down the critical analysis of EU foreign policy activities (Ibid.).

Smith tried to achieve the goal of knocking off the notion of civilian power Europe with the help of a two-step strategy. The first stage involved the distillation of the ‘ideal type’ of civilian power from the literature that utilised the concept of civilian power with reference to the EU, as well as more generally. To this end, she drew mainly on Maull (1990), Duchêne (1973) and Hill (2003) and arrived at a definition of the ‘approximate ideal type’ of civilian power as an ‘actor which uses civilian means for persuasion, to pursue civilian ends, and whose foreign policy making process is subject to democratic control or public scrutiny’ (Smith, K. E., 2005, p. 5). At the same time, Smith placed the ideal type of civilian power in opposition to the ideal type of military power, which she defined as an ‘actor which uses military means (exclusively, though admittedly this is difficult to envisage), relies on coercion to influence other actors, unilaterally pursues “military or militarized ends” (again, it is difficult to envisage this, but we might include here goals such as territorial conquest and acquisition of more military power) and whose foreign policy making process is not democratic’ (Ibid.). Smith did not find many examples in real life that were close to the ideal type model of civilian power (Ibid., p. 6). She pointed only to Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland as states closest to pure civilian power (Ibid.). These examples raise, of course, the question of what a power is, because none of the actors mentioned by Smith is viewed as a power in the international system.

The second stage of Smith’s strategy involved testing the EU against her model of the ideal type of civilian power. It is important to note, however, that Smith’s concern was not with whether or not the EU/EC ever was a ‘real civilian power’ (Ibid.). Smith focused on the
present rather than the past and asked whether in the years 2000s it was still possible to view the EU as civilian power Europe (Ibid., p. 7). More specifically, Smith concentrated her criticism on the argument, represented mainly by Maull (2000), that the EU can acquire military instruments and still be a civilian power. This argument included the proposition that what counted more than having military means was the fact that the EU pursued ‘civilian ends’ (Smith, K. E., 2005, p. 7). She pointed to Whitman (2002), Stavridis (2001) and Larsen (2002) as writers who continued Maull’s military-but-still-civilian argument despite what Smith perceived to be a ‘stretching of the definition of civilian power’ (Smith, K. E., 2005, p. 8).

For Smith, the idea that an actor can acquire or use some military means and still qualify as a civilian power was highly problematic (Ibid., p. 10). It raised the question of how much military power an actor could acquire before ceasing to qualify as a civilian power (Ibid.). As Smith put it (Ibid.), ‘where is the cut-off point?’ Smith also challenged the suggestion that the EU continued to be a civilian power for as long as it continued to pursue civilian ends (Ibid.). In Smith’s view, the main problems in this respect were the absence of a ‘good, clear definition’ of what a civilian end is and the tendency of some observers to state in an uncritical manner that the EU is actually pursuing civilian ends (Ibid.).

Moving on to the other two elements of her definition of the ideal type of civilian power, a strategy of persuasion and a foreign policy making process subjected to democratic control or public scrutiny, Smith found that the EU was not satisfying these criteria either. Smith stressed that the EU was using conditionality increasingly and extensively in its dealings with external parties, and thus practiced a form of coercion and not persuasion in external relations (Ibid., pp. 10-11). She also highlighted the serious question marks hovering over the democratic character of EU foreign policy making process, nurtured in particular by insufficient formal parliamentary control in external policy areas and the equally or even more insufficient parliamentary input in relation to the use of force by the EU and/or EU Member States (Ibid., p. 11).

Against this background, Smith drew the conclusion that civilian power Europe was ‘definitively dead’ and that the EU found itself somewhere along the spectrum between the two ideal types of civilian power and military power, like almost any other international actor in the world (Ibid., pp. 12, 17). She acknowledged that the EU did indeed, ‘for a brief moment in time, offer an alternative vision of international relations’, but over time the EU Member States had been ‘converted’ to the idea that the large territorial unit that was the EU had to also have military instruments for its dealings with others’ (Ibid., p. 12). For Smith, the development of the EU’s military dimension discredited and discarded its ‘most powerful
instrument of soft power’, namely its credentials as what Robert Cooper (Cooper, R., 2003a) called a ‘post-modern paradise’ (Smith, K. E., 2005, p. 12).

Smith’s attack on the idea that in the 2000s the EU could still be described as a civilian power is clear and compelling, but not without problems. First, it is not really directed at the original concept of civilian power Europe proposed by Duchêne. Smith’s definition of ‘ideal type civilian power’ is significantly different from Duchêne’s idea of ‘civilian power Europe’. Smith identified several equally significant criteria that a power needed to fulfil in order to qualify as a civilian power: civilian means, civilian ends, a strategy of persuasion and a democratically controlled foreign policy making system.

In contrast, Duchêne focused mainly, although not exclusively, on the nature of the means at the disposal of the EC in its external interactions. It is true that he spoke about the EC’s civilian ends and its ‘built-in sense of collective action’, as well as about the EC as being an imperfect expression of social values such as equality, justice and tolerance (Duchêne, 1973, p. 20). However, he mentioned these aspects only after pointing out that the potential of Western Europe to acquire ‘great influence’ as a ‘large political cooperative formed to exert essentially civilian forms of power’ came from the fact that Western Europe was ‘endowed with resources and free of the burden of a load of military power’ (Duchêne, 1972, p. 43).

In other words, the source of the EC’s civilian power, including its civilian ends and its ‘built-in sense of collective action’, was the possibility for the EC to use only civilian means and not be obliged to also develop military means. This is also evident in Duchêne’s description of the EC as an actor ‘long on economic power and short on military power’ (Duchêne, 1971). The civilian power Europe envisioned by Duchêne was not an actor without military power, only one with ‘short military power’ whose main source of power was in civilian means, or economic means to be more precise.

Duchêne’s original argument about ‘civilian power Europe’ would thus discard the other criteria in Smith’s definition of an ideal-type civilian power: the pursuit of civilian ends, a strategy of persuasion and a foreign policy making process subject to democratic control or public scrutiny (Smith, K. E., 2005, p. 5). For Duchêne, these would be effects of the reliance on civilian means, which is the key determinant of civilian power. Consequently, Duchêne’s definition justifies describing the EU as a civilian power for as long as the EU does not acquire ‘long military power’. This contention remains, of course, exposed to the same question as the one about the ‘cut-off point’ between civilian and military power in Smith’s argument (Ibid., p. 10). In this case, it is a question about the cut-off point between ‘short’ and ‘long’ military power.
Restricting the criteria for describing the EU as a civilian power to the nature of the means that the EU employs also raises the question of why the acquisition of military means should push the EU away from the civilian end, as envisaged by Smith’s model of the continuum between civilian power and military power. It is also possible to argue that the EU can have both civilian and military means and can thus acquire both civilian power and military power. Putting civilian means and military means at the opposing ends of the same continuum is possible only when the main purpose of the analysis is to search for the essence or ‘true nature’ of the EU as a single-faceted actor. If, on the other hand, the purpose is to describe the EU as a multi-faceted actor, civilian means/civilian power and military means/military power are two parallel axes, not opposite ends of the same continuum. Figure 1.1 below illustrates the differences between the two conceptualizations.

![Diagram](image)

Figure 1.1 The single-faceted model vs. the multi-faceted model of actorness

Another problematic aspect in Smith’s argument is the way in which she used the criterion of relying on persuasion rather than coercion. She argued that the idea that the EU could acquire some military means and still be described as a civilian power implies ‘stretching’ the term civilian ‘past its breaking point’ (*Ibid.*, p. 1). On the other hand, she invoked the EU’s increasing and extensive use of conditionality, a form of coercion and not persuasion, in its dealings with external parties as a sign of the EU’s slide along the continuum of power away from the civilian end and towards the military end. Is this not a stretching of the term military ‘past its breaking point’? Is conditionality a ‘military’ factor
even in the absence of military means? All of the conditionality practiced by the EU in its external interactions and much of all conditionality practiced in the international system is in economic (civilian) and not military terms. There is a significant difference between ‘do this or we will impose economic sanctions’ and ‘do this or we will attack you’. Moreover, there is also a significant difference between ‘do this or we will impose economic sanctions’ and ‘do this and you will get this or that advantage’. These are all different forms of conditionality, and it would be legitimate to claim that the use of conditionality indicates that an entity has the features of a military power only if the strategy of conditionality in question relies on military means.

Finally, the result of Smith’s last test, a foreign policy making process that is subject to democratic control or public scrutiny, is also difficult to accept. She argued that there was insufficient formal parliamentary control in external policy areas and equally little, or even less, parliamentary input in relation to the use of force by the EU and/or EU Member States and, therefore, the democratic character of EU foreign policy making process was in doubt (Ibid., p. 11). This diagnosis overlooked the very important fact that the EU was still under construction. The European Parliament has gradually acquired more and more power within the EU system but it is not yet as powerful as a national parliament. The process of defining the role of the national parliaments of the EU’s Member States in the EU system is also still under way and, therefore, makes it unrealistic to judge the extent of parliamentary input or oversight before the final general lines of the outcome of this process become clearer.

The problems of the third test conducted by Smith are also compounded by the fact that the ‘under construction’ state of the EU also means that some areas of EU external policy are in fact the least developed aspects of the European construction. Trade is indeed a fully integrated area where the EU plays the primary role, but foreign and security policy, including defence policy, is an area where the individual EU Member States are the main actors, and not necessarily as direct representatives of the EU, but as individual states in the international system and only indirect representatives of the EU. This situation raises the same problem as the underdevelopment of the parliamentary dimension of the EU’s institutional system: it cannot be judged as if this is or would be its final form as long as it still is an ongoing construction process. During the construction period, evaluations of the democratic nature of the EU must also take into account the final form that the EU is expected to take in the nearer or more distant future.

In the context of this thesis, what matters most in Smith’s reaction to the emergence of the EU as a military actor is her focus on means and the underlying assumption that means determine ends. This assumption obscures the fact that military means can be used for a
variety of ends and that there are no such things as ‘militarised ends’. Some ends may be achieved by either military means or non-military means. For example, forcing another actor on the international scene to do a certain thing can be achieved by economic means as well as by military means, but the result is the same in both cases. Achieving a particular result by using non-military means does not make any difference to the result itself. Therefore, the focus must be on ends or on how an actor uses its military capabilities, and not on the military means themselves. The different focus in Smith’s argument obscures from her the most significant aspect of the rise of the EU as a military actor, namely its contribution to the Kantian transition from an international system of rivals to an international system of friends. This same problem also affected Ian Manners’ argument that the birth of ‘military power Europe’ means the death of ‘normative power Europe’.

1.2 The death of normative power Europe

When Karen Smith attacked it as incompatible with the emergence of the EU as military actor, the notion of civilian power Europe had been a dominating concept in the literature about the character of the EU as an international actor for more than thirty years. In the early 2000s, the concept of civilian power Europe was under pressure mainly because the EU was acquiring a military dimension, but also because of the rise of a new major conceptualization of the EU as international actor, namely the notion of normative power Europe. Paradoxically, or maybe even ironically, this new contender to the dominant position in the literature on the international role of the EU was born as an endangered concept threatened by the same developments that were also threatening the notion of civilian power Europe. Shortly after the idea of normative power Europe was introduced by Ian Manners in 2002, the rapid development of the EU as military actor was interpreted by the very same author as the beginning of the end for his concept of normative power Europe.

Ian Manners presented the concept of normative power Europe in 2002, in the Journal of Common Market Studies (Manners, 2002). He took as his starting point Hedley Bull’s (1982) contention, which he agreed with, that in the 1980s the civilian power of the EC was conditional upon the military power of EC Member States (Manners, 2002, p. 236). However, Manners argued, the international developments of the 1990s imposed a need to rethink both the notion of military power and that of civilian power (Ibid.). Moreover, Manners agreed with Rosecrance’s (1998) contention that ‘Europe’s attainment was normative rather than empirical’, meaning that Europe, in contrast to the times when it ruled the world through the physical imposition of imperialism, was coming to set world standards by promoting norms (Manners, 2002, p. 238). What Manners proposed in this context was to
step beyond the civilian power vs. military power debate, a move that, he argued, would reveal the value of the notion of ‘normative power Europe’ or ‘Europe as promoter of norms’ as a more appropriate way of capturing the essence of the EU as an international actor (Ibid., p. 236).

It is important to note from the beginning that Manners did not place the concept of normative power Europe in a relationship of competition with those of civilian power Europe and military power Europe, but in a relationship of complementarity (Ibid.). Manners viewed the concept of normative power as a valuable addition to the debate concerned with understanding the EU’s civilian and military power in world politics (Ibid.). In contrast to both Bull (1982), who saw civilian power as conditional upon military power, and Smith (Smith, K. E., 2005), who viewed civilian power as incompatible with military power, Manners saw the two concepts as different, but their relationship in his view was neither of unidirectional dependence, as suggested by Hedley Bull, or of mutual exclusion, as suggested by Karen Smith. What Manners suggested, in effect, was that an actor might possess one, or both, or neither of these two distinct forms of power.

As Manners pointed out (Manners, 2002, p. 239), at the more general level, beyond the field of EU studies, the generic concept of normative power in international politics was not something new. He traced the idea of normative power back to Carr (1939/1964), who distinguished between economic power, military power and power over opinion (Manners, 2002, p. 239). Manners also believed that Duchène (1973) had articulated a notion of normative power when he referred to the EC as an ‘idée force’ that exercised power through the beliefs of the EC’s ‘founding fathers’ and through its appeal to widely differing political temperaments (Manners, 2002, p. 239). Finally, Manners found another instance of the concept of normative power in Galtung’s (1973) reference to ‘ideological power’ as the ‘power of ideas’ (Manners, 2002, p. 239). In this context, Manners squarely placed his concept of normative power Europe within the same group as ‘power over opinion’, ‘idée force’ and ‘ideological power’ (Ibid.).

Manners offered a first glimpse into his notion of normative power when he referred to the collapse of communist regimes across Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War as examples of the power of ideas and norms, of normative power rather than of the ‘power of empirical force’ (Ibid., p. 238). For Manners, the disintegration of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe was an effect of the perception by the leadership and citizens in the region that the ideology of those regimes was no longer sustainable (Ibid.). Accordingly, he viewed the collapse of those regimes as the result of a collapse of norms rather than the effect of the power of force (Ibid.). This example, however, was problematic because it suggested that
until the fall of the communist regimes the citizens of Eastern Europe had viewed the ideology of those regimes as legitimate and sustainable. The argument suggests that before 1989 the people of Eastern Europe had been sincerely convinced of the ideas behind the totalitarian communist regimes controlling them. The fact that those regimes needed repressive security services like the Stasi in the German Democratic Republic, or the Security Service in Romania, suggests that many citizens of these countries did not consider their regimes legitimate and did not believe in the totalitarian ideology that underpinned them.

Manners provided an explicit definition of normative power alongside separate definitions of civilian power and military power. Thus, he defined civilian power as the ‘ability to use civilian means’, military power as the ‘ability to use military means’ and normative power as the ‘ability to shape conceptions of normal’ (Ibid., p. 240). Manners equated his definition of civilian power with Carr’s (1939/1964) ‘economic power’ and Galtung’s (1973) ‘remunerative power’ (Manners, 2002, p. 240). He also linked his notion of military power to Carr’s (1939/1964) ‘military power’ and Galtung’s (1973) ‘punitive power’ (Manners, 2002, p. 240). Finally, Manners associated his idea of normative power with Carr’s (1939/1964) ‘opinion power’ and Galtung’s (1973) ‘ideological power’ (Manners, 2002, p. 240).

Manners argued not only that the EU was a normative power, something that he did not really regard as special, considering that historical empires and contemporary global powers had also promoted their own norms, but also that it was a normative power with a difference (Ibid.). However, Manners used the term ‘different’ inconsistently. His argument appears to say simultaneously that the EU is different because it has a normative basis and that the EU is different from other normative actors because its normative basis is different. Manners saw the EU’s normative difference as flowing from the EU’s historical context, hybrid polity and politico-legal constitution (Ibid.). More specifically, Manners pointed at the EU’s origins in a post-war environment dominated by strong aversion towards the nationalisms blamed for the slide towards a catastrophic conflict, to its evolution into a hybrid of supranational and international forms of governance transcending Westphalian norms and to its constitution as a political entity produced through an elite-driven, treaty-based, legal process (Ibid., pp. 240-41).

Together, these factors generated, or rather accelerated, as Manners put it, the EU’s commitment to placing universal norms and principles at the centre of its relations with its Member States and with the world (Merlingen et al., 2001; Clapham, 1999; Smith, K. E., 2001; cf. Manners, 2002, p. 241). The result was, as Manners pointed out, that the EU’s external relations were grounded in a ‘catalogue of norms’ that was closer to the
European Convention on Human Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights than those of most other actors in world politics (Manners, 2002, p. 241). The same factors also made the EU different from any pre-existing political forms, a difference that predisposed the EU to act in a normative way and therefore provided the basis for conceptualizing the EU as normative power Europe (Ibid., p. 242).

Besides explaining what he understood by normative power Europe in general terms, Manners also identified the norms promoted by the EU and outlined the channels through which the EU projected those norms. He identified five ‘core’ norms and four ‘minor’ norms, extracted from the EU laws and policies that constitute together the Union’s *acquis communautaire* and *acquis politique* (Ibid.). The first group included peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, while the second group contained social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance (Ibid., pp. 242-43).

In discussing the channels through which the EU projected these norms, Manners drew on Whitehead (1996), Manners and Whitman (1998), Smith (Smith, K. E., 1998) and Cremona (1998) to identify five main channels: ‘contagion’ or diffusion through the unintentional diffusion of ideas from the EU to other political actors, ‘informational diffusion’ or diffusion through strategic communications and declaratory communications, ‘procedural diffusion’ or diffusion through the institutionalization of a relationship between the EU and a third party, ‘transference’ or diffusion through exchanges of goods, trade, aid or technical assistance between the EU and third parties, and ‘overt diffusion’ or diffusion through the physical presence of the EU in third states and international organizations (Ibid., pp. 244-45).

There is a certain element of confusion in Manners’ argument, stemming from his statements regarding the objectives and outcomes of his investigation. He contended that his intention was to show that the EU was constructed on a normative basis and that this predisposed it to act in a normative way, or as a promoter of norms, in world politics (Ibid., p. 252). This contention stands side by side with Manners’ statement that his argument was about the fact that the EU had a normatively *different* basis for its relations with the world (Ibid., p. 253). The reality is that Manners’ article does, indeed, outline the difference in the EU’s normative basis, but says very little about why or how a normative basis predisposes the EU, or any other actor for that matter, to behave as a promoter of norms. Moreover, in some places Manners referred to the EU’s *different* normative basis and in others he dropped the word ‘different’ when mentioning the EU’s normative basis and its implications for the EU’s relations with the world. The result is that in some places his argument suggests that the EU is different because it has a normative basis, while in others it appears to say that the EU has a
normative predisposition because its normative basis is different from those of other actors with normative bases. In other words, it is not clear whether the claim that the EU was a normative power rested on the contention that the EU was constructed on a normative basis or on the argument that the normative basis of the EU was different from the normative basis of other actors.

The continued relevance of the concept of normative power Europe in the context of the rapid development of the EU as military actor came under serious pressure in 2006, when its very author questioned its future. The special issue dedicated that year by the Journal of European Public Policy to the question of what kind of power the EU was in international affairs gave Manners the opportunity to ‘revisit’ the notion of ‘normative power Europe’, placing special emphasis on the impact of the development of the EU’s military dimension (Manners, 2006). More precisely, Manners’ objective was to reflect on the risks posed by the militarization of the EU beyond the year 2003 for the EU’s normative power in world politics (Ibid., p. 183). The special significance of the year 2003 for Manners derived from the fact that in that year the EU adopted its first ever security strategy, the document entitled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World - European Security Strategy’ (Council, 2003q). Manners saw this event as a crossroads in the process of militarizing the EU (Manners, 2006, p. 183).

In reconsidering his original concept of normative power Europe, Manners took as his starting point a passage from the ESS that talked about the need for the EU to be more active in the pursuit of its strategic objectives and to use the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities (Ibid., p. 188). The same passage also described ‘active policies’ as necessary in order to counter the ‘new dynamic threats’ to EU security and called on the EU to develop a ‘strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention’ (Council, 2003q, p. 17). This particular passage from the ESS was for Manners the best illustration of what he saw as a ‘sharp turn away from the normative path of sustainable peace towards a full spectrum of instruments for robust intervention’ (Manners, 2006, p. 189).

In order to highlight the EU’s ‘sharp turn’, Manners pointed first at the institutional and operational prioritization, within the framework of the evolving ESDP, of the military rather than the civilian structures and frameworks (Ibid., p.189). He then placed the prioritization of military affairs within the broader context of the role played by what he described as a ‘Brussels-based transnational policy “network”’ seeking to direct EU militarization towards a military doctrine of “preventative engagement”’ (Ibid., p. 191). The third essential factor was the role played by the emerging European ‘military-industrial
simplex’, comprising the ‘military-armaments lobby’ and the ‘technology-industrial lobby’, in forging a ‘simple but compelling’ link at the EU level between the need for forces capable of robust intervention, the technological and industrial benefits of defence and aerospace research, and the creation of a European armaments agency (Ibid., p. 193).

Manners found what he described as compelling evidence for the presence of the European ‘military-industrial simplex’ in a paragraph from a July 2004 Joint Action by the Council of the EU that outlined the concept of the proposed European armaments agency:

> the agency will aim at developing defence capabilities in the field of crisis management, promoting and enhancing European armaments co-operation, strengthening the European defence industrial and technological base and creating a competitive European defence equipment market (Council, 2004b; Manners, 2006, p. 193).

In this context, the ESS appeared to Manners as a crossroads with two alternative pathways, one leading to ‘normative power Europe’ and the other to ‘great power Europe’ (Manners, 2006, p. 193). It was in this context that Manners saw the EU’s apparent ‘sharp turn away from the normative path of sustainable peace towards a full spectrum of instruments for robust intervention’ as a reorientation from normative power Europe to great power Europe (Ibid.). For Manners, the acquisition of ‘better policies like those of the great powers’ would make the EU more like bigger states, a scenario that would not necessarily give the EU more power in interstate politics, but would instead increasingly risk the EU’s normative power (Ibid., p. 194). More importantly, for Manners making the EU more like the ‘great powers’ or the ‘bigger states’ was a trend that would ‘leave the problems of interstate politics precisely where they were’ (Ibid.). Like Duchêne before him, Manners did not argue against any EU military dimension. He was not concerned only by the acquisition of military capabilities, but also by the perceived prioritization of military intervention over non-military conciliation. In Manners’ view, the tendency towards the prioritization of military intervention was a trend that had already started to erode the idea of normative power Europe (Ibid.).

The contention that making the EU more like bigger states leaves the problems of interstate politics ‘precisely’ where they were is not without problems. The question is which problems of interstate politics remain unchanged. If Manners was referring to the entire global system of interstate relations, then he was probably right, although it is difficult to accept that the EU represents a section of the system significant enough to transform the entire system.
On the other hand, if Manners was really referring to interstate relations in general, as it appears he was, he overlooked the EU’s impact on the intra-EU system of interstate politics.

The process of European integration did transform the relations between the EU’s Member States. The original idea of making war between France and Germany not only materially impossible but also unthinkable (Schuman, 1950) seems to have become a reality. The same also goes for any other EU Member States. At the beginning of the twenty-first century it was hard, to say the least, to see any of the EU’s Member States as capable of taking up arms against another EU Member State. Therefore, the EU and its predecessor Communities did not leave the problems of European interstate politics ‘precisely where they were’, no matter which of the two pathways, normative power Europe or great power Europe, unfolds in the future. The EU might have had very limited, if any, impact upon interstate politics on a global scale, but its profound impact on European, or more precisely intra-EU, interstate politics is undeniable.

Another problematic aspect of Manners’ argument is his insistence on the idea that the prioritization of military structures and frameworks leads the EU along the great power Europe pathway instead of the normative power Europe track. One of the specific examples of prioritization of the military dimension given by Manners is the emphasis placed by the EU on identifying and achieving military capabilities ahead of civilian capabilities (Manners, 2006, p. 189). When assessing the implications of examples such as this one it is important to keep in mind that the 1990s and 2000s highlighted the underdevelopment of the EU’s military dimension and the implications of this situation for the EU’s capacity to do anything significant in situations such as the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s.

The emphasis placed on the need to develop the EU’s military dimension in the aftermath of the Balkan conflicts and then of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 can as well be interpreted as a rush to bring the military capabilities of the EU to the same level of development as other instruments of EU external action. The idea that the prioritization of the military aspects leads the EU towards great power status rather than towards a normative power identity holds true only if this prioritization of the military dimension will persist even after the EU’s military capabilities have been developed to a level comparable to other instruments for EU external action. In other words, the prioritization of military aspects will push the EU along the great power Europe pathway only if it proves to be a permanent, instead of a temporary, prioritization.

As in the case of Smith contention that ‘military power Europe’ was the beginning of the end for ‘civilian power Europe’, in the context of this thesis the most important aspect of Manners’ reaction to the development of the EU’s military dimension is the same focus on
means as determinants of ends. In the case of Manners’ argument, this problem is even more prominent because the idea of ‘normative power Europe’ referred primarily to certain ends, like ‘changing conceptions of the normal’. By saying that the acquisition and prioritisation of military means was killing the notion of ‘normative power Europe’, Manners in effect said that military means could not be associated with the ends underpinning the concept of normative actor. This contention implied the same problematic assumption that means determine ends that resulted in a focus on means and the exclusion of ends as objects of study. Consequently, like Karen Smith, Ian Manners failed to see the contribution that the development of the EU as a military actor was making to the Kantian transition in the international system.

1.3 The birth of real power Europe

While for Karen Smith and Ian Manners the rapid development of military Europe during the first decade of the 21st century looked like the beginning of the end for both civilian power Europe and normative power Europe, for others the emergence of the EU as military actor marked the birth of the EU as a real power. The argument that the EU cannot be a power and not even an actor without military power has been an important part of the literature on the international role of the EU since the early 1980s. For the proponents of this argument, the notions of power and actoriness are closely linked to that of military power, seen as the most fundamental form of power that underpins all other forms of power, including civilian and normative powers. Consequently, in light of this kind of argument the development of the military dimension of the EU can only be equated with the development of the EU as ‘real power Europe’. The two most prominent arguments against notions of the EU as a power or even an actor came from Hedley Bull (1982) and Robert Kagan (2002; 2003).

Hedley Bull was the author of the first major attack on Duchêne’s notion of civilian power Europe, published in 1982 in the *Journal of Common Market Studies* (Bull, 1982). Bull took as his starting point the contradiction that he saw in the arguments of Duchêne and others between the concept of ‘civilian power’ and that of ‘traditional military/political power’ (*Ibid.*, p. 149). Bull referred to the idea of civilian power Europe as a ‘contradiction in terms’ (Bull, 1982). His attack on the notion of civilian power Europe was twofold. It was an attack on the concept of ‘civilian power’ *per se* and at the same time an attack on the idea of ‘Europe’ being an actor embodied by the EC.

Bull traced the origins of the notion of civilian power back to perceptions in the late 1960s and early 1970s that there was an approaching era of scarce resources in which power would stem from the possession of resources such as oil or food rather than from the ability to
exert force (*Ibid.*, p. 149). Bull also highlighted the apparent confirmation given to this position by the experiences of the Western countries in the ‘springtime of détente between the superpowers’, in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, when the role of force seemed to move into the background (*Ibid.*, pp. 149-150). For Bull, these elements marked a return to the idealist or progressivist views of international politics of the 1920s and ushered in what he called the ‘neo-idealist or neo-progressivist fashion of the 1970s’ (*Ibid.*, p. 150). In order to highlight the weakness of the foundations underpinning the neo-idealist trend of the 1970s, Bull put it in contrast to the ‘return to power politics of the 1980s’ (*Ibid.*).

The détente between the superpowers was for Bull the expression of a ‘fleeting’ balance of military strength acceptable to both sides (*Ibid.*). The widening of the agenda of world politics to incorporate economic, social and cultural issues reflected the fact that the states system was ‘spreading its tentacles’ to bring within its grip areas that had previously been left to the private sector (*Ibid.*, p. 151). Increasing preoccupations with economic issues did not mean a decline in the importance of strategic issues and the possession of scarce resources was a source of power for states that were militarily weak only for as long as states that were stronger militarily chose not to use their force (*Ibid.*). Finally, the source of the power or influence of ‘civilian actors’, including the European Community (EC), was to be found beyond the scope of their control, in the strategic environment provided by the military power of states (*Ibid.*).

Bull’s discussion of the weakness of the foundations underlying any notion of civilian power provided the background for the second part of his attack on the concept of civilian power Europe. He declared sternly that it was unhelpful to approach the problem of the vulnerability of the countries of Western Europe, stemming from their lack of military capabilities, from the standpoint of the question, purely theoretical in his view, of whether or not the ‘Europe of Community visionaries’ needed military power in order to become an effective actor in international affairs (*Ibid.*). The reason for this was that ‘Europe’ was not an actor in international affairs and did not seem likely to become one (*Ibid.*). Under these circumstances, Bull was concerned with the ‘actual’ Europe of state governments (*Ibid.*). In ‘actual Europe’, the ‘various committees, assemblies and secretariats bearing the designation “European”’ played only a minor role, primarily as instruments of inter-governmental cooperation (*Ibid.*). The institutions of the EC represented for Bull just some structures ‘among others’ in that mix of committees, assemblies and secretariats that carried the label ‘European’ (*Ibid.*). Moreover, Bull also pointed out that the ‘Europe’ he focused on was not the whole of Europe, but only the Western part of the European continent (*Ibid.*). In this
context, Bull also lashed out at any EC claim to speak in the name of the whole of Europe (Ibid.).

Thus, for Bull the real actors in his ‘actual Europe’ were the nation-states, a situation that raises questions in relation to what place was left for the EC in Bull’s ‘actual Europe’. The answer to this question is apparent in the way Bull formulated the three central questions of his inquiry. The first asked whether the nation-states of Western Europe needed to become more self-sufficient in military power (Ibid.). Bull made no mention of the EC when he discussed this first question. The second was concerned with the steps required in the event of an affirmative answer to the first question (Ibid.). Again, Bull ignored completely the EC, thus suggesting that it was not relevant for the analysis of this second question either. The EC appeared only in the third and last of Bull’s main questions, which asked what role could be played by the EC in the process of increasing the military self-sufficiency of Western European nation-states (Ibid.). These three questions thus reveal that Bull’s inquiry was in essence about the nation-states of Western Europe and their military power. The EC represented only a secondary concern, the subject of a sort of supplementary section dealing with the ways in which the EC could be inserted into the state-related processes that constituted the real central focus of the analysis.

Despite all his talk of the improbability of the EC’s becoming an actor in international affairs, when he turned to the question of what role the EC can play in the process of strengthening the military capabilities of Western European nation-states, the first thing Bull said was that what he called a ‘Europeanist strategic policy’ was not viable in the absence of ‘some appropriate form of political and strategic unity’ among the nations of Western Europe (Ibid., p. 163). Still, Bull’s idea of Western European political and strategic unity did not refer to a supranational community, a concept that he saw as a potential source of weakness rather than strength in defence policy (Ibid.). The first question that this position raises is whose defence policy Bull had in mind. A supranational community might undermine the strengthening of national defence policies, but it could provide a basis for the development of a supranational defence policy. If making ‘Europe’ more self-sufficient in military terms is to be regarded as a desirable goal, it does not really matter whether this means a strong supranational defence policy or a set of strong national defence policies. But it does matter a lot if there is a preference, as seems to be the case in Bull’s argument, for the preservation of the nation-state in its original form and for the prevention of the emergence of new supranational forms such as the EC. If the purpose were indeed to make ‘Europe’ militarily stronger, then it could be plausibly argued that an integrated supranational defence policy would in fact be more unitary and stable over time than a cluster of more or less coordinated
national defence policies, and that the former would therefore be more conducive to ‘European’ military strength than the latter.

The heart of Bull’s argument against the notion of civilian power Europe and even against that of the EC as international actor is the contention that without military resources there cannot be any talk of actoriness or power. The process of developing the EU’s military capabilities was launched almost twenty years after Bull published his seminal article, and after ten years of rapid development that process still had a long way to go to make the EU a really important military actor. On the logic underpinning Bull’s 1982 article, the launch of the EU’s military dimension could only mean that the EU was finally emerging as an actor and perhaps even a power on the international stage. Thus, while the ‘militarization’ of the EU was deplored by some, like Karen Smith and Ian Manners, it would have probably been welcomed by Hedley Bull as the birth of Europe as ‘real power Europe’.

An indirect suggestion that the emergence of the EU as military actor can be equated with the birth of ‘real power Europe’ can also be found in the second most prominent argument against notions of the EU as power, namely Robert Kagan’s conceptualization of the EU as ‘post-power Europe’ or ‘anti-power Europe’ (Kagan, 2002; 2003):

> Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kant’s “Perpetual Peace”.

Robert Kagan opened his argument that ‘Americans come from Mars and the Europeans from Venus’ with the observation that at the beginning of the 21st century there was a significant difference in strategic perspectives between the United States and Europe (Kagan, 2002, pp. 3-4). The Europeans insisted on an approach that sought to influence others through subtlety and indirection and displayed more tolerance for failure and more patience when solutions were not reached quickly. The Europeans also appeared to be quick to appeal to international law, international conventions, and international opinion to solve disputes and tried to use commercial and economic ties to bind nations together. Finally, Kagan also pointed out that the Europeans often emphasized process with an apparent belief that ultimately process can become substance.

Seeking the source of the differences in worldviews between the two sides of the Atlantic, Robert Kagan arrived at the conclusion that those differences were not the natural result of ‘differences in national character’, but the outcome of a ‘dramatic shift in the power
equation’ between the two (Ibid., pp. 5-6). Two hundred years earlier, Europe was strong and believed in strength and martial glory, while the United States was weak and pursued strategies of indirection and weakness. In the early twenty-first century, Europe ‘saw the world through the eyes of weaker powers’, *militarily* weaker powers to be more precise, while the United States had become powerful and ‘behave[d] as powerful nations do’ (Ibid.). This material difference was compounded, in Kagan’s view, by an ideological difference, stemming from the fact that Europe’s unique historical experience over the second half of the twentieth century, culminating with the creation of the European Union, had produced a different set of ideals and principles regarding the utility and morality of power.

Kagan made frequent such analogies between contemporary Europe and eighteenth-century United States and between the contemporary United States and eighteenth-century European great powers (Ibid., p. 18). This had the probably unintended effect of suggesting that contemporary United States carries the same negative connotations that had been associated with the great European powers of the eighteenth century, seen as fighting *against* freedom, and that contemporary Europe carries the positive connotations associated with the eighteenth-century United States, seen as fighting *for* freedom. The further implication is, of course, that once Europe acquires military might comparable to that of contemporary United States, it will become more like the great European powers of the eighteenth century and contemporary United States, while a decrease in the military might of the United States will make the US more like the eighteenth-century United States and contemporary Europe.

According to Kagan, the military weakening of Europe has been accompanied by the development of a psychology of weakness, to be contrasted with the psychology of power that has developed in the meantime on the other side of the Atlantic (Ibid., pp. 10-11). The essence of Europe’s psychology of weakness is an aversion to the exercise of military power. Accordingly, Europe has acquired a strong interest in

inhabiting a world where strength doesn’t matter, where international law and international institutions predominate, where unilateral action by powerful nations is forbidden, where all nations regardless of their strength have equal rights and are equally protected by commonly agreed-upon international rules of behaviour (Ibid.).

For Kagan, this was the natural attitude of weaker powers. As an illustration, he gave the example of the Americans in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when they wanted the same things as the Europeans of today. He then contrasted this perspective to that
of great powers past (France, Britain, and Russia) and present (the United States), who ‘often fear rules that may constrain them more than they fear the anarchy in which their power brings security and prosperity’ (Ibid.).

In the new context of the late twentieth century, Kagan continued, the Europeans started to believe that they had found a method of transcending power and that they had to share it with the world, thus making the ‘transmission of the European miracle to the rest of the world’ Europe’s new ‘mission civilisatrice’ (Ibid., pp. 17-18). For Kagan, this was the main problem between Europe and the United States. Europe’s new sense of mission was threatened by America’s power and its willingness to exercise that power, even unilaterally if necessary. Kagan described ‘unilateral and extralegal’ military action of the United States against Iraq as representing for the Europeans an ‘assault on the essence of “postmodern” Europe’, an ‘assault on Europe’s new ideals’ and a ‘denial of their universal validity’ (Ibid.). Kagan again drew an analogy with the situation of the United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, whose republican ideals were assaulted by the European monarchies.

This point is straightforward. Whether or not Europe’s new “mission civilisatrice” is a good or bad thing is a subjective question. However, the ‘transmission of the European miracle to the rest of the world’ depends on having on board at least some of the other major international actors. This is especially true in the case of the more powerful actors. It would probably be easier for Europe to pursue its new self-assigned mission if it were the preeminent power in both economic and military terms, instead of the United States. But it is not. Even in economic terms, the idea that Europe is the second largest or even the main powerhouse of the world is debatable and is likely to become even more questionable as China and other emerging major economic powers continue to rise and overtake the EU’s major economies that still tend to see themselves as global rather than regional powers.

On the military side, there can hardly be any talk of Europe as the main power or even as a major power. Under these circumstances, it is crucial for Europe to put together a ‘coalition of the willing’ that would be committed to the same values as Europe and would be willing to work with Europe to spread them around the world. This coalition of the willing can be a coalition of the powerful or a coalition of the many. The most obvious formula for a coalition of the powerful is an EU-US coalition, but the problem is that just as Europe’s new sense of mission is threatened by America’s psychology of power, so is also the latter threatened by the former. The idea of taking up and promoting a model proposed by a weaker power is incompatible with a psychology of power such as that described by Robert Kagan.

Kagan saw an ‘abundance of ironies’ in Europe’s situation at the beginning of the third millennium, because the European rejection of power politics and devaluation of
military force as a tool of international relations were the product of the presence of American military forces on European soil (*Ibid.*, p. 24). The European belief that power was no longer important was made possible by American power, but the Europeans, ironically, ended up looking at American power and the strategic culture behind it as being ‘outmoded and dangerous’ (*Ibid.*).

Kagan’s portrayal of Europe’s place in the international system is very much a continuation of the argument put forward by Hedley Bull twenty years earlier. Kagan’s critique of Europe implies that, as long as the EU does not acquire a significant military dimension, it cannot be a real power. Moreover, any EU influence on the world stage is in fact underpinned by US military power. However, while Bull wrote his article twenty years before the EU took the first steps towards developing its military capabilities, Kagan wrote at a time when the EU was already moving fast to develop its military capabilities. It is true that the EU was only at the beginning of this process, but Kagan’s failure to take into account the possibility that the process would be continued put his argument at risk of becoming rapidly outdated. The context of the early 2000s, when the EU declared its military capabilities operational, launched its first military operations and adopted its first ever security strategy, exposed Kagan’s argument to the same risk as Fukuyama’s premature claims about the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama, 1992).

One conclusion that can be extrapolated from Kagan’s argument is the opposite of what he intended to demonstrate. By Kagan’s logic, if the EU cannot be regarded as a power if it has few or no military capabilities, then the EU can be viewed as a power once it does acquire significant military capabilities. In other words, in light of Kagan’s argument the emergence of the EU as a military actor marks the birth of the EU as a real power on the world scene.

Kagan’s argument and his indirect suggestion that the EU needed military capabilities if it wanted to be truly influential in the world acquired prominence in the context of the transatlantic and intra-EU crises surrounding the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. A high level EU official, Robert Cooper, called on the Europeans to heed Kagan’s warning and start building a strong military Europe (Cooper, 2003a, b). In his ‘European reply’ to Robert Kagan, Robert Cooper effectively used Kagan’s argument as an opportunity to urge the Europeans to redress the situation by developing a strategic culture and better military capabilities and thus decreasing their reliance for their own defence on the Americans (Cooper, 2003b).

At the same time, Cooper pointed out that although Kagan’s basic thesis was compelling it also contained certain assumptions that were not valid (*Ibid.*). For example, it
was not true that the Europeans had no military capability, only that their capability for intervention abroad was severely limited. At the same time, it was true that the United States was capable of conducting a war on its own, but it needed the support of others to deal with the post-conflict situation. Robert Cooper agreed with Robert Kagan that the main problem with Europe, leaving aside the decline in the size of the defence budgets and the quality of defence expenditure, was the ‘general unwillingness in Europe to see the world in terms of power relations’ (Cooper, 2003a). For illustrative purposes, he mentioned the low legitimacy of the use of military power in countries like Germany, Italy, Greece, and Spain, for ‘good historical reasons’, and the general preference of most European countries to live in a world of law rather than one of power, this too due to ‘good historical reasons’.

Against this background, Cooper asked whether Europe would behave differently if it had more military power. His ‘best guess’ was that it would. In the economic field, Cooper pointed out, Europe had the capacity to act as a unit and its weight was roughly equal to that of the United States. Cooper acknowledged that ‘economic power Europe’ acted within a legal framework, but stressed the fact that this legal framework had been shaped to a considerable extent by Europe itself and that within this framework Europe behaved in a ‘much rougher and tougher fashion’ than in other areas.

Unwillingness to think in terms of power relations put Europe in the situation of a free rider, where ‘400 million Europeans [relied] so much on 250 million Americans to defend them’ (Cooper, 2003a). This was for Cooper a dangerous situation because ‘there is no such thing as free defence’, there is no guarantee that American and European interests will always coincide, territorial defence (the only type of defence that Europe might be capable of) is increasingly irrelevant and it is ‘unhealthy’ to have only one superpower that would not have ‘someone to talk to’ (Ibid.). This line of argument took Cooper to the conclusion that Europe needed to accelerate the process of integration in the field of defence and to develop its military capabilities. He did not see Europe equaling the United States in military power. He only suggested the achievement of greater interoperability and greater deployability. For Europe not to use its full potential, including its military potential, amounted for Robert Cooper to irresponsibility. In the context in which the American president of the day had announced that while part of the history of the civilized world was written by others, the rest of this history was to be written by ‘us’, Cooper warned that if the Europeans wanted to be inside that ‘us’, they needed more influence with the United States and for that they needed more power, including military power (Cooper, 2003b).

Robert Cooper’s reply to Kagan’s suggestion that the Europeans are from Venus was a friendly reply, even an encouraging one that welcomed negative analyses of Europe’s
condition in the world as valuable opportunities to press the Europeans into thinking in terms of power politics and developing their military power. As a result, Cooper’s argument had the same effect as the arguments proposed by Robert Kagan and Hedley Bull. It suggested that the EU could not be seen as a power as long as it did not have appropriate military means. At the same time, Cooper also suggested, conversely, that once the EU acquired an important military dimension notions of ‘power Europe’ become legitimate. In other words, in light of Cooper’s argument, the rapid development of the EU’s military dimension in the first decade of the twenty-first century marked the birth of the EU as ‘real power Europe’. This type of attitude attracted harsh words from other observers of EU and international politics. Ian Manners, for example, described Robert Cooper as being part of a transnational policy network that ‘diverted the EU on a road towards militarization led by “martial potency” and driven by the growth of a Brussels-based military-industrial simplex’ (Manners, 2006, pp. 189-192). For Manners, Robert Cooper was one of the factors contributing to the death of normative power Europe.

The interpretation stemming from the ‘non-power Europe’ arguments advanced by Hedley Bull, Robert Kagan and Robert Cooper is the opposite of the arguments developed by Karen Smith and Ian Manners, but it presents the same problems. Like the other reactions, it too focuses on means and suggests that means determine ends. This is most evident in the arguments of Robert Kagan and Robert Cooper, who suggested that if the EU had the same military capabilities as the United States, it would automatically develop a psychology of power and would behave like a real power, such as the US. This contention reduces ends to means and obscures the different ways in which an actor might use its military capabilities on the international scene. In this way, like Karen Smith and Ian Manners, Robert Kagan and Robert Cooper blinded themselves to the most significant contribution that ‘military power Europe’ was making in the international system, namely supporting the Kantian transition from a world of rivals to a world of friends.

1.4 Military vs. non-military and hard vs. soft

The three main arguments about the impact of the development of the EU’s military dimension on the international role of the EU echo the larger debate on hard vs. soft forms of power, which has been going on in the field of International Relations since the early 1990s. Thus, Ian Manners’ discussion of the notion of normative power also highlights the close relationship between this idea and Nye’s concept of soft power (Nye, 1990; 2004). Both Manners and Nye traced their respective concepts back to the same idea, namely E. H. Carr's notion of power over ideas. Moreover, both concepts imply the ability to influence others.
without using threats or payments. By defining normative power as the ‘ability to shape conceptions of the normal’ (Manners, 2002, p. 240) by promoting one’s own norms, Manners echoed Nye’s explanation that soft power refers to the ‘ability to shape the preferences of others’ (Nye, 2004, p. 5).

Joseph S. Nye Jr. first coined the term ‘soft power’ in 1990 in a book addressing the ongoing debate about the perceived decline of American power (Nye, 1990). Nye revisited this notion in 2002 (Nye, 2002), but it was only in 2004 that he developed the concept more extensively in a new book especially dedicated to the idea of soft power (Nye, 2004). As he noted in the preface to his book 2004, by then the term soft power had become widely used in public and academic discourse, even though in many cases its meaning was not the same as the one intended by Nye (Ibid., p. xi).

Starting from the basic definition of power as the ‘ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants’ (Ibid., p. 2), Nye made a distinction between hard power, or command or active power, and soft power, or co optive or indirect power (Nye, 1990, p. 31). Hard power rests on inducements or threats and can thus take the form of economic power or military power (Ibid.). Soft power, on the other hand, is based on an actor’s ability to ‘achieve the outcomes that it prefers in world politics because other countries want to follow it or have agreed to a system that produces such effects’ (Ibid.). Nye described soft power as the ‘second’ or ‘structural’ face of power and referred to it as the ‘ability to get the outcomes you want without having to force people to change their behaviour through threats or payments’ (Nye, 2004, p. 15).

Nye also stressed the differences between soft power and other phenomena that could be mistaken for soft power. Thus, he pointed out that soft power is not merely influence and is more that persuasion, and then concluded that in behavioural terms soft power is attractive power (Ibid., p. 5). In this way, Nye defined soft power as a form of purely psychological power that relies solely on perceptions and desires, in contrast to hard power which is underpinned by material factors (‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’).

Thus, in light of Nye’s argument there are three forms of power, namely military hard power, economic hard power and soft power (Ibid., p. 30). Nye was concerned primarily with the different degrees of relevance of each form of power in different contexts and wanted to emphasize the increasing importance of soft power in the changing world of the late twentieth century and early twenty first century. Nevertheless, Nye also pointed out that despite its increasing significance, soft power may continue to be less relevant in a military context (Ibid., p. 17). In discussing the interplay between hard power and soft power, Nye also
introduced the idea of smart power, defined as the ability to combine hard and soft power \textit{(Ibid., p. 32)}.

Duchêne’s notion of civilian power Europe may also be seen as incorporating Nye’s later idea of soft power because Duchêne, too, mentioned cultural example, social movements and pressure groups as sources of influence (Duchêne, 1972, p. 47). In this way he might be said to have pre echoed Nye, who almost two decades later presented national attraction and the ability to set the agenda as sources of soft power (Nye, 1990, p. 31). However, this only appears to be so, because there is a fundamental difference between Duchêne and Nye in this respect. Nye made a distinction between military, economic and soft power, while Duchêne distinguished only between military and non-military forms of power. For Duchêne, Nye’s soft power would be part of civilian power, alongside economic power. In contrast, Nye placed economic power in the same category as military power, classifying both these forms of power as hard power.

Thus, while Manners’ notion of normative power overlaps to a considerable extent with Nye’s idea of soft power, Duchêne’s concept of civilian power appears as a hybrid form of power incorporating elements of both hard power and soft power. By contrast, the notion of ‘real power’ arising from the arguments put forward by Hedley Bull (1982) and later by Robert Kagan (2002; 2003) and Robert Cooper (2003a, b) can only be related to Nye’s notion of hard power, because this idea of real power is actually an idea of military power. In light of the ideas presented by Bull, Kagan and Cooper, an actor cannot be any kind of power without military power because all other forms of influence are contingent on military power. The notion of civilian power, which is in essence a reference to non-military power, was a ‘contradiction in terms’ for Hedley Bull and he would probably say the same about any other ideas of non-military power, including soft power.

In discussing the notion of soft power, Nye also introduced the idea of smart power (Nye, 2004, p. 32), a concept further developed by Ernest J. Wilson III and a term that has also become a significant presence in official discourse, including EU discourse. Nye defined smart power as the ability to combine hard and soft power \textit{(Ibid.)}. Wilson defined it in a similar manner, as the ‘capacity of an actor to combine elements of hard power and soft power in ways that are mutually reinforcing such that the actor’s purposes are advanced effectively and efficiently’ (Wilson, 2008, p. 115). As Wilson pointed out \textit{(Ibid., pp. 111, 114)}, when he, Wilson, was writing his article on ‘hard power, soft power, smart power’, published in 2008, Nye was working on the same topic. Indeed, he was co chairing, together with Richard L. Armitage, the Commission on Smart Power established in 2006 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, 2007).
By defining smart power as the ability to combine elements of hard power and soft power, Wilson distinguished, like Nye before him, between hard power and soft power. Even though the discussion about smart power may appear as being about a third form of power, in reality it does not affect the basic hard-soft distinction. Smart power is a term that actually refers to a strategy and not to a form of power. It is about being smart about power and using the different forms of power available in combinations and ways that best serve one’s purposes. Thus, in essence, smart power is only a combination of hard and soft power and not a third type of power. To have smart power, an actor must first have hard power and soft power and then use them in an optimal combination. Therefore, Wilson’s and Nye’s arguments about smart power are meta arguments about the two basic forms of power.

At the time when Ernest Wilson published his article about ‘hard power, soft power, smart power’, the term smart power was already present in official discourse, including in EU discourse. In May 2008, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement delivered a speech at the European Studies Centre of St. Antony’s College at Oxford University, on ‘Europe’s smart power in its region and the world’ (Commission, 2008). The EU Commissioner for Enlargement defined smart power as ‘combining soft and hard power better in the EU’s external relations by using the whole spectrum of our policy instruments and economic resources’ (Ibid.). This is the same idea that also underpins the notion of smart power present in the writings of both Ernest J. Wilson III and Joseph S. Nye Jr.

Smart power was also present in the subtitle of the conference ‘Security & Defence Day '09’. The conference, organised by the European Parliament on 18 November 2009 (European Parliament, 2009), bore the subtitle ‘EU Smart Power’. This at first sight suggests that the idea invoked by the conference was the same as the idea of ‘smart power’ as developed by Wilson and Nye and as used in other parts of official EU discourse. However, this is misleading because the European Parliament used the term smart power differently, as illustrated by the continuation of the conference’s subtitle: ‘Towards a better integration of European civilian and military dimensions’. Thus, in this context the term smart power cannot be equated with that used by Wilson because it does not rest on the hard-soft distinction proposed by Nye in the early 1990s (Nye, 1990), but on the civilian-military distinction advocated by François Duchêne in the early 1970s (Duchêne, 1972; 1973).

In effect, the way in which the European Parliament used the term smart power builds on and steps beyond all three main arguments about the EU as an international actor. While those arguments focus on the most distinctive aspect of the EU as an international actor or argue that the EU should focus on certain dimensions of power, the European Parliament combined the ideas presented by François Duchêne (1972; 1973), Hedley Bull (1982), Ian
Manners (2002; 2006), Robert Kagan (2002; 2003) and Robert Cooper (2003a, b) and thus defined smart power as an optimally integrated mix of civilian power and military power. This definition cannot be fully equated with Wilson’s definition of smart power only because the civilian-military distinction does not fit the soft-hard distinction. The soft-hard distinction is a distinction between ‘soft power’ on one side and military and economic power on the other side, while the civilian-military distinction is a distinction between civilian power, which includes both economic power and ‘soft power’, and military power. However, the basic idea of using all forms of power available in the best possible way is the same, and therefore the two different definitions of smart power used by the European Parliament and by Ernest Wilson are still twins, even though not identical twins.

Nye’s and Wilson’s notion of smart power has also been echoed by Parag Khanna, who described the EU as a ‘metrosexual power’ that ‘stylishly struts past the bumbling United States on the catwalk of global diplomacy’ (Khanna, 2004, p. 66). The metaphors he presented in the introduction to his article entitled ‘The Metrosexual Superpower’ suggest that his notion of ‘metrosexual power Europe’ is the same as ‘smart power Europe’. He presented the notion of metrosexual power as a reference to an actor that ‘combines the coercive strengths of Mars and the seductive wiles of Venus’ (Ibid.). In this way, Khanna echoed Nye’s and Wilson’s definition of smart power as the ability to combine hard and soft power (Nye, 2004; Wilson, 2008). As a result, Khanna’s discussion of metrosexual power is not about a distinct form of power but about strategy, about combining hard and soft power instead of relying primarily or exclusively on hard power.

Despite the close relationship between the metaphoric definition provided by Khanna and the concept of smart power advocated by Nye and Wilson, in fact Khanna’s notion of metrosexual power is not underpinned by the hard-soft distinction behind the idea of smart power, but by the military-civilian or military-non-military distinction used by François Duchêne (1972; 1973), Hedley Bull (1982), Ian Manners (2002; 2006), Robert Kagan (2002; 2003) and Robert Cooper (2003a, b). The best illustration of this difference is Kahnna's reference to the economic incentives used by the EU as being part of the ‘sensitive side’ of his ‘hard-sensitive’ power equation (Khanna, 2004, p. 66). Nye (1990) placed economic incentives on the hard side of his hard-soft power equation. By contrast, Duchêne (1973) placed economic incentives on the civilian side of his civilian-military power equation. Thus, the idea of metrosexual power can be said to be a variety of smart power that is slightly different from the latter notion because it uses the military-civilian distinction instead of the hard-soft distinction. Nevertheless, Kahnna’s ‘metrosexual power’ and Nye’s and Wilson’s
‘smart power’ are still twins because they are based on the same argument that an actor should use all its power resources to advance its purposes.

While Parag Khanna’s idea of ‘metrosexual power Europe’ is almost exactly the same as Nye’s and Wilson’s notion of ‘smart power’, Peter van Ham’s concept of ‘social power Europe’ is similar to Manners’ idea of ‘normative power Europe’. Peter van Ham described the EU as an actor that relies primarily on ‘social power’ (van Ham, 2010, p. 34), a term more frequently used in the field of sociology (Ibid., p. 3) that van Ham employed as a reference to the ‘ability to set standards, and create norms and values that are deemed legitimate and desirable, without resorting to coercion or payment (Ibid., p. 8). This definition is a clear illustration of how closely linked van Ham’s idea of ‘social power Europe’ is to Manners’ notion of ‘normative power’, defined as the ‘power of ideas and norms’ or the ‘ability to shape conceptions of “normal”’ (Manners, 2002, p. 240). In fact, Peter van Ham himself pointed out that ‘social power’ is another term for what Manners had called ‘normative power’ (van Ham, 2010, p. 35). In other words, van Ham’s ‘social power Europe’ is virtually the same as Manners’ ‘normative power Europe’.

By proposing to use a ‘more sociological’ term instead of a term like ‘normative power’, Peter van Ham made a very important move, because in this way he better grounded the concept behind this term in the fundamental social science field that incorporates political science and international relations as a branch and a sub branch, respectively. This move is important because International Relations and EU Studies are underpinned, like any other discipline concerned with people and social structures, by the fundamental fields of sociology and psychology. The concepts developed and used in subareas like International Relations and EU Studies should be grounded in, or at least harmonised with, the basic sociological and psychological concepts and principles.

Peter van Ham has also been an advocate of using branding techniques to enhance the power of political actors, including states and supranational organisations like the EU or NATO (van Ham, 2001; 2002; 2005; 2008; 2010). Van Ham saw the EU as a ‘master brand’ or an actor possessing significant brand power stemming primarily from its name, policy style and its basic principles, ideas and norms (van Ham, 2008, pp. 11-13) It was in this context that he described the EU as an actor that is ‘morphing from a regional civil power into a more fully fledged global superpower’ and argued that in this process the EU faces a ‘serious branding challenge’ (Ibid., 2008, p. 14). For van Ham, the EU’s main problem as a ‘morphing’ power is that its old image as a civilian and regional power lingers on (Ibid.) and as long as it does so the EU may not be able to bring its influence in line with its new
enhanced status as a full-fledged global power. In other words, the EU has to rebrand itself in order to bring its image into line with its real place on the world stage.

This approach indicates that van Ham’s idea of ‘morphing power Europe’ is a reference to the changing character of the EU as an international actor. This idea echoes Smith’s and Manners’ concern with the impact of the ‘militarisation’ of the EU on the international role of the EU. Smith (2000; 2005) saw the development of the EU’s military dimension as the death of civilian power Europe, while Manners (2006) interpreted the same phenomenon as the death of normative power Europe. In contrast, van Ham saw the emergence of the EU as a military actor as a ‘morphing’ or transformation of the EU into a full-fledged power that wields both soft and hard power (van Ham, 2008, pp. 11-4). Thus, van Ham’s argument is more closely related to the ideas of Hedley Bull (1982), Robert Kagan (2002; 2003) and Robert Cooper (2003a, b), who contended that the EU cannot be regarded as a real, or full-fledged, power as long as it does not acquire military power. Van Ham’s idea also echoes Nye’s (2004) and Wilson’s (2008) arguments about smart power as a reference to an actor that has the ability to combine both hard and soft power.

One puzzling aspect of van Ham’s argument is the fact that although he describes the EU as an actor that is morphing from a regional civil power into a more fully fledged global superpower, thus suggesting that ‘morphing’ refers only to the phenomenon of adding military means to the existing non-military resources, at the same time he also talks about the EU’s ‘shift’ from soft power to hard power (van Ham, 2008, pp. 11-4). The word ‘shift’ does not suggest the idea of adding hard power to soft power. Instead, it suggests that the EU is morphing from an actor relying primarily on soft power into an actor relying more on military power. If this is what he means, then his reaction to the emergence of the EU as a military actor is the same as the reaction of Smith (2000; 2005) and Manners (2006). That reaction was that the development of the EU’s military dimension amounts to the transformation of the EU into an actor relying primarily on its military means. This reaction is problematic because the EU has been and continues to be under construction and the acquisition of its first military means per se cannot say anything about the future behaviour of the EU. Means do not determine behaviour. The main question is how the EU uses its military means, and for what purposes.

1.5 Conclusion

The review conducted in this chapter shows that the rapid development of the EU as military actor in the first decade of the twenty-first century became a pivotal aspect in the literature concerned with understanding the international role of the EU. The launch of the ESDP
in 1999 triggered an intense debate about the impact of this new process on the two dominant conceptualizations of the EU as international actor, namely civilian power Europe and normative power Europe.

On the one hand, supporters of ideas of the EU as a civilian power or normative power deplored the development of the military dimension of the EU as spelling out the death of both civilian power Europe and normative power Europe. Nevertheless, it is important to note here that not all critics of military power Europe saw the simple acquisition of military capabilities as the main problem. Only Karen Smith argued that any military capabilities were incompatible with the notion of ‘civilian power’. In contrast, Duchêne and Manners suggested, at least indirectly, that the EC/EU could be described as civilian power or normative power, respectively, even after acquiring military capabilities, but only for as long as it was not long on military power or did not give priority to ‘military means and ends’ over ‘civilian means and ends’.

On the other hand, for critics of notions like civilian power and normative power the emergence of the EU as military actor appeared as the birth of the EU as a real power because for them military power was the most fundamental form of power that underpinned any other form of power in the international system. However, Hedley Bull, Robert Kagan and Robert Cooper did not talk directly about the development of the EU as military actor, but rather about the absence or underdevelopment of the EU’s military dimension. In other words, their welcoming of the development of the ESDP as the beginning of the rise of the EU as a true power is only an indirect conclusion. Their focus was on the incompatibility between the notion of power and the absence of significant military capabilities, but this criticism also means that the EU’s incompatibility with the status of power disappears once the EU acquires appropriate military capabilities. Thus, although Bull, Kagan and Robert did not refer directly to the rapid development of the EU as military actor in the first decade of the twenty-first century, on their logic the main significance of this process is the birth of the EU as ‘real power Europe’.

The two main reactions to the development of the EU’s military dimension both centred on the simple acquisition of military capabilities. However, this focus on the simple acquisition of military capabilities is not sufficient for understanding the implications that the development of the EU’s military dimension holds for the character of the EU as international actor. The proponents of both civilian power Europe and normative power Europe did not define these concepts exclusively in terms of means. Both notions have also been linked to certain types of ends, like ‘domesticating relations between states’ (Duchêne, 1973, pp. 19-20) or promoting certain norms (Manners, 2002, p. 236). Yet, the proponents of these
ideas reacted to the development of the EU as military actor by focusing exclusively on means, as if military means, supposedly in contrast to civilian means, have different *intrinsic* ends and it did not matter what an actor did or intended to do with its military capabilities. The only thing that mattered was that it had such capabilities and this was a problem by default. Although coming from a different angle, arguments that describe the development of the EU’s military dimension as the birth of the EU as a real power make similar suggestions. Especially in light of Kagan’s argument (2002; 2003), the development of the EU’s military capabilities can only make the EU move from a psychology of weakness to a psychology of power and an increased readiness to use military means to advance EU influence in the world.

This thesis takes a different perspective and argues that what matters most in the context of the development of the EU as military actor is not the simple acquisition of military capabilities but the ways in which the EU uses or intends to use those capabilities in relation to other actors on the international scene. This argument is based on the social theory of international politics developed by Alexander Wendt (1992; 1999; 2003; 2004) and two major social-psychological frameworks informing it, namely the self-categorization theory formulated by John C. Turner and his colleagues (Turner et al., 1987) and George Hebert Mead’s symbolic interactionism (Mead, 1934).

In Wendt’s world, if the EU is ready to use its military capabilities against the Other, then those capabilities have the meaning of rival capabilities that threaten the Other in the event of a dispute with the EU. If the EU excludes the possibility of using its military capabilities against the Other and at the same time is also ready to use its military capabilities to assist the Other, then the EU’s military capabilities have the meaning of friendly capabilities that serve not only the security of the EU Self but also that of the Other. The way in which the EU defines or uses its military capabilities in relation to the Other is crucial to the international role of the EU and the impact of the EU on the structure of the contemporary international system. The next two chapters provide an outline of the Wendtian perspective that underpins this thesis, structured around the issue of the power of prosocial behaviour in the international system.
Chapter 2: The Wendtian Actor

The arguments discussed in the previous chapter focused on the simple acquisition of military capabilities as a factor that erodes conceptualizations of the EU as civilian power or normative power and promotes instead an image of the EU as a ‘real power’ that is ready to use its military capabilities to advance its own interests on the international scene. This way of looking at the development of the EU as a military actor is undermined by the focus on the simple acquisition of military capabilities because means are not ends and therefore the simple acquisition of military capabilities does not say anything about how an emerging military actor is likely to behave in the international system. A better approach to understanding the implications of the EU’s evolving military dimension for the character of the EU as an international actor is to accept the idea that ends and behavioural patterns are not intrinsic to means, and therefore that what is required is a study of the intended and actual uses of the EU’s new military capabilities. This approach rests on Alexander Wendt’s social theory of international politics, where the focus is on the ways in which actors use or intend to use their military capabilities in interactions with others.

Alexander Wendt is one of the main figures associated with the rise of constructivism in the field of international relations, a radical alternative to conventional International Relations (IR) theory established in the late 1980s and early 1990s especially through the writings of Nicholas Onuf (1989), Friedrich Kratochwil (1989) and Alexander Wendt (1987; 1992) (see Brown, C., 2001, p. 52; Barnett, 2005; Reus-Smit, 2005; Hurd, 2008). Wendt described his social theory of international politics as indebted especially to the work of Richard Ashley (1983; 1984; 1987; 1988), Hedley Bull (1977), and John Ruggie (1983a, b; 1993) (see Wendt, 1999, pp. 32-33). He also stressed the fact that his theory is rooted more in social theory than in IR theory and one of the effects of this situation is that his theory stands outside the traditional categories of IR theory. As a result, Wendt saw his theory as cutting across the traditional cleavages in IR theory between Realism, Liberalism, and Marxism, supporting and challenging parts of each.
In Wendt’s world, the most important question to be asked in the context of the EU’s emergence as a military actor is whether this new military actor is developing into a ‘prosocial’ or ‘friendly’ actor. In light of the Wendtian theoretical framework, an actor behaves prosocially towards another actor when it excludes the use of its military means against the Other even in the event of a dispute and at the same time is also ready to use its military means to help the Other. In this way, a prosocial actor takes the role of ‘friend’ in relation to the Other and at the same time also teaches the Other the same role and thus contributes to the production and reproduction of a Kantian security culture based on the principle of ‘one for all and all for one’. In contrast, a competitive or rival actor does not have any immediate intentions to attack the Other but does not completely exclude the use of its military capabilities against the Other in the event of a dispute. In this way, a competitive actor takes the role of rival in relation to the Other and at the same time also teaches the Other the same role and thus contributes to the reproduction of a Lockean security culture based on the principle of ‘live and let live’.

This chapter is the first part of an outline of the model of the Wendtian prosocial actor that also includes the third chapter. This chapter discusses the model of the Wendtian agent and applies it to the case of the EU, while the next chapter adds the qualifier ‘prosocial’ to the basic model of Wendtian agent. The first section of this chapter discusses the problem of referent objects in the context of Wendt’s social theory of international politics and then applies the solution proposed by Wendt to the case of the EU. The second section turns to the concept of corporate agency and outlines what this means first in the context of Wendt’s discussion about the state as actor and then in the context of discussions about the EU as an international and especially as a military actor. The third section discusses the notion of corporate self and like the other two sections starts by outlining the Wendtian model of the corporate self and then applies it to the case of the EU.

2.1 The problem of referent objects

Wendt focused on the state as international actor because he saw the state as the fundamental unit of the international system, or the structure that makes the states system possible (Wendt, 1999, p. 194). In fact, Wendt applied to the case of the state a more general discussion about organisations as corporate agents or actors. Where he discussed the structure of state agency, he started by pointing out the requirements that any social structure must satisfy in order to be considered a corporate agent capable of intentional action (Wendt, 1999, p. 218). In a later article, Wendt stated explicitly that he saw his model of the state as actor as applying not only to states, but to ‘most of the important actors in contemporary world politics’, including
states, multinational corporations and most non-governmental organisations (Wendt, 2004, p. 298).

Wendt was concerned with providing a conceptualisation of the state as a person, a preoccupation motivated mainly by the fact that the idea of state personhood has a strong presence in social science and IR, as well as in the everyday life of citizens, the media, and policymakers (Ibid., p. 289). ‘Anthropomorphic talk’ about states (for example, ‘the United States wants this’, ‘the United States is interested in that’, and so on) is practiced by scholars, citizens, and policymakers and is essential for making sense of day-to-day international relations (Carr, 1939/1964; Wendt, 1999, pp. 195-6). In fact, Wendt argued, the notion of state personhood is so useful for understanding world politics that it would be a miracle if it did not refer to a real thing (Wendt, 1999, pp. 64-7; Wendt, 2004, p. 290). This contention obviously also applied to other forms of corporate actors, like multinational corporations or non-governmental organisations, which receive the same kind anthropomorphic treatment. In other words, while the notion of state personhood is essential for making sense of everyday international relations, the more general notion of corporate personhood is essential for making sense of the social world in general.

In answering the question of whether or not the state or any other social structure is a person, Wendt focused only on the concept of psychological person, to be distinguished from other notions of personhood, such as legal or moral personhood (Vincent, 1989; Wendt, 2004, p. 294). This idea implies that the state has a Self, understood as the totality of the state’s ‘thoughts and feelings having reference to itself as an object’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 230). The thoughts and feelings in question occur within the minds of the individuals that enact that particular state in everyday life.

However, before defining the state as person and then developing a model of the Self of the state, Wendt needed first to deal with the problem of referent objects, to clarify ‘what the putative object is to which the term “state” is supposed to refer’ (Ibid., p. 199). This was necessary because, as Wendt pointed out, there are at least three significantly different conceptualizations of the state: Weberian, Pluralist, and Marxist (Ibid.). For Wendt, each of the three major conceptualizations of the state was extreme, focusing exclusively on only one major but particular aspect of the state. Wendt tried to widen the definition of the state by taking into consideration all three major elements of the state featured in the three major conceptualizations of the state. More specifically, Wendt used the Marxist conceptualization of the state as a framework for integrating the Weberian and the Pluralist conceptualizations.

This integrative concern notwithstanding, at the heart of Wendt’s definition of the state as a referent object was the Weberian or organizational conceptualization of the state and
this was primarily because this particular conceptualization is the only one among the major three to look at the state as an actor. The Weberian conceptualization of the state is based primarily on Max Weber’s definition of the state as an organization with a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence (Weber, 1925/1978; Poggi, 1990; Tilly, 1990; Mann, 1993; cf. Wendt, 1999, p. 199). The Weberian state is an organizational actor seen as ontologically independent of society. For Wendt, this was the most anthropomorphic of the three major definitions of the state, because the Weberian state has interests, makes decisions, and acts in the world, while at the same time being conceptually independent of the society it governs (Wendt, 1999, pp. 199-200).

Although the Weberian state provided the core of the Wendtian model of the state, the latter also incorporated elements from the opposite perspective, the Pluralist or reductive conceptualization of the state. In contrast to the Weberian state, the Pluralist state is reducible to interest groups and individuals in society (Bentley, 1908; Truman, 1951; Almond, 1988; cf. Wendt, 1999, p. 200). Wendt saw the Weberian perspective as state-centric and the Pluralist approach as society-centric. The Pluralist state is ‘nothing more than “government”, the concrete individuals who head the state at any particular time’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 200).

The integration of the Weberian and Pluralist definitions of the state within the Wendtian state was made possible by the Marxist or structural conceptualization of the state (Althusser and Balibar, 1970; Poulantzas, 1975; Jessop, 1982). The Marxist state is the structure that binds the state as an organizational actor (the Weberian state) to its corresponding society (the Pluralist state) in a relationship of mutual constitution (Wendt, 1999, p. 200). Wendt emphasized the fact that the integrative potential of the Marxist conceptualization of the state comes from the fact that this perspective accepts key assumptions from both the Weberian and the Pluralist definitions. The Marxist state is relatively autonomous from society but not ontologically independent of society, and thus has something in common with both the Weberian state (relative autonomy from society) and the Pluralist state (ontological dependence on society) (Ibid.).

Against this background, Wendt acknowledged the central role of the Weberian state in his ‘book on systemic international politics, which assumes states are actors’ and at the same time sought to ‘supplement’ the Weberian state with elements taken from the Pluralist and the Marxist models. In this way, he arrived at the Wendtian definition of the ‘referent object of “the state”’ as an ‘organizational actor that is internally related to the society it governs by a structure of political authority’ (Ibid., p. 201). Through this process of conceptual integration, or rather supplementation, Wendt also emphasized the distinction between state, society, and the structure of relations between the two of them. This distinction
became even clearer when he suggested using the term ‘state’ to refer to the Weberian state, an organizational actor, ‘state structure’ to refer to the Marxist state, a structure of political authority, and ‘state-society complex’ (Cox, 1987) to refer to the Weberian-Marxist-Pluralist ensemble (Wendt, 1999, p. 202).

Like the term ‘state’, the term ‘EU’ too can be used as a reference to many related but different things and is therefore similarly exposed to the problem of defining the referent object. The term EU can be used to refer to all the individuals who can be described in one way or another as being part of the EU. This maximal definition of the EU as a referent object includes all the individuals that are citizens of the EU, regardless of whether or not they are members of the EU institutions. A more restricted definition of the EU as a referent object makes a distinction between the individuals that make up the EU institutions and other EU citizens. This problem is not affecting only the EU. It is a general problem of any human organisation. In the case of the state too, some definitions refer to the state as the totality of its citizens, while others refer only to the individuals working in state institutions. The same applies to the case of business corporations. The maximal definition includes everybody that is in some way or another part of the corporation, including the management, the workers, and the shareholders. Definitions that are more restrictive take into account only the employees of the corporation. In this context, any theoretical framework or empirical analysis using the term ‘EU’ has to spell out very clearly how it uses this term in order to avoid confusion.

It is important to note here that the case of the EU is further complicated by the use of the term Europe. The term Europe has a long history as a reference to Western Europe as a political, economic, and cultural area distinct from Eastern Europe (Bartlett, 1993, pp. 2-3). Today, this term is used frequently by officials from the EU institutions or from the institutions of the EU Member States as well as by EU citizens more generally to refer to the EU. One prominent example is the EU’s first security strategy, entitled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ (Council, 2003q). This use of the term Europe is not limited to the EU and its Member States. There are also other international actors that use it in this way, including the US. For example, speaking at the EU-US Summit meeting held on 3 November 2009 in Washington D.C., the US president Barack Obama mentioned the Lisbon Treaty as a factor that would further move ‘Europe’ in the direction of integration (White House, 2009a).

Nevertheless, the term Europe also has a wider meaning, as a reference to the European continent. This wider definition includes not only the EU states and societies, but also the non-EU states and societies, including Norway, Switzerland, Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, and others. Turkey is a border case, a state-society complex linked to both Europe and the Middle East. In this wider Europe, the use of the term Europe as a reference to the EU is
not readily accepted. In 2007, when the EU celebrated 50 years since the signing of the Treaties of Rome, the then president of Russia, Vladimir Putin, sent a letter of congratulations in which he also reminded the EU that Europe is not just the EU and that there cannot be a ‘united Europe’ without Russia (President of Russia, 2007).

Putin’s letter highlights another problem that arises from the way in which the EU uses the term Europe. On the one hand, the EU uses the term Europe as a reference to the EU. On the other hand, the EU treaties suggest that the EU may eventually include all the states and societies that can be described as ‘European’. Under Article 49 of the 2006 consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, ‘any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may apply to become a member of the Union’ (Treaty on European Union, 2006). The same expression is also present in the post-Lisbon consolidated version of the same treaty: ‘Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union’ (Treaty on European Union, 2008). There is however the problem that the EU treaties do not define the ‘European State’. At first sight, a European state is a state that is located in Europe, defined as the geographical area between the Barents Sea to the north, the Mediterranean Sea to the south, the Atlantic Ocean to the west, the Ural Mountains to the east, and the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea to the south-east). In the light of this common-sense definition, the only border case is Turkey, because only a small area of Turkish territory is located west of the Bosporus Strait, the conventional geographical feature separating the European and Asian continents (National Geographic Society, 1999, pp. 90-1).

The absence of an explicit definition of a ‘European State’ in the EU treaties has also given rise to a second definition of a European state as a state-society complex that is based on the same political, economic, and cultural principles as the EU Member States. While the common-sense geographical definition of a ‘European State’ puts only Turkey under a question mark, the second, structural, definition of a European state is a lot more controversial because it implies the possibility of unending EU enlargement, to any region of the world, restricted only by ‘cultural’ differences. In contrast to cultural differences, differences in political and/or economic structure can be more or less easily eliminated through reform. This means that EU membership is open to states like the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, because these states share with the EU states the same political, economic, and cultural principles. However, if political and economic differences fade away through reforms, any state with a strong European cultural legacy would fit the definition of a European state. The group of eligible candidates may thus expand to include also states from other regions, like Latin America or Africa.
The EU’s claim to the term Europe seems to find a lot of support also in the academic field of EU studies. Most of the literature concerned with the EU as an international actor uses the terms EU and Europe interchangeably, including the two main concepts developed in this literature: civilian power Europe and normative power Europe (Duchêne, 1971; 1972; 1973; Hill, 1993; 1996; Manners, 2002; 2006; 2008; 2009; Toje, 2008). Another prominent example is the special issue on the EU as an international actor published by the journal *International Affairs* in 2008, entitled ‘Ethical Power Europe’ (Aggestam, 2008).

Nevertheless, some parts of this literature use the term Europe to illustrate the fact that the EU is not an actor in itself and/or is not likely to become one (Bull, 1982; Kagan, 2003). At first sight, this looks like a rejection of the EU’s claim to the term Europe, but in fact, it still recognizes the EU Member States as ‘Europe’. The only difference is that the EU is seen as a group of states and not as an actor in its own right. Ultimately, the EU’s claim to the term ‘Europe’ is not extraordinary. The term ‘America’ functions in a similar way. Although it can be a reference to a geographical and/or political area encompassing both the North-American and the South-American continents, it commonly acts as a reference to the United States. This thesis uses only the term ‘EU’ to refer to the EU. The term appears in this thesis in phrases like ‘civilian power Europe’, ‘normative power Europe’, ‘real power Europe’, ‘military power Europe’ and ‘prosocial power Europe’ to illustrate the connection with the literature concerned with the nature of the EU as an international actor, where the use of the term Europe to refer to the EU is widespread.

Wendt’s definition of the state as a referent object (Wendt, 1999, pp. 199-201) can be adapted to the case of the EU as well as to the case of any other organisation, but in the process of such adaptation, the specifics of different referent objects need to be taken into account. The EU is not a state, at least not yet or at least not in light of the dominant definition of the state. From the point of view of the Weberian definition of the state as an organization with a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence (*Ibid.*, p. 199; Weber, 1925/1978, p. 54), the EU will become a state only if its Member States eventually decide to transfer to the EU all of their competences in the field of ‘organised violence’. That would in effect transfer the monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence from the EU Member States to the EU.

However, this interpretation of the Weberian definition of the state misses some very important details. Max Weber was preoccupied to identify what differentiates states from other organisations, what is the feature of the state that is its essential, distinctive characteristic. His conclusion was the ‘monopoly on the legitimate use of organised violence’ (Weber, 1925/1978, p. 54). Other organisations may engage in organised violence, but their
actions are legitimate only if they have a ‘licence’ to do so from the state. However, reducing
the definition of the state to the state’s most distinctive feature misses the rest of the object
because the state is not concerned only with organised violence. The state is concerned with
the entire public sphere, including the regulation of violence. The regulation of violence may
be the most fundamental function of the state, but it is not the only one and when violence is
under control it is not even a prominent function.

Therefore, a more accurate definition of the state is that of an organisation that
formulates and implements public policy. From the point of view of this wider definition, the
EU appears much more similar to a state because it has competences in many areas of public
policy within its territory. However, it does not have all the competences of a state and in
particular it does not have a monopoly on the legitimate use of organised violence and
therefore, although it shares many features with a state, it does not have all the features of a
state and is not a state.

Nevertheless, the same principles used by Wendt to define the state as a referent object
also apply to the EU and to any other type of organisation. Like the state, the EU or any other
type of organisation has three major elements: a corporate agent or the organization proper,
stakeholders and a structure of relationships that binds together the corporate agent and its
stakeholders. In the case of a state, the stakeholders are the citizens that make up the society
corresponding to that state. In the case of the EU, the group of stakeholders has a different
make-up than in the case of the state. In the case of the state, the stakeholders are the citizens
and their various forms of sub-national social organisations. In the case of the EU, the
stakeholders include the citizens of the EU Member States and their sub-national
organisations, as well as the national organisations themselves, namely the Member States. In
other words, in contrast to a state, an organisation linked to a society, the EU has a dual
constituency: Member States and member societies. As a creation of its Member States, the
EU is linked primarily to its Member States. Through this link, the EU is only indirectly
connected to its member societies, the societies corresponding to the EU’s Member States.
However, the EU also has a direct link to the societies of its Member States, embodied in the
European Parliament.

The three major conceptualizations of the state presented by Wendt (1999,
pp. 199-201), Weberian, Pluralist, and Marxist, can be applied to any other organisation,
including the EU. Like the state and any other organization, the EU appears differently in the
different lights of these three major perspectives. In light of the Weberian perspective, the EU
appears as an organisational actor. This is in fact a more relaxed Weberian perspective that
not focused exclusively on the criteria of sovereignty and the territorial monopoly on the
legitimate use of organized violence. This more relaxed Weberian perspective focuses rests instead on the Weberian view of the state as an organizational actor (*Ibid.*, p. 199). From a Weberian point of view, the EU is related to its Member States and member societies through the functions that it performs for them, but is not reducible to them (*Ibid.*).

A Pluralist view of the EU goes to the other extreme and reduces the EU to interest groups and individuals in society. For the Pluralist perspective, one of the main complications presented by the EU is its double constituency, composed of Member States and member societies. It is not possible to say that the EU is reducible to its Member States and societies, because the Pluralist perspective also reduces the state to interest groups and individuals in society (*Ibid.*, p. 200). As a result, the EU too is reduced to interest groups and individuals in its member societies.

Finally, from a Marxist point of view, the EU appears as the structure that binds the EU and its Member States and member societies in a relationship of mutual constitution (*Ibid.*). While in the case of the state the Marxists talk about the structure that binds the state and its society, in the case of the EU the situation is complicated by its dual constituency of Member States and member societies. The EU is linked to both its Member States and its member societies, while at the same time EU Member States are also linked to their corresponding EU societies.

Wendt’s solution to roll up the three views into one also applies to the case of the EU. The Wendtian model of the essential state presents an ‘organisational actor that is internally related to the society it governs by a structure of political authority’ (*Ibid.*, p. 201). When adjusted for the case of the EU, this model of agency presents an organisational actor internally related to the states and societies it governs (to the more limited extent that it does) by a structure of political authority. The link to the Member States is mainly through the European Council and the Council of the European Union, while the link to the member societies is mainly through the European Parliament. Of course, this definition also has to take into account that the Member States are in turn internally related to their corresponding member societies by a structure of political authority. The structure of the EU is therefore more complex than that of the state, as shown in Figure 2.1 below.
2.2 Corporate agency

The definition of the referent object of ‘the state’ was for Wendt a very important preliminary move that precedes his actual definition of the essential state, based on ‘what all states in all times and places have in common’ (Ibid.). Wendt acknowledged the anti-essentialist criticism that states are social constructions that cannot have any trans-historical, cross-cultural essence, but he defended his ‘minimalist view of the state’ by pointing out that there are ‘significant constraints on what we can plausibly call a state’ and these constraints reveal the trans-historical and cross-cultural essential properties of the state (Ibid., pp. 201-202).

The Wendtian essential state is made of a ‘fuzzy set’ of ‘properties that tend to cohere in homeostatic clusters’ (Ibid., pp. 202-14). Wendt extracted these properties from the three major conceptualizations of the state incorporated in the Wendtian definition of the state as referent object. From the Weberian state he took two properties: ‘an organization claiming a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence’ and ‘an organization with sovereignty’. From the Pluralist state he took ‘a society’ and from the Marxist state he took ‘an institutional-legal order’. The fifth property, ‘a territory’, is common to all three major conceptualizations of the state. Wendt reserved the term ‘state’ only for the Weberian organizational actor, distinct from the ‘state structure’ and from ‘society’. Within Wendt’s framework, the ‘state’, the ‘state structure’, and the ‘society’ form together the ‘state-society
complex’. As a result, the Wendtian state proper is an ‘organizational actor embedded in an institutional-legal order that constitutes it with sovereignty and a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence over a society in a territory’ (*Ibid.*, p. 213). This organisation is linked to its corresponding society through a state structure, but remains distinct from its society.

The monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence, or at least the claim to such monopoly, is the most essential property of Wendt’s essential state, just as it is for the Weberian state, the conceptualization that is at the heart of the Wendtian state. As Wendt put it, ‘control over the means of destruction is the ultimate and distinctive basis of state power, and only this is essential to stateness’ (*Ibid.*, p. 204). This particular feature of the states has given rise to images of the states as ‘specialists in the legitimate use of organized violence’ or ‘protection rackets’ (Poggi, 1990, p. 21; Tilly, 1985; cf. Wendt, 1999, p. 204). Wendt was careful to make a distinction between ‘organized violence’ and other forms of violence, the former being a reference to the ‘coordinated use of deadly force by a group’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 204). The monopoly aspect on the other hand is a centralized or decentralized system of command and control over the various security agencies of a state. The two requirements that matter the most for the constitution of a state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of organized violence are for the coercive agencies of that state to be non-rivals (‘they do not settle their disputes by force’) and unified (‘each perceives a threat to others as a threat to itself’) (*Ibid.*, p. 205). As Wendt pointed out, the first without the second constitutes a ‘security community’ (Deutsch, K. et al., 1957; cf. Wendt, 1999, p. 205). When both requirements are fulfilled, the outcome is a system of ‘collective security’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 205).

One question that was left unanswered by Wendt with regard to the idea of a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence was the question of legitimacy. A legitimate monopoly on the use of organized violence involves not just the ability to maintain the monopoly, but also a right to do so (*Ibid.*, p. 206). One of the difficult cases mentioned by Wendt was that of drug cartels that exercise monopolies of force in the territories they control and at the same time enjoy the willing support of the people they control. Another difficult case invoked by Wendt was that of totalitarian states where people are not free to express their opposition. These illustrative cases suggest that the monopoly on the use of organized violence does not really have to be legitimate for a state to be a state. It only has to be real. In the first example, the state nominally in charge cannot be said to be fully present as a state in the territories controlled by the drug cartels. On the other hand, the drug cartels cannot be viewed as constituting a full state, because they would have to also acquire the other features of a state, not just the monopoly on the use of force. Nevertheless, both the nominal state and
the drug cartels in Wendt’s first example present elements of statehood and therefore are best described as incomplete states.

Wendt’s second example is of a different kind. The totalitarian state where the people do not see its monopoly on organized violence as legitimate is a full state for as long as it can maintain that monopoly. It ceases to be a state only when its power weakens and its monopoly on organized violence is removed by internal and/or external forces. This second example suggests that it is more appropriate to remove the requirement of legitimacy from the definition of the state and make instead a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate states or monopolies on organized violence. Wendt adopted a somewhat different position and proposed to privilege the state’s claim to a monopoly on organized violence and treat that claim as a right until popular opposition makes it impossible to sustain (Ibid.).

The second most essential feature of the Weberian core of the Wendtian essential state is sovereignty and has two aspects or dimensions, one internal and the other external (Ibid., pp. 206-9). Saying that a state has internal sovereignty is saying that the state is the supreme locus of authority in society, while external sovereignty means the absence of any external authority higher than the state. Like in the case of the monopoly on organized violence, Wendt saw the internal sovereignty of a state as something recognized as a right by the corresponding society. In his view, sovereignty is not state autonomy relative to society, but the recognition by the society that the state has certain powers, or authority. This position is problematic in the same sense as the position on the legitimacy of the monopoly on organized violence. An effective totalitarian state still has internal power or authority even if this is not recognized by its corresponding society as rightful. Again, the conclusion is that the question of legitimacy should be taken out from the basic definition of the essential state and used instead to make a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate states rather than between states and non-states.

The question of legitimacy also appears as a central issue in Wendt’s discussion of external sovereignty (Ibid., pp. 207-9). He insisted that this was not an issue of autonomy and highlighted the gap between the right of a state to do what it wants and its ability to exercise that right. This argument presented the same difficulties as the arguments about internal sovereignty and the monopoly on organised violence. A state may have the right to be externally sovereign and at the same time be incapable of exercising that external sovereignty. Does this make it still externally sovereign? A sovereign state incapable of exercising its sovereignty is a sovereign state only in name.

The problems of Wendt’s insistence on legitimacy were also clearly revealed by Wendt himself, when he said that ‘a state can have external sovereignty even if it is not
recognized by other states’ (*Ibid.*, p. 208). In other words, a state can be externally sovereign even without legitimacy. Wendt went even further and said that ‘empirical statehood can exist without juridical statehood’ (*Ibid.*, p. 209). Again, the obvious solution is to set aside legitimacy as a criterion for distinguishing legitimate states from illegitimate states.

This discussion highlights that legitimacy too can be divided, like sovereignty, into an internal and an external dimension, thus creating four major categories of states: states that are legitimate both internally and externally (recognized by both their own societies and by other states), states that are legitimate internally and illegitimate externally (recognized by their own societies but not by other states), states that are illegitimate internally but legitimate externally (recognized by other states but not by their own societies), and states that are illegitimate both internally and externally (not recognized by either their own societies or by other states).

The Wendtian state is linked to its corresponding society through a state structure, or a structure of political authority. For Wendt, state actors are differentiated from their societies, but internally related to them so that when they interact they do so with their societies ‘conceptually “in tow”’ (*Ibid.*, p. 201). Moreover, states ‘are constituted by state structures with political authority over societies, and as such conceptually presuppose their societies’ (*Ibid.*, p. 209). Between the state and its society stands a structure of political authority constituted by the norms, rules, and principles ‘by which conflict is handled, society is ruled, and social relations are governed’ (Benjamin and Duvall, 1985, pp. 25-6; cf. Wendt, 1999, p. 202). And of course, there is the territory. Bringing all these elements together, but from the perspective of the *state* rather than that of the *state-society complex*, Wendt defined his essential state as an ‘organizational actor embedded in an institutional-legal order that constitutes it with sovereignty and a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence over a society in a territory’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 213). To highlight how stripped down his essential state was, Wendt also pointed out what this essential or minimalist state does not imply. It does not imply any particular political system, any particular mode of production, recognition by other states, or undivided sovereignty (*Ibid.*, p. 214). For Wendt, including any extra feature besides the five essential properties means referring to a contingent form of state.

For Wendt, ‘states are people too’ and anthropomorphizing the state is a fundamental requirement (*Ibid.*, p. 215). Although he acknowledged the problems of anthropomorphizing the state (*Ibid.*, pp. 221-4), his claim was that this is ‘not merely an analytical convenience, but essential to predicting and explaining [the state’s] behaviour, just as folk psychology is essential to explaining human behaviour’ (*Ibid.*, p. 221). It should also be noted here how illustrative the sentence ‘states are people too’ is for Wendt’s theoretical framework. It is even
possible to say that the essence of Wendt’s entire social theory of international relations is embodied in two sentences: ‘states are people too’ (Wendt, 1999) and ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ (Wendt, 1992).

Wendt’s definition of what makes a structure an agent or actor, influenced by Buzan (1991), includes three fundamental features: an Idea of corporate agency and a decision structure that both institutionalizes and authorizes collective action (Wendt, 1999, p. 218). Thus, the first requirement of state agency is that the shared knowledge of a group of individuals reproduces an Idea of the state as a corporate person or group Self. With the help of insights from Weber (1925/1978), Gilbert (1989), Bukovansky (1997) and Swales and Rogers (1995), Wendt further divided the Idea of the state as a corporate person into a representation of the state’s members as a ‘we’ or ‘plural subject’, a discourse about the principles of political legitimacy that underpins their collective identity, and collective memories that connect them to the state’s members in the past.

The other two ingredients of state agency are properties of what Wendt called, following French (1984), the state’s ‘internal decision structure’ (Wendt, 1999, pp. 219-21). First, the state’s internal decision structure is required to institutionalize collective action. This implies that ‘individuals take it for granted that they will cooperate’ (Ibid., p. 219). Institutionalization has in turn two sub-elements, centralization and internalization. Centralization consists in a hierarchical system of decision-making that ‘discriminates in favour of some individuals [top officials or principals] over others [subordinates or agents]’ (Achen, 1989; cf. Wendt, 1999, pp. 219-20). In order to achieve institutionalization, centralization has to be accompanied by the internalization of corporate norms into the individuals’ identities and interests. The absence of internalization results in an instrumental attitude towards those corporate norms that involves a constant questioning of the rationality of cooperation and a continuous search for opportunities for free riding.

Besides institutionalization, the internal decision structure of the Wendtian state is also required to achieve authorization (Wendt, 1999, pp. 220-1). Authorization implies that the actions of the members of an organisation, in this case the state, can be attributed to or re-described as the actions of the organisation (French, 1984; cf. Wendt, 1999, p. 220). In other words, ‘individuals’ actions are constituted as actions of a collective’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 221). The rules that specify the relations of authority, dependency, and accountability within an organization transfer the responsibility for individual actions to the collective and in this way, individual members act as representatives or on behalf of the organisation.

This discussion about the ‘essential state’ as the key actor in the international system focuses on only one major function of the state, namely the regulation of organised violence
through its monopoly on the legitimate use of organised violence. This means that the Wendtian model of the state as international actor is centred on the state as military or defence actor and that Wendt’s world is the military world or the world of defence. This aspect is particularly significant when applying the Wendtian model of corporate agent to the case of the EU because the development of the EU as an agent in the external world did not start in the defence field, but in the economic sector. The original objective of the first European Community, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) established in 1952, was a security objective, but the Community itself was primarily economic in nature. This is illustrated by the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950, the official birth certificate of the first European Community and of the later European Union, where the idea of European integration is presented as a means of preventing a new war with Germany (Schuman, 1950). On the other hand, under the ECSC Treaty of 1951, the first European Community was ‘founded upon a common market’ and its main task was to contribute to ‘economic expansion, growth of employment and a rising standard of living in the Member States’ (Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 1951).

It follows that in light of the Wendtian model of corporate agent, with its focus on the military dimension of the state (Wendt, 1999, p. 193), the EC/EU was not a relevant agent for as long as it did not acquire a military dimension. Wendt did not claim that the military field is the only one that matters. He claimed only that this is the most fundamental field of international relations because the regulation of organised violence is the most fundamental problem of the social world at any level. From this point of view, an organisation becomes relevant in the context of the Wendtian theoretical framework only when it also becomes a military actor. In the case of the EU, this happened only at the beginning of the twenty-first century, when the EU declared the ESDP operational, and not when the first European Community was established.

The establishment of the ECSC in 1952 was quickly followed by an attempt to also create the European Defence Community based on a plan proposed by the then French defence minister, René Pleven, but the plan failed (Weigall and Stirk, 1992, p. 75; cf. Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 192). The establishment of the European Defence Community would have created the basis for EU agency in the military field and would have marked the birth of the EC/EU as a ‘real’ Wendtian actor. However, this did not happen and the real first step in the development of the defence dimension of the EU, embodied in the ESDP, came only in 1999, at the Cologne European Council (Council, 1999a). In Cologne, in June 1999, the European Council committed itself to endowing the EU with autonomous
military capabilities and the will to use them (Ibid.). Thus, the year 1999 marked the birth of the EU as military actor and therefore put the EU on the ‘map’ of the Wendtian world.

However, the birth of the EU as military actor has not meant a replacement of the EU Member States as military actors with the EU. In the defence field, an EU Member State can act individually and when it does so, its actions are those of an individual state actor, not of ‘the EU’. The link to the EU is still there, in the sense that everybody else outside the EU knows that that actor is also an EU member, but the action is an ‘EU action’ only indirectly, by association. However, when the Member States meet in the Council of the European Union, the main institutional player in the EU’s defence policy, and decide to take action in this area, that action is an EU action regardless of who puts it into practice. It may be all the Member States, a group of Member States, or even only one Member State. Theoretically, it may even be an external state, doing the job for the EU. It is still an EU action. What matters most is that that action rests on an EU decision and reflects the authority of the EU and not of individual Member States.

One significant complication when defining EU agency is the fact that the EU is under construction. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, both the EU and its Member States are present on the international scene. There are certain fields, like the common commercial policy, where the EU has in effect replaced its Member States on the international stage, but in other areas, in particular in the security and defence field, it is possible to have both EU and Member State actions, even at the same time. However, there is no guarantee that this situation will persist in the future. In fact, logic suggests the opposite. The main value of transferring all national competences in terms of external relations to the EU level is the level of negotiating power that can be achieved in this way. This has already been proven in the area of trade. As the representative of a population of 500 million people (Eurostat, 2009) and an economy with a GDP of EUR 12 trillion (Ibid.), the EU is one of the most powerful actors in global trade negotiations.

Integrating the entire external dimension of the EU to the extent achieved in the trade area would endow the EU, and implicitly its Member States and member societies, with the same level of negotiating power in all areas of international politics. In an international system that includes very large entities like the US and China and other emerging large entities like India or Brazil, a fragmented EU external presence can be very costly. Individually, none of the EU Member States, not even the Big Three, can compare even remotely in size to actors like the US or China. Given this external context in which size matters more and more, it is probably safe to argue that it is only matter of time, maybe a quite long time (another 50 years or more) but still only a matter of time, until the EU
achieves full integration in external policy areas. This would also be in line with the fundamental EU principle of subsidiarity, according to which action in a particular policy area should take place at the level where it can be the most effective. In the case of external relations, it is obvious that this is the EU level.

2.3. Corporate self

The discussion about the requirements of state agency, especially the part about the idea of the state as a corporate actor, emphasizes the fact that the Self of the Wendtian state is a structure of the mind, a structure of ideas or of ‘thoughts and feelings’. Wendt defined the Self more generally as a structure of knowledge or the ‘totality of an individual’s thoughts and feelings having reference to himself as an object’, a formulation that he took from Rosenberg (1981) and Pratkanis and Greenwald (1985) (see Wendt, 1999, p. 230). Understanding the Self of the state as a structure of ideas residing in real individual minds is essential because very often the field of International Relations creates the illusion that states are ‘creatures’ or ‘machines’ or ‘objects’ that are distinct from people and behave differently from people. In this context, it is essential constantly to keep in mind the fact that states are made of people and therefore they are in essence groups of people - organized or structured groups of people, to be more exact. For this reason, state behaviour is human behaviour and attempts to theorise about state behaviour without taking into account the fundamental processes underpinning human behaviour, namely the processes of human psychology, have the effect of undermining the foundations of the discipline of International Relations as a subfield of social science.

Of course, this is not to say that the Wendtian state is only a structure of ideas. Only the Self of the Wendtian agent is a structure of ideas. This structure of ideas comes on top of other structures, including structures of the material kind. The latter include material structures like the bodies of the people that make up a state, as well as the other material objects (for example buildings, vehicles and equipment) that these people use to enact the state. Nevertheless, Wendt focused on the Self of the state as the fundamental source of the state’s behaviour. The material structures are important, but they are given meaning and direction by ideas. Although it is common to hear that ‘ideas do not kill people, bombs do’, in reality it is still ideas that kill people because bombs are ultimately launched by ideas. In other words, it is ultimately the structure that Wendt called the Self of the state that generates the behaviour of the state in question.

Nevertheless, this is not to say that the Self of a state is a structure that is given by nature or independent from the structures around it. On the contrary, the Self of a state, like
the Self of any human being is the product of three major forces. One of these forces is internal and consists in the self-organising processes taking place within the Self. The other two forces are external. One stems from the structures of ideas with which the Self in question interacts in the world out there. These structures include the Selves of other states. The other major external force that shapes a state’s Self stems from the material structures with which the Self interacts in the external world. These material structures include the material structures on which the Self in question supervenes, as well as other material structures, including those underpinning other Selves. However, the effects upon the Self of any external structure operate only through the internal processes of the Self. The Self may resist the pressures exerted by external structures. The impact of the external structures depends on the internal processes of the Self accepting inputs from those external structures. The Self may embrace those external inputs or accept them only reluctantly, but what matters most is whether it accepts them or not.

Once the idea that the Self of a state is a structure of thoughts and feelings is accepted, the next important step is to understand that this structure resides within the minds of the individuals that make up the state. A state receives expression in the form of patterned behaviour, which is in turn the outcome of the individuals that make up that state enacting or giving expression to the Self of the state in the social world. It is important, however, to recall Wendt’s distinction between state and society and his discussion about state-society complexes. This distinction also attracts a distinction between the individuals that make up a state and the individuals that make up the society linked to that state. In the light of these distinctions, the idea of a state-society complex implies two groups of individuals linked together through a structure of state-society relations. The individuals that make up the state are also members of the corresponding society, but the enactment of the state in the social world requires these individuals to behave primarily as members of the state when they function as members/representatives of the state, leaving aside their thoughts and feelings as members of the corresponding society.

As a result, the Self of the state, of that organisational actor that is linked to but distinct from its corresponding society, resides within the minds of the individuals that make up that organisational actor. This group of individuals includes all the employees of the state, of all ranks, but it is further divided into sub-groups that have varying roles in enacting the agency of the state, depending on the context. For example, on the international stage the main individuals that enact a particular state are usually those that make up the presidency of that state and certain departments or ministries, mainly those dealing with foreign affairs, trade, and defence.
The idea that the Self of a state is a structure of thoughts and feelings that resides within the minds of the individuals who enact that state in the social world has the further implication that the Self of the state does not exist in the form of a single or unitary field, but in the form of multiple instances. Each employee of the state carries in his or her mind an instance of the Self of the state. This suggestion echoes quantum theory, but in a somewhat different way than that suggested by Wendt’s moves towards a quantum social theory (Wendt, 2006). The idea that the Self of a state exists in the form of multiple instances echoes the idea in quantum theory that energy exists in the form of multiple packets rather than a single, unitary field. The Self of the state is not a single or unitary ‘field’ or construction either. It cannot be thought of as a field that encompasses all the individual minds that make up that state simply because there is no direct connection between those distinct minds. There is communication between minds, but thoughts that occur within one mind cannot extend directly onto another mind. They can be reproduced within another mind only if transmitted by the mind of origin in the form of sensory stimuli (audio, visual, tactile, or olfactory) through the mediation of mechanical processes in the physical world (writing, speaking, moving and so on) and then taken in by the mind of destination. Discussions about the ‘mind of the state’ or about any other kind of ‘group mind’ are not really discussions about a single and unitary mind, but about many individual minds that reproduce in a more or less accurate form the same minimum set of thoughts and feelings about the group as an object.

Similarly, the EU Self is a structure of the mind that is made of the basic ideas defining the EU as an organisational actor and occurs within the minds of the individuals that enact the EU in the social world. It is important to recall at this point the distinction between the individuals that make up the EU as an organisational actor and other individuals linked to the EU. The latter category includes the individuals that make up the EU Member States and the individuals that make up the EU member societies. The first category, that of the individuals who enact the EU as an organisational actor in the social world, includes first of all the employees of the EU institutions. These are not just the employees of the three main institutions, the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament, but also the employees of other major EU institutions like the European Court of Justice, the European Central Bank, and the Committee of the Regions, as well as the employees of any other institution that is part of the EU’s institutional infrastructure. However, the EU is not enacted in the social world only by the individuals who are its direct employees. The EU is also enacted by individuals who are employees of the EU Member States. In fact, most of the decisions taken at the EU level are put in practice by employees of the EU Member States rather than by employees of the EU institutions. When they act as representatives of the EU, all these people must load in their
minds the EU Self because otherwise, they would not be able to act as representatives of the EU and therefore the EU would not be enacted in the social world.

However, to say that an employee of a state carries in his or her mind an instance of the Self of that state is not the same thing as saying that each employee has a complete instance of the Self of that state in his/her mind or that his/her ‘copy’ of the Self of that state is identical to the copies residing within the minds of the other employees of the state. What matters most is that there is a minimum set of features that is reproduced within each individual instance of the Self of the state. These minimal features are necessary for the patterned behaviour of any social structure, not just in the case of the state. Wendt seemed to argue the contrary, by saying that there is no requirement for the idea of corporate personhood to be in the head of every individual in the group (Wendt, 1999, p. 219). He claimed that this is neither necessary nor sufficient, because corporate actors can believe things that their members do not and because individuals can have common knowledge (defined as actors’ interlocking beliefs about each other’s rationality, strategies, preferences, and beliefs and about the states of the external world - see Ibid., pp. 159-60) and not constitute a corporate actor. According to Wendt, the basic requirement of corporate agency is that individuals accept the obligation to act jointly on behalf of collective beliefs, whether or not they subscribe to them personally. For Wendt, states acquire their causal powers and get reproduced over time through individuals acting on this commitment.

Nevertheless, when individuals accept an obligation to act jointly on behalf of collective beliefs they also import those collective beliefs into their own minds, whether they like it or not. Social structures such as a family or a sporting team cannot display their specific patterned behaviour without their members carrying in their minds corresponding Selves that reproduce the same minimal features. Thus, even the employees that hate their state and are in total disagreement with the collective beliefs underpinning their state have to carry and enact an instance of the Self of the state in order to continue to do their jobs at least at a minimum level.

Of course, at this point it is very important to note the differences between instances of the Self of the state residing in different minds. Beyond the minimum set of features, the Self of the state takes a different form in the mind of the state’s diplomats than it does in the mind of the state’s police officers. The former is the Self of the state as an actor in the international system, the latter the Self of the state as a law enforcer in its corresponding society and territory. This cognitive division of labour made Wendt suggest that the state can be conceptualized as a superorganism, defined as a ‘collection of single creatures that together possess the functional organization implicit in the formal definition of organism’ (Wilson and
Sober, 1989; cf. Wendt, 2004, p. 309; also see Wendt, 2004, pp. 309-11). Wendt emphasized the similarities between the state and the classical examples of superorganisms, the colonies of social insects like ants and termites and some species of bees and wasps (Wendt, 2004, pp. 309-10). Like superorganisms, states are individuals with their own spatiotemporal specificity, are organised into mutually constitutive part-whole relationships, are homeostatic systems, and exhibit some autonomy from the environment. Like superorganisms and in contrast to organisms, states are made up of individuals who do not die immediately as soon as the collective is destroyed and do not engage in genetic reproduction (their reproduction is better described as cloning).

The discussion about the state as a superorganism and the ways in which states and other superorganisms differ from organisms directed Wendt to the conclusion that the physical criterion, namely the skin in the case of organisms, is not appropriate for explaining what makes superorganisms individuals. Following Hegel and his concept of ‘thought organism’ or *Geistesorganismus*, Wendt suggested that the notion of *thought* is a better criterion for defining a superorganism identity. In Wendt’s view, the survival of a superorganism like the state depends on the ‘participation of individuals in a collective thought process (in this case, in a “narrative of state”), whose boundaries are instantiated by the practices that produce and reproduce that process’ (*Ibid.*, p. 311). Nevertheless, any ‘narrative of state’ includes many chapters, and the corresponding collective thought process is structured accordingly. In other words, the individual minds that participate in the collective thought process underpinning a particular state carry around different segments of that collective thought process, but together those individual minds ensure the ‘individuality’ of the collective thought process.

Like the Self of a state, the EU Self does not occur in a complete form in the minds of the people who enact the EU in the social world. The complete EU Self contains all the ideas that define what the EU is and what it does, meaning at least all the ideas contained in the EU treaties. However, the minimum requirement for the enactment of the EU in the social world is that each individual representing the EU in the social world carry in his or her mind all the ideas that define the EU function that the individual in question has to fulfil. For example, individuals working in the area of trade policy need to have in their minds all the basic ideas that define the EU as an actor in the field of trade. However, this functional differentiation may go even deeper and an individual working on the EU’s trade relations with China may carry only ideas that define what the EU is and what it does only in relation to EU-China trade. This functional differentiation of the EU Self across different policy areas reflects the functional differentiation that exists between different units of the EU’s institutional
infrastructure. According to this logic, not even the individuals occupying the top offices in the EU institutions have to carry around a complete EU Self because none of those offices covers all the functions of the EU.

The most prominent functional differentiation within the EU Self is between internal and external policy areas, the latter having its own dedicated title in the EU Treaty (Treaty on European Union, 2008, pp. 28-39). This is not unique to the EU; it is a situation that also applies to all states because they are national political organisations that draw lines or borders between domestic affairs and international affairs. One major effect of this division is to differentiate between the internal/domestic EU Self and the external/international EU Self. Distinguishing an external EU Self, however, does not make it unitary. The functional differentiation that creates functionally different internal and external EU Selves also works within the area of external EU policy.

The most important functional differentiation within the external EU Self is between the security and defence dimension and the economic dimension of the external EU Self. The security dimension stems from the ESDP, while the economic dimension stems from the Common Commercial Policy and the Development and Aid Policy (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2008, pp. 139-40, 141-3). The ESDP is actually embedded within the wider CFSP (Treaty on European Union, 2008, pp. 30-40), but the ‘foreign policy’ dimension has a horizontal nature, spanning both the security and the economic dimensions.

Within each of the two major dimensions of the external EU Self it is possible to make further lower level distinctions. Within the economic dimension, it is possible to distinguish between the trade sub-dimension and the aid sub-dimension. The security dimension incorporates a security/defence distinction that often appears as a civilian/military distinction (Ibid., pp. 38-40). Each of the lowest level functional differentiations provides the basis for a corresponding EU Self. All these distinct EU Selves are inter-related, in the sense that they have in common a basic set of ideas about the EU as an organisational actor, but from an analytical point of view, they remain distinct structures.

From the perspective of Wendt’s social theory of international politics, the most significant EU Self is the military or defence EU Self based on the defence dimension of the ESDP. The military or defence EU Self is made of EU ideas about the EU as an object in the military or defence field of international relations and is carried around in their minds by the EU employees or representatives whose role is to enact the defence dimension of the ESDP. Beyond the EU level, the military EU Self is also present in the minds of employees of the EU Member States because decisions taken at the EU level have to be put into effect not only by the EU institutions, but also by the EU Member States (Ibid., p. 30). Figure 2.2 below outlines
the general structure of the global EU Self and the place of the military EU Self within that structure.

2.4 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to complete the first step in interpreting the development of the EU as a military actor in light of the Wendtian perspective. This first step involved providing an outline of the Wendtian model of agent or actor and applying it to the special case of the EU as international actor and in particular to the sub-case of the EU as military actor on the international scene. Clarifying the referent object of the term ‘EU’ and then providing a model of the EU as actor are essential first steps in any study of the EU as actor or agent. Such studies must start with the definition of the EU as international actor.

The Wendtian model of agent provides the basis for a model of the EU as a corporate actor that is not reducible to its individual members (the EU employees and representatives) and is a real ‘psychological person’ with human attributes such as a Self. The Self is a structure of ‘thoughts and feelings’ and therefore a structure of the mind, but the corporate
Self or an organisational actor like a state or the EU is not unitary and does not occur in a complete form in any individual mind that enacts that state or the EU in the real world. The global EU Self contains an external EU Self and an internal EU Self, and the external EU Self is further divided into an economic external EU Self and a security and defence external EU Self. The latter sub-division also contains the military or defence EU Self and this is the most significant component of the global EU Self in the context of the Wendtian perspective.

Within the corporate Self, Wendt focused on collective identity as the key to the main problem of the contemporary international system, namely the transition to a Kantian culture of ‘one for all and all for one’, because collective identities are sources of prosocial behaviour. Thus, the next step in the process of applying the Wendtian perspective to the case of the EU as military actor is to discuss the concept of collective identity and its main effects. Nevertheless, Wendt’s discussion of collective identity and the related arguments about prosocial actors and their impact on the international system were left underdeveloped. Against this background, the next chapter also represents a direct contribution to the development of the Wendtian social theory of international politics because it picks up the discussion of collective identity were it was left by Wendt and expands it with further insights from the field of social psychology. In this way, the next chapter adds to the Wendtian model of actor presented in this chapter a complete discussion of how actors can support or impede the Kantian transition in the international system. Together, this chapter and the next chapter provide a fully developed model of the Wendtian prosocial actor.
Chapter 3: The Power of Prosocial Behaviour

The previous chapter outlined the Wendtian model of the international actor and applied it to the case of the EU as a military actor as a first step in the process of providing a Wendtian assessment of the implications that the development of the EU as military actor has for the international role of the EU. However, the model of actor outlined in the previous chapter does not say anything about the character of an international actor. That model only explains the concept and conditions of corporate agency and the structure of the corporate Self of an organisational actor. To say that the model of the EU as a military corporate person with a corresponding military Self says anything about the character of the EU as international actor means to fall in the same trap as Smith (Smith, K. E., 2005) and Manners (2006) and assume that means determine ends. Corporate agency means only that a social structure has the capacity to act in a particular field and does not say anything about how a corporate agent is going to act.

To use the Wendtian perspective to answer the question of what the implications of the EU’s emergence as military actor are for the international role of the EU is not reducible to conceptualizing the EU as a Wendtian actor or agent. For this purpose, it is necessary to test the EU against the Wendtian model of prosocial actor. The Wendtian model of prosocial actor builds on the basic concept of actor or agent but also incorporates the notions of collective identity and prosocial behaviour. In Wendt’s world, an actor engaging in prosocial military practices governed simultaneously by the principles of non-violence and mutual assistance takes the role of friend in relation to the Other and at the same time teaches the Other the same role. The role of friend in turn provides the basis for the production and reproduction of collective identities, which in turn are sources of prosocial behaviour. Thus, the Wendtian prosocial actor contributes to the Kantian transition in the international system, which is for Wendt the main challenge confronting the contemporary international system.

Against this background, applying the Wendtian perspective to the case of the EU as military actor requires a second step that adds to the basic Wendtian model of actor the notions of collective identity and prosocial behaviour. The first section of this chapter focuses
on the notion of collective identity, which refers to a real psychological phenomenon that is a major source of prosocial behaviour and plays a pivotal role in Wendt’s argument about prosocial actors and their contribution to the production and reproduction of a Kantian culture in the international system. The second section discusses prosocial behaviour as a process in which the Self learns the role of friend and at the same time teaches the Other the same role and leads to the production and reproduction of collective identities and their associated Kantian culture of international relations. The third and last section of this chapter addresses the methodological implications deriving from Wendt’s model of prosocial actor, used in the subsequent chapters as methodological guidelines for studying the specific case of the EU as an emerging military actor.

3.1 Collective identity

Wendt saw the psychological phenomenon of collective identity as the key to the main challenge facing the contemporary international system, namely the transition from the Lockean security culture of ‘live and let live’ to a Kantian security culture of ‘one for all and all for one’. For Wendt, much of the history of the international system was dominated by the Hobbesian security culture of ‘kill or be killed’, but that was gradually replaced by a Lockean culture of ‘live and let live’, founded by European states in the 17th century (Wendt, 1999, p. 314). Looking at the late twentieth century, Wendt saw a new structural change, a transition to a Kantian culture of ‘one for all and all for one’ (Ibid., p. 314). However, he did not claim that there was an inevitable move of the international system to a Kantian culture (Ibid., pp. 311-2). In Wendt’s view, the transition to a Kantian culture of anarchy is the main challenge facing the contemporary international system and collective identity is the key to this transition because each of the three major cultures of anarchy is based on a particular role and therefore associated with a corresponding role identity (Ibid., pp. 338-9). The Hobbesian culture is associated with the identity of enemy, the Lockean culture with that of rival, and the Kantian culture with that of friend. The continued reproduction of the Lockean culture dominating the contemporary international system depends on international actors that reproduce the corresponding identity of rival. Accordingly, the transition of the international system to a Kantian culture of anarchy depends on international actors producing and reproducing the identity of friend because the role identity of friend provides in turn the basis for collective identity.

Attributing to the state and other corporate actors human properties such as identities was justified in Wendt’s world by the argument that corporate actors are entities with a Self (Ibid., p. 224). Identities are the fundamental construction blocks of the Self, an idea
stemming from the claim that the Self comprises the ‘totality of an individual’s thoughts and feelings having reference to himself as an object’ (Ibid., p. 230). Identities are in essence answers to the questions ‘who am I?’ and ‘who are we?’ Each answer of this kind occurring within a Self constitutes an identity of that particular Self. Identities are inter-subjective phenomena only in the sense that they are outcomes of both internal and external processes. As psychological processes, as processes of the mind, identities are ultimately processes that occur within individual minds, within one mind in the case of identities that refer to only one person and within many minds in the case of identities that refer to groups of persons, including the state.

For analytical purposes, the answers to the question of who the state is, or the identities of that state, can be organized within the structure of the Self in a variety of ways. The most basic distinction of relevance in the context of this thesis is that between international/external and internal/domestic answers/identities. In the case of any given state, the identities of that state as an agent in the international system are answers to the question of who is that state as an international actor. Together, these answers constitute the international identity of that state, which occurs within the larger structure of the Self of that state alongside the state’s internal identity. The latter comprises all the answers to the question of who the state is ‘internally’, in relation to its corresponding society. Some answers to the question of who the state is are relevant in both contexts and therefore can be found in both the international and internal identity of the state. One such example is the answer that a particular state is a democracy, a ‘type identity’, as Wendt would call it, that is relevant not only internally, but also within the framework of the international system.

In defining identity, Wendt started with the ‘philosophical’ definition of identity as ‘whatever makes a thing what it is’, which he found to be too broad (Ibid., p. 224). He preferred instead to treat identity as a ‘property of intentional actors that generates motivational and behavioral dispositions’ (Ibid.). In another place, Wendt referred to identity as a ‘script or schema about who we are and what we should do in a certain context’ (Ibid., p. 230). Wendt saw identity as an inter-subjective phenomenon, in the sense that although it is rooted in an actor’s self-understandings, at the same time the meaning of those understandings often depend on other actors understanding the actor in question in the same way (Ibid., p. 224). As Wendt put it, ‘identities are constituted by both internal and external structures’ and thus are made of ‘two kinds of ideas’, ‘those held by the Self and those held by the Other’ (Ibid.). Nevertheless, these statements cannot be accepted as meaning that the identity of an actor is located anywhere except within that actor. Although it is the product of ideas held by the Self and ideas held by the Other, an identity ultimately occurs only within the Self, not
within both the Self and the Other. Individual minds do not have direct access to other minds and therefore ideas occurring within one mind cannot directly extend to another mind.

It is important to note from the outset that Wendt’s discussion identity was incomplete, to the point of becoming confusing to some of Wendt’s critics (see for example Zehfuss, 2001). Wendt built his own typology of identities on several existing other typologies (McCall and Simmons, 1978; Hewitt, 1989; Fearon, 1997; cf. Wendt, 1999, p. 224), which he described as not being ‘entirely compatible’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 224). Moreover, Wendt acknowledged the fact that his own typology of identities was not exhaustive and explicitly stated that he did not pretend that his definitions were definitive. As a result, he described his discussion of identity as ‘only a first cut’ (Ibid.). Nevertheless, some of his critics have looked at it as a final cut and have become worried about the apparently ‘dangerous liaison’ between identity and constructivism (Zehfuss, 2001).

The personal or corporate identity is the most fundamental form of identity in Wendt’s framework, because it provides a platform or site for the other kinds of identities. For Wendt, personal or corporate identities are ‘constituted by the self-organizing, homeostatic structures that make actors distinct entities’ (Wendt, 1999, pp. 224-5). These structures include a material base or ‘body’ (in the case of the state the many bodies of the individuals that make up the state) and consciousness and memory or a ‘sense of I’ (in the case of the state a joint narrative of its members as a corporate actor). The Wendtian agent has only one personal or corporate identity because this identity is the one that distinguishes it as a ‘locus of thought and activity’ separate from other agents. The term separate is crucial here. It has to be understood strictly: separate from other actors does not mean different from or opposite to other actors. Two distinct actors may be similar or even identical, but they would still be separate. Talking about two actors being separate entities does not imply that those actors are different or even opposites. The Other is not the ‘Opposite’, it is just the ‘Separate’.

On top of a personal or corporate identity come other kinds of identities. Wendt’s notion of ‘type identity’, a term borrowed from Fearon (1997), refers to a ‘social category or “label applied to persons who share (or are thought to share) some characteristic or characteristics, in appearance, behavioural traits, attitudes, values, skills (e.g. language), knowledge, opinions, experience, historical commonalities (like region or place of birth), and so on”’ (Fearon, 1997, p. 14; cf. Wendt, 1999, p. 225). In the world of states, Wendt equated the notion of type identity with ‘regime types’ or ‘forms of state’ (Cox, 1987; cf. Wendt, 1999, p. 226). An actor can have only one personal or corporate identity, but it can carry many type identities at the same time.

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A role identity is constituted by a position in a social structure and by behavioural norms towards Others that possess relevant counter-identities (Wendt, 1999, p. 227). Wendt’s examples include professors and students, and masters and slaves. For Wendt, professor and student or master and slave are ‘positions in a stock of collective knowledge’ (Ibid.). In the case of the states, Wendt equated the notion of role identity with that of ‘foreign policy role’ (Holsti, 1970; Walker, 1987; cf. Wendt, 1999, p. 227). At the same time, he did not agree with the presumption that the concept of role implies normative integration and cooperation, because shared ideas can be conflictual or cooperative and therefore ‘enemy’ can be as much a role identity as ‘friend’.

The final kind of identity addressed by Wendt is what he called ‘collective identity’ and represents a fundamental component of the Wendtian model of prosocial agent (Wendt, 1999, pp. 229-30). Wendt also used the term ‘identification’ to refer to the same phenomenon. Somewhere else, Wendt referred to collective identity as ‘identification with the welfare of others’ (Ibid., p. 106). These terms refer to a ‘cognitive process in which the Self-Other distinction becomes blurred and at the limit transcended altogether’ (Ibid., p. 229). It is a process that involves ‘extending the boundaries of the Self to include the Other’, is issuespecific and rarely total. Collective identities are underpinned by role and type identities, but are not reducible to the latter kinds of identities. As Wendt pointed out, like role identities collective identities too involve incorporating the Other into the Self, but while role identities do this in order to enable the Self and the Other to play different roles, collective identities do the same in order to merge them into a single identity (Lancaster and Foddy, 1988; cf. Wendt, 1999, p. 229). Collective identities also build on type identities, because they too involve shared characteristics, but not all type identities are collective identities because they do not necessarily involve ‘identification’. These considerations led Wendt to a definition of collective identity as a ‘distinct combination of role and type identities, one with the causal power to induce actors to define the welfare of the Other as part of that of the Self, to be “altruistic”’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 229).

A major effect of Wendt’s typology of identities is to make important distinctions within the international identity of the state, meaning among the answers to the question of who the state is as an international actor. Wendt’s different kinds of identities are different kinds of answers to the question of who a state is on the international stage. For example, in the case of the US the most basic answer to the question of who that state is on the international stage is the answer ‘the US’. This answer constitutes the corporate identity of the state called the US on the international stage and provides, as indicated by Wendt, a platform for other kinds of identities. The other identities include answers such as those suggested by
Wendt, namely ‘a democracy’ (type identity), a ‘hegemon’ (role identity), or a ‘member of the West’ (a collective identity).

However, it is important to keep in mind the fact that a state has only one corporate identity, but can have many type, role, and collective identities. Besides being a democracy, the US is also a capitalist state. Besides being a hegemon, the US is also an ‘economic engine’. And the US is not just a member of the West, but also a member of the United Nations, a member of NATO (an identity that is included within the larger identity of member of the West), a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), and a member of the Anglophone world. The identities that make up the overall international identity of the US are as many as the self-descriptions of the US as an international actor.

In the context of the Wendtian model of prosocial actor the main focus is on collective identity because of its potential to induce actors to be ‘altruistic’ and the implications of this potential for the structure or political culture of the international system. However, Wendt’s definition of collective identity suffers from the same problem as his entire discussion of identity. It is just a ‘first cut’ and not a ‘definitive definition’ (Ibid., p. 224). Thus, the term identification is arbitrarily restricted to situations in which one person or a group of persons identifies with another person or group of persons. However, the term identification can also refer to the process of identifying an object, which can be the Self as well as the Other and can be anything, including a living organism or inert matter or a social structure. It is obvious that in Wendt’s definition the term identification refers only to a situation in which one actor (the Self) feels or thinks that it is the same with another actor (the Other).

Moreover, in Wendt’s definition of collective identity identification involves a blurring or even the transcendence of the Self-Other distinction. The problem is that in Turner’s self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), the main theoretical framework informing Wendt’s notion of collective identity, there is nothing to suggest this kind of blurring. The term ‘categorization’ in self-categorization theory refers to self-representations that place the Self in certain groups and not in others. Being placed in one particular group does not involve any blurring of the distinction between Self and other members of the same group. The process of categorization does not involve the unification of Self and Other into a new single Self, but the unification of Self and Other within the same Group. Within the group, Self and Other remain distinct realms.

Taking into consideration the confusion generated by the fact that Wendt’s definition of collective identity is just a ‘first cut’, it is necessary to step beyond his definition and look at the main concept that informs Wendt’s notion of collective identity, namely the concept of
social identity that is at the centre of Turner’s self-categorization theory (Ibid.). Wendt directly linked his definition of collective identity to social identity theory. In the footnote associated with the term ‘collective identity’, he mentioned that this term ‘is also known as “social identity” in the social identity literature’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 229). But then, he went on and became even more precise (the ‘social identity literature’ is a very wide realm) and associated his notion of collective identity with Turner’s self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987). He did this almost explicitly, because he defined the process of ‘identification’, or ‘collective identity’, as a process in which ‘the Self is “categorized” as Other’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 229). The term ‘categorized’ is the ultimate direct link between Wendt’s notion of collective identity and Turner’s concept of social identity, or social identification to be more exact.

Self-categorization theory is a highly prominent theoretical framework from the discipline of social psychology, where together with another key theoretical framework, social identity theory, it forms what has become known in the field of social psychology as the social identity perspective or approach (Haslam, 2004, pp. 17-39). Although commonly referred to as a unitary approach, the social identity perspective in fact comprises two related but distinct theoretical strands: social identity theory (SIT), developed primarily through the work of Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner (Tajfel, 1972; 1974; Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Turner, 1975; cf. Turner, 2000/2004, p. xviii), and self-categorization theory (SCT), elaborated mainly by John C. Turner and his colleagues (Turner, 1978; 1982; 1985; Turner et al., 1987; cf. Turner, 2000/2004, p. xviii). One point that is important to note here is Turner’s insistence that the term ‘approach’, or perspective for that matter, should not obscure the fact that social identity theory and self-categorization theory are not ‘merely ways of thinking’, but ‘theories’ that ‘comprise a set of core, interrelated assumptions and hypotheses that lead to specific, testable and novel predictions’ (Turner, 2000/2004, p. xix).

As Turner (2000/2004), Hogg (2003) and Haslam (2004) noted, the social identity approach has had considerable impact on the field of social psychology and beyond. Turner (2000/2004, p. xvii) noted a rapid growth of interest, during the last decade of the twentieth century, in applying social identity ideas to the problems of organisational psychology. He also stressed that the two theories that form the social identity approach had generated a ‘vast amount’ of empirical work not only in social psychology but also beyond and had been stimulating ‘more work than they had ever done before’ in a broad variety of areas, including intergroup relations, stereotyping, group processes, social influence, language and communication, social cognition and the self-concept (Ibid., p. xviii). In a similar vein, Haslam (2004, p. 27-28) noted the continuing considerable impact of social identity theory on
the field of social psychology and also highlighted the gradual spread of the influence of this theory from the restricted areas of group antagonism and social competition to a ‘broad array of topics’ that included prejudice, stereotyping, negotiation and language use. Like Turner (2000/2004, p. xvii), Haslam noted the increase in interest in social identity ideas during the last years of the twentieth century and the early years of the twenty-first. Haslam (2004, p. 27) detected the influence of social identity theory ‘around the world’ and in areas within and beyond organisational psychology, including clinical and health psychology, linguistics, political science and even theology (Esler, 2000).

Wendt’s social theory of international politics, in particular through his model of prosocial actor, is another major example of the spread of the influence of the social identity approach, and especially of self-categorization theory in this case, beyond the field of social psychology. In Social Theory of International Politics, Wendt explicitly linked his notion of collective identity to Turner’s concept of social identity (Wendt, 1999, p. 225). It is true that later on Wendt also associated his notion of collective identity with other ‘cognates’, thus suggesting that his concept of ‘collective identity’ and other notions such as ‘social identification’ (Turner et al., 1987), ‘we-feeling’ (Deutsch et al., 1957), ‘solidarity’ (Markovsky and Chaffee, 1995), ‘plural subject’ (Gilbert, 1989), ‘common in-group identity’ (Gaertner et al., 1993), ‘thinking like a team’ (Sugden, 1993) or ‘loyalty’ (Oldenquist, 1982) were all interchangeable (Wendt, 1999, p. 305). Nevertheless, the section of the book specifically dedicated to discussing the different types of identities, including collective identity, draws only on social identity theory and self-categorization theory. Moreover, Wendt’s contention that ‘collective identities’ or ‘social identities’ have the causal power to induce actors to define the welfare of the Other as part of that of the Self or, in other words, to be ‘altruistic’ (Ibid., p. 229) rests on the key hypotheses of self-categorization theory.

The concept of social identity that informs Wendt’s notion of collective identity rests on a set of fundamental assumptions, some of which are general assumptions of social psychology, while others are more specific to self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987, p. 44). At the more general level is the social-psychological assumption that the self-concept may be defined as the ‘set of cognitive representations of self available to a person’ (Ibid.). At the more specific level, self-categorization theory assumes that cognitive representations of self take the form, amongst others, of self-categorizations, or ‘cognitive groupings of oneself and some class of stimuli as the same (identical, similar, equivalent, interchangeable) in contrast to some other class of stimuli’ (Ibid.). Another major element specific to self-categorization theory is the assumption that there are at least three levels of abstraction of
self-categorization relevant for the social self-concept: superordinate, intermediate and subordinate (Ibid., p. 45).

Turner’s notion of social identity refers to the intermediate level of abstraction of self-categorization, which comprises ‘ingroup-outgroup categorizations based on social similarities and differences between human beings that define one as a member of certain social groups and not others’ (Ibid.). In contrast, the highest level is the superordinate level of the self as human being and includes self-categorizations based on ‘common features shared with other members of the human species in contrast to other forms of life’ (Ibid.). At the other end, the lowest level of abstraction is the subordinate level of the self as a specific individual person and contains self-categorizations based on ‘differentiations between oneself as a unique individual and other ingroup members’ (Ibid.). It is also important to note here that due to the fact that the term is used to designate a psychological mechanism or process, there is a preference in the self-categorization theory literature to use the phrase ‘social identification’ instead of ‘social identity’ (Ibid., pp. 45-46).

Besides taking a close look at the features of Turner’s concept of social identity, it is also necessary at this point to distinguish it from other notions of social identity. It is important to do so because the term identity suffers from the fact that almost every field of the social sciences and the humanities has a concept of identity that applies to few other fields or to that field alone. As de Levita (1965, p. 2; cf. Vryan et al., 2003, p. 367) put it, ‘it is possible that in every particular set of statements that deserves the name “theory” we could define a concept of identity which has a meaning for that theory, and that theory alone’. The same also applies to the situation of the term ‘social identity’ across the social sciences and the humanities. As Thoits and Virshup (1997) noted, the concept of social identity has been used to convey a wide array of meanings in the social psychological literature. A similar observation came from Marilynn Brewer, who referred to social identity as a concept that has been ‘invented and reinvented across the social and behavioural sciences’ (Brewer, 2001, p. 115).

Within the taxonomy devised by Thoits and Virshup (1997), Turner’s concept of social identity falls within the group labelled ‘collective identities’ or ‘we’s’. Thoits and Virshup conceptualized we’s as ‘identifications of the self with a group as a whole’ (Ibid., p. 106). Collective identities in turn were distinguished from ‘individual identities’ or ‘me’s’, understood as ‘identifications of the self as a certain kind of person’ (Ibid.). Thoits and Virshup (1997, p. 107) also illustrated this distinction by referring to the difference between answers to the question ‘Who are we?’, which are forms of ‘collective identities’ or ‘we’s’, and answers to the question ‘Who am I?’, which embody ‘individual identities’ or ‘me’s’. 73
Building on previous reviews, including that by Thoits and Virshup (1997), Marilynn Brewer (2001) proposed four different terms to distinguish between the different meanings of the concept of social identity. Like Thoits and Virshup (1997), Brewer differentiated between we-type and me-type identities and placed Turner’s notion of social identity in the first group. Thus, Turner’s concept of social identity is in the group labelled ‘group-based social identities’, which includes ‘perceptions of self as an integral part of a larger group or social unit’ (Brewer, 2001). However, in contrast to Thoits and Virshup (1997), Brewer made a further distinction between ‘group-based social identity’ as identification with a collective and ‘collective identity’ as the ‘norms, values, and ideologies that such identification entails’, or in other words the contents of that ‘group-based social identity’ (Brewer, 2001, p. 119). It is thus possible, in the context of Brewer’s taxonomy, to conceptualize Turner’s idea of social identity as a container-type identity and Brewer’s notion of collective identity as the contents of that container.

When discussing the concept of collective identity/social identity in the context of the international system it is also important to note that Realism, the theoretical framework still dominating the field of International Relations, sees states as egoists or self-interested by definition and claims that to think of them as capable of developing collective identities and prosocial behaviour is naive or even dangerous (Wendt, 1999, pp. 238-43). Wendt used his experimentally-backed discussion of collective identity and its effects to attack this Realist claim and he started by highlighting the paradox of this claim. For Wendt, the corporate identity of a state depends on a collective identity below the level of the state, among the individuals that make up that state (Ibid., pp. 229-30). As Wendt put it, ‘it is only in the virtue of the most thoroughly social individual identity (collective identity) that the anti-social identity of the “Realist” state is possible in the first place’ (Ibid., p. 230). Thus, to say that states are fundamentally self-interested and cannot develop collective identities is to say that for some unknown reason human behaviour changes suddenly and totally when it reaches the level of the state. In other words, human beings are capable of developing collective identities at the level of family, local community, region and so on, including at the level of the state, but not beyond the level of the state.

3.2 Collective identity and prosocial behaviour

In Wendt’s world, collective identity is the key to the transition of the contemporary international system from a Lockean security culture of ‘live and let live’ to a Kantian security culture of ‘one for all and all for one’. However, the link between collective identity and that international transition is prosocial behaviour. In Wendt’s world, the Kantian
transition depends on collective identities because collective identities induce the actors carrying them to behave prosocially or cooperatively towards other actors. Collective identity in turn rests on the role identity of friend, defined by Wendt as an actor that does not only exclude the use of violence in relation to the Other, but is also ready to use its military resources to help the Other (Ibid., pp. 298-9). Finally, the role identity of friend is associated with prosocial behaviour. When an actor follows the two principles of friendship, non-violence and mutual assistance, that actor takes the role of friend in relation to the Other and at the same time also teaches the Other the same role and contributes the production and reproduction of the Kantian culture of ‘one for all and all for one’.

In support of his contention that collective identity has the causal power to ‘induce actors to define the welfare of the Other as part of that of the Self, to be “altruistic”’ (Ibid., p. 229), Wendt invoked ‘substantial experimental support’ (Caporael et al., 1989; Dawes et al., 1990; Kramer et al., 1995; cf. Wendt, 1999, p. 229). This substantial experimental support comes mainly from more than three decades of extensive empirical research in the general social identity tradition (Oakes, Haslam and Turner, 1994; Turner, 1991; Turner et al., 1987; cf. Simon, 2004, p. 39; Haslam, 2004). Wendt’s claim that collective identities are sources of prosocial or cooperative behaviour rests on the key hypotheses of Turner’s self-categorization theory. These hypotheses posit that one of the major effects of the psychological process of social identification (what Wendt called ‘collective identity’) is to increase the predisposition of the Self to cooperate with the Other.

According to self-categorization theory, the psychological process of social identification tends to increase the perceived identity between self and ingroup members (Turner et al., 1987, p. 50). This perception of identity between self and ingroup members leads to a perceived identity of interests in terms of the needs, goals and motives associated with ingroup membership, which in turn implies an empathic altruism and an empathic trust (Ibid., p. 65). The former involves perceiving the goals of other ingroup members as one’s own, while the latter induces assumptions that other ingroup members share one’s own goals (Ibid.). Self-categorization theory further suggests that a shared and mutual perception by ingroup members of their interests as interchangeable will result in intragroup cooperation (Ibid.). This suggestion underpins the hypothesis that processes of social identification tend to increase the level of intragroup cooperation (Ibid.).

There is no illustration of the link between social identity and social cooperation or altruism that is more powerful than the so-called minimal group studies conducted by Henri Tajfel and his colleagues and others during the 1970s (Tajfel et al., 1971; Billig and Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel, 1978a, c, d; Brown, R. G., 1978; cf. Haslam, 2004, p. 18). The design of
the first study, by Tajfel et al. (1971), involved the creation of groups that were as stripped-down and meaningless as possible, followed by the gradual addition of meaning until the first signs of discrimination could be detected. Participant schoolboys were told that they were assigned to one of two groups on the basis of simple criteria such as their estimation of the number of dots on a screen or their preference for the paintings of Klee or Kandinsky, but the actual distribution was in reality random. Participants were then asked to distribute small amounts of money to an anonymous member of the ingroup and to an anonymous member of the outgroup. Participants were not asked to distribute money to themselves. Haslam noted that this particular aspect eliminated the influence of individual self-interest and personal economic gain (Haslam, 2004, p. 18). The results revealed an inclination of participants towards ingroup favouritism, in the form of a tendency to choose rewards that implied more money to people identified as ingroup members.

A second study by Tajfel et al. (1971) that built on the original minimal group study was even more revealing. In the second experiment, participants were presented with a range of pairs of rewards from which to choose (Ibid.; cf. Haslam, 2004, pp. 18-19). Each pair of rewards specified two small amounts of money, one for an anonymous member of the ingroup and the other for an anonymous member of the outgroup. This time, the results revealed not only an inclination towards ingroup favoritism, but also a tendency towards the maximization of the difference between groups in a way that favoured the ingroup member (Ibid.). As Haslam (2004, p. 19) put it, the main driver behind the behaviour of participants seemed to be not a desire to maximize the absolute gain of the ingroup member, but a desire to maximize the relative gain of the member of the ingroup over the member of the outgroup. This was not a strategy of ‘doing well as such’, but one of ‘doing better than the other group’ (Ibid.).

Haslam (2004) highlighted that similar results have also come out of real life studies, not only laboratory experiments. One such real life study recounted by Haslam (2004, p. 19) was a study by Brown (Brown, R. G., 1978), focusing on the employees of an aircraft engine manufacturing company. Similar to the second minimal group study by Tajfel et al. (1971), Brown’s real life group study showed that the workers’ primary concern during wage negotiations was with the preservation of wage differentials between different categories of employees rather than with increasing their own absolute gains. Most employees were keen to maximize the difference between their wages and those of less skilled workers and, at the same time, to minimize the difference between their wages and those of more skilled workers. An illustrative example of the consequences of this behaviour was the case of the employees with the highest levels of skill, who awarded themselves less pay than they were awarded by
the other groups and, at the same time, awarded the other groups much less than those groups awarded themselves (Brown, R. G., 1978; cf. Haslam, 2004, p. 19).

The main effect of the original minimal group studies and the other studies inspired by them was to suggest that the simple categorization of individuals into members of one group or another is sufficient to induce them to displaying ingroup favouritism (Turner, 1975; Tajfel, 1978b; cf. Haslam, 2004, p. 19). Subsequent studies continued to test various aspects of the minimal group studies in order to see whether the findings could be replicated or whether factors other than simple categorization were in play. Over the years, such studies have repeatedly reconfirmed that the existence of an ingroup-outgroup division is the only necessary and sufficient prerequisite for ingroup favouritism (Doise et al., 1972; Bilig and Tajfel, 1973; Brewer and Silver, 1978; Oakes et al., 1994; Bourhis, Turner and Gagnon, 1997; cf. Haslam, 2004, pp. 19-20).

Prosocial or cooperative behaviour has in turn the effect of stimulating the production and/or reproduction of the same collective identity at the level of both Self and the Other. This effect of prosocial behaviour propagates through the processes of symbolic interaction. This part of Wendt’s theory is informed by another major theoretical framework from the field of social psychology, namely the symbolic interactionist tradition rooted in the work of George Herbert Mead (Mead, 1934; Blumer, 1969; Stryker, 1980; cf. Wendt, 1999, p. 327). Wendt made an explicit link between his theory and Mead’s theory when he presented Mead’s framework and the symbolic interactionism derived from it as a ‘rich framework for thinking about how identities and interests are learned in social interaction’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 327).

The fundamental principle underlying the Meadian model of social learning is the principle of reflected appraisals or mirroring: ‘actors come to see themselves as a reflection of how they think Others see or “appraise” them, in the “mirror” of Others’ representations of the Self’ (Ibid.). Thus, the principle of reflected appraisals generates the hypothesis that if the behaviour of the Other represents the Self as an enemy, then the Self is likely to internalize the role of enemy into its own identity. An important aspect of this principle is the fact that it refers to the perceptions of the Self regarding the Other’s representations of the Self. This is very important because there is a risk of interpreting the principle of reflected appraisals as referring to the real representations of the Self in the minds of Others. This would require the Self to know exactly what is in the head of the Other. The real meaning of this principle is that learning to see oneself in the mirror of Other’s representations of the Self relies in fact on guesswork influenced mainly by the ‘gestures’ of the Others. And, as with any guesswork, the degree of correspondence to reality can vary.
To illustrate the principle of reflected appraisals, Wendt used the conventional symbolic interactionist model of a ‘conversation of gestures’ between two actors, Ego and Alter, meeting in a First Encounter, a world without shared ideas (Mead, 1934; Wendt, 1999, pp. 328-31). This model uses the terms Ego and Alter in the same way in which this thesis uses the terms Self and Other. They are only references to two separate actors. The Ego-Alter and Self-Other distinction does not imply any fundamental difference or opposition, only separate entities. Moreover, references to Alter or to the Other are not necessarily universal references to every other actor, but only references to another actor in a particular interaction. In the context of this thesis, the Ego-Alter or Self-Other discussion could be as well presented as a discussion about actor A and actor B in the context of a particular interaction or ‘conversation of gestures’.

The assumption of a world without shared ideas implies that Ego and Alter do not share representations. Nevertheless, they bring with them preconceived ideas about who they are, and implicitly who the Other is, and these representations represent the starting point for their interaction. These preconceived or preliminary representations of Self and Other provide the basis for Ego and Alter each to construct a ‘definition of the situation’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 329). Any representation of Self and Other, no matter if it is preconceived or not, involves assigning a role to the Self in relation to the Other. This aspect of the process has been labelled ‘role-taking’ (Turner, 1956; Schwalbe, 1988; cf. Wendt, 1999). It is a process of ‘choosing from the available representations of the Self who one will be, and thus what interests one intends to pursue, in an interaction’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 329). The process of role-taking goes hand in hand with the process of ‘alter-casting’ (Weinstein and Deutschberger, 1963; cf. Wendt, 1999, p. 329). The two processes are inseparable because roles are ‘internally-related’ and therefore when Ego assigns a role for itself it also implicitly assigns a role to Alter (Wendt, 1999, p. 329). Wendt illustrated this with examples such as a trader and someone to trade with, a proselytizer and a convert, a conqueror and a conquest, or a professor and a student (Ibid.).

The interactionist model breaks the Ego-Alter encounter or social act into four ‘scenes’ (Ibid., p. 330). First, Ego takes some action that reflects its a priori definition of the situation, and this action tells Alter what role Ego wants to take in their interaction and what is the corresponding role for Alter. As Wendt put it, ‘Ego is trying to “teach” Alter its definition of the situation’ (Ibid.). However, this should not be taken to mean that Ego has the intention to teach Alter its definition of the situation, as Wendt’s argument seems to suggest. Such an ‘attempt’ to teach the Other one’s own definition of the situation is present in any social interaction. It can be a real attempt, an intentional action, or an indirect attempt, an
unintentional action. Whether Ego wants this or not, when it acts it conveys signals to Alter about Ego’s definition of the situation. If Alter accepts and goes along with this definition of the situation, it can be said to have learned Ego’s ‘lesson’. In other words, Ego may teach Alter its definition of the situation even when Ego does not want or intend or try to do this.

Nevertheless, Ego’s first gesture in this First Encounter does not extend directly to Alter’s mind. It gets there through the filter of interpretation. In the second scene of the social act, Alter interprets Ego’s action on the basis of both Ego’s signal and its own a priori definition of the situation (Ibid.). When Ego’s action does not fit into Alter’s definition of the situation, Alter is confronted with dissonant information and has two options. It can ignore the dissonant information and stick to its a priori definition of the situation or it can adjust its definition of the situation to accommodate Ego’s action. When Alter chooses the second option, it is said to have learned Ego’s ‘lesson’ about the definition of the situation. However, the definition of the situation learned by Alter is not necessarily identical to that existing in Ego’s mind. Alter’s adjusted definition of the situation reflects Alter’s interpretation of Ego’s action and therefore is influenced above all by Alter’s interpretation skills. If Alter does not make a relatively accurate interpretation in the first social act of this First Encounter, in subsequent acts Ego’s action would still not fit into Alter’s definition of the situation and Alter would be confronted again with new dissonant information and with the two options of ignoring it or continuing to ‘learn’ from Ego.

Assuming that Alter learns something from Ego, in the third scene of the social act Alter takes some action of its own and this action reflects Alter’s newly adjusted definition of the situation (Ibid.). Similar to the first scene, this action is also a signal for Ego about Alter’s definition of the situation. And as in the first scene, someone, this time Alter, ‘tries’ to ‘teach’ somebody else, this time Ego, a lesson about the definition of the situation. As in the case of Ego in the first scene, there is no requirement that Alter have an intention to teach. Alter’s action constitutes a signal about Alter’s definition of the situation no matter whether Alter wants this or not. The only requirement for Alter’s action to be an attempt to teach Ego is for Ego to pay attention - to take Alter’s action into account. The model suggests that there can also be situations when neither Ego nor Alter pays attention to the other’s actions, as well as situations when only one of the two takes into account the other’s actions.

When it does take into account Alter’s action, Ego experiences the same situation as Alter in scene two of the social act. In the fourth scene, Ego interprets Alter’s action in the light of its own a priori definition of the situation and of the information conveyed by Alter’s action (Ibid.). The dissonant information in Alter’s action, that information that does not fit into Ego’s definition of the situation, presents Ego with a choice between ignoring it and
adjusting its own definition of the situation. If Ego does adjust its own definition of the situation to accommodate the dissonant information in Alter’s action, it is said to have learned Alter’s lesson about the definition of the situation. Like Alter’s adjusted definition of the situation from scene two, Ego’s adjusted definition of the situation from scene four does not necessarily reflect accurately Alter’s definition of the situation. Even when both actors learn from each other’s definitions of the situation, the relationship between the two distinct instances of the definition of the situation depends on the capacity of Ego and Alter accurately to interpret the information conveyed by the other’s actions.

Most interactions, including First Encounters, are made of several social acts. After the fourth scene of the first social act of a First Encounter, the cycle starts again. In the first scene of the second social act, Ego takes some action that reflects its newly adjusted definition of the situation from scene four of the first social act. Alter interprets Ego’s new action and may readjust its definition of the situation to accommodate the new dissonant information in Ego’s action. Alter then takes some action of its own, which reflects its newly readjusted definition of the situation from scene two of the second social act. Ego interprets this action and may also readjust its own definition of the situation to fit the new dissonant information in Alter’s action. And so on. If both Ego and Alter learn from each other’s ‘lessons’, eventually they will arrive at the same definition of the situation and each action by one of the them will fit into the other’s definition of the situation.

Nevertheless, the model of an Ego-Alter First Encounter suggests a wide variety of possible evolutions of the encounter. It is possible that both actors learn from each other’s lessons about the definition of the situation and eventually arrive to the same definition and each actor’s action will fit both actors’ definition of the situation. However, the model suggests that it is also possible for neither Ego nor Alter to be willing to learn the other’s lesson about the definition of the situation. This brings forth the question of the role of power in the social act. In light of the Wendtian perspective, power relations are the determinants of the direction in which the learning taking place in the social act unfolds (Ibid., p. 331).

At the extremes, one of the two actors learns everything from the other’s lesson about the definition of the situation while the other learns nothing from the first actor’s lesson. In interaction, each side tries, intentionally or not, to teach the other its own definition of the situation and they do so by rewarding behaviours that support that definition and punishing behaviours that do not (Ibid.). Wendt’s argument again creates the impression that it is necessary for each party to have an intention of teaching the other party its own definition of the situation. However, that intentionality is not necessary. Even when Ego does not have such an intention, its actions may ‘reward’ Alter’s behavior, unintentionally. Ego’s actions
may benefit Alter, and thus ‘reward’ Alter’s behavior, simply because Alter has brought its definition of the situation in line with that of Ego. In this case, Ego’s actions also confirm Alter’s definition of the situation and therefore constitute ‘rewards’ for Alter’s decision to align its definition of the situation to that of Ego.

As Wendt pointed out, citing Baldwin (1979), what counts as power depends on definitions of the situation (Wendt, 1999, p. 331). In Wendt’s example, if Ego wants to interact with Alter on the basis of trader identities, having more nuclear weapons does not count as power. Of course, this is unless Ego uses its nuclear weapons to threaten Alter into trading with Ego. No matter what counts as power in a particular definition of the situation, what is important is who has more of it. This is important because that actor is also in a better position to teach the other its own definition of the situation rather than having to learn the other’s definition of the situation. This led Wendt to adopt Karl Deutsch’s definition of power as ‘the ability to afford not to learn’ (Deutsch, K., 1968; cf. Wendt, 1999, p. 331). Wendt called an actor that has more of ‘what counts as power’ a ‘significant Other’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 331).

Here the term ‘significant’ should be understood as powerful, not as relevant. It is not a reference to other actors that are relevant in a particular social act. It is a reference to the actors that are powerful in a particular social act. In each of the two main fields of the international system, the security and defence field and the economic field, the power of a particular international actor depends on its capabilities in that particular field. A big economy combined with a weak security and defence capacity makes an actor a power or a significant Other in the economic area, but a ‘flabby giant’ in the security and defence sector (EUobserver.com, 2004). For example, in the European Union’s case the significant Others in the international system include mainly the US, Russia, China, India, Japan and Brazil. These states have large economies or large economic potential and/or large military capabilities or potential. Nevertheless, Russia for example, is a more significant ‘significant Other’ in the security and defence field than in the economic field. China, on the other hand, is becoming equally significant in both the security and the economic areas.

These examples show that it is also possible to make distinctions between different ‘kinds’ of significant Others. Some actors may be significant Others at the level of a region. For example, Indonesia is a significant Other for every other actor in South-East Asia, but it does not hold the same position outside that region. Its significance is less in the wider Asia-Pacific region and even more so beyond that region. In contrast, actors like the US or China are significant Others for every other actor in the international system and could therefore be called global significant Others. It is also true that the US is in fact the only
‘really’ global significant Other and China still an emerging global significant Other. The term significant Other, as used in this context, is not however appropriate for actors that manage to command attention only because they represent problems. An actor like Iran can normally be described as a regional significant Other, but its nuclear program transformed Iran into a global problem. This does not make Iran a global significant Other because, when Iran’s problematic nuclear program is no longer a problem, Iran’s significance will shrink back to the regional level. For this reason, actors that acquire global significance because they pose a global problem should be described as global problem Others and not global significant Others. In essence, they continue to be just regional significant Others.

Of course, the model of an Ego-Alter First Encounter is purely theoretical because there is no such thing as a world without shared ideas. Moreover, it seems that there never has been such a world. Human individuals have always been born into society and therefore have always been exposed from the beginning to shared ideas. Wendt acknowledged that the assumption of a world without shared ideas is ‘unrealistic for most applications’, but he still used it because in his view it helps to highlight the role played in identity formation by the way in which actors treat each other, as well as the fact that the production and reproduction of cultures also involves the production and reproduction of identities (Wendt, 1999, p. 328). Nevertheless, he also suggested that the basic model of the Ego-Alter encounter can easily be extended to situations in which culture already exists. However, it still remains unclear why the assumption of a world without shared ideas is necessary, especially considering the fact that it opens Wendt’s theory to the criticism that it relies on unrealistic assumptions. As Wendt himself pointed out, the model works even if it starts without this assumption. The only difference in the latter case is that, instead of saying that Ego and Alter bring to the interaction preconceived representations of Self and Other based on ideas that they do not share, it is necessary to say that they bring to interaction preconceived representations based on shared ideas. This does not change what happens next. Ego makes a gesture, then Alter responds, then Ego responds and so on, and this conversation of gestures may or may not confirm their preconceived representations.

The argument that collective identity generates prosocial behaviour and prosocial behaviour in turn generates collective identity has the appearance of circularity. It can be read as saying that prosocial behaviour is both an effect and a cause of collective identity. However, this is just an appearance of circularity and nothing more, as will be demonstrated. Wendt was aware of this apparent problem, but treated it as a real problem (Ibid., p. 342). He admitted it as a ‘true’ problem of circular causality and the only reason for which he eventually got over it was because he saw it as ‘benign circularity’. He pointed out that the
‘Crude Law of Social Relations’ (Deutsch, M., 1983) itself was recursive: ‘by engaging in certain practices agents produce and reproduce the social structures that constitute and regulate those practices and their associated identities’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 342). He then went on to say that although agents and social structures are ‘mutually constitutive and co-determined’, the ‘first cause of social life’ is what actors do: ‘We are - or become - what we do’ (Ibid.). It can be argued that what actors do can in turn be caused by certain identities and therefore Wendt’s argument cannot escape the problem of circularity. In fact, it does, because actors may engage in prosocial policies for egoistic reasons. Although their cause may be an egoistic identity, the effect of prosocial policies is still to teach both the Self and the Other the role identity of friend and its associated collective identity.

In reality, there is no circularity in this argument, only sequentiality. Wendt’s representation of this process as a circle ignores a crucial factor: time. Once time is taken into consideration, the process of collective identity production and reproduction appears as a sequence. Bernd Simon (2004, p. 2) described identity as a ‘social psychological mediator in people’s experiences and behaviours in the social world’ and emphasized that this must not be understood as a logical circularity, but as a causal chain. Identity processes receive input from interaction in the social world and then, only then, provide output in subsequent interactions in the social world. There may be an appearance of simultaneity in these processes, which in turn may create the appearance of circularity that is also present in Wendt’s argument. However, no matter how fast the processing of input from the social world into output in the social world takes place, input still comes before output. Therefore, they succeed each other in time and do not occur simultaneously. This argument can be illustrated graphically as in Figure 3.1 below.
3.3 Methodological implications

Using the Wendtian perspective to study the real-world international system and its actors has a number of major methodological implications that constitute the research design guidelines underpinning this thesis. The most significant such implication stems from Wendt’s focus on what he saw as the main challenge for the contemporary international system, namely the transition to a Kantian culture of ‘one for all and all for one’. Because in Wendt’s social theory of international politics this Kantian transition depends on the production and reproduction of collective identities and because this latter process depends on individual international actors behaving as prosocial actors, it follows that in Wendt’s world the main focus is in fact on the presence of prosocial actors on the international scene. From a methodological point of view, this translates into a requirement to test individual international actors against the Wendtian model of prosocial actor and this requirement in turn points to the case study method.

A case study is a ‘detailed and intensive analysis of a single case’ such as a single community, a single organization, a single person or a single event (Bryman, 2004, pp. 48-49). The most famous case studies commonly cited as classic examples in social science textbooks and handbooks (Reynolds and Herman-Kinney, 2003; Yin, 2003;
Bryman, 2004; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Babie, 2007; Berg, 2007) include studies of single communities such as Cornerville (Whyte, 1955), East End Boston (Gans, 1962) and Banbury (Stacey, 1960), single schools like Beachside Comprehensive (Ball, 1981) and Bishop McGregor (Burgess, 1983), single families such as the Sánchez family (Lewis, O., 1961), single organizations such as factories (Burawoy, 1979; Pollert, 1981; Cavendish, 1982), bakeries (Ditton, 1977) or police departments (Holdaway, 1983), single persons such as ‘Stanley, the jack-roller’ (Shaw, C. R., 1930) or the professional thief (Sutherland, 1937), single events such as the Cuban Missile Crisis (Allison, 1971), a rape attack (Winkler, 1995) or the Balinese cockfight (Geertz, 1973).

Applying the Wendtian perspective to the study of the international system requires case studies of individual international actors that test these actors against the Wendtian model of prosocial actor. Accordingly, this thesis is in fact a case study that applies the Wendtian perspective to the case of the EU. However, Wendt’s world is in essence the military world because the Wendtian perspective focuses on the state as the main international actor, due to the state’s central role in the regulation of organised violence. Therefore, a case study of the EU as international actor based on the Wendtian perspective is in fact a study of the EU as military actor. Obviously, this Wendtian focus on military actors makes the Wendtian perspective fit particularly well within the debate about the implications that the EU’s development as a military actor has for the international role of the EU.

On the other hand, choosing the case study method does not determine the operations that the conduct of the study will involve. In other words, the case study has to be combined with other methods appropriate for analysing the object of the study. In light of the Wendtian perspective, testing the EU against the model of Wendtian prosocial actor involves an analysis of EU defence policy, which implies the analysis of both the documents and history of ‘military power Europe’. Documents play a fundamental role in the life of an organisation, and this is especially true in the case of constitutional and policy documents. As Wendt put it, the ‘mind’ and ‘thoughts’ of an organisation are usually written down in the organisational documentation (Wendt, 1999, p. 222). However, the analysis cannot be restricted to the level of documents because documents are primarily intentions of action or action guidelines and not real actions. Therefore, the study of an organisation as a corporate actor requires combining documentary analysis with an analysis of practice.

The effect of these considerations derived from the Wendtian perspective is to point in the direction of the qualitative research method known in social science as the ‘life history method’, the ‘biographical method’, ‘personal history’, ‘document analysis’ or the ‘life story’ (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975; Denzin, 1989; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Titon, 1980;
cf. Herman-Kinney and Verschaeve, 2003, p. 232). This particular method involves presenting the subjective experiences and definitions of situations held by one person, one group or one institution or organisation as they interpret such experiences (Herman-Kinney and Verschaeve, 2003, p. 232). The life history method includes three major distinct types of analysis: the comprehensive life history that looks at the entire life of the subjects under investigation, the topical life history that focuses on a ‘slice’ of the subjects’ lives and the edited life history that involves, among other things, evaluating the data and amplifying the important information (Herman-Kinney and Verschaeve, 2003: 233-234). This thesis can be described as a topical life history because it focuses on only one slice of the life of the EU as international actor, namely the slice that refers to the EU as military actor on the international scene.

One final methodological question refers to what a Wendtian inquiry searches for in analysing the documents and practices of the EU as military actor. The answer to this question comes from the core component of the Wendtian model of prosocial actor. For Wendt, a prosocial actor is an actor that takes the role of friend in relation to the Other when interacting with other actors on the international scene (Wendt, 1999, pp. 341-2). In Wendt’s social theory of international politics, the term friend is used strictly to refer only to a ‘military friend’ and the role of friend is based on two fundamental principles: non-violence and mutual assistance (Ibid., pp. 298-9). Both conditions are independent and equally necessary. An actor that practices the principle of non-violence towards the Other but not also that of mutual assistance is only a neutral actor. It is not a rival, because it excludes the possibility of using violence against the Other, but it is not a friend either, because it is not willing to use its military resources to help the Other.

Thus, testing the EU as military actor against the Wendtian model of prosocial actor involves an analysis of the documents and practices of the EU as military actor in search of representations of the EU Self in relation to the Other with respect to the use of EU military capabilities. The main question is whether the history of the ESDP has been dominated by images of the EU Self in which the EU appears as a friend of the Other. Of course, the analysis is also required to contrast these instances of EU friendship with instances of EU neutrality or even rivalry, because the latter are incompatible with the idea of the EU as a prosocial power on the international scene. To be considered a prosocial actor, the EU must practice not only the principle of non-violence towards the Other, but also that of mutual assistance. For example, a non-violent EU that is not willing to use its military capabilities to help the Other is only a neutral, falling on the Wendtian axis of international roles somewhere between rivals and friends. In line with these methodological considerations, the empirical
analysis of the EU as military actor undertaken in this thesis searches the military documents and history of the EU for images of the EU Self in relation to the Other in the defence field.

The method outlined here on the basis of specific methodological implications derived from the Wendtian perspective echoes a number of major methodological frameworks in use in the field of International Relations. At first sight, this method can be described primarily as a constructivist or social constructivist method because, after all, Wendt has been viewed as the founder of a major strand of constructivism in International Relations and Wendt himself described his social theory of international politics as a ‘constructivist approach to the international system’ or alternatively as a ‘constructivist theory of the states system’ (Ibid., pp. xiii).

Labelling this study of the EU as military actor as ‘constructivist’ would also have the further effect of placing it alongside other constructivist projects in the field of EU studies. Approximately at the same time as Wendt published his Social Theory of International Politics, in a special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy dedicated to the ‘social construction of Europe’, Christiansen et al. (1999) argued that constructivism was ‘particularly well suited’ for the study of European integration due to the transformative impact of this process on the European states system and its constituent units. For Christiansen et al. (1999), a constructivist approach had the potential to ‘enhance our capacity to answer why and how European integration arrived at its current stage’.

As illustrated by these statements and by all the articles published in that special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy (Checkel, 1999; Christiansen et al., 1999; Diez, 1999; Glarbo, 1999; Koslowski, 1999; Marcussen et al., 1999; Moravcsik, 1999; Rosamond, 1999; Shaw, J., 1999; Smith, S., 1999), in the field of EU studies the constructivist approaches have tended to focus on the ‘inside’ of the European construction and have been concerned primarily with studying the EU Member States and the impact of the process of European integration on them. The tendency to concentrate on the inside of the process of European construction continued to be a strong presence in the field of constructivist EU studies for the entire first decade of the 21st century (Dyson, 2000; Cederman, 2001; Merlingen, 2001; Pollack, 2001; Schild, 2001; Trondal, 2001; Jachtenfuchs, 2002; Checkel, 2003; Cowles, 2003; Jupile et al., 2003; Kelemen, 2003; Lewis, J., 2003; Pollack, 2003; Aalberts, 2004; Zürn and Checkel, 2005; Meyer, 2005; Pollack, 2005; Risse, 2005; Anderson and Seitz, 2006; Merand, 2006; Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2006).

This internal focus is fully compatible with the Wendtian perspective, especially considering that Wendt focused primarily on states as the key actors of the international system. However, this thesis is concerned primarily with studying the EU as an international
actor in its external world rather than the EU Member States as actors in the intra-EU process of European integration. At the same time, this thesis is concerned with the impact that the EU as international actor, and in particular as military actor, has on the international system, rather than the impact that the process of European integration has on EU Member States. In other words, in contrast with the existing constructivist studies of the EU, focusing primarily on the ‘inside’ of the European construction, this thesis is concerned with the ‘outside’ or the external dimension of the European construction. Under these circumstances, as a ‘constructivist’ study of the EU, this thesis remains outside the area covered by the existing constructivist literature in the field of EU studies.

In the field of International Relations, constructivist approaches have also been described as sociological approaches and as psychological approaches. The ‘sociological’ label comes from the fact that approaches of this kind are based on conceptualizations of the international system in social terms, as a social system or society (Kratochwil, 2008) and therefore this thesis can also be viewed as being based on a sociological method. The ‘psychological’ label, on the other hand, has been applied to constructivist approaches because of the constructivist focus on identity and especially on social identity (Goldgeier and Tetlock, 2008). In the context of this thesis, the ‘psychological’ label is in fact far more appropriate than any other labels, including the more general ‘constructivist’ label, because the Wendtian model of prosocial actor is actually the model of a psychological person (Wendt, 2004, p. 294).

However, the term psychological is too wide and begs the question of which branch of psychology is the closest to the method used in this thesis. The answer is given by the two main psychological theoretical frameworks that inform the Wendtian model of prosocial actor. The self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) and symbolic interactionism (Mead, 1934; Blumer, 1969; Stryker, 1980) are two highly prominent frameworks from the field of social psychology, and therefore the method deployed in this thesis is best described as a social psychological method. It is important to recall here Turner’s insistence that self-categorization theory and the social identity theory perspective more generally should not be viewed, despite the name of the latter, as approaches or ‘ways of thinking’, but as ‘theories’ that ‘comprise a set of core, interrelated assumptions and hypotheses that lead to specific, testable and novel predictions’ (Turner et al., 1987, p. xix).

Turner’s self-categorization theory is also present in the field of EU studies, especially through its central concept of social identification, corresponding to Wendt’s notion of collective identity. However, like the constructivist studies of the EU, studies of the EU based on the notion of social identification have tended to focus on the ‘inside’ of the process of
European construction. A prominent example is a book edited by Thomas Herrmann-Risse and Marilyn Brewer entitled *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU* (Herrmann, Rise and Brewer, 2004). Even the title is a clear illustration that the book is about the inside of the EU and this is indeed the case. Some chapters of the book explicitly rest on the fundamental psychological process of social identification, but they focus, like the entire book, on what happens to the identities of the individuals working in EU institutions, like European parliamentarians, national officials and Brussels-based journalists.

In contrast, this thesis focuses on the identity of the EU as an organisational actor on the international stage and on the relationship between that identity and the culture of the international system, rather than on the culture of the EU system and its relationship with the identities of the EU Member States. Consequently, this thesis is related to studies of the EU based on the social identity perspective only to the extent to which it uses the fundamental concept of social or collective identification. Beyond that, this thesis has a different focus at a different level, on the EU as military actor on the international scene instead of the EU Member States as actors in the EU system or on individuals working in the EU institutions. Moreover, this thesis combines the fundamental hypotheses of self-categorization theory with other fundamental notions from symbolic interactionism, and is therefore different from the existing social psychological studies of the EU.

Ultimately, this thesis is completely and strictly located within that section of the literature on the EU that is concerned with studying the EU as international actor, and within that section it is completely and strictly located within the sub-section focusing on the EU as a military actor on the international stage. In this area of the literature on the EU, this thesis is unique in providing a study of the EU as a military actor based on a social psychological theoretical framework. It is true that if the ‘constructivist’ label is used, this thesis would appear as being close to the normative power Europe argument advanced by Ian Manners (2002; 2006) because the conceptualization of the EU as a normative actor that induces others to adopt its own norms gives that argument a ‘constructivist’ flavour. Nevertheless, this thesis relies on a different conceptual framework that defines it more narrowly as a ‘social-psychological’ study rather than as a ‘constructivist’ study.

3.4 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to complete the Wendtian model of prosocial actor by adding to the basic Wendtian model of actor the notions of collective identity and prosocial behaviour. In light of the Wendtian perspective, the focus is on states and other organisations as corporate actors that are not reducible to their individual members and are real
‘psychological persons’ with human attributes such as a Self and identities. Within the corporate Self, Wendt focuses on collective identity as the key to the main problem of the contemporary international system, namely the transition to a Kantian security culture of ‘one for all and all for one’. Collective identities are sources of prosocial behaviour but their continued production and reproduction depends on prosocial practices. When a military actor practices both the principle of non-violence and that of mutual assistance in relation to the Other, that actor takes the role of friend in relation to the Other and at the same time teaches the Other the same role. The role of friend in turn provides the basis for collective identities and thus contributes to the continuation of prosocial behavioural practices.

It is important to recall that the Wendtian world is in essence the military world where the states are the main actors because they are the main military actors. This makes the Wendtian perspective particularly appropriate for a debate concerned with the implications of the EU’s development as military actor. While the earlier reactions to this development tended to focus on the simple acquisition of military capabilities and tended to see those military capabilities as determining ends and roles, the Wendtian perspective suggests that a better approach to understand the implications for the international role of the EU is to test the EU against the Wendtian model of prosocial actor. This perspective places the main focus not on the simple possession of military capabilities but on the ways in which they are used or intended to be used. Moreover, instead of focusing on the impact of the emergence of the EU as a military actor on claims of moral superiority or uniqueness, as the civilian power Europe and normative power Europe perspectives tend to do, the Wendtian perspective is concerned primarily with the relationship between the birth of the EU as military actor and the Kantian transition, the main problem of the contemporary international system.

In line with the methodological implications outlined in this chapter, the analysis of the EU as a military actor that follows in the next three chapters is divided into three parts reflecting three major periods. Chapter 4 covers the period from the launch of the development of the EU’s new security and defence policy in 1999 until the ESDP was declared operational at the end of 2001. Chapter 5 looks at the very special year of 2003, when the EU launched its first military operations and adopted its first ever security strategy, but also suffered a major crisis linked to the invasion of Iraq, the most significant military event of the first decade of the 21st century. Finally, chapter 6 focuses on the period that followed the year 2003, when the EU launched more military operations and at the same time continued to be in a complicated position in relation to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Chapter 4: Universal Friendship

As shown in chapters 2 and 3, using the Wendtian perspective to answer the question about the implications that the EU’s emergence as a military actor has for the international system translates that question into a question about the relationship between the EU’s development as a military actor and the Kantian transition in the international system. For Wendt, the structure of the international system, defined as the security culture of that system, is the most important aspect of the international system and is currently facing the challenge of moving from a Lockean culture of ‘live and let live’ to a Kantian culture of ‘one for all and all for one’. The driver of this Kantian transition is the ‘prosocial actor’, a notion that refers to a military actor that engages in prosocial behaviour that follows simultaneously the principles of non-violence and mutual assistance. In this way, a prosocial actor takes the role of friend in relation to the Other and at the same time teaches the Other the same role. The role of friend in turn provides the basis for the production and reproduction of collective identities and their associated political culture, the Kantian culture of ‘one for all and all for one’.

Against this background, applying the Wendtian perspective to the case of the EU as an emerging military actor involves testing the EU against the Wendtian model of prosocial actor. Chapter 3 has provided an outline of the Wendtian prosocial actor that constitutes the comparative basis for the analysis to be undertaken in chapters 4, 5 and 6. This chapter is the first step in analysing the EU as an emerging military actor by testing it against the Wendtian model of prosocial actor and covers the earliest stage in the development of the military dimension of the EU, from the adoption of the St Malo Declaration in 1998 to the moment when the EU’s new ESDP was declared operational, at the end of 2001. This first part of the analysis also outlines the relationship between the images projected by the St Malo Declaration and the representations stemming from earlier, pre-ESDP, fundamental EC/EU documents like the Single European Act, the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Amsterdam.
4.1 The birth of the ESDP

The construction of the EU as an organisation began in the economic sector. It is true that the original objective of the first European Community, the European Coal and Steel Community established in 1952, was a security objective. The Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950, the official birth certificate of the first European Community and of the later European Union, envisaged the ECSC as a means of preventing a new war with Germany. The declaration described the pooling of the Franco-German production of coal and steel as a limited but decisive step towards the elimination of the age-old Franco-German opposition, the coming together of the nations of Europe, and the achievement of peace in Europe and in the world (Schuman, 1950). The pooling of the Franco-German production of coal and steel was expected to achieve these goals by linking the post-war economic recoveries of the two former major adversaries and at the same time by placing the German industrial production under supervision in order to prevent the unauthorized manufacture of armaments (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 193). The security objective of the ECSC was also mentioned in a memorandum from Jean Monnet, where he described the ECSC as the only way of escaping the post-war deadlocks, including ‘the increasing acceptance of a war that is thought to be inevitable’ (Vaughan, 1976, p. 51; cf. Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 193).

The original objective of the first European Community was a security objective, but the Community itself was economic in nature, an economic means to a security goal. Under Article 1 of the ECSC Treaty, the first European Community was ‘founded upon a common market’ (Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 1951). Article 2 of the same treaty assigned to the ECSC the task of contributing to ‘economic expansion, growth of employment and a rising standard of living in the Member States’ (Ibid.). The remaining four articles of the first title of the ECSC Treaty continued along the same line, providing a basic outline of how the common market for coal and steel should work. Thus, although the Schuman Declaration was concerned primarily with security issues, in the ECSC Treaty the fundamental articles that contained the basic definition of the ECSC referred only to economic issues and made no mention of any security aspects. The Community was therefore supposed to impact the security field only indirectly, through action in a specific area of the economic field that was of crucial significance to the security field. The first basis for what was later to become EU action was thus established in the economic field.

The establishment of the ECSC was quickly followed by the attempt to also create the European Defence Community, based on a plan proposed by the then French defence minister, René Pleven. The Pleven Plan envisaged the creation of a fully integrated European
Army under the authority of the ‘political institutions of a united Europe’, including a European Minister of Defence and a European Council of Ministers (Weigall and Stirk, 1992, p. 75; cf. Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 192). The EDC Treaty was signed in 1952 but was then rejected by the French National Assembly, in 1954 (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 192). It was a proposal that even its author, France, was not enthusiastic about. In fact, the main impulse for the Pleven Plan came from the US, which wanted a rearmed West Germany as a major element in the European Cold War defence system (Marsh and Mackenstein, 2005, pp. 7-8). France did not like the idea of a rearmed Germany but could not resist US pressure either and in the end reluctantly proposed a new project of supranational integration in the defence field. The compromise French proposal envisaged embedding all German units within a European army under the supranational control of the European Defence Community and its associated European Political Community (Ibid., 2005, p. 8). The UK did not want to participate in the proposed EDC and in the end the new proposal was finally struck down by its very author, France.

The real first step in the development of the security and defence dimension of EU action, in the form of the ESDP, was taken only in 1999, by the Cologne European Council (Council, 1999a). However, the conventional birth certificate of the ESDP is the Franco-British St. Malo Declaration of 1998 (St. Malo Declaration, 1998). Like the the Schuman Declaration of 1950, the St. Malo Declaration is a document from outside the EU framework. This new proposal to develop the defence dimension of the EU, formulated by the UK and strongly supported by France, was launched during a Franco-British bilateral summit that took place in St. Malo and was very soon followed by the first ever meeting of the EU defence ministers (Allen and Smith, 1999). The main idea enshrined in the St. Malo Declaration was the need to endow the EU with ‘the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in response to international crises’ (St. Malo Declaration, 1998).

This was not a new idea in the context of the process of European construction. In fact, the goal of building the EU’s security and defence dimension was inscribed in the EU Treaty signed in 1992 in Maastricht, the treaty that established the EU on the foundations provided by its predecessors, the European Communities. In the original version of the treaty, Article J.4.1 provided for the EU’s common foreign and security policy to include ‘all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence, which might in time lead to a common defence’ (Treaty on European Union, 1992).

Even before that, the Single European Act signed in 1986 and enacted in 1987 introduced the European Political Cooperation, the predecessor of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP), within the European Communities’ treaty base and described ‘closer cooperation on questions of European security’ as an essential contribution to the ‘development of a European identity in external policy matters’ (Single European Act, 1987). The same article of the SEA, Article 30(6)(a), declared the Member States’ readiness to ‘coordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security’ (Ibid.). However, in contrast to the Treaty of Maastricht, the Single European Act referred only to ‘security’ and did not make any specific mention of ‘defence’. 

Nevertheless, it is the French-British summit of St. Malo that has become the conventional ‘real’ starting point in the development of the security and defence dimension of the EU. The St. Malo Declaration was also an important statement of EU friendship towards the Other, in the Wendtian sense outlined in the previous chapter (Wendt, 1999, pp. 298-9). The declaration focused on the need to strengthen European armed forces and develop appropriate decision-making structures, but it also referred to how EU defence policy would relate to the Other. The declaration stated that the proposed ‘credible military forces’ would be used to respond to international crises (St. Malo Declaration, 1998). The idea of the EU using its credible military forces to respond to international crises is a reference to crises occurring in the external world and involving other actors present in that world and therefore it is also a reference to the Other. Through this reference the EU took the role of friend in relation to every actor in the international system because it linked the proposed EU defence policy to the two essential principles underpinning the role of friend: non-violence and mutual assistance (Wendt, 1999, pp. 298-9).

The idea of responding to international crises suggested that the EU was ready to help in crises which were actually located in the external world and affected primarily actors from that external world. It is true that international crises do not affect only the actors directly involved in them, but also other actors, even distant actors. For example, the security crisis in Pakistan affects mainly Pakistan, but is also perceived as a threat to their own security by the US and other actors because it is seen as helping Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda has attacked the US and continues to be viewed by the US as the ‘greatest threat’ to its security (US President Barack Obama cited in Reuters, 2009a). As a result, an actor responding to an international crisis can be viewed as and may really be acting only in its own interest, to protect its own security. However, by responding to the crisis it also helps one or more Others involved in that crisis. Moreover, because the crisis may also affect other distant actors, and most crises usually do so, the actor responding to the crisis actually helps those other distant actors as well. Furthermore, some crises are regarded as threats not only to regional security, but also to
global security. In such cases, an actor responding to the crisis is in effect helping all the other actors on the international scene.

The St. Malo Declaration echoed earlier fundamental EU documents, such as the Single European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht, but it also differed from those documents in some important ways. The differences between the St. Malo Declaration and the Single European Act were not limited to the absence of the term ‘defence’ from the latter. Another major difference and the most significant in the context of this analysis was that in the Single European Act the idea of a common EC/EU security policy appeared as serving egoistic purposes and was therefore in a situation of incompatibility with the Wendtian notion of friendship (Wendt, 1999, pp. 229, 298-9, 341-2). Under Article 30(2)(a) of the Single European Act the purpose of the proposed ‘European foreign policy’ was to ensure that the combined influence of EC/EU Member States was exercised as effectively as possible (Single European Act, 1987). Similarly, under Article 30(6)(a) the purpose of closer cooperation on questions of European security was to contribute to the development of a European identity in external policy matters (Ibid.).

Thus, the provisions introducing European Political Cooperation were only about the EC/EU, about its own security, influence and identity, and did not take into account in any way the security concerns and problems of other actors. This attitude was also present in the common provisions of the Single European Act, where the EC/EU declared the objective of the European Communities and the European Political Cooperation to be ‘concrete progress towards European unity’ (Ibid.). By focusing only on European security, in the Single European Act the EC/EU drew a very clear boundary between the security of the Self and the security of the Other, a move that fell short of the Wendtian criterion of friendship that envisages ‘defining the welfare of the Other as part of that of the Self’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 229). The Single European Act said that the security of the EC/EU did not include the security of other actors and therefore constituted an egoistic statement. This was in stark contrast with the St. Malo Declaration, where the purpose of the proposed ‘credible military forces’ was to respond to international crises and thus made the security of other actors part of the security of the EU (St. Malo Declaration, 1998).

The move away from the egoistic worldview embedded in the Single European Act of 1987 and towards the friendly or prosocial orientation of the St Malo Declaration of 1998 began with the Treaty of Maastricht signed in 1992 and enacted in 1993. The similarities between the Treaty of Maastricht and the St. Malo Declaration were as significant as the differences between the latter and the Single European Act. One major such similarity was the presence of the idea of a common EU defence, but the most significant similarity was the
prosocial orientation of the provisions referring to the proposed common defence policy. However, the Treaty of Maastricht was not a real step forward in the move away from an egoistic worldview because the prosocial orientation of EU defence was significantly thinner in this document by comparison with the St Malo Declaration.

Under Article J.1(2) of the Treaty of Maastricht, the first objective of EU foreign and security policy was ‘to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union’ (Treaty on European Union, 1992). Under the same Article, the second objective of EU foreign and security policy was ‘to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways’ (Ibid.). Thus, the first two objectives referred exclusively to the EU and its security and interests. Moreover, there was nothing in the first two objectives to suggest that the security of the EU included in any way the security of others. On the contrary, the phrase ‘in all ways’ suggested that the EU was ready to act against the security interests of other actors in order to strengthen its own security. This constituted an egoistic statement with a hint of rivalry. The EU not only drew a clear line between its security interests and the security concerns of other actors, but also left the door open to EU action against the security interests of others.

By themselves, the first two objectives enshrined in Article J.1(2) of the Treaty of Maastricht would have given EU foreign and security policy a clear egoistic orientation. However, this egoism was qualified by the third objective inscribed in the same Article: ‘to preserve peace and strengthen international security’ (Ibid.). This was a reference to general or global peace and security and therefore had the effect of making the security of everybody else in the world part of the security of the EU. In this way the EU declared its readiness to contribute to the security of the Other and thus took the role of friend in relation to the Other. This statement of friendship diluted the statement of egoism stemming from the first two objectives and gave EU foreign and security policy a prosocial orientation. Nevertheless, the prosocial orientation of the Treaty of Maastricht was still not on the same par with that of the St. Malo Declaration because the latter referred only to responding to international crises, thus making the security of others fully part of the security of the EU.

The concept of EU foreign and security policy embedded in the EU treaties was taken to the level of prosociality reflected in the St. Malo Declaration by the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was signed in 1997 and entered into force in 1999, after the adoption of the St. Malo Declaration. The Treaty of Amsterdam did not eliminate the egoistic elements embedded in the main objectives of EU foreign and security policy. In the post-Amsterdam consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, the first two objectives of EU foreign and security policy were still defined in egoistic terms: ‘to safeguard the common values, fundamental
interests, independence and integrity of the Union’ and ‘to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways’ (Treaty on European Union, 1997). Even the phrase ‘in all ways’ was still there, keeping alive the suggestion that the EU not only excluded the security concerns of others from its security policy, but was also ready to act against the security interests of other actors if that was the only way to strengthen EU security.

Nevertheless, in the post-Amsterdam consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union the egoistic elements were almost completely neutralised by the inclusion of the so-called Petersberg tasks, previously the responsibility of the Western European Union (WEU). The prosocial orientation of EU defence policy under the post-Amsterdam consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union also rested on the unchanged objective of preserving peace and strengthening international security. Nevertheless, if this was the only prosocial element in Title V of the post-Amsterdam Treaty on European Union, the prosocial orientation of EU defence policy would have been at the same level with the original version of the Treaty on European Union. However, the post-Amsterdam version had a thicker prosocial orientation stemming from new provisions on the tasks of EU defence policy.

Under Article 17(2), the tasks of EU defence policy included ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’ (Ibid.). Each of these tasks was also a reference to the Other. They implied that the EU was ready to help the Other when the security of the Other was affected by humanitarian crises, natural catastrophes or armed conflict. In this way, the EU took the role of friend in relation to the Other. The Petersberg tasks gave EU defence policy an almost exclusively prosocial orientation because they were the only tasks acceptable for EU defence policy. The egoistic orientation embedded in the more selfish objectives of EU foreign and security policy was thus almost completely neutralised because the only tasks permitted for EU defence policy were prosocial in nature.

Thus, when it was adopted in 1998, the St. Malo Declaration reflected the same prosocial orientation in defence policy as the Treaty on European Union, based primarily on the idea that the newly proposed EU defence policy would be exclusively for helping the Self by helping the Other and not for helping the Self against the Other. This was a major prosocial step forward by comparison with the original 1992 version of the Treaty on European Union and the earlier Single European Act of 1986. However, the St. Malo Declaration was only a first step in the production of an image of ‘military power Europe’ as a friend of the Other. The EU continued to reproduce and develop the ideas underpinning this image in the St. Malo Declaration and in the process also continued to reproduce the image of Self as a friend of the Other.
4.2 Developing the ESDP

The St. Malo Declaration of 1998 has become the conventional birth certificate of the ESDP, but the ‘formal launch of the Union’s military enterprise’ took place only in 1999, at the Cologne European Council (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 199). As the St. Malo Declaration was still only a statement of intention, it was not surprising that there was no EU military contribution to the military intervention in Kosovo during the first part of 1999. The 1999 intervention in Kosovo was a NATO-led operation in which military action was dominated by the US (Allen and Smith, 2000, p. 103). The military contributions made by EU Member States were made under the banner of NATO and were not regarded as enacting the newly announced EU defence policy. In fact, that operation and especially the fact that military action was dominated by the US provided further impetus for improving EU capacity to use military force (Ibid.).

In Cologne, in June 1999, the European Council committed itself to endowing the EU with a security and defence dimension in the form of a ‘capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so’ (Council, 1999a). This commitment was taken directly out of the St. Malo Declaration, word for word (see St. Malo Declaration, 1998). The 1999 Cologne Declaration represented mainly the European Council’s commitment to develop the EU’s military capabilities on the basis of existing national, bi-national and multinational capabilities (Council, 1999a). The declaration also included the decision to launch the process of integrating the functions of the WEU into the EU framework, as envisaged by the Treaty of Amsterdam, and an acknowledgment of the need to strengthen the industrial and technological defence base. The declaration also spent considerable space on the future relationship between the EU and NATO.

In Cologne, the EU talked again about the need to develop the EU’s capacity for autonomous action, repeating the same ideas also inserted in the 1998 St Malo Declaration, word for word. That included the idea that the purpose of EU defence policy and capabilities was to respond to international crises (Ibid.). By repeating this idea, the EU also reproduced the associated representation of the EU Self as a friend of the Other. The Cologne Declaration also mentioned the Petersberg tasks and restricted the scope of EU defence policy to conflict prevention and crisis management (Ibid.). The Petersberg tasks and the notions of conflict prevention and crisis management were all linked to the Other and projected a representation of the EU as an actor that not only respected the security concerns of the others, but was also
ready to help with the security problems of the others. In this way, the Cologne Declaration reproduced the representation of the EU Self as a friend of the Other.

However, in Cologne the EU did another very important thing. Besides representing itself as a friend of the Other, the EU also represented other actors as ‘friends of the Other’. The Cologne Declaration did this by opening EU crisis management operations to participation by other actors, including non-EU NATO members and other non-EU European allies and partners. The Cologne Declaration provided not only for mutual consultation and cooperation between the EU and NATO, but also for non-EU European allies and partners to have the opportunity to ‘participate fully and on an equal footing in the EU operations’ (Ibid.). This idea went beyond representing the EU as a friend of the Other. By participating in EU-led operations, the ‘non-EU European allies and partners’ would do the same thing as the EU. They would take the role of friend in relation to the Other by participating in operations that benefit not only their individual security but also the security of every other actor on the international scene. This went one step further by comparison with the ESDP-defining documents preceding the Cologne Declaration. In the Cologne Declaration, the EU took the role of friend in relation of the Other and at the same time also encouraged or taught its partners to adopt the same role in relation to others.

While the Cologne European Council of June 1999 provided the basic definition of the ESDP, the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 endowed the ESDP with a dedicated organizational infrastructure (Council, 1999b). The Helsinki meeting has been viewed as a sign of significant progress in the EU’s search for a coherent and effective external role (Allen and Smith, 2000, p. 101). The significance of the 1999 Helsinki Council for the development of the ESDP stemmed mainly from the adoption of the ‘headline goal’ of developing the capacity to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making) (Council, 1999b). The Helsinki Council also decided to create a specialised institutional infrastructure for the ESDP, including the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) (Ibid.).

At the same time, the EU also continued to reproduce the image of Self as a friend of the Other stemming from the Cologne Declaration of 1999 and other earlier ESDP-defining documents. In Helsinki the EU reproduced the self-representation as a friend of the Other by repeating all the prosocial ideas underlying the concept of EU defence policy. The EU repeated both the idea that EU defence policy was confined to conflict prevention and crisis
management, or the Petersberg tasks, and the idea that EU-led military operations can only be conducted in response to international crises (*Ibid.*). In this way, the EU again made the security of the Other a full part of the security of the Self and thus again took the role of friend in relation to the Other.

In Helsinki, the EU also continued the new practice of representing the Other, and not only the Self, as a friend of others, evident earlier in the Cologne Declaration. The EU did so by referring to cooperation with NATO and the participation of non-EU states in EU operations (*Ibid.*). The non-EU states that the EU could invite to contribute to an EU-led operation included not only the non-EU NATO members and EU accession candidates, but also ‘Russia, Ukraine and other European States engaged in political dialogue with the Union and other interested States’ (*Ibid.*). All these aspects represented certain others as taking the role of friend in relation to the Other, like the EU did. Participating in EU-led military operations involved contributing together with the EU to the security of other actors and therefore implied taking the same role of friend that the EU took in relation to the Other.

After Cologne and Helsinki, the EU continued to develop its security and defence capabilities and institutions with a view to declare the ESDP operational by the end of 2001 (Allen and Smith, 2001, pp. 98-100). Thus, in 2000, in Feira and Nice, the European Council adopted key decisions on the development of EU civilian and military capabilities, including the establishment of appropriate political and military bodies and structures (Council, 2000a, b). In Nice, in December 2000, the EU also set the objective of making the ESDP operational at the latest by the end of 2001 (Council, 2000b). In Göteborg, in June 2001, the EU adopted new targets for the development of civilian capabilities and adopted the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts (Council, 2001a). The Göteborg meeting saw the last major decisions on the development of EU defence policy before the terrorist attacks on the US of 11 September 2001, after which the EU internal context became dominated by successive rows among EU Member States over the handling of foreign policy (Allen and Smith, 2002; 2003).

In Feira and Nice, and later in Göteborg, the EU continued to focus primarily on the development of its military and civilian capabilities. Nevertheless, at the same time the EU also continued to reproduce the image of the EU as a friend of the Other by repeating the basic ideas enshrined in the Treaty on European Union. The EU recalled that EU defence policy was strictly for conflict prevention and crisis management and that its main objective was to contribute to international peace and security by responding to international crises (Council, 2000a, b; 2001a). In this way, the EU reproduced the idea that EU defence policy was only for helping the Self by helping the Other and thus also reproduced the representation
of the EU as a friend of the Other. In Nice, the EU even described the military capabilities developed under the ESDP as crisis-management instruments available to the entire international community, thus projecting another image in which EU defence policy contributed to the security of the EU by helping with the security problems of the entire international community (Council, 2000b).

Another important idea reproduced by the EU in Feira, Nice and Göteborg was the idea that EU defence policy was an open process allowing for the participation of non-EU states. The EU declared the project of EU defence to be open to non-EU NATO members, EU accession candidates and other partners (‘Russia, Ukraine and other European States with which the Union maintains a political dialogue and other interested States such as Canada’) and at the same time talked about the EU as a partner of NATO, the UN and other international organisations active in the field of security and defence (Council, 2000a, b; 2001a). In this way, the EU continued the practice of encouraging its partner-others to take the role of friend in relation to the Other by participating in EU-led operations aimed at strengthening the security of the participating actors by solving the security problems of the whole international community.

The year 2001 was also the year when EU Member States signed the Treaty of Nice, amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community and aimed mainly at institutional reform in preparation for the EU’s massive eastward enlargement. The Treaty of Nice made only minor amendments to the articles dealing with EU foreign and security policy (Allen and Smith, 2001, pp. 97-8). Therefore, the images of the EU as a friend of the Other stemming from Title V of the Treaty on European Union stayed the same. In the post-Nice consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, EU defence policy continued to be strictly confined to the area defined by the Petersberg tasks (Treaty on European Union, 2002, p. 16). By leaving the provisions on the scope of EU defence policy unchanged, the EU also reconfirmed its role as a friend of the Other.

Thus, the first steps in the development of the EU’s military dimension, following the adoption of the St. Malo Declaration of 1998, can also be viewed as a process of reproducing the image of the EU as a friend of the Other first introduced by the St. Malo Declaration and the Treaty of Amsterdam. In Cologne, Helsinki, Feira, Nice and Göteborg, the EU continued to present itself ready to use its future military capabilities to help with the security of the Other because the security of the EU Self was intrinsically linked to the security of others. In this way, the EU made the security of the Other part of the security of the Self and put itself in the role of friend. By introducing the new practice of also representing its partners as ‘friends
of the Other’, the EU in effect amplified the prosocial orientation of its emerging defence policy and thus continued to move forward on the prosocial path opened by the St. Malo Declaration. However, by the time the EU declared the ESDP operational, at the end of 2001, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 against the US had already triggered another new process that was to draw the limits of the EU’s prosocial orientation.

4.3 The ESDP becomes operational

Only three years after the St Malo Declaration and two years after Cologne and Helsinki, in December 2001 in Laeken the European Council declared the ESDP operational (Council, 2001e). This was in line with the decision adopted in Nice, in December 2000, but declaring the ESDP operational in December 2001 was still controversial because the ESDP was not yet regarded as really operational (Marsh and Mackenstein, 2005, p. 69; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 199). One of the main reasons was the fact that the Berlin-plus arrangements giving the EU access to NATO assets, the only assets that the EU could hope to access at that time, were operationalised only at the end of 2002, when a joint EU-NATO declaration was adopted to this end (Council, 2002g; Marsh and Mackenstein, 2005, p. 69). Therefore, at the time when the ESDP was declared operational the perception was that the full range of Petersberg tasks could not be undertaken before 2003 (Allen and Smith, 2002, pp. 97-8). The EU did indeed launch its first ESDP operation in January 2003, operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), which had the effect of replacing the controversy surrounding the operationality of the ESDP with an almost opposite controversy about a perceived fast militarization of the EU to the detriment of civilian power Europe and normative power Europe (Smith, K. E., 2005; Manners, 2006).

In Laeken, the EU also issued a major statement on relations with the Other. One of the main aims of the declaration on the future of the EU adopted in Laeken was to provide a vision of the EU as an international actor, a global international actor to be more precise. According to the European Council, the declaration on the future of the EU marked a ‘decisive step for the citizen towards a simpler Union, one that is stronger in the pursuit of its essential objectives and more definitely present in the world’ (Council, 2001e). What is even more significant is the fact that the section about the EU’s new role in a globalised world was dominated by references to security and defence, a situation reflecting the fact that this declaration was adopted in the immediate aftermath of the attacks of 11 September 2001.

In defining its new global role, the EU continued to take the role of friend in relation to the Other, but for the first time the EU also drew a clear line between the friend-Other and the rival-Other. In the extraordinary context created by the attacks of 11 September 2001, the
EU identified religious fanaticism, ethnic nationalism, racism and terrorism as ‘opposing forces’ (*Ibid.*). Moreover, the EU envisaged its place in the world as a ‘power resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism’ and also described itself as doing this ‘battle’ worldwide (*Ibid.*). Thus, in Laeken the EU suggested that it was ready to use violence if necessary in order to force the opposing others to revise their behaviour. This was an image of the EU as rival and therefore the idea that the EU was confronted with opposing forces and was ‘doing battle’ against them had the effect of projecting an image of the EU as a rival of those others who engaged in the kind of behaviour that the EU regarded as a threat to EU and world security (see Wendt, 1999, pp. 279-83).

In the process of pointing out its rivals, the EU also identified its friends. The EU did not refer to fanaticism, ethnic nationalism, racism and terrorism as forces opposing only the EU. For the EU, those forces were opposing the entire world and constituted major threats to world security, not only to EU security. In this context, the EU’s intention to fight the opposing forces implied a willingness to fight threats to world security, wherever they may be. This idea of the EU acting against security threats anywhere in the world suggested that the EU could not be secure if the world was not secure and thus implied that world security was part of EU security. In this way, the EU not only identified its rival-Other, but also took the role of friend in relation to everybody else. In other words, the EU presented itself as a friend of any Other who was not engaging in one of the behavioural practices identified by the EU as threats to both EU and world security. This aspect is very important because it highlights the absence of images of the EU as a neutral actor that would never consider using violence against the Other but would not help the Other either.

In Laeken, the EU also repeated earlier ideas about the openness of the ESDP and cooperation with NATO, international organisations, non-EU NATO members, EU accession candidates and other potential partners, in particular Canada, Russia and Ukraine (Council, 2001e). The EU continued to present itself as a very close partner of NATO in the management of crises and also mentioned cooperation with other international organisations, in particular the UN and the OSCE, before moving on to talk about cooperation with states (*Ibid.*). The EU mentioned the non-EU European NATO members and the EU candidates as ‘particularly important’ as partners of the EU in the area of security and defence and also referred to other actual and potential partners, like Canada, Russia and Ukraine (*Ibid.*). In this way, the EU continued to reproduce images in which not only the EU was presented as a friend of the Other, but also the EU’s most significant partners, both states and international organisations. By participating in EU-led military operations the EU’s partners
take the same roles as the EU: friends of the actors assisted by those operations and rivals of the actors engaged in the threatening behaviours targeted by those operations.

At the same time, in Laeken the EU issued a particularly strong statement of friendship towards the US in the context of the terrorist attacks suffered by the latter. For the EU, ‘the terrible attacks against the US demonstrated that terrorism was a real challenge for Europe’ (*Ibid.*). That statement presented the attacks on the US as problems not only for US security but also for EU security and had the effect of making US security part of EU security. Moreover, the EU declared its willingness to act alongside the US to help the US in preventing and controlling the terrorist threat, and described the process of developing EU military and civilian capabilities as a process of making the EU stronger and more capable to contribute to the fight against terrorism (*Ibid.*).

The statement of friendship towards the US made by the EU in Laeken had been preceded by several other EU declarations relating to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and projecting an image of the EU as a very close and determined friend of the US and a determined rival of the Other behind those attacks. On 12 September 2001, the EU described the events of the previous day as attacks ‘not only on the US but against humanity itself and the values and freedoms we all share’ (Council, 2001b). In other words, the attacks on the US were regarded at the same time as attacks on the EU and on everybody else in the international community. This statement presented the security of the US as part of EU and world security. Against this background, the EU declared its intention to ‘spare no efforts’ to help identify, bring to justice and punish the authors of the attacks and to work closely with the US and all partners to combat international terrorism (*Ibid.*). Thus, the EU not only identified with the security of the US, declaring an attack on the US to be an attack on the EU and on everybody else, but also expressed its intention to help the US and all other members of the international community in the fight against terrorism.

This image of the EU as friend was also accompanied by an image of the EU as rival, a rival of the authors of the attacks of 11 September 2001. The phrase ‘spare no efforts’ left the door open for any kind of EU action, including military action. This idea was further strengthened by a reference to the EU’s determination to combat all forms of terrorism with ‘all the resources at its disposal’ (*Ibid.*). At the same time, the EU declared itself to be a rival not only of terrorists but also of their sponsors (*Ibid.*). By referring to sponsors, the EU also hinted at the possibility of taking action, including military action, against states sponsoring terrorist activities, alongside the non-state organisations and individuals carrying out terrorist attacks.
The EU reproduced these images again only two days later, on 14 September 2001, in a joint declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government of the EU, the President of the European Parliament, the President of the European Commission and the High Representative for the CFSP (Council, 2001c). The attacks were again described as not only against the US but against the entire world, including the EU:

This assault on humanity struck at the heart of a close friend, a country with which the European Union is striving to build a better world. But these terrible terrorist attacks were also directed against us all, against open, democratic, multicultural and tolerant societies. (Ibid.)

Against this background, the EU again expressed its willingness to help the US bring to justice the perpetrators of the attacks and the language used left open the possibility of using any means, including military means, to achieve this objective. The EU talked about not allowing, under any circumstances, those responsible to find justice, wherever they may be (Ibid.). This was a statement of full rivalry that would not stop until the perpetrators are brought to justice and would have no geographical limits. Moreover, the EU extended this statement of rivalry beyond the perpetrators of terrorist attacks to include ‘those responsible for hiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of these acts’ (Ibid.). Thus, EU rivalry was not limited to a particular kind of actor, but suggested that the EU was ready to take action against any actor involved in such behavioural patterns, including state-Others.

On 14 September 2001, the EU made another very significant gesture that echoed the EU practice of placing other actors in the role of a friend of the Other. This time, the EU introduced the opposite practice of explicitly placing other actors in the role of rival in relation to certain Others, namely the Others involved in behaviours regarded by the EU as major security threats. On 14 September 2001, the EU called on all countries sharing the same universal ideals and values as the EU and the US to ‘join together in the battle against terrorist attacks’ (Ibid.). The EU went on and talked about global solidarity, about the importance of working together to find solutions to conflicts and about the need for all countries to redouble their efforts in the fight against terrorism (Ibid.). Through these ideas, the EU placed all international actors, excluding those associated with terrorist activities, in the same group with the EU as friends of the US and rivals of any actor engaged in terrorist behavioural patterns.
The possibility of military action against a rival state-Other was eventually clearly spelled out when the EU acknowledged a US riposte under UN Security Council Resolution 1368 as a legitimate action (Council, 2001d). The EU announced the readiness of EU Member States to take actions in support of the US riposte and in that context pointed out that those actions may also be ‘directed against states abetting, supporting or harbouring terrorists (Ibid.). However, the EU declared the ESDP operational only two months later and therefore in September 2001 it was not in a position to contribute EU military capabilities to the US riposte in Afghanistan. This is why the actions mentioned by the EU, in support of the US riposte, were to be taken by EU Member States and did not involve the EU defence capabilities under development within the ESDP framework. It is true that individual Member State contributions were still associated with the EU, but the EU identity can best be expressed through contributions clearly identified as EU rather than national contributions. At the time when the US-led military action in Afghanistan was initiated, in October 2001, EU defence capabilities were not yet operational and therefore EU friendship towards the US and rivalry towards the perpetrators of the attacks of 11 September 2001 remained confined to the level of discourse and substituted in practice by the friendship and rivalry of individual EU Member States.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the first stage in the history of ‘military power Europe’, initiated in 1998 through the adoption of the St. Malo Declaration. The analysis covers the period from the adoption of the St. Malo Declaration to the moment when the EU declared the ESDP operational, in December 2001. As the analysis shows, during that time the EU focused mainly on developing its capabilities and decision-making structures. The analysis also shows that during that time the EU constantly took the role of friend in relation to the Other. Although the original Treaty on European Union contained important egoistic elements in the form of selfish security and defence objectives, the later inclusion of the Petersberg tasks gave the incipient EU defence policy a prosocial orientation.

By limiting its defence policy to the Petersberg tasks, the EU made world security a part of EU security and declared itself ready to help any other actor on the international scene. In this way, the EU took the role of friend in relation to everybody else in the international system. This EU practice of taking the role of friend in relation to the Other in the context of its evolving defence policy was a constant during the first phase of the ESDP and gave the EU’s incipient defence policy a universal prosocial orientation. However, the ESDP was
declared operational only in December 2001 and therefore up to that moment EU friendship towards the Other was confined to the level of discourse.

The year when the EU declared the ESDP operational also saw a significant change in EU representational practices, following the terrorist attacks on the US of 11 September 2001. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the EU intensified its discourse of friendship towards the Other, especially towards the US, but also drew a line between the friend-Other and the rival-Other. Before 11 September 2001, the EU made no reference to any rival-Other and made generic or universal statements of friendship towards all Others, but after 11 September 2001, the EU responded to threatening Others by taking the role of rival towards them. This change in the EU practice of representing itself as a friend of the Other had the effect of qualifying the universal prosocial orientation of EU defence policy and replacing it with a more moderate prosocial orientation that still covered every international actor except for those engaged in or supportive of terrorist activities.

The events of 11 September 2001 also changed another important EU representational practice. Before the attacks, the EU used to also place other international actors in the role of a friend of the Other. After the attacks of 11 September 2001, the EU qualified its discourse of universal friendship and at the same time operated a similar qualification in the discourse placing others in the same role. After the attacks, the new EU discourse had a dual line. One was that the EU was a rival of those engaged in certain threatening behaviours and that everybody else should take the same role against those threatening others. The other was that the EU was a friend of everybody else, that is all actors not involved in threatening behaviours, and that other actors, especially the EU’s main partners, should also take the same role in relation to non-threatening Others.

Thus, by the time the EU declared the ESDP operational, the incipient EU defence policy had shifted from its earlier universal prosocial orientation to a more moderate prosocial orientation that still represented the EU as a universal friend but excluded the actors engaging in certain threatening behaviours. The next chapter continues the analysis of the first ten years of ESDP by turning to the very special year of 2003, which saw the first EU military operations and the first EU security strategy, but also a major intra-EU and transatlantic crisis triggered by the US-led invasion of Iraq.
Chapter 5: The Shadow of Neutrality

The year that followed the EU declaration on the operational capability of the ESDP has been described in retrospect as a long period of waiting between the events of 11 September 2001 and the outbreak of the conflict in Iraq in March 2003 (Allen and Smith, 2003, p. 97). In 2002 the development of the ESDP was slowed down by the negotiations surrounding EU-NATO relations and the issue of EU access to NATO capabilities (Ibid., pp. 97-8). Greece objected to the 2001 Ankara agreement on EU access to NATO resources and thus prevented the EU from taking over the NATO operation in FYROM in the autumn of 2002 (Ibid., p. 97). The EU-NATO strategic partnership containing the Berlin-plus arrangements giving the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities was adopted only in December 2002, in Copenhagen, and entered into force on 17 March 2003 (Ibid.; Council, 2009a). In the meantime, the EU had also completed the transfer to the EU of WEU subsidiary bodies (the Satellite Centre and the Institute for Security Studies), adopted a declaration on the commitment of capabilities in the area of rule of law and broadened the scope of the ESDP to include the fight against terrorism (Council, 2009a).

In contrast to 2002, the year 2003 stands out as a special time in the first decade of the history of the ESDP. It was the year that saw the US-led military invasion of Iraq, launched by the US and its allies on 19 March 2003. On 1 May 2003 US President George W. Bush declared the end of major combat operations and ‘Mission Accomplished’ but in practice this proved to be only the end of the initial invasion and the beginning of a turbulent and lengthy military occupation. The first month of the invasion of Iraq was also the month when the EU launched its first military operation, operation Concordia in FYROM, taking over from NATO operation Allied Harmony (Ibid.). However, the first EU military operation without recourse to NATO capabilities, Artemis, was launched only in June 2003, in the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Ibid.). The other major event of 2003 in the context of the ESDP was the adoption of the first ever EU security strategy, the European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council in December 2003 (Council, 2003q).
This chapter provides a reading of the year 2003 in the history of the ESDP in light of the Wendtian perspective, which focuses on the images of the EU Self in relation to the Other stemming from the special defence events of that year. The main concern is to test the discourse and actions of the EU in 2003 against the model of prosocial actor presented in chapters 2 and 3. The analysis starts with the outbreak of conflict in Iraq and the images of Self and Other projected by the absence of the EU, the opposition of some EU Member States and the participation of other EU Member States and EU candidates. The second part of the chapter turns to the first EU military operations and analyses the images of Self projected by the first external EU military deployments. Finally, the third section of the chapter focuses on images of the EU Self stemming from the 2003 ESS, the most comprehensive statement on the relationship between ‘military power Europe’ and the Other issued by the EU in the first decade of the ESDP.

5.1 The invasion of Iraq

The moment when the US president George W. Bush, in his 2002 State of the Union address, described Iraq, Iran and North Korea as forming an ‘axis of evil’ has been viewed as the starting point in the slide towards conflict in Iraq (Allen and Smith, 2003, p. 111). That moment was also the beginning of a split within the EU and between EU Member States and the US. The growing split within the EU became evident at the European Council meeting held in Barcelona in March 2002 and was then transferred to the debates surrounding the successive UN resolutions concerning Iraq (Ibid., pp. 111-112). By the beginning of 2003, just before the launch of military action in Iraq, the divisions among EU Member States and candidates over the Iraq crisis were running very deep.

Within the EU, the main division was between the UK on the one hand, arguing in favour of military intervention in Iraq alongside the US, and on the other hand France and Germany, opposing such action (Allen and Smith, 2004, pp. 95-6). This division was not limited to EU Member States but also extended to EU candidates. On 30 January 2003, eight EU Member States and candidates issued a public letter supporting the US position, followed at the beginning of the next month, on 5 February 2003, by a another statement issued by ten other EU and NATO candidates expressing support for the US position (Joint Statement by the Leaders of Eight European Countries, 2003; Statement of the Vilnius Group Countries, 2003).

During that period of growing internal and external division, the EU continued to represent itself as a friend of the US, but this practice was confined to the level of discourse and contrasted sharply with the national-level discourse and actions of some EU Member
States. On 11 March 2002, the EU issued a declaration in commemoration of the terrorist attacks of 11 September, in which the EU reiterated its full solidarity with the US and repeated the idea that the attacks had been not only attacks on the US but also on the EU and its Member States (Council, 2002a). Against this background, the EU talked about the need for all countries to act against terrorism and about the EU’s determination to ‘work in every field to prevent similar events from happening again’ (Ibid.). The declaration also mentioned the individual contributions made by EU Member States to the actions of the international coalition against terrorism (Ibid.). Later the same year, on the occasion of the first anniversary of the attacks of 11 September 2001 the EU conveyed another powerful message of solidarity with the US in the fight against terrorism and again talked about its determination to continue to contribute to that fight (Council, 2002b).

After the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1441 on 9 November 2002, warning Iraq that it will face ‘serious consequences’, on 14 November 2002 the EU issued a statement in which it welcomed the adoption of that resolution and again presented itself as a determined friend of the US (Council 2002c). The EU did not refer directly to the US, but its declaration did sound like an indirect expression of support for the US. The EU urged Iraq to comply with Resolution 1441 and at the same time warned Iraq that it was ‘Iraq’s last opportunity to fulfil its disarmament obligations’ (Ibid.). Referring to Resolution 1441 as a ‘last opportunity’ suggested that failure to comply with that resolution would open the way to military action against Iraq. This idea further led to the suggestion that the EU supported US military action against Iraq if Iraq failed to seize that last opportunity. This was not the same with saying that the EU was ready to help the US by contributing military capabilities and therefore the EU statement of 14 November 2002 was only a statement of support for the US. It cannot be said to be incompatible with EU self-representations as a friend of the US, but it cannot be said to be conducive of such EU self-images either.

In early 2003, just before the military invasion of Iraq, the Greek Presidency tried to produce a common EU position and in the process also tried to continue the EU practice of representing itself as a friend of the US. On 27 January 2003, the EU said again that its goal was the effective and complete disarmament of Iraq’s WMD and that UN Resolution 1441 of 8 November 2002 represented a ‘final opportunity to resolve the crisis peacefully’ (Council, 2003a). The EU did not refer directly to the US and its intentions to invade Iraq very soon, but by referring to Iraq’s final opportunity to avoid war it echoed the US position and left the door open for its statement to be interpreted as a declaration of support for the US position. On the other hand, the EU did not say anything about any EU contribution, leaving everything in the responsibility of the UN Security Council. Consequently, in January 2003 the EU only made
an indirect suggestion that it might support the US position but it did not take the role of friend in relation to the US. The role of friend implies a readiness to help the Other. In January 2003, in sharp contrast to earlier EU statements, the EU did not say anything about helping the US.

The Greek Presidency made another attempt to produce a common EU position on 17 February 2003 (Council, 2003c). The position expressed by the EU on that occasion reflected the opposing views of EU Member States and conveyed contradictory messages. On the one hand, the EU repeated the warning that Iraq had a final opportunity to resolve the crisis peacefully and reiterated its commitment to work with the US for the disarmament of Iraq. In this way, the EU conveyed the message that it was ready to help the US with its proposed actions against Iraq, which involved military action, and thus projected an image of the EU as a friend of the US. On the other hand, the EU also said that the primary responsibility for dealing with the disarmament of Iraq lied with the Security Council, thus suggesting that it was not actually ready to do anything to help the US. Moreover, the EU also said that it wanted to achieve the disarmament of Iraq peacefully, thus expressing opposition to US intentions to take military action against Iraq. As a result, the EU statement of 17 February 2003 projected a confusing image in which the EU appeared at the same time as a friend and as a neutral in relation to the US in the context of the Iraq crisis.

By the time of the extraordinary European Council meeting held in Brussels on 17 February 2003, individual EU Member States and candidates were already engaged in exchanges of conflicting positions, some of them supporting the invasion of Iraq and others opposing it. Five EU Member States and ten EU candidates expressed support for military action in Iraq, emphasizing in particular their support for the US as a very close friend. France, Germany and Belgium, on the other hand, expressed opposition to military action and to US plans by pointing out that they wanted a continuation of the inspections conducted by UNMOVIC and the IAEA and did not agree that war was already the only option (Joint Declaration by Russia, Germany and France on Iraq, 2003; Joint Statement of Belgium, France and Germany on Iraq, 2003; Villepin, 2003).

That exchange held major implications for the image of Self as a determined friend of the US that had already been embedded in the nascent EU defence discourse as a central component. The opposing statements issued by France, Germany and Belgium had the effect of restricting EU friendship towards the US to the level of discourse and undermined even that discourse because their opposition conveyed the message that they were not ready to help the US in its actions against an actor that the US viewed as a threat to US security. The decision of some EU Member States not to stand by the US in the context of the Iraq crisis
was particularly striking because those EU Member States already had a long history of declaring their readiness to act alongside the US against security threats that they regarded not only as threats to US security but also as threats to EU and world security.

From an analytical point of view, the main focus is not on whether France, Germany and Belgium were ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ to oppose US plans. When the focus is on images of the EU Self in relation to the Other, and especially on the fate of images of the EU Self as a friend of the Other, ready to help the Other in its hour of need, what matters most is whether in the last instance, when after all the debates, controversies and opposition, the US is still determined to pursue a certain course of action, EU Member States are ready to play the role of a friend of the US and use their military capabilities to assist their friend the US even though they do not agree with the US position. If EU Member States do not stand alongside the US in that last instance, they may be ‘right’ but they are certainly no ‘friends’ of the US, only neutrals exposed to new charges of unreliability and even free riding. Of course, opposition expressed individually by some EU Member States is not an EU position and therefore does not directly involve the EU identity. However, EU Member States are not only individual states but also EU Member States and therefore their actions also engage the EU identity, even though they do so only indirectly.

While the opposition expressed by EU Member States like France, Germany and Belgium undermined the image of the EU as a friend of the US, the support provided by other EU Member States and by EU candidates had the opposite effect, indirectly reproducing the idea that the EU was after all still a friend of the US. At the beginning of 2003, the statements issued by five EU Member States and ten EU candidates had the effect of projecting an image of friendship towards the US (Joint Letter by the Leaders of Eight European Countries, 2003; Statement of the Vilnius Group Countries, 2003). They thus continued the earlier EU practice of describing the attacks of 11 September 2001 as attacks on all of them, not just on the US, and making the security of the US part of their own security. At the same time, they expressed a firm commitment to stand by the US and this was the most significant aspect because by then the US was already intent on taking military action against Iraq. By stating their support for and solidarity with the US in such circumstances, the signatories of the two statements in effect declared their readiness to assist the US with its military action against Iraq. By expressing this readiness to help the US, they represented themselves as friends of the US and indirectly, because they were also carriers of the EU identity, also represented the EU as a friend of the US.

It is true that the statements issued by fifteen EU Member States and candidates in January and February 2003 were national statements and not EU statements and therefore
they did not engage directly the EU identity. They were primarily national statements of friendship towards the US and not EU statements of EU friendship towards the US. Nevertheless, like the opposing statements issued by France, Germany and Belgium, they were not the declarations of just any states. They were declarations of EU Member States and candidates and therefore, indirectly, they also engaged the EU identity. Therefore, their support for the US position and readiness to help the US with its military action against Iraq also conveyed the indirect message that the EU was at least partly a friend of the US. Moreover, the message was in fact that the majority of EU states were friendly towards the US because the eighteen signatories would soon form a majority of EU Member States. Ten of the fifteen signatories were only EU candidates at that time and therefore it could be argued that their association with the EU identity was weaker, but in fact they were very-soon-to-be EU Member States. Eight of them became EU Member States less than a year later, on 1 May 2004, and the other two acceded to the EU four years later, on 1 January 2007. Therefore, at the beginning of 2003 they represented a soon-to-be majority of EU Member States, a fact seized upon by the US Defence Secretary, who made a distinction between ‘old Europe’ and a supposedly friendlier ‘new Europe’ and in this way contributed to the further deepening of the EU’s internal divisions (Allen and Smith, 2004, p. 96).

Thus, by the beginning of 2003 the EU practice of representing itself as a friend of the US was confined to the level of discourse and even contradicted by the discourses of the EU Member States that were opposed to the US position on Iraq. This situation started to also change the EU-level discourse, which became contradictory, stating simultaneously that the EU was ready to help the US but would not help the US (Council, 2003c). However, the image of the EU as a friend of the US was also supported by the discourse of five EU Member States and ten EU candidates on the verge of becoming EU Member States. What was even more significant, instead of dying out completely the image of the EU as a friend of the US was actually put in practice, though only indirectly. By the end of 2003, the US-led forces in Iraq included contributions from fifteen EU Member States and candidates (US Government Accountability Office, 2007).

By making military contributions to actions taken by the US against a threatening Other, the fifteen EU Member States and candidates proved their readiness to help the US and thus put in practice their images as friends of the US. Like the discursive images of friendship projected prior to the invasion, the military contributions to the invasion were national contributions and not EU contributions. Nevertheless, they still engaged the EU identity, indirectly, because they were national contributions coming from states associated with the EU as Member States or soon-to-be Member States. As a result, by contributing to the US-led
military operations in Iraq, participating EU Member States and candidates also conveyed an indirect message of EU friendship towards the US, a message that this time was no longer confined to the level of discourse but expressed through real-world action. However, besides being an indirect image of the EU as a friend of the US, this image was also intertwined with the image of the UK as the real or main EU friend of the US. This was because the UK was by far the largest EU contributor to the US-led military operations in Iraq, the UK contribution peaking at 46,000 from March through April 2003 (Ibid., pp. 7-8). Thus, the image of the EU as a friend of the Other was again intertwined with the image of another actor as the real friend of the Other behind the EU, but this time this flickering image of EU friendship was even weaker than in the Western Balkans or Africa because it involved the EU identity only indirectly.

In contrast to developments at the national level, there was no direct EU contribution to the US-led military operation in Iraq. In the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq the EU made frequent statements on the situation in Iraq but none of them included any references to the US or images of the EU as a friend of the US. Between March 2003, when the US started the military operation in Iraq, and December 2003 the EU issued nine statements dealing with the situation in Iraq, but they contained no trace of the earlier EU discourse of friendship towards the US (Council, 2003e, f, g, h, k, l, m, n, o). During all this time, the EU mentioned the US only once, in the first statement issued after the invasion of Iraq, where the EU referred briefly to the transatlantic partnership (Council, 2003e). However, that was only a brief reference to the US and too weak to actually project an image of the EU as a friend of the US. The EU talked about the ‘need to strengthen the transatlantic partnership’ and the necessity of a ‘sustained dialogue on the new regional and global challenges’ (Ibid.). That statement was a far cry from earlier statements about EU readiness to stand shoulder to shoulder with the US and help the US in the fight against threatening Others.

EU discourse of friendship towards the US started to return only at the end of 2003, when the EU adopted the first ever EU security strategy and at the same time also issued a unilateral declaration on transatlantic relations (Council, 2003p, q). The two documents marked the return of discursive images of the EU as a friend of the US by presenting the EU and the US as standing united in the face of familiar and emerging security threats and working to develop joint strategies to combat those threats. This description suggested that the EU was ready to help the US in the fight against the main security threats and did not exclude the possibility of military action. The EU did not refer specifically to the possibility of military assistance, not even indirectly as it had done before by referring to whatever means would be necessary, thus leaving the door open for any interpretation. Nevertheless, by not
specifically excluding military assistance from the idea of the EU and the US combating together immediate threats to security, the EU took a first step to return to earlier images of the EU as a friend of the US.

5.2 The first EU military operations

Besides effectively switching off EU discourse of friendship towards the US and casting a shadow of neutrality on images of the EU as a friend of the Other, the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 also had the effect of overshadowing a major moment in the history of ‘military power Europe’, the launch of the first EU military operations. The first ESDP mission was a civilian mission, EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina launched by the EU on 1 January 2003, while the first EU military operation, operation Concordia in FYROM, was launched on 18 March 2003 (Council, 2009a, p. 6). In FYROM, the EU took over from a NATO operation, Allied Harmony, and used NATO capabilities and in December the same year operation Concordia was replaced by an EU police mission, operation Proxima (Allen and Smith, 2004, p. 97). The first EU military operation based on EU capabilities, operation Artemis in DRC, was launched only on 12 June 2003 and was not only the first EU military operation undertaken without recourse to NATO capabilities, but also the first EU military operation outside Europe (Council, 2009a, p. 6).

The EU first expressed its willingness to take over from NATO in FYROM in 2002 (Council, 2002d, e), and on 27 January 2003 the EU approved the principle of the military operation and established the operational financing mechanism (Council, 2003b; European Commission, 2003). The formal decision to launch EUFOR Concordia, with the participation of fourteen third states, was taken on 18 March 2003 (Council, 2003d) and the goal of EUFOR Concordia was defined as guaranteeing the security needed for implementing the Ohrid Framework Agreement and building stability and democracy in FYROM (Council, 2008c, p. 41). The operation was conducted with recourse to NATO collective assets and capabilities, under the Berlin-plus EU-NATO arrangements (Ibid., p. 41). EUFOR Concordia received contributions from 27 states, 23 of which were at the time EU Member States or EU candidates about to become EU Member States (Ibid.). On 29 July 2003, the EU decided to extend EUFOR Concordia until 15 December 2003 and on 29 September 2003 the EU approved the principle of EUPM Proxima and decided that it would replace EUFOR Concordia on 15 December 2003 (Council, 2003i, j).

As the first EU military operation, operation Concordia was the first practical manifestation of the incipient EU defence policy. Until then the EU had been building capabilities and institutions that would endow the EU with the capacity to act in the security
and defence field with both civilian and military means. The first practical manifestation of the civilian dimension of the ESDP was the EU police mission launched in Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 2003, while the military dimension of the ESDP finally became a real world presence through operation Concordia. However, Concordia symbolised not only the first manifestation of EU agency in the military field, but also the first practical enactment of the discourse of EU friendship towards the Other that the EU had been reproducing since the launch of the ESDP in 1999. Until operation Concordia, the idea that the EU’s developing military capabilities were aimed at helping the Self by helping the Other, repeated by the EU over and over again in Cologne (Council, 1999a), Helsinki (Council, 1999b), Feira (Council, 2000a), Nice (Council, 2000b), Göteborg (Council, 2001a) and Laeken (Council, 2001e), had been confined to the level of discourse.

In light of the Wendtian perspective and the model of prosocial actor deployed in this thesis, the main significance of operation Concordia stems from the fact that the EU used its military capabilities to support the security of the Other. In Wendt’s world, when an actor uses its military capabilities to provide security assistance for the Other that actor takes the role of friend in relation to the Other and constitutes a prosocial presence on the international scene (Wendt, 1999, pp. 341-2). In the case of operation Concordia, the direct beneficiary of EU military assistance was FYROM. By using its military capabilities to assist FYROM, the EU took the role of friend in relation to FYROM.

However, EU assistance for FYROM was also indirect assistance for other actors on the international scene. The situation in FYROM was part of the UN Security Council Agenda and had been the basis for the earlier NATO operation in that country. The situation in FYROM was therefore a security concern for the entire North-Atlantic community as well as for the whole international community. Thus, by taking over the responsibility of ensuring the security of FYROM, the EU took the role of friend not only in relation to FYROM, but also in relation to the entire North-Atlantic region, represented by NATO, and to the whole international community, represented by the UN.

Another aspect of operation Concordia that has special significance in the context of Wendt’s social theory of international politics is the participation of non-EU states. By inviting non-EU states to contribute to Concordia, the EU in effect invited those participants to share the same role as the EU in relation to the Other. Participation in a EU-led military operation meant the same thing for the non-EU participants as it meant for the EU. The non-EU participants used their military capabilities to provide security assistance for the Other and in this way took the role of friend in relation to the Other (Ibid.). Thus, like the EU,
the non-EU contributors to operation Concordia took the role of friend in relation to FYROM as well as in relation to NATO members and to UN members.

Nevertheless, most of the non-EU participants in Concordia were in fact EU candidates about to become EU Member States very soon. Concordia involved a total of 27 participant states, of which only 13 were EU Member States in 2003, when this operation took place (Gross, 2009, p. 173). However, of the 14 non-EU participant states, 10 were EU candidates expected to join the EU in the next few years (nine in the year after Concordia and the other two in 2007). Moreover, three of the other four non-EU contributors that were not about to become EU Member States, Turkey, Norway and Iceland, were in fact very closely associated with the EU. In other words, although at first sight Concordia appeared to be an exercise in which the EU was also joined by many non-EU others that took the same role of friend in relation to the Other, in reality most of the contributing non-EU others were virtually already part of the EU Self. This had the effect of diluting the third-party dimension of the EU’s prosocial orientation in the context of operation Concordia, making this dimension look more like involving an extension of the Self rather than a real Other.

Only one of the 27 contributors to Concordia was not an EU Member State, an EU candidate or an EU associate and that state was Canada (Ibid.). At first sight, the Canadian participation contributed to the preservation of that third-party dimension of the EU’s prosocial orientation that had been embedded in the concept of EU defence policy. Even if this was the case, it was a very weak third-party contribution, only one state out of a total of 27 contributors and a contribution consisting of only one person out of a mission total of 357 (Lindstrom, 2004, p. 117). However, the third-party aspect was even weaker than that because Canada, even though it was not as closely associated with the EU as the other contributors, it still had a very strong indirect link with the EU, embodied in NATO. Through NATO, Canada was closely linked to the EU Member States, most of which were also NATO members. At the same time, most of the EU candidates about to become EU Member States were also NATO members or about to become NATO members. Thus, the Canadian Other was not as close to the EU as the other non-EU contributors but was still closely related to the EU through its links with the EU Member States and candidates. The presence of the Canadian Other extended the third-party dimension of the EU’s prosocial orientation, but only to the border of the North-Atlantic community.

The image of the EU as a friend of the Other projected by operation Concordia was undermined to a certain degree by the fact that Concordia relied on NATO assets and capabilities. Concordia was a take-over mission from NATO, which had been present as a military actor in FYROM since 2001 (Ibid., p. 174). NATO operation Allied Harmony was a
small mission that was a follow-up to the initial NATO operation Essential Harvest and to NATO operation Amber Fox, another follow-up mission that preceded operation Allied Harmony (Ibid.). Under the Berlin-plus agreement, giving the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities, when the EU took over it was NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) who was appointed EU Operational Commander, and the Operation Headquarters was located at the central command of NATO military forces, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium (Ibid., p. 175). At the same time, all 27 contributors were either NATO members or NATO candidates about to become NATO members very soon.

This made operation Concordia appear more like a NATO operation carrying the EU hat. The strong presence of the NATO identity contributed to an image in which the ‘real’ contribution to the security of FYROM came from NATO and not from the EU. As a consequence, Concordia made NATO look as the real friend of the Other behind a military operation that was defined as an EU operation. This in turn made the EU appear as only a nominal friend of the Other that was not actually making a real own contribution to the security of the Other. Thus, operation Concordia projected only a blurred image of the EU as a friend of the Other that was interlaced with an image of NATO as the real friend of the Other behind the EU military operation.

In contrast with the blurred image of the EU as a friend of the Other stemming from operation Concordia, operation Artemis projected a much clearer representation of the EU as a prosocial military actor. In contrast with the situation in FYROM, the situation in DRC was highly unstable. Fighting between ethnic Hema and Lendu militias had already caused hundreds of deaths and thousands of displaced persons in a country where the previous ten years of conflict had resulted in over 50,000 deaths and over 500,000 displaced persons (Lindstrom, 2004, p. 119). The force of 700 UN Uruguayan MONUC troops deployed in Bunia in April 2003 was insufficient and in this context the UN Secretary General asked France to lead a multinational force in a temporary intervention until more UN troops were deployed on the ground (Helly, 2009a, p. 182).

France later decided to Europeanise the operation and in the end the operation in DRC was launched within the framework of the ESDP and represented the EU response to the UN request asking for military assistance in the Ituri region pending the deployment of a larger UN force (Ibid.; Council, 2008a, p. 43). In contrast to operation Concordia, operation Artemis was launched within the framework of the ESDP but outside the framework of the Berlin-plus arrangements giving the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities. EUFOR Artemis in DRC
did not make recourse to NATO capabilities and therefore it was the first ‘truly’ EU military operation.

Artemis focused on Bunia and was aimed at securing the town, refugee centres and airport and ensuring the safety of NGOs and UN personnel (Council, 2008a, p. 43). France acted as the framework nation for operation Artemis and the operation’s personnel of approximately 2,000 troops included 1,785 French personnel (Ibid.; Helly, 2009a, p. 183). Besides France, Artemis also received contributions from sixteen other states, eleven of which were EU Member States (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK), two were EU candidates about to become EU Member States very soon (Hungary and Cyprus), one was a NATO member (Canada), one was an African state (South Africa) and one was a new emerging global power and an outsider to both Africa and Europe (Brazil) (Helly, 2009a, p. 181). Operation Artemis lasted for only three months and was accompanied by a gradual handover to the UN troops. The withdrawal of the EU force was completed in Bunia on 6 September 2003 and in Entebbe on 25 September 2003, being replaced by a new UN contingent of about 5,000 troops from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Indonesia (Ibid., p. 183).

Operation Artemis contributed to the strengthening of the image of the EU as a friend of the Other. Like operation Concordia, operation Artemis was an example of the EU using its evolving military capabilities to help other international actors and thus taking the role of friend in relation to the Other (Wendt, 1999, pp. 341-2). In this case the main beneficiary of EU defence assistance was DRC and therefore operation Artemis was first of all a statement of EU friendship towards DRC. However, the situation in DRC was not a security concern only for DRC. As an issue on the agenda of the UN Security Council, the situation in DRC was a security concern for the entire international community embodied by the UN (Lindstrom, 2004, p. 119). As a consequence, the EU military contribution to ensuring security in DRC also symbolised EU help for all the other members of the UN and therefore operation Artemis was a statement of EU friendship towards DRC as well as towards the whole UN community. The image of operation Artemis as a message of friendship towards the UN-Other was further strengthened by the fact that the operation was the EU’s positive response to a request for military assistance coming from the UN (Ibid.).

The image of the EU as a friend of the Other was more powerful in the case of operation Artemis than in the case of the earlier operation Concordia mainly because operation Artemis did not take recourse to NATO assets and capabilities (Helly, 2009a, p. 182). Therefore, in contrast to operation Concordia, which projected an image of the EU as a friend of the Other interlaced with an image of NATO as the real friend of the Other behind
the EU operation, operation Artemis deinterlaced that image and effectively removed its NATO component. However, the statement of friendship embodied in operation Artemis was still not a purely EU statement. The UN had asked France, as a UN member and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and not the EU as such to take over the responsibility of ensuring security in Bunia and in the Ituri region of DRC (Ibid.; Lindstrom, 2004, p. 119). Subsequently, France decided to launch the operation within the framework of the ESDP but at the same time remained the main contributor to the force sent to DRC, contributing more than 1,700 personnel to the operation total of approximately 2,000 (Helly, 2009a, pp. 181-3). This had the effect of intertwining the image of Artemis as an EU operation with an image of Artemis as a mainly French operation, which had the further effect of projecting an image of France as the real provider of military assistance behind the EU operation. In other words, France appeared as the real friend of the Other behind what was defined as an EU military operation.

Thus, at first sight, operation Artemis only replaced the NATO component with a French component in that blurred image of the EU as a friend of the Other stemming from operation Concordia. Nevertheless, the image of the EU as a friend of the Other was clearer in the case of Artemis because the French identity was fully a part of the EU identity, while the NATO identity only overlapped with the EU identity, because of the differences in membership. An EU operation relying on the capabilities of one of the major EU Member States is ‘more EU’ than an operation relying on the capabilities of another organisation whose membership includes both EU and non-EU states. Moreover, operation Artemis involved fewer non-EU NATO members than operation Concordia. Four of the contributions received by Concordia came from NATO members that were neither EU Member States nor EU candidates about to become EU Member States (Canada, Iceland, Norway and Turkey) (Lindstrom, 2004, p. 117; Gross, 2009, p. 173). By contrast, in the case of operation Artemis there was only one contributor that was neither an EU Member State nor an EU candidate about to become an EU Member State, namely Canada (Lindstrom, 2004, p. 120; Helly, 2009a, p. 181).

The image of EU friendship projected by operation Artemis was more intense by comparison with operation Concordia also because the force involved in the former was larger. Operation Artemis was comparable to operation Concordia in terms of duration, but it was much larger than the latter in terms of troops. While operation Concordia involved about 350 troops, the strength of operation Artemis was around 2,000 troops (Lindstrom, 2004; Gross, 2009; Helly, 2009a). However, the impact of the larger contribution to operation Artemis on the image of the EU as a friend of the Other was counterbalanced by the fact that
the end of operation Concordia was not the end of ESDP action in FYROM. Operation Concordia was replaced by EUPOL Proxima, an EU police mission that in turn was replaced at the end of 2004 by EUPAT FYROM, the EU police advisory team mission completed in the middle of 2006 (Lindstrom, 2004; Gross, 2009). In contrast to Concordia, operation Artemis was replaced by a new UN force and not by another EU operation (Lindstrom, 2004; Helly, 2009a). Even though the EU missions that followed operation Concordia in FYROM were civilian and not military operations, this difference was sufficient to make operation Concordia appear as symbolising a stronger EU interest and readiness to help than operation Artemis.

The image of the EU as a friend of the Other projected by operation Artemis was more powerful also because Artemis was an EU operation outside Europe. In the case of operation Concordia and other operations in the Western Balkans the situation was different. The primary beneficiaries of those operations were direct neighbours of the EU and were expected to become EU candidates and eventually EU Member States. In other words, although the accession of FYROM to the EU was not a close prospect, it was nevertheless a relatively certain prospect (Gross, 2009, pp. 174-5). For this reason, operation Concordia appeared like friendship towards an Other that was already deemed to become part of the Self at a later stage. In other words, through operation Concordia the EU appeared as really only helping the Self and not the Other. In the case of operation Artemis, the situation changed because DRC was not an Other with prospects to become part of the Self. Thus, by providing assistance to an Other more distant from the Self than FYROM the EU took one more step towards strengthening its message of universal friendship towards the Other. The EU represented itself as an actor that was ready to help not only those Others that would eventually become part of the Self but also other actors that were not that closely linked to the Self.

Furthermore, the prosocial orientation of EU defence policy was more powerfully expressed in the case of operation Artemis, by comparison with operation Concordia, also because the list of non-EU contributors extended farther beyond states closely associated with the EU. The participants included twelve EU Member States, two EU candidates and three non-EU states (Helly, 2009a, p. 173). When operation Artemis was launched, on 12 June 2003, the participating EU candidates (Hungary and Cyprus) were less than a year away from becoming EU Member States. The other three contributors occupied very different positions in relation to the EU. Canada was not directly associated with the EU, but had nonetheless a very strong indirect link with the EU through its membership in NATO alongside most Member States of the EU. South Africa was a non-EU and non-Nato state, like Brazil. The difference between South Africa and Brazil was that South Africa was an African state with a
direct interest in the situation in DRC as a regional security concern, while Brazil was an emerging global power with an indirect interest in DRC as a global security concern. By contrast, the non-EU participants in operation Concordia included only EU candidates and non-EU NATO members (Lindstrom, 2004; Gross, 2009). Through the participation of Brazil and South Africa, operation Artemis marked an expansion of the third-party dimension of the EU’s prosocial orientation.

5.3 The European Security Strategy

The year 2003 was a very special year in the history of the ESDP primarily because it was the year of the invasion of Iraq and the year of the first EU military operations, but also because that was the year when the EU adopted its first ever security strategy, the ESS entitled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ (Council, 2003q). The ESS was adopted in unusual circumstances, relatively soon after the invasion of Iraq by a US-led coalition of forces and in the context of an ongoing war in Afghanistan (both directly linked to the attacks of 11 September 2001) and while the EU was on the verge of adopting a major new treaty that would have established a ‘constitution for Europe’. The ESS was the most comprehensive statement on the relationship between the ESDP and the Other issued by the EU in the first decade of the ESDP. The ESS was also a highly prominent statement because it was quickly recognised as the EU’s ‘defining fundamental position’ in the field of security and defence (Berenskoetter, 2005, p. 72).

The ESS projected two major images of the EU in relation to the Other in the area of defence, one in which the EU was a rival of the rival-Other and one in which the EU was a friend of everybody else. As a security strategy adopted in the aftermath of the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq and in the context of an ongoing related conflict in Afghanistan, the ESS focused first on the global challenges and key threats confronting the EU at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In this context, the first major image stemming from the ESS was that of the EU as rival of the rival-Other, underpinned by the actions envisaged by the EU in response to the threatening Other. However, in the ESS the EU did not single out any particular state as being a rival. Instead, it talked about certain behaviours that were considered major threats to the security of the EU and of the entire global community.

Those threatening behaviours included terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime (Council, 2003q). Terrorism was associated primarily with violent religious extremism. The EU also pointed out that the proliferation of WMD was potentially its greatest security threat. These threats are not actors and therefore
they do not refer directly to any particular Other. They refer in fact to any Other that engages in one of those major threatening behaviours. That threatening Other can be any kind of actor present in the external world, including states who engage in such threatening behaviours or support such behaviours from non-state actors.

Nevertheless, the EU did single out some of its actual or potential rivals by giving examples of actors engaged in threatening behaviours. For the threat of terrorism, the EU pointed at Al Qaeda, a non-state actor (Ibid., p. 3). For the threat of the proliferation of WMD, the EU mentioned the Middle East as a region particularly prone to a WMD arms race (Ibid.). It is important to note here the significance of this wide reference to an entire region. The EU did not make a distinction between states and non-state actors and did not indicate any particular actor, not even as an example. As a result, mentioning only the region suggested that in that region the EU expected threats from both non-state and state actors.

For the threat of regional conflicts, the EU gave the examples of Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region, the Korean Peninsula and ‘conflicts nearer to home, above all in the Middle East’ (Ibid., p. 4). All these examples involved state actors and therefore, although the EU referred to the conflicts themselves and not to their protagonists, this still was at least an indirect reference to the state actors involved in those conflicts as Others that threaten the security of the EU and of the rest of the world. To exemplify the threat of state failure, the EU mentioned Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under the Taliban. However, these were not references to states, but to the non-state actors that had ‘corroded’ those state actors from within (Ibid.). Finally, the examples given for the threat of organised crime were references to non-state actors, namely criminal gangs, especially from Afghanistan and the Balkans (Ibid., pp. 4-5).

Thus, although the EU’s key threats were not direct references to particular Others, the EU did refer to particular Others by giving examples of rival-Others for each key threat. However, only three of the EU’s five key threats had examples that also included state actors: the proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts and failed states. By identifying the key threats, the EU in effect described the state and non-state others engaged in threatening behaviours as rivals of the EU. However, in light of the Wendtian perspective what matters most is how the EU responded to its actual or perceived rivals. A rival actor that responds in kind, by taking the role of rival in relation to its rivals, contributes to the continued reproduction of the Lockean security culture of ‘live and let live’ in the international system. In contrast, a friendly actor that takes the role of friend even in relation to its rivals can eventually transform its rivals into friends and therefore supports the transition to a Kantian security culture of ‘one for all and all for one’ on the international scene (Wendt, 1999, pp. 341-2).
In the ESS, what the EU said it would do or should do in the face of key threats provided the basis for an image of the EU as rival of its rival-Other. If the EU answer was to turn the other cheek and even offer assistance to its rivals when in need, then the EU would have taken the role of friend in relation to the rival-Other. However, in its 2003 security strategy the EU did not turn the other cheek towards its rival-Other. The EU presented itself as determined to ‘defend its security and promote its values’ (Council, 2003q, p. 6). To this end, the EU had three strategic objectives: addressing the threats, building security in its neighbourhood and an international order based on effective multilateralism. The ideas that made up each of these individual strategic objectives built up an image of the EU as a rival of its rivals. Under each of the three strategic objectives, the EU presented itself mostly as an actor that was ready to act against the rival-Other and suggested that even the use of military capabilities against the rival-Other was a real possibility. In this way, the EU excluded the security of the rival-Other from that of the Self and even hinted at the possibility of using violence against the rival-Other, thus taking the role of rival in relation to the rival-Other.

Under the strategic objective of ‘addressing the threats’, the EU appeared as an actor that was active in fighting the threat of terrorism, especially through the measures adopted in the aftermath of the attacks of 11 September 2001, including the European Arrest Warrant, ‘attacks’ on terrorist financing and mutual legal assistance with the US (Ibid.). Even the choice of words, in this case the ‘attacks’ on terrorist financing, contributed to depicting the EU as a rival of its rivals, and not a friend. The words were softer where the EU talked about fighting the proliferation of WMD. It emphasized multilateral regimes and its contribution to the strengthening of those rules (Ibid.). It did not refer directly to any particular Other, but this remained nevertheless a general indirect reference to any Other, state or non-state, engaging in proliferation activities.

The reference to what the EU did in relation to regional conflicts was a mixed reference. The EU mentioned that it ‘had intervened to help deal with regional conflicts’, a statement that implied EU action against a rival-Other, the rival-Other that was not directly attacking the EU but was engaged in a regional conflict that threatened the security of the EU and that of the entire world (Ibid.). However, in contrast to the images of the EU as a rival of its rivals, here the EU appeared as a friend of its rivals. The Others engaged in regional conflicts were rivals because their behaviour threatened the security of the EU and signaled that they did not care about the security of the EU or other third parties. Nevertheless, the EU still described itself as their friend because its action consisted in helping them to deal with their regional conflicts. A similar image of the EU also stemmed from the reference to failed states and to what the EU had done to ‘put failed states back on their feet’ (Ibid.).
Thus, in the context of the references to regional conflicts and to failed states, the EU presented itself as a friend of the rival- or problem-Other. This was particularly significant because it drew a clear distinction between EU responses to the state rival-Other and EU responses to the non-state rival-Other. In the context of the fight against terrorism, a threat coming primarily from non-state actors, the EU was unequivocal in taking the role of a rival of the non-state rival-Other. However, when it came to the state-Other engaged in a regional conflict or the state-Other taking the form of a failed state, which were technically rivals because they threatened the security of the EU Self, the EU turned around and presented itself as their friend by expressing its readiness to come to their help. This was an important instance in which the EU took the role of friend in relation to rivals and suggested a tendency to do so only in relation to the state rival-Other. Besides taking the role of friend instead of that of rival in relation to the state rival-Other engaged in a regional conflict or taking the form of a failed state, the EU also showed itself ready to help that state rival-Other against non-state rival-Others. In light of these differences in attitude, the EU appeared as a friend of the state-Other, even when the state-Other was a rival-Other, and a rival of the threatening non-state rival-Other.

The image of the EU as a friend of the state rival-Other engaged in a regional conflict or taking the form of a failed state was particularly strong in the context of references to the EU neighbourhood. The EU presented itself as being active in addressing the threats, but it did so especially in relation to its own neighbourhood. The EU described neighbouring states engaged in violent conflict and neighbouring countries affected by state weakness, organised crime, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth as ‘problems for Europe’ (Ibid., p. 7). At the same time, tackling these problems was for the EU part of the European interest. In this way, the EU made the security of the neighbouring state-Other part of the security of the Self, which had the effect of representing the EU as particularly friendly towards the neighbouring state-Other.

This image referred only to the state-Other and not to the non-state rival-Other. The EU was interested in and ready to help with the security of its neighbouring states against their non-state rivals. They were the states located in Eastern Europe, especially the Southern Caucasus and the Balkans, the Middle East, especially the Mediterranean area, and in the wider ‘Arab World’ (Ibid., p. 8). In the EU’s own words, the task was ‘to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean’ (Ibid.). The EU’s neighbourhood also contained an even more special category of Others. Among the EU’s neighbouring Others there were some who were candidates to EU membership. Their case was special because they were about to become part
of the EU Self and thus cease to be an Other in relation to the EU. As a result, their status was beyond that of Other and implicitly beyond that of friend, a kind of half-Other-half-Self.

Nevertheless, the image of the EU as a friend of the state rival-Other was restricted to the state-Other engaged in a regional conflict or reduced to the form of a failed state. In relation to other rival states, the EU took the role of rival. This was the case of the states that had ‘placed themselves outside the bounds of international society’, including some that had ‘sought isolation’ and others that ‘persistently violate[d] international norms’ (Ibid., p. 10). Although the EU did not say it directly, the suggestion was that those rogue Others represented a threat to the security of international society and, implicitly, to the security of the EU. In other words, the states engaging in this kind of behaviour represented the rival-Other, a rival of the world and of the EU.

However, even in this context the image of the EU as a rival of the rival-Other was very vague because the EU presented itself as a real rival only in relation to the state rival-Other that was ‘unwilling to rejoin the international community’, which ‘should understand that there is a price to be paid’ (Ibid.). In relation to the state rival-Other that was willing to rejoin the international community, the EU took the role of friend by declaring itself ready to assist them (Ibid.). In this way, the EU took the role of friend, not of rival, because a rival would simply not care what happens to its rivals once the latter stop their threatening behaviours. By contrast, a friend is ready to help former rivals, not just let them be.

The second major image stemming from the ESS was a representation of the EU as a friend of everybody else on the international scene who did not take the role of rival in relation to the EU. In the ESS, the EU linked its security to the security of the entire world. The EU saw a world of global threats in which the security of the EU depended on an effective multilateral system capable of ensuring the security of the entire planet by creating a ‘stronger international society’ (Ibid., p. 9). In terms of contributions, the EU gave precedence to the United Nations Security Council, which had the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. However, the EU indicated that one of its priorities was to strengthen the UN system and by doing so the EU in effect stated its readiness to contribute to the security of all the other actors in the world. This was again a reference only to the state-Other, which for the EU was the foundational block of the international society: ‘the quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation’ (Ibid., p. 10). The EU thus presented itself as a friend of every state in the world, including rival states if they were prepared to stop their threatening behaviours and return to the international community.
This image was further strengthened by the other ways in which the EU envisaged contributing to the security of every state in the world. The EU wanted to contribute to the strengthening of not only the UN system, but of all international organisations, regimes and treaties and of all regional organisations, like the OSCE, the Council of Europe, ASEAN, MERCOSUR, the African Union (AU), which played an important role in the strengthening of global governance (Ibid.). A special EU contribution to international security was the transatlantic relationship, viewed by the EU as ‘one of the core elements of the international system’ expressed not only through the EU but also through NATO (Ibid.).

However, the ESS also made some important distinctions between different categories of friends. Within the group of its state friend-Others, the EU emphasized the special place of its closest partners, starting with the US. The ESS projected a vision of a world in which the EU and the US acted together in support of international peace and security and thus constituted a ‘formidable force for good in the world’ (Ibid., p. 13). The words were quite strong and had the potential to generate expectations far beyond the potential of the EU as a defence actor and even beyond the potential of cooperation between the EU and the US, thus extending the ‘capabilities-expectations gap’ (Hill, 1993) to more and more areas. Nevertheless, they also illustrated how keen the EU was to represent itself and the US as a defence team acting not only for their own security but also for that of the entire world. The fact that the EU referred to the world was important because in this way it did not project an image in which the EU and the US constituted a security team against the rest of the world, but a security team for the entire world. The EU still took the role of friend in relation to all the state-Others and at the same time also cast the US in the role of a friend of all other state-Others.

None of the other close partners identified by the EU in the ESS received a special treatment like the US. Nevertheless, the other close partners of the EU were still considerably more important than other friend-Others. The EU talked about strategic partnerships with major actors in every area of the world, which in light of the Wendtian theoretical framework appeared as strategic friendships (Wendt, 1999, pp. 298-9). The EU saw itself acting together with its strategic partners to ensure their own security and the security of the entire international society. In this image, the EU took the role of friend in relation to its strategic partners and to the rest of the state-Others and at the same time also cast its strategic partners in the role of friends of the rest of the world.

The EU made a very clear distinction between its most significant friend, the US, and its strategic friends, but it also made distinctions among the latter. The first among the strategic friends was Russia, which was also the closest strategic partner in geographical
terms (Council, 2003q, p. 14). After Russia, the EU referred to Japan, China, Canada and India, a list that raises some questions. The most obvious question relates to the order of this list, which is problematic (Ibid.). This order clearly did not reflect size and international significance. If the list was based on size and international significance, it would have looked like this: China, India, Japan and Canada. And if this was the case, the list should also have included other emerging major powers, especially Brazil.

On the other hand, the order clearly did not reflect closeness of relations with the EU. If closeness of relations was the ordering criterion, the list should have looked like this: Canada, Japan and then India and China at the same level. It is obvious that the list presented by the EU could not be viewed as anything else than as a vague reference to or even an afterthought about the EU’s strategic friends. However, the important aspect was that the EU’s security strategy did make a distinction between general friends, one ‘irreplaceable’ friend and several strategic friends. Those distinctions established different degrees of friendship in the context of the first EU security strategy, but they were also at the same time all oriented towards taking the role of friend in relation to all the other state-Others on the international scene. As a result, the EU’s special friendships were not closed or defensive or offensive security arrangements, but security teams acting not only for their own security but also for the security of everybody else in the international system.

5.4 Conclusion

The analysis undertaken in this chapter focuses on the major events of a very special year in the history of military power Europe. The year 2003 was the year that saw the invasion of Iraq and a major internal EU crisis caused by the divisions between the EU Member States that opposed the US-led military intervention in Iraq and the EU Member States and candidates that supported the invasion and contributed to the US-led operation. The year 2003 was also the year when the EU launched its first military operations and the year when the EU adopted its first ever security strategy.

The analysis shows that the year 2003 had a major impact on the representations of Self in relation to the Other projected by EU action or inaction in the field of defence. Due to its internal divisions over the invasion of Iraq, the EU did not provide military assistance and did not even express support for US action in Iraq. This had major implications for the image of the EU in relation to the US because the EU already had a significant history of presenting itself as the closest friend of the US. However, the image of the EU as the friend of the US was not completely destroyed because the US received assistance and support from a number of EU Member States and candidates, which in fact were about to become a majority of EU
Member States. The contributions made by those EU Member States and candidates also constituted an indirect EU contribution and indirectly maintained the image of the EU as a friend of the US.

While the vanishing of the EU identity in the context of the invasion of Iraq had the effect of eroding the image of the EU as a friend in relation to the EU’s most special Other, the US, the launch of the first EU military operations had the opposite effect. Operations Concordia and Artemis were not only the first practical manifestations of the EU as a military actor, but also the first practical expressions of the EU discourse of friendship towards the Other. They projected an image of the EU as a military actor ready to use its military capabilities to help the Other. However, neither operation Concordia nor operation Artemis projected a pure image of the EU as a prosocial military actor. Both of them projected blurred images in which the image of the EU as a friend of the Other was interlaced with the image of other entities as the ‘real’ friends of the Other behind the EU military operations (NATO in the case of operation Concordia and France in the case of operation Artemis).

Finally, the ESS adopted in 2003, the first EU security strategy, represented both a continuation and a culmination of the EU prosocial discourse in the field of defence. The ESS was essentially a major statement of universal friendship towards the state-Other, but it also drew the limits of the prosocial orientation of the EU as an emerging military actor. The ESS identified the rival-Other as the Other engaged in certain threatening behaviours and presented the EU as a rival of the rival-Other. Nevertheless, the EU responded as a rival only to the non-state rival-Other and to a certain state rival-Other (the rogue state-Other that ‘refuses to rejoin the international community’). In relation to any other state rival-Other, the EU appeared ready to come to their help and thus took the role of friend.

The findings of the analysis undertaken in this chapter show that the year 2003 marked the translation into practice of EU discourse of friendship towards the Other. The EU not only continued to describe itself as a friend of the Other, but also started to act as a friend of the Other. Nevertheless, the events of the year 2003 also cast a shadow of neutrality on the image of the EU as friend of the US-Other and at the same time injected a certain degree of fuzziness in the images of the EU as friend of the Other stemming from the first EU military operations and outlined the limits of the idea of the EU as a universal friend of the Other. The trends that marked the history of images of the EU as a friend of the Other in the very special year 2003 continued in the subsequent years of the first decade of the ESDP, as will be shown in the next chapter.
Chapter 6: Between Friendship and Neutrality

The year 2003 was a very special year in the history of the first decade of the ESDP as well as in international history in general. While at the general international level the year 2003 was special because of the relatively sudden escalation in the ‘global war on terror’ through the invasion of Iraq, at the EU level the year 2003 was special not only because of the Iraq crisis but also because it was the year of the first ESDP operations, including the first EU military operations, and the first EU security strategy. Considering the magnitude of the very special events of 2003, it is not surprising that in the following years the history of the evolving EU defence policy mirrored the events of 2003 and the period between 2004 and 2010 looked like an extension of the year 2003.

The intra-EU and transatlantic divisions appeared to have been eliminated by the end of 2003, when the EU adopted its first security strategy and at the same time issued a unilateral declaration on transatlantic relations. Nevertheless, after 2003 the EU Member States opposed to military action in Iraq continued to keep their distance, in significant contrast to the situation in Afghanistan, where there had been no EU-level military contributions, but where the individual contributions of EU Member States represented an overwhelming majority of the EU’s Member States. The period between 2004 and 2010 also saw an expansion of ESDP military operations through the launch of four new such missions in the Western Balkans and Africa. The same period also saw the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, which was in a way a product of the earlier failure to promote the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe but which has nevertheless made important additions to the evolving ESDP.

This chapter is an analysis of the history of ESDP between 2004 and 2010 that focuses on images of the EU Self in relation to the Other that stem from major EU actions and documents in the area of defence. This perspective constitutes a testing of the EU as military actor against the Wendtian model of prosocial actor outlined in chapters 2 and 3. Together with the previous two chapters, this chapter serves the purpose of answering the question
whether as an emerging military actor the EU supports or impedes the Kantian transition in the international system to a security culture of ‘one for all and all for one’. The analysis starts with the new EU military operations launched between 2004 and 2010 in the Western Balkans and Africa, and then moves on to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The third and final part of this chapter investigates the post-Lisbon consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, enacted on 1 December 2009, and the first five-year review of the European Security Strategy conducted by the EU in 2008.

### 6.1 New EU military operations

Between 2004 and 2010, the EU launched five new military operations within the framework of the ESDP, one in the Western Balkans (EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina) and four in Africa (EUFOR RD Congo, EUFOR Tchad/RCA, EUNAVFOR Atalanta off the coast of Somalia and EUTM Somalia). In 2005, the EU also launched a mixed ‘civilian-military action’ in support of the AU’s enhanced mission to Sudan/Darfur.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, like in FYROM before, the EU took over from NATO, which had been present in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995. The EU first signalled its intention to take over from NATO in December 2002 (Council, 2002f), but the internal crisis triggered in 2003 by the invasion of Iraq delayed that decision (Keohane, 2009, p. 212). In the meantime, the EU deployed a police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in January 2003, which was in fact the first ever ESDP mission, but it was a civilian operation, not a military one (Merlingen, 2009, p. 161). Operation Althea was eventually deployed by the EU on 2 December 2004, after NATO decided to end its operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the UN Security Council authorised the EU to take over (Ibid., p. 213).

The other four military operations launched by the EU between 2004 and 2010 took place in Africa. EUFOR RD Congo was the second EU military operation in DRC, after operation Artemis of 2003, and had the same aim as the earlier operation, namely to support the UN operation in that country (MONUC). In December 2005 the UN invited the EU to consider the possibility of deploying a military force to assist MONUC during the elections planned in DRC for summer 2006 (Major, 2009, p. 312). At that time, the EU had already provided substantial security assistance for the transition process in DRC, both civilian (EUPOL Kinshasha and EUSEC RD Congo, both launched in 2005) and military (EUFOR Artemis, launched and concluded in 2003). The EU expressed support for the UN request in March 2006, and in April 2006 the UN Security Council authorised the EU deployment (Ibid.). EUFOR RD Congo was launched on 30 July 2006 and lasted until 30 November 2006 (Ibid., p. 311).
In Chad and CAR, EUFOR Tchad/RCA complemented the UN Mission to Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) (Helly, 2009b, p. 341). EUFOR Tchad/RCA was primarily the outcome of a French initiative to address the consequences of the Darfur crisis, whose effects were spilling over into Chad and CAR together with the flows of refugees (Ibid., p. 340). The first French proposal for the EU to act in Chad was made on 21 May 2007 and was followed by the establishment of an EU Joint Planning Group relying mostly on French planning capacities (Ibid.). France played the main role in convincing European partners and the reluctant Chadian authorities to engage in and contribute to a new EU military operation (Ibid., p. 341). The UN Security Council approved the EU operation and its mandate on 25 September 2007. The EU operation was aimed at protecting civilians in danger, improving security for the delivery of humanitarian aid and the movement of humanitarian personnel and contributing to the security of UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment (Ibid.). EUFOR Tchad/RCA was deployed on 15 March 2008 and concluded on 15 March 2009.

Until the end of 2008 all EU military operations were land operations, but on 19 November 2008 the EU marked a new ESDP premiere by launching the first EU naval military operation. EUNAVFOR Atalanta was launched for the purpose of deterring and combating piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden (Helly, 2009c, p. 392). The concerns expressed by shipping companies, freight forwarders, insurance companies and the International Maritime Organisation in connection with the security situation off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden eventually led to requests for assistance from the navies (Ibid., p. 394). The EU was directly affected by this situation because the Gulf of Aden was transited by 95% of EU Member States’ trade transported by sea (Ibid.). In that context, many EU Member States became ready to deploy naval assets in the region in the framework of the ESDP (Ibid.).

A first step was taken in September 2008 through the establishment of a coordination cell, NAVCO, aimed at supporting the deployment of military assets to assist commercial and humanitarian vessels (Ibid., pp. 394-5; Council, 2008d). The activities of EU NAVCO were subsequently included in the mandate of EU NAVFOR Atalanta, which was based on several UN Security Council resolutions urging the states cooperating with Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government to coordinate anti-piracy activities, to protect WFP vessels and to enhance judicial and anti-crime cooperation (Helly, 2009c, p. 395).

Somalia was also the target of a military mission launched by the EU in 2010 to contribute to the training of Somali security forces (Council, 2010a, b, c). The EU had already been involved in the process of stabilising Somalia, but that involvement had not included a
military contribution (Council, 2010d). The Council of the EU agreed to launch a military mission in support of this process amid growing concerns about the deteriorating situation in Somalia (Council, 2010a). The EU Somalia Training Mission, or ‘EUTM Somalia’, was agreed by the Council on 25 January 2010 (Ibid.) and launched on 7 April 2010 (Council, 2010b, c).

EUTM Somalia was launched in support of Resolution 1872 adopted by the UN Security Council in 2009 and has operated in close cooperation with other international actors, in particular the UN, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the US (Council, 2010e). EUTM Somalia was launched with the purpose of strengthening the Transitional Federal Government and the institutions of Somalia by providing specific military training for the Somali security forces (Ibid.). Nevertheless, the mission was not deployed to Somalia itself, but to Uganda. Uganda is the country where the training of the Somali forces has been carried on and also the country that hosts the mission headquarters (Ibid.). This mission is due to last until 2011 and involves approximately 150 EU personnel (Ibid.).

Besides these four military operations relating to Africa, the EU also launched a mixed ‘civilian-military action’ in support of the African Union Mission in Sudan/Darfur (AMIS) (Council, 2008a). The EU support action for AMIS II was launched in July 2007 at the request of the AU (Ibid.). The AU mission had been deployed since May 2004 to monitor the humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement of 2004 and subsequent agreements and to improve security for the delivery of humanitarian aid and the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (Ibid.). AMIS became AMIS II in October 2004, following the decision to expand and enhance the mandate of this AU mission (Ibid.). As a mixed operation, the EU support action for AMIS II also included a military component comprising not only military experts and observers, but also coordinated strategic airlifts for over 2000 AU personnel (Ibid.). This mixed EU mission lasted until December 2007, when the AU’s mandate expired and AMIS handed over to the joint AU/UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur (UNAMID) (Ibid.).

The image of Self projected by the EU through the EU military operations launched between 2004 and 2010 was a reproduction and at the same time also an enhancement of the earlier images of the EU as a friend of the Other projected by operations Concordia and Artemis. By using its military capabilities to provide security assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in DRC, in Chad, in Somalia and in Sudan/Darfur, the EU took the role of friend in relation to those Others. At the same time, the EU also took the role of friend in relation to the NATO-Other and the UN-Other because the situation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina had been a security concern for NATO as well as for the entire UN community. The cases of DRC, Chad, Somalia and Sudan/Darfur on the other hand had not been on the NATO agenda, but they had been security concerns for the AU and UN communities. By offering to help in situations that were a source of wider security concern, the EU took the role of friend not only in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, DRC, Chad, Somalia and Sudan/Darfur, but also to everybody else in the North-Atlantic, the AU and the UN communities. Thus, between 2004 and 2010 the EU did the same thing as in the earlier cases of FYROM and DRC and continued to reproduce the image of the Self as a friend of the Other.

In fact, the images of EU friendship towards the Other projected by the EU military operations launched between 2004 and 2010 were even stronger than the similar messages conveyed by the earlier operations Concordia and Artemis because later EU deployments were larger. Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the largest deployment of EU peacekeepers in the first ten years of the ESDP. In 2004, the EU deployed 7,000 troops in the framework of operation Althea, with the primary mandate to ensure compliance with the 1995 Dayton Agreement (Keohane, 2009, p. 213). It was a very large deployment by comparison with Concordia (around 350 troops) and even with Artemis (about 2,000 troops). However, the initial deployment was later downsized until it reached the level of 2,200 troops in 2009 (Ibid., p. 211). Nevertheless, as the most significant EU deployment during the first decade of the ESDP, operation Althea represented a major contribution to the strengthening of the image of the EU as a friend of the Other by conveying the message that the EU was ready to undertake even larger deployments in order to provide military assistance for Others.

Deployments in the frameworks of EU military operations in DRC, Chad and Somalia were comparable to operation Artemis, but much larger than operation Concordia and one of them was also much longer than both Artemis and Concordia. The second largest EU military operation after operation Althea was operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA. EUFOR Tchad/RCA had the strength of 3,700 troops and lasted for a full year (Helly, 2009b, p. 339). EUFOR RD Congo and EUNAVFOR Atalanta were comparable in terms of troop deployments between themselves as well as with the earlier operation Artemis, but by the end of 2009 EUNAVFOR Atalanta already had a much longer duration than the other two. EUFOR RD Congo totalled 2,400 troops and lasted for four months, thus being comparable with operation Artemis, which amounted to 2,000 troops and lasted for almost three months (Major, 2009, p. 311; Helly, 2009a, p. 181). EUNAVFOR Atalanta amounted to around 2,000 troops and by the end of 2009 it had been in place for more than one year (Helly, 2009c, pp. 391-2). These aspects made EUNAVFOR Atalanta the third most significant EU military operation after operations
EUFOR Althea and EUFOR Tchad/RCA. Like operation Althea, the other EU military deployments represented not only reproductions of the image of the EU as a friend of the Other, but also enhancements of that image because they represented increases in both the level and the duration of EU military deployments to provide security assistance for the Other.

EUTM Somalia and the EU support action for AMIS II were smaller by comparison with other EU operations in Africa, but they too contributed to the strengthening of the image of the EU as a friend of the Other because they represented an expansion of the EU contribution to the security of the Other. Thus, EUTM Somalia added to the positive effect of EUNAVFOR Atalanta on the image of the EU as a friend of the African and UN Other. Similarly, the EU support action for AMIS II represented an addition to the EU contribution to the security efforts of the AU and the UN and therefore had a positive impact on the image of the EU as a friend of the African and UN Other.

Although the EU military operations launched between 2004 and 2010 strengthened the image of the EU as a friend of the Other, they did not make that image clearer. Between 2004 and 2010, the EU continued to project images of the Self as a friend of the Other that were intertwined with images of other actors as the ‘real’ friends of the Other behind the EU military operations. Thus, in the case of operation Althea the image of the EU as a friend of the Other was interlaced with an image of NATO as the true or real friend of the Other, just as in the case of the earlier military operation Concordia in FYROM. Approximately 80% of the EU troops deployed in 2004 in the framework of operation Althea were in fact troops that were already in Bosnia and Herzegovina and had been part of NATO’s Stabilisation Force (SFOR) (Keohane, 2009, p. 213). NATO had been present in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995, when 60,000 troops were deployed there under the Implementation Force (IFOR) for the purpose of assisting the implementation of the Dayton Agreement (Ibid., p. 212). IFOR was replaced in December 1996 by another NATO force (SFOR) made of 30,000 troops in December 1996 (Ibid.). Subsequently, SFOR was further downsized until it was eventually replaced by operation Althea.

Moreover, like the earlier military operation in FYROM (Concordia), operation Althea was carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin-plus arrangements (Ibid., p. 213). Operation Althea had its own chain-of-command answering to the Council of the EU, but the operational chain-of-command was managed through NATO (Keohane, 2009, p. 213). Moreover, EUFOR used NATO’s SHAPE headquarters for operational planning and NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) acted as EUFOR operational commander (Keohane, 2009, p. 215). Thus, the EU’s reliance on troops already on the ground as part of the previous NATO operation and recourse to other
NATO assets and capabilities introduced a NATO component in the image of the EU as a friend of the Other stemming from operation Althea. As in the case of operation Concordia, the presence of NATO elements had the effect of suggesting that the real friend of the Other behind operation Althea was again NATO. Consequently, the image of the EU as a friend of the Other projected by operation Althea was as blurry as that projected by operation Concordia because it was interlaced with an image of NATO as the real friend of the Other behind EU military operations.

The images of the EU as a friend of the Other projected by operations EUFOR RD Congo and EUFOR Tchad/RCA suffered from the same blurriness as the image projected by operation Althea. However, in the case of the former the apparent real friend of the Other behind the EU operation was not NATO, but France. France was the largest contributor to EUFOR RD Congo, accounting for 1,090 personnel out of the mission total of 2,400 (Major, 2009, p. 311). On the other hand, the second largest contributor, Germany (780 personnel), had to be pressured to take a leading role in terms of both providing troops and command structures (Major, 2009, p. 315). As a result, France appeared as the real driving force behind operation EUFOR RD Congo and therefore the image of the EU as a friend of the Other was not crystal-clear, but intertwined with an image of France as the real friend of the Other behind the EU military operation. The same effect also stemmed from EUFOR Tchad/RCA, where the driving force was again France because that mission was based on a French initiative and France also played a major role in mobilising other EU Member States to make contributions (Helly, 2009b, pp. 340-1).

The military operations launched by the EU between 2004 and 2010 also reproduced the third-party dimension of the prosocial orientation of earlier EU military operations. EUFOR Althea had five third-party contributors (Albania, Chile, Switzerland, Turkey, FYROM), EUFOR RD Congo two (Turkey and Switzerland), EUFOR Tchad/RCA three (Russia, Albania and Croatia) and EUNAVFOR Atalanta two (Croatia and Norway) (Keohane, 2009; Major, 2009; Helly, 2009b, 2009c). Through the non-EU contributions the EU effectively put the non-EU participants in the position of taking the same role as the EU in relation to the Other, namely the role of friend. In other words, the EU not only took the role of friend of the Other but also encouraged others to take the same role.

However, only two of those operations had ‘real’ third-party contributors. Non-EU contributors from the European Free Trade Association (Norway and Switzerland) and from the Western Balkans as well as Turkey were very close associates of the EU and most of them already had been given the perspective of EU membership. This left only Russia and Chile as real third-party contributors to the EU military operations launched between 2004 and 2010.
As a result, the third-party dimension of the prosocial orientation of those EU military operations was maintained at the same level with the earlier operation Artemis in terms of the number of non-EU contributors, but the non-EU participants were different and this contributed to the strengthening of the image of the EU as an open friend that encourages all other actors to take the role of friend in relation to the Other.

This discussion shows that after launching the first military operations in 2003 the EU continued to strengthen its image as a friend of the Other by launching new military operations in the Western Balkans and Africa. Nevertheless, this image continued to be fuzzy because most of the new EU operations relied on military capabilities associated primarily with another organisation (NATO) or with one of the EU Member States (France). However, between 2004 and 2010 the image of the EU as a friend of the Other was not affected only by the fact that it was intertwined with images of other actors as the real friends behind EU operations, but also by shadows of neutrality and reluctant friendship that persisted in the context of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

6.2 Iraq and Afghanistan

Between 2004 and 2010 the EU launched five new military operations, but at the same time made no direct military contribution to the main military events of the early twenty-first century, namely the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. After the US declaration on the end of major combat operations in Iraq, the US-led military operation in Iraq became a protracted conflict with increasing levels of violence (PBS Newshour, 2006). The year 2007 saw a surge in the number of US troops in Iraq, preparing the ground for the planned reduction in troops and transfer of security responsibilities to the Iraqi authorities (White House, 2007). The surge was followed by a decrease in the levels of violence, by up to 40-80% by early 2008 according to the Pentagon (CNN, 2008), and the gradual exit of other coalition members.

The US was from the beginning the main actor in the Iraq War and the organiser and leader of the coalition of multinational forces operating in Iraq, but it also received more or less substantial assistance from many other states, including many EU Member States. However, there was no direct EU military contribution and some EU Member States were opposed to military action and in the end decided to stand aside completely. This had major implications for the image of the EU as a very close friend of the US projected by the EU at the level of discourse.

Similar to what happened before and during the initial invasion of Iraq, EU behaviour in the context of the Iraq War continued to undermine the image of the EU as a friend of the US by casting a shadow of neutrality. The persistent absence of an EU contribution to the
US-led military operations in Iraq conveyed the message that the EU was not ready to use its newly developed military capabilities to help the US. As a consequence, the EU did not take the role of friend in relation to the US, thus undermining one of the central images of Self as a friend of the Other embedded in EU defence policy discourse.

However, not taking the role of friend is not the same as taking the role of rival. There is a crucial difference between the readiness to use military capabilities to help the Other (Wendt, 1999, pp. 298-9) and the readiness to use military capabilities against the Other (Ibid., pp. 279-83). The fact that the EU did not use its military capabilities to help the US was not sufficient to create an image of the EU as a rival of the US because unwillingness to help the Other does not necessarily imply a willingness to attack the Other. Instead, EU unwillingness to help the US projected an image of the EU as a neutral actor, an actor that would not use its military capabilities against the Other but would not use those capabilities to help the Other either.

This image of the EU as a neutral actor in the context of the Iraq War was in stark contrast with the revived EU discourse about Self as a very close friend of the US-Other. The security strategy adopted by the EU in 2003, the most prominent conceptual document of the first ten years of ESDP, and the unilateral declaration on transatlantic relations adopted by the EU on the same occasion both talked about the EU and the US as acting together against security threats as a ‘formidable force for good in the world’ (Council, 2003p, 2003q). Thus, EU security and defence discourse projected an image of the EU as an actor ready to use its capabilities, including its military capabilities, to help the US tackle security threats. The situation in Iraq may have been regarded as the outcome of flawed US policy but once created it became a major security problem for every member of the international community, not just for Iraq and the US. The EU may have been ‘right’ to keep its distance from a situation that it blamed on the actions of the US, but this also conveyed the message that EU willingness to act together with the US against security threats was not unconditional and that there can be very serious situations where that willingness to help the US does not apply.

Nevertheless, the image of the EU as a friend of the US was not completely wiped out in the context of the Iraq War. The EU did launch an ESDP operation for Iraq, but it was a very small civilian operation that was not even deployed inside Iraq (Korski, 2009, pp. 231-232). EUJUST LEX Iraq was deployed in July 2005 with a total strength of 30 and contributions from 17 EU Member States and candidates. The operation was aimed at strengthening the rule of law and promoting respect for human rights in Iraq and consisted mainly of training courses for high and middle level officials in senior management and criminal investigation (Ibid., p. 231; Council, 2005).
However, not even that small operation was deployed inside Iraq, because EU Member States could not agree to do so that early after the intra-European and transatlantic crisis over the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Korski, 2009). All EU governments professed support for EUJUST LEX Iraq and the EU states that assisted the US during the initial invasion even wanted a robust EU engagement. Other EU states, however, opposed an in-country role for EUJUST LEX by invoking the volatile security situation in Iraq. The latter included EU states like France, which had opposed military intervention in Iraq from the beginning, and Spain, which assisted the US during the initial phase of the Iraq War but then exited Iraq after the Madrid train bombings of 11 March 2004 and the change of government that followed those attacks.

EUJUST LEX Iraq was not a military operation and therefore did not change the message that the EU was not ready to use its military capabilities to help the US. However, as a civilian ESDP operation, EUJUST LEX was the next best thing that the EU could do to help the Other in the security and defence area. Therefore, EUJUST LEX Iraq had at least a minimum contribution to maintaining a minimum semblance of the EU as a friend of the US by conveying the message that although it was not willing to use its military capabilities to act together with the US against a major security threat, at least the EU was prepared to use other security instruments to provide some assistance for US-led operations in Iraq.

Nevertheless, even this minimal image was very fragile because of the size and limitations of EUJUST LEX Iraq. A strength of only 30 people made EUJUST LEX Iraq look like a very small EU gesture when compared with the strengths of other EU operations. On top of this, the limitations that prevented a direct EU presence in Iraq further undermined any idea that the EU was a real friend of the US and not just a neutral actor that would stand aside while the US struggles with a major security threat.

Between 2004 and 2010 there was very little at the EU level to reproduce the image of the EU as a friend of the US. As before and during the initial US-led invasion of Iraq, the image of the EU as a friend of the US was reproduced only indirectly by the actions of some of the EU’s Member States. Most of the EU states that provided the US with military assistance during and immediately after the invasion of Iraq continued to do so after 2003. Those contributions were national contributions and therefore they conveyed national messages of friendship towards the US. However, the actions of the EU’s Member States do not involve only their national identities, but also the EU identity. No matter what they do or want, as long as they are members of the EU the EU Member States will never be regarded only in terms of their national identities. They will always carry the EU identity alongside
their national identity and other identities like NATO or the UN. As a result, their actions will always also be indirectly associated with the EU.

Thus, even though the actions of EU contributors to US-led military operations in Iraq were national actions, they were also indirectly associated with the EU and therefore also constituted indirect EU actions. Therefore, the messages of friendship towards the US conveyed by the EU contributors to the Iraq War were also indirect messages of EU friendship towards the US. In this way, although there was no direct EU action in the context of the Iraq War, the image of the EU as a friend of the US was still reproduced in that context, indirectly, through the contributions made by some EU Member States.

By 2004, the EU contributors to the Iraq War represented a majority of EU Member States, but that year also marked the beginning of the withdrawal of EU Member States from military operations in Iraq. The first EU Member States starting to withdraw from Iraq were Spain and Hungary, in 2004 (BBC News, 2004a, b). In Spain, the terrorist attacks of 11 March 2004 led to a change in government in the elections of 14 March 2004 and the subsequent withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq in April 2004 (BBC News, 2004a). Portugal left Iraq in 2005 (ABC News, 2005), Italy in 2006 (BBC News, 2005a), Denmark and Slovakia in 2007 (BBC News, 2007a; Sydney Morning Herald, 2007), Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland in 2008 (Novinite.com, 2008; Radio Prague, 2007; Baltic Times, 2007; 2008; Associated Press, 2008), and Estonia, Romania and the United Kingdom in 2009 (CNN, 2009; Xinhua, 2009; Guardian, 2008b).

At first sight, this gradual withdrawal from Iraq could be interpreted as a trend that undermined images of Self as a friend of the US, including that indirect image of the EU as a friend of the US. However, only the pre-2008 withdrawals may be framed as signs of a fading in the willingness of EU contributors to continue to assist the US in Iraq. In 2007, the US announced a troop surge in Iraq and the intention to start withdrawing American troops from that country (White House, 2007; BBC News, 2007c). In 2008 the Pentagon reported a 40-80% reduction in violence in Iraq by March 2008 (CNN, 2008) and in December the same year the Iraqi Government approved the US-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) providing among other things for the withdrawal of US troops from Iraqi cities by 30 June 2009 and a complete withdrawal of US forces from Iraq by the end of 2011 (BBC News, 2008b; White House, 2008).

Thus, the gradual withdrawal of EU contributors from the US-led coalition in Iraq in 2008 and 2009 was in line with a shift in US policy in the same direction and therefore went along with and not against US policy in Iraq. As a consequence, the withdrawal of the EU
contributors did not undermine their image as friends of the US and thus their indirect contribution to the reproduction of the image of the EU as a friend of the US did not suffer.

The main factor undermining the image of the EU as a friend of the US after 2003 was the behaviour of the EU states that were against the US-led invasion and then continued to keep their distance from the US-led operations in Iraq (Allen and Smith, 2004, pp. 95-6). The absent EU states included two of the largest EU Member States, France and Germany, alongside some of the smaller EU Member States. Through their absence, those EU Member States conveyed the message that they were not willing to use their capabilities to help the US tackle a major security threat. This message was not compatible with the role of friend, which is based on the willingness of the Self to assist the Other (Wendt, 1999, pp. 298-9).

However, this message was not associated with the role of rival either because it did not necessarily imply that the Self may use violence against the Other (Ibid., pp. 279-83). The absent EU states projected an image of themselves as neutral actors in relation to the US. Their message was that they were not considering the use or threat of violence against the US but they were not willing to help the US either. This message placed them somewhere between the role of rival and that of friend, in a neutral position that was not sufficient for sustaining an image of their Selves as friends of the US-Other. Indirectly, through their association with the EU identity, they also undermined the image of the EU as a friend of the US and this was particularly damaging after the end of 2003 when the EU adopted a security strategy and a declaration on transatlantic relations that presented the EU and its Member States as very close and very determined friends of the US, ready to stand alongside the US in the fight against major security threats (Council, 2003p, 2003q).

The conflict in Afghanistan followed a slightly different course by comparison with the conflict in Iraq and so did the behaviour of the EU Member States, with different effects on the image of the EU as a friend of the US. The War in Afghanistan was the original ‘war on terror’, launched on 7 October 2001 in reaction to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (White House, 2001; Guardian, 2001), but then gradually became the ‘forgotten war on terror’ after the US and its allies shifted their focus to the conflict in Iraq (PBS NOW, 2008). In 2003 the main focus shifted to the Iraq War and the War in Afghanistan suddenly appeared like a secondary concern for the US-led ‘coalition of the willing’ despite signs of renewed Taliban activity (Christian Science Monitor, 2003a, b).

The situation in Afghanistan continued to deteriorate and prompted coalition forces to renew their offensive against the Taliban and shift the focus from the war in Iraq back to the war in Afghanistan. In 2008, as it was winding down the 2007 troop surge in Iraq, the US started to increase its troop numbers in Afghanistan, including by shifting some troops from
In 2009, the deteriorating security situation in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and the lessons learned from the troop surge in Iraq led the US to decide further increases in the number of US troops in Afghanistan (USA Today, 2009). This trend culminated on 1 December 2009, when the US president announced the decision to send another 30,000 extra troops to Afghanistan (White House, 2009b).

As in Iraq, the US has been the main actor and contributor in the context of military operations in Afghanistan. The US-led Operation Enduring Freedom, launched on 7 October 2001 (White House, 2001), has been based primarily on US troops and the US has also been the main contributor to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, established by the UN shortly after the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom (UN Security Council, 2001). At the same time, both Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF received contributions from many other states, including most members of the European Union. In October 2001 the US reported that it had recorded pledges of support for military operations in Afghanistan from over sixty states, including from all fifteen members of the then EU and from nine of the then thirteen EU candidates (Congressional Research Service, 2001).

By May 2002, the US allies were contributing more than 7,000 troops to Operation Enduring Freedom and to ISAF, representing more than half of the 14,000 non-Afghan forces in Afghanistan (US Department of State, 2002). In 2002 the allied contributions included contributions from twelve of the then 15 EU Member States and from nine of the then thirteen EU candidates (Ibid.). The contributions made by the EU Member States to military operations in Afghanistan were channelled through the national level, the NATO level and the UN level and not through the EU level. None of the military contributions made by EU Member States to operations in Afghanistan were direct EU military contributions and this aspect had significant consequences for the image of the EU as a friend of the US.

As in the case of the Iraq War, the absence of a direct EU military contribution to either Operation Enduring Freedom or ISAF had the effect of undermining the image of the EU as a friend of the US. The continued reproduction of that image requires the EU to use EU military capabilities to provide security assistance for the US. When it does so, the EU conveys the message that it is ready to use its capabilities to help the US and thus takes the role of friend in relation to the US-Other (Wendt, 1999, pp. 298-9). When it does not do so, the EU conveys the message that it is not willing to use its military capabilities to help the US and thus falls back in the role of a neutral actor that has no intention to use its military capabilities against the US but does not want to use those capabilities to help the US either.
Nevertheless, the lack of a direct EU contribution to military operations in Afghanistan has to be placed in context. When those operations were launched, the EU was only about to declare its military capabilities operational (Council, 2001e) and even that declaration was regarded as premature because the EU was able to launch the first ESDP operations only in 2003 (Marsh and Mackenstein, 2005, p. 69; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 199). Against this background, the EU absence in the early stages of the conflict in Afghanistan was more easily justified as a lack of capabilities than a lack of will and therefore the negative impact on the image of the EU as a friend of the US was weaker than in the case of the Iraq War. However, the EU continued to be absent from military operations in Afghanistan even after the launch of the first EU military operations in 2003. This continued EU absence maintained a high level of pressure on the image of the EU as a friend of the US.

Although there was no direct EU military presence in Afghanistan, this did not mean an absolute absence of the EU identity in the context of military operations in that country. As in the case of the Iraq War, the image of the EU as a friend of the US was not completely wiped out because the EU contributed a civilian mission to the operations in Afghanistan, EUPOL Afghanistan. Launched on 15 June 2007, it was a much larger operation than the ESDP mission for Iraq, EUJUST LEX Iraq, reaching the strength of 225 out of the authorised 400 by mid-March 2009 (Peral, 2009, p. 325). As in Iraq, although the EU mission was not a military operation, it was still an EU contribution that could also be seen as security assistance for the US and therefore had the effect of maintaining a minimum indirect reproduction of the image of the EU as a friend of the US. However, it could not completely compensate the impression that the EU had declared its military capabilities operational (Council, 2001e), had repeatedly described itself as the closest friend of the US (Council, 2003p, 2003q) and then failed to use its military capabilities to help the US and the rest of the international community in Afghanistan. This dissonant message could only be compensated by the contributions made by individual EU Member States.

The complete absence of any direct EU military contribution to operations in Afghanistan had a negative impact on the image of the EU as a friend of the US, but that image received indirect support from the military contributions made by EU Member States. By December 2009, the contributions made by EU Member States accounted for 30,479 ISAF troops out of the ISAF total of 84,150 troops, representing 36.22% of ISAF (NATO, 2009). It can be argued that the military contributions made by EU Member States in Afghanistan can only be regarded as national contributions or as NATO or UN contributions, but not as EU contributions. However, as in Iraq, in Afghanistan the EU Member States carried with them not only their national or NATO or UN identities, but also the identity of ‘EU Member State’.
As a consequence, although their contributions in Afghanistan were not channelled through the EU to constitute a direct EU contribution, those contributions still engaged the EU identity, indirectly, and therefore also constituted indirect EU contributions.

What was even more important in the case of Afghanistan was that there were no divisions among the EU Member States as the ones manifested in the context of the Iraq War (Allen and Smith, 2004, pp. 95-6). In contrast with the Iraq War, the operations in Afghanistan received contributions from most members of the EU, including the most prominent opponents to the invasion of Iraq, namely France and Germany (US Department of State, 2002). This aspect strengthened the indirect contribution that the EU Member States made to the reproduction of the image of the EU as a friend of the US by participating alongside the US in the military effort in Afghanistan.

Although most EU Member States made contributions to the US-led military operations in Afghanistan, most of them were also reluctant to answer US calls for increases in their troop contributions. By the end of 2009, when it was preparing to announce a new surge in US troops in Afghanistan, the US had already been complaining for a long time about the reluctance of other NATO members, most of which were also EU members, to increase their contributions to military operations in Afghanistan (Reuters, 2008). The reluctance of most EU members of NATO to significantly enhance their military presence in Afghanistan had the effect of undermining their individual images as friends of the US. Indirectly, that reluctance of the EU members of NATO also eroded the image of the EU as a friend of the US.

However, reluctance to increase contributions is not the same thing as not contributing or retracting contributions. The message conveyed by the reluctance of the EU members of NATO was not that they, and indirectly the EU, were not friends of the US or that they were neutral actors that would not think about using their military capabilities against the US but would not use those capabilities to help the US either. Instead, the message was that they were reluctant friends, willing to use their military capabilities to help the US but within certain limits that the US regarded as insufficient. The major exception was the UK, which maintained all along an image of Self as a friend of the US that was more intense than that of any other EU member of NATO (Agence France Press, 2009a, b).

Like in Iraq, the prominence of the UK as the main EU contributor to the US-led military effort in Afghanistan had significant implications for images of the EU Self as a friend of the US-Other. The effect was similar to what was happening in the Western Balkans and Africa, where the image of the EU as a friend of the Other was intertwined with images of other actors as the real friends of the other behind the EU military operations. In Afghanistan,
like in Iraq, the image of the EU as a friend of the Other was not only an indirect projection coming from the national level, but also a blurry projection that also included an image of the UK as the real or the really significant EU friend of the US Other.

In the end, the reluctance of EU members of NATO to increase their contributions to military operations in Afghanistan was not a fatal blow to their image as friends of the US because they eventually agreed to send more troops to Afghanistan. US calls for more NATO troops to be sent to Afghanistan intensified as the US president was preparing to announce a surge in US troops in Afghanistan in 2009-2010 (Times, 2009). The first EU member of NATO to announce new increases in its troop numbers in Afghanistan was, unsurprisingly, the UK (Agence France Press, 2009a). Other EU members of NATO initially continued to be reluctant to pledge more troops for Afghanistan (Agence France Press, 2009c), but eventually accepted the US request (Agence France Press, 2009d; Reuters, 2009).

By eventually answering US calls for more military contributions to operations in Afghanistan, NATO members and partners, including the EU members of NATO, reproduced their image as friends of the US and indirectly also the image of the EU as a friend of the US. Nevertheless, the apparent reluctance with which they did so had the effect of qualifying that image and presenting them as reluctant friends of the US, and not as unconditional friends of the American Other.

Thus, in the context of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the main military events of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the image of the EU as a friend of the US-Other was only an indirect product of the military contributions made by individual EU Member States. Even this indirect image was further weakened by a shadow of neutrality in the context of the Iraq war and a shadow of reluctance in the context of the Afghanistan war. Moreover, the indirect image of the EU as a friend of the US was also intertwined with an image of the UK as the real or the most important friend of the US in the EU. The problems confronting the image of the EU as a friend of the US Other were in stark contrast to the EU discourse of friendship towards the US Other and towards the general Other, which was again reinforced by the security strategy review conducted in 2008 and in the post-Lisbon consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, enacted on 1 December 2009.

6.3 The Treaty of Lisbon enters into force

While they were launching new EU military operations in the Western Balkans and Africa and making individual contributions to US-led military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the EU Member States also continued the process of developing the concept and capabilities of the evolving EU defence policy. The special year of 2003 was also the year when the
Constitution on the Future of Europe concluded its work and presented the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution of Europe, later rejected by referendum in France and the Netherlands and eventually aborted and replaced with the Treaty of Lisbon amending the EU’s existing treaty base. Nevertheless, after 2003 the development of the ESDP continued to concentrate on the same major priorities that had been dominant since the 1999 Cologne Council launched that process, namely the development of the ESDP’s institutions and capabilities.

In 2004, the EU approved the ‘2010 Headline Goal’, envisaging the creation of rapidly deployable battalion-sized ‘battle groups’, decided to establish the European Defence Agency and adopted a civilian headline goal with a 2008 deadline (Council, 2009a, pp. 6-7). In 2005, the EU created the European Security and Defence College and in 2006 the European Defence Agency adopted a ‘long-term vision’ on the future development of European military capabilities (Ibid., p. 7). Of course, not everything went smoothly and in November 2007 the EU Member States had to replace the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 with a new Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (Ibid.). In 2008, the EU Member States adopted two ministerial commitments on the development of capabilities, one on civilian capabilities and one on military capabilities, and a declaration on the strengthening of capabilities, and then conducted the first review of the security strategy adopted in 2003 (Ibid.).

In the meantime, the EU and its Member States were also navigating through a very serious crisis triggered by the rejection of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, drafted by the Convention on the Future of Europe in 2003 and signed by the Member States in 2004. The proposed constitutional treaty was rejected by referendum in France in May 2005 and in the Netherlands in June the same year (BBC News, 2005b, c). The Member States reacted by aborting the draft constitutional treaty (BBC News, 2005d) and proposing instead a new amending treaty aimed at adjusting the EU’s institutional mechanisms to a Union of 27 and more (BBC News, 2007b). The Treaty of Lisbon was signed on 13 December 2007 (BBC News, 2007d) and entered into force on 1 December 2009 (BBC News, 2009b). The delay was due to its initial rejection in Ireland, where a second referendum accepted it only on 2 October 2009 (BBC News, 2008a; 2009a).

The Treaty of Lisbon focused mainly on institutional aspects, including in the external policy areas, and introduced the post of President of the European Council (Treaty on European Union, 2008, pp. 22-3), appointed for a renewable term of 2.5 years and responsible for the chairmanship of the European Council and for the external representation of the EU on issues of common foreign and security policy, and that of High Representative for the CFSP (Ibid., pp. 26-7), who is at the same time Vice-President of the Commission, assisted by a new
European diplomatic service, the European External Action Service (EEAS). Besides these key institutional changes in the CFSP area, the Treaty of Lisbon also introduced specific changes and additions in the ESDP area, most notably by providing for mutual aid and assistance between Member States in the event of armed aggression (Ibid., p. 39). However, in the defence area the main focus was on institutional mechanisms and capabilities, like the possibility of ‘permanent structured cooperation’ and the agency for armaments, research and military capabilities, the European Defence Agency (Ibid., 2008, pp. 38-9).

The Treaty of Lisbon did not bring significant changes at the level of the image of the EU as a friend of the Other embedded in the Treaty on European Union. As in the original Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht and in its post-Amsterdam and post-Nice consolidated versions, in the post-Lisbon version the first references to the relationship between the EU and the Other still projected an image of the EU as a selfish actor. In Article 3(5) of the post-Lisbon EU Treaty, the EU first stated that in its relations with the external world the main priority was to ‘uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens’ (Ibid., p. 17). This was a statement of self interest that referred only to the Self and did not take into account the interest or fate of the Other. On the contrary, the idea of the EU promoting its values may be seen as a statement against the Other, more specifically against the Other whose values are different from those of the EU. The opening statement of Article 3(5) thus left ample space to be interpreted as an unfriendly statement.

Nevertheless, the rest of Article 3(5) projected a different representation of the EU in relation to the Other because it expressed the EU’s readiness to contribute to the peace and security of the entire world (Ibid., p. 17). This idea constituted a general or universal statement of friendship towards the Other. In contrast to the opening sentence, the EU did not refer only to its own security but to the security of everybody else in the world. As a result, the EU made the security of everybody else part of its own security and in this way conveyed the message that it did not only respect the security of the Other but also cared about the Other and was ready to help the Other. This was a statement of friendship, in the Wendtian sense, in which the EU took the role of a friend of the Other and at the same time cast the Other in the same role (Wendt, 1999, pp. 298-9; 341-2). Consequently, the image projected by Article 3(5) of the post-Lisbon EU Treaty had a mixed character, combining both egoistic and prosocial elements.

The prosocial element introduced by Article 3(5) was also repeated in Articles 21(2)(a), part of the treaty’s general provisions on the Union’s external action, and 42(1), part of the specific provisions on the common security and defence policy. Like in the earlier
versions of the EU Treaty, the ESDP continued to have an outward orientation by definition. Article 42(1) stated that the EU’s security and defence capabilities, both civilian and military, could be used on ‘missions outside the Union’ (Treaty on European Union, 2008, p. 39). In other words, the ESDP was specifically dedicated to the EU’s relations with the Other in the external world.

However, its primary purpose was to contribute to peace-keeping, conflict prevention and the strengthening of international security and this gave the ESDP a prosocial orientation because in this way the EU did not refer only to its own security. The EU made its security part of the security of the world and vice-versa and in effect said that there could not be a secure EU in an insecure world. As a consequence, the EU expressed its readiness to contribute to the security of the entire world and by doing so the EU took the role of friend in relation to every Other in the external world. In this way, the EU reproduced the earlier images of Self as a friend of the Other stemming especially from the 2003 security strategy.

Nevertheless, this image of universal EU friendship was not without its limits. The exception was the Other engaging in behavioural patterns constituting security threats, anywhere in the world. By saying that it was ready to use its civilian and military capabilities for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and the strengthening of international security, the EU did not make only a statement of friendship towards the Others affected by security problems but also a statement of rivalry towards the Other creating and/or perpetuating such problems.

The reference to the rival-Other was strengthened by one of the most significant novelties brought by the Treaty of Lisbon, the clause of mutual defence in the event of armed aggression inscribed in Article 42(7) of the post-Lisbon EU Treaty (Ibid., p. 39). The Member States’ obligation to provide ‘aid and assistance by all the means in their power’ to a Member State that was the ‘victim of armed aggression on its territory’ was a statement of readiness to act militarily against that aggressive Other and therefore a statement of rivalry towards aggressive Others (Ibid.). Nevertheless, this clause of mutual defence referred more to relations between the EU’s Member States than to relations with the outside Others and therefore it was primarily a statement of friendship between EU Member States rather than a statement of rivalry towards aggressive Others.

The rest of the ESDP provisions enshrined in the post-Lisbon EU Treaty focused mainly on the operational aspects of the ESDP, especially on capabilities and decision-making mechanisms. This echoed the general history of the ESDP in its first ten years, when the EU’s main concerns were with developing appropriate civilian and military capabilities and putting in place the necessary institutional and decision-making infrastructure. After the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, on 1 December 2009, the EU’s most comprehensive statement
on the concept of the ESDP, and especially on the relation between the EU as military actor and the Other, continued to be the ESS, the security strategy adopted in December 2003 (Council, 2003q). The vision embodied by the ESS was reconfirmed with only slight changes in 2008, when the EU conducted the first five-year review of the ESS, resulting in the ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World’ (Council, 2008d). The report was described by the EU as a reinforcement of the ESS (Ibid., p. 3).

Like the original 2003 security strategy before it, the 2008 review projected two major images of the EU Self, one in which the EU appeared as a rival of the rival-Other and one in which the EU appeared as a friend of everybody else in the international system. The first image stemmed from the key threats that the EU reconfirmed in 2008. In this way, the EU also reconfirmed who was seen as a rival of the EU. The main threats to the security of the EU continued to be the proliferation of WMD, terrorism and organised crime and regional conflicts (Ibid., pp. 3-7). Thus, the key threats continued to be behavioural patterns rather than actors and the EU continued to identify as rivals any entities, state or non-state, engaging in one of these threatening behavioural patterns.

However, in 2008 the EU also extended the range of security threats to include cyber security, energy security and climate change (Ibid., pp. 3-7). Climate change was the most impersonal threat identified by the EU, although it is also possible to argue that there are certain behavioural patterns that contribute to climate change and therefore the actors engaged in such behaviours represent threats to the security of the EU and the world. Activities that threaten the climate, cyber security or security energy can be perpetrated by both non-state and state actors and therefore in these areas the EU’s rival-Others can be any actors engaging in any of the activities identified by the EU as threatening.

Thus, the image of the EU as a rival of the rival-Other stemming from the 2008 review of the ESS was primarily an undefined image that did not point at any specific Other, but at any Other engaging in certain threatening behaviours. Nevertheless, in 2008 the EU did mention two states as unfriendly Others: Iran and North Korea (Ibid., p. 7). Their nuclear programmes placed these states among the EU’s most threatening Others. However, North Korea was mentioned only briefly and the main focus was on Iran. The EU described Iran as a growing source of concern and the possible development of an Iranian nuclear military capability as an ‘unacceptable’ threat to EU security (Ibid., p. 7). This statement represented Iran as unfriendly and the term ‘unacceptable’ also suggested that the EU was standing ready to take whatever action was necessary to protect itself against the Iranian threat, thus taking the role of rival in relation to Iran.
The representation of the EU as a rival of a nuclear-armed Iran was completed by the EU’s intention to support the UN process against the Iranian nuclear programme and to cooperate with regional countries, including the Gulf States, to build regional security (Ibid., p. 7). The last idea seemed to be a reference to regional pressure on Iran to give up its nuclear programme. Thus, the EU statement on Iran was a statement of rivalry. The EU viewed Iran as unfriendly and in response presented itself as a rival and not a friend of Iran. Although North Korea was mentioned only briefly, that state was placed in the same group of threatening others with Iran and therefore the implication was that the EU statement of rivalry towards Iran also applied to North Korea. As a consequence, the EU represented Iran and North Korea as its two main state-rivals and at the same time took the same role of rival in relation to these rival others.

One state-Other that had a very special position in the EU vision of the external world embodied in the 2008 review of the ESS was Russia. The 2008 review placed Russia close to the border between the category of friend and that of rival because it was engaged in certain behaviours that threatened the security of the EU and the world (Ibid., pp. 6, 10). Nevertheless, Russia was also represented as a friend of the EU that was essential for tackling many of the main threats to EU security (Ibid., pp. 10-11). One of the sources of Russia’s image as a rival-Other in the context of the 2008 review of the ESS was the Russia-Georgia armed conflict of August 2008 (Ibid., pp. 6, 10). Regional conflicts were described as one of the main threats to the security of the EU and the rest of the world and therefore whoever was engaged in a regional conflict also threatened the security of the EU and others. Obviously, this applied mainly to the initiators of regional conflicts, but the EU explanation was rather general and therefore also allowed for the possibility that other parties to the same conflict may perpetuate or even escalate the conflict even though they were not among the initiators. In fact, Russia and Georgia were exactly in this kind of situation because the 2009 Council-commissioned report on the conflict in Georgia concluded that both sides were responsible for starting the war (Council, 2009b). As a consequence, although in the context of the 2008 review of the ESS the EU did not say specifically that Russia was an initiator of the conflict in Georgia, the latter report brought additional clarifications and completed the image of the Russian Other as a rival of the EU.

However, in contrast to the cases of other rivals, the EU did not take the same role of rival in relation to either Russia or Georgia. Instead, the EU presented itself as a friend of both Russia and Georgia by pointing out that it ‘led the international response, through mediation between parties, humanitarian assistance, a civilian monitoring mission and substantial financial support’ (Council, 2008d, p. 6). In other words, instead of taking action against
Russia or Georgia or both, the EU took action to help both Russia and Georgia to extinguish the conflict, restore their security and in this way eliminate a threat to the security of the EU and the rest of the world. By doing this, the EU made the security of both Russia and Georgia part of EU security and thus took the role of friend in relation to these two state-Others.

As a result, while Russia was described as a rival of the EU, the EU responded by taking the role of friend in relation to the Russian Other. This image of the EU as a friend of Russia was further amplified by references to Russia as an ‘important partner on global issues’ (Ibid., p. 11). This statement projected a representation of the EU and Russia acting together to ensure their security and the security of the rest of the world. This implied that the EU was taking the role of friend in relation to Russia because the security of Russia was linked closely together with the security of the EU and the EU declared itself ready to help strengthen Russia’s own security.

Russia was the one state-Other that had a very peculiar position in the 2008 security strategy review, in the category of friend but bordering the category of rival. At the centre of the category of friends of the EU was the US. Like in the security strategy adopted in 2003, and in contrast to the images projected in the context of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, in the 2008 security strategy review the EU continued to represent the US as the EU’s key partner on security issues and the EU-US partnership as a ‘formidable force for good in the world’ (Ibid.). In this way, the EU represented itself as a friend of the US and at the same time cast the US in the same role because both parties appeared ready to help each other on security issues. However, the same representation also created an image of the EU and the US as friends of the rest of the world because they were not concerned only about each other’s security but also about the security of every other actor in the world. This made the friendship between the EU and the US an open friendship, for themselves and for the rest of the world rather than for themselves and against the rest of the world.

In the 2008 security strategy review the EU also pointed again at other state-Others as friends of the EU (Council, 2008d, pp. 11-12). The list was a little more extensive than the list presented in the 2003 security strategy, and the order was different too. While in the 2003 security strategy the second in the list of strategic friends was Russia, after the special American friend, in 2008 the second place was taken by China, which was followed by Canada and Japan (Ibid., p. 11). Russia came only in fifth place and was followed by India, Brazil and South Africa, and Norway and Switzerland within Europe. This list still had confusing aspects but it also reflected changes in the positions of the EU’s strategic Others in the EU vision of the world.
China’s move to the second position illustrated the growing significance of China as an emerging global power and the EU’s desire to be China’s friend in the security sector of the international stage. On the other hand, Russia’s fall in the fifth place reflected primarily the impact of the Russia-Georgia conflict of 2008. The EU was upset about Russia’s involvement in what the EU saw as a threatening course of events, but still wanted to be friends with Russia. Nevertheless, Russia’s ‘fall’ in the fifth place in the EU list of strategic friends also echoed the more general tendency to see Russia as a lesser emerging power and to move away from the concept of ‘BRIC’ countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) to that of ‘BASIC’ countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) (Guardian, 2010).

In 2008, Canada and Japan could not be said to be among the world’s global or emerging global powers, especially in security terms, but they were the EU’s closest partners after the US. If they had the size of China, they would certainly have taken the second and third places in the EU’s list of special friends. India and Brazil were two other emerging global powers listed by the EU as strategic friends, but the list started to become confusing from this point on because Brazil was an emerging global power in economic rather than security terms. Brazil’s inclusion in the EU security strategy was more a reflection of the extension of the EU security concept beyond the borders of traditional concepts of security to include issues such as energy security and climate change (Council, 2008d, pp. 3-7). The extension of the EU security concept also explains the inclusion of Norway, another actor that had little clout in the security field of the international scene but was a major source of energy resources and therefore very important for EU energy security. The inclusion of Switzerland can be justified only by its location deep inside the European continent, surrounded by EU Member States on all sides, as it was neither a sizeable actor, nor a major economic powerhouse or a significant security actor.

Thus, despite the shadows of neutrality and reluctance stemming from the behaviour of EU Member States in the context of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, at the level of discourse the EU continued to reproduce a clear image of the Self as a friend of the Other. The EU continued to present itself as a universal friend of almost any state-Other, including most of the rival state-Others. Statements of EU rivalry continued to be overwhelmingly restricted to non-state Others engaging in threatening behaviours.

6.4 Conclusion

The analysis undertaken in this chapter highlights certain patterns of continuity in the process of reproducing the image of the EU as a friend of the Other, between 2004 and 2010 by comparison with the year 2003. Like the first EU military operations launched in 2003, the
four new EU military operations launched between 2004 and 2010 contributed directly to the continued reproduction of the image of the EU Self as a friend of the Other and at the same time also strengthened such representations. The image of the EU as a friend of the Other also continued to be strengthened at the level of EU discourse, where the post-Lisbon consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union reconfirmed the message that the EU can be secure only if the Other is secure and thus made the security of the Other part of the security of the Self and put the EU in the role of a friend of the Other. The same image also stemmed from the five-year review of the first EU security strategy, which also reproduced the general limits of representations of the EU as a universal friend of the Other and thus revealed that even in relation to most state-rivals the EU still took the role of friend or at least declared itself ready to take the role of friend once the threatening behaviours of the Other stopped.

On the other hand, the reproduction of the image of the EU as a friend of the Other continued to be weaker in the context of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan mainly because the message of EU friendship towards the Other was not carried directly by ESDP military operations. That message was still there, but in the much weaker form of an indirect message derived from national military operations launched by some of the EU Member States. In the context of the conflict in Afghanistan, the image of the EU as a friend of the Other was also weakened by the reluctance of the EU contributors to answer US calls for increases in their troops in Afghanistan. That reluctance combined with the indirect nature of the individual contributions of EU states to convey the message that the EU was a friend of the US-Other, but only a reluctant friend, not an unconditional friend. The image of the EU as a friend of the Other was even weaker in the context of the Iraq War, where some EU Member States continued to keep their distance and thus conveyed the counteracting message that the EU was only a neutral actor and not a real friend of the Other. Therefore, the image of the EU as a friend of the US-Other continued to be affected by the shadow of neutrality.

This chapter thus shows that the period between 2004 and 2010 was a period of continuity in the history of the image of the EU as a friend of the Other, but only by comparison with the year 2003. Like the year 2003, the period between 2004 and 2010 contrasted with the period between 1999 and 2001, the latter being dominated by an almost unqualified image of the EU as a universal friend, while the former projected much more nuanced representations of the EU Self as a friend of the Other, sometimes bordering the category of reluctant friendship or even that of neutrality.

This chapter concludes the empirical analysis of the first decade of ESDP and is followed by a conclusion that summarizes the findings of the empirical analysis undertaken in
chapters 4, 5 and 6 and discusses the implications of these findings for the debate about the rise of military power Europe and its impact on the role of the EU as international actor.
**Conclusion**

The purpose of this thesis has been to present a new perspective on the implications that the EU’s development as a military actor has for the international role of the EU. The thesis started with the argument that existing interpretations of this development are undermined by their underlying assumption that means determine ends. This assumption resulted in interpretations of EU’s emergence as a military actor appearing as the beginning of the end for civilian power Europe and normative power Europe, or as the real birth of the EU as a true power in the international system. In contrast, the Wendtian perspective underpinning this thesis contends that ends give direction to means, not the other way around. The thesis therefore places its primary focus on the ways in which the EU uses or intends to use its military capabilities in interaction with the Other.

In light of the Wendtian perspective, the main question that has to be asked in connection with the development of the EU as a military actor and its implications for the international role of the EU refers to the relationship between the EU as an emerging military actor and the ‘Kantian transition’ in the international system. What Wendt described as the Kantian transition in the international system is the replacement of the currently dominant Lockean security culture of ‘live and let live’ with the Kantian security culture of ‘one for all and all for one’. In contrast to the Lockean culture, where military actors restrain from using their military capabilities to settle their disputes but do not completely exclude the possibility of attacking each other and are not ready to help each other, in the Kantian culture military actors completely exclude the idea of using their military capabilities against each other and at the same time they are also ready to use those capabilities to help each other (non-violence and mutual assistance). For Wendt, the Kantian transition is the most important challenge facing the contemporary international system and therefore the most significant question that has to be asked in connection with any military actor on the international stage, including emerging military actors like the EU, refers to their relationship to the Kantian transition.

In Wendt’s world, the Kantian transition is driven by prosocial actors, defined as actors whose behaviour follows the principles of non-violence and mutual assistance. By
behaving in this way in relation to the Other, a prosocial actor takes the role of friend in relation to the Other and at the same time teaches the Other the same role. The role of friend provides the basis for the production and reproduction of collective identities, which in turn increase the predisposition of the actors carrying them to behave prosocially towards the Other. Thus, answering the question about the relationship between the development of the EU as military actor and the Kantian transition requires testing the EU against the Wendtian model of prosocial actor. The EU supports the Kantian transition in the international system to the extent to which it behaves prosocially towards the Other.

The analysis undertaken in chapters 4, 5 and 6 provides the basis for claiming that in its first ten years of development as military actor the EU did indeed behave prosocially towards the Other and therefore supported the Kantian transition in the international system. The main factor underpinning this contention is the fact that the practice of representing the Self as a friend of the Other was a constant presence in the context of the ESDP in the first ten years of ESDP history. At the same time, the image of the EU as a friend of the Other was a much stronger presence than the image of the EU as a rival of the Other. Furthermore, although the EU also projected images of Self as a reluctant friend and even a neutral actor, these images were not powerful enough to undermine representations of the EU as a friend of the Other.

When the St Malo Declaration of 1998 signalled the imminent launch of the ESDP, it also projected the first image of the EU as a friend of the Other and that image continued to be reproduced at the level of the ESDP concept in both the major defining documents of the ESDP and in the successive versions of the Treaty on European Union. Moreover, the EU later also added a third-party dimension to its image as a friend of the Other because in addition to presenting itself as a friend of the Other the EU at the same time also tried to place third parties in the same position in relation to the Other by providing for third-party participation in the future military operations of the new ESDP.

However, even though the practice of representing the EU as a friend of the Other was constantly maintained, the image of the EU as a friend of the Other did not remain exactly the same for the entire first decade of the ESDP. There is a major difference between the images of the EU as a friend of the Other reproduced before and after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 against the US. Prior to 9/11, the EU represented itself exclusively as a friend of the Other and even as a universal friend that was ready to use its military capabilities to help everybody else in the world. After the attacks of 11 September 2001, the EU started to qualify this image as a universal friend of the Other by drawing the limits of its friendship and confining it within the boundaries of the ‘international community’. After 9/11, the EU started
to present itself as a rival of actors that stayed outside the rules of the international community and engaged in behaviours considered by the EU as threatening the security of the EU or of other parts of the world.

At first sight, the introduction of the image of the EU as a rival of its rivals may appear as undermining the contention that the EU could still be viewed as a prosocial actor on the international scene. If this were the case, the EU would have stopped supporting the Kantian transition because an actor that responds to its rivals by taking the same role of rival cannot contribute to the Kantian transition, but only to the continued reproduction of the Lockean culture. Nevertheless, while it was drawing the limits of its friendship and thus suggesting that it was also prepared to act as a rival of the Other, at the same time the EU was also drawing strict limits for any rivalry towards the Other. The image of the EU as a rival of its rivals was qualified in particular by the attitude of the EU towards the state rival-Other that was not seen by the EU as the more or less innocent victim of apparently impersonal forces like regional conflicts and state failure.

The EU did not take the role of friend in relation to all state rivals. Reacting to state rivals engaged in other threatening behaviours, like terrorism or proliferation of WMD, the EU adopted the role of rival and not that of friend. However, while taking the role of rival in relation to certain state rivals, the EU also declared itself ready to become their friend once they stopped their threatening behaviours. In other words, when those state rivals stopped being rivals the EU did not intend to continue to be their rival or to adopt an attitude of neutrality towards them. On the contrary, the EU intention was to stop considering action against them and even to help them. In this way, although the EU did not take the role of friend in relation to the most dangerous state rivals, it still maintained the prospect of friendship and therefore projected an image in which the EU was truly a rival of its rivals only in the case of non-state rivals. In the case of state rivals, the EU appeared keen to take the role of friend even in relation to the most threatening state rivals.

Thus, the EU took the role of rival unequivocally only in relation to the non-state rival-Other (non-state actors engaged in behaviours identified by the EU as major security threats, such as terrorism, proliferation of WMD or regional conflicts). In contrast to the non-state rival-Other, in the case of the state rival-Other there were even instances when the state rival-Other engaged in behaviours described by the EU as threatening (states engaged in regional conflicts and failed states), but was still treated by the EU as a friend or at least as a potential friend (the case of states engaged in regional conflicts and rogue states that were at least willing to return to the ‘international community’). This attitude contributed to the
strengthening of the image of the EU as a friend of the state Other and the confinement of the image of the EU as a rival of its rivals to the non-state rival-Other.

Therefore, the emergence of images of the EU as a rival of the rival Other did not really undermine the image of the EU as a friend of the Other. On the contrary, the analysis shows that in relation to the state-Other the EU continued to present itself as a universal friend. In other words, the way in which the EU reacted to actors perceived as rivals amplified the prosocial character of the EU as military actor in the international system. At the same time, after 9/11 the prosocial character of the EU was also amplified by another major difference between the images of the EU as a friend of the Other before and after the attacks of 11 September 2001. In contrast to the post-9/11 period, before those events the image of the EU as a friend of the Other was confined exclusively to the level of discourse or concept. This is not surprising, considering that the EU declared the ESDP operational, or somewhat operational to be more precise, only at the end of 2001 and launched the first ESDP operations only in 2003. Nevertheless, the absence of any prosocial practice was a serious handicap for any suggestions that the EU was a prosocial actor supporting the Kantian transition.

The situation changed only in 2003, when the EU launched the first ESDP operations, including the first military operations. After 2003, the EU continued to launch new military operations, adding practice to discourse and thus confirming in action the previously discursive image of Self as a friend of the Other. At the same time, the EU also started to confirm in practice the third-party dimension of its image as a friend of the Other, because some EU military operations included non-EU contributors that were not EU candidates or associates and sometimes not even NATO members. However, there still was a significant gap in that image between the level of action and that of discourse. While at the level of discourse the EU presented itself as a friend ready to help any Other in the international community wherever in the world, in practice EU military operations were concentrated in the Western Balkans and Africa. Moreover, the military operations in the Western Balkans looked more like self-help than other-help because the countries of the Western Balkans had already been given the perspective of EU membership and were already a kind of half-Other half-Self about to become full part of the EU Self.

This practice-discourse gap in the image of the EU as a friend of the Other may be seen as undermining the idea of the EU as prosocial actor, just as the ‘capabilities-expectations gap’ highlighted by Christopher Hill (1993) appeared to undermine the idea of the EU as an effective international actor. However, this argument fails to take into account the fact that by the beginning of the twenty-first century the EU was still under construction,
especially in the military area, the very last addition to the external dimension of the European construction. The gap in the image of the EU as a friend of the Other was primarily a gap between the blueprint of the EU as military actor, laid down in the Treaty on European Union and the defining documents of the ESDP, and the interim phases in the construction of the EU as a military actor, reflected by the EU military operations. Consequently, the EU will continue to develop as a prosocial actor for as long as there is progress in the development of the EU as military actor towards a blueprint conceptualizing the EU as a prosocial military actor on the international stage.

The image of the EU as a friend of the Other was also affected by the shadow of neutrality cast by the behaviour of some EU states in the context of the Iraq war. The main sources of that shadow were the EU states that opposed US-led military action in Iraq and then continued to stand aside after the outbreak of conflict. Regardless of whether they were ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ to do so, they also conveyed the message that there were circumstances in which they were not ready to help the US-Other and were more inclined towards a neutral position. This message was in stark contrast with the EU defence discourse, in which the EU and its Member States had been presented as the most determined friends of the US-Other. In this way, the neutral EU states, especially France and Germany, cast a shadow of neutrality on the image of the EU as a friend of the US-Other by intertwining it with an image of the EU as a neutral actor that was not contemplating using its military capabilities against the US, but was not prepared to use those capabilities to help the US either.

However, this shadow of neutrality did not seriously undermine the character of the EU as prosocial actor on the international stage because, while some EU states opposed the US and chose to stay neutral, other EU states decided to support the US and contributed military resources to the US-led operations in Iraq. Moreover, the EU Member States and candidates that supported the US were about to become a majority of EU Member States very soon after the launch of the military operations in Iraq. In other words, in the end there was a majority of EU Member States that behaved as friends and not as neutrals in relation to the US in the context of the Iraq war. The friendly EU states, representing a majority of EU states, counterbalanced the impact of the neutral EU states and maintained at least a minimum semblance of the image of the EU as a friend of the US-Other. The message of friendship towards the US conveyed by them was primarily an individual or national message, but it also had an impact on the image of the EU as well as on that of NATO. The British and Polish contributions were primarily British and Polish, but the UK and Poland were also EU and NATO members and therefore their contributions also represented indirect EU and NATO contributions. As a result, the contributions made by individual EU Member States projected
not only images of the individual contributors as friends of the US, but also an indirect image of the EU as a friend of the US.

The behaviour of certain EU states in the context of the Iraq war was the main source of the shadow of neutrality affecting the image of the EU as a friend of the US-Other in the first decade of the ESDP. It is true that there was no direct EU contribution to the military operations in Afghanistan either, but there were individual contributions from most EU states, including the EU states that stood aside in the context of the Iraq war. As in the case of the Iraq war, the individual contributions were also associated with the EU and NATO identities and therefore conveyed an indirect message of EU friendship towards the US. Consequently, the overwhelming majority of EU states contributing to the US-led military operations in Afghanistan projected individual images of themselves as friends of the US as well as an indirect image of the EU as a friend of the US.

However, although the shadow of neutrality present in the context of the Iraq war was not reproduced in the context of the war in Afghanistan, its place was taken by a shadow of reluctance stemming from the reluctance of the EU states to answer US calls to increase their contributions to the military effort in that country. The EU contributors did answer the US calls in the end but they did so only reluctantly and therefore they conveyed the message that they were friends of the US and not just neutrals, but there still were limits to their friendship because they were not ready to expand their help. Consequently, while in Iraq the indirect image of the EU as a friend of the US was present but affected by the images of some EU states as neutral towards the US, in Afghanistan the indirect image of the EU as a friend of the US was stronger but still affected by negative factors, this time by the images of most EU states as reluctant friends of the US.

Thus, in the context of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the image of the EU as a friend of the Other was weakened mainly because it was just an indirect suggestion stemming from the national actions of EU states and because it was intertwined with images of the EU as a reluctant friend or even a neutral. It is important to note that the weakening of the image of the EU as a friend of the US Other did not mean its replacement with an image of the EU as a rival of the US Other. The main threat to the EU contribution to the Kantian transition in the international system came from images of the EU as a reluctant friend of the US Other or as a neutral actor in relation to the US Other. Such images of the Self are not images of rivalry but they still contribute to the reproduction of the Lockean culture, because the Kantian transition depends exclusively on friendship. Neutral actors and reluctant friends do not intend to use their military capabilities against the Other but are not willing to use those capabilities to help the Other either. Consequently, they do not support the Kantian transition in the international
system and contribute instead to the continuation of the Lockean culture not because they act as rivals of the Other but because they do not act as friends of the Other.

The situation of the image of the EU as a friend of the Other in the context of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars was in strong contrast to the messages conveyed by the EU military operations in the Western Balkans and Africa, where the image of the EU as a friend of the Other came directly from EU action and not indirectly from the actions of the EU states. However, even in the context of EU military operations the image of the EU as a friend of the Other was often fuzzy because many of those operations relied too heavily on the military capabilities of NATO or of one EU state. Consequently, some EU military operations appeared as NATO operations, while others looked more like French operations. This situation had the effect of intertwining the image of the EU as a friend of the Other with images of NATO or France as the real friend of the Other behind EU military operations. A similar phenomenon could be seen in the context of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, where even that weak indirect image of the EU as a friend of the US-Other was interlaced with an image of the UK as the real or main EU friend of the US. That was the effect of the UK being by far the main EU contributor to US-led military operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

The findings of the analysis thus show that in the first decade of the history of the EU as military actor EU discourse and actions constantly projected an image of the EU as a friend of the Other, even though the intensity of this image varied from the highs of EU military operations in the Western Balkans and Africa to the lows of indirect and partial EU contributions in the context of the Iraq war. The analysis also shows that the main threat to the image of the EU as a friend of the Other did not come from images of the EU as a rival of the Other, which were a very weak presence in the context of the ESDP, but from images of the EU as a reluctant friend of the Other or even a neutral actor in relation to the Other. However, the images of the EU as a reluctant friend or a neutral actor were not powerful enough to inject discontinuity in the reproduction of the image of the EU as a friend of the Other. Therefore, it can be concluded that in the first decade of the EU as military actor the dominant image was that of a friend of the Other.

The conclusion that the image of the EU as a friend of the Other dominated the first ten years of the ESDP provides the basis to further conclude, in light of the Wendtian perspective, that during that period the EU developed as a prosocial military actor and therefore supported the Kantian transition in the international system. By taking the role of friend in relation to the Other, the EU at the same time cast the Other in the same role and thus contributed to the production and reproduction of corresponding collective identities within both the Self and the Other. Collective identities grow from friend identities and in turn
provide the basis for a Kantian culture in which in military actors take the role of friend as the starting point for their interactions. Thus, in its first decade as an emerging military actor the EU contributed to the construction of a Kantian international system in which military actors are predisposed to exclude the use of violence to settle disputes with the Other (non-violence) and at the same time to also help the Other not only when the security of the Self is directly threatened, but also when the security of the Other is under threat (mutual assistance).

This conclusion highlights the shortcomings of the perspectives underlying the existing literature on the implications that the development of the EU as military actor has for the international role of the EU. By focusing simply on the acquisition of military capabilities and thus assuming that means determine ends, the arguments about the death of ‘civilian power Europe’ and ‘normative power Europe’ and the birth of ‘real power Europe’ failed to see the most significant implication of the EU’s development as a military actor. As an emerging military actor, the EU was supporting the transition from a Lockean security culture of ‘live and let live’ to a Kantian security culture of ‘one for all and all for one’. Assuming, as Wendt did, that the Kantian transition is the most significant challenge facing the contemporary international system, it follows that it is the EU contribution to the Kantian transition that is the most significant aspect of the EU’s emergence as a new military actor on the international stage.

This thesis also has significant normative implications that are important lessons about what the EU should do to support the transition of the international system towards the most desirable outcomes. However, those lessons depend on the answer given to the question concerning the desirability of each of the three security cultures labelled by Alexander Wendt as ‘Hobbesian’, ‘Lockean’ and ‘Kantian’ (Wendt, 1999, pp. 246-312). This thesis rests on a fundamental assumption that the Hobbesian culture is the least desirable and the Kantian culture is the most desirable, but this assumption may not necessarily be universally accepted. The Kantian culture of ‘one for all and all for one’ may be the most desirable in a world of Gandhis, but in a world of ben Ladens, a warrior world, the most desirable culture may be the Hobbesian culture of ‘kill or be killed’. In a world that accepts or even glorifies the principle of ‘kill or be killed’, people who talk about peace may be seen as naïve or even 'suckers' (Ibid., pp. 282, 342).

The assumption underlying this thesis is that an international system ruled by the law of the jungle is the least desirable. The Hobbesian culture is based on the role of ‘enemy', which places the Self in the position of a threatening adversary who observes no limits in its violence towards the Other (Ibid., p. 258). A Hobbesian international system is a world in which actors constantly try to destroy each other and violence between them is limited only
by inadequate capabilities or the presence of an external constraint (Ibid., p. 261). As Wendt pointed out, the Hobbesian culture is a ‘true self-help system’ of ‘war of all against all’ in which actors follow the principle of ‘sauve qui peut’ or ‘kill or be killed’ (Ibid., p. 265). Wendt also pointed out that ‘world politics has often been Hobbesian’, but the international system has escaped the Hobbesian culture in the seventeenth century, when it was replaced by a Lockean culture (Ibid., p. 279).

In light of the same basic assumption that a world of 'kill and be killed' is the least desirable, a Lockean culture is a significant improvement by comparison with the Hobbesian culture. The Lockean culture is based on the role of ‘rival’, which places the Self in the position of a competitor who uses violence to advance its own interests but refrains from killing the Other (Ibid., p. 258). In a Lockean world of 'live and let live', actors expect each other to recognise their sovereignty as a right, the ‘right to live’, and not to try to conquer or dominate others (Ibid., p. 279). However, this recognition does not extend to the right to be free from violence in disputes, and therefore rivals may still use violence in settling disputes, including disputes concerning boundaries (Ibid.). For Wendt, the Lockean culture is embodied in the Westphalian states system that emerged in the seventeenth century, and even though the Hobbesian culture has not disappeared completely, for the last three centuries the dominant culture in world politics has been the Lockean culture (Ibid., pp. 279, 297). In the twentieth century world politics continued to be dominated by the Lockean culture, but the second half of that century also saw the emergence of the first instances of Kantian culture. As Wendt pointed out, the first instances of the Kantian culture emerged in the North Atlantic area and encompassed the states of Western Europe and North America (Ibid., p. 297).

The fundamental assumption behind this thesis does not only suggest that the Lockean culture is more desirable than the Hobbesian culture, but it also implies that the Kantian culture is the most desirable of the three fundamental forms of international culture. The Kantian culture is the opposite of the Hobbesian culture. While the Hobbesian culture is based on the principle of ‘kill or be killed’, the Kantian culture relies on the principle of ‘help and be helped’. The central role in the Kantian culture is that of ‘friend’, which places the Self in the position of an ally who does not use violence to settle disputes and also works with the Other as a team against security threats (Ibid., p. 258). In a Kantian world, actors settle their disputes without war or the threat of war and also fight as a team when the security of one of them is threatened by a rogue third party (Ibid., p. 299). Actors may have many disputes outside the security area, but the ways of settling those disputes are restricted by the two basic rules of non violence and mutual assistance that dominate the security field. In light of Wendt’s model of the international system, the emergence of the first instances of Kantian culture in the
North Atlantic area after the Second World War marked the beginning of the Kantian transition in the international system.

Thus, the assumption that the Hobbesian culture is the least desirable form of international culture translates into the further assumption that the Kantian culture is the most desirable, which in turn further translates into the assumption that the Kantian transition is extremely valuable. If this transition is so valuable, then the factors driving the transition are equally important. In light of Wendt’s theoretical framework, the production and reproduction of a particular form of culture depends on actors engaging in certain practices that produce and reproduce that particular culture (Ibid., pp. 313-8). Thus, the production and reproduction of the Kantian culture depends on prosocial actors who take the role of friend in relation to others (Ibid., pp. 336-43). In this way they project images of Self as a friend of the Other and others are encouraged to take on the same role and project the same kind of images of themselves as friends of others. Practices that project images of the Self as a friend of the Other constitute the foundations of the Kantian culture because the Kantian culture of ‘one for all and all for one’ is based on the role of friend (Ibid., pp. 258).

Assuming that the Kantian transition is extremely important and valuable, and given that this transition depends on the presence of prosocial actors in the international system, it follows that prosocial actors can also be said to be extremely valuable. They are so because they are the drivers of the transition of the international system to the most desirable form of international culture. This assumption highlights the significance of the conclusion that in its first years as an emerging military actor the EU behaved as a prosocial actor. This conclusion presents the EU as a contributor to the transition of the international system towards the most desirable form of international culture. Accordingly, the development of the EU as a prosocial actor in the international system is the most desirable direction that the EU can take in the construction of its military dimension.

This argument highlights the normative dimension of the conclusion of this thesis. On the one hand, by revealing the importance of the EU’s prosocial behaviour in the context of the Kantian transition in the international system, this thesis also reveals one of the most valuable effects of the EU’s emergence as a military actor on the international scene. On the other hand, the conclusion of the thesis also highlights what the EU should do, or rather continue to do, if it really wants a ‘better world’ (Council, 2003q; 2008d). In light of the Wendtian model, the best world is the Kantian world. As an emerging military actor in a primarily Lockean world, the EU has so far been a contributor to the construction of the Kantian world, but if it wants to continue to build the better Kantian world it should continue
to behave prosocially and it should also strengthen its prosocial character as an international actor.

The EU’s first ten years as a military actor have indeed been a contribution to the Kantian transition, but this contribution has been affected by the shadow of neutrality. The EU should be ready to use its military capabilities to help others and when it cannot do it because of a lack of appropriate capabilities, it should send out very clear and strong messages that it does not act not because it does not want to but because it cannot do so. An image of the EU as an actor that has the capacity to help others but does not want to do so undermines the EU’s contribution to the Kantian transition in the international system. This is an image of the EU as a neutral actor that encourages other actors to adopt the same attitude towards the EU. A world in which actors project images of Self as neutral towards the Other is a system stuck between two worlds, the Lockean world of the past and the Kantian world of an elusive future. In this context, it is important to be aware of how damaging ‘gaps’ in how the EU is perceived by others can be, as Christopher Hill (1993) warned a long time ago, and follow Peter van Ham’s advice to use branding techniques to bring the images of the EU Self perceived by others into line with reality (van Ham, 2001; 2002; 2005; 2008).

Of course, the fact that in its first ten years as military actor the EU did indeed contribute to the Kantian transition in the international system does not constitute a guarantee that the EU will continue to support that transition. In order to continue to play this critical role in the international system, alongside other prosocial international actors, the EU must continue the practice of representing itself as a friend of the Other. As it continues to expand the practical dimension of the ESDP in line with the blueprint outlined in the Treaty on European Union and the major ESDP-defining documents, the EU must ensure that its discourse and especially its actions follow the two fundamental principles of Wendtian friendship: non-violence and mutual assistance. The EU has significant potential to be one of the main global actors in the future international system, in both economic and security terms, including in the field of defence. If the development of this potential continues to go hand in hand with the development of the EU as a prosocial military actor, the rise of the EU as one of tomorrow’s major global actors will become closely associated with the construction of a Kantian international system.
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