War without End?
One thousand years of anti-Islam discourse

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Abstract

The years since the terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001 have seen the West revert to a familiar historical trajectory, one dating back a millennium and extending into the foreseeable future. This is the running contestation with the world of Islam. Underpinning this phenomenon is a persistent anti-Islam discourse whose roots can be traced to the early Western images of the Muslims, essentially Church propaganda crafted in the eleventh century CE amid the mobilization for the First Crusade.

In such an atmosphere, a distinct portrait began to take shape, with the practices and beliefs of the Muslims conceived as mirror-images of self-evident Christian virtues: Islam is a religion of violence and cruelty; Mohammad and the Qur’an stand for falsehood and deception; Muslims are sexual deviants. Later accretions to this discourse include a string of essentialist ideas that remain regular features in today’s political arena, on the Internet, on “talk” radio, and with greater erudition but much the same substance in the so-called quality press, and, all too frequently, in the Academy: Muslims are backward and fearful of modernity; the West is rational, Islam is fanatical; Muslims are jealous of Western lifestyles; they hate women; they are anti-democratic and despise Western notions of civic freedoms.

Contemporary currents in sociology, from secularization theory to notions of globalization, have failed to predict or explain the appearance today of a “resurgent” Islam, or to account for what it is that Muslims say, and do, and believe in any meaningful way (Sutton and Vertigans 2005). Likewise, traditional Western history of ideas has proven unable to explain the unchanging nature of the anti-Islam discourse in the face of ever-new data amassed in ten centuries of trade, travel, study, warfare, and so on. These shortcomings exercise a profound, corrosive effect on a range of issues across the contemporary social sciences, including sociology, politics, intellectual history, law, theology, international relations, human rights, and security studies.

In response, this thesis applies the analytical techniques of Michel Foucault to explore the creation of the anti-Islam discourse in the medieval period and the social, intellectual, and political influences that this has exerted ever since. It then applies a sociological framework which revolves around one central theoretical position – that the very idea of Islam has been perpetuated by those Western social groups and institutions that stand to benefit from its survival. Three interrelated research questions are examined: How is this discourse formed? How does it operate? And, lastly, Cui bono? Who benefits? Specific themes of concern to the contemporary West – Islam and science; Islam and violence; and Islam and women – are then explored in terms of these questions. Finally, new avenues for future research are proposed that would set aside, or “reverse,” central aspects of the anti-Islam discourse and open the way for sociologists and other social sciences to begin to fill the considerable gaps in the Western idea of Islam.
Acknowledgements

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Candidate declaration

I hereby certify that this thesis contains no material that has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at any university or other institution. I likewise affirm that to the best of my knowledge, this thesis contains no material written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text.

Jonathan Lyons
5 December 2009
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Chapter One: Introduction

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and their aftermath are just the latest reminder of the West’s complete and enduring failure to engage in any meaningful and productive way with the world of Islam. I argue that for almost ten centuries, attempts at understanding have been held hostage to a grand, totalizing Western narrative that shapes what can – and, more importantly, what cannot – be said and thought about Islam and the Muslims. This is no less true today, from the political arena to the counter-terrorism think tanks, from the Academy to the Internet “blogosphere,” than it was in the medieval halls of the Roman Curia and the courts of the European Crusaders.

Further, I argue that this same narrative, which reflects what I call the anti-Islam discourse, exercises a profound and corrosive effect on a range of issues across the contemporary social sciences, including sociology, politics, the history of ideas, law, theology, international relations, human rights, and security studies. It casts a shadow over the way social scientists think, and write, and speak about Islam and the Muslims. I argue that it shapes how social science listens to what it is that Muslims say and interprets what it is they do. And it guides their research programs, their private advice to governments, and their statements to the press and the public at large. This in turn, I argue, has left Western societies both intellectually unprepared and politically unable to respond successfully to some of the most significant challenges of the early twenty-first century – the global rise of Islamist political power, the more narrow emergence of religious violence and terrorism, clashes between established social values and multicultural rights on the part of growing Muslim immigrant populations, and so on.
As a result of these failures, I argue that the notion of a looming “clash” of world civilizations, advanced first by Bernard Lewis (1990) and more comprehensively by Samuel Huntington (1993), is moving steadily from a theoretical exercise – one that was met initially with ridicule among the foreign policy establishment and academics alike (Abrahamian 2003) – towards a self-fulfilling prophecy. One has only to consider the successful November 2009 Swiss referendum campaign to write a ban on the building of minarets into the constitution to see this notion has captured Western imaginations. In such an atmosphere, it has been all too easy for the contemporary U.S. neo-conservatives and their supporters worldwide, who have relied on this same anti-Islam discourse to generate fear of the Muslim Other, to sell the “war on terrorism” as essential to Western security, and to lead the West into its greatest confrontation with Islam since the Middle Ages.

Properly unpacked, the anti-Islam discourse can be shown to provide more than just the context and imagery that surrounds the war on terrorism, the present wave of Islamophobia, or the broader cultural project advanced by adherents of Huntington’s coming civilizational clash, advanced in 1993. Despite the interrogatory tone of his title – The clash of civilizations? – Huntington leaves little doubt that he expects a future conflict, driven not by ideology or economics but by culture: “The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural” (1993, 22). While it is a relatively simple matter to “connect the dots” between this discourse and the

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1 Abrahamian attributes the sudden popularity of Huntington’s thesis after the terrorist attacks in large measure to its ability to “analyse international relations without discussing actual politics – especially the issue of Palestine in particular and of Arab nationalism in general” (Abrahamian 2003, 534-538). As will become clear in the course of this dissertation, I see the same phenomenon more widely as a reflection of the anti-Islam discourse under the harsh lights of post-September 11 America.
present state of tensions between Occident and Orient, to stop there would be to overlook the profound nature of a discourse that has silently shaped one thousand years of shared history – and one that seems destined to shape the future as well. Its powers extend well beyond the war on terrorism, and they explain a whole host of subtle but important derivative effects, without which the clash of civilizations thesis that underpins this war would be literally unthinkable.

Since 11 September 2001, the West has launched two major wars against Islamic countries; contributed directly through conflict to the deaths of tens of thousands of Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan, and indirectly to the loss of many tens of thousands more lives through disruptions to health and other basic services;\(^2\) helped suppress popular Islamist aspirations across the Muslim world, from Palestine to Somalia to Southeast Asia; and restricted civil liberties at home and cracked down hard on its own Arab and Muslim populations in the name of counter-terrorism.\(^3\) The CIA, meanwhile, has coordinated a clandestine campaign to kidnap suspected Muslim terrorists and shuffle them around the globe – often with the help of friendly intelligence services – so they may be tortured in third countries or simply dumped into the juridical no-man’s land of the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, without regard for the Constitution, the Geneva Convention, or the founding ideals of Revolutionary-era America. The

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\(^2\) Given the general chaos in Iraq, the number of civilian deaths as a result of the U.S.-led invasion has proven enormously difficult to estimate. Figures range from 601,027 in a 2006 study by G. Burnham et al. in the *Lancet* to less than 50,000, from the Iraq Body Count project. The supreme power in Iraq, the U.S. military, says it does not keep records of civilian deaths. In an effort to overcome the methodological difficulties, the Iraq Family Health Survey conducted a household survey in 2006 and 2007 in order to estimate mortality between January 2002 and June 2006. The group estimates 151,000 violent deaths in that period (2008, 484-493).

\(^3\) For details of the campaign targeting American Muslims, including their religious charities, see D. Cole (2003, 19-22). Abdo (2006b) explores the more general effects on ordinary Muslims in America after the attacks on New York and Washington.
resulting damage to the rule of law and other Western liberal values has been significant.

Central to this anti-Islam discourse is a series of familiar ideas that echo across today’s political arena, on the Internet, on “talk” radio, in the so-called quality press, and, all too frequently, in the Academy. Such notions include:
Islam is a religion of violence and is spread by the sword; its tenets are upheld only by coercion and force; Islam’s prophet, its teachings, and even its God are false; Muslims are backward, “medieval,” and fearful of modernity; Islam is by nature fanatical; Muslims are sexually perverse – either lascivious polygamists, repressive misogynists, or both; they are anti-democratic and despise Western notions of civic freedoms; and, finally, they are caught up in a jealous rage at the Western world’s failure to value them or their beliefs.

I argue that this is not simply a matter of stereotypes – reassuring modes of thought and expression to castigate the Muslim as Other and simultaneously reinforce the value and values of the West; if it were, the well-defined boundaries of the discourse would have eroded or otherwise shifted significantly, at least in places, over more than one thousand years of increasing physical, intellectual, economic, and theological contact and contestation between East and West. Rather, we must recognize that fundamental to this discourse has been the creation in the Western consciousness – and thus in Western thought – of an impermeable conceptual barrier, one constructed from the very tissue of the discourse itself.

Rarely have the central themes of the anti-Islam discourse faced serious critical scrutiny or nuanced analysis. Rather, they are often asserted or simply left, unstated and unacknowledged, to operate silently in the background. In an
observation as apt now as when it was first advanced nine hundred years ago, Guibert de Nogent, a chronicler of the First Crusade, noted that it was not important to actually know anything about Islam in order to attack it: “It is safe to speak evil of one whose malignity exceeds whatever ill can be spoken” (quoted in Rodinson 1987, 11). As a result, the West’s “conversation” with Islam has always been a one-sided affair, essentially a dialogue with itself; it reveals much about the subject but little or nothing about the object in question. In the vernacular of today, “It is all about us.” This has meant a fatal decoupling of the Western idea of Islam from its meaning and content as a vital religious, social, and cultural institution in its own right. Incompatible with the West’s interests or outside its conceptual understanding – or at times merely inconvenient – the belief system of the Muslims has been set aside in favor of a denatured Islam that better fits the established discourse.

Thus, a Muslim woman cannot simply wear the veil because she believes God has so ordained, or to express her own religious feelings; rather, it must be the result of patriarchal repression by her husband, father, uncles, or brothers. Likewise, there is little incentive to trace the complex and at times contradictory record of traditional Islamic texts on violence, personal struggle, and resistance – signified in the Western mind under the emotive rubric of jihad. Instead, a necessary, causal relationship between Islam and violence is posited and countless examples adduced to support it, September 11 being currently the most spectacular. Put another way, Islam qua Islam is allowed no independent

\[4\] I have chosen to italicize the Arabic word jihad throughout this study, in recognition that it is, indeed, both a foreign word and a foreign concept. By contrast, the Western discourse has sought to ‘naturalize’ the term, and to reduce its meaning to a single and consistent interpretation – that of aggressive armed struggle against all non-Muslims. As we shall see in Chapter Six, this is but one of many meanings and interpretations of jihad, all of which have been shaped throughout the Islamic experience by religious, social, and political context. It is, thus, literally untranslatable in any meaningful sense.
existence but is effectively a creation of the Western mind. Unnoticed in the Western world, this phenomenon has not gone by without comment among the Muslims: for decades, the religious revolutionaries of Iran have referred to it dismissively as “American Islam.”

* * *

How, then, has the West’s anti-Islam discourse persisted intact, even thrived, over the course of one thousand years? What has so far retarded any real development or evolution – whether seen in terms of traditional Western notions of historical change, the “discontinuities” of Gaston Bachelard and the post-modern French philosophers, or Thomas Kuhn’s “paradigm shift” – in the dominant narrative?

I propose to address these questions sociologically, more specifically by means of discourse analysis. My methodological approach will be discussed in Chapter Three. For now, let me simply state the central theoretical position of the present work – that the very idea of Islam has been perpetuated by those Western social groups and institutions that stand to benefit from the survival of the discourse. Three interrelated questions about the anti-Islam discourse provide the underlying structure of my analysis: How is this discourse formed? How does it operate? And, lastly, that classical sociological problem: Cui bono? Who benefits? This approach shifts the setting away from intellectual history and casts instead it as a matter for sociological inquiry. Herein lies its explanatory power: when we open this particular window on Islam as discourse and take a look, what is it that we see that has not been seen before?

In my approach to this discourse I am primarily following the work of Michel Foucault, particularly in the early phase of his career – roughly the
period ending with his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France in 1970. Foucault has written widely on epistemological phenomena in strictly Western contexts, including studies of the discourses of madness, clinical medicine, prison, and sexuality. At one point, Foucault proposed a study of what he called the “great division” between Occident and Orient, a project he never carried out (Foucault 1961, iv; Rosemann 1999, 270). He did, however, venture into the contentious issue of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, supporting it much longer and more enthusiastically than most others among the European Left.⁵

Still, Foucault’s methods – what he has referred to as his “tool box” – can go a long way toward explaining why it is that certain things can be thought and said about Islam and the Muslims and certain other things cannot.⁶ In an effort to build upon Foucault’s work, and to address some of its limitations when applied to the West’s anti-Islam discourse, I will also take into account studies in the sociology of knowledge – most notably the works of Max Weber and Karl Mannheim – as well as the cultural criticism of Edward Said.

A few other prominent features of my approach also bear noting at this time. First, I have chosen to focus exclusively on the West’s discourse of Islam, that is, the body of accepted and acceptable Western knowledge about Islam and Muslims; any detailed exploration from the Muslim perspective is beyond the scope of this inquiry. Here, I want to avoid the fallacy common among Western

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⁶ Foucault writes: “I would like my books to be a kind of tool box which others can rummage through to find a tool which they can use however they wish in their own area. … I don’t write for an audience, I write for users, not readers (1994c: 523-24).
Orientalists that the Muslim world saw in the Crusading Christians the same existential, civilizational threat that the latter clearly saw in it (cf. von Grunenbaum 1961, 31ff; echoed in Berger 1973, 56). In fact, the caliphal court in Baghdad turned a blind eye to the fall of Jerusalem in 1099 despite pleas for help from local Muslims, and it took decades for the forces of Islam to set aside their internal squabbles and repel the invaders (cf. Maalouf 1984, xiii-xvi). This is a critical error for it presumes that whatever was going on in the West was mirrored – or should have been – mirrored in the East and thus the two experiences can be understood and assessed in the same terms and in the same way. As we shall see, this leads only to a dead-end.

Second, it needs to be stressed that an analysis of the anti-Islam discourse can be carried out without direct reference to the West’s claims to any truth-value in its statements about Islam; the truth – or lack thereof – of those statements produced is no “defense” against the underlying fact that the entire conversation takes place within the very confines of the discourse. A number of scholars have sought to refute, for example, statements linking violence, coercion, and authoritarianism to the very essence of the Muslim faith (e.g. Saeed 2006; Khatab and Bouma 2007; Afsaruddin 2007). Others argue that this is no less true in other faiths and belief systems, from Judaism to Scientology (Appelby 2000), or that violence lies at the heart of all religious experience (Girard 1977, 1996). While it may be instructive and appear straightforward at times, it is not strictly necessary to weigh in on this and other questions that the Western discourse has addressed. What is important, rather, is the way the discourse operates to produce such statements and to eliminate or bar others, and why this discourse remains intact.
Third, I have limited the scope of this inquiry by generally restricting myself to Islam as defined by the historical experience of the early Muslim empires, from Afghanistan and western China to North Africa and across to al-Andalus, or Muslim Spain. This was, after all, the “Muslim world” as apprehended by Christian Europe at the formation of the anti-Islam discourse, and in many ways it remains so today. The West’s “discovery” of a wider Muslim ummah has done nothing notable to alter the discourse, except perhaps to reinvigorate and strengthen its central foundation. When we are told, for example, that Indonesian Muslims practice a “softer” variant of the faith, this is nothing but a reinforcement of the original narrative, the exception that proves the rule.

Throughout this study, I use the terms “Islam” and “Muslim” quite deliberately, in both their religious and cultural meanings, rather than fall back on the specific ethnic identities, such as Arab, Persian, Kurd, and others who comprise the diverse world of Islam. Marshall Hodgson’s classic work, The Venture of Islam (1974), proposes a calibrated set of distinctions among the terms “Islam,” the faith itself; “Islamdom,” the counterpart to Christendom, i.e., those areas where Islam predominates; and “Islamicate,” to describe the civilizational complex as a whole. Turner (2003, 1-2) would add “Islamist,” to encompass political Islam, as well as “Arabic” as a subculture of Islamdom in which the Arabic language is dominant.

For my purposes such terminology, while worth bearing in mind in other contexts, is subsumed in the broader anti-Islam discourse which, by its very nature, does not make or require any such distinctions. At issue here is the West’s discourse of Islam and Muslims, not a discourse of Arabs, Seljuk Turks,
the Fatimids of Egypt, or whatever group may have predominated at a given historical moment. As far as Christendom was concerned they all shared a single, overriding identity as Muslims, and it is this overarching, religious identity that the anti-Islam discourse addresses. While today the West tends to think largely of Arabs when speaking of Islam, the object of this discursive formation has always been “Islam-ness,” not “Arab-ness.” In short, the construction of Islam and Muslims by the West has been essentialist, uniform, and not conducive to nuance and variation.

As we shall see in the course of this dissertation, the discourse is always spelled out in terms of this Islam-ness, regardless of any ethnic, national, or even Biblical identifier applied to the Muslims at a given moment. Historically, such ethnic complexities were particularly opaque to European Christendom, which had only the vaguest notion of the distant Muslim peoples. Pope Urban II’s original call to Crusade, for example, was directed against the Persians – “an accursed race, a race wholly alienated from God,” in one version of the pope’s declaration of war – rather than the socially and politically ascendant Arabs. Others equally damned the Arabs or the Turks, or simply lumped them all together as Saracens – that is, the children of Abraham’s wife, Sarah – or as Ishmaelites – named for Abraham’s eldest son. Finally, “the West” is taken here to encompass the lands of medieval Christendom and the modern states and societies – including their associated discursive practices – which have emerged from them and which dominate the world today.

The continuity of such broad categories as “Islam” and “the West,” and their utility within the established narrative, came into sharp relief with the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Five days later, President George W.
Bush wrapped himself and his nation securely in the mantle of Christian holy war, first declared in the eleventh century CE: “This is a new kind of war – a new kind of evil. And we understand. And the American people are beginning to understand. This crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to take a while” (2001).

The White House immediately expressed the president’s regret over use of the word crusade, acknowledging it might have “upset” the Muslim world (Fleischer 2001). Nonetheless, Bush repeated the term five months later when he made it clear that this military campaign, like its medieval forerunners, would extend beyond a single nation or a single people to represent a ‘civilizational’ alliance of like-minded forces. Thanking the Canadian military for joining the effort, Bush said: “They stand with us in this incredibly important crusade to defend freedom, this campaign to do what is right for our children and our grandchildren” (2002b).

President Bush later guarded his use of language more carefully, but powerful figures in his administration felt no such compunction. John Ashcroft, then attorney general with responsibility for enforcement of America’s beefed-up security laws, told a conservative radio interviewer: “Christianity is a faith in which God sends his son to die for you,” while Islam is “a religion in which God requires you to send your son to die for him” (quoted in Sheer 2002). The top intelligence officer then in charge of the Pentagon’s pursuit of Osama bin Laden, Lieutenant-General William G. Boykin, assured the Christian Right that the U.S.-led war on terrorism was a struggle between the beneficent God of the Christians and the false “idol” worshipped by Muslims. Boykin asked members of the Good Shepherd Community Church in Sandy, Oregon: “Why do they hate
us? The answer to that is because we’re a Christian nation. We are hated because we are a nation of believers” (quoted in Arkin 2003).7

Accompanying this rhetoric from U.S. officials has been a groundswell of popular Islamophobia, running from North America through Europe and on to Australia, which has dented the very idea of liberal democratic society. Since 2001, the incidence of hate crimes in America against Muslims and Arabs in general – or those presumed to be Arabs – has also risen sharply, although the latest data available from Council on American-Islamic Relations, a Muslim advocacy group, reports some significant improvement between 2006 and 2007 (CAIR 2008). One study by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life found that 46 percent of Americans surveyed said Islam was more likely than other religions to encourage violence, a substantial increase from the year before (Pew Forum 2004).

Data collected by the Pew in 2006 found that the number of American respondents saying Islam had nothing in common with their own religious faith had increased since an earlier survey in 2005, to 70 percent from 59 percent (Pew Forum 2007). Asked to give one-word impressions of Islam, those surveyed offered negative attributes twice as often as positive ones; “fanatic” was the second most frequent response (after “devout”), but the terms “radical” and “terror” were also popular. Fifty-eight percent of these same respondents said they knew “little or nothing” of Islam (Pew Forum 2007). A follow-up study in 2009 found 65 percent of those interviewed felt Islam differed “very much” or “somewhat” from their own beliefs and values – the highest figure for

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7 NBC news earlier broadcast some of the tapes, provided by Arkin, the network’s military analyst.
any faith in the survey – although the number of respondents linking Islam to violence declined somewhat, to 38 percent. (Pew Forum 2009).

A separate survey of religious attitudes in America by Wuthnow (2004 [2003]) found that 23 percent said it should be illegal for Muslim groups to meet and practice their faith, while 47 percent and 40 percent said the words “fanatical” and “violent” respectively applied to Muslims (164). The Gallup Organization recently found that a majority of Americans see “little” or “nothing” to admire in Islam or the Muslim world (Abdo 2006a). Likewise, Australia’s Muslim and Arab community faced a sharp increase in incidents of racial and ethnic hatred in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks on New York and Washington, aggravated by the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings, which targeted Australians and other foreigners (Poynting and Mason 2006, 367). A 2003 study for Australia’s Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission reported that 87 percent of Muslims surveyed had experienced racist abuse or violence since 11 September (Poynting and Noble 2004). A survey of European attitudes, meanwhile, showed rising antagonism toward Muslims in 2008 over previous years, with 52 percent in Spain, 50 percent in Germany, 46 percent in Poland and 38 percent in France now displaying negative attitudes toward them (Pew Forum 2008).

Anti-Muslim sentiment is particularly virulent on the Internet, whence it easily spills over into the cultural mainstream and into the old-line media world of television, radio, newspapers, and books (Tirman n.d.). Prominent supporters of the Bush administration, particularly members of the Christian Right, are regular features of old and new media alike, routinely condemning Islam and its

8 By contrast, 25 percent regarded Hindus as “fanatical” and 23 percent applied the word to Buddhists. However, one fifth favored outlawing members of either faith from worshipping together (Wuthnow 2004, 164).
prophet. The late Rev. Jerry Falwell, whose Christian Right lobby wields enormous influence within the Republican Party, called Muhammad “a terrorist … a violent man, a man of war” (2002). America’s premier televangelist, Pat Robertson, labeled the prophet “an absolute wild-eyed fanatic” and “a killer” (2002). And the Rev. Jerry Vines, past president of the Southern Baptist Convention, the largest Protestant denomination in America with an estimated 16 million members, said Muhammad was a “demon-possessed pedophile,” asserting he had had twelve wives, the youngest of whom was nine years old (quoted in Sachs 2002). As of this writing, an Internet search of Muhammad and “pedophile” brings up approximately 263,000 hits on this theme – an increase of more than 50 percent in the two years that I have been tracking this informal index.

Public attitudes reflect the public discourse. The 2007 Pew survey, for example, found the media was the single biggest influence on Americans’ attitudes toward Islam; this was all the more the case among those with negative opinions toward Muslims (Pew Forum 2007). Here, too, there has been virtual unanimity that the terrorist attacks represent an existential threat to America, its core values, and, in fact, to Western civilization as a whole – all framed as a part of a declaration of cultural war by the angry, anti-modern, and alien forces of Islam. In a review of the coverage of September 11 and its aftermath in what he called the “quality” media aimed at “the American literati and intelligentsia” – defined in the study as The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal newspapers and the journals Time, Newsweek, New Republic, and

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9 The charge stems from the tradition which says the Prophet’s last wife was a child-bride, the daughter of his close friend and ally Abu Bakr – later the first of the rightly guided caliphs. While the practice was common at the time, her precise age is still subject to dispute, as is her age when the marriage was later consummated.
Atlantic Monthly – historian Ervand Abrahamian found a remarkably consistent message in the headlines and content of news stories (2003, 530).

In a note introducing a special section that would run for four months, the flagship New York Times promised its readers “complete worldwide coverage of the roots and consequences of September 11.” This daily feature, bannered “A Nation Challenged,” and the other pages of the newspaper proffered such headlines as: “This is a religious war”; “Jihad 101”; “Barbarians at the gate”; “The force of Islam”; “Divine inspiration”; “Defusing the holy bomb”; “The core of Muslim rage”; “Dreams of holy war”; “The deep intellectual roots of Islamic rage”; and “A head-on collision of alien cultures” (Abrahamian 2003, 531).

The contemporary reverberations of Islamophobia have by no means been restricted to American soil, as the worldwide clamor in late 2005 and early 2006 over the publication of a series of Danish cartoons of Muhammad made all too clear. Around one hundred and forty people were killed, mostly in the Muslim world, during public protests against the cartoons, which were originally created for Denmark’s biggest newspaper and then reprinted widely, generally in the name of free speech. Danish embassies were set on fire, and some Muslim countries announced boycotts of Denmark’s exports. The moral outrage of Muslims at lampoons of the prophet was met by equal outrage on the part of Western public opinion at the notion of restraint on freedom of expression – and at the notion that Muslims could be so outraged.10

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10 For a more complete account of this affair, see Jonathan Lyons, Out of the mouth’s of babes: What the Danish ‘Cartoon Crisis’ can tell us about the multicultural future. In Terrorism and Social Exclusion: Misplaced Risk – Common Security, eds. David Wright-Neville and Anna Halafoff. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Forthcoming.
The affair began with the publication in September 2005 of twelve editorial cartoons of Muhammad in the *Jyllands-Posten* daily. One of the images portrays the Prophet with a bomb-shaped turban. In another image, Muhammad is pleading with a queue of would-be suicide bombers outside heaven’s gate: “Stop. Stop. We ran out of virgins.” This latter is a reference to the argument, popular in some Western circles, that suicide attacks are motivated by promises of sexual reward in the afterlife and cannot possibly be rational or deliberate acts of military, political, or personal resistance.

Major dailies in Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and many other countries around the world published some or all of the cartoons. France’s influential *Le Monde*, for example, reprinted two of the original cartoons, created one of its own for the front page, and made all twelve of the Danish images available online. Virtually all other French newspapers also carried examples in support of *Jyllands-Posten* (Berkowitz and Eko 2007, 780).

In Australia, the controversy fed seamlessly into the “values debate” – essentially a running proxy war over multiculturalism, national identity, and, by extension, national security in a rapidly changing world. For the most part, it served as fuel for those who felt that the country’s official policy of multiculturalism was pandering to demands by Australia’s Muslims that, by virtue of their religious and cultural differences with the non-Muslim majority, they be treated differently than the rest of society. Concerns over national security were not far beneath the surface. Marking the fifth anniversary of the attacks of 11 September, Prime Minister John Howard warned his audience: “There is a section of the Islamic population which will not integrate …. [and]
does have values and attitudes, which are hostile to Australia’s interests”
(Herald Sun, 11 September 2006).

Pope Benedict XVI has also firmly planted the banner of Christian
particularism in the post-September 11 landscape. In an address on 12
September 2006 at the University of Regensburg, where he had taught in the
1970s, the pontiff quoted the late fourteenth-century Byzantine Emperor Manuel
II Paleologus in religious debate with a “learned [Muslim] Persian” on the
subject of holy war: “Show me just what Muhammad brought that was new, and
there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread
by the sword the faith he preached” (2006). The pope did acknowledge a well-
known injunction in the Qur’an against “compulsion in religion” (Qur’an 2:256)
but assured his listeners that “experts” had dated it to the early years of
Muhammad’s prophethood, when the Muslim community was still too weak to
compel obedience among non-believers.

Benedict then went on to argue that the use of force in religion offends
Christian rationality but is in keeping with the Muslim conception of a God
whose omnipotence transcends any such category, that is, one who can literally
defy reason: “The decisive statement in this argument against violent conversion
is this: not to act in accordance with reason is contrary to God’s nature” (2006).
Muslims were outraged. In their eyes, the pope had explicitly passed over a
chance to repudiate the emperor’s charges that Islam offered nothing but
violence, a move widely seen as a Vatican endorsement; he had failed to
acknowledge the Church’s own sponsorship of the anti-Muslim Crusades or
other acts of inhumanity in the name of God, such as the Inquisition, the brutal
suppression of the Cathar heresy in southern France, or the expulsion of Jews
and Muslims from the Iberian peninsula; and he had repeated the charge that Islam – and by extension its conception of God – was not rational, unlike his own the Christian faith.

Evangelical Christians, meanwhile, have been even more explicit than Pope Benedict in casting doubt on the traditional theological teaching that the God of the three major monotheist faiths is one and the same. In fact, after September 11 the relative few among American evangelical preachers and commentators who had been willing even to countenance such a view hardened their attitudes significantly. Recent years have seen an outpouring of anti-Islam polemical works by leading evangelical figures disputing the “one God” thesis and grounding the September 11 attacks and other acts of terrorism specifically within the Islamic holy texts (Cimino 2005, 165-166).

The anti-Islam discourse hardly stands alone. The Western experience can be defined by a number of such fundamental discourses, each of long standing and great power. These include the gender discourse, the discourse on race, the discourse on the Enlightenment and the idea of “progress” in general, and the discourse on science – to name a few of the most prominent. The anti-Semitic discourse, perhaps, deserves a specific mention, for it might appear at first glance to resemble that of the Western narrative of Islam. Any such comparison, however, is misleading. While Jews were regular targets of persecution, discrimination, and, not infrequently, organized violence across medieval Europe, they retained a necessary place in Christian theology and exegesis and thus retained a legitimate, if problematic, place in Western thought and society. Augustine had taught that the existence of the Jews bore witness to the validity of Christian scripture’s claims to roots in the Old Testament, while
Christian eschatology held that some Jews were destined to convert as an immediate prelude to the End of Time.

Unlike the Cathar heretics and, later, the Muslims, the Jews could never fully be cast as “Others”; as such, they could never become the targets of Christian holy war although “collateral damage” was often heavy. In a letter exhorting the people of England to join the Second Crusade, Bernard of Clairvaux, one of the leading voices of the twelfth-century Latin Church warned would-be warriors that the Jews, widely blamed for the death of Jesus, must not be harmed amid this revival of religious zeal. “The Jews are for us the living words of Scripture, for they remind us always of what our Lord suffered. They are dispersed all over the world so that by expiating their crime they may be everywhere the living witnesses of redemption” (Bernard of Clairvaux 1953, 462). Nor did the Jews ever present, despite the favored tropes of anti-Semites, anything like the economic, political, intellectual, or religious challenges to Western Christendom that were posed by Islam.11

I have chosen to examine the anti-Islam discourse for a number of reasons. First of all, it has not been properly recognized or studied before. In fact, little attention has been paid in general to Western historical narratives of Islam, beyond the classic works of Norman Daniel (1960, 1966, and 1975) and Richard Southern (1962) and more recent studies by John V. Tolan (2002 and 2008). By contrast, the literature on the treatment of Jews and heretics has been considerable. For example, Robert Moore’s *Formation of a persecuting society: Power and deviance in Western Europe, 950-1250*, explores the persecution of

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“deviants,” that is, Jews, heretics, lepers, homosexuals, but makes no mention of the Muslims (Tolan 2002, xvi). Second, the anti-Islam discourse interacts or overlaps to varying degrees with each those discourses listed above, making it central to our understanding of Western civilization as a whole. Third, I believe it can shed light on a whole range of intellectual, social, and political problems facing the social sciences and, more broadly, contemporary Western societies.

The anti-Islam discourse, for example, pervades the Western histories of ideas. Scholars have known since the late 1950s of direct links between the “revolutionary” planetary theory of Copernicus and the work of Muslim astronomers two hundred to three hundred years earlier, that is, from the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries CE. Yet, the West clings to the notion that whatever intellectual glories once existed in the Muslim world – if they are acknowledged at all – were extinguished for good in the early twelfth century by the masterful anti-science polemics of the Muslim theologian Abu Hamid al-Ghazali.12 As a result, the full import of this and subsequent discoveries about the longevity of Arab science well past the “due date” assigned by the West’s traditional historical narrative remain largely unexplored.

However, to do so would violate the anti-Islam discourse, which assures us that Islamic science fell victim long before to Islamic obscurantism in the formidable person of al-Ghazali. Given such a turn in Muslim intellectual life, what use could there be to speak of, say, late medieval Islamic science? Or what need to probe Copernicus’ connections to the Muslim world? Such silence is indeed deafening. A more cogent explanation for the decline of Islamic science would avoid the “Ghazali trap” and might focus instead on the same geopolitical,

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12 For a look at the general failure of Western scholars to come to grips with this discovery and its ramifications, see George Saliba Islamic science and the making of the European Renaissance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007).
economic and social factors that are traditionally applied to other civilizations
and cultures undergoing profound change (cf. al-Hassan 1996).

There is also considerable evidence that Muslim intellectual and cultural
traditions played an important role in the rise of the European university, an
event trumpeted by the traditional historical narrative as a defining moment in
the emergence of contemporary Western civilization. Classic exemplars of this
latter tendency include Haskins (1957) and Grant (1996); Grant calls the rise of
the universities a “peculiarly Western phenomenon” (1996, 34). Yet, earlier
Muslim traditions included the practice of grouping foreign students into
associations, or “nations”; the wearing of distinctive dress or gowns by the
teaching masters; the awarding of a chair as a seat of honor and comfort for a
distinguished teacher; the granting of a recognized degree, in this case the
teaching license – in Arabic, the *ijaza* – to permit students deemed ready to take
on pupils of their own; and a number of specific university terms, such as the
*stadium generale* and, quite possibly, the *baccalareus*. Again, the presence of the
anti-Islam discourse has all but precluded serious investigation into any links
between the mosque-centered teaching of the Arabs and the development of that
treasured Western cultural accomplishment, the university (Makdisi 1981b).

Turning back to Foucault, this time invoking his principle of “reversal”
in an attempt to peek behind the established discourse, it becomes possible to ask
what the effects might be if the dominant anti-Islam discourse as it applies to the
history of Western ideas were rejected. Suddenly, a number of enormously
exciting possibilities begin to suggest themselves. Suddenly, miscellaneous facts
that have been merely floating around, with no theoretical home to call their
own, start to fall into place.
These include the “mystery” of the Arab provenance of Copernicus’ mathematical work and of our university system; the Arab origins of much of the Western scientific lexicon; the unmistakable strains of the Muslim philosophers Avicenna and Averroes throughout the works of Thomas Aquinas and other seminal Western works; the links between medieval Arabic poetry and that of the troubadours, or the powerful Arabic literary influences on such quintessentially “Western” figures as Dante and Cervantes. Once the veil of the anti-Islam discourse is pulled back, these orphaned bits of information, small enough to ignore as curiosities or aberrations on their own, begin to take on a new coherence and a whole new meaning.

Casting an eye back over the past millennium of relations between Islam and the West, it is certainly possible to identify an alternative narrative that removes their undoubted contestation from the accepted framework of East versus West and places it within a single cultural arena. A few examples include Makdisi (1990); Voll (1994); Esposito (1999); Turner (2001, 2003); Bulliet (2004); and Lyons (2009a). Yet the prevailing discourse is so powerful and authoritative that such an approach has failed to make any serious inroads into Western thought. The result is an unnatural, and clearly unhelpful, separation of two rich and powerful cultural traditions that share far more than we are generally prepared to acknowledge. This, in turn, distorts Western understanding of the Muslim world and its culture and all but guarantees that any attempt at East-West communication will result in what the Turks call “a dialogue of the deaf.”

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The next chapter will present a framework for understanding the anti-Islam discourse that is both sociological and theoretical, while Chapter Three will outline my methodological approach. Chapter Four will then explore in detail the formation of Islam as discourse – thus addressing the first of my underlying analytical questions – and lay the groundwork for the discussion of the social, intellectual, and political influences that this has exerted ever since.

Chapters Five, Six, and Seven take a thematic approach, breaking down the anti-Islam discourse into a number of component parts and placing each in their appropriate social context. Central themes to be investigated include Islam and science; Islam and violence; and Islam and women. Throughout, I shall bear in mind the remaining analytical questions: How does the anti-Islam discourse operate? And who benefits from this discursive formation and its perpetuation? Chapter Eight concludes this study with a proposed alternative reading of relations between Islam and the West and outlines areas for future research.
Chapter Two: The sociological approach

This thesis develops a sociological explanation for the formation of the anti-Islam discourse and to uncover the social forces that perpetuated and defended it in the face of new and expanding information about Islam and Muslims along with the shifting political, religious, and economic relationships between Occident and Orient. In doing so, it seeks to address the following questions, among others: Which social groups and institutions act as carriers of this discourse? What central themes have emerged from this discursive formation? How have succeeding ranks of “Islam experts” – from the ideologues of the medieval Church to the Renaissance humanists, from the Orientalists in the service of imperialist expansion to today’s neo-conservatives – benefited from their monopoly over the East-West narrative? And how has the production and reproduction of this discourse enjoyed such lasting success even as the labors of these experts have proven such obvious failures?

I also stake out space for the work of sociologists in a field, the Western study of Islam and Islamic movements, that has recently been dominated by the disciplines of political science, international relations, history, and others. In this way, I seek to address a call for just such a sociological approach issued by Philip W. Sutton and Stephen Vertigans in 2005. Lamenting the Academy’s failure to recognize and then explain in any satisfactory way the contemporary “growth of practicing Muslims, the establishment of Islamic states and the emergence of radical Islamic social movements,” Sutton and Vertigans write in *Islamic resurgence: A sociological approach*:

[S]ociological analysis potentially brings something unique to our understanding of this important phenomenon by connecting Islamic history to changes in the figuration of international states, the rise of political and violent
forms of Islam alongside widespread beliefs in ‘civilized’ values and ‘superior’ (and ‘inferior’) civilizations. In short, the absence of a thoroughgoing sociological perspective leaves our understanding of resurgent Islam relatively fragmented and therefore partial” (2005, 2).

As the authors recognize, most efforts to date to address contemporary Islam and the Muslims within a sociological framework, albeit indirectly rather than head-on, have so far yielded little and have often clouded the issues more than they have clarified them. Thus, throughout most of the twentieth century the popularity and longevity of secularization theory within the social science corpus, and among sociologists of religion in particular, virtually ensured that inquiries into what is commonly termed an Islamic revival, or resurgence, would see this as an unexpected development to be explained in terms of reaction to, or escape from, economic, political, or physical hardships.

By effectively correlating a rise in secularization with the emergence of this same modernity such tendencies virtually dictate that growing Muslim religiosity and expanding Islamic movements would come to be seen as deviant or reactionary phenomena restricted to marginalized populations (Sutton and Vertigans 2005, 27). This has introduced into the study of non-Western societies gross distortions across a range of disciplines, from sociology of religion to politics and international relations. “Postmodernity challenges the idea that in our era there is still a grand narrative – the Western concept of modernity – a single overall character and direction to the meaning of progress, modernity, or development for all countries,” writes Scott M. Thomas. “[Yet] all mainstream theories of world politics are relentlessly secular with respect to motivation” (2005, 11).

The root of the problem lies in the same Enlightenment notions of progress that so heavily imbue the works of such pioneers as Marx, Durkheim,
Weber, and Freud. All saw religious expression as significant but somehow outside the main flow or direction of modernizing societies (Berger 1999, 2-4; Beyer 2006, 97-98). One of the central concerns running throughout Weber’s work, for example, is the notion of rationalization, as measured by the degree to which intellectual coherence and consistency over time replace magical elements in a society’s approach to religion. This Entzauberung – best understood as disenchantment, in the sense of the loss of mystery or signification – lies at the heart of Weber’s sociology of knowledge and describes a process whereby charismatic and prophetic knowledge is gradually reinterpreted and rationalized, first by a new stratum of acolytes and priests and, later, by intellectuals and bureaucrats who reflect the dominant forces in society at large (Gerth and Mills in Weber 1995, 51-65; Swatos and Christiano 1999, 212).

In Sociology of religion, Weber writes: “As intellectualism suppresses belief in magic, the world’s processes become disenchanted, lose their magical significance, and henceforth simply ‘are’ or ‘happen’ but no longer signify anything. As a consequence, there is a growing demand that the world and total pattern of life be subject to an order that is significant and meaningful” (1965, 125). This growing demand, and the accompanying demystification of the world, then, represents “secularization” – a process that increasingly came to be seen as both a social good and a universal phenomenon against which all societies could be measured and assessed. Weber, himself, appears to have had in mind a rather fluid definition of “secularization,” particularly in its application to the study of religion.\[13\]

\[13\] In his 1918 lecture at Munich University, later translated into English as “Science as a vocation,” Weber prefers the term “intellectualization” to describe this process (1958, 139; cited in Swatos and Christiano 1999, 212).
In the hands of Weber’s heirs, secularization theory evolved from the vague assessment of Church-state power relations or the extent of religious authority to the full-blown “claim that, in the face of scientific rationality, religion’s influence on all aspects of life – from personal habits to social institutions – is in dramatic decline” (Swatos and Christiano 1999, 214). Underpinning much of this development was the influential work of Talcott Parsons, who adopted an evolutionary approach grounded, once again, in an Enlightenment notion of development and progress. The result is, effectively, an approach to religious history in which the “stages” of development are defined in advance (Swatos and Christiano 1999, 218-19). This falls into the trap of what George Sweezy once dismissed as sociology’s predilection for “the present as history” (Sweezy 1953; cited in Mills 1959, 146).

Classical secularization theory has beaten a retreat over the last decade or more, amid growing recognition of rising levels of religious activity worldwide, and across virtually all traditions as well as among New Religious Movements (cf. Stark and Bainbridge 1985; Greeley 1989; Thomas 2005). One of its earlier supporters, Peter Berger, has since acknowledged that proponents of secularization were wrong in their assertion of a necessary, causal link between modernity and a decline in religiosity on both the societal and individual level. “The world today … is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever. This means that a whole body of literature by historians and social scientists loosely labeled ‘secularization theory’ is essentially mistaken” (1999, 2; cited in Sutton and Vertigans 2005, 27). Moreover, Berger notes, religious communities have not been forced to adapt to secularity, as the theory would have predicted, in order to survive; rather, those that have thrived in the
modern world are precisely those that have resolutely refused to do so (1999, 4). Rodney Stark’s contribution to a special issue of *Sociology of Religion* devoted to secularization theory was titled succinctly, Secularization, R. I. P. (1999, 249-273). Still, the residual influence of secularization theory on the study of Islam, at least, has generally remained intact.

The rise of globalization theories among social scientists has likewise bolstered the prevailing view of Islam and of contemporary Muslims – frequently characterized as “fundamentalist” – as both reactive and reactionary. In general, such theories commonly focus on economics, politics, and culture as separate realms, although some seek a combination of the three. At their core, however, they take the industrialized Western nation-state and its associated societal forms as the yardstick against which to measure all others. This, in turn, yields a decidedly Eurocentric view and tends to ignore or downplay the perspective of those taking part in Islamic movements (Sutton and Vertigans 2005, 89). As a result, Islamic and other religious movements tend to be seen as resistance to Western values, or materialism, or culture in general (cf. Robertson and Lechner 1985; Waters 1998). Zygmunt Bauman, for example, ties globalization directly and intimately to fundamentalism: “[F]undamentalist tendencies … reflect and articulate the experience of people on the receiving end of globalization…” (1998, 3; cited in Sutton and Vertigans 2005, 90).

Yet, Sutton and Vertigans point out, these Islamic movements are “far more sophisticated than Western theorists give them credit for, and they are themselves part of the globalizing processes which they seek to direct. They need to be given far more attention within globalization theories” (2005, 90-91). That they are not reflects the underlying assumption of most globalization
theories that the West is culturally and economically creative while other civilizations and cultures lack – yet secretly yearn for – this same dynamism (2005, 175). We shall see the clear results of this theoretical blind spot in Chapter Five, on the discourse of Islam and science.

Globalization theories, like secularization theories before them, also suffer from a basic methodological shortcoming when applied to Muslims: the weight of the traditional view of Islam as the “independent variable” that can account for the salient characteristics of Muslim societies, including levels of socio-economic or political development (Abootalebi 2000, ix; 2003, 155). This again focuses attention on exclusion, rather than on inclusion; on what is missing in the Islamic world, rather than on what is present but largely ignored or simply unseen by the Western gaze – a process that both emerges from, and sustains, the anti-Islam discourse. “Muslim societies are still considered to lack essential features associated with the dynamic development of the West, including rationality, liberalism, democracy, and as a consequence are considered inferior” (Sutton and Vertigans 2005, 26).

The remarkable resilience and unchanging nature of the anti-Islam discourse over the past millennium also poses a significant challenge to the traditional Western history of ideas – and for the philosophy of history in general. The primary difficulty surrounds the very notion of change, something fundamental to the way history has been conceived in the Western experience. This holds as much for the Church Fathers as for the philosophes of the Enlightenment and the post-modernists, even as the nature of that change – generally but not exclusively held up as “progress” – becomes increasingly complex. For Augustine, history was essentially a straight-line progression, from
the flawed society of man to that shining metropolis on the hill, literally *The City of God*.

The eighteenth-century Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico added a layer of complexity when he proposed a three-fold development in the history of nations: an age of gods, an age of heroes, and an age of men. Vico’s complex and idiosyncratic system, laid out in his *Scienza nuova*, was generally ignored by his contemporaries. It was, however, rediscovered and remains steadfastly influential to this day. Of particular interest to the sociologist, Vico made ample room for the activities of man and society as the appropriate object of study:

“But in the night of thick darkness enveloping the earliest antiquity, so remote from ourselves, there shines the eternal and never failing light of a truth beyond all question: that the world of civil society has certainly been made by men, and that its principles are therefore to be found within the modifications of our own human mind” (Vico 1968, 331).

Of course, the Western idea of history has undergone significant evolution since Giambattista Vico, but there has been no substantive departure from its central engagement with notions of change: through Hegel, to Marx and his revisionists, and on to the post-modern era. Later critiques of Enlightenment historiography do not generally dispute this notion of historical progress as much as they rebel against the flawed way in which earlier practitioners sought to justify it. These thinkers cast their own efforts in terms of restoring historical “realism” (White 1973, 47-48). Marxist dialectical materialism, for example, represents an attempt not to eliminate this notion of progress but to rationalize it:

“It [dialectical materialism] reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure before it except the uninterrupted progress of
becoming and passing away” (Engels 1941, 12).

In this same vein, Thomas Kuhn’s landmark study of revolutions in science rises and falls on the dynamic of one paradigm driving out another as an accumulation of new data in the form of anomalies vitiates the incumbent approach and literally forces scientists, often against their own innate conservatism, to accept another set of problems and viewpoints. When the shortcomings of the conventional view become too big to ignore, Kuhn argues in *The structure of scientific revolutions*, a shift in paradigm is in order. In fact, it is unavoidable. “Paradigms gain their status because they are more successful than their competitors in solving a few problems that the group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute” (23). In response to his critics, Kuhn later modified some of his terminology, but his essential observations about the nature of scientific change remain intact. Much of the controversy centered on his definition of “paradigm,” and in later writings he noted that perhaps “theory” would have been a better choice (1970, 2, n. 1). For our purposes, “paradigm” remains perfectly viable.

But what if the there is no change? What if we find none of the transformations of discursive formations that the modern French philosophers, following Bachelard, refer to as “discontinuities”? What if there simply is no paradigm shift? What if the anti-Islamic discourse shows none of the attributes of the traditional history of ideas, but instead appears to violate the “laws” of intellectual physics?

This is, I contend, is pretty much has happened. The outlines of new paradigms have emerged but so far none have prevailed. Despite the intervening centuries and the military, commercial, and cultural communication that they
naturally entailed, not to mention countless studies, monographs, news items, and other statements about the Muslim world, the Western “conversation” about Islam remains very much rooted in its medieval beginnings. Kuhn would teach us that the short-comings contained in an initial paradigm constructed one thousand years ago on the basis of Crusades propaganda and a complete lack of first-hand knowledge of Islam would have succumbed long ago to such manifest anomalies. In its place, we would expect to find a more insightful, more useful, and ultimately more helpful way of looking at and thinking about Islam and Muslims. That has not happened. Instead, we near the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century much as we began it – with a deadly crisis of relations between Islam and the West, of which the war on terrorism, which our leaders tell us may never end, is but the most acute symptom.

In response, I propose to modify the traditional approach to intellectual history using a sociological approach in order to better understand the workings, maintenance, and consequences of the anti-Islam discourse. Revisiting the three elements of our analytical framework – the formation of the discourse, its operation, and its social and institutional beneficiaries – allows me to relocate the problem within the realm of sociology. And that is the aim of this thesis.

This does not, however, mean losing sight of the historical content or of the utility of historical analysis in general. Zygmunt Bauman’s evocatively titled work *Liquid Fear* flirts with the danger of doing just that. Bauman notes that in response to modernity, particularly at its virulent, globalizing worst, the world’s monotheistic faiths have fallen back on a polarizing, black-and-white worldview as a means of final defense. He then adds:

Indeed, the Manichean vision of the world, the call to arms in holy war against satanic forces threatening to overwhelm the universe, the reducing of the Pandora’s box of economic, political and social conflicts to an apocalyptic
vision of a last, life and death confrontation between good and evil: these are not patterns unique to Islamic ayatollahs. On our fast globalizing planet, the “religionization” of politics, of social grievances and battles of identity and recognition, seem to be the global tendency (2006, 113-114).

While perhaps a plausible enough description of today’s world, Bauman has failed to hear the clear echo of the same sentiments, fears, and attitudes that were present at the very creation of the anti-Islam discourse, one thousand years earlier, and nurtured ever since. Rather than a response, to use Bauman’s phrase, “commissioned, customized and tailor-made to satisfy the longings fed by negative globalization” (2006, 115), we are clearly dealing with deep-set and lasting forces, ideas, and conceptualizations that cannot simply be explained away by the latest twists and turns of modernity.

As C. Wright Mills points out, the essential unity of history and sociology is central to proper social studies. “No social study that does not come back to the problems of biography, of history and of their intersections within a society has completed its intellectual journey,” Mills writes at the outset of his manifesto, The Sociological imagination (1959, 6). Such an approach can move the researcher in new directions and generate fundamental questions of acute interest to the sociologist: What is the structure of the society under consideration? Where do we place this society in human history, and how does it differ from other eras? And, what kinds of men and women prevail in this time and place? “Whether the point of interest is a great power state or a minor literary mood, a family, a prison, a creed – these are the kinds of questions the best social analysts ask. They are the intellectual pivots of classic studies of man in society – and they are the questions inevitably raised by any mind possessing the sociological imagination” (1959, 7).
Sutton and Vertigans conclude *Resurgent Islam* with a call to sociological arms: “It is well known that Max Weber’s magisterial study of the world religions was cut short before he completed his work on Islam. Surely the time is now long overdue for sociologists to bring Weber’s project to fruition and take the study of Islam into the mainstream of twentieth-first-century sociology” (185). That may be too immense a task for any mortal sociologist, but it is hoped that the present study will mark a significant step in the right direction. And that means, first, a return to the most fundamental questions of all: Just what do we mean by Islam? And why do we mean this instead of something else?

* * *

Recent decades have seen a growing recognition among social scientists of the importance of language and its steady transformation from a relatively neutral or transparent means of communicative exchange to an object worthy of study, either as part of other, established disciplines or in its own right (Fairclough 1992, 2). The result has been a proliferation of competing definitions and theoretical approaches to the analysis of discourse (Van Dijk 1985 for an overview). However, two distinct camps can be discerned: those grounded primarily in linguistics and concerned with “extended samples of either spoken or written language”; and those based chiefly in social theory and addressing “different ways of structuring areas of knowledge and social practice” (Fairclough 1992, 3).

Among the latter trend is so-called Critical Discourse Analysis, which sees discourse – here defined as language used in speech and writing, listening and reading – as “social practice” (Fairclough and Wodak 1998, 258), or as
“practical, social, and cultural phenomenon” (Van Dijk 1998a, 2). Theoretical approaches within Critical Discourse Analysis, however, vary widely, depending largely on the degree to which they rely on the linguistic characteristics of texts and statements (Fairclough and Wodak 1998, 271-280).

At one end of the spectrum lies critical linguistics, developed in Great Britain in the 1970s (cf. Halliday 1978 and 1994; Fowler 1991), with its close attention to grammatical usage, choice of vocabulary, and the ways in which one text influences the production of a subsidiary one, for example, how a government report might become an item in the news (Fairclough and Wodak 1998, 263-264). Intermediate approaches have, among other avenues, sought to account for the relationship between social change and discursive change (Fairclough 1989 and 1992), to introduce a central role for cognition (Van Dijk 1998a), or to integrate comprehensive historical background against which texts are then analyzed and interpreted (Wodak 1989).

At the other end of the spectrum – some might say well straying outside its confines altogether – stands the work of Michel Foucault, in which linguistic analyses of texts and statements play no significant role and broader epistemological and philosophical questions predominate. As to his own working definition of the term discourse, Foucault writes: “I believe I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements” (1972a, 80). And it is this latter meaning, the rules that oversee the production and reproduction of statements as constitutive of knowledge, as well as their subsequent transformation into a discipline, that are central to both Foucault’s
thinking and to my own analysis of the anti-Islam discourse.

Commentators have found it hard to resist dividing Foucault’s wide-ranging output over his short but marvelously productive life – he died in 1984, aged 58 – into three phases in accordance with his predominant theoretical concern at any one time (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 352). While it is important not to make too much of these distinctions and instead to see them as part of the evolution of a coherent and consistent intelligence, there is nonetheless a certain utility in taking them as separate, if interrelated, methodologies (A. Davidson 1996, 221-233; Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 104). This is particularly the case for two of the most useful items for our study in Foucault’s “tool box”: those techniques he refers to as “archaeology” and “genealogy.” His third form of analysis, that of ethics, need not concern us.

A. Davidson later sums up the distinction between these two approaches, as well as their fundamental compatibility, qualities that can illuminate all three elements of our analytical framework:

Archaeology attempts to isolate the level of discursive practices and formulate the rules of production and transformation for these practices. Genealogy, on the other hand, concentrates on the forces and relations of power connected to discursive practices; it does not insist on a separation of rules for production of discourse and relations of power. But genealogy does not so much displace archaeology as widen the kind of analysis to be pursued (1996, 227).

So what, exactly, is archaeology? As with many things concerning Foucault’s work, there is not one, straightforward answer, and so it may be better first to address what archaeology is not, by contrasting it– as the author does himself in The archaeology of knowledge – with the traditional notion of the history of ideas. “[A]rchaeological description is precisely … an abandonment of the history of ideas, a systematic rejection of its postulates and procedures, an attempt to practice a quite different history of what men have said” (1972a, 138).
In his inaugural lecture to the Collège de France, delivered in 1970, Foucault spells out four distinct differences that characterize his method.\textsuperscript{14} First of all, archaeology is not intended to impose unities on the unruly diversity of discourses, whether a work, a period, or a theme. Nor does it seek to reveal hidden meanings, uncover influences, or ascribe innovation or originality to individuals; it is not an interpretive discipline. Likewise, it is not the pursuit of “the point of creation” (1972b, 230). Unlike archaeology, these are all hallmarks of the history of ideas as commonly constructed and practiced.

Yet, for Foucault, such activities are not worthy of serious, “grown-up” researchers:

It is not legitimate, then, to demand, point-blank, of the texts that one is studying their title to originality, and whether they really possess those degrees of nobility that are measured here by the absence of ancestors. … But to seek in the great accumulation of the already-said the text that resembles ‘in advance’ a later text, to ransack history in order to rediscover the play of anticipations or echoes, to go right back to the first seeds or to go forward to the last traces, to reveal in a work its fidelity to tradition or its irreducible uniqueness, to raise or lower its stock of originality … these are harmless enough amusements for historians who refuse to grow up (1972a, 143-44).

In contradistinction to such historical practice, archaeology takes differences and dis-unities seriously, making no attempt either to explain them away or to establish a systemic relationship among them but only endeavoring to describe them. This inverts the usual values, not by increasing differences but simply by declining to reduce them. “For the history of ideas, the appearance of difference indicates an error, or a trap. … Archaeology, on the other hand, takes as the object of its description what is usually regarded as an obstacle: its aim is not to overcome differences, but to analyze them, to say what exactly they consist of, to differentiate them” (Foucault 1972a, 171).

\textsuperscript{14} While this lecture was delivered in late 1970, the text here is from the appendix to the 1972 edition of \textit{The archaeology of knowledge}. It will identified in the text as 1972b, while \textit{Archaeology} will be designated 1972a.
This gives Foucault’s work the unique power to identify “minor” statements and other obscure data overlooked by traditional investigation, a quality computer scientists and physicists approvingly call “granularity,” and restore to them their true, full value. “Foucault’s genius,” writes the philosopher Ian Hacking, “is to go down to the little dramas, dress them in facts hardly anyone else had noticed, and turn these stage settings into clues to a hitherto unthought series of confrontations out of which, he contends, the orderly structure of society is composed” (1986, 28). Or, as A. Davidson notes, “the method of archaeology also makes possible the discovery of new continuities, overlooked because of a surface appearance of discontinuity” (1986, 223-224).

In the thematic section of this dissertation, comprising Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, we will encounter the same phenomenon in what I referred to earlier as miscellaneous facts left “homeless” by the anti-Islam discourse.

Archaeology can also explain why it is that certain things can be thought and said about Islam and the Muslims and certain other things cannot. In other words, it reveals the ways in which the anti-Islam discourse operates. In The archaeology of knowledge, Foucault makes clear the central distinction between his method and the more linguistic approach, common to forms of Critical Discourse Analysis: “The question posed by language analysis of some discursive fact or other is always: according to what rules has a particular statement been made, and consequently according to what rules could other similar statements be made? The description of the events of discourse poses a quite different question: how is it that one particular statement appeared rather than another? (1972a, 27; emphasis added). In a special English-language preface – which he proposed calling “Directions for Use” – to another major
methodological work, *The order of things*, Foucault adds: “I should like to know whether the subjects responsible for scientific discourse are not determined in their situation, their function, their perceptive capacity, and their practical possibilities by conditions that dominate and even overwhelm them” (1994b, xiv).

The utility of this approach can be demonstrated by returning to Pope Benedict XVI’s address to German intellectuals in 2006, we can now begin to understand the workings of the anti-Islam discourse more clearly. Aside from the spectacle of one of Urban the Crusader’s direct successors lecturing Muslims on the subject of holy war, the pontiff found himself hopelessly entangled in two of the central threads of the West’s established narrative, violence and the nature of God, with the delicate matter of sex, perhaps understandably, ignored. Yet, his polemic is fatally flawed on several counts because of basic errors in textual analysis.

For one, the Qur’anic verse barring “compulsion in religion” (2:256)\(^{15}\) is, in fact, contrary to Benedict’s assertion, a later revelation from the Medina period, by which time Muhammad was a significant political and military leader and increasingly able to enforce his will; it was not made, as the pope argued, from a position of weakness and then somehow forgotten or set aside when Muhammad’s fortunes reversed. Moreover, Islam never presents anything like an unequivocal or unwavering endorsement of religious violence; rather, notions such as *jihad* – and of other concepts commonly seen by many Muslims and

\(^{15}\)The sura in question, the second chapter of the Qur’an, is the longest of the 114 sections of the text. The verse in question can be translated as follows: “There is no compulsion in religion. The right direction is henceforth distinct from error. And he who rejects false deities and believes in Allah has grasped a firm handhold which will never break. Allah is Hearer, Knower.” All translations from the Qur’an are taken from Marmaduke Pickthall, *The meaning of the glorious Koran: An explanatory translation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1909).
non-Muslims alike as fundamental to the faith and, thus, immutable – reflect the social and political context of specific time and place. I will return to this subject in my discussion of Islam and violence, in Chapter Six.

Nor must Muslims take a backseat to any of the other “People of the Book” in terms of their faith’s underlying rational characteristics. The very language of the Qur’an makes repeated appeal to man’s rationality. A significant number of verses refer to the rational order inherent to God’s universe and to man’s capacity to recognize and exploit this order for his own needs, such as keeping time: “He [God] it is who appointed the sun a splendor and the moon a light, and measured for her stages, that you might know the number of the years, and the reckoning [of time]. … He details the revelations for people who have knowledge” (10:6). By one Western scholar’s count, the Arabic word for “knowledge” (ilm) and its derivative forms comprise almost one percent of the Qur’an’s 78,000 words and are among its most frequently used terms and phrases, a linguistic feature that highlights just how important the concept was for the first Muslims (Rosenthal 2007, 19-21).

As Foucault would most assuredly have pointed out, such papal muddling is inescapable. It is also largely beside the point. Benedict was “misled” not by a few errant facts or mistaken interpretations by his experts but by the existence of an anti-Islam discourse that allows for no other conclusions or statements about Muslims but that they are prone to violence by their faith

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16 Franz Rosenthal recognizes the importance of knowledge and wisdom for the Ancient Graeco-Roman world but adds: “Yet, nobody would wish to argue that the attitude toward knowledge in the Ancient world as a whole or in any particular region or epoch of it was inspired and sustained by the same single-minded devotion that existed in medieval Islam. … Nor was the sphere of religion ever fused with that of knowledge as inseparably as happened later on in Islam.” Franz Rosenthal, Knowledge triumphant: The concept of knowledge in medieval Islam (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 336-337.
and irrational to boot. In other words, there was nothing else the pope could say; he was, quite literally, overwhelmed.

Nor is it only popes, politicians, and the public at large who are seduced by the siren call of the prevailing discourse; expertise and scholarship provides no defense, as we can see in the case of the Orientalist historian Bernard Lewis. Lewis has long advocated a reading of Islam as an authoritarian and rigid faith – and thus implacably anti-modern. Lewis writes in *The political language of Islam*: “The duty of obedience to legitimate authority is not merely one of political expediency. It is a religious obligation, defined and imposed by Holy Law and grounded in revelation” (1988, 91). Yet, this view is based in large part on his particular reading and translation of a key verse in the Qur’an (Afsarrudin 2008, 127). By translating a key phrase in verse 4:59 – *ulu `l-amr minkum* – as directing believers to “obey those in authority over you” rather than “those in authority among you,” Lewis chooses to obscure the verse’s egalitarian intent and focuses instead on the supposed authoritarian nature of Islam (Afsaruddin 2006b, 53-54; 2008, 127).

**Foucault’s work is not without its difficulties, and his commentators and critics have raised objections that are either philosophical or political – or, more frequently, both. The former critique generally centers on the problem of self-reference, or relativism, also a well-known pitfall in the sociology of knowledge. Particularly troubling for many is Foucault’s insistence on the total autonomy of discourse to produce statements in accordance with rules that are outside the consciousness of the speakers themselves and that are only recognizable to the**

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17 Here the prepositional phrase *minkum* means “among you,” not “over you” (Afsaruddin 2008: 127).
archaeologist. Such autonomy threatens to cast all knowledge as relative and all serious thought as an illusion on the part of the thinker. And it appears to raise the relativist question of how the archaeological discourse can evade its own illusions.

This leads Dreyfus and Rabinow, for example, to conclude that Foucault has so far failed to construct a successful “post-modern science of human beings,” although they are sympathetic to Foucault’s project and see archaeology as an imperfect rough draft of what would later become his profound methodological contributions to the study of man and culture. Still, *The archaeology of knowledge*, they write:

affirms that all serious discourse is subject to rules which determine the production of objects, subjects, and so forth – rules which the archaeological discourse claims to discover and describe. The archaeologist, indeed, aspires to contribute to a general theory of such production. … Yet, by avoiding a claim to truth or seriousness, archaeological discourse claims to make itself exempt from the problems raised by such a total theory. It is no surprise that archaeology, by thus affirming and denying the finitude of its own discourse, turns out to be as unstable as its precursors. (1983, 98).

Richard Rorty sees archaeology as a failed theory of knowledge altogether and dismisses this aspect of Foucault’s thought as a well-meaning “polemic against traditional notions” of epistemology (1986, 42), while Charles Taylor takes issue with what he calls Foucault’s “repudiation” of the “old Enlightenment-inspired combination” of truth and freedom (1985, 152).

There are, perhaps, a few signs in his own work that Foucault had a sense of the dangers outlined by his critics, and he seems at times to hedge his bets on whether archaeology will meet his expectations in the future (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 99-100). In his conclusion to *The archaeology of knowledge*, presented as a response to an imagined critical reader, Foucault acknowledges he is at the early stages of his investigations and that there are no “means of
guaranteeing” that archaeology will remain both stable and autonomous. “After all, it may be that archaeology is doing nothing more than playing the role of an instrument that makes it possible to articulate, in a less precise way than in the past, the analysis of social formations and epistemological descriptions. … I accept that my discourse may disappear with the figure that has borne it so far” (1972a, 208).

These remarks, seen by some as prophetic, ushered in an evolution in Foucault’s thinking which saw a new emphasis on social practice at the expense of pure theory and the emergence of a new methodological addition to the “tool box,” that of genealogy. Again, it is important not to see Foucault’s genealogy as a repudiation of his archaeology but as its new-found complement, a way to look more deeply into the dynamics of discursive practice. Genealogy allows Foucault to step back from the discourse he is exploring as archaeologist and to treat it as a “discourse-object” in its own right (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 106).

This introduces a second order of analysis, one that reaches beyond that available to pure archaeology. The need for this revised approach follows naturally from the earlier methodology worked out in The order of things. “This obsession with words was too fragile to stand. Foucault had to return to the material conditions under which the words were spoken. Not wanting to go back to individual speakers or authors, he at least had to consider the interests which spoken and written words would serve. …You inevitably have to consider who is doing what to whom” (Hacking 1986, 33-34). This, of course, opens the way to questions of acute interest to the sociologist.

“Genealogy” and many other aspects of Foucault’s work owe a large debt
to his own reading of Nietzsche, an encounter that Foucault’s French biographer
dates with some precision to 1953 (Eribon 1991, 52). Of particular interest here
is the prominence of the so-called will to knowledge. In his remarks to the
Collège de France, Foucault makes it clear that this will to knowledge – seen
here as reliant on institutional support, such as education, ritual, or doctrine, and
subject to rules of access and deployment – acts as a “power of constraint” upon
discourse (1972b, 219). And he is now explicit about the existence of limits and
controls on discourse that are rooted in individual societies. “I am supposing that
in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected,
organized, and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose
role is to avert its powers and its dangers, to cope with chance events, to evade
its ponderous, awesome materiality” (1972b, 216).

Foucault then effectively uses his lecture to foreshadow the coming
methodological turn, and he notes three key principles of his new genealogy:
“how series of discourse are formed, through, in spite of, or with the aid of these
systems of constraint; what are the specific norms for each; and what were their
conditions of appearance, growth, and variation” (1972b, 232). By now, the echo
of my own analytical questions surrounding the anti-Islam discourse should be
clear: How was this discourse formed? How does it operate? And which
institutions and groups stand to benefit from its preservation and perpetuation?

Genealogy and its introduction of social and institutional constraints
upon discourse did not necessarily satisfy Foucault’s detractors. Here, politics
also begins to enter the fray, generally as an assertion of the need for social
critique and corrective action, rather than just analysis. Commentators on the
Left were particularly dismayed by what appeared to them to be Foucault’s
renunciation of the Idea of Man on the last page of *The order of things*, which wonders aloud whether man might not soon be erased, “like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea” (1994b, 387). With an ending like that, they seemed to say, what room could there be for resistance or other revolutionary action? Foucault, says Hayden White, “not only finds little to lament in the passing of Western civilization, but also he offers less hope for its replacement by anything better” (1987, 134). Moreover, many suspected Foucault of what might be called “crypto-functionalism,” universally condemned by such critics as fundamentally conservative (Hoy 1986, 7).

Epistemological doubt and political critique have tended to reinforce one another. “There would appear to be no independent standpoint, no possibility for the development of critical principles. Of course, one can ask the obvious question: what is Foucault’s standpoint?” (M. Walzer 1986, 64). Lacking any answer they see as acceptable, Foucault’s critics, says David Couzens Hoy, find him “not simply a functionalist, but a nihilistic, fatalistic one” (1986, 10). For a practitioner of more linguistic-based discourse analysis, such as Fairclough, Foucault’s work suffers from its failure to recognize a dialectical relationship between speaker and the spoken in which the former is not helpless before unseen rules but able to reshape and restructure the latter: “Foucault’s insistence upon the subject as an effect of discursive formations has a heavily structuralist flavor which excludes active social agency in any meaningful sense” (1992, 45).

The most prominent of Foucault’s critics in this regard is no doubt Jürgen Habermas, who treats Foucault’s epistemology as an apologia for the existing social and political order and a denial of all possibility of change, and of modernity in general. As a result, Habermas first lumps him among the
neoconservatives (1981, 13) but later suggests that Foucault has seen the error of his ways with a late-in-life bid to rejoin “the circle of philosophical discourse of modernity which he thought he could explode” (1986, 108). The tone of this critique recalls an earlier outburst by Jean-Paul Sartre, who in 1966 denounced Foucault’s disdain for the march of history, saying he had replaced “cinema by the magic lantern, movement by a succession of immobilities” (quoted in O’Farrell 1989, 11). Foucault’s riposte came in a footnote in the French edition of The archaeology of knowledge: “Is it necessary to point out to the last dawdlers, that a ‘tableau’ is formally a ‘series of series’? In any case, it is not a little fixed image which is placed in front of a lantern to the great disappointment of children, who at their age, of course, prefer the vivacity of cinema” (quoted in O’Farrell 1989, 11, n. 44).

Significant and interesting enough in their own right, none of these criticisms renders Foucault’s tool box any less useful for my analysis. Foucault’s epistemological weaknesses, if they are in fact weaknesses and not just reflections of his readers’ own hopes, expectations, and ideological beliefs, are most acutely felt against the backdrop of the grand post-modern search for a new science of man, a response to the Aristotelian question of whether a proper science of the individual is even possible. I am deploying archaeology and genealogy against a more modest target: how is the Western “science” of Islam carried out? And what are its consequences?

Clearly, Foucault’s analytical strengths may be drawn upon here without any danger that relativism will infect all of Western knowledge. In fact, what some commentators have termed his unserious attitude toward the truth can be turned into an analytical asset, for it allows me to focus on the workings of the
anti-Islam discourse without the distraction of necessarily having to arbitrate the
truth or falsity of all of its claims. As noted earlier, this dissertation is more
interested in what the discourse tells us is true – and what is not, or cannot be,
true – about Islam and the Muslims.

Foucault summarizes his own thinking in this regard in the foreword to
the English edition of *The order of things*: “What I would like to do … is to
reveal a positive unconscious of knowledge: a level that eludes the
consciousness of the scientist and yet is part of scientific discourse, instead of
disputing its validity and seeking to diminish its scientific nature” (1994b, xi).
This is a perfectly reasonable research program and one I shall attempt to
emulate as much as possible in the pages to follow.

Similarly, any perceived political shortcomings on the part of Foucault
are immaterial. In the first place, he has not cast himself – whatever his public,
political persona might suggest – as a political theorist; nor is he in need of any
political self-justification (Hoy 1986, 12). Second, his analysis of forces at work
within or between discursive formations need not be taken to prevent or
determine the actions of any given individual within society. Finally, the
conflation of social thinker and social activist to which some of his
commentators may succumb is not helpful. This is, in my view, largely a conceit
of the post-war European intelligentsia, but being one is not contingent upon
also being the other. It seems to me, a division of labor may often be more
appropriate; or, to paraphrase Marx, from each according to his predilection to
each according to his need.

* * *

Edward Said’s *Orientalism* demonstrates the undoubted power and
efficacy of Foucault’s analytical methods for cultural and social studies. This landmark work, which defines Orientalism as “a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the Occident’” (Said 1995, 2), relies heavily on Foucault’s discourse analysis as detailed in The archaeology of knowledge and Discipline and punish, a fact that Said acknowledges at the very outset:

My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage – and even produce – the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period. Moreover, so authoritative a position did Orientalism have that I believe no one writing, thinking, or acting on the Orient could do so without taking account of the limitations of thought and action imposed by Orientalism (1995, 3).

Orientalism also serves as both an invaluable precursor and something of a way station for the present work. Said’s pioneering effort has deeply shaped my own thinking, and that of countless others across a range of fields, and helped clear the way for this investigation. Yet, it focuses on one specific segment – the content-rich heyday of the European colonial era and its U.S.-dominated aftermath – of the broader narrative arc that I take as my own field of study, which stretches from the discovery of Islam by the Christian West somewhere around the early eleventh century CE and reaches into the foreseeable future. By extending it backwards and forwards in time, and by placing the phenomenon of Orientalism in the context of the anti-Islam discourse as a whole, I hope to build substantially on Said’s work.

These differences in scope and frame of reference naturally lead to some notable differences in approach, analytical questions, and ultimately in findings. For Said, the Orientalist discourse is both precursor and handmaiden to Western colonial domination of the East, and its early formation can be dated to the late
eighteenth century, when European ideas and images of the Orient began to take on the urgency and immediacy that surrounds one culture’s direct, physical subjugation of the Other. While Orientalism concerns only the West’s experience of the East, the East itself remains a physical space comprised of real nations and cultures whose “lives, histories, and customs have a brute reality obviously greater than anything that could be said about them in the West” (Said 1995, 5).

Thus, Said finds it necessary to qualify somewhat the implied notion of the East as an intellectual or cultural construct. “It would be wrong to conclude that the Orient was essentially an idea, or a creation with no corresponding reality” (1995, 5). In contrast, I see the crucial formation of the broader anti-Islam discourse, of which Orientalism is but an important element, as taking place precisely outside the confines of any corresponding reality. I will argue in subsequent chapters that this quality is central to the discourse’s unwavering form, its power, and its continued hold on the Western imagination over the course of a millennium. In this way, the anti-Islam discourse is distinct from many other discursive formations, for example those treated in Inventing Eastern Europe (Wolff 1994), or Inventing the middle ages (Cantor 1991). Both are, properly speaking, reconceptualisations rather than inventions. A more appropriate comparison would be Martin Bernal’s Black Athena: The Afroasiatic roots of classical civilization, which details the discursive formation – what he calls “the fabrication of Ancient Greece” – surrounding the origins of Western culture (1987).

A second consequence of Said’s periodization is the privileged place he accords to Western power within the discursive formation he calls Orientalism.
“To believe that the Orient was created – or, as I call it, ‘Orientalized’ – and to believe that such things happen simply as a necessity of the imagination, is to be disingenuous. … The relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony…” (1995, 5). Without denying the important place for power in general, or that ever since Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798 the East-West dynamic has been shaped by particular power relations, this was not the case at the formation of the anti-Islam discourse. In the first place, medieval Christendom lagged the Muslim world by virtually any measure – cultural, scientific, military, or economic. Second, the formation of the discourse took place, as Chapter Four will recount in detail, without any real knowledge or first-hand experience of Islam or Muslims. And third, what power there was in the relationship was surely to the disadvantage of Christian Europe, which saw in Islam an existential, civilizational threat; for its part, the world of Islam felt it could safely ignore the invading Crusaders for decades before reluctantly mobilizing to expel them.

Said does part company with Foucault over one important aspect of the latter’s approach to discourse analysis, the so-called problem of the author. For Said, Foucault’s stress on the autonomy of discourse and the unseen rules that bind the authors of statements downplays or removes any question of “profit, ambition, ideas, the sheer love of power” (1994, 117). Said, like Habermas and a number of other critics of Foucault, see his post-structuralist tendency to set aside the author and read everything, everywhere as text as a threat to political and social action, intervention, or resistance. Here, Said takes a harder line against this Derrida but does not spare Foucault either (Ochoa 2006, 52).

As a result, Said seeks to identify the peculiar features of individual texts
by individual authors, rather than to see them largely as the undifferentiated – and undifferentiate-able – production of the discursive formation in question. “The unity of the large ensemble of texts I analyze is due in part to the fact that they frequently refer to each other: Orientalism is after all a system for citing works and authors,” Said writes (1995, 23). This leads Said to an approach familiar to more linguistic-based elements of Critical Discourse Analysis: “Accordingly my analyses employ close textual readings whose goal is to reveal the dialectic between individual text or writer and the complex collective formation to which his work is a contribution” (1995, 24-25).

The example Said offers to support this strategy is instructive. He notes that such was the reception of Edward William Lane’s *Manners and customs of the modern Egyptians*, first published in 1836, as authoritative that no one then writing about the Orient, not just about Egypt, could fail to borrow from it even when such borrowings were clearly inappropriate, unreliable, or otherwise beside the point. Thus, passages about Egypt are transposed verbatim into another author’s work about village life in Syria. “Lane’s authority and the opportunities provided for citing him discriminately as well indiscriminately were there because Orientalism could give his text the kind of distributive currency that he acquired. There is no way, however, of understanding Lane’s currency without also understanding the peculiar features of his text…” (1995, 23).

Rather than see this phenomenon as demanding unique attention for the putative author, as does Said, it would seem consistent with the archaeological discourse to treat the “unity of the large ensemble of texts” that he uses to justify his approach as a product of the entire discursive formation of Orientalism. Put
another way, the remarkable “currency” that Said attributes to *Manners and customs of the modern Egyptians*, its interoperability with other, seemingly unrelated Orientalist texts, stems from the power of the discourse and its rules of formation not from any necessary attribute of the author himself. Foucault’s approach to discourse analysis, after all, effectively removes the author in an effort to provide direct access to the deeper epistemological phenomena: “Thus conceived, discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined” (1972a, 55). Given the explanatory power of archaeological analysis, the particularly broad sweep of statements that comprise one thousand years of anti-Islam discourse, and the resilience of its rules of formation, I see no compelling reason to follow Said’s gambit in this regard.

However, such differences are minor in comparison to the similarities that characterize our approaches to these separate but related discursive formations. Both Orientalism and my own investigation are, in the final analysis, studies of Western society and culture, despite their deep investment in things Eastern. The object of investigation, whether Orientalism or the anti-Islam discourse as a whole, is but a useful means to watch the West watching the Other; it is these processes of scrutiny, the collection of facts, and the dissemination of knowledge that are important, not the ‘Orient’ or the wider Muslim world itself. Said seeks to ground this in the structure of power underpinning more than two hundred years of colonial and post-colonial domination, while I aim to locate it in a broader social and intellectual context that supports a range of subsidiary discursive formations and practices, of which
Orientalism is but one notable facet among many.

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It should be clear by now that Foucault’s twin techniques of archaeology and genealogy can provide effective tools for this investigation, particularly with regard to the formation and operation of the West’s anti-Islam discourse. They will also provide the beginnings of a response to the third and final element of my analytic framework: cui bono? Who benefits? However, I shall attempt to address this final question more thoroughly by examining in a new light some of the classic works in social studies as complementary to my discourse analysis. This means addressing Max Weber’s “unfinished” study of Islam, revisiting Karl Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge (1936), and exercising the “sociological imagination” of C. Wright Mills (1959).

Although not necessarily meant as a compliment, the philosopher and theologian Paul Ricoeur nonetheless provides a useful definition of the last strand of my theoretical approach: “The sociology of knowledge rejects an immanent history of ideas which would be governed only by the structure of problems and their philosophical solutions. It attempts to replace the would-be history of ideas within the total dynamics of society” (1965, 58). Needless to say, this definition is part of a critique of sociology’s limitations in Ricoeur’s eyes.

Naturally, this sets in relief specific issues that flow from my third analytical question: Which social groups and institutions benefited from excising from the history books the enormous Arab cultural contribution to the West?

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18 Islam features widely in Weber’s writings, yet he never completed planned studies of Islam, early Christianity, or medieval Catholicism, to complement his works on Judaism and the religions of China and India. As Talcott Parsons points out, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism served as Weber’s jumping-off point for his study of faith and society. See Parson’s “Introduction” in Weber 1965: xx-xxi.
From the notion that Islam is inherently violent? Or fundamentally antipathetic toward women? Who benefits today from perpetuating these ideas? And how can I best account for the periodic ebbs and flows – the occasional ups as well as the predominant downs – in relations between Islam and the West, as well as the larger, more stable narrative arc that reaches from Muhammad’s revelation to the present day? Chapter Five, Six, and Seven will address these underlying issues in a series of thematic explorations, which, when taken as a whole, make up this social history of the Western idea of Islam.

As discussed above, Weber’s notion of the fundamental dis-enchantment – or Entzauberung – that characterizes modern societies naturally leads to a demand for “order” and “meaning” as what was once mystery becomes governmental reports, bureaucratic data, and media coverage (1965, 125). The social manifestation of this phenomenon, in terms of Western views of Islam and the anti-Islam discourse, lies with the serial “Islam experts” who have defined the Muslims for the rest of us over the centuries. Initially the virtually exclusive domain of the Latin theologians, this discourse was over time gradually reinterpreted and rationalized, first by intellectuals – the humanists, the philosophes, and Orientalist scholars – and then by bureaucrats – the colonial administrators, diplomats, and ministerial appointees.

Here, Weber offers another useful insight about the sociologist’s ability to identify and analyze those social layers that exercise particular influence on the beliefs of the times: “Those strata which are decisive in stamping the characteristic features of an economic ethic may change in the course of history. And the influence of a single stratum is never an exclusive one. Nevertheless, as a rule one may determine the strata whose styles of life have been at least
predominantly decisive for certain religions” (1958, 268). In this light, it is
worth restating that the anti-Islam discourse has always been an elite affair, in
which an uninformed public has no other recourse – nor does it generally seek
any – than to put itself in the hands of the experts. The later rise of mass media
and the advent of public opinion surveys have done nothing to cast doubt on the
top-down nature of the West’s predominant Islam narrative; as we have already
seen, “elite” opinion is reliably reflected in “mass” opinion on the subject.

Robert K. Merton has applied one of Weber’s best-known, if most often
abused, theses – the relationship between the rise of Protestantism and the rise of
modern capitalism – in his own study of the relationship among science, faith,
and society in seventeenth-century England. In Science, technology and society
in seventeenth-century England, Merton argues that intellectual movement
away from the fields of philosophy, theology, and art and toward the study of
science in the last four hundred years can be ascribed, at least in part, to social
and cultural factors, an argument that leads him to pose questions not too distant
from my own: “Which social processes are involved in shifts of interest from
one division of human activity to another? What, indeed, is the nature of the
sociological conditions that are associated with pronounced activity in any one
of these domains?” (1970, 3). Merton’s sixth chapter is entitled, “Puritanism,
pietism, and science: testing a hypothesis.” He finds the values of Puritanism
“congenial,” if not necessarily essential, to the development of scientific values,
a finding not dissimilar to Weber’s albeit in a slightly different context (1970,
112-136).

But Merton is wary of what he sees as the over-reliance of Weber and

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19 This work first appeared in 1938. All citations here are from the 1970 edition.
other Continental thinkers on the ideas and attitudes of social elites, at the expense of a more “American” focus on mass public opinion. “[T]his leaves untouched, and untouchable, the independent question of the extent to which these beliefs set down in books express the beliefs of the larger and, so far as history goes, inarticulate population,” Merton wrote many years after his initial study of science and society in England (1966, 445). With this qualification out of the way, Merton focuses on the essentials of the sociology of knowledge: “It is primarily concerned with the relations between knowledge and other essential factors in the society or culture” (1966, 456).

This requires consideration of other important questions: What exactly do we understand as “knowledge”? And do different types of knowledge involve different types of relationships to social structures? Merton attacks the matter this way: “The question is, of course, whether these diverse kinds of ‘knowledge’ stand in the same relationship to their sociological basis, or whether it is necessary to distinguish between spheres of knowledge precisely because this relationship varies for the various types” (1966, 467). Social theorists have offered a number of answers to these and related questions. Definitions of knowledge, for example, range from the broadest category, that of “culture” in general, to much more specific modes of thought and intellectual activity.

One of the most useful approaches for understanding aspects of the anti-Islam discourse can be found in the work of Karl Mannheim, who excludes the exact sciences from his understanding of knowledge but includes “historical, political and social science thinking as well as the thought of everyday life”
Merton 1966, 470) – the very types of knowledge that most interest us.\textsuperscript{20} With this in mind, Mannheim’s *Ideology and Utopia* unfurls his approach to the understanding of knowledge: “The principle thesis of the sociology of knowledge is that there are modes of thought which cannot be adequately understood as long as their social origins are obscured” (1936, 2). Here, we can see an underlying compatibility with Foucault’s later genealogical approach.

But Mannheim has more to offer. His sociology of knowledge appears particularly well-equipped to take into account the seemingly “ahistorical” stasis of the anti-Islam discourse: “It is never an accident when a certain theory, wholly or in part, fails to develop beyond a given stage of relative abstractness and offers resistance to further tendencies toward becoming more concrete, either by frowning upon this tendency towards concreteness or declaring it to be irrelevant. Here, too, the social position of the thinker is significant” (1936, 276).

Finally, the importance that Mannheim ascribes to the “intelligentsia” not only fits neatly with my own notion of the “Islam expert,” but it also suggests how it is that the ossified outlook of such a group can become entrenched in social and political terms: “In every society there are social groups whose special task it is to provide an interpretation of the world for that society. … The more static a society is, the more likely it is that this stratum will acquire a well-defined status or position of a caste in that society” (1936, 10).

Mannheim had in mind such social groups as the Brahmins or the medieval Latin clergy, but I will argue that this same phenomenon holds true for the “caste” of practitioners of the anti-Islam discourse whose oracular utterances rarely face serious examination or challenge. For a recent example, one has to

\textsuperscript{20} Merton (1966, 467) argues that Mannheim’s exemption of the formal sciences follows Marx. See also Mannheim1956, 150.
look no further than the assurances to the White House from the establishment Orientalists Bernard Lewis and Fouad Ajami that ordinary Iraqis would welcome the U.S. invasion of their country. Ajami, for example, boldly predicted, “We shall be greeted, I think, in Baghdad and Basra with kites and boom boxes” (quoted in von Drehele 2002). Vice President Dick Cheney invoked similar assurances from Lewis when he told the public that American forces would be “greeted as liberators” by the Iraqi people (Cheney 2003).

Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge has not always retained the respect it deserves, largely due to consistent if at times misplaced criticism of the epistemological aspects of his work – a critique not unlike that faced later by Foucault. This is the familiar problem of relativism, which Mannheim’s critics see as flowing from the notion that all knowledge, which by definition must include his own theory, is socially determined and thus cannot be evaluated as “true” or “false” by any knowable standard of validity. Alexander von Schelting’s review, in 1936, of the 1930 German edition of Ideolgie und utopie helped set the tone for this line of criticism in the English-speaking world (1936, 664-674).21

Yet, Mannheim’s thinking on the subject, presented most comprehensively in the 1936 English edition of Ideology and Utopia, clearly recognizes this danger and takes it into account. As A. P. Simonds argues, Mannheim has as his ultimate goal an understanding of the interaction of thought and being, a notion central to any sociology of knowledge. “By looking closely at Mannheim’s manner of formulating the question, and in considering this in the light of his arguments … about the nature of meaning and its

communication, it is possible to see that his object is the interpretation of thought, not its reduction to some non-meaningful ‘base’” (1978, 21).

Simonds’ reading of Mannheim is the one that I shall employ here, for it provides a useful avenue of exploration into the anti-Islam discourse and one that allows ample room for interpretive analysis of the underlying social structures that have supported this narrative without necessarily devolving into crude reductionism. In this way, it resembles Weber’s classic work on the Protestant ethic and the rise of modern capitalism more than it does the scientific materialism of Marx and Engels. Moreover, the controversy over relativism and other elements of Mannheim’s epistemology leaves essentially intact much of what Merton, himself a strong critic of this alleged relativism, calls Mannheim’s “substantive sociology of knowledge” (1973, 31), that is, the relationship between thought and social structure. Mannheim, himself, at times distinguished between the two, related ventures: “[O]ne can accept the empirical results without drawing the epistemological conclusions” (1936, 239). It is also worth noting, as I have already shown in the case of Pope Benedict XVI, that the truth-value of the anti-Islam discourse is not fundamentally at issue; only its formation, longevity, and power need be considered.

Finally, I want to note the contribution by C. Wright Mills of several other ideas that have greatly influenced the conception and planned execution of this project. First, he is adamant that the sociologist never allow considerations of method and theory to distract from completing the job at hand; they are tools, not ends in themselves. “‘Method’ has to do, above all, with how to ask and answer questions with some assurance that the answers are more or less durable. ‘Theory’ has to do, above all, with paying close attention to the words one is
using, especially their degree of generality and their logical relations. The primary purpose of both is clarity of conception and economy of procedure, and most importantly just now, the release rather than the inhibition of the sociological imagination” (Mills 1959, 120).

Second, Mills asserts the absolute need for social scientists to risk thinking the Big Thoughts, and not to slice and dice research questions into minor issues that effectively exempt the existing political and social order from serious re-examination and criticism – a lesser task that he assigns to judges, social workers, teachers, and such. “The social scientist who spends his intellectual forces on the details of small-scale milieux is not putting his work outside the political conflicts and forces of his time. He is, at least indirectly and in effect, ‘accepting’ the framework of his society. But no one who accepts the full intellectual tasks of social science can merely assume that structure” (1959, 78). Thus the scale and scope of this inquiry into one thousand years of Western thought is deliberately, if somewhat dauntingly, ambitious.

Mills has also helped highlight the central problem of the anti-Islam discourse, reflected in the inability of Western thought to accommodate alternative ways to look at the question long after the old ways have proven bankrupt:

When we try to orient ourselves – if we do try – we find that too many of our old expectations and images are, after all, tied down historically; that too many of our standard categories of thought and of feeling as often disorient us as help to explain what is happening around us; that too many of our explanations are derived from the great historical transition from the Medieval to the Modern Age; and that when they are generalized for use today, they become unwieldy, irrelevant, not convincing (1959, 166).

Peeling back the separate layers of mystery that conceal the West’s Islam discourse – is there a more apt word for such a venture than “archaeology”? –
represents a necessary first step toward understanding the damage that it has wrought over the centuries, from the sectarian violence of the Crusades to the exploitation and degradation of Orientalist colonialism to today’s anti-Muslim war on terrorism. Perhaps it will also serve as a modest contribution toward dismantling a discourse that has trapped East-West relations for too long in an unhelpful and even dangerous cul-de-sac. Toward that end, I will conclude my study with an alternative reading of “Islam” and “the West” – one that posits them as products of a single cultural space, rather than the immutable civilizational antagonists that they have come to represent in the eyes of both Muslims and Westerners alike.

Richard Fenn has suggested that the analogous approaches of the two traditions to the literature and imagery of Apocalypse provide ample argument for just such a reunion: “[M]odernity and the colonial experience have intensified apocalyptic yearnings in Islam, as they also have in Western Christianity. It is therefore impossible to distinguish modern Islam from Christianity as though one is wholly eastern and the other from the West. Both are developments, however antagonistic, within a common civilization” (2006, 41). Rather than restrict ourselves to the formative yet particular realm of the End Times, I intend to extend the argument across an entire range of cultural and philosophical activity common to East and West, from the eleventh century and well into the future.

But first, it is necessary to explore in detail the formative process surrounding the anti-Islam discourse, before turning to its most important aspects for the contemporary Western world – the issues of science, rationalism and modernity, of violence, and of the treatment of women. Using the discourse
analysis of Michel Foucault and then overlaying it with the classical concerns of Weber, Mannheim, Mills, and others, I seek to explicate several interrelated questions of abiding interest to the sociologist: What social groups and institutions created this discursive formation? How does it operate, in seeming defiance of the modern conception of historical change? Who sustains it? And, finally, who benefits from its immutable presence in the western imagination?
Chapter Three: Method

This study will adopt two intersecting methodologies and apply them to the anti-Islam discourse. These comprise an analysis of the discourse itself – its formation, its operation, and its rules for the West’s production of statements about Islam and the Muslims – and an examination of the social actors and institutions who have carried and perpetuated this discourse – unchallenged and largely unexamined – as accommodating to both personal benefit and group interest. In this way, I seek to create a framework that takes into account not only the discursive formation that one might call “Islam,” but also the interconnected relations and activities of those I have termed “Islam experts,” that is, those responsible for “serious speech” about the topic.

This second aspect of my methodological approach will add a valuable new dimension to the already powerful tools of Foucauldian discourse analysis while simultaneously grounding the entire project in the established realm of sociological inquiry. It is hoped that this combination of approaches will contribute substantially to new understandings of the Western idea of Islam and open up fruitful avenues for future research in the field.

Both of these approaches enjoy substantial intellectual pedigrees. For Foucault, each age or epoch may be characterized by an episteme – also termed the historical a priori – that expresses the conditions of possibility of human knowledge, an idea he borrowed from Kant after stripping out the latter’s universalist idealism (O’Farrell 1989, 54-57; Rosemann 1999, 36-38). Early on, Foucault writes in The order of things, first published in French in 1966, of his archaeology as the uncovering of the episteme:
What I am attempting to bring to light is the epistemological field, the episteme in which knowledge grounds its positivity and thereby manifests a history which is not that of its growing perfection, but rather that of its conditions of possibility; in this account, what should appear are those configurations within the space of knowledge which have given rise to the diverse forms of empirical science. Such an enterprise is not so much a history, in the traditional meaning of the word, as an ‘archaeology’ (1994b, xxii).

He later refined his thinking to allow for competing, or multiple, epistemes in any one era to interact but still to function as ultimate arbiter of what may treated as fitting within a particular discipline, in our case that of Islam: “The episteme is the ‘apparatus’ which makes possible the separation, not of the true from the false, but of what may from what may not be characterized as scientific” (1980, 197). In other words, the idea of the episteme, or conditions of possibility, for the anti-Islam discourse carries with it not only the historical setting and sociological prerequisites of this dominant narrative but its epistemological context as well (Mudimbe 1988, ix). In this way, archaeology makes room for both discourse analysis and the sociological exploration of the way it is formed, operates, and perpetuates itself and allows us to pose our central analytical question: who benefits from the anti-Islam discourse?

At the heart of any discourse analysis sits the realm of communicative acts, defined by social scientists, philosophers, and linguists in a variety of competing and overlapping ways. For Foucault, the only linguistic act that matters is what he calls, in The archaeology of knowledge, the énoncé. This is commonly, if not quite satisfactorily, translated into English as “the statement,” a rendering which lacks some of the French word’s broader linguistic connotations (Shumway 1993, 98). Once again, it may be best to begin with an outline of what Foucault’s notion of the statement does not entail, before laying out the ways I shall be using the notion of statements, and thus of discourse, in this investigation: “The statement is neither an utterance nor a proposition,
neither a psychological nor a logical entity, neither an event nor an ideal form” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 45). Statements do not include routine, daily speech acts. Nor are they restricted to the spoken or written word; they may be images, maps, photographs, schematics, architectural plans, and so on.

Statements most relevant for my analysis comprise what is often referred to as serious speech. Such statements lead a rarefied existence, and are privileged by claims to truth and meaning that are widely recognized or otherwise validated, studied, emulated, and passed on. These are the stuff of textbooks and classroom instruction, learned journals, monographs, public lectures, art exhibits, items in the news media. Throughout their existence, such statements remain at all times subject to rules of formation that are hidden or otherwise inaccessible to “speakers” and “listeners” alike. “Statements are not, like the air we breath, an infinite transparency; but things that are transmitted to be preserved, that have value, which one tries to appropriate; … things that are duplicated not only by copy or translation, but be exegesis, commentary, and the internal proliferation of meaning” (Foucault 1972a, 120).

The domain of statements may be further qualified by their existence within a specific discursive formation or discipline. Thus, Foucault at varying times addresses, among others, the clinical discourse, the economic discourse, or the discourse of natural history. Discourse analysis within the notion of a discipline is particularly useful, for it casts in relief the internal rules that operate within that discursive formation and highlights the noncontingent role played by truth and meaning. “A discipline is not the sum total of all the truths that may be uttered concerning something; it is not even the total of all that may be accepted,
by virtue of some principle of coherence or systematization, concerning some
given fact or proposition” (Foucault 1972b, 223).

Just because a statement may consist of a truth about plants, for example, that does not necessarily qualify it as part of the recognized discipline known as botany. It must first be seen to be among possible truths – “within the true,” says Foucault, citing one of his own teachers – and then validated by the rules of formation at work within that field:

In short, a proposition must fulfill some onerous and complex conditions before it can be admitted within a discipline; before it can be pronounced true or false is must be … ‘within the true.’

It is always possible that one could speak the truth in a void; one would only be in the true, however, if one obeyed the rules of some discursive ‘policy’ which would have to be reactivated every time one spoke (1972b, 224)

I shall take this same approach and apply it to the Western science or discipline of Islam and the Muslims, that is, to the serious speech that I call the anti-Islam discourse.

As a result, I will treat primarily the statements of those who have put themselves forward as “Islam experts” –and who are accepted as such in distinct historical epochs or eras – as the raw data for analysis. From time to time, popular or other lay manifestations of this expertise may also be examined. However, as already noted above, the discourse on Islam has been since its very formation in the eleventh century the exclusive realm of experts, in the face of whose expertise the public at large has had little choice but to act as passive, trusting receptors.

Such expert statements can be found in a wide variety of Western sources, sources that in a different methodological context and a different analytical framework would be considered “secondary” ones: works on the history of science, of philosophy, or religion; ethnographic and anthropological
texts; news items; bureaucratic reports; and the statements of politicians and
government functionaries. Here is the primary canon of the anti-Islam discourse,
for we can see this discursive formation in full cry. Others will resemble more
traditional primary sources, for example the memoirs of colonial administrators
in British-ruled Egypt and India; the philosophical and literary writings of
Montesquieu; the call to Crusades of Urban II and other political speeches; or
essays by leading Renaissance humanists.

As a sociologist exploring the Western idea of Islam, I am not
particularly interested in the veracity – the seriousness – of claims by serious
speech to either meaning or truth, although from time to time it may be useful to
put forward alternative understandings or interpretations that surface periodically
in the West but which remain outside “the true.” Rather, my primary aim is to
explore how the discursive claims are produced and deployed in the first place,
only to be set aside later – as if on a library shelf – and then hauled down again
in the furtherance of the discourse and at the behest of new social actors or
institutions. I propose to do this by examining what Foucault calls the “modes of
existence” of such statements as the most fruitful way of understanding the
workings of the anti-Islam discourse.

The analysis of statements, then, is a historical analysis, but one that avoids all
interpretation: it does not question things said as to what they are hiding, what
they are ‘really’ saying, in spite of themselves, the unspoken element that they
contain … but on the contrary, it questions them as to their mode of existence,
what it means to them to have come into existence, to have left traces, and
perhaps to remain there, awaiting the moment that they might be of some use
once more; what it means to them to have appeared when and where they did –
they and no others (1972a, 109; emphasis added).

In addition to my archaeological analysis of the discursive statements
about Islam, this study will also invoke the more classical sociological approach
to the matter of the Islam expert, namely how does he or she benefit from the
prevailing discourse? However, these two avenues are perhaps not as far apart as
one might expect when first contemplating the interaction of the classical world
of Max Weber and the post-structuralist milieu of Michel Foucault. Throughout
his works, Weber reveals the importance he places on his subject’s notion of
reality and on that subject’s point of view, what constitutes his verstehende
Soziologie, or interpretive sociology, that takes into account insight into the
behavior of the individual subject rather than attributing such behavior to
idealized types or positivist abstractions (Turner 1974, 39).

Still, Weber does make significant room for the social power of ideas and
their ability to shape and direct human behavior. Weber’s insights are not
diminished by his own entanglement in the anti-Islam discourse, which saw him
insist that “early Islam” was a hedonist religion carried by the warrior classes
(1965, 51-52). In his understanding of the Orient, Weber here was following
neatly in the footsteps of the classical European thinkers of the nineteenth
century – Adam Smith, John Stuart Mills, Karl Marx, and others (Turner 1974;
Matin-Asgari 2004). Writing on the social psychology of world religions, he
notes: “Not ideas, but material and ideal interests directly govern men’s conduct.
Yet very frequently the ‘world images’ that have been created by ‘ideas’ have,
like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by
the dynamic of interest” (1958, 280). While clearly less interested than Foucault
and the post-structuralists in the epistemological context of discursive
formations, Weber acknowledges that ideas, like railway “switchmen,” can also
be determinant of social action.

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1 As Bryan Turner points out in his study of Weber and Islam, the social theorist largely tended
to disregard his own precepts when he turned his eyes toward the Muslim world (Turner 1974: 3).
Weber’s sociology fits neatly within my own framework in several other ways as well. First, he argues that one’s worldview and its accompanying motivations are molded by the self-interest of one’s social strata. Second, he defines social action as that which “takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course,” a position that downplays or even excludes subjective behavior of any one particular social actor (Weber 1947, 89; Turner 1974, 41). Third, for Weber, sociology is not particularly interested in “an objectively ‘correct’ meaning or one that is ‘true’ in the metaphysical sense,” a central characteristic that distinguishes “the empirical sciences of action,” including sociology, from such “dogmatic” disciplines as jurisprudence, ethics, or logic (1947, 89-90). Taken together, then, many of the central elements of Weber’s sociological project dovetail nicely with my own inquiry into the ways varying social groups, herein defined as Islam experts, deployed the same anti-Islam discourse to advance their own interests in concert with one another, even as the context and meaning of those interests may have changed over the centuries.

Just as I have read Pope Benedict XVI’s speech in Germany not necessarily for any meaning or truth in his comments on Islam, rationality, and violence, but for what it tells us about the power of the predominant discourse, so I will examine the central Western narratives touching on Islam and the Muslim world – what we might call the entire Orientalist corpus extended back to medieval times and forward to the present day – to trace the lines of this discursive formation.

Similarly, I can explore Benedict’s statements on Islam as social action, not as the subjective behavior of any one individual but as the expression of both
epistemological context and sociological self-interest. When applied to each of
the separate thematic presentations – Chapter Five on Islam and science; Chapter
Six on Islam and violence; and Chapter Seven on Islam and women – this same
methodological approach will allow me in each case to identify the formation of
the anti-Islam discourse and then to study its modes of operation, before
considering my and final analytical question – who benefits?

Here, then, is the true battleground for the Western understanding of
Islam and the Muslims, for it is in the production, presentation, and maintenance
of these statements that the discourse has triumphed. And it is here that any
sociological study of Islam must begin – at the very beginning.
Chapter Four: The discourse: ‘Othering’ the Muslim

Sometime in 1076, Pope Gregory VII wrote a most respectful letter to the Muslim ruler of what is today eastern Algeria. Addressing the Hammadid amir as “Anazir, king of the province of Mauretania sitifensis in Africa,”¹ the pope agreed to consecrate a local bishop to tend to the spiritual needs of the amir’s Christian subjects. Gregory also thanked the king for accompanying his request with gifts and sent word that he had freed a number of Christian prisoners as a goodwill gesture. All this was, of course, the act of an accomplished diplomat and experienced man of world affairs.

Yet Gregory, the dominant figure of his day in Latin Christendom, seamlessly crosses over from the demands of politesse to the realm of theology: “In truth, such charity we and you owe more particularly to our own than to the remaining peoples, for we believe and confess, albeit in a different way, the one God, and each day we praise and honor him as the creator of the ages and the ruler of this world” (2002, 204).² And he proposes to establish possible commercial and political ties to Anazir, through a pair of trusted aides who were “brought up with us in the Roman palace from almost their very youth” (2002, 205).

Gregory’s pontificate, from 1073 to 1085, placed him at the forefront of the Church’s struggle with the rising power of nascent European states unleashed

¹ Known in Arabic as al-Nasir, he ruled from 1062-1089/90.

by the gradual disintegration of the Carolingian Empire once led by
Charlemagne. These new states – including what we would more or less
recognize today as Germany, France, England, among others – were headed by
monarchs who sought centralized control over all aspects of social and economic
life within their realms. Conflict with the Catholic Church’s traditional claims to
final, universal authority flared in particular over the appointment of senior
clerics, who enjoyed dual roles as spiritual leaders and enormously rich and
powerful local landowners. At the same time, the economic needs of the
religious establishment in a feudal economy had led to the creation of large
religious foundations with great landholdings of their own, remaking many a
high church officer in the image of the lay landed elite. The struggle for the final
say over such affairs became the dominant issue of the eleventh century
(Emerton 1990, ix-xi).

Pope Gregory’s response was a militant one. He moved aggressively to
limit lay authority over the investiture of bishops and other senior clerics; to
clamp down on the practice of simony – the trade in clerical office that had
arisen to meet the demand for such powerful and lucrative posts; and to enforce
existing requirements for clerical celibacy as a way of preventing these positions
from becoming hereditary family holdings independent of Church influence and
control. All these measures were linked by a central theme running throughout
Gregory’s thought – the imperative to assert and strengthen papal prerogatives as
matters of right and law, rather than of theological requirement or religious duty.
To complement his social and economic policies, Gregory VII also elevated an
innovative theological line, that of armed struggle in the interest of the faith –
under the ultimate leadership of the popes – to the center of official Church thinking. Here arose the doctrine of Christian holy war.

Gregory had had a long-running interest in warfare on behalf of the faith, and at one point he proposed the creation of papal fighting force, the Militia of St. Peter, from among the warring European knights to combat heresy and enforce the Church’s claims against its secular rivals. The pope and his most loyal supporters, the fideles beati Sancti Petri, recognized that their ambitious reform project was certain to provoke concerted political opposition that could only be countered by adequate armed force. While force of arms was clearly a temporal matter, the Church reformers of the eleventh century introduced a uniquely spiritual component directed at lay recruits – the notion of absolution of sins for those who battled in the name of the papacy. This created a potent mix of penance and violence that would one day animate the Crusades (Tyerman 2006, 46-47).

Sympathetic Church intellectuals like Bishop Anselm of Lucca, a loyal partisan of the pope and an expert in canon law, combed through the works of the Church Fathers, especially Augustine, for theories of just war that could be invoked in support of Gregory’s endeavors. Anselm’s redaction of the views of Augustine yielded the twin notions of sanctified warfare commanded by God and of God’s direct intervention to ensure ultimate victory for true believers (Riley-Smith 1986, 6; Asbridge 2004, 28). Another papal ally, John of Mantua, reworked Jesus’ famous admonition to one of his followers to sheath his sword as the Roman soldiers closed in to arrest him in the Garden of Gethsemane: “Put your sword back into its place; for all who take the sword will perish by the sword (Matthew 26:52).
In the hands of John of Mantua, Jesus had not directed his disciples to surrender their swords or to disavow violence altogether, but only to await a more opportune moment to strike, sometime in the future. The allegorical message was clear: such a time was finally at hand, under the leadership of Pope Gregory VII (Asbridge 2004, 29). Bishop Bonzio of Sutri, meanwhile, widely celebrated the image of the Christian holy warrior who would battle heretics and schismatics and protect the weak and downtrodden among the pious (Tyerman 2006, 47-48). These same reformers also realized that the Church had to restore its position of moral and temporal authority and to draw closer to the common people, as part of its broader resistance to the secular power of kings (Riley-Smith 1986, 4-5). What better than a volunteer papal army that would allow ordinary believers to defend the faith while providing for the remission of their worldly sins in return?

Not surprisingly, Gregory’s strained relations with the monarchs of Latin Christendom were complicated by his growing calls for a military campaign, which he aspired to lead in person, against heretics, “Saracens,” and loosely-defined “pagans.” Lacking military forces of his own, the pope was left to rely for men and materiel on the support and goodwill of the very secular rulers whose political, social, and economic powers he now sought to rein in. Gregory was especially eager to aid the Byzantine Christians against the attacks of Saracen forces, in large measure as a way of extending Rome’s influence over the rival Eastern empire. In a letter to Count William of Burgundy, dated 2 February 1074, the pope asks for troops to be sent to Italy to confront the Normans, a campaign he hoped would serve as a prelude to a march toward Constantinople. “We also hope that a further advantage may, perhaps, accrue
from it: namely, that when the Normans are brought to peace we may cross to Constantinople to bring aid to Christians who are grievously afflicted by the most frequent ravagings of the Saracens and who are avidly imploring us to extend them our helping hand” (2002, 51).

In a separate appeal dated 1 March 1074 to “all who are willing to defend the Christian faith,” the pope reports a visitor from “the lands beyond the seas” had informed him that that “a race of pagans has strongly prevailed against the [Eastern] Christian empire and with pitiable cruelty has already almost up to the walls of the city of Constantinople laid waste and with tyrannical violence seized everything; it has slaughtered like cattle many thousand Christians” (2002, 55).” This was almost surely a belated reference to the decisive defeat of the Byzantines at Manzikert, two and a half years earlier, at the hands of the Muslim Seljuq Turks. A further sense of the pope’s military ambitions may be seen in a letter to Henry IV three months later. Gregory announces that he has already succeeded in rousing “Christians everywhere … that they should seek by defending the law to lay down their life for their brothers.” He says fifty thousand “men from Italy and from beyond the Alps” are ready to march at his command, and he asks Henry to safeguard the Church during his planned absence (2002, 123).

Pope Gregory’s general commitment to the idea of holy war, his zeal in expanding papal prerogatives by force if necessary, his emphasis on indulgence for Christian holy warriors, his desire to extend Rome’s influence eastward, and his denunciations of pagans and Saracens alike has seen him cast by traditional historical accounts in the role of father of the anti-Muslim Crusades launched two decades later by Pope Urban II, his former aide and protégé. The literature
on the origins of the Crusades is, of course, extensive. Gibbon, for example, sees Gregory as the “magnanimous spirit” animating the entire enterprise against the Muslims (1910, 6, 35). Steven Runciman’s History of the Crusades praises the pope’s “imaginative statesmanship” in laying out the new policy of holy warfare (1951, 1, 99). Recent studies take a somewhat more measured and nuanced view (Asbridge 2004; Tyrman 2006; Riley-Smith 1986).

Gregory VII becomes a significant link in a logical – and chronological – chain of events which culminates in Urban’s call to the anti-Muslim Crusade in November 1095 in the French town of Clermont. Thus, Jonathan Riley-Smith opens his The First Crusade and the idea of Crusading with the following summing-up of Western historical consensus:

There is general agreement that the Crusade was the climactic of a movement in which the eleventh-century Church reformers, locked in conflict with ecclesiastical and secular opponents, turned to the knights of the Christian West for assistance. Pope Urban’s message to the faithful at Clermont is believed to have been the synthesis of ideas and practices already in existence – holy war, pilgrimage, the indulgence (1986: 1).

On the level of archaeological analysis, however, things look quite different. This is all the more the case if we suspend, Foucault-like, the overriding search for historical unities. First of all, we can see from his official correspondence that Gregory VII is clearly casting the Saracens as a threat to individual Christians – even “many thousand Christians” – but never as an existential danger to Christendom as whole. Second, he is often confused about the nature of the enemy and assigns the adversary, whether described as “pagan” or “Saracen,” no particular ideological content beyond a general hostility to general Christian interests. For example, Gregory accuses the “pagans” who now rule most of Spain of “ignorance of God,” clearly not recognizing their direct
religious and ethnic affinities with the Muslim Arabs and Berbers of North Africa, home to his interlocutor Anazir (1990, 6-7).

More confusion arises when, elsewhere, he makes a distinction between the two as he bemoans the levels to which the Church has sunk of late: “Its ancient colors are changed, and it has become the laughingstock, not only of the Devil, but of Jews, Saracens, and pagans” (1990, 195). Gregory is also more than prepared to paint rivals closer to home – the Normans, the Lombards, or even the troublesome citizens of his adopted Rome – as far greater concerns than any pagan or Saracen and to blame Europe’s secular rulers for fostering a culture of violence, instability, and war for profit:

But now everyone, as if smitten with some horrible pestilence, is committing every kind of abominable crimes without any impelling cause. They regard neither divine nor human law; they make nothing of perjury, sacrilege, incest or mutual betrayal. Fellow citizens, relatives, even brothers, capture one another for the sake of plunder, extort all the property of their victims and leave them to end their lives in misery, a thing unknown anywhere else on earth. Pilgrims going to or returning from the shrines of the Apostles are captured, thrust into prison, tortured worse than by any pagan and often held for a ransom greater than all they have (1990, 39-40).

Read against this background, Gregory VII’s letter to the Muslim king of “Mauretania sitifensis in Africa” is clearly one of those minor statements, what have been called “the little dramas” – discounted by conventional accounts – that when examined by the Foucauldian archaeologist help reveal the deeper structures of society, its thought and culture. What is perhaps most striking about this particular letter is the way it suggests a basic level of theological and doctrinal understanding of Islam on the part of the pope and his circle, the likes of which would only rarely reappear until the modern era – if then.

As we have seen, Gregory grasps the nature of Muslim belief in the one God, whom he identifies with that worshipped by the Christians and, by extension, the Jews. In another passage he seeks to curry favor with Anazir by
astutely reprising the Muslims’ own view that their spiritual lineage goes back to
Abraham: “For God knows that we love you sincerely to the honor of God, and
that we desire your own welfare and honor both in the present life and in that
which is to come; and with heart and lips we beseech that God himself will bring
you, after the long continuance of this life, into the blessedness of the bosom of
the most holy patriarch Abraham” (2002, 205).”

In *Madness and civilization*, Foucault addresses the Western discourse of
madness by seeking “that zero point in the course of madness at which madness
is an undifferentiated experience. … To explore it we must renounce the
convenience of terminal truths, and never let ourselves be guided by what we
may know of madness” (1961, ix). Likewise, when we set aside “what we may
know” of the Crusades, we can see that for Pope Gregory VII Islam was not an
enemy-in-waiting, and certainly not a threat to the very survival of his Church.
Despite some relatively acute sense of some of the basic tenets of Islam on the
part of the pope, for the broader society it remained much an “undifferentiated
experience,” with no particular ideological content and barely discernible among
a sea of generalized threats to the world of Latin Christendom that included
rebellious Normans, marauding Viking bands and other pagan barbarians of
various stripes, mysterious Saracens, distant Persians, and, worst of all, the ever-
present danger of Christian heretics closer to home.

But within just two decades, when Urban II publicly issued the call to the
First Crusade, such a letter from a pope to a Muslim leader would, by the new
rules of the new discursive formation, had become unthinkable –un-writable
even – and would remain so for many, many centuries to come. This, then, helps
us to zero in on Foucault’s “zero point,” in this case that moment at which the
idea of the Muslims becomes bound up irrevocably with the West’s discourse of Islam.

The formation of this anti-Islam discourse, like the history of madness, is the history of difference imposed from without. Any internal attributes of Islam, its meaning for its adherents, its worldview, its religious dogmas, and so on – that is, Islam qua Islam – are irrelevant and can be safely ignored. Thus, Foucault could just as easily been addressing the West’s emergent narrative of Islam and the Muslims when he writes:

> The history of madness would be the history of the Other – of that which, for a given culture, is at once anterior and foreign, therefore to be excluded (so as to exorcise the interior danger) but by being shut away (in order to reduce its otherness); whereas the history of the order imposed on things would be the history of the Same – of that which, for a given culture, is both dispersed and related, therefore to be distinguished by kinds and to be collected together into identities (1961, xxiv).

Later in this chapter we will explore the West’s “Othering” of the Muslim: the ways the once-familiar was first made alien and strange; the ways Islam was isolated and otherwise “shut away”; and the ways Western discourse imposed from without its own demand for orderly identities on this new-found Other. But first we must examine the Muslim’s relatively uneventful sojourn through Western consciousness as “undifferentiated experience” – from Muhammad’s revelations, beginning in accordance with Muslim tradition in 610 CE, until shortly before the first Christian mobs began setting off to “reclaim” the holy city of Jerusalem from the Muslims at the end of the eleventh century.

* * *

Abiding uncertainty over just who the Muslims might be – and where they might fit within God’s divine plan for humankind – has left a curious trail through the annals of Latin Christendom. Chronicles, letters, and other documents from this early period serve up a hodge-podge of designations that
reveal a mixture of roughly equal parts indifference and ignorance about the subject at hand. This state of affairs was not helped by the generally low level of learning in the West. The disorder that swept in with the barbarian invasions of the western Roman Empire, from the fourth century CE, had gravely weakened formal education and undermined the preservation and pursuit of knowledge. Science, philosophy, geography, medicine, and many other fields suffered badly. There were a few outposts – chiefly monasteries in Ireland, northern England, Catalonia, and southern Italy – where the monks labored to keep some scraps of classical learning alive. Yet the results were meager.

When medieval Christians thought about the Muslims at all, they generally assigned them to one of two broad categories, either “ethnic” or “biblical.” The former designations included Arabs, Moors, Persians, and Turks. The latter drew from familiar scriptural history: Saracens, that is, descendents of Abraham’s wife Sarah; Hagarenes, from the line of Sarah’s insubordinate bondwoman Hagar; and Ishmaelites, from Hagar’s son Ishmael. As is clear from Gregory VII’s own correspondence, these terms were hopelessly confused in even the most acute medieval mind. Any cultural, sectarian, or ethnic distinctions among the Muslims were likewise lost on the Latins. In one account of his call to Crusade, for example, Pope Urban II denounces, incorrectly as it happens, the infidel enemy in Jerusalem as “Persians.” The modern English terms, “Muslim” and “Islam,” did not appear until the early seventeenth century (Tolan 2002, xv, n. 1).

This early confusion and uncertainty is understandable. The Christian West then faced far greater and more immediate dangers than any posed by the remote and distant Muslim empire, which spread outward from Arabia with
remarkable speed after the death of Muhammad in 632. Byzantine-controlled Damascus fell to the Arabs in 635, and the Persian capital Ctesiphon, just two years later. Alexandria surrendered in 641. Muslim forces reached India by 643 and Spain by 711. They decisively defeated the forces of the Tang dynasty for control of Turkic western China at the battle of Talas, in 751. Still, medieval Europe initially regarded the Arabs as little more than a nuisance, akin, perhaps, to the Vikings, the Magyars, and other barbarians who periodically raided the settled lands or harried local shipping. For centuries they remained largely free of religious animus or other ideological content in the eyes of Christian Europe. Little or no inquiry was made into the nature of their society, its faith or practices.

Much of this initial approach was set by Isidore of Seville, one of the most influential authorities in early medieval times and a contemporary of the Prophet Muhammad. Isidore’s masterwork, *Etymologies*, unfinished at his death in 636 CE, went on to become one of the most popular and widely used collections of Western knowledge into the thirteenth century (Lyons 2009, 34-35). In keeping with the predominant intellectual and religious thought of his day, Isidore relies heavily on the notions of representation and resemblance to explain the world around him, often riding roughshod over the linguistic, historical, and scientific niceties in the process.

This approach rested in large part on no less an authority than Augustine, whose teachings were taken as directives that the faithful Christian seek only God’s mystery, not material explanation, in an ultimately unknowable universe. Daily life was rife with allegorical meaning – the moon, for example, stood for the Church, for it reflected the divine light, while the wind represented the Holy
Ghost (Crombie 1979, 35). Numbers were valued more for their scriptural meaning than as practical units of counting or calculation. Three stood for the Trinity, four, for the Creation, while seven, their sum, comprised “perfection.” This explains the popularity of religious imagery in groups of seven – angels, seals, trumpets (E. Weber 1999, 34-45).

In one typical example, Isidore explains the etymology of the Greek word for king: “A king is called basileus in Greek because like a pedestal’s base [basis] he supports the people…” (Etymologies, 201).3 In another, he informs his readers that the Latin for foreigner, peregrinus, derives from a contraction of the Latin for “unknown parents,” parentes ignorari. However, his derivation of names for the Muslims, is refreshingly straightforward: “A son of Abraham was Ishmael, from whom arose the Ishmaelites, who are now called, with corruption of the name, Saracens, as if they descended from Sarah, and Agarenes, from Agar [Hagar]” (Etymologies, 192). Yet, Isidore ventures nothing about the belief system of these Agarenes, in contrast to his readiness to counterpose the rationality of the Christians with the animal-like irrationality of the Jews. According to his Etymologies, the Jews’ use of the term synagogue stems from the word “congregation,” more aptly applied to a herd of sheep or cattle, while the Christian church implies “convocation,” which “is more fitting for those who use reason, such as humans” (Etymologies, 173; cited in Tolan 2002, 15).

Not even significant territorial gains on the Iberian Peninsula by a Muslim force of Arabs and Berbers in the early eighth century, followed by regular forays into France from their base in Narbonne, or even a successful raid on Rome and the sack of St. Peter’s Cathedral, in 846, could disturb this general

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3 All quotations are from Isidore of Seville, The etymologies, tras. And eds. Stephen A. Barney et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
Latin view. In his *Ecclesiastical history of the English people*, the Venerable Bede recounts one such attack with equanimity, reinforced by his faith in God’s protection and confidence in ultimate Christian victory: “In the year of our Lord 729, two comets appeared around the sun, striking terror into all who saw them,” signs that Bede, who died five years later, took to mean that mankind was “menaced by evils” both day and night (*Ecclesiastical history*, 330).

These were, he suggests, the arrival of the Arabs and unexplained troubles in his native Northumbria. “At this time, a swarm of Saracens ravaged Gaul with horrible slaughter; but after a brief interval in that country they paid the penalty of their wickedness” (1968, 33). A later Carolingian chronicle, the *Annales regni francorum* for 793, lists a Saracen foray into the south of France and a revolt by local Saxons as equally noteworthy, if not terribly troubling, events of that year (quoted in Rodinson 1987, 4).

The general serenity on the subject of the Saracens on the part of Bede, the leading Latin intellectual of his day, was not only a product of the enormous distance between his Northumbrian monastery and the heart of emerging Arab power to the east. It also reflected Bede’s own understanding of the state of affairs in the Holy Land, now under the control of the Muslim Arabs, collected in his *De locis sanctis* (Wallace-Hadrill 1962, 4-5) and later excerpted in the *Ecclesiastical history*. The former work itself was based on another text of the same title, by the Irish monk Adamnan of Iona, and both rely on the personal account of a recent pilgrimage to Jerusalem by the *Galliarum episcopus* Arculf, tentatively dated to 679-82, approximately forty-five years after the Muslim conquest (Meehan 1958, 11).

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Throughout, Arculf paints a rich portrait of Christian religious life and provides detailed descriptions of his visits to all of the important holy sites in Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and environs, clearly unimpeded by its Muslim overlords. At one point, he praises the “king of the Saracens, Mavais by name” for arbitrating a dispute over ownership of Christ’s burial shroud by ruling against the Jews – still the traditional spiritual enemy in spite of the Muslim rise to power – and in favor of the Christians (*De locis sanctis*, I, 9). Later, recounting life in the imperial city of Damascus, the visiting bishop notes: “The king of the Saracens holds the principality and has his court there, and in the same place a great church has been raised in honor of the holy John the Baptist. In this city, too, which they frequent, even the unbelieving Saracens have constructed a church” (*De locis sanctis*, II, 29). For Arculf, a Christian bishop traveling alone through Muslim territory, the only real difficulty throughout his extensive journey appears to have been his efforts to return home, for he is reported shipwrecked “by a violent storm off the western coast of Britain,” ultimately a fortuitous event that first brings him into contact with Adamnan, his future amanuensis (*Ecclesiastical history*, 300).

Greater proximity to the Muslims, however, did not necessarily spark greater Christian intellectual or theological interest in Islam, or even enhance understanding of these newcomers. The same may also be said for the Byzantine Empire, which saw its territory and power beginning to erode in favor of the neighboring Muslims from the mid-seventh century CE. Instead, the Christian experience in both Muslimruled Spain and Orthodox Byzantium helped lay the

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5 This is a reference to Mu’awiyah, the first true Umayyad caliph who ruled in Damascus from 660 to 680 CE.

groundwork for a later Western anti-Islam discourse that had very little to do with what Muslims actually said, did, or believed. What ultimately emerged was a rigid and long-lasting corpus of polemical and apologetic works, defensive by nature and not overly concerned with anything but ridiculing the Muslim faith and discouraging conversion on the part of Christians and cultural Arabization in general.

Muslim expansionism in Spain in the early eighth century – chiefly through exploitation of local divisions, well-timed threats, and astute diplomacy rather than by armed conquest – failed to promote anything like serious inquiry into this new phenomenon on the part of Latin Christendom. Nor did it prompt undue alarm on behalf of the large indigenous Christian population, which soon found numerous cultural, economic, and even political advantages to life under Muslim rule. Even Church ideologues and polemicists were, for the most part, far more concerned with perceived Christian heresies and the threat of accretions from Jewish practice than with the presence of Islam on the peninsula (Wolf 1986, 281-284). Rival Berber and Arab factions in southern Spain routinely found that their own Muslim faith did not prevent local Christian forces from seeking alliances with them as late as 1010 (Blanks 2002, 259).

The extant early Christian chronicles from Spain identify the followers of Islam strictly as Arabs, Saracens, or Ishmaelites. Terms of religious identity, particularly those that would have defined the Muslims in direct opposition to Christians, such as pagan, infidel, or gentile, are markedly absent (Wolf 1986, 283; 1990, 40). Two chronicles from post-invasion Spain, known as the Arabic-Byzantine Chronicle of 741 – the oldest extant document of its type – and the
Mozarabic Chronicle of 754, offer useful windows on the local elite’s thinking about these newcomers to continental Europe, including some of the earliest references to the Prophet Muhammad. Yet both documents paint a thoroughly anodyne picture of the Arabs as Muslims, concentrating almost exclusively on political developments and generally steering clear of religious discussion. An account in the Chronicle of 754 of the Arab military successes against the Byzantines, for example, is cast in the language of political rebellion and liberation from the Orthodox “yoke” and is notably devoid of religious overtones, despite the defeat by the upstart Muslims of Emperor Heraclius, champion of the Eastern Christians:

The Saracens rebelled … and appropriated for themselves Syria, Arabia, and Mesopotamia, more through trickery than through the power of their leader Muhammad, and devastated the neighboring provinces, proceeding not so much by means of open attacks as by secret incursions. Thus by means of cunning and fraud rather than by power, they incited all of the frontier cities of the empire and finally rebelled openly, shaking the yoke from their necks (Chr754, 8).

Elsewhere, the Chronicle of 754 is more than prepared to praise individual Muslim rulers of al-Andalus, as well as the Arab caliphs in far-off Damascus, and to condemn others, according to their performance in office. We are told that Yazid, caliph from 680-83 CE, was “the most pleasant son of Mu’awiyah” and was “very well liked by all of the peoples of the land that were subject to his rule” (Chr754, 31). A local governor, Uqbah ibn Hajjaj (734-740 CE) also comes in for praise for his sensible financial management and modest style: “He very energetically enriched the fisc by various means and lived austerely on his private income. He condemned no one except according to the justice of his own law” (Chr754, 82).

All quotations from the Chronicles of 741 and 754, cited as Chr741 and Chr754, are from Conquerors and chroniclers of medieval Spain, trans. and ed. Kenneth Baxter Wolf (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press), 1990.
These same criteria are also applied to the former Visigoth Christian masters of Spain, with no sign that their respective religious affiliations played any part in the author’s assessments (Wolf 1990, 37-8). Similarly, religious themes are notably lacking from the chronicle’s treatment of the defeat of Roderic, the last king of the Visigoths, by the advancing Arabs, an event which it ascribes to internal political rivalries among the Christians as well as to the king’s own overweening ambition.

In a rare exception, the author of the Chronicle of 741, an unknown Christian who may have served in the local Arab administration, briefly describes Muhammad as “a prescient man” with prophetic powers. “Today the Saracens worship Muhammad with great honor and reverence as they affirm him to be an apostle of God and a prophet in all of their sacraments and scriptures” (Chr741, 13). But his successor, who draws heavily on the earlier document for much of his core material, drops virtually all references to the Arabs’ religious identity, makes only the briefest passing mention of Muhammad, and declines to portray the Franks’ victory – later celebrated throughout Christendom – over the Arabs at Poitiers in anything like sectarian terms. The victors are roundly praised as steadfast and brave but the defeated Arabs are neither ridiculed nor vilified: “The northern peoples remained immobile like a wall, holding together like a glacier in the cold regions, and in the blink of an eye annihilated the Arabs with the sword” (Chr754, 80).

This early chronicle tradition is notable in one other important respect, its readiness to create a space for the Arab rulers of Spain, and the Arabs in general, in the grand sweep of world history. The use of the chronicle style was well-suited to recounting major events at the intersection of Christians and Muslims,
such as the defeat of Heraclius or the conquest of al-Andalus, without having to address the contentious and potentially explosive issue of religious identity and rivalry. But the *Chronicle of 754*, with its simultaneous use of the chronologies of the Byzantine emperors, the Biblical “date” of creation, the reigns of the Arab caliphs, the Spanish era, and the Muslim religious epoch, dating from Muhammad’s flight to Medina in 622 CE, suggests an inclusive worldview on the part of the author – or at the very least a fatalistic recognition that the Muslims, like the other players in this drama, were here to stay (Collins 1989, 60).

When early sectarian tensions did flare in al-Andalus, it was often the local Arabized Christians, the Mozarabs, who were most instrumental in defusing them. Faced with an attempt, beginning in 851, by militant Christian clerics and activists to foment a rebellion by seeking persecution and even death through a public campaign of blasphemy against the Prophet Muhammad, the assimilated Mozarabs of the imperial capital Cordoba effectively disowned this so-called martyrs’ movement.

For these Mozarabs, who were fluent in Arabic and intimately familiar with the faith and culture of the ruling Arabs and Berbers, this was not simply a calculated effort to maintain their comfortable places in a thriving society and economy. It was also an expression of their fundamental understanding of Islam. How was it, they demanded of the militants and their clerical supporters, that such a campaign could be considered a legitimate act of martyrdom when the Muslims, like their Christian and Jewish subjects, worshiped the one true God and followed a law revealed by one of his prophets? After all, Muslim law treated Jews and Christians as fellow People of the Book, allowing them to
retain their property and according them considerable autonomy in exchange for political loyalty and payment of an annual poll tax. In their eyes, this made it acceptable to cooperate with the Muslims and delegitimized the so-called martyrs (Wolf 1986, 290).

But the very real threat of assimilation and mass conversion to Islam throughout al-Andalus could not be ignored forever. It eventually provoked a significant backlash among the local clergy, which increasingly engaged in a concerted effort to attack any notion that Islam and Christianity could coexist in the same theological, social, or cultural space. They were also intent on rolling back the tide of Arabization, which had already made huge inroads into the language and culture of the local Christian population. In the ninth century, the bishop of Cordoba famously lamented the fact that Arabic was threatening to replace Latin, the language of the Catholic Church, in daily usage among his fellow Christians: “Hardly one can write a passable Latin letter to a friend, but innumerable are those who can express themselves in Arabic and can compose poetry in that language with greater art than the Arabs themselves” (quoted in Hillenbrand 1994, 115). The bishop’s deepest fears were well-founded: the common use of Arabic helped break Latin’s stranglehold on Europe’s literary speech, paving the way for the rise of the vernacular languages and the great works of “national” writers: Cervantes, who uses the device of a lost Arab ‘original’ author, Sidi ben Hamed, to frame his story of Don Quixote; Dante, whose description of Paradise and the Inferno almost certainly spring from Islamic models then in European circulation; and Shakespeare (Menocal 2002: 44).
Here, the role of Christian sacred history would prove extremely useful, for it offered a familiar and easily defined space in which to orient the sudden arrival of the Muslims on the world stage. Polemicists instinctively reached back into the Church’s rich textual tradition to help imagine and frame the emerging new enemy. This was none other than the rich trove of obscure references, terrifying predictions, and arresting imagery contained in the Book of Revelation, at the end of the New Testament, and in the older Book of Daniel. Adoption of the Christian Apocalyptic tradition to both understand and define the Muslims, in particular, the notion that Muhammad represented the Antichrist – or at the very least, the false prophet of whom Jesus had earlier warned his followers – began to take root in Spain. Eulogius of Cordoba may have been the first Latin author to label Muhammad the Antichrist, based on the Muslims’ refusal to accept Christian teachings that Jesus, whose prophecy they openly acknowledge, was the son of God. Muhammad was also denounced as a false prophet and a heresiarch (Wolf 1986, 291-293). Apocalyptic theologies and their application to the Muslims had already enjoyed a long history in the increasingly isolated Byzantine lands that directly bordered the dynamic and expansive empire of Islam.

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8 Tolan (2002) sees the imperatives of Catholic sacred history as the determining factor in later Western attitudes toward Islam, and he contrasts this in particular with the views of Norman Daniel (1984), who suggests that literary convention, repeated endlessly but not necessarily believed, provides the central element. Throughout this thesis, I argue that it is the predominant anti-Islam discourse that allows both of these phenomena – the application of sacred history and the use of literary convention – to stand unchallenged to this day.

9 The power of this stream of thought among the three major monotheist faiths can be seen in the established Muslim tradition of Daniel apocalypses, drawing on the authority if not the actual text of the Book of Daniel (Cook 2002, 55-57).

10 On Byzantium’s long-running polemic with Islam, shaded by its own proximity and direct political, economic, and religious rivalry see Meyendorff 1964, 113-132; and Kaegi 1969, 139-149. For a summary of the early transition in Spanish Apocalyptic commentary from a focus on Christian heresy to condemnation of the Muslims, see Williams 1993, 217-233.
Despite the efforts over the centuries of Church leaders and intellectuals to stamp out literal readings of the apocalyptic literature, this same tradition would prove immensely useful as a central pillar of anti-Muslim propaganda. Among the most prominent critics of this tradition was Augustine, who sought to defuse any notion of coming apocalyptic crisis by presenting the Last Days as a slow, steady process of penitence and self-discipline in this life, rather than a theological Big Bang at the end of time (E. Weber 1999, 44-45). Its hold on the popular imagination, however, was not diminished.

Later events in the Near East helped cement the link between the still-mysterious world of Islam and the worst terrors of the Latin Christians. In 1009, the Muslim caliph ordered the destruction of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem, an act associated in the European imagination with the persecution of believers that foretold the End of Time. Coming so soon after the millennial symbolism surrounding the year 1000, it appeared to tie the Muslim control of the holy city to the coming of the Apocalypse (Blanks 2002, 259-261).

Rumors, almost certainly false, of tighter Muslim restrictions on access to the city by the steady flow of Christian pilgrims, and even of physical harassment directed at religious travelers, only exacerbated these sentiments. Peter the Hermit, one of the populist rabble-rousers who helped lead the People’s Crusade to its disastrous end outside Constantinople in 1096 was said by some to have been ill-treated by the city’s Muslim overlords on an earlier pilgrimage to the Holy Land. Anna Comnena, daughter of the Byzantine Emperor Alexius, reports that Peter “suffered much as the hands of the Turks and Saracens,” before struggling back to Europe. In another version, Jesus comes to Peter in a
dream and directs him to warn Christian Europe of Muslim perfidy (Blake and Morris 1985, 86-90).

By tapping into the potent apocalyptic tradition, the emerging anti-Islam narrative significantly increased the odds of its own long-term survival, a phenomenon that Fenn sees very much at play in our own age: “Modernity intensifies the hatreds that separate the East from the West, but it is apocalyptic beliefs that solidify the enmity between the Islamic and Christian worlds into passions that are enduring, intractable, and above all hell-bent on a bloody finale” (2006, 28).

At the other end of the Christian world, in the eastern lands of Byzantium, the coming of the “godless” Arabs, in particular their conquest of Jerusalem and the surrounding Holy Land, was also cast in terms of sacred history: as a scourge from heaven that would ultimately be turned back by renewed Christian rectitude. Sophronius, Patriarch of Jerusalem, bemoaned the recent loss of Bethlehem in his Christmas sermon of 654, and he attributed the defeat to divine retribution for the sins of his fellow believers. Strikingly, Sophronius makes no mention of the religious faith of the invaders or of their spiritual leader, Muhammad (Kaegi 1969, 139-140). Other eastern theologians preferred to see the crisis strictly in terms of their own internal doctrinal disputes, mostly over the nature of Christ, while members of the persecuted Nestorian and Monophysite communities, now living in formerly Byzantine lands, found a new freedom of worship under the Arabs that had been sorely lacking under the heavy hand of orthodoxy enforced from Constantinople.

Despite their new-found intimacy with the Arabs and the enormity of the long-term threat to Byzantine theological and imperial interests, Orthodox
thinkers remained confident the danger was a fleeting one, and they made no real attempt to inquire about the religious beliefs of their Muslim rivals. Those in a position to know better, such as the bureaucrat-turned-monk John of Damascus, either were unable to grasp fully the significance of what they had learned or preferred to keep such knowledge to themselves. According to traditional accounts, John came from a family with many years’ high-level administrative service to the Muslim court in Damascus, and his De haeresibus betrays a certain intimacy with some aspects of Muslim belief, chiefly Islam’s rejection of Christ’s divinity and of his suffering on the Cross. Yet, he commingles these with accusations of idol worship at the Ka’aba and infection with the Arian heresy that so concerned the orthodox Christian thinkers of his day.11 In fact, John finds a place for Islam among the Christian heresies.

The Saracens, he writes, were idolaters until the days of Heraclius, who ruled Byzantium from 610 to 641 CE. “From that time on a false prophet appeared among them, surnamed Mameth [Muhammad] who, having casually been exposed to the Old and New Testament and supposedly encountered an Arian monk, formed a heresy of his own” (De haeresibus, 133).12 John, like many other Orthodox writers, then links the pre-Islamic practice of idolatry among the Arabs to Islam itself, with the Ka’aba in Mecca said to be the venue for continued worship of a stone image of Aphrodite: “They venerated the morning star and Aphrodite, whom they called ‘Habar’ in their language, which means ‘great’” (De haeresibus, 133). This is clearly a jumbled reference to the

11 John of Damascus’ authorship of the chapter on Islam in De Haeresibus is not universally accepted by scholars. Some argue it was borrowed from an earlier text, while others suggest it may have been added later. However, modern opinion generally attributes the work to John. For a summary of the controversy, see Sahas 1972, 60-61 and Meyendorff’ 1963, 116-17. A detailed bibliography on the matter can be found in Sahas 1972, 61, n. 2.
common Arabic phrase, *Allahu akbar*, or “God is most great,” which Muslims use frequently and in many different contexts. Still, John refrains from presenting the Muslims in eschatological terms or linking their appearance to the existing apocalyptic traditions. Moreover, his accusation that Muhammad was a “forerunner of the Antichrist” does not differ in form or substance from those he and his fellow Orthodox thinkers regularly directed against those more traditional heresiarchs, the Nestorians (Sahas 1972, 69; Tolan 2002, 55).

As in Spain, the Orthodox clergy were primarily concerned with quashing any notion of commonality between Islam and Christianity, rather than engaging their rivals in scholarly, theological debate. Thus, they repeatedly asserted that Muslims were idol worshippers, something their own personal experience and knowledge over the centuries could hardly have confirmed. As late as 1178 the Byzantine Emperor Manuel I ran afoul of the religious hierarchy when he ordered that an official rite for Muslims converting to Christianity no longer include an anathema against “the God of Muhammad,” an imperial recognition that the two faiths worshipped the same divinity. The emperor won a narrow victory but only after church leaders again asserted that the Muslim God was in fact an idol “of hammer-beaten metal” (quoted in Meyendorff 1964, 124-5). However, for Latin Christendom as a whole, such controversies brewing in far-off Byzantium or cut-off Spain were very much on the fringes of both sacred and secular geography, and Islam largely remained an “undifferentiated experience,” one that would only take on meaningful shape and definition with the advent of Christian holy war and the Crusaders’ march on Jerusalem.

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Islam, then, was virtually a blank canvas for Latin Christendom of the late eleventh century. The two best sources of reliable intelligence on the Muslims, the Christian elites of al-Andalus and Byzantium, had both been unable to exploit their privileged positions of proximity to the Arabs and to offer up anything of real value on Islam or the Muslim peoples. Their need to combat conversion or assimilation, as well as other domestic pressures, instead produced strong polemical and apologetic traditions for internal consumption. Besides, the experience of these communities on the fringes of Christian European consciousness was too remote to make much immediate impact. Instead, they would act as deep reservoirs of pejorative imagery, polemical rhetoric, and apologetic strategies around which the West’s dominant Islam discourse would later coalesce.

For now, the imperatives of holy war demanded an easily grasped and emotionally compelling enemy worthy of such a grand cause and the enormous mobilization of men, money, and materiel such a campaign would entail. In the relatively brief period between Pope Gregory VII’s sympathetic correspondence with the Muslim “King Anazir” of 1076 and the launch and prosecution, beginning just two decades later, of the First and Second Crusades, the essential “Othering” of the Muslim was virtually complete. No longer “undifferentiated experience,” Islam and the Muslims now took on a specific ideological role as the ultimate enemy of Christendom.

This new discursive formation, what we have identified as the anti-Islam discourse, can clearly be seen taking shape in the episodic accounts of Pope Urban II’s public call to Crusade, delivered in late 1095 to the Church council in Clermont. There are no extant copies of the pope’s actual text, but his
declaration of holy war was recounted numerous times by chroniclers over the ensu-
ing decades, and these tellings and retellings – along with their historical, social, and theological accretions – present us with the steady unfolding of the new anti-Islam discourse as it begins to take on the recognizable features of its final, adult stage.

This lack of a verbatim text is no real obstacle; in fact, it is immaterial – and it may even be a distinct advantage – for the anti-Islam discourse that Pope Urban ushered in remains clearly visible to the archaeologist sifting through the discursive deposits left behind in the chronicles of Fulcher of Chartres; Robert the Monk, also known as Robert of Rheims; the anonymous Gesta francorum et aliorum Hierosolymytanorum, the earliest of the group and an extremely popular source for later writers; Balderic, archbishop of Dol; Guibert, abbot of Nogent; as well as their many successors, imitators, and commentators.

Or, as cultural historian Norman Daniel, a pioneering student of Western images of Islam, remarks in a somewhat different context in his analysis of Crusades propaganda:

In Urban’s preaching we find new notions, more especially new sentiments, that correspond to ideas immediately and henceforth in general use. From this point of view it matters more what Urban was understood to have said than what he actually did say. We shall say little to distinguish the propagandist from the consumer of propaganda, because the one is usually, and simultaneously, the other. We are concerned only to identify the main lines of persuasion and self-persuasion which thenceforward men of all types accepted as defining their official motivation (1989, 40).

None of the surviving versions of Pope Urban’s declaration of holy war was recorded at the time of Clermont or in the immediate days thereafter. In fact, none predates the launch of the First Crusade, in 1096, or even the successful Christian siege of Jerusalem, in July 1099. The Gesta francorum et aliorum Hierosolymytanorum, by a knight traveling with Bohemond of Taranto, one of
the leading Crusades commanders, is the oldest and dates from around 1100 CE. Robert the Monk’s account may have been written as much as a decade after that. Thus, all are forged, either directly or indirectly, by the experience of religious war and informed to varying degrees by the momentous events precipitated by the pope’s famous speech some years earlier.

This, of course, provides these and other writers with the rare chance to justify in advance the violent conduct of the subsequent campaign, which the saw the massacre of Jews in Central and Eastern Europe, the rampant killing of alien Arab Christians in the Near East, as well as the deaths of many Muslims, including unarmed civilians, at the hands of the Crusaders. It also permits the presentation of the substantial territorial gains initially made by the Latin forces in the name of liberation of holy sites and the struggle against spiritual pollution at the hands of the unclean pagans. Thus, the epic Chanson d’Antioche relates how Christ on the Cross predicts the coming of the Crusaders, one thousand years later: “My friends, the people are not yet born who will avenge my death with their steel lances. … They will regain my land and free my country” (Le Chanson d’Antioche, 305).

An examination of the multiple chronicles as the collective product of a new discursive formation reveals a number of interrelated themes and ideas that, taken together, present for the first time in Latin Christendom the singular identity of the Muslim as Other. Gone is the fellow worshipper of the same God – “albeit in a different way” – or the recipient of good wishes for an eventual return to “bosom of the most holy patriarch Abraham,” seen in the correspondence of the otherwise bellicose Gregory VII. In his place, the Muslim

is now “godless” defiler of Christian sacred precincts, tormentor and torturer of true believers, idol-worshipper, and usurper of lands rightfully belonging to Latin Christendom. In other words, the Muslim is no longer undifferentiated experience. Instead, he is assigned distinct characteristics that make him the opposite of all that is “Christian” and a legitimate target of holy war, whose death or destruction carries with it promises of the remission of sins for those willing to take up the Cross.

The earliest of these texts, the *Gesta francorum*, devotes little space to Urban’s speech at Clermont, comprising in all just several paragraphs; the bulk of the work is a first-hand narrative of the military campaign itself, ending with the conquest of Jerusalem in 1099 and the follow-up victory at Ascalon one month later. Throughout, the author does not hesitate to present the horrors of warfare. Nor does he cover up the misdeeds of his fellow Christians, including incidents of cannibalism in the Syrian town of Marra and the slicing open of Muslim corpses in a frenzied search for hidden gold coins: “So they cut up the corpses, because bezants were to be found concealed in their stomachs. Others cut their flesh up into morsels and had them cooked for eating” (*Gesta francorum* 1945, 77).14

Even after victory in Jerusalem and a celebratory mass at the Holy Sepulcher, the bloodshed continued with the slaughter of the defeated Muslims on the Temple Mount, where they had been promised protection by the commander of the Crusader forces: “The following morning our people climbed the roof of the Temple [of Solomon], attacked the Saracens, men and women and decapitated them with drawn swords. Some threw themselves from the top of the

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Temple. … No one has ever heard and no one has ever seen such a slaughter of the pagan people; pyres, like [hay] stacks, were set up, and nobody, save God alone, knows their number” (*Gesta francorum*, 88).

The *Gesta* casts Urban’s appeal exclusively in terms of Christian redemption and Christian duty: “Whoever wishes to save his soul should not hesitate humbly to take up the way of the Lord, and if he lacks sufficient money, divine mercy will give him enough. … Brethren, we ought to endure much suffering for the name of Christ – misery, poverty, nakedness, persecution, want, illness, hunger, thirst, and other (ills) of this kind” (*Gesta* 1962: xlixx).

The *Gesta francorum* contains no suggestion that the campaign is a life-and-death struggle against an infidel or heretical enemy. In fact, the Muslim enemy is not yet even clearly identified or defined. This begins to change with the next account of Urban’s address at Clermont, *A history of the expedition to Jerusalem* by the French churchman Fulcher of Chartres.¹⁵ It is not clear exactly when Fulcher wrote the first edition of his history, although internal textual evidence and its periodic reliance on the *Gesta* and another similar work as primary sources suggest he began in late 1101 or early 1102 and completed it around 1106 (Ryan 1970, 18-21).

In his account of the Council of Clermont, Fulcher tells us that the pope identified the enemy simply as “the Turks, a Persian people” who have “killed or captured many people, have destroyed churches, and have devastated the Kingdom of God” (Fulcher of Chartres 1970, 66). Urban then warns his listeners that the Turks are intent on conquering “God’s faithful people much more

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extensively” if they are not held in check (Fulcher of Chartres 1970, 66). And he reminded his listeners of their religious duty to stand up to such a menace: “Oh what a disgrace if a race so despicable, degenerate, and enslaved by demons should thus overcome a people endowed with faith in Almighty God and resplendent in the name of Christ! Oh what reproaches will be charged against you by the Lord Himself if you have not helped those who are counted like yourselves of the Christian faith!” (Fulcher of Chartres 1970, 66).

Yet Fulcher presents the call to Crusade as only one part – and by no means the central part – of the matters before the Council of Clermont. Rather, the pope’s overriding message is one of the urgent need for the radical reform of society and the Church, and Fulcher relegates his appeal to Crusade to the third chapter of his opening Book I. In the preceding chapters we instead see the pope castigating the Christians for their violent behavior toward one another, denouncing the moral degeneracy of daily life as a whole, and upbraiding the clergy for its abject failures to lead by example.

As an interesting instance of the broader discourse at work today, it is worth pointing out that Fulcher’s presentation prompts his modern English translator, Frances Rita Ryan, to note with “surprise” that the call to Crusade does not feature more prominently in the account of Clermont: “Rather surprisingly, we learn that most of the business seems to have dealt with decrees proposed by Pope Urban as the leader of the Cluny reform movement in the Church. Not until the third chapter does Fulcher set forth the call for the First Crusade and its enthusiastic reception” (Ryan 1970, 25).

Any reticence on the part of the pope – or, more precisely, on the part of the Latin propagandists who popularized his speech at Clermont and the First
Crusade in general – to identify the Muslim masters of the Holy Land with all that is evil in the world, or to present a catalogue of their crimes against innocent Christians, is wholly gone by the time Robert the Monk puts pen to parchment, around 1107 or later. This would correspond to a renewed, if brief, upsurge in enthusiasm in Europe, particularly in Robert’s native France, for a fresh Crusade, as well as to a period of post-war reflection in which the full implications of the first campaign against the Muslims were coming more sharply into focus. In fact, Robert was commissioned by his abbot to produce his *Historia Iherosolimitana*, essentially a redaction and rewriting of the *Gesta* with the incorporation of some additional information, to whip up support for a new military expedition (Sweetenham 2005, 6). Other works on the Crusade began to appear around the same time, with the same goals in mind.

That “vile race” of Turks or Persians in the earlier account of Fulcher of Chartres is now an enemy completely outside the pale, ritually unclean and utterly cut off from God himself. Thus, Robert the Monk, who reports that he personally attended the Council of Clermont but only writes of it many years later, presents Pope Urban as juxtaposing Robert’s fellow Franks – “men chosen and beloved of God” – against the “race of Persians” – “a foreign people and people rejected by God” (Robert the Monk 2005, 79).16 In Robert’s hands, the pope then produces a laundry list of terrible crimes suffered by Christians at the hands of the Muslims – one torture is markedly reminiscent of the *Gesta*’s earlier account of Christians slitting open Saracens to search for gold coins that they may have swallowed – and demands the Latin princes set aside their internal quarrels and march to the Holy Land:

They throw down the altars after soiling them with their own filth, circumcise Christians, and pour the resulting blood either on the altars or into the baptismal vessels. When they feel like inflicting truly painful death on some they pierce their navels, pull out the end of their intestines, tie them to a pole and whip them around it until, all their bowels pulled out, they fall lifeless to the ground. They shoot arrows at others tied to stakes; others again they attack having stretched out their necks, unsheathing their swords to see if they can mangle to hack off their heads with one blow. And what can I say about the appalling treatment of women, which is better to pass over in silence than to spell out in detail? … [L]et the Holy Sepulcher of our Lord the Redeemer move you – in the power as it is of foul races – and the holy places now abused and sacrilegiously defiled by their filthy practices (Historia Iherosolimitana 80).

It is only after this list of Muslim atrocities is laid out that the pope begins to take up his domestic reform agenda with an appeal for civil peace and moral conduct among the Christians themselves, an aspect emphasized from the start in the older Gest. But even here, Robert has Urban return immediately to the language of war and conquest; the pope praises the Franks’ martial prowess and reminds them that Jerusalem is a land “more fruitful than any other, almost another Earthly Paradise” (Historia Iherosolimitana, 81), in contrast to the hardscrabble life and poor prospects that many face here at home. “When Pope Urban had eloquently spoken these words and many other things of the same kind, all present were so moved that they untied as one and shouted, ‘God wills it, God wills it’” (Historia Iherosolimitana, 81).

Reading the Gesta francorum alongside its successor texts, especially Robert the Monk’s Historia Iherosolimitana, brings the West’s emerging discursive formation of Islam into sharp relief. The Gesta is foremost a chronicle of a violent and arduous military campaign, written by a military man, and it bears witness to the atrocities of war committed by both sides: “…[Y]ou could not find stronger or braver or more skilful soldiers” (Gesta francorum 1962, 21). The Gesta has little time for theological speculation, for the religious implications of the First Crusade, for the guiding hand of the papal court, or for
the role of the Crusaders as religious pilgrims rather than warriors. Its narrative is not one of Christian sacred history playing out, or of the recovery of “Christian” territory, but rather of the age-old story of men at war.

The Historia Iherosolimitana, by contrast, places the theological narrative front and center. Thus, Robert lovingly locates Pope Urban’s address at Clermont in what he sees as its rightful place as the dramatic starting point of the entire venture and the glory it would bring with the conquest of Jerusalem. The religious aspects of crusading now take clear priority over purely military ones, while the central goals of the campaign – the conquest of “holy” land and the cleansing of the “unclean” presence of the pagan Saracens from hallowed sites – are linked firmly to notions of sacred history and religious competition (Sweetenham 2005, 21-21).

For Robert, the Muslims were not a worthy enemy to be admired in any way but more like animals to be slaughtered and, perhaps, pitied for finding themselves on the wrong side of God. “That was how the Turks were gloriously defeated by the Franks; their jabbering voices, the grinding of their teeth and noise of their daily insults were no longer heard,” he writes of one Christian victory outside the walls of Antioch, in early 1098. “The Turks look on from the high walls and lofty towers, weeping bitterly, tearing their cheeks and pulling out their hair. They start to beg the help of Mahommed, their master; but Mahommed could not bring back those Christ had destroyed through his soldiers” (Historia Iherosolimitana, 134-35).

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Robert the Monk’s redaction of the Gesta Francorum, like the other revisionist works of his fellow chroniclers in the early twelfth century, sealed the
Othering of the Muslim among the political, intellectual, and religious elite of Latin Christendom. The followers of Islam were now irretrievably outside the bounds of civilized society, reduced in status to little more than animals. They were almost universally depicted as idolaters and thus cut off from any possibility that they worshiped the same God as the Christians. Any common ground – the begrudging respect of one soldier for another seen in the *Gesta*, for example, or the different manner of approaching the same deity, referred to by Gregory VII – was now lost. In such an atmosphere, it was unthinkable to consult Muslims about their own practices or beliefs.

The Muslims’ newfound alterity had a number of important social consequences. As Foucault wrote of the emerging discourse of madness in *Madness and civilization*, Islam was now something to be excluded – “so as to exorcise the interior damage” that might be done to the Christian West – and to be shut away – “in order to reduce its otherness” (Foucault 1961, xxiv).

Christendom responded to increasing contacts between Muslim and Christian, particularly as a result of the expanding Christian conquest of al-Andalus, with ever tighter exclusions on Muslim social and religious life – a process that concluded with the ultimate act of isolation and exclusion, the wholesale expulsion of the Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula.  

In 1179, the Third Lateran Council barred Muslims from holding Christian slaves, while the Fourth Council, of 1215, imposed a range of new measures designed to safeguard the Christians’ physical – especially sexual – purity and spiritual integrity. These included regulations to require Muslims to dress in distinctive clothing so there could be no accidental “mixing” of the two

17 The Jews were subject to these same restrictions, generally imposed at the same time as those against the Muslims.
communities; to banish Muslims from the public space during Holy Week; and to bar Muslims from holding positions of authority over Christians (Tolan 2002, 189-198). In the mid-thirteenth century, King Alfonso X of Castile prepared an idealized legal code, which he never enforced, that envisioned the almost complete separation of the Muslim and Christian communities under his rule. Here again, the emphasis was on the prevention of religious contamination – conversion to Islam was banned, but so was any act of Muslim worship within eyesight of Christians – and of physical contamination in the form of sexual relations (Tolan 2002, 189-190). Alfonso X’s attempt at radical social engineering, an idealized apartheid aimed at some of his most educated and productive subjects, is all the more notable, given his historical reputation as a patron of Islamic arts and sciences.

These moves toward isolation and exclusion of the Muslims – and the accompanying ignorance of things Muslim on the part of the West – created the necessary conditions for the rise of a new social actor, whose role has remained virtually intact to this day. This is, of course, the “Islam expert,” the predominant carrier of the idea of Islam and thus the central social figure in the anti-Islam discourse. In its ideal type, the Islam expert acts as the trusted intermediary between the familiar world of “us” and the disquieting world of “them.” This expert, unwittingly subject to the rules of the dominant discursive formation, tells us what to think and what not to think about Islam; in the absence of any real countervailing information, the expert’s word generally goes unchallenged and is accepted at face value. There is, ultimately, little alternative.

In the earliest centuries of the anti-Islam discourse, this role was commonly filled from among the ranks of the educated Christian clerical class.
Later eras saw the rise of the humanist theoreticians of the Renaissance; the
nineteenth-century armies of philologists, anthropologists, and literary critics,
which created the Orientalist underpinnings for Western colonial domination of
the Muslim world; and today’s array of journalists, commentators, pundits, and
political leaders.

The early prototype of the Islam expert lies with the curious figure of
Petrus Alfonsi, a Jewish convert to Christianity whose experience of life among
the Muslims in his native Spain provided material for a crucial chapter in his
*Dialogue against the Jews*, otherwise devoted to a polemic against his former
co-religionists. Petrus was born in Huesca, a small border city under Muslim
control that was seized by Christians in 1097. In keeping with the traditions of
his relatively prosperous Jewish community, he received a solid education that
included Arabic and Hebrew, Jewish religious studies, as well as the secular
sciences of mathematics, astronomy, and medicine. He converted to Christianity
in 1006 (Resnick 2006, 11).

*Dialogue against the Jews*, completed around 1109 and presented in the
form of an exchange between the author as both a Jew, under the name of
“Moses,” and as a Christian convert named “Petrus,” devotes one of its twelve
chapters to the “faith of the Saracens.” From its opening lines, this fifth chapter
establishes Petrus Alfonsi’s credentials as an expert on the Muslims, one able to
present and explain the faith to Latin Christendom: “I wonder why,” asks Moses,
“when you abandoned your paternal faith, you chose the faith of the Christians
rather than the faith of the Saracens? … For you were always, as I said,
associated with them and you were raised among them; you read [their] books,

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Catholic University of America Press, 2006).
and you understand the language” (Dialogue, 146). Moses then goes on to offer a generally accurate account of many of the central teachings and practices of the Muslims, before repeating the same query: “Since from childhood, no less, you have known that these things and many others, which would take too long to enumerate, were written and held in the greatest veneration by the entire race of Saracens, then why have you followed the Christian rather than the Muslim religion?” (Dialogue, 150).

In response, Petrus lays out his central case against Islam: what appears on the surface to be a fully rational “law” is in fact a cover for idol worship, falsehood and deceit, sexual depravity, Muhammad’s boundless personal ambition, and forced conversion at the point of the sword. Other elements of Muslim practice, he argues, are mere devices to set Islam apart artificially from the faith of the Christians and Jews. These include the banning of wine and the five daily prayers, the latter of which Petrus argues is merely a compromise between the three prayers of the Jews and the seven codified for Christians by the Rule of St. Benedict.

In its attack on Islam, the Dialogue against the Jews takes particular aim at the person of Muhammad, and it dismisses Moses’ suggestion that converting to Islam would have allowed Petrus to “better enjoy the felicity of the present life” as well as that of the afterlife. “One thing,” Petrus responds tartly, “remains uncertain to you, I reckon: how useless I will judge that doctrine that they call Muhammad’s. When, though, you have heard this life and character summarized in my narration, then you will easily be able to discern whether I do or do not know what is true about him” (Dialogue, 150-151).
According to Petrus, Muhammad’s rise to power and influence was not divinely inspired; he performed no miracles and was not a true prophet, and thus it would not be “appropriate” to follow his law. Instead, Petrus presents Muhammad’s rise as the product of calculating ambition, fuelled by his own inordinate sexual appetites and aided by a Christian heretic and two renegade Jewish advisors, who helped manufacture a religious message designed to win over followers:

And these three mixed together the law of Muhammad, each one according to his own heresy, and showed him how to say such things on God’s behalf which both heretical Jews and the heretical Christians who were in Arabia believed to be true; whereas those who were unwilling to believe of their own free will nevertheless were forced to believe for fear of the sword. But we do not know of any other prophecy of his nor any miracles, as we heard about Moses, Joshua, Samuel, Elijah, and Elisha who, we read, performed many miracles (Dialogue, 152).

A true prophet would not only perform miracles and correctly foretell the coming of momentous events but would also lead a life of exemplary probity. None of this, says Petrus, applies to the leader of the Muslims, who could not contain his own sexual desires and who used his religious teachings, such as the permissibility of polygamy, to gratify them and those of his followers.

“Muhammad loved women a great deal and was too much the voluptuary, and, just as he claimed, the power of the lust of forty men dwelled in him. And also, especially because the Arabs were very dissolute, he pandered to their desire, so they would believe” (Dialogue, 161).

Nor could he succeed without the use of force, in contradiction to the revelations recorded in the Qur’an. “That Muhammad commanded [them] to despoil, capture, and slay the adversaries of God until they decided to believe or pay tribute, is not among the acts of God, nor did any of the prophets command that anyone be forced to believe, but he commanded this himself out of a desire
for money, in order to destroy his enemies” (Dialogue, 159). Petrus then presents a series of quotations from the Qur’an opposing the use of force, including the well-known injunction – cited in a completely different context by Pope Benedict XVI almost one thousand years later – against “compulsion in religion” (Qur’an 2:256). “Why, then, did he order [them] to despoil, capture, and coerce the nations to believe by force, and why does he claim that all these are the paths of God? Tell me, Moses, why do you order me to believe a law which contradicts itself?” (Dialogue, 160).

In the Dialogue against the Jews we can see the basics of the anti-Islam discourse in its mature form, incorporating elements from the established polemical tradition cultivated in Petrus’ native Spain. It raises the specter of past idol worship and decadence among the Arabs – “A purity resulting from the ablution of the members, however, was important to the worshipers of the planet Venus, who, wanting to pray to her, prepared themselves as if they were women, coloring [their] mouths and eyes” (Dialogue, 156). At the same time, it locates Islam among the Christian heresies bedeviling Church orthodoxy, in this case as the work of the Jacobites. Muhammad is presented as a deceiver, a false prophet even, driven by sexual fantasies and a lust for power and violence. And the very essence of the religion is now grounded in force and coercion, dressed in an outward message of peace and conciliation.

Yet Dialogue against the Jews does more than establish the central tenets of the anti-Islam discourse; it reveals the scope, power, and operation of the discursive formation itself. Easily overlooked in the text’s polemical excess is the dispassionate and generally straightforward account of many of the core

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19 Here, Petrus Alfonsi departs from Christian tradition, which identifies the “heretic” said to have advised Muhammad with the Nestorian figure of Sergius.
beliefs and practices of the Muslims, which opens the work’s discussion of Islam. This includes belief in the One God and Muhammad as his prophet, the five daily prayers, the fast of Ramadan, and the *hajj* pilgrimage. Also noted, albeit in cursory fashion, are the Muslim dietary laws, legal procedures pertaining to marriage, property, and related matters, as well as the ban on the consumption of wine. In other words, the author of this seminal anti-Islam text is far from ignorant of the ways of the Muslims. After all, he has lived among them for years and knows their habits, customs, as well as their sacred language. Yet virtually none of this informs the central narrative.

As we shall see with succeeding generations of Islam experts, facts on the ground which do not accord with the discourse, are not treated as facts at all; they may be ignored, distorted, or never truly mastered in the first place. This becomes all the more the case as the works of Islam experts gradually give rise to Islam as a “discipline.” In his *Discourse on language*, Foucault points out that for a fact even to be considered it must meet the criterion of this dominant discourse: “In short, a proposition must fulfill some onerous and complex conditions before it can be admitted within a discipline; before it can be pronounced true or false is must be … ‘within the true.’ It is always possible that one could speak the truth in a void; one would only be in the true, however, if one obeyed the rules of some discursive ‘policy’ which would have to be reactivated every time one spoke” (1972b, 224). Moses’ account of Muslim belief in *Discourse against the Jews*, then, is not “within the true” and thus can be safely ignored, while Petrus’ polemic meets the “onerous and complex conditions” of the anti-Islam discourse and thus may be accepted, retained, and preserved.
Dialogue against the Jews placed the imprimatur of the leading Western expert, in this case an Arabic-speaking former Jew from once-Muslim Spain, on the anti-Islam discourse that first emerged with the advent of the Crusades. An examination of these texts allows us not only to track the formation and operation of this discursive formation but also to apply the third element of our analytic framework by returning to the question posed at the outset – cui bono?

In the case of Robert the Monk, this is a relatively simple manner: he was directed by his abbot to rework the standard account of the First Crusade, the Gesta francorum, and to invest it with enthusiasm for a renewed military campaign against the Muslims. Robert and his fellow authors of the immediate post-Crusade period also had to account for the atrocities against the Jews, eastern Christians, and defeated Saracens at the hands of the Christian forces, and to justify – in advance – the destruction or seizure of land and property in a far-off realm. In their hands, Pope Urban II’s message of the pressing need of social, religious, and political reform inside Latin Christendom gets pushed to the background, and the speech at Clermont becomes instead an urgent appeal for holy war against the polluting presence of the animal-like Muslims in lands now deemed to be Christian by right.

For his part, Petrus Alfonsi cast his lot with the increasingly dominant forces of Christendom by renouncing his Jewish faith under the sponsorship of no less than the Bishop of Huesca and the king of Aragon, from whom he took his new, Christian name. Petrus tells us he was baptized in 1106 by Bishop Stephen and received “at the sacred font” by his godfather, Alfonso I, “the glorious emperor of Spain” (Dialogue, 40). Soon he was celebrated not only as
an expert on things Muslim but also as an adept of Arab science, which dwarfed the low level of contemporary European learning.

Petrus goes out of his way to deny any connection – some have “accused me of vainglory and falsely claimed that I had done this for worldly honor, because I perceived that the Christians’ nation dominated all others” (Dialogue, 41). However, it is worth noting that his personal advancement and that of the anti-Islamic discourse that so pervades the Dialogue against the Jews went hand in hand. Sometime after completing his Dialogue, Petrus moved to England and later to France, and in both locales his level of scientific learning, unremarkable in the Arabic cultural milieu of his homeland, astounded his new hosts and reinforced his fame and influence. For a time, he attached himself to a small circle of scholar-monks in England’s West Country who were interested in the latest ideas in astronomy and mathematics beginning to trickle in from the Arab world, and he may have served as court physician to King Henry I.20

Petrus’ wanderings and his storied scientific achievements helped establish the popularity of the Dialogue in different parts of Christian Europe and established him as the leading source of information on Islam (Southern 1962: 35, n. 2; Kedar 1984: 92; Tolan 2002: 154). Today, it is extant in an impressive sixty-three manuscripts, with another sixteen adaptations. An abbreviated version incorporated into a popular work of the mid-thirteenth century, the Speculum historiale of Vincent de Beauvais, survives in another two hundred copies. At times, only the chapter on Islam was transcribed (Tolan 2002, 154), a fact that underscores the centrality of the anti-Muslim discourse for

20 The man known by Chaucer as Piers Alphonse was also the author of The Priestly Tales, which had a long-lasting influence on the development of Western literature. It introduced European readers to the Arabic literary form of the “framed tale,” or story within story, further popularized by the translation of A Thousand and One Nights. Chaucer adopted this notion in his Canterbury Tales, as did Boccaccio in the Decameron (Menocal 2002, 151).
Latin Christendom, as opposed to the older but less pressing “problem” of the Jews.

Among Petrus Alfonsi’s most important and influential readers was Peter the Venerable, the abbot of Cluny and head of a vast religious empire that at its height comprised more than six hundred monasteries and thousands of monks (Kritzeck 1964, 3). In 1142 during a visit to Spain, Peter paid a team of scholars an exorbitant fee to translate the Qur’an and several other religious texts from Arabic into Latin as raw material for his own polemical works, the *Summa totius haeresis Saracenorun* and the *Contra sectam sine haeresim Saracenorum*, the latter an apparent attempt to refute the teachings of Islam and to entice Muslims to convert to Christianity.

Peter the Venerable’s conclusions are all in keeping with the anti-Islam discourse, which by this time was already well-established. Like many of his contemporaries, he casts Muhammad a sex-mad fraud: “[I]n order that he could more easily attract to himself the carnal minds of men, he loosed the reins on gluttony and impurity, and he himself having at the same time 18 wives, including the wives of many others, committing adultery as if by divine command, he added to himself a larger number of damned ones by his example, as it were, as a prophet,” he recounts in the *Summa totius haeresis Saracenorum* (quoted in Kritzeck 1964, 137). Elsewhere, Peter puzzles over whether the Muslims were heretics or brute pagans before concluding, halfheartedly, that they should probably be counted among the former given their veneration of Jesus as a great prophet (Kritzeck 1964, 137-144).

But Peter the Venerable has bequeathed us more than just a useful retelling of the anti-Islam narrative, dressed up in the scholarly tradition of
textual analysis and presented in the grand style of the Church Fathers. He has revealed one of the hidden aspects of the anti-Islam discourse: its formation took place long before the West had had any meaningful knowledge of Islam or real interaction with Muslims. Writing as the Church was preparing to launch the Second Crusade, Peter cannot help wondering aloud why the military campaign against the Muslims might not be preceded, or at least accompanied, by a serious attempt to convert these “heretics” to the true faith rather than simply killing them. It is in this context, that Peter makes his fateful confession: “A flame was enkindled in my meditation. I was indignant that the Latins did not know the cause of such perdition, and by reason of that ignorance could not be moved to put up any resistance; for there was no one who replied [to it] because there was no one who knew [about it]” (quoted in Kritzeck 1956, 180).

The radical social and religious reforms backed by Pope Urban II and his circle culminated in the call to Crusade at Claremont in November 1095 and the ensuing preparations for the invasion of the Holy Land, then under Muslim control. Here is the “zero point” of the West’s discourse of Islam, and it marks a break with an earlier time when the ideas and images of the Muslims had been largely vague and unformed in the European consciousness. The ambitious mobilization of Christian Europe, demanded by wartime exigencies of the First Crusade and by the broader social and political needs of the Church, required an identifiable and distinct enemy. From now on, the Muslim Other would be imbued with qualities in direct opposition to Christian ones. Chief among these were the notions of Islam as irrational, as inherently violent, spread by the sword and maintained by force, and as sexually perverse.
In short, the Muslims were transformed from an inchoate, if at times deadly, nuisance to an existential threat to Latin Christendom, and they were now seen to stand for an annihilation of true Christian values, beliefs, and practices. Yet this same discourse was fashioned with little or no reference to actual Muslims and forged with no real understanding or recognition of what they believed, or said, or did. None of this was of much concern to the reformist Church intellectuals and ideologues who were the first direct beneficiaries of this new narrative. Nor would it be to the subsequent generations of “Islam experts” who have drawn on this narrative to advance their own interests ever since.

The result, I argue, has been a fateful decoupling of the anti-Islam discourse from the nondiscursive reality of Islam and a broad distortion of the Western understanding of the Muslims on virtually all fronts, from the eleventh century CE to the present day. Chapter Five explores the ways that various social cohorts over time have used the irrationality assigned to the Muslims for their own social, political, and economic advancement while obscuring the enormous contributions of Islamic civilization to our own.
Chapter Five: Islam and science

Perhaps no other realm of the Western experience has been as jealously guarded as that of science and its stepsister, technology. To be “Western” today – or at least, “Westernized,” as is largely the case among the elites worldwide – is to be totally enmeshed in a world and a worldview shaped by the products and processes of modern science. Those who command its secrets and wield its powers – or at least feel that they do so – literally rule the world. The West’s military, economic, and political predominance all rely on the continued mastery and effective monopoly of science. Enforcement measures include global restrictions on military technology transfer, even to less-developed states that purchase sophisticated Western arms, as well as the nuclear arms control regime that safeguards, albeit imperfectly, the developed world’s privileged grip on such weaponry. Similarly, Western pharmaceutical, agricultural, and software firms vigorously sell high-priced drugs, seeds, or computer operating systems to the rest of the world while retaining the fundamental technology for themselves.

Noting this, the rest of humanity wants in and has been more than willing to accept science and technology on Western terms.21 This has extended the reach of modern science around the world, without regard for national boundaries or for non-Western intellectual, cultural, or religious traditions. As a result, the discourse of science and the practice of the scientist is recognizably the same everywhere. One would be hard-pressed to make a serious claim for the

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21 By contrast, the public outcry against the threat of Western cultural or economic domination has been significant and often effective. This has been the case particularly in much of the Muslim world, which has at the same time embraced Western science and technology with enthusiasm.
existence today of a “Hindu astronomy,” or a “Chinese mathematics,” intellectual categories that may have made perfect sense in bygone times.

In the Muslim world, beginning with the so-called modernizing trend of the nineteenth century, this same phenomenon has produced a general consensus on the need to catch up to the West, with little time set aside for debate over the broader implications for society, science, or faith (Iqbal 2002, xv-xix). Islamic science, one grounded in the Islamic intellectual tradition and its theory of knowledge and its practice of scholarship, can now only be spoken about in the past tense. All that remains, are attempts by some religious conservatives to endorse creationism or to find the roots of all scientific discoveries in the sacred texts of Islam – both signs of the enduring importance of the need to be “scientific.”

Given the enormous value of this monopoly, it is not surprising that the West has sought to maintain its control over the source of modern science. Thus, the predominant discourse has enshrined the birth and subsequent history of modern science in a series of myth-like events, including the heresy trial of Galileo, the Renaissance, the Scientific Revolution, and celebrated its totemic achievements, such as penicillin, the A-bomb, the Space Race, DNA sequencing, and generally privileged itself in terms of its care and feeding over the centuries. Cementing this hegemony in place requires eliminating all other possible contenders, a cause that has generally been well-served since the nineteenth century by the discipline commonly known as the history of science, with its propensity to measure other, non-Western scientific traditions – Mayan, Chinese, Islamic, and so on – solely by the yardstick of modern, that is to say, Western, science.
One of the most troublesome aspects of this claim on science as Western birthright, however, is what we might call the problematic of Muslim science.\textsuperscript{22} After all, from the eight century CE and well into the Renaissance, the Muslims led the world in creative works of science and produced many of the ideas and technologies that are today inextricably bound up with our common and accepted notions of Western civilization: the algebra of al-Khwarizmi and the perfection of trigonometry; the medical teachings and psychological insights of Avicenna; the pioneering chemistry of Gaber; the geographical works of al-Idrisi; the engineering marvels of al-Jazari; the rationalist philosophy of Averroes; and the theoretical innovations in mathematical astronomy at the Maragha observatory, to name just a few of the most prominent examples uncovered to date, with more assuredly on the way. Even more important than any individual work was the Arabs’ conceptual breakthrough that goes to the very heart of the contemporary West – the realization that science can grant humans power over nature (Lyons 2009a).

Much of our modern technical vocabulary comes straight from the Arabic, along with the understanding such terms embody: from \textit{azimuth}, \textit{alembic}, and \textit{alcohol}, to \textit{zenith} and \textit{zero}. The Western diet owes a considerable debt to Muslim agronomy – such foods as apricots, oranges, hard wheat, and artichokes – as do our nautical terminology and commercial language – admiral, sloop, barque, tariff, arsenal, and \textit{douane} (Abulafia 1994, 1; Kramers 1990, 97). Likewise, those masters of early secular European literature, Dante, Cervantes, and Chaucer, were all well aware of Islamic philosophy and science and of the

\textsuperscript{22} It is worth noting in passing the existence of a second such problematic, that of Chinese science. See, for example, Needham 1969. Toby Huff, whose study of Islam and science will be covered in detail later in this chapter also provides an overview of Chinese science (Huff 2003: 240-324). For a critique of Needham, see Sivin 1984 and Saliba 1999.
religious imagery of Muslim culture. As George Sarton, one of the first Western historians of science to begin to take the Islamic intellectual tradition seriously, once noted, science and philosophy flourished across the Muslim world far longer than it did among either the Greeks or the medieval Latins (Sarton 1927-48, 2:1:1; Iqbal 2002, 127).

And therein lies the problematic: Given the enormous power and undeniable achievements of Islamic science over the centuries, at a time when Christian Europe faced a deeply impoverished intellectual landscape and had to borrow extensively from the Muslims, how can modern science be said to represent the natural and exclusive product of the Western experience?

A range of Western strategies have evolved in the face of this and related questions. The simplest, and still the most prevalent, is to downplay or ignore outright Islamic achievements in science and philosophy as – to recall Foucault’s useful phrase – simply “outside the true.” University textbooks intended for use in survey courses often adopt this tactic,23 as do the Western mass media and, as a result, much of the general public. Widespread news coverage in 2007 of a “discovery” by Western mathematicians that medieval Iranian architecture displayed sophisticated geometric patterns that were understood in the West only five hundred years later illustrates just how woeful our knowledge of Islamic science really is. One of the researchers even suggested that the Islamic designers likely did not understand the underlying science of what they were doing at the time (The New York Times, 27 February 2007). And one only has to recall the recent Gallup Organization finding that a majority of Americans

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23 These are all too common but as a matter of interest one might cite two examples: Spielvogel 2007, a popular college textbook in the United States, devotes only a handful of paragraphs to the import of Islamic science and philosophy; and Engelbrektson 1994. On Engelbrektson, see Saliba 1999.
believe Islam has contributed little or nothing of value to the world to see this strategy at work. In other words, the problematic of Islamic science can be resolved, simply by denying that it ever existed in the first place.

This course of denial, however, has generally not been open to the Western discipline of the history of science, yet it still suffers from serious shortcomings when considering the Islamic scientific tradition. It cannot, for example, account for much of what we now know about Islamic science, particularly recent findings that significantly extend the scope – and extend forward the time-line – of Muslim scientific achievement, any more than it can offer cogent reasons for its eventual decline, or even date that decline with any rigor or precision (Iqbal 2002, 127ff; Saliba 2007). Instead, it is caught up in the gravitational pull of the anti-Islam discourse that sustains the predominant Western view of the Muslims and their world.

History of science is, perhaps, particularly prone to such distortions, for – in contrast to, say, the history of philosophy – it tends to assess and evaluate any historical achievement or text in terms of its contribution or similarity to the ideas of accepted modern conceptions of science (Pines 1986, 352; Berggren 1996, 266). This, in turn, dictates the range of sources and the types of evidence considered by the West – in other words, the production of all Western statements about Muslim science. Two key distortions emerge as a result: a predetermined narrative of the Muslims as “caretakers” of the classical Greek tradition until Europe was ready to take up the torch; and self-selection of only those medieval Muslim works that can be cast as precursors to modern science as worthy of consideration, study, and preservation (Berggren 1996, 266).
In a critique of such approaches to the Islamic scientific tradition, George Saliba identifies the main strands of what he calls the “classical narrative.” These include the lack of any substantive pre-Islamic Arabic tradition on which to build an indigenous science; the consequent need to rely exclusively on translated works and other borrowings from more “advanced” civilizations nearby, namely the Greek, the Sasanian, and the Hindu; the essential recapitulation of the classical Greek experience, with few real innovations and certainly no radical transformation of the idea of science itself; the short-lived nature of an Islamic “Golden Age” of science and philosophy that soon enough gave way before the onslaught of religious reaction; and, finally, the swift rise of an autonomous European tradition, known as the Renaissance, at the start of the West’s solo journey toward today’s modern science (2007, 1-3). To this, we would add the notion that relations between science and religion are inevitably characterized by conflict, as featured in the West’s account of its own Scientific Revolution. In Islam, by contrast, principles of the faith are tied directly to the sciences and to philosophy, comprising a seamless whole in which all knowledge is legitimate so long as it remains within the framework of the Muslim worldview as laid out in the Qur’an (Nasr 1983, 64).  

At the heart of this classical narrative lies one of the central tenets of the Western discourse of Islam: the fundamental hostility of Muslims toward rational thought, seen as the mirror opposite of prevailing Western attitudes. And it is this notion that runs, in various guises, virtually throughout all statements

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24 Such prominent philosophers as Avicenna, Averroes, and Maimonides were also all great physicians, the latter a Jew who wrote his philosophical works in Arabic and served as personal doctor to Saladin (Nasr 1983, 184).
about the course of Islamic science since the subject first began to attract serious Western scholarly interest until today.

In *The rise of early modern science: Islam, China, and the West*, the sociologist Toby Huff (1993, 2003)\(^{25}\) provides an excellent exemplar of the contemporary discourse, particularly as it defines and then seeks to address the problematic of Islamic science. *The rise of early modern science* is particularly useful for our purposes, because it reflects the established Orientalist canon and rests upon long-accepted Western interpretations for its underlying data set (Rashed 1994, 332-348; Saliba 1999a, 2002; Iqbal 2002, 143). Cast in the specific terms of the present study, it reflects fully the anti-Islam discourse. Thus, Huff writes: “The problem of Arabic science has at least two dimensions. One concerns the failure of Arabic science to give birth to modern science; the other concerns the apparent decline and retrogression of scientific thought and practice in Arabic-Islamic civilization after the thirteenth century” (47).

All of the central arguments advanced by Huff’s sociological approach to the problematic of Islamic science ultimately recapitulate one of the core elements of the anti-Islam discourse: the notion that an inherent opposition to rational thought on the part of the Muslims prevented their once-great scientific enterprise from attaining Western heights. In this schema, the rise of an orthodox religious thought – associated by Orientalist scholars since the nineteenth-century with the work of the towering medieval theologian al-Ghazali – acts as an impermeable firewall to the development of the spirit of free inquiry and autonomous institutions, such as universities, that inevitably led to modern science. In contrast to the Islamic world and its tradition of enforced

\(^{25}\) Citations from this work will be from the second edition, published in 2003.
“orthodoxy,” says Huff, the West enjoyed centuries of “unfettered” pursuit of rational thought: “This [Western] flight of the imagination, if you will, was both sponsored by and motivated by the idea that the natural world is a rational and ordered universe and that man is a rational creature who is able to understand and accurately describe that universe” (1).

As to the vexing matter of explaining the decline of science within Islam, Huff offers a revealing corollary to his earlier argument, further steeped in the Western discourse: the historic patterns of conversion to Islam gradually eroded the number of non-Muslims, steadily depleting the pool of scientific and philosophic talent not constrained by religion, until an anti-science tipping point was reached somewhere around the thirteenth century. “[W]ith this new wave of conversion to Islam, the percentage of freethinkers [i.e., non-Muslims] who were not fearful of the corroding effects of the foreign sciences also dramatically declined, and this dynamic probably had negative consequences for the pursuit of the natural sciences and intellectual life in general” (47, n 2).

This same general thrust – of ultimate failure and inevitable decline vis-à-vis a modernizing West – takes on more polemical tones in the hands of Bernard Lewis, whose What went wrong? Western impact and Middle Eastern response (2002) was written but not yet published when terrorists struck the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In a brief preface added afterwards, Lewis asserts a direct, causal link between those events and what he sees as the systemic shortcomings of the Muslim world in its prolonged encounter with the West:

This book was already in page proof when the terrorist attacks took place in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. It does not therefore deal with them, nor with their immediate causes and after-effects. It is however related to these attacks, examining not what happened and what followed, but
what went before – the longer sequence and larger pattern of events, ideas, and attitudes that preceded and in some measure produced them (2002).

Like Huff, Lewis blames a refusal to accept, or even recognize, what he calls the “underlying philosophy and socio-political context of … [Western] scientific achievements” on the part of the Muslims. Further, Lewis sees in this the genesis of an anti-Western anger and a resentment that boiled over so many centuries later in September 2001. “The relationship between Christendom and Islam in the sciences was now reversed. Those who had been disciples now became teachers; those who had been masters became pupils, often reluctant and resentful pupils” (2002, 81).

The West’s interaction with Islamic science has enjoyed a lengthy, complex, and colorful history, characterized by distinct periods of ebb and flow dating back at least to the tenth century CE, when Christian Catalonia slowly began to absorb and then transmit westward such innovations as the astrolabe, the Hindu-Arabic number system, and even the game of chess from the neighboring cultural superpower of Muslim al-Andalus (Burnett 1997, 3). There soon followed an intensive period of Western enthusiasm and affinity for Muslim science and philosophy, succeeded by an even more intensive period of assimilation, and even outright expropriation, before the emergence of the longest and final phase, essentially one of denial, which largely persists to this day to varying degrees in the works of Huff and Lewis, among others.

As one would expect given the vagaries of cultural transmission, these phases often lack distinct boundaries and display considerable overlap and even significant, if temporary, reversals. Yet the overarching trajectory is undeniably one of the assertion – often with remarkable speed and severity – of the West’s prevailing anti-Islam discourse, effectively diluting and even devaluing the
originality, creativity, and staying-power of Muslim science and philosophy. This in turn distorts the Western social sciences with regard to the Muslim world and perpetuates the notion of a looming clash of civilizations by highlighting the Otherness of the Muslim and obscuring considerable areas of scientific and philosophical commonality between the traditions of East and West.

How, then, can we account fully for both the shifting dynamics of the Western reception of the Islamic scientific tradition over the centuries – from affinity to appropriation to denial – as well as for the general narrative arc stretching back from the present to the formation of the anti-Islam discourse itself? The answer lies with application of our analytical framework to reveal not only the formation and operation of the classical narrative of Islamic science but its social and institutional beneficiaries. The approaches spelled out in our earlier discussions of theory and methodology provide us with the necessary tools to account for this relationship and to locate it in terms of the totalizing discourse of Islam. These are, namely, Foucault’s principle of reversal as part of his broader archaeological method, and the analytical question, who benefits?

In Foucault’s hands the reversal of meaning allows us to peek behind the discourse itself and to gain a better understanding of its modes of operation and rules of production. Underlying this approach is the observation that the elements which seem to sustain a given discourse also carry with them dangers that obscure the view of the archaeologist. “Where, according to tradition, we think we recognize the source of discourse, the principles behind its flourishing and continuity, in those factors which seem to play a positive role, such as the ‘author discipline’ or the will to truth, we must rather recognize the negative activity of the cutting-out and rarefaction of discourse” (Foucault 1972b, 229).
By freeing ourselves from the unity commonly assumed in meaning, for example, we may free ourselves to ask questions that are hidden or otherwise overlooked or ignored. In *Madness and civilization*, Foucault deploys this strategy to focus not on madness as an object itself but on the shifting ways in which the word “madness” was applied. This reveals how the term was reinvented at different times to serve different goals (Shumway 1993, 17). Elsewhere in the same text, he practices the reversal of value: the freeing of the mad after the French Revolution was commonly seen as a humanitarian act of liberation from the horrors of imprisonment, when in fact it doomed many to far greater misery on the streets (Shumway 1993, 17). Likewise, as we will see in the rest of this chapter, the Western discourse of Islamic science was periodically expropriated by different social groups to serve different ends while generally remaining within the same general outlines until its emergence in its final form, beginning in the nineteenth century. At the conclusion of this study, we shall also see how reversing the traditional concept of the inevitability of tension between theology and science, a holdover from the Western experience, opens up fruitful new ways to explore and understand the Islamic scientific and philosophical tradition.

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Toward the end of the twelfth century, a wandering English scholar signaled the arrival of a new era in European learning, one that saw the replacement of traditional Western sources of authority by new-found riches of Islamic science and philosophy, now within Christian reach in Spain, Sicily, and the Crusader states of the Near East. Recounting his intellectual pilgrimage to
Spain upon his return home sometime around 1175, Daniel of Morley wrote in his *Philosophia*, also known as *De naturis interiorum et superiorum*:

> When some time ago I took myself away from England for the sake of academic study and spent some time in Paris, there I saw beasts seated in scholarly chairs with grave authority. ... These masters were so ignorant that they stood as still as statues, pretending to show wisdom by remaining silent. But when I heard that the doctrine of the Arabs ... was all the fashion in Toledo in those days, I hurried there as quickly as I could, so that I could hear the wisest philosophers of the world (*Philosophia*, quoted in Pym 2000, 41.)

Daniel later made his way back to England with “a precious multitude” of Arabic books, extending a budding Western tradition in peripatetic scholarship and intellectual tourism. More significantly, he imported an entire cosmology fully grounded in “the doctrine of the Arabs,” in this case the Aristotelian teachings of the ninth-century Baghdad-based astrologer and philosopher Abu Mashar, commonly known in Latin as Albumazar.

Daniel was by no means the first student from Christian Europe to abandon outmoded Western teachings and seek out Arab science. That honor may well go to his fellow Englishman, Adelard of Bath, who left behind his traditional education at the cathedral schools of France and traveled to the Crusader principality of Antioch, in Asia Minor, sometime around 1109 CE (Cochrane 1994, 32-37; Lyons 2009a, 89ff). In a popular essay, *Questions on natural science*, Adelard hectored his fellow Europeans for their blind adherence to intellectual orthodoxy and announced that Arab science had freed man to explore the natural world with his own faculties:

> For I have learned one thing from my Arab masters, with reason as guide, but you another: you follow a halter, being enthralled by the picture of authority. For what else can authority be called other than a halter? As brute animals are led wherever one pleases by a halter, but do not know where or why they are led, and only follow the rope by which they are held, so the authority of written words leads not a few of you into danger, since you are enthralled and bound by brutish credulity (*Questions on natural science*, 107).
Daniel of Morley’s own teacher in Spain, the prolific translator of Islamic scientific and philosophical texts Gerard of Cremona, was himself drawn to al-Andalus in search of a first-hand look at an Arabic version of Ptolemy’s great astronomical textbook, the *Almagest*. Gerard was to live the rest of his life in Spain, where he was responsible, in full or in part, for the translation of more than seventy Arabic texts. A eulogy, published by his students on his death in 1187, noted that he, too, had turned to the works of the Muslims after a mastering what little the West had had to offer: “[F]or the love of the *Almagest*, which he could not find at all among the Latins, he went to Toledo; there, seeing the abundance of books in Arabic on every subject, and regretting the poverty of the Latins in these things, he learned the Arabic language, in order to be able to translate” (quoted in Grant 1974, 35).26

Among the translations attributed to Gerard and his disciples were medical textbooks and surgical manuals, including Avicenna’s great *Canon of Medicine* – it was later printed in 1515, in Venice, and remained a standard European work into the 1600s – and assorted treatises on alchemy and chemistry, astrology, astronomy, mathematics, optics, and the science of weights (d’Alverny 1982, 453). In an important shift away from the purely technical concerns of the earliest translators, Gerard of Cremona began to open up the West’s intellectual horizons through the introduction of a broader range of Greek philosophy and natural science, as well as the writings of the Arab philosophers and scientists themselves.

This process was virtually completed by another traveling scholar, the enigmatic polymath Michael Scot, whose translations around 1230 of Averroes’

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26 The eulogy was attached to Gerard’s translation of Galen’s *Tegni* (Lindberg 1978, 66, n. 61). For the full text, see Grant 1974, 35.
commentaries on Aristotle forced Christian Europe to confront directly an alien system of metaphysics and cosmology. In the course of a colorful career dotted by allegations of sorcery and Black Magic, Michael emerged as the West’s first true expert on Aristotle; the translator from the Arabic of important astronomical and metaphysical works; mentor to Fibonacci, one of the West’s great mathematicians; and an author of original works on astrology, human anatomy, physiology, and physiognomy.

Men like Adelard of Bath, Daniel of Morley, Gerard of Cremona, and Michael Scot were all part of an influential new Western cohort of scholars that grew out of social, economic, and political changes that had begun to emerge in tenth-century Europe. Chief among these changes were the development of a money-based economy and the associated rise of proper towns and cities at the expense of a slowly unraveling feudal order (Grant 1996, 34). Peasants escaping bondage to the land peopled these new towns, where they could pursue independent lives as merchants or artisans and take advantage of economic updrafts from expanding foreign trade and the emergence of city life itself. Gradually, these new urban communes began to organize to defend their interests against the nobility, the crown, and the Church.

Before that, Europe had had nothing to even approach the great Muslim urban centers like Damascus, Baghdad, or Cairo, where wealthy and well-ordered societies could provide financial, social, and institutional support for learning and scholarship (Wiet 1971, 3–4). Western education, by contrast, remained the province of the so-called cathedral schools, relying on outmoded texts and a narrow curriculum to churn out a trickle of future clerics and clerks for Church and State. All that now began to change with the rise of the towns.
Students and teaching masters, who had begun to meet informally, followed the lead of artisans and other urban professionals and came together to found independent corporations to regulate membership, reduce competition, and protect their livelihood. This is the origin of our modern term “university,” which initially described the *universitas*, the totality of members of any guild or profession. Over time, the word’s origins became obscured (Haskins 1957, 9; Grant 1996, 34).

Adelard of Bath, Michael Scot and the rest of Europe’s new intellectuals were characterized by a high degree of mobility within the normally rigid world of medieval Europe, as well as by their distinct urban origins (Le Goff 1993, 5-6). They represented a broad-based social movement, as witnessed by the range of nationalities among the leading translators in Spain: Germans, English, Scots, French, Italians, Slavs, and others. And, much to the alarm of the entrenched interests of the Church who feared their loss of monopoly over learning, they were far more open to new ideas, new experiences, and new technologies than their colleagues in the staid cathedral schools. This prompted one twelfth-century monk to complain bitterly about these new “professional” students: “They are wont to roam about the world and visit all its cities, till much learning makes them mad; for in Paris they seek liberal arts, in Orleans classics, at Salerno medicine, at Toledo magic, but nowhere manners and morals” (quoted in Haskins 1957, 82-83).

These new urban scholars recognized, too, that knowledge was power, and that no knowledge was as powerful as the new and exciting ideas available from the Muslims. In other words, they were direct beneficiaries of the Islamic science and, as a result, they promoted it actively. In the hands of these
independent and inquisitive intellectuals, “knowledge workers” in today’s parlance, the translation movement quickly became a significant export industry. Arabic texts were gathered mostly in Spain, but also in Sicily and the Near East, rendered into Latin by multi-ethnic, multi-confessional translation teams often using the local vernacular as an intermediary language, and then dispatched to the cathedral schools and budding universities in France, England, and Italy (MacKay 1977, 88; Burnett 1994, 1044).

It is worth noting that Spain saw little direct benefit from this process despite its status as the richest Western repository of Muslim learning. Perhaps blinded by the crusading zeal that characterized the so-called Reconquista, its leaders were largely unable to mobilize this unique resource. The later expulsions of first the Jews, who were heavily Arabized, and then of the Muslims, deprived the now-Christian territory of many of its best-educated and most skilled residents.

But outside Spain, mastery of Muslim learning proved a powerful aid to social advancement. Adelard of Bath, the son of a mid-level Benedictine functionary, used his status as England’s leading Arabist to become tutor, advisor, and, it appears, personal astrologer to King Henry II. Taking advantage of his standing at court, Adelard used part of his astronomical text, *On the use of the astrolabe*, to lecture Henry on the ideal model for his kingdom: it should be ruled by a philosopher-king, for philosophers speak the truth and are guided by reason; it should tolerate all religious faiths; and it should recognize the authority of the Arabs – that is, of the scientists and thinkers – and not that of the Church (Burnett 1997, 46). Michael Scot’s extensive knowledge of Arabic science and philosophy secured his appointment as personal physician and counselor to
Frederick II of Sicily, the Holy Roman Emperor. Frederick underwrote Michael’s translations of Averroes and Avicenna and arranged for them to be forwarded to “you men of learning” in the Italian universities for dissemination and study (quoted in van Cleve 1972, 303).  

This royal patronage effectively made Michael Europe’s leading public intellectual and represented a huge step up from Michael’s early years when he apparently paid for his scholarly life as an itinerant musician (Thorndike 1965, 12). Such was his reputation for learning – he was said to know Hebrew as well as Arabic, and to be well-versed in medicine, mathematics, and astronomy – that Michael even managed to win the financial support from both Frederick and his great rivals, the popes (Haskins 1927, 274-75).

Other scholars and translators, like Daniel of Morley, were supported by direct commissions from leading bishops or given benefices from Church properties, effectively to fund their research. Another indication of the Church’s early role in the transmission of Arabic text lies with the fact that so many were dedicated to local bishops and other churchmen who had clearly underwritten or otherwise supported the work of the translation teams. Adelard of Bath, for example, dedicated one of his major works to the bishop of Syracuse, who may have helped arrange his travel to southern Italy and on to the Near East.

Yet so strong was demand for what Adelard called the *studia Arabum*, that this new breed of scholar was often quite independent from the Church. Many of their works, both translations and original texts, flew in the face of Catholic orthodoxy, and few of these early scholars were prepared to simply do...

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27 The full text is available in J. L. A. Huillard-Breholles, *Historia diplomatica* (Paris: Plon Fratres, 1852-61), vol. 4, I, 383. Some attribute this letter to Frederick’s son, Manfred. For the view that the letter was almost certainly written by Frederick, see van Cleve 1972, 303, n. 2.
the Church’s bidding. When Peter the Venerable, the abbot of Cluny and one of the most powerful men in Christendom, wanted a team of scholars to translate the Qur’an into Latin for the first time, he had to resort to “a large remuneration” to convince them to suspend their studies of Islamic astronomy (quoted in Kritzeck 1956, 180). Nonetheless, Robert of Ketton, the lead translator of the Qur’an, remained less than enthusiastic. He notes in his preface that he was willing “to overlook in the meantime, my principal study of astronomy and geometry” to take part in the translation but remained determined to return at once to the work that had drawn him to Spain in the first place – understanding the Islamic science of the stars (quoted in Kritzeck 1964, 62).

This enthusiastic reception of things Islamic was not, however, without serious reservations, even among the most enthusiastic Western adepts of Arabic science and philosophy. Robert of Ketton’s translation of the Qur’an – actually more of a learned paraphrase than a direct rendering of the Arabic – and its subsequent early manuscript tradition betray many aspects of the anti-Islam discourse. This is evident already in the title of the work, *Lex Mahumet pseudoprophete*, or “The religion of Muhammad, pseudo-prophet.” Robert’s preface then refers to Islam as *lex letifera*, or a “death-dealing religion,” and the enemy of all Christendom (Burman 2007, 13-15). This is, of course, the same Robert of Ketton who had such love for Arabic astronomy and alchemy, to which he soon returned.

The earliest surviving manuscript of this Latin Qur’an, from the twelfth century, carries on in this same tradition. Annotations in the margins such as “liar” and “extremely stupid” provide a running commentary, while some of the chapters, or suras, are given derogatory headings, including: “… Enveloped in
Absurd Lies and the Characteristic Repetition of Incantations” (Burman 2007, 60). Other notations link Muhammad to the Devil and assert that Islam relied on sexual gratification to win over converts: “Note that he [Muhammad] everywhere promises such a paradise of carnal delights, as other heresies have done before” (Tolan 1998, 356). A marginal drawing, meanwhile, depicts “Mahumeth” with the head of man and the body of a fish, a possible reference to the predominant Christian view that Islam was a hodge-podge of beliefs and practices (d’Alverny 1948, 81-82; Cahn 2002, 51-53).

Even those not venturing directly into questions of religion took refuge in the predominant Western narrative of Islam and the Muslims. Roger Bacon, the thirteenth-century English scholar who so admired the Muslim practice of philosophy – “Philosophy is drawn from the Muslims,” he once decreed (quoted in Atiya 1962, 220) – also denounced what he saw as the unbridled lust that characterized Muslim life. They are, he asserts, “absorbed in sensual pleasures because of their polygamy” (Opus majus, 815).28 One anonymous scribe concluded his laborious copy of a Latin translation of Albumazar with a personal note of protest: “finished, with praise to God for his help and a curse on Mahomet and his followers” (quoted in Tester 1987, 153).

Initial reaction to Islamic science, mostly in the form of new technologies such as the astrolabe, the abacus, and the Hindu-Arabic number system, was less equivocal among the West’s traditional clergy and the public at large, with Black Magic regularly invoked as the true source of such innovations. In his History of the Kings of England, William of Malmesbury, a twelfth-century monastic...

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librarian, denounced the new technologies that the future Pope Sylvester II had first brought one hundred fifty years earlier from Muslim-influenced Spain: “There he learned what the singing and flight of birds portended, there he acquired the art of calling up spirits from hell” (William of Malmesbury: 199). William also dismissed Sylvester’s mathematical ideas as “dangerous Saracen magic” and attributed his election as pontiff, on the cusp of the millennium in 999 CE, to a pact with the Devil. A thirteenth-century tradition called the learned Sylvester “the best necromancer in France, whom the demons of the air readily obeyed in all that he required of them by day and night, because of the great sacrifices he offered them” (quoted in Burnett 1997, 16).

Far more threatening to West’s traditional order was the arrival from the early twelfth century of Arab astrology, which many saw as a threat to Christian ideals of free will, and the Muslims’ rendering of Aristotelian physics and cosmology that accompanied it. It had been one thing for the Western elite to marvel at the practical uses of the Muslims’ astrolabe, algorism, or related technologies, for none of these required a radical rethinking of Christendom’s dominant worldview – at least not at the relatively low level at which Europe’s early adopters first approached them. And Aristotle’s methods of logical argumentation, the dialectic, had already been adopted by Church authorities keen to use it to establish the truth of Christian revelation in their battle against heresy. But all that began to change with the introduction of the natural philosophy of the Arab Aristotelians. Here was an underlying metaphysics, a

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30 Centuries earlier, the first scholars of the Abbasid Empire, too, had been drawn to Aristotle’s logical works as a useful tool in their polemics with other faiths and with opposing Muslim sects (Gutas 1998: 61-63).
science of “being as being,” that addressed many of the same questions, albeit in a very different way, as the traditional readings of revelation. It presented medieval Christendom with a competing “theory of everything” that could not be either digested and assimilated painlessly on the one hand, or ignored outright on the other.

Albumazar’s ninth-century *Introduction to astrology*, the full text of which appeared in Latin in 1133 and again in 1140, provided the West with the first major pathway into the Aristotelian tradition in natural science. Adelard of Bath had some two decades earlier translated Albumazar’s own abridged version, the *Lesser introduction to astrology*. This early translation, essentially a practical handbook, helped ignite an appetite in the West for Arab astrology and other occult practices, but it omitted the Aristotelian framework that made the full *Introduction to astrology* such a powerful text. And it was this Arab-influenced apprehension of Aristotle rather than any immediate direct access to his natural philosophy that prompted the Church to ban his teachings at the University of Paris, then the premier center of Christian theology, in 1210-1215 CE (Lemay 1958, xxvii).

The initial crisis at Paris induced by the Aristotle of the Muslim astrologers was soon followed by the appearance around 1230 of Michael Scot’s translations of the great commentaries on Aristotle’s metaphysics and natural science by the Muslim philosopher and jurist Ibn Rushd, known to the Latins as Averroes. The works of Averroes provided Europe with some of its first access to an authentic Aristotle, freed of earlier entanglements with the occult. Yet this posed an even greater challenge to the West, for it forced Christendom to
reexamine critically many of its most closely held beliefs – on Creation, on the
nature of God, and on humanity’s place in the universe.

Here, then, lie the origins and driving forces of the second phase – after
the initial flurry of translations in Spain, Sicily, and the Near East – of the
Western encounter with the Islamic intellectual tradition, that of assimilation
and, more accurately, of appropriation of Arab science and philosophy. This
required an intensive effort to “Christianize” Aristotle, already champion of the
Church’s dialectic, and to make his powerful natural philosophy and
metaphysics safe for Western consumption (Lemay 1958, xxiii; Bullough 1996,
46-47). And this meant, in effect, a campaign of intellectual “ethnic cleansing”
that would attempt to strip out any traces of Muslim influence – now to be seen
as a corruption of the original text – and bequeath a user-friendly Aristotle to his
true heirs in the Latin West. Over time, the vital contributions of the Muslim
philosophers were pushed so far to the margins of Western intellectual history as
to be almost invisible. A similar pattern would soon be repeated in other fields,
including mathematics, medicine, and even literature. Each time, the anti-Islam
discourse would provide the rules of procedure and the intellectual mechanism
for this willful act of forgetting.

The beneficiaries of this second stage in the West’s encounter with
Muslim science and philosophy were no less than the Scholastics, exemplified
by such figures as Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. Like the wandering
scholars of a newly urbanizing Europe before them, the Scholastic monks and
their sponsors found in Muslim science an avenue to power, prestige, and
influence. This was particularly true of the Order of Preachers, the Dominicans,
who seized on the opportunities provided by the arrival of Muslim science and
its disruptive powers in order to challenge their great rivals the Franciscans and
to confront the rising influence of the secular intellectuals in the universities.

Beginning in the early thirteenth century Church authorities in Paris
issued more than a dozen lists of banned ideas, largely of Arab origin and all
meticulously detailed in the *Collectio errorum*. Yet, the need for continued
renewal of such bans betrays their very ineffectiveness; both the secular teaching
masters and the theologians, it seems, regularly ignored them. Among the first to
recognize the futility of such a quarantine was Thomas Aquinas’ own Order of
Preachers, and the Dominican charter of 1228 explicitly permitted its students to
read the works of pagans and philosophers, if only “briefly.” This was a
powerful signal that at least some religious intellectuals recognized that the new
learning was not about to fade away and must instead be harnessed for the good
of the Church (van Steenberghen 1955, 79-80).

Three years later, Pope Gregory IX appeared to agree, and he called for
the formation of a panel of experts to review the natural philosophy of Aristotle
and his Arab commentators and to purge their errors:

> But since, as we have learned, the books on nature which were prohibited at
> Paris in provincial council are said to contain both useful and useless matter,
> lest the useful be vitiated by the useless, we command your discretion …
> that, examining the same books as is convenient subtly and prudently, you
> entirely exclude what you shall find there erroneous or likely to give scandal
> or offense to readers, so that, what are suspect being removed, the rest may
> be studied without delay or offense (*Chartularium universitatis Paresiensis*,
> I, 143-144; cited in Thorndike 1975, 34).

In the event, this papal commission never met. However, the campaign to purge
the Arab Aristotle of errors and Christianize its approach to the natural world
was taken up by some of the leading Scholastics – a difficult and deeply
controversial effort whose long-term chance at success was established only with the canonization of Thomas Aquinas in 1323, almost fifty years after his death.\textsuperscript{31}

In effect, Thomas carved out an intellectual and theological compromise that reserved for the Church its most fundamental beliefs while freeing the new men of science to inquire fully into the natural world around them. His approach recognized explicitly the new power of Muslim science and philosophy in the West and saved the Church from a possibly fatal confrontation with the forces of reason as unleashed by Arab influence. By providing a way out from the controversy over the arrival of Arab learning, Thomas removed the Muslims as the fulcrum around which any ensuing Western struggle between faith and reason would turn. This, then, hastened the departure of Muslim science and philosophy from Western historical memory.

Thomas’s method and its lasting ramifications for the Western narrative of Islam can be best be seen in his complex and nuanced approach to the medieval controversy over Eternity of the World. This doctrine has a long history in the Christian tradition, beginning with the opening lines from Genesis: “In the beginning, God created heaven and earth.” For the most part, Christians, following the Jews and followed later by the Muslims, understood this to mean the universe had a distinct starting point and was created “from nothing.” In this traditional view, God made the universe at a time of his choosing, and then controlled each and every event in it.

\textsuperscript{31} Paul Oskar Kristeller notes that Thomism, while enormously influential for centuries, only became the accepted philosophical doctrine of the Church a little more than 100 years ago. Before that, it was one of several important tendencies in Christian thought (Kristeller 1992, 29-91).
Such creation “in time,” however, was not the predominant view in the Greek cultural sphere where early Christianity first flourished. Writing in *Metaphysics*, for example, Aristotle says:

> There is something which is always moved with an unceasing motion; but this is circular motion. And this is not only evident from reason, but from the thing itself. So that the first heaven will be eternal. There is, therefore, something which moves. But, since there is that which is moved, that which moves, and that which subsists as a medium between these, hence there is something which moves without being moved, which is eternal, and which is essence and energy” (*Metaphysics*, trans. Thomas Taylor, XX, 1071b, 238).

This is, of course, Aristotle’s famous Unmoved Mover, a notion that clearly stands at odds with traditional readings of scripture. Still, the matter lay mostly dormant for centuries at a time. The full implications of Aristotle’s position – if they were even fully understood at the time – either did not really penetrate the early Christian consciousness or were conveniently ignored (Dales 1990, 35-56).

For Aristotle, the Eternity of the World was also linked with notions of infinity and time, the latter of which he defined as the measure of bodies in motion. Here, some Christian thinkers felt they could harmonize the teachings of Aristotle with the teachings of Genesis by arguing that the universe was created not “in time,” but together “with time.” Before the creation, there were no bodies or anything else to provide the change and movement that time required. With the creation of the necessary bodies, however, time could now be said to exist, providing the “beginning” that the Book of Genesis demanded. Augustine took just such a line in Book XI of his *Confessions*, and in doing so he managed to keep the problem at bay for eight hundred years (Dales 1984, 170).

The European encounter with Muslim learning, first in the philosophical inquiries of the Persian polymath Avicenna – in Arabic, Ibn Sina – and later in the commentaries of Averroes, upended this state of affairs. Little credited in the
classical narrative but just as important, it paved the way for the eventual Western assimilation of philosophy and science. As pious Muslims – and like their later Christian readers – both Avicenna and Averroes were committed monotheists and thus much more interested than the pagan Aristotle to connect metaphysics to their understanding of the One True God.

Of particular interest early on were Avicenna’s discussions of metaphysics and his notion of the soul, from his comprehensive Kitab al-shifa, or the Book of healing, begun in 1021 CE (Hasse 2000, 1). These excerpts were first translated into Latin in Toledo by 1166, but it took considerable time before their full impact was felt. At least one hundred extant Latin manuscripts of his philosophical writings were copied after 1250, almost a century after their initial translation into Latin (Marenbon 1987, 57).

Meanwhile, thanks to Michael Scot, Averroes’ commentaries on Metaphysics and Aristotle’s other works of natural philosophy made their way to Paris and other universities around 1230. As a brilliant philosopher in his own right and as a fellow monotheist, Averroes commanded enormous respect in medieval Europe. Latin scholars often dispensed with his name and referred to him simply as the Commentator, just as Aristotle was known in these same circles as the Philosopher. No less a cultural icon than Dante accorded Averroes – and Avicenna for that matter – his highest honors for non-Christians:

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32 The medieval Western reading of Averroes was, of course, based solely on those of his works that translators chose to render into Latin and, as such, was highly self-selective. There was enormous demand for his commentaries on Aristotle and his medical texts, for example, but his equally important writings on the proper relationship between religion and philosophy, between faith and reason, remained largely unexplored. Averroes’ On the harmony of religion and philosophy is preserved in several Arabic versions and one Hebrew translation. Apparently, it never appeared in Latin (Hourani 1967, 40–41), although there is some evidence that Roger Bacon may have been familiar with its argument if not with the actual text (Hackett 1988, 98-112). As a result of this selective reading, Averroes’ often-subtle reasoning and careful conclusions were easily taken out of context and often applied in their more extreme forms.
Divine Comedy (Canto IV: 129-44) assigns them both a place in limbo, alongside Aristotle and other members of his “philosophic family.”

Among his teachings, Averroes deftly laid out the case for the Eternity of the World – that both time and matter were eternal and that the Creator had simply set the entire process in motion. Implicit in this Arab philosophical tradition was the notion that God did not bother with the details of everyday life, that he remained steadfastly unaware of what the medieval theologians called “particulars.” Likewise, God was effectively removed from day-to-day management of the universe. Instead, he relied on universal laws of nature which stemmed from his own perfection. In the eyes of their many critics, such notions contravened the scriptural promise of Judgment Day, when God would personally assess each man’s adherence to the moral code spelled out by revelation. It also raised serious doubts about scriptural accounts of miracles. But they helped create the necessary opening for man to pursue and uncover the laws of existence, otherwise known as natural science.

By the mid-thirteenth century, the arrival of this new learning, what Adelard of Bath had earlier called the *studia Arabum*, had touched off free-for-all in Western theological and secular circles. The arts faculty at Paris, dominated by a new generation of Arab-inspired philosophers, was in open rebellion against Church-imposed limitations on the scope of their inquiries. For their part, the theologians were fortified by the Franciscan John of Fidanza, later canonized as St. Bonaventure, who used Lenten conferences in 1267 and 1268 to denounce philosophy unless illuminated by faith (van Steenberghen 1978, 2). Bonaventure also listed the Eternity of the World among the most dangerous errors of the day. Such a notion was heretical, he argued, and could not possibly
be proven by reason. But Bonaventure and his supporters then went further. They asserted that they could use philosophy to demonstrate that the world had been created “in time” in accordance with their reading of the Book of Genesis.

Thomas Aquinas’ masters in the Order of Preaches dispatched their intellectual star to Paris in 1269 to try to quell the storm. As loyal servants of the Church, the Dominicans were naturally alarmed by the rising tide of philosophical speculation that seemed to infringe on traditional theological territory. Yet they were equally concerned that the conservative backlash, led by the rival Franciscans, would prevent the Church from deploying the powerful new arsenal of natural philosophy against heretics, such as the Cathars of southern France.

Before joining the Dominicans, Thomas studied at Naples, where he first encountered natural philosophy in an environment shaped by the works of the Arab and Jewish thinkers favored by Emperor Frederick II. These included Avicenna and Averroes as well as the Jewish scholar Maimonides, who used Arabic for his philosophical writings. One of Thomas’ first teachers later joined a circle of Christians and Jews studying Maimonides (Torrell 1996, 7), whose Guide for the perplexed and other works may have been translated or at least summarized at Frederick’s court by Michael Scot (Thorndike 1965, 28).

Thomas’ works display a deep respect for Avicenna and Averroes – even when he violently disagreed with them – as well as for the other great Greek, Arab, and Jewish philosophers, perhaps a remnant of his university days in Naples (van Steenberghen 1978, 22). Avicenna was still the leading authority for Western philosophers, and the direct influence of his ideas can be found in Thomas’ works, including two proofs of God’s existence and the distinction
between divine and human knowledge (Colish 2006, 2-3). Likewise, Albertus Magnus’ study of the true “roots of science” singles out for praise such Arab figures as al-Zarqali, al-Battani, Tabit ibn Qura, Gabir ibn Aflah, al-Brutgeri, al-Fargani, Abu Mashar (Albumazar), and many others (Høyrup 1996, 106, n 9).

Thomas had already sided decisively with his fellow theologians – and against the Muslims – in a dispute with the Parisian philosophers over the immortality of the soul, but his essay On the Eternity of the World, written in 1270, directed a powerful blow at Bonaventure and his circle. Thomas dismissed as “fragile” the notion that reason can demonstrate with certainty that the world was created in time. Proponents had argued that God was the cause of all things and thus must have come before the world that he created, thus establishing creation as an identifiable temporal act. Averroes had argued earlier in his own war of words with conservative Muslim theologians, Tahafut al-tahafut, or the Incoherence of the Incoherence, that the traditionalists had failed to understand that both God’s will and his creative actions must be instantaneous (Tahafut al-
tahafut, 65).

Thomas now adopted this same line:

Since people are accustomed to think of productions that are brought about by way of motion, they do not readily understand that an efficient cause [that is, God] does not have to precede its effect in duration. And that is why many, with their limited experience, attend to only a few aspects, and so are overhasty in airing their views (De aeternitate mundi, 21).

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33 Averroes chose his title as a direct response against Abu Hamid al-Ghazali’s Incoherence of the philosophers, a major theological work that challenges the Arab philosophers on their own terms.


He also dismissed fears this would deprive God of his divine will, which likewise does not have to precede its effect in duration. “The same is true of the person who acts through his will, unless he acts after deliberation. Heaven forbid that we should attribute such a procedure to God!” (*De aeternitate mundi*, 21).

Thomas concludes that on the basis of logic alone, Averroes may well be correct: the world is both eternal and created by God. What is more, this approach avoids the danger of making the world co-eternal with God – a notion that Jews, Christians, and Muslims would all abhor as polytheism. Thomas declares from the outset that it is an absolute article of Catholic faith that the world was created by God at a specific time, but he concludes that the traditionalists’ failed attempts at philosophical argumentation do not help the Catholic cause: “[S]ome of them are so feeble that their very frailty seems to lend probability to the opposite side” (*De aeternitate mundi*, 22).

Debate over the eternal creation served as a surrogate for one of the most pressing questions of late medieval Latin Christendom, the relationship between revelation and reason. For Thomas and the other theologians and philosophers at Paris, this effectively meant the relationship between the powers of an omnipotent God, as revealed by scripture, and the laws of nature, as described by the new men of science. In the eyes of the conservatives, what science calls natural laws – for example, cause and effect – are in fact the continuous creative powers of God, processes that could be interrupted and even reversed at any time should God wish to do so. As such, they are not laws at all and thus cannot be the domain of speculative inquiry.

But for Thomas, only a few areas are off-limits to philosophy. He identifies three fundamental articles of faith that cannot be proven by reason and
must simply be accepted by all Christians: God’s creation of the world at a
specific time; the mystery of the Trinity; and Jesus as the savior of humankind.
That leaves virtually the entire natural world and even traditional theological
questions – for example, God’s existence – to be adjudicated by reason. Thomas
saw that any other solution would leave Christian truth vulnerable to challenges
it might not be able to repel.

In his *Summa theologiae*, unfinished at the time of his death in 1274,
Thomas uses the Eternity of the World to argue that preserving separate realms
of science and revelation is vital to the protection of the faith:

> That the world had a beginning … is an object of faith, but not of
demonstration or science. And we do well to keep this in mind; otherwise, if
we presumptuously undertake to demonstrate what is of faith, we may
introduce arguments that are not strictly conclusive; and this would furnish
infidels with an occasion for scoffing, as they would think that we assent to
truths of faith on such grounds” (*Summa theologiae*, 66).36

In this way, Thomas Aquinas succeeded in effectively Christianizing the
Arab Aristotle, just as Averroes had succeeded in the “Aristotelianization of
Christianity” – more commonly known as Scholasticism – and in ensuring the
place for reason in late medieval Christendom (Bullough 1996: 46-47). Under
the direct influence of the Arab tradition, Thomas carved out separate spaces for
traditional Church teachings and the new findings of the scientists emerging
under the influence of the Muslim intellectual tradition.

Although it was many centuries before it gained a firm hold, this Thomist
compromise still defines the Western rules of engagement between faith and
reason. It also effectively naturalized Arabic science and philosophy and steadily
removed its leading figures, in particular Averroes and Avicenna, as flashpoints

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in the episodic tensions between secular intellectuals and the Church. From now on, that battle would be fought almost exclusively on what was seen as wholly Western terrain. Taken together with the enormous success of the so-called translation movement and the European enthusiasm for science that it spawned, it is not surprising that Thomas also ushered in the beginning of the end of the explicit Western love affair with Arab learning.

Within less than one hundred years of the saint’s death, Francesco Petrarch, often called the father of Western humanism, pronounced a new and harsh verdict that still resonates today within the classical narrative of Islamic science: “I shall scarcely be persuaded that anything good can come from Arabia; but you learned men, through some strange mental illness, celebrate them with great, and unless I am mistaken, undeserved trumpeting” (Rerum senilium, 2:472). The medieval period of open assimilation and unabashed admiration in for Muslim science and philosophy had drawn to a close, as Europe returned to the predominant discursive notion of Muslims as wholly unsuited for scientific disciplines.

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Petrarch’s sick-bed complaint, in a personal letter dated 1370 to the physician and astronomer Giovanni di Dondi, is more than a literary device to dismiss unwanted medical advice – that Petrarch abstain from drinking cold spring water and avoid certain foods, including apples. It is a heartfelt denunciation of all things Arab: “I hate the entire race. … There is nothing more charming, softer, more lax, in a word, more base” (Rerum senilium, 2:471).

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Worse still, Arabic teachings have squelched Latin learning, particularly in medicine, and intimidated contemporary physicians into silence or mere imitation rather than fresh scholarly inquiry. Even the Greeks could not better the achievements of Latin culture, yet the “measly Arabs” are widely held up as paragons of learning who cannot be equaled, let alone surpassed: “O infamous exception, O marvelous dizziness of things, O Italian intellects benumbed or quenched! I singularly weep over your talent, hemmed in by such narrowness” (*Rerum senilium*, 2:473).

Petrarch’s dim view of Arab scholarly achievement is part and parcel of a boundless enthusiasm for renewing the West’s zeal for a fresh Crusade, inflamed by a series of Christian setbacks in the East, as well as his notion that the Muslims were weak, adulterous, and effeminate and unworthy stewards of lands rightfully Christian. The last Crusader statelet had fallen to the Muslim armies shortly before Petrarch’s birth in 1304, and Ottoman expansion across Anatolia during his lifetime only inflamed his sense of urgency (Bisaha 2001, 284).

In a lengthy and rambling letter to Pope Urban V, written around 1367, Petrarch begins with an appeal for the liberation of the Eastern Christians from Muslim rule and warns of the danger posed to the West itself, largely through its own passivity and indifference:

> You know the plight of your Christians throughout the East. Indeed the evil is close. Have you not heard of the unsoldierly peoples of Asia, whom our slackness makes valiant – especially the former Phrygians, now Turks – endlessly plunder wretched Greece and ravage the Cyclades that are scattered through the Aegean? Even if the Greeks deserve to pay for their stubborn persistence in rebellious sinfulness, the Turks are nevertheless crossing over from there toward us and true Catholicism (*Rerum senilium*, 1:254-55).

For Petrarch, then, the established anti-Islam discourse served a number of overlapping interests and ends. It offered a rhetorical language, an historical
narrative, and a theological worldview in which to locate his renewed call to
Crusade. This included such traditional elements as the diminution of the
Muslims as “lax,” “soft” or “unsoldierly”; their depiction as “Egyptian dogs” or
other beasts desecrating Christian holy sites (De vita solitaria, 245)\(^{38}\); their
alleged polytheism (Canzoniere, 54-55);\(^ {39}\) and dismissal of the Prophet
Muhammad as “an adulterous and licentious fellow” and an “infamous robber,”
who fostered “wicked superstition” rather than a true religion (De vita solitaria,
247-48).

This same discourse also provided the early humanists with the ideal
framework for their central project: the assertion of a direct and glorious link
between their own cultural, political, and intellectual endeavors, the studia
humanitatis, and those of a “classical” Greece and Rome. Clearly, such an effort
required the gradual liquidation of the Muslim intellectual legacy, a task
complicated somewhat by the preceding two hundred years of eager and explicit
study and assimilation of Arab science and philosophy on the part of Western
scholars. That this was a conscious strategy on the part of the humanists can be
seen clearly in the fact that Renaissance scholars were well aware of Arab
learning and often made use of it themselves, as the very least as preparation for
their own work. Weissinger cites a number of examples, including a detailed and
generally accurate accounting by Louis Le Roy, dated 1594, of Arab
achievements throughout the Middle Ages. Likewise, Jean Bodin, writing in
1583, places the Arabs among the leading practitioners of the arts and sciences
(Weissinger 1945, 466).

\(^{38}\) The life of solitude [De vita solitaria], trans. and ed. Jacob Zeitlin (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1924).

But it also required a renunciation of the Christian Middle Ages in general, and of the methods and teachings of the Scholastics in particular. Only then could these new social and intellectual actors be freed to invent the idea of a “Renaissance” and with it an intellectual history that drew a straight line between the fall of Rome and mid-fourteenth-century Europe, with no inconvenient detours to include either Arabs or “medieval” monks (Weissinger 1945: 462-67). 40

The application of the anti-Islam discourse by the early humanists provided this new cohort of independent scholars with more than a compelling theory of history. It also offered the means of social and professional advancement in an urbanizing society still largely dominated on the one hand by the clergy – and in Petrarch’s Rome that meant first of all the pope and the papal curia – and on the other by the princes and other great landowners. The studia humanitatis, encompassing rhetoric, grammar, poetry, history, and moral philosophy, became a pathway to political power and social influence as its practitioners increasingly found positions as secretaries to princes and senior clerics, or as chancellors of the independent Italian republics. Many also served as private tutors to the wealthy households, inculcating their cultural values and worldview in the minds of future leaders. By the mid-fifteenth century, the Italian universities began to welcome the humanists into their faculties – and to pay well for their services, often from public funds. At the University of Florence only professors of civil law earned more than the teachers of rhetoric and poetry (Grendler 2002, 209-214). Informal humanist gatherings, or

40 George Makdisi argues that both scholasticism and humanism arrived in the West from the Islamic world toward the end of the eleventh century CE, with the latter emerging into recognizable Western form two centuries after the former amid the general rise of European urban life (Makdisi 1989, 175-182). Makdisi thus provides yet another example of an enormous failing by traditional intellectual history in the face of the anti-Islam discourse.
“academies,” also flourished, often under the patronage of a wealthy figure or prominent member (D’Amico 1983, 88).

As one would expect from an intellectual current that laid such stress on the value of grammar, rhetoric, literary style and eloquence in general, language itself was a central concern of the humanists. And this meant the Latin of Cicero, as famously championed by Petrarch, and the Greek of the ancient philosophers and scientists, particularly Archimedes – another Petrarch favorite (Rose 1975, 9). It most certainly did not mean “medieval” Latin, Italian or other vernacular tongues, or – God forbid – Arabic. Unlike their Muslim counterparts, the Western humanists did not look to their own scriptural language as their preferred model. Islamic humanism sought a return to the classical language of the Qur’an, and, to some extent, of pre-Islamic poetry (Makdisi 1989, 180-82). The Italian humanists adopted Cicero as their standard; they had little time for the medieval Latin, or for the mastery of the Italian vernacular as displayed by Dante, for example.

This cultivation of high-style Latin led to careers in the papal court and its ecclesiastical and secular circles, providing the early humanists with economic security and social position (D’Amico 1983, 61). Under their influence, Virgil became the accepted authority in poetic style, while Vetrivius’ De architectora, written in the first century CE, was established as the last word in architectural theory and practice and guided the building of High Renaissance Rome (D’Amico 1983, 125). Giorgio Valla of Piecenza, one of the leading humanist theoreticians, even proposed a unity of classical Latin, the Roman Empire, and the Catholic Church, with the medium of language binding the latter
elements together for eternity – this in spite of their of obvious philosophical, religious, and political differences (Johnson 1978, 31-33; D’Amico 1983, 119).

The study of Greek also flourished under the growing influence of the humanists, a phenomenon no doubt aided by the continuing Ottoman expansion at the expense of Greek-speaking Byzantium. A number of Greek intellectuals sought safety and employment in the West, particularly in and around the papal court and in the Italian universities. Fuelled in part by Petrarch’s enthusiasm for the works of Archimedes – or, more precisely, by his endorsement of Cicero’s enthusiasm for Archimedes – interest in Greek manuscripts, especially in mathematics, engineering, and even and philosophy, ran high among wealthy patrons, collectors, and humanist scholars (Rose 1975, 2-9; D’Amico 1983, 121).

Senior Church figures, including Pope Nicholas V and Cardinal Bessarion, stocked their personal collections with important Greek manuscripts, and both emerged as leading underwriters of translations into Latin of classical Greek works (Grendler 2002, 219; D’Amico 1983, 121). The fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans in 1453 unleashed a wave of Greek manuscripts to the West, many of which ended up in Nicholas’ new Vatican Library. An inventory after his death, in 1455, included twelve hundred and nine manuscript volumes, of which four hundred and fourteen were in Greek. Under Nicholas’ predecessor, the same collection housed just two Greek manuscripts, out of a total of three hundred and forty volumes (Rose 1975, 36-37).41

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41 Rose notes that this made the Vatican Library under Nicholas V the largest collection of books in Western Christendom (Rose 1975, 37). The great medieval Muslim libraries, by contrast, contained hundreds of thousands of volumes, and private collections and those affiliated with religious institutions often numbered in the tens of thousands (J. Pedersen 1984, 113-117; Mackensen 1952, 79-299; Bashiruddin 1967, 149-162).
The humanist pursuit of Greek manuscripts came to resemble the earlier intellectual gold rush that had seen such figures as Adelard of Bath, Daniel of Morley, and Gerard of Cremona set off for formerly-Muslim lands in search of Arab wisdom. Now, however, it was fuelled by the new humanist idea of history – captured, ultimately, in the very notion of a Renaissance – and by a related quest for classical authenticity, without the unwanted Arabs as intellectual middle men. From its very beginnings, then, Western humanism was an attempt both to create a new theory of knowledge resting on what were now defined as exclusively Western sources – that is, classical Greek and Latin works – and to renounce any connections to the medieval scholastics, who were so in thrall to the Muslim tradition (Cifoletti 1996, 123; Høyrup 1996, 110).

This logic can be seen clearly at work in Valla’s *De rebus expetendis et fugiendis*, an influential humanist encyclopedia completed in 1501 and comprising translations and paraphrases of classical works. Along the way, Valla rigorously excludes any mention of Arabic learning; it is now the work of the unwanted Other – or, as the humanists would have put it, the work of barbarians (Rose 1975, 48; Cifoletti 1996, 123). Likewise, the humanist scholars were eager to apply their new methods of textual criticism to the medieval Latin translations, most made via the Arabic, and to restore the meaning of the Greek texts by working exclusively in the original language of Aristotle and Archimedes.

Such goals, however laudable on their face, contained a number of serious pitfalls that the humanists, blinded by their theory of history and bolstered by the established anti-Islam discourse, could not even imagine. Many of these same shortcomings still plague the Western history of ideas, as collected
in the classical narrative of Muslim science. Foremost, in reducing the Arabs’ role to little more than that of caretakers of an authentic Greek and Roman classical tradition, the Renaissance humanists effectively eliminated the very real contributions to knowledge made over the centuries by the Muslim thinkers. Second, they unwittingly reintroduced errors and recreated philosophical and scientific problems already addressed within the Islamic tradition.

Third, by creating a vacuum once occupied by Arab science, they allowed space for Western science to assert its primacy all the more easily, even to the point of openly rewriting intellectual history, as was the case with the art of algebra. Finally, they forestalled, and even precluded, scholarly exploration of the full richness and depth of that same tradition to the point that the current state of knowledge about Islamic science and philosophy remains woefully incomplete. Hundreds of thousands of scholarly manuscripts, produced over many centuries in Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Urdu, remain unstudied and largely forgotten (Rashed 1984, 2; Savage-Smith 1988). It is difficult not to believe that what would emerge from a systematic analysis of this material would yield a very different picture of Muslim science than the one that predominates today. The same can be said of Islamic religious history, where only a tiny fraction of available manuscripts have been printed, let alone edited and studied (Makdisi 1981a, 217-18). As a result, the anti-Islam discourse has been more than content to fill in the blanks.

Take, for example, the works of the Hellenistic astronomer Ptolemy, whose astronomical textbook, the *Almagest*, and study of cartography and geography, the *Geographia*, were important texts for both late medieval and early Renaissance scholars. Particularly prized among the Italian humanists was
a Greek codex of the *Geographia* brought to Florence by the Byzantine scholar Emanuel Chrysolaras at the end of the fourteenth century; leading humanists of the day all jockeyed for access to the text and translations proliferated throughout the Renaissance (Rose 1975, 26-27). Yet, this rush to abandon medieval Latin translations made earlier through Arabic mediation in favor of Greek originals deprived Christian Europe of the many and substantial corrections and revisions made over the centuries by Muslim astronomers, mathematicians, and cartographers.

Influenced by the ritual requirements of their faith, early Arab scholars had been particularly keen to identify the *qibla* – the direction of Mecca in which to pray, bury their dead, or slaughter their animals – from cities and towns across the vast Muslim lands. They were also deeply interested in cartography and navigation, both to address the requirements of the *hajj* as well as for geopolitical and commercial reasons, and in the ability to tell time and date, in order to regulate the five daily prayers and to mark the fasting month of Ramadan. All of these were essentially problems in geometry and spherical trigonometry and required the accurate determination of geographical coordinates – areas in which the Arabs found Ptolemy’s work to be deeply deficient as early as the ninth century CE. In fact, Islamic mathematicians and astronomers greatly improved on Ptolemy’s calculations of the coordinates for around eight thousands cities, towns, and geographical features (Sezgin 2005, 75-77; Kimmerling 2002, 20-21; Donini 1991, 36-37).

The history of Western mapping of the Caspian Sea illustrates the point. Western cartographers, following Muslim examples, had successfully portrayed the Caspian’s primary north-south orientation by the fourteenth century. Less
than two hundred years later, under the influence of the new translations of the
*Geographia* directly from the Greek, Europe’s mapmakers set aside the fruit of
Arab research and reverted to the classical representation of the Caspian as
running east-west. Only two centuries later was the damage finally undone, eight
hundred years after the Muslims had first accurately charted the Caspian (Sezgin
2005, 541-542). In a similar vein, Renaissance Europe’s refusal to recognize and
then master the underlying achievements of medieval Arab science led to the
widespread notion that the earth’s circumference was some twenty percent
shorter than it actually was, an error not addressed by Western experimentation
until the sixteenth century.42 Christopher Columbus used this shorter distance in
planning his exploration of the New World, an error with almost fatal
consequences (Donini 1991, 37).

The Muslim critique of Ptolemy’s *Almagest* was even more profound,
with attacks directed at its theoretical shortcomings, the methods and quality of
its calculations, and its reliance on out-of-date observational data. Since their
earliest translations, Muslim scholars had steadily corrected and revised the
original Greek text, including more accurate determination of the length of the
solar year and improving other measurements (Saliba 2007, 78-84). They also
introduced the trigonometric functions in place of more cumbersome chords
used in the Greek tradition (Saliba 2007, 88). The resulting Arabic version and
thus any Latin translation from it, then, was clearly an improvement over the
authentic Greek original.

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42 A famous experiment carried out on the orders of Caliph al-Mamun around 827 CE had
estimated one degree of the earth’s circumference at 111.8 km (69.47 miles) in today’s units, not
far from the accepted modern value of 111.1 km (69.03 miles) – a variance of around .62 percent
(Donini 1991, 36-37). In a sense, the Arabs had faced a similar dilemma as the later Europeans.
They could not agree on how to interpret the unit of measurement used by Ptolemy. Unlike the
Europeans, however, they did not simply hazard a guess but devised their own experiments to
determine the proper value.
Over time, this Muslim critique broadened to encompass the so-called *shukuk* literature, literally “objections” to Ptolemy’s theoretical construct and its underlying cosmology (Sabra 1984, 134; Saliba 2007, 94-117). The central problem, the Muslims argued, was the failure of Ptolemy’s planetary model to honor his own stated, fundamental theoretical requirement: that celestial objects all move in uniform circular motion, with the earth at their center. Instead, Ptolemy had sought to account for anomalous observational data by introducing the notion of the “equant point,” essentially an axis of rotation for some of the planets that did not pass through the center of the universe. In other words, he had violated the central requirement of classical astronomy, as laid down by Plato and Aristotle and accepted for two thousand years – that all planetary motion was in the form of perfect, uniform circles. The oldest of the detailed *shukuk* works dates to the mid-eleventh century, one hundred years before Western translators in Spain struggled even to understand the mathematics and astronomy of the *Almagest* well enough to translate it into Latin.

This critique of Ptolemy soon spread to the Muslim philosophers, including Avicenna and Averroes, who joined the astronomers and mathematicians in demanding that any cosmology both account for observed scientific data and remain in accord with its own internal rules and representation of reality. “The science of astronomy of our time contains nothing existent, rather the astronomy of our time conforms only to computation and not to existence,” complains Averroes (quoted in Saliba 2007, 179). Such a science, they argued, had to be both predictive and consistent – all hallmarks of what today is celebrated as the modern scientific method.
Scholars in the *shukuk* tradition also responded with proposed revisions to Ptolemaic astronomy, offering everything from modest improvements to wholesale overhaul of the entire system. In addition to addressing the shortcomings of classical astronomy, it helped later Arab scientists mount the first serious challenges to the authority of Aristotelian physics (Saliba 2007, 183). It also produced at least two approaches that were later used by Copernicus in his ultimately successful overthrow of Ptolemaic cosmology (Kennedy and Roberts 1959; Hartner 1973; Saliba 2007, 193-232).

None of this, of course, would have been known to the humanist scholars and their patrons, determined as they were on preparing authentic translations from authentic Greek texts. Cardinal Bessarion, for example, dreamt of preparing a new translation of the *Almagest* but in the end had to hand the project over to two prominent mathematicians. In the event, the result was more an epitome than a full translation, although it received more than its share of intellectual glory during the Renaissance (Thorndike 1963, 144-45). The distorting effects of this humanist cult of Greek language and learning can still be seen today in Western scholarship of Islamic learning. For example, Muslim philosophical and scientific terminology that can be identified as coming directly from the Greek is generally given precedence over original Arab concepts, categories, and ideas (Rashed 1994, 1). This, of course, strengthens the accepted notion of the Muslims as loyal torch-bearers of classical Greek culture, rather than as exemplars of creative forces in their own right.

Not simply content to invoke the anti-Islam discourse in the name of classical authenticity, as with the *Geographia* and the *Almagest*, the humanists also engaged in outright suppression of the Muslim tradition in order to achieve
their social and intellectual aims. As Giovanna Cifoletti has shown, this was particularly the case with the French algebraists of the sixteenth century, who used the anti-Islam discourse to discredit Muslim scientific achievement and then to gradually insinuate into the Western narrative a decidedly non-Arab pedigree for their art (Cifoletti 1992, 1996). Here, the driving forces included the desire to establish a European – or better yet, a French national – history of algebra and to raise the status of algebra above that of a simple, practical tool at the bottom of the social hierarchy, like surveying or commercial transactions, to a serious, theoretical discipline in its own right (Cifoletti 1996: 125; Høyrup 1996: 112). A similar pattern can be seen in the historiography of medicine (Criciani 1990; Cifoletti 1996, 125).

For the French algebraists and their Italian counterparts, the weapon of choice was the history of science; they steadily wrote the Arabs out of the history of algebra, providing a model for their later exclusion from science in general, as they told and retold the genealogy of what became known as the *ars magna*, the “great art.” As we have already seen, ’’s humanist encyclopedia of 1501 excluded “barbaric” Arabic works from its account, thus paving the way for the later naturalization of the sciences as exclusively Western products. Four decades earlier, Regiomontanus, the first significant humanist mathematician and a member of Bessarion’s circle, delivered his famous Padua lectures on the history of mathematics. No real mention was made of Muslim contributions to geometry or algebra. The latter, “the flower of mathematics,” was instead ascribed to the third-century Greek mathematician Diophantus, whose manuscript on the subject Regiomontanus said he had recently discovered (Høyrup 1996, 111). Even Arab advances in the art of arithmetic calculation
were ignored (Høyrup 1996, 111) – this despite the fact that the very term then in common usage, “algorism,” was a Latin corruption of the Muslim mathematical authority al-Khwarizmi.

At first, however, most humanist accounts of algebra acknowledged the importance of al-Khwarizmi – the title of whose seminal text *Kitab al-jabr wa’l-muqabala*, or Book of restoring and balancing, gave the West the word “algebra” – or else ascribed it to “Geber,” a reference to the eleventh-century scholar Gabir ibn Aflah (Cifoletti 1996, 127-28). However, the Muslim role was soon pushed to the periphery, or presented as the source of unnecessary “difficulties” that had prevented the *ars magna* from assuming its rightful place in the Western intellectual pantheon. Eventually, it would be eliminated altogether, particularly by the later French algebraists.

In 1559 Jean Borrel, sought to do away with the name algebra completely, and to locate it deliberately within the classical Greek notion of the art of calculation, or *logistica*: “There remains to be added to the top, as a crown, that type of reasoning which is called popularly by the Arabic name of Algebra. I prefer to call it *quadratura*” (quoted in Cifoletti 1996, 131). Borrel then presents what is soon to become the established Western verdict on Muslim science:

> The utility and the intelligence of *quadratura* is accompanied by a specific difficulty, which derives more from the defect of its propagators than from the nature of the thing. For those, really ignoring the method of the disciplines, going far in the roughness of words and things, involve and trouble everything to the point that nothing could be more confused, and accumulating the clouds they obscure the senses of the readers (quoted in Cifoletti 1996, 131).

Three decades later, an influential treatise ascribed posthumously to the prominent humanist Petrus Ramus sidelined the Muslims altogether and provided an anachronistic and mythical origin to algebra. It was now said to be
the work of “an unknown mathematician” of Syriac – that is, of non-Muslim Arabic, most likely Christian – origin who somehow shared his discovery with the ancient Greek hero, Alexander the Great. As Cifoletti notes, with this transposition of historical settings – the Syriac references suggests the early Christian era, long after Alexander was dead – Ramus was now clearly operating in the realm of a founding myth, with a central valorizing role played by a glorious Greek culture (1996, 135).

Throughout this period, there was plenty of contemporary evidence surrounding Ramus and his humanist colleagues of both historical and continuing intellectual intercourse between the Muslims and the Europeans. The publishers Dee and Commandino produced a translation in 1560 of a work on Euclid, which they ascribed to “Machometo Bagdadino,” or Mahomet of Baghdad, a clear reference to Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi; Ibn al-Haytham’s groundbreaking work on optics was printed in the West in 1572; and an Arabic version of Euclid’s elements, said to be the work of the thirteenth-century mathematician Nasir al-Din Tusi, was published in Rome in 1595 (Høyrup 1996, 115). Even Ramus himself had written an earlier treatise on algebra that does little more than reprise al-Khwarizmi and in general tends to emphasize the importance of the Arabs over that of the Greeks (Cifoletti 1996, 132; Høyrup 1996, 114-115).

Yet such evidence did nothing to slow the momentum of the anti-Islam discourse, with its notion of the Muslim as Other, in its support of the humanist theory of history, or its social, intellectual, and political aims. There could no longer be room for an Islamic intellectual tradition in a Europe that was fast reinventing itself under the banner of a Renaissance of Greek and Latin learning.
The arrival of the so-called Age of Discovery, with its implicit promise of economic, territorial, and geopolitical gains at the expense of non-Christian, non-European societies only accelerated this tendency.

As Høyrup points out, European mathematicians could have moved away from classical teachings, or discovered in the Muslim tradition fruitful avenues for future study, research, and advance. They did neither. “In an age of incipient colonial expansion, however, such alternative histories or myths would have seemed awkward, perhaps even improper. The myth so fittingly prepared by Humanist mathematicians for a different purpose, to the contrary, was conveniently at hand and was generally adopted and handed down until the present or near-present time” (Høyrup 1996, 115-16).

As we have seen, initial Western perceptions of Islam were formed by a Crusades-era propaganda that would have largely made the notion of Muslim learning ridiculous. As military, commercial, and political contacts increased, however, there followed an intense curiosity and enthusiasm for the studia Arabum, fuelling the translation movement of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and spurring a profound interest on the part of medieval Europe in the arts and sciences. This was soon displaced by a period of assimilation and expropriation by the Scholastics, such as Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, before giving way to denial and outright exclusion at the hands of the humanists.

The final stage, dating from the Enlightenment and still in effect today, has essentially ratified this state of affairs by declining to engage with many of the outstanding problems of Islamic science and instead posing variants of that popular rhetorical question: What’s wrong with Islam? In its modern form, the
classical narrative is prepared to acknowledge the existence of an Islamic scientific tradition but is then compelled to locate it securely in a chronological strongbox, generally described as a delimited “Golden Age” from which decline was an inevitable product of its own essential Islam-ness (cf. Hodgson 1974; Lapidus 1988; Lewis 1976, 2002; Huff 1993, 2003; and so on). When it exits at all, then, Islamic science becomes a problem – When did it die off? Or, why did it fail to produce modern science? – in search of a solution, rather than a subject to be explored, developed, and understood in anything like its own terms.

The outlines of the classical narrative of Islamic science first emerged in recognizable form in the European Enlightenment. This was a time when Christian Europe began to sense political, military, and intellectual weakness on the part of its long-standing rivals to the east (Saunders 1963, 702-03). The final failed attempt by the Ottoman Empire to take Vienna, in 1683, the loss of Buda, in 1686, and the Treaty of Carlowitz signed by the defeated Turks and the victorious Christian powers in 1699, as well as the fall of the Safavid dynasty in Iran and the sharp decline of the Mughal Empire in India soon afterwards, seemed to ratify this change in fortunes (Saunders 1963, 703; Lewis 2002, 16-18). Soon enough, the study of Islamic science found itself completely bound up with the larger Orientalist project, subordinating the Western assessment of Islamic intellectual achievement and its historical trajectory to the imperatives of European empire-building.

Not surprisingly, given their own intellectual and philosophical orientations, the Enlightenment thinkers, and their Orientalist successors, invoked the notion of human reason – or in the case of the Muslims, the lack thereof – as the basis for the Western claim on science. After all, Borrel’s
humanist history of algebra had already pronounced the Muslims ill-disciplined, course, and obscurantist, while the anti-Islam discourse had long before established the West as the antithesis of the Muslim Other and, thus, uniquely placed to resolve such problems with the help of reason. Who else, then, could rescue algebra and, in fact, all of science from the “defect of its propagators”?

In his scandalous – and, as a result, wildly popular – *Lettres persanes*, first published in 1721 and reprinted ever since, Montesquieu deploys the imagined correspondence of two Persian visitors to Paris as a literary device to comment upon the social, intellectual, and political mores of his native land. More important for our purposes, Montesquieu also offers the very latest in Western thinking about the East in his depiction of his Muslim protagonists, Usbek and Rica, and he touches widely on Western notions of the Orient, including that of science, learning, and reason in general. Among his sources were recent French travel literature, such as Jean Chardin’s *Voyages en Perse* and Antoine Galand’s translation of *Les mille et une nuits* (Healy 1999: xi). The result is not incompatible with the classical narrative.

In Letter XVIII, a cleric from the Persian holy city of Qom chides Usbek, presumably now under the influence of his host culture, for questioning established Muslim religious tradition: “You are always asking questions that have already been asked of our holy Prophet a thousand times. Why do you not read the traditions of the doctors of religion?” (*Lettres persanes*, 95). In letter XXXI, Usbek’s nephew, now in Venice, reports that he has studied the art of commerce, the ways of princes, among other things Western. “I am applying

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*Citations are from Œuvres complètes de Montesquieu: Lettres persanes* (Paris: Garnier frères, 1875).
myself to medicine, physics, and astronomy; I study the arts. Finally, I am lifting
my eyes the clouds that covered my eyes in the land of my birth” (130).

And in letter XCVII, Usbek reports to the Persian “dervish” Hassein that
the West prefers to follow reason rather than to celebrate the “divine frenzy” or
otherwise to attain Oriental wisdom. This, he notes, has led to some remarkable
discoveries: “They have cleared up chaos and explained, by a simple
mechanism, the order of the divine architecture. The Creator of nature has set
matter in motion: nothing else is needed to produce this great variety of effects
that we see in the universe” (310). Of course, this is the same lesson Adelard of
Bath and his cohort brought back from the Muslim world six hundred years
erlier.

Rica, meanwhile, recounts, in Letter CXXXV, a visit to a Parisian library
where a stranger volunteers to act as his guide. When the guide, apparently a
well-meaning Frenchman keen to display his nation’s cultural strengths,
dismisses as unworthy of their attention the library’s collection of books on
“judicial astrology” and other occult subjects, Rica informs him that in the East
astrological prediction plays the role in the West reserved for algebra, that is, for
science. “We make use of astrology ... just as you use algebra. To each nation its
own science, in accordance with which it regulates its policies (421).

In presenting the characters of Usbek and Rica in The Persian letters,
Montesquieu is engaging in what Foucault calls “controlled derivation,” in
which each type and character belongs to a recognized system of generalizations
(Foucault 1972a, 138; Said 1994, 119). According to this notion, drawn from the
practice of natural science in the seventeenth century, identity is not absolute or
unique but can only be set out in comparison with an Other: “…[T]here can no
longer be any signs except in the analysis of representations according to identities and differences. … An animal or a plant is not what is indicated – or betrayed – by the stigma that is found to be imprinted upon it; it is what others are not” (Foucault 1972a, 144). Montesquieu’s protagonists are not Persians or Muslims so much as they are Persia and Islam. Or, to apply Said’s later refinements, they are the products of the Western idea of Persia and of Islam, part of a “system of representations framed by a whole set of forces that brought the Orient into Western learning, Western consciousness, and later, Western empire” (1995, 202-03). As such, Usbek and Rica are derivative of the Muslim East as anti-science, irrational, and in thrall to tradition, judicial astrology, and “the divine frenzy.”

Such controlled derivations – and there were plenty of examples in contemporary European travel works and other popular literary forms – provided the backdrop, then, to the Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt (Lowe 1990, 119). This was as much an act of Orientalist imagination and Orientalist scholarship as it was an act of war, for it was the first such venture to have harnessed directly, and in advance, the expertise of the Orientalist as a means of colonial expansion (Said 1995, 80-83). Napoleon’s small army of scholars formed a crucial part of his much larger Armée d’Égypte, and it was to play an outsize role in the Egypt campaign.

Only these savants – historians, biologists, philologists, archaeologists – were not there to learn from the Muslims but to learn about them, to confirm and classify this knowledge along Western lines, and to record it in the grandly named Description de l’Égypte, which eventually filled twenty-three large volumes. Napoleon’s scholars were central to the colonial project and worked
closely with the military authorities to achieve French colonial aims. Writing in
the work’s preface, Jean-Baptiste-Joseph Fourier noted their aim was to advance
civilization in a land “which has transmitted its knowledge to so many nations,
[but] is today plunged into barbarism” (quoted in Said 1995, 85).

But just what was the source of that “barbarism”? In an influential
lecture, delivered toward the end of his career, on “L’Islamisme et la science,”
the French philologist Ernest Renan argues that Islam itself was the problem.
And he attributes the decline of that scientific tradition to the counter-attack of
orthodox Muslim theologians around 1200 CE, once internal heresy in the form
of the Ismailis and external threat in the shape of the Crusaders were safely
suppressed: “Islam is something harmful to human reason” (Renan 1883, 19).

In keeping with the spirit of his times, Renan was not content simply to
assert this; he had, he assured his many students and readers, the science to back
it up. For Renan, this went under the rubric of his beloved philology, which he
defined as follows: “Philology is the exact science of mental objects. It is to the
sciences of humanity what physics and chemistry are to the philosophic sciences
of bodies (Renan 1890, 149; cited in Said 1985, 132-33). Following on the heels
of the German scholars of Indo-European languages, Renan applied the evolving
techniques of comparative linguistics and cultural anthropology to the Semitic
tongues. From there, it was but a small step from “the history of language to
history-through-language” (Roshed 1994, 337).

Thus, Renan concludes in his Histoire générale et système comparé des
langues sémitiques, the Semitic tongues are not really suitable for abstract
thought and certainly are not on a plane with Aryan, that is, Indo-European languages in this regard.\footnote{Edward Said calls the *Histoire générale* “a construction enabled by the historian’s capacity for skillfully crafting a dead … Oriental biography … as if it were the truthful narrative of a natural life.” In this way, it was just like Renan’s famous *Vie de Jesus* (1995: 146).}

The unity and simplicity which characterize the Semitic race are found in the Semitic languages themselves. Abstraction is unknown to them and metaphysics is impossible. As a language is a necessary mould for the intellectual activities of a people, an idiom almost bereft of syntax, without variety of construction, deprived of conjunctions that establish such delicate relations between members of thought, that depict objects by their external qualities, must be eminently suited to the eloquent inspiration of visual thinkers and the image of fugitive impressions, but must reject any philosophy, any intellectual inspiration. … We may say that Aryan languages compared with Semitic languages are the languages of abstraction and metaphysics compared with those of realism and sensitivity \(\text{(Renan 1858, 18; cited in Rashed 1994, 337, n 4).}\)

Fortified by the findings of science, such as the philology of Renan and his contemporaries, that system of controlled derivations which had already established the Muslim as irrational, superstitious, and ultimately unsuited to science or philosophy gained a lasting handhold on the Western imagination. Even when later historians began to jettison Renan’s brand of crude cultural anthropology, they retained much of the same fundamental orientation that had flowed from his work, chiefly the inability or unwillingness to consider a significant role for the Arabs and Muslims in the creation of Western science \(\text{(Roshed 1994, 338-39).}\)

Where a tradition of science and philosophy is even acknowledged within an Arab or Muslim cultural milieu, it is invariably circumscribed neatly within the boundaries of a Golden Age. Only the parameters of such an age are left open to debate, and so defining – and then explaining – them has become the central task of modern Western historians of Islamic science. Here, the decisive factor is invariably one of the core tenets of the anti-Islam discourse: Islam’s
hostility to rational thought and exclusive reliance on a religious orthodoxy that is inimical to scientific endeavor.

No where is this more in evidence than in the work of Ignaz Goldziher, whose seminal essay “The attitude of the old Islamic orthodoxy toward the ancient sciences” provides a direct link between the Orientalist traditions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century with the classical narrative still popular among many of today’s scholars. Published in German in 1916 and translated into English in 1981, it has been called the single most influential study of its kind (Gutas 1998, 166; Makdisi 1981a; Iqbal 2002, 138-39). It provides the theoretical superstructure for the later work of prominent Western scholars, including Crombie (1996), Grant (1996), Lapidus (1988), Lindburg (1992), Lewis (1976, 2002), Huff (1993, 2003), and others.

Goldziher recapitulates the Western history of tensions between religion and science by framing any opposition within the Muslim world to Aristotelian science and philosophy as the work of an Islamic “orthodoxy.” Thus, Goldziher concludes: “Quite clearly, it was primarily Aristotelian metaphysics (ilmahiyat) that was rejected by orthodoxy. The principles and results of this metaphysical system were believed to be fundamentally opposed to the doctrines of Islam” (Goldziher 1981, 192). In other words, science succumbed to the internal logic of Islam, which is by its nature anti-rationalist, obscurantist, and inhospitable to innovation of any kind. Other explanations for the decline of the Islamic scientific tradition, such as economic malaise or geopolitical weakness, foreign invasion, climate change, plague and other outbreaks of disease, the collapse of vital irrigation systems, even the onset of imperial decadence, are rarely if ever given serious considerations.
Some modern critics have found Goldziher’s notion of “orthodoxy” in Islam highly problematic. With no centralized authority and with a pronounced stress on each individual’s relationship to God, it is difficult to locate an institutionalized arbiter of either the orthodox or the heretical. Nor, as Dimitri Gutas reminds us, is it possible to identify more than a few, very specific periods in which science did not carry on alongside its critics, many of whom appear to have had no particular religious motivation whatsoever. Moreover, Islamic astronomy attained perhaps its highest point, and was the object of enormous institutional support, at the very moment – in the thirteenth century CE – when such “orthodoxy” was said by Goldziher and others to have established its everlasting predominance (Gutas 1994, 169-172; see also Iqbal 2002, 140).

Goldziher’s analysis is further complicated by contemporary circumstances, which tended to shade his views and those of his colleagues in favor of Islam as practiced among the more familiar Ottomans of the nineteenth-century and against that of their rivals, the Wahhabis, or neo-Wahhabis, of more remote and – in the eyes of the West – more inhospitable Saudi Arabia (Makdisi 1981a, 219).

Such objections, however, have done little to discred it the classical narrative of Muslim science, which rests, unmoved and unmoving, on the bedrock of the anti-Islam discourse. In fact, Huff’s *The rise of early modern science: Islam, China, and the West* openly invokes the authority of Goldziher to support his own contention that Islam and science were ultimately incompatible: “In general, the structure of thought and sentiment in medieval Islam was such that the pursuit of the rational or ancient sciences was widely considered to be a tainted enterprise. This has been shown most systematically in the work of Ignaz
Goldziher.” Huff further cites Goldziher’s assessment that such science was ungodly (70).

Throughout the history of Western engagement with the question of science and philosophy from the Islamic world, various social groups and institutions have stepped forward to uphold their own particular interests. The arrival of Muslim science in the Latin West in the eleventh and twelfth centuries CE sparked two significant responses: its eager embrace by a new social elite of educated urban intellectuals, scholars, and professionals and the equally impassioned denunciation as Black Magic by more entrenched social, religious, and political interests.

Once the building blocks of Islamic science and philosophy were sufficiently mastered and naturalized, however, Europe was able to free itself from any acknowledgment of the Arab contribution. The early humanists of the fourteenth century, led by Petrarch, advanced their own careers at court, in the rising cities and towns, and in the Church hierarchy by promoting a new, “reborn” European learning whose roots lay in an idealized notion of ancient Greece and Rome. Here, the established discourse of Islam as fundamentally irrational proved a powerful tool of social advancement for this new generation of scholars and bureaucrats, schooled in Greek and the classical Latin of Cicero rather than in the language of the Qur’an, al-Khwarizmi, or Avicenna.

The French algebraists of the sixteenth century deployed this same discourse to denigrate Muslim scholarship as a prelude to the creation of their own history of mathematics and the ensuing enhancement of their academic prestige and their political and social influence. Nineteenth-century Europe elevated elements of this narrative – that the Muslims were irrational and thus
intellectually ill-suited to the rigors of metaphysics and abstract thought in
general – to a “scientific” principle later supported and justified the West’s later
colonialization of Eastern lands.

Each of these distinct social groups successfully invoked the Western
discourse of Islam along the way, reinforcing its power and institutionalizing its
teachings. Neither our knowledge of the Islamic intellectual tradition, nor of
ourselves and our “Western” culture, are the better for it. Yet, as we shall see in
the next two chapters, a very similar process has shaped our views of a range of
issues that seemingly divide East from West – violence, religious warfare, and
the rights of women.
Chapter Six: Islam and violence

Just as the West has safeguarded its exclusive authority over modern science from any serious encroachment by the Islamic tradition, so, too, has it arrogated a monopoly over the legitimate uses of force in conflicts involving the Muslim world. As with modern science, the production of Western statements on the subject of violence and war is shaped profoundly by central tenets of the anti-Islam discourse. These include: that Islam is inherently violent and spread by force; that Muslims are irrational and are motivated by religious fanaticism; and – a more recent accretion that flows from these others – that Muslims are filled with jealous rage for the West, its freedoms and life-styles. Here again, the Muslim East is held up as the mirror opposite to the Judeo-Christian West.

The result is an unchallenged narrative that affords the West the power to determine which tactics, weaponry, and targets are legitimate – and which are not. This also allows the West to define its conflicts with Islam in ways that successfully mobilize support at home for the use of force while simultaneously circumscribing the enemy’s actions and discounting, delegitimizing, and even eliminating altogether his own motives or goals. This same narrative has benefited successive social groups and institutions – Church propagandists, the early Islam experts, Renaissance humanists, Orientalist intellectuals and their colonial masters, and today’s media pundits, terrorism scholars and political leaders – all of whom have exploited and preserved the discourse virtually unchanged from its earliest roots in Crusader Europe.

The U.S. response to the attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., on 11 September 2001, has seen the most spectacular – and spectacularly successful
– intersection of these two discursive phenomena: Western monopoly over the legitimate use and technologies of violence; and control of the equally important definition of the enemy. The former allows the West access to its arsenal of high-tech weaponry, from unmanned drones to so-called precision munitions. It also dismisses civilian deaths as “collateral damage,” while condemning the enemies’ deployment of car bombs, suicide attackers, and the highly effective roadside munitions, the so-called improvised explosive devices (IEDs), as lacking any legitimacy.¹

The latter, meanwhile, deprives Muslims of any claim to specific rational motivation, whether grounded in historical grievance, political opposition, social dissidence, or specific readings of religious tradition. President George W. Bush took pains in public to say the war on terrorism was not a war on Islam and the Muslims. Yet, as we have seen in Chapter One, Bush’s own repeated use of the word “crusade” and of the apocalyptic language of his strong supporters among the Christian Right, the anti-Muslim rhetoric of his own senior aides, the scope and practice of the subsequent law enforcement and military campaigns, the political rhetoric, and the groundswell of popular anti-Islam sentiment fueled largely by the media drumbeat in support of this war all appear to contradict that. Moreover, it is seen as just such a war by virtually the entire Islamic world, and by many non-Muslims as well, including many in favor of just such a campaign.

In Writing the war on terrorism: Language, politics, and counter-terrorism, Richard Jackson defines this war as “both a set of institutional practices and an accompanying set of assumptions, beliefs, forms of knowledge,

¹ It is difficult not to conclude that the use of the phrase, “improvised explosive devices,” in the place of the perfectly serviceable words “mines” and “bombs” is somehow aimed at denigrating and dismissing what has turned out to be a highly effective weapon against Western troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Judging by their lethality, the technology has clearly moved well beyond mere improvisation.
and political and cultural narratives. It is an entire language contained in a truly voluminous store of ‘texts’ – any act of written or spoken speech…” (2005, 16-17). From such texts flow all the security laws and legal rulings, the patriotic symbols and slogans, the policy documents, briefing papers, and so on that comprise the war effort (17-18).

As discussed in Chapter One, the war on terrorism has been presented as part of a never-ending struggle in defense of Western civilization and values against fanatical, nihilist Muslims who hate modernity, democracy, and the very notion of freedom. Politicians, the military, the new generation of “security” experts, pundits, commentators, and journalists have all reprised the central themes of the anti-Islam discourse as they sought to set the events of 11 September 2001 into a narrative that could simultaneously address the public’s demands for some sort of an explanation of the attacks and shape the state’s political and military responses. This effort culminated in the popular rhetorical question, “Why do they hate us?” – a catchphrase that all but dictates the inevitable answer but does not in itself pose a meaningful query.

Chapter Six investigates the ways in which the established Western narrative of violence in Islam has fuelled the war on terrorism and then colored its rhetoric, shaped its public reception, distorted its policy choices, and determined its outcomes. I begin with an examination of popular studies and commentaries on the phenomenon of contemporary terrorism, including the best-selling works of historian Bernard Lewis and New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman, among others. I then look back at how the anti-Islam discourse has performed this same task in relation to other conflicts with the world of Islam, from the early modern rivalries with the Ottoman Empire to the
age of colonialism. Throughout, I shall endeavor to address the question of which groups, parties, institutions, or other social actors rely on, and benefit from, this discourse of Islam and violence.

Under the influence of Church ideologues, the seizure of Muslim territory in the late eleventh century by force of Christian arms was righteous specifically because the enemy was declared outside the pale of religious, and thus of human, society. In the eyes of Christian Europe, the Muslims lusted after power and violence, as was self-evident from their occupation of the Holy Land, while the Crusaders sought only the rightful liberation of Christ’s sacred resting place. For Petrarch, the defining voice of early European humanism, the Muslims posed a natural, existential threat. He went on to urge preemptive Western conquest of the Near East as the only suitable response.

The rise of Ottoman power and the threat felt across Europe from the armies of the sultan, brought home by the Muslims’ seizure of Belgrade from Hungarian control in 1521, saw Europe’s anti-Muslim discourse reinvigorated both by the fear of impending attack and by its increasing utility as an ideological weapon in the domestic, European struggle over the Reformation. In the process, the Muslim world was again reduced to an undifferentiated mass, standing only for evil, violence, tyranny, bloodlust, and general mayhem; it had no cause, only effect. Later, in Napoleon’s Egypt and British India, Muslim resistance to Western colonial occupation was seen solely in terms of religious “fanaticism” and a taste for violence, while any desire for independence, self-determination, or for restoration of religious and cultural values was marginalized or simply ignored. Throughout, the primary carriers of this anti-
Islam discourse have benefited from its perpetuation, virtually intact across the centuries.

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The events of 11 September 2001 pierced the complacency that had settled on the West in the years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, just as they silenced the triumphalist note struck by Francis Fukuyama’s notion that Western civilization had at last successfully negotiated “the end of history” (Fukuyama 1992). In fact, the immediate aftermath of the attacks on the United States saw the West turn its back on what we now can recognize as but a brief detour through the anti-Communist Cold War. It soon reverted to its more familiar geopolitical trajectory: the millennium-long contestation with the world of Islam.

That this radical shift in political, social, and intellectual mobilization, from a Cold War footing to the war on terrorism, was carried out so totally, so swiftly, and virtually without any meaningful opposition bespeaks the enormous power and influence of the established anti-Islam discourse. It provided, quite literally, an off-the-shelf response that seemed in the eyes of many to address the questions plaguing political leaders and ordinary citizens alike: Who were these people? Why did they attack us? What do they want? And – as posed most memorably by President George W. Bush and then echoed in the media – Why do they hate us?

The ready-made response served up by the anti-Islam discourse to these and related questions on the minds of an anxious and bewildered public is perhaps best illustrated by the remarkable success of a slim volume of essays by Bernard Lewis, which appeared shortly after the 11 September attacks and zoomed up the best-seller lists. As we have seen, Lewis’ What’s wrong with
Islam? Western impact and Middle Eastern response was already in production at the time of the attacks. The author, a retired Ottoman specialist with a string of more than twenty scholarly and popular works to his credit, apparently saw no need to revisit his manuscript to explain the phenomenon of al-Qaeda and its deadly attacks – this on a day that Lewis’ patrons in the Bush administration, including the powerful vice president, Dick Cheney, say had changed the world forever. Rather, Lewis simply affixed the briefest of prefaces to the work before presenting it to a marketplace suddenly thirsting for information about the new threats coming from the skies. Within weeks, there were eighty thousand copies in print, an enormous figure for a work of its type.

Naturally enough, Lewis’ legions of fans in government, in the media, and among the reading public – as well as the author himself – all saw the prepared text of What’s wrong with Islam? as unerringly prophetic. Islam was inherently violent, fundamentally anti-modern and unable to develop politically or economically without outside intervention, and all the while enmeshed in impotent, anti-Western rage, Lewis writes, reprising familiar themes he had long professed. “I’d rather have been proven wrong, but I wasn’t,” he told USA Today (24 January 2002).

Lewis’ apparent prescience further cemented his already strong ties to the neo-conservatives in and around the Bush White House, who increasingly turned to him for both policy advice and intellectual backing for the war on terrorism and its step-child, the invasion of Iraq. Lewis has advised the administrations of both George Bush and George W. Bush, and Vice President Dick Cheney honored him in an address to the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia in 2006 in which the vice president noted Lewis’ valuable briefings at the White House.
He is also a regular contributor to influential conservative publications and a much sought-after voice on news programs and talk shows, leading *The New York Times* to celebrate him as a “media star” (3 November 2002; cited in Abrahamian 2003, 541). As Bush speechwriter David Frum told *The Wall Street Journal*, the administration’s response flowed naturally from Lewis’ proscription: “Bernard comes with a very powerful explanation for why 9/11 happened. Once you understand it, the policy presents itself afterward” (3 February 2004). That policy, which the same newspaper dubbed the “Lewis Doctrine,” called on the United States to intercede forcibly to bring forth what the Muslim Arabs were incapable of achieving on their own: a recognizable – that is, Western-style – democracy. With Lewis and like-minded academic Fouad Ajami leading the way, neo-conservatives already itching for an attack on Baghdad could now paint their project as a necessary exercise in democratic nation-building.

But was Lewis “right” after all? Or was he simply following in the long line of Western Islam experts, such as Petrus Alfonsi, Petrarch, and Montesquieu, each of whom has turned to the established narrative of Islam and the West as a way to benefit himself, his social cohort, and his allies? In other words, was Lewis, too, simply overwhelmed by the anti-Islam discourse to the extent that his “answers” preceded any question he or his powerful political patrons were likely to pose? A close reading of his popular works – books, newspaper op-ed articles, and interviews – suggests that this is precisely the case, for what Lewis presents in *What went wrong?* and related writings as analysis of Islam takes little or no account of the actual Muslim world, or of the Muslim actors themselves. As we have come to expect, Islam *qua* Islam is
ignored once again. “The book was already in page proof on September 11. But anyone who followed the Middle East could see which way things were going,” Lewis told a television interviewer (C-SPAN, 30 December 2001). There was, then, no need to address the actual phenomenon of al-Qaeda, the specific rise of bin Laden, previous U.S. support for his anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, the broad appeal of bin Ladenism, or related issues in order to diagnose and explain, “What went wrong.”

As Edward Said has established in his writings on Orientalism, one of the overriding characteristics of such scholarship is the complete disregard for what Muslims actually say and do, in favor of what the Islam expert says that they say and do – and mean. “It should be noted that Orientalist learning itself was premised on the silence of the native, who was to be represented by an Occidental expert speaking ex cathedra on the native’s behalf, presenting that unfortunate creature as an undeveloped, deficient, and uncivilized being who couldn’t represent himself” (2002, 71). Referring directly to Lewis’ What went wrong? Said notes: “Announcing portentously that Muslims have ‘for a long time’ been asking ‘what went wrong?’ he [Lewis] then proceeds to tell us what they say and mean, rarely citing a single name, episode, or period except in the most general way” (Said 2002: 72). Rather, Lewis’ words appear to leap directly from the pages of Pope Urban II’s wartime ideologues and their successors.

Lewis makes this connection for himself. Receiving an award in 2007 from the American Enterprise Institute, bastion of Washington’s neo-conservatives, Lewis received a standing ovation for defending the Crusades as “a late, limited and unsuccessful imitation of the jihad that spread Islam across

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2 Available at http://www.booknotes.org/Transcript/?ProgramID=1657.
much of the globe” (The Wall Street Journal, 8 March 2007). In the same address, he condemned today’s Muslim migration to Europe as an attack on the West and cited what he called the Muslims’ natural advantages over their adversaries in “ideological fervor” and “demography” (The Wall Street Journal, 8 March 2007) – this latter presumably a reference to relatively high birth rates in Muslim communities. Lewis’ argument here recalls his earlier defense in 2001 of President Bush’s comparison of his own war on terrorism to a crusade, something Lewis labeled “unfortunate, but excusable” (Lewis 2001). He goes on to denounce, without irony, Osama bin Laden’s own use of the same terminology as the U.S. president.

So what lies at the heart of Lewis’ view of Islam and the Muslims? What, then, did go wrong? Several distinct strands are repeated continuously throughout his works, perhaps most prominently what he presents as the essential failure of the Muslim lands to modernize at the pace and in the direction dictated by the West and the anger, hatred, and resentment this failure has produced in the Muslim soul. Underpinning this view is a totalizing narrative of the world of Islam as a single civilizational bloc always at, or near, a state of all-out religious warfare with the West, a condition Lewis confidently traces back to the earliest days of Islam itself and, in particular, to the Muslim practice and understanding of jihad. The outlines of this argument, presented in early form in 1990 in “The Roots of Muslim Rage” (Atlantic Monthly, September, 1990: 47-58) mark Lewis – not Samuel Huntington – as the true father of the “clash of civilizations” thesis, so eagerly absorbed into the public discourse after the al-Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington (Said 2002, 71; Abrahamian 2003, 541). In fact, Lewis himself uses the phrase (Lewis 1990).
Lewis was more explicit in positioning the Islamic world as the antithesis of everything “Western”:

They’ve been hating us for a long time. In a sense, they’ve been hating us for centuries, and it’s very natural that they should. You have this millennial rivalry between two world religions, and now, from their point of view, the wrong one seems to be winning. And more generally, I mean, you can’t be rich, strong, successful and loved, particularly by those who are not rich, not strong and not successful. So the hatred is something almost axiomatic.

The question which we should be asking is why do they neither fear nor respect us? (C-SPAN, 30 December 2001). 3

For Lewis, this “axiomatic hatred” takes center stage, and there can be no other possible explanation for any anti-Western sentiment among Muslims except Islam’s cardinal impulse toward armed, global expansionism and its chronic losing hand in “millennial rivalry” with the West. Other possible sources, such as rejection of Western notions of modernity, resistance to colonial domination, opposition to global capitalism, reaction to Western interference in the affairs of Muslim societies, and so on, are never examined. Nor does he allow for consideration of a specific, Islamic ethic and worldview that has no interest in following blindly along the Western path. To return to Foucault’s exceedingly useful phrase, none of these are “within the true”; they are, instead, among the many things that cannot be said about Islam and are thus swept aside by the West’s anti-Islam discourse. What is left, then, is an inevitable clash of civilizations, of which the war on terrorism is but a dangerous and alarming symptom.

The central discursive formation at work here is the organic link created between violence carried out by Muslims – any Muslims, anywhere – and the

requirements of their faith as identified with the religious concept of *jihad* and the oft-associated notion of the *shahid*, or martyr. In fact, the prevailing Western discourse of violence in Islam can be seen clearly in the Orientalist tradition of textual scholarship surrounding these terms, of which Lewis is perhaps the most prominent and effective contemporary advocate. This is particularly the case with *jihad*, which has entered the popular Western vocabulary as “holy war,” not least on Lewis’ authority (cf. Lewis 1988, 72-73).

Today, the term has been wholly naturalized and taken on a life of its own in the Western imagination. In their best-selling book, *The age of sacred terror* (2002), former White House counterterrorism officials Steve Simon and Daniel Benjamin do not even include *jihad* in the otherwise detailed glossary that appears at the back of the text. Thus, there is nothing between entries for *jahiliyya* and the Kaaba – a vivid illustration of just how effectively such a complex, multivalent concept as *jihad* has been denatured and then assimilated into the Western vocabulary of the war on terrorism. In their account of the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, the authors simply refer to the attack as “a jihad mission,” presenting *jihad* as an accepted term whose universal meaning and significance are understood and shared by all readers – and by all believers (Benjamin and Simon 2002, 29).

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4 We will focus this argument on the appropriation of the concept of *jihad*, although many parallels may be seen in the predominant Western discourse of martyrdom in Islam. For a recent reexamination of the ideas of martyrdom in the Christian and Muslim traditions, see Wicker 2006.

5 That contemporary militant Muslim groups often embrace a similar understanding of *jihad* is an indication that they, like the Western experts, have found the same discourse of Islam and violence as a useful source of social, political, and religious mobilization. In the same vein, the Western discourses of Islam and science and Islam and women have periodically found favor, to varying degrees, within elements of Muslim societies.
Given the power of the anti-Islam discourse, it is not surprising that the glossary entries by Benjamin and Simon offer an inconsistent mix of classical and contemporary understandings of Islam, selectively deployed to bolster their argument about the central place of violence in Islam. For example, their definition of *dar al-harb*, reinforces their notion of an endlessly expansionist Islam: “…the realm not yet under Islamic law” (447; emphasis added). In fact, the history of the concept of *dar al-harb*, literally the “abode of war,” suggests it evolved in recognition that a permanent state of actual warfare between the *dar al-Islam* and the *dar al-harb*, essentially the non-Muslim world, was untenable and doomed to failure. This was soon followed by the recognition of another such abode, that of states with whom the Muslims have treaties, the *dar al-ahd* (Mottahedeh and al-Sayyid 2001, 28-29).

None of these terms can be found in the Qur’an or the sunna of the Prophet, and they were instead shaped by geopolitical realities of later times. They were ultimately abandoned by classical jurists because they no longer applied to the real world (Afsaruddin 2008, 118-119). In contrast, the authors’ definition of militant Zionist group Gush Emunim makes no mention of the movement’s well-known history of assassinations and car bombings against Palestinians, or of its failed plot to blow up the Dome of the Rock (cf. Sprinzak 1987). They simply identify it as “an Israeli settler movement founded in 1974” (447).

In an extensive footnote, the two authors cite the authority of Bernard Lewis, backed by “modern scholarly consensus,” in support of their contention that the Muslim understanding of *jihad* has consistently imposed a religious obligation to carry out armed struggle against non-Muslims. And they dismiss all
other religious understandings of the concept, including the “greater jihad” of internal struggle on the part of the individual believer to overcome his base human nature and be a better Muslim – a concept that encompasses personal development, education, acts of charity, and other good works:

The last century has seen a trend toward the interpretation of the so-called greater jihad as the more genuine form of Islamic struggle. The terminology comes from a hadith of disputed reliability in which Muhammad is reported to have said, upon returning from battle, that he has now returned from the lesser jihad to the greater, spiritual, jihad. Until recently, however, Muslim scholars were unanimous in insisting on the priority jihad had as warfare against the unbeliever. Bernard Lewis made this case most famously, but modern scholarly consensus on the matter is summed up by the new edition of the Encyclopedia Islamica (55; emphasis added).

Although literally relegated to a footnote by Benjamin and Simon, their understanding of jihad, and the “scholarly consensus” it represents, puts on full display the discourse of Islam that underpins The age of sacred terror, as well as Lewis’ What went wrong? and many other such works. Foremost, in the great Orientalist tradition perfected in the nineteenth century, it announces to the reader the beliefs and practices of the Muslims – thus, we are told, of the unanimity of “Muslim scholars” – without actually presenting any Muslim voices. Second, it walls off possible other interpretations, such as the greater or spiritual jihad, by dismissing these as “outside the true,” even as it hints at their very existence. Third, it purports to offer a scientific narrative based on a definitive readings of Muslim texts that may or may not reflect what it is that Muslims say or do in real life. And it presents violent action carried out by Muslims as a natural and necessary outgrowth of their faith, thereby depriving them of motivations that may be rooted in worldly matters, including competing Western actions, ideas, or interests.

This can be seen all the more clearly by examining the article, cited by Benjamin and Simon, in the Encyclopedia Islamica, a standard Western
reference work edited by Bernard Lewis, among others.\textsuperscript{6} In the encyclopedia’s entry for “Djihad,” Émile Tyan writes that the notion “stems from the fundamental principle of the universality of Islam: this religion, along with temporal power which it implies, ought to embrace the whole universe, if necessary by force” (Tyan 1991, 538). As a result, armed \textit{jihad} is an obligation for all Muslims, at all times, and any peace with non-Muslims is by nature transitory and may be revoked without notice whenever circumstances better favor success. “Certain writers,” Tyan notes, in particular among the Shi’ites, explain \textit{jihad} in terms of internal, spiritual struggle or set very strict limits on use of armed aggression, but these, we are told, are inconsistent with both “general doctrine and historical tradition” (538).

Tyan dismisses those interpretations of \textit{jihad} that do not conform to his model of perpetual warfare as mere apologetics:

Finally, there is at the present time a thesis, of a wholly apologetic character, according to which Islam relies for its expansion exclusively upon persuasion and other peaceful means, and the \textit{jihad} is only authorized in cases of ‘self defense’ and of ‘support owed to a defenseless ally or brother.’ Disregarding entirely the previous doctrine and historical tradition, as well as the texts of the Qur’an and the sunna on the basis of which it was formulated, but claiming, even so, to remain within the bounds of strict orthodoxy, this thesis takes into account only those early texts which state the contrary (539).

Similarly, Tyan mentions only briefly the rich etymology of \textit{jihad}, with its Arabic root of j-h-d, and its linguistic relationship to \textit{ijtihad}, the practice in Islamic law of independent reasoning applied to religious sources. One who carries out \textit{ijtihad} is known as a \textit{mujtahid}, also from the same j-h-d root. However, this link between the intellectual and religious activity of \textit{ijtihad} and the understanding of \textit{jihad} is largely ignored in favor of an exclusively militaristic reading.

\textsuperscript{6} In this same vein, they also cite an essay on \textit{jihad} by Douglas E. Streusand (1997), which in turn invokes the Lewis approach to understanding the term. Thus, the circle is completed.
Other possible readings and other possible interpretations beyond this “modern scholarly consensus” – a more perfect example of metonymy applied to the anti-Islam narrative is hard to imagine – of both the religious ideal and the actual practice of *jihad*, have been pushed beyond the boundaries of “the true” by the discourse of violence in Islam. Impelled by Foucault’s stratagem of reversal, we might well ask, what if the key strands in this discourse were set aside, or otherwise negated? Specifically, what if Islam were *not* inherently violent, spread only by force, maintained by coercion, and driven by hatred for the non-Muslim West?

Doing so opens up a number of important new pathways for an understanding of *jihad* – and for the actions and behaviors of Muslims in general. For one, it removes the facile dismissal of that “wholly apologetic” reading, by the Shi’ite jurists among many others, of *jihad* as internal, personal struggle, as self-defense, or as legitimate aid to an ally or fellow Muslim under attack. Second, it allows us to explore seriously the variable context of the Islamic understanding over time of *jihad*, its legitimate scope, targets, and aims. And it holds up to scrutiny the notion, advanced so forcefully by Lewis and other purveyors of this “modern scholarly consensus,” that historically there has been only one single interpretation – that of a religious obligation of aggressive warfare against non-Muslims.

Such explorations have been the focus of some recent scholarship on the problem (cf. Mottahedeh and al-Sayyid 2001; Afsaruddin 2006; 2008, 108-120; Bonner 2006; Hashmi 1996; and so on), much of it in direct response to the foregrounding of the notion of *jihad* in the public discourse of Islam and violence after the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks. Each of these studies reveals in
different ways the complex and ever-shifting understanding by Muslims of the religious concept of *jihad*, as well as the relationship between this understanding and the social, political, and religious context of the times. Challenging the “modern scholarly consensus” that *jihad* only ever had one, consistent meaning – that of aggressive warfare against all non-Muslims – Roy Mottahedeh and Ridwan al-Sayyid write: “In fact, differences about the status and nature of *jihad* are a marked feature of early Islamic law, and details about the conduct of *jihad* continue to reflect historical circumstance throughout the history of Islamic law in the Middle East” (2001, 23).

These differences include the legitimacy of aggressive war altogether; the nature of legitimate targets of any such aggression – that is, only Arabian polytheists, or those people who do not follow a book of scripture, or non-Muslims in general; the necessary religious authority to declare and lead a *jihad*; its rules and mode of conduct; and so on. Also at issue is exegetical theory, including the disputed notion of abrogation (*naskh*), by which some verses in the Qur’an are taken by some jurists to have superseded others that appear, at least to limited human understanding, to offer contradictory guidance.

The most important examples of *naskh* for the present discussion lie with the Qur’an’s so-called sword verses, which sanction slaying “idolaters” after the sacred truce months have elapsed (9:5), as well as attacks against those “People of the Book” who ignore the sacred teachings and flout God’s will (9:29). Some Muslim jurists in the centuries after Muhammad’s death in 632 steadily advanced this militaristic understanding of *jihad* and argued for abrogation of more conciliatory verses, including those that emphasize peaceful coexistence.
with enemies and the explicit right to make treaties with non-Muslim, as well as the more explicit verse: “There is no compulsion in religion (2:256).”

Asma Afsaruddin, a scholar of early Islam, finds that many prominent Muslim legal scholars never accepted the abrogation of this verse. Among those who did not accept its abrogation were Muhammad Jarir al-Tabari (d. 923 CE) and Ibn Kathir (d. 1373 CE). Both were adamant that verse 2:256 had never been abrogated. Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328 CE), mentor to Ibn Kathir and a figure often invoked as the spiritual father of the strict Wahhabi movement which predominates to this day in Saudi Arabia, saw jihad as a defensive endeavor to be waged only against those unbelievers who were hostile towards the Muslims. Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi’i (767-820 CE), founder of one of the four major schools of Sunni law, condoned offensive jihad but he specifically limited this to encompass only the Muslims’ struggle against the pagan Arabs (Afsaruddin 2006, 22-23).

The Qur’an, the fundamental text in Islam and the only one that is divine – the sunna of the Prophet may be said to be divinely inspired but it, and the hadith collections and the later body of jurisprudence, or fiqh, are ultimately human endeavors and decidedly not the word of God – has little to say on the subject of jihad, particularly as it relates to fighting and warfare. And it offers even less in the way of a comprehensive doctrine of war (Bonner 2006, 22). Generally, the word jihad appears in the Qur’an with the meaning of “striving” or “effort,” and it frequently precedes the phrase, “in the path of God” (fi sabil allah).

By contrast, the holy text specifically uses other Arabic words to denote fighting, killing, or armed combat (qital) or war in general (harb) (Afsaruddin
In all, words containing the Arabic root j-h-d, denoting “effort” or “striving,” appear forty-one times in the Qur’an, with just ten of these referring to the conduct of warfare – all uses that at the same time stress devotion to God, self-sacrifice, and righteous conduct (Heck 2004, 97-98; Bonner 2006, 22).

Thus, fully formed, absolutist notions of jihad such as that invoked in the anti-Islam discourse cannot necessarily claim sanction in the only infallible text in Islam. Instead, these and competing interpretations appear to have evolved in an organic fashion in the centuries following the revelation in response to changed and changing social and political circumstance. “This development seems to have taken place sometime after the revelation and collection of the Qur’an itself,” writes Bonner. “It is important to remember, however, that the concept of jihad was not, in the Qur’an, primarily or mainly about fighting and warfare. The ‘internal,’ ‘spiritual’ [greater] jihad can thus claim to be every bit as old as its ‘external,’ ‘fighting’ counterpart” (22).

Historical, social, and political context also plays a large role in the understanding and application of jihad throughout history. This can be seen clearly in both the shifting approaches to jihad in the legal literature, as well as in the changing political and social circumstances that necessarily influence this understanding. Weber reminds us in The sociology of religion of the distinction between the vocation of a prophet and those of later priestly classes, who then regulate “the content of prophecy or the sacred traditions by supplying them with a casuistical, rationalistic framework of analysis, and by adapting them to the customs of life and thought of their own class and of the laity whom they controlled” (1965, 69).
This same process is reflected in the changing landscape of *jihad*. Thus, classical scholars in the Arabian heartland of the Hijaz, well away from the Muslims’ direct political and military competition with Christian Byzantium, tended to place relatively little emphasis on *jihad*, while Syrian jurists along the borderlands supported obligatory warfare against their non-Muslim neighbors and political and economic rivals in Constantinople. Hijazi views were also colored by their abiding doubts about the legitimacy of the Umayyads in Damascus, who as rulers of the Islamic empire would lead any such campaign (Mottahedeh and al-Sayyid 2001, 26-27; Afsaruddin 2008, 116). In all cases, later understandings of *jihad* appear to have enjoyed an independent existence, separate and distinct, from the revelation to Muhammad. In terms of our own analytical question – *cui bono?* – we can recognize the sociological process whereby successive groups, classes, and institutions have benefited directly from imposing their own reading of *jihad*.

As elsewhere in this study, we are not concerned so much with establishing the “truth value” of any one particular reading of *jihad* as we are with underscoring the presence of a single, persistent Western discursive formation of violence in Islam that remains largely immune to serious challenge on historical, linguistic, and theological bases. As we have seen above, some recent work has begun to chip away at this “modern scholarly consensus” (Mottahedeh and al-Sayyid 2001; Afsaruddin 2008; Bonner 2006; Hashmi 1996), but it has made no real impact – nor should we expect that it would – on the predominant discourse of violence in Islam.

Benjamin and Simon do not stop there. They then extrapolate this absolutist understanding of *jihad* as central to obligatory Muslim religious
practice to create an entire theology of violence in which terrorist attacks like those carried out by al-Qaeda comprise “a form of sacrament” in a cosmic battle between good and evil (40). In this way, a seamless connection is drawn between the attacks on New York and Washington in 2001 and the very roots of the Islamic faith, as represented by God’s revelation to the Prophet Muhammad, in seventh-century Arabia.

Thus, the authors’ brief narrative of the al-Qaeda attacks is prefaced by an excerpt from the Qur’an in which God outlines the fiery end that awaits the unbeliever, who is too proud, too arrogant, or too skeptical to receive the sacred teachings sent down for his own salvation:

I will surely cast him into the Fire. Would that you knew what the fire is like!
It leaves nothing, it spares no one; it burns the skins of men. It is guarded by nineteen keepers.

We have appointed none but the angels to guard the Fire, and made their number a subject for dispute among the unbelievers, so that those to whom the Scriptures were given may be convinced and the true believers strengthened in their faith.

Benjamin and Simon cite this as Qur’an 74:30–31, but they have, it seems, mistakenly condensed several verses before that one. The Pickthall translation follows:

Him shall I fling unto the burning. Ah, what will convey unto thee what that burning is!
It leaveth naught; it spareth naught. It shrivelleth the man. Above it are nineteen.
We have appointed only angels to be wardens of the Fire, And their number have We made to be a stumbling-block for those who disbelieve; That those to whom the Scripture hath been given may have certainty, And that believers may increase in faith (74:26–31)

The imagery here was, perhaps, simply too much to resist, given the fiery end of the Twin Towers in New York and the blaze at the Pentagon, and yet it is hard to imagine what else might have motivated the selection of lines from this famous sura, generally known as “the Cloaked One,” as an epigraph to
murderous terrorist attacks. The language at work here – condemning unbelievers to the hellfire – would not at all be out of place in the Christian tradition. To cite just one well-known example, Dante’s *Divine Comedy* (Canto 28: 30-31) recounts in detail Muhammad’s hideous torments in Hell, his body split asunder so that his entrails hang out – an image that may reflect the Western discourse that casts Muhammad not as a prophet but as a Christian schismatic. Nor would it be wholly unfamiliar to the followers of other religious traditions that offer true redemption only to those who accept and follow a specific creed while describing torments for those who fail to do so.

But the reliance of Benjamin and Simon on “The Cloaked One” is problematic in other ways, as well. Sura 74 is among the earliest revelations and calls on a terrified Muhammad, who has been covered in a cloak by his loving wife Khadija after his shock encounter with the Angel Gabriel, to toss aside his protective wrap and preach the Word of God to his fellow man: “O thou enveloped in the cloak, Arise and warn” (74:1-2). We have here the very outset of Muhammad’s sacred vocation, one that places him within the general pre-Islamic Arabian tradition of spiritual “warners” and in the specific line of the Abrahamic prophets recorded in earlier Jewish and Christian scriptures. God then assures Muhammad that only those who fail to heed the holy teachings need worry at the End of Time: “For when the trumpet shall sound, surely that day will be a day of anguish, not of ease, for disbelievers” (74:8-10). Subsequent lines make it clear that “those to whom the Scriptures have been given and

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7 The canonical order of the revelations presented in the Qur’an was established after the death of Muhammad, under the direction of the third caliph, Uthman. This Uthman codex generally arranges the verses from the longest to the shortest, with the exception of the first sura, the *fatiha*, or “The Opening.” By tradition, the place of revelation, the early ones in Mecca and later ones in Medina, are noted in the text, although debate continues in scholarly circles over some of these conventions.
believers” (74:31), that is, the pious People of the Book, will spared such a fate in the afterlife. This is in keeping with Muhammad’s own understanding of his prophetic mission, which was to restore for good the true essence of past revelation that had been corrupted or neglected by Jewish and Christian practice.

Impelled by the discourse of violence in Islam, Benjamin and Simon present the terrifying spiritual warning conveyed in the “The Cloaked One” to stand as a fitting introduction to mass murder. Likewise, this logic induces them to see the al-Qaeda attack strictly as a necessary act of religious devotion and – as we have come to expect from the anti-Islam discourse – allows for no other possible factors or explanations:

[T]he motivation for the attack was neither political calculation, strategic advantage, nor wanton bloodlust. It was to humiliate and slaughter those who defied the hegemony of God; it was to please Him by reasserting His primacy. It was an act of cosmic war. What appears to be senseless violence actually makes a great deal of sense to the terrorists and their sympathizers, for whom this mass killing was an act of redemption (Benjamin and Simon 2002: 40).

This same Muslim theology of violence, larded with other central elements of the anti-Islam discourse, runs throughout the commentaries of Thomas Friedman, whose power and influence as foreign affairs columns for the flagship U.S. newspaper, The New York Times, dwarfs those of What went Wrong? and The age of sacred terror. Friedman’s columns reach hundreds of thousands of newspaper readers several times a week, including most of the American elite, and many millions more around the world on the Internet. In spring of 2002, he won a Pulitzer Prize, for distinguished commentary, for what the awards committee called “his clarity of vision, based on extensive reporting,
in commenting on the worldwide impact of the terrorist threat” in the aftermath of the al-Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington.⁸

Friedman’s columns were also collated into a best-selling book, *Longitudes and attitudes: Exploring the world after September 11*, which features on its cover a detail from an Italian mannerist painting of the Battle of Lepanto, when the naval forces of European Christendom decisively defeated the Muslim Ottomans in 1571, in what many have seen as a turning point in the balance of power between the Muslims and the West.

Writing from Jerusalem in his first published commentary on the events of 11 September 2001, Friedman invokes the powerful imagery of the last great shooting war between rival global worldviews: “Does my country really understand that this is World War III? And if this attack was the Pearl Harbor of World War III, it means there is a long, long war ahead” (Friedman 2002: 45).⁹ The attacks, he writes on 13 September, were the work of “super-empowered angry men and women out there,” who pervert Western science for their own, evil ends: “What makes them super-empowered … is their genius at using the networked world, the Internet and the very high technology they hate, to attack us. Think about it: They turned our most advanced civilian planes into Human-directed, precision-guided cruise missiles – a diabolical melding of their fanaticism and our technology. Jihad Online” (46; emphasis added). He then continues his military theme by recalling the U.S. Marine Corps motto in his final call to arms: “It won’t be easy. It will require our best strategists, our most creative diplomats and our bravest soldiers. Semper Fi” (48). Friedman’s

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⁹ Citations from Friedman’s newspaper columns will be drawn from *Longitudes and attitudes* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 2002).
columns often draw on this discourse of military might, leaving no doubt about how he frames the problem of al-Qaeda and terrorism by Muslim groups in general. An essay of 9 December 2001 concludes: “Mr. President, where do we enlist?” (87).

It is worth noting that Friedman briefly appears to step outside the prevailing discourse and calls the attacks “an amazing technological feat” despite the anti-technology bias that he attributes to the perpetrators’ religious beliefs. In the end, of course, this tribute to the skill and planning of the Muslim hijackers cannot be allowed to stand, and he presents an unnamed “Israeli military official” to sound a skeptical note that all the attackers did was manage to fly planes that were already in the air: “‘It’s not that difficult to learn how to fly a plane once it's up in the air,’ he said. ‘And remember, they never had to learn how to land’” (48).

For Friedman, the lesson is clear: wed to an antipathy for science, reason, and the modern world grounded in their religion, members of al-Qaeda and their ilk only know how to fight and destroy, in contrast to the suddenly embattled West. This theme is more developed in a column of 2 October 2001: “[T]he terrorists can hijack Boeing planes, but in the spiritless, monolithic societies they want to build, they could never produce them. The terrorists can exploit the U.S.-made Internet, but in their suffocated world of one God, one truth, one way, one leader, they could never invent it” (46).

Three days later, on 5 October 2001, Friedman lashes out at any suggestion that the hijackers and their network had anything but apocalyptic designs:

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10 It is worth juxtaposing Friedman’s reference to “one God” – the very definition of monotheism shared by Muslims, Christians, and Jews – with that of Pope Gregory VII one thousand years earlier.
One can only be amazed at the ease with which some people abroad and at
campus teach-ins now tell us what motivated the terrorists. Guess what? The
terrorists didn’t leave an explanatory note. Because their deed was their note:
We want to destroy America, starting with its military and financial centers.
Which part of that sentence don’t people understand?

Have you ever seen Osama bin Laden say “I just want to see a smaller Israel in
its pre-1967 borders,” or “I have no problem with America, it just needs to
have a lower cultural and military profile in the Muslim world”? These
terrorists aren’t out for a new kind of coexistence with us. They are out for our
non-existence (67)

In March of 2002, Friedman was still maintaining that the hijackers and their
supporters and masters were devoid of all political demands (211; cited in
Abrahamian 2003, 531-32).

In fact, Osama bin Laden and the leadership of al-Qaeda had made it
clear long before what they were seeking, first in the so-called fatwa of 1996 –
“Declaration of war against the Americans occupying the Land of the Two Holy
Islamic Front for jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders.”11 Among these are
the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Muslim lands, particularly from
Saudi Arabia, home of the holiest site in Islam; an end to Western support for
Israel and its repression of the Palestinians; a halt to violence against Muslim
communities worldwide, from India and Central Asia to the Balkans; and an end
to U.S. support for corrupt and repressive regimes in Islamic countries,
especially that led by the Saudi royal family (bin Laden 1996; 1998).

The later “fatwa” includes a declaration of war to enforce these demands:
“The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an
individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is
possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque [Jerusalem] and the

11 The originals appeared in the London-based Arabic newspaper Al Quds al Arabi. English
translations are available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html and
holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim” (bin Laden 1998). Moreover, the 2001 hijackers did in fact leave behind their own letter or “testament,” which was soon in the hands of the FBI.

The al-Qaeda attacks of 11 September caught the Western world by surprise, although members of the intelligence community had uncovered plenty of advance warnings and bin Laden himself had spelled out the threat to U.S. military and civilian targets should his demands be ignored. But there was, of course, no such corresponding gap or failure in terms of the anti-Islam discourse. As we have seen, Bernard Lewis, Richard Benjamin and Steve Simon, Thomas Friedman, joined by countless other Islam experts, stepped forward to advance the predominant discursive formation of violence in Islam. In doing so, the contemporary Islam experts furthered their policy objectives toward the Muslim world, ensured their own centrality to the Western foreign policy debate, enriched themselves through book sales, lecture fees, think tank and academic appointments, and provided invaluable support to their allies in government and industry.

Media companies likewise rushed to embrace this same discourse, now wrapped up neatly in the “clash of civilizations” thesis advanced first by Lewis and more explicitly by Samuel Huntington. The New York Times created its special daily section devoted to the attacks, “A Nation Challenged.” Opinions and viewpoints beyond this framework were declared outside “the true” and were notably absent from the airways, the news pages, and the Internet. In the same vein, the Muslim intellectual Tariq Ramadan, a Swiss national, was barred from entering the United States and taking up a prestigious teaching post at
Notre Dame University for “security reasons,” while several prominent non-Muslim academics who strayed too far outside the discourse were denied promotions, tenure, or even ousted from the Academy.\(^\text{12}\)

One need only recall the almost universal vilification of the late Susan Sontag for writing in *The New Yorker* two weeks after the al-Qaeda attacks that the events had to be seen in the context of America’s long role in the Muslim world and the opposition and anger that such role had engendered in many quarters. Sontag wrote:

> The disconnect between last Tuesday’s monstrous dose of reality and the self-righteous drivel and outright deceptions being peddled by public figures and TV commentators is startling, depressing. The voices licensed to follow the event seem to have joined together in a campaign to infantilize the public. Where is the acknowledgement that this was not a ‘cowardly’ attack on ‘civilization’ or ‘liberty’ or ‘humanity’ or ‘the free world’ but an attack on the world’s self-proclaimed super-power, undertaken as a consequence of specific American alliances and actions? How many citizens are aware of the ongoing American bombing of Iraq?” (Sontag 2001).

Concludes one scholarly study of the American media response: “A cursory glance at the U.S. media after September 11 leaves no doubt as to Huntington’s triumph. The media framed the whole crisis within the context of Islam, of cultural conflicts, and of Western civilization threatened by the Other” (Abrahamian 2003, 531).

Television “talking heads,” security experts, journalists, and academics were not the only social beneficiaries of the discourse of violence in Islam. The immediate militarization of America’s response to al-Qaeda, a policy that grew organically out of the underlying anti-Islam discourse, created a bonanza for the military-industrial complex, with lucrative procurement contracts, R&D

\(^{12}\) Ramadan later took up a position at Oxford. In other celebrated cases, Juan Cole, a professor of Middle East history at the University of Michigan, was blocked from an appointment at Yale in 2006, after a public outcry by conservative academics, politicians, and bloggers, while the political scientist Norman G. Finkelstein was denied tenure at DePaul University in 2007 and then left the university under similar circumstances.
investments, and so on; for the security apparatus, with its expanded powers, larger budget, and growing cadres and the corresponding clampdown on civil liberties; and for the politicians who led the charge. Yet none of that would have been possible without the firm grounding of the “text” of 11 September in a thousand-year narrative, only this time costumed as an inevitable civilizational clash between Islam and the West.

As we have seen, the Western discourse of Islam dates to the First Crusade and its aftermath and was at first perpetuated chiefly by the reformist elite of the Catholic Church, personified by Pope Urban II, and its allies among the ruling houses of Europe. It also received the backing of charismatic preachers such as Peter the Hermit, who rallied public support among the masses for the crusading enterprise, while adventurers and minor nobles alike saw in it a pathway to riches, land, and even hereditary titles in territories conquered in the name of Christian holy war. Yet, none of these direct beneficiaries of the discursive formation had had anything but the most cursory acquaintance – if that – with the world of Islam and the Muslims.

Seen from a distant Europe – and reflected in the chronicles of the First Crusade, almost all of which were recorded well after the event – the Christian victories over the Muslim armies offered proof that God had foreordained the success of the Crusade in general and the capture of Jerusalem in particular. Likewise, the Holy City was widely assumed in Latin circles to have been historically Christian, with Muslim suzerainty an anomalous, short-lived, and clearly reversible state of affairs. As a result, the Crusaders arrived as an army of liberation to restore God’s rightful order to the geo-political map of the Near

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East. This gave the campaign a preeminent and permanent place in the sacred history of Christendom, something to which none of the later crusades could ever aspire. In the words of Norman Daniel:

The First Crusade was one of the principal events in the history of European consciousness. This is obvious from the number of second-hand accounts of it that were written; and there has never been a time when Europe has not, in one way or another, remembered the First Crusade. Accounts of later crusades are ordinary histories and travels; the first was the response to a clerical idea which satisfied a wider – and more powerful – emotional need. … What began as a common enthusiasm broke up immediately into its constituent parts, and yet a certain common attitude, which was pan-European, remained (1975: 113).

Also contributing to the break-up of this “common enthusiasm” was the relentless logic of facts on the ground. The creation at the end of the eleventh century of the Crusader states, comprising the Kingdom of Jerusalem and its vassal states of Edessa, Tripoli, and Antioch, added a new dimension to the region’s complex political and religious landscape. The rulers of this “Latin East” soon saw that their own fate was bound up with those of the Muslims, Christian Arabs, and Jews who populated the region; there would be no significant re-infusion of European Christians to help colonize the new Crusader states. The Crusader movement – and, later, Europe as well – found itself increasingly enmeshed in the cultural, political, military, and economic life of the Muslim world in ways that would have horrified men like Peter the Hermit and Pope Urban II, who died just days before the news of Jerusalem’s capture reached Rome.

As with countless invaders before them, the Crusaders discovered that the act of conquest leaves its mark on the besiegers as well as the besieged. There would be numerous campaigns to come – even the mystery of the so-called Children’s Crusade of 1212 which Christian legend says ended in enslavement at Muslim hands – but the idea of Crusading would never really
return to the vision of Urban II. The adaptable Normans took on the best aspects of Arab life even as they expelled Muslim rulers from the eastern Mediterranean, creating sumptuous courts whose learning and culture began to rival those of the great caliphs and sultans. At the same time, the symbolic value of Jerusalem as a place worthy of fighting and dying for began to fade – if only gradually – in the face of new economic, political, cultural realities.

Chief among these was the spectacular growth of East-West trade. The Church clearly recognized the danger that this posed to the survival of its anti-Muslim agenda, and it sought to strangle commerce with the infidel, particularly in such strategic goods as wood for shipbuilding, iron, arms, and even foodstuffs (Daniel 1997, 137). Yet, money from this new trade with the East began to flow into the merchant coffers of southern Europe. Genoa dominated commerce with North Africa and the Black Sea region, while Venice maintained a lock on trade with Egypt and Syria (Attiya 1962, 171).

Along with shipments of oil, textiles, and precious metals came new ideas, technologies, and systems of thought. Our modern Arabic numerals were popularized in the West thanks to contracts and other trade documents drawn up between Muslim merchants and their Italian counterparts. Trade terminology in numerous European languages still bears the mark of Arabic and Persian commercial usage. Seaborne commerce required navigational aids, such as sophisticated maps, charts, and instruments, all areas where the medieval Muslims excelled. One measure of these expanding economic ties was the appearance in European treasuries, as far away as England, of Muslim gold. The minting of gold coins, halted in ninth-century Europe for lack of bullion,
resumed in the Italian city states four centuries later after supplies from the East were secured (Abulafia 1994, 10).

Changes in the nature of the Crusades were also striking. Later campaigns, which continued off and on for centuries, were either designed to claim territory already retaken by the Muslims or else perverted by political ambition or greed, such as the sack of Christian Constantinople in 1204 at the instigation of the merchants of Venice. Soon, the initial disarray among the Muslims that had coincided with the first arrival of the Crusaders began to dissipate, and within forty-five years they began to push back the Christian advances, a process eventually crowned by Saladin’s triumphant entry into Jerusalem in 1187 at the head of a unified force from Egypt and all of Syria.

The glories of the Latin East were gone forever. But the discursive formation that had made the First Crusade possible continued unabated and largely unchanged by the growing interaction and changed dynamic between East and West. Soon, in Europe’s early modern period, the central elements of this discourse – the notions of Islam as violent, corrupt, deceitful, tyrannical, and perverse – were turned inward as Europe struggled with the social, religious, and political dislocations ushered in by the Reformation. The discursive formation of Islam, then, provided a ready-made template for new generations of ideologues and “experts” to take down from its shelf and apply to a Christian Europe now divided along sectarian lines. Even without the intimate and bloody interactions that once characterized the Crusades, Islam was to remain a permanent fixture of the European imagination.

Two literary forms of the early modern era illustrate the breadth and scope of this discursive formation, even as they presided over a subtle shift in
focus, from the Muslim Other to the European Self. The first of these were the so-called Türkenbüchlein, popular German pamphlets of the early sixteenth century that invoked the threat of Turkish invasion in support of demands for Christian repentance and reform (Bohnstedt 1968, 3). The second comprised works of romance, long the preeminent literary form by which Christendom had imagined its relationships and conflicts with the outside world (Robinson 2007, 2).

The most famous of the Türkenbüchlein are undoubtedly three works on the subject by Martin Luther, but many of his lesser-known contemporaries on both sides of the new Christian divide tried their hand at the genre. The earliest such work dates to the spring of 1522, shortly after the fall of Belgrade to the Ottoman armies, with the phenomenon having largely run its course within two decades (Bohnstedt 1968, 3). All took the evil, existential threat to Christendom posed by the Turkish armies in nearby Eastern Europe for granted, and the Ottoman sultan, Suleiman the Magnificent, was generally depicted as a "hereditary foe of all Christians." Massacres, torture, the murder of the unborn in the mother’s womb, and other abominations were all ascribed to “the Turk,” now synonymous with Saracen, Persian, or Mahometan (Bohnstedt 1968, 18-19).

Yet, these same texts quickly turn their fire on ideological enemies within the Christian camp, whether Lutheran or Papist. Many identify the Turks as a scourge sent by God either to punish the Lutheran heresies, or to force reform on a wayward and erring Roman Church, as the case may be. A children’s hymn, written by Luther and used well into the nineteenth century when any Turkish threat must have been at most a distant memory, links the pope and the sultan in eternal infamy: “Keep us true to thy Word, O Lord, and
preserve us from murder by the Pope and the Turk, who would topple Jesus Christ, thy Son, from thy throne” (quoted in Bohnstedt 1968, 24, 24 n. 25). In a similar vein, the first English translator of the Qur’an, Alexander Ross, dismissed Cromwell as an English-speaking “Mahomet” (Robinson 2007, 172).

Luther’s early polemics with the Church seemed to suggest that he saw the Turk as the lesser of the two evils and that a fight against the Muslims would only serve to prolong Church corruption. He soon clarified his stance and produced numerous anti-Turkish pamphlets and sermons, most prominently On war against the Turk (Robinson 2007, 43-44; Forell 1945, 257-59). As part of the ideological battle with Islam, Luther was also instrumental in securing the publication of the Qur’an, in Robert of Ketton’s polemical Latin paraphrase, over the initial objections of the authorities in Basel (Kritezck 1964, 201; Tolan 2002, xix). In a letter to the city council, Luther writes: “To honor Christ, to do good for Christians, to harm the Turks, to vex the devil, set this book free and don’t withhold it” (cited in Clark 1984, 11).

Just as the Türkenbüchlein naturalized the anti-Islam discourse and adapted it to the religious controversies of contemporary Europe, so, too, did early modern literary romance seek to make sense of a changed and changing world in which Islam and the Muslims now comprised a permanent fixture, an agreed reference point, against which to measure other threats and other enemies. Among the key texts is Edmund Spencer’s Faerie queene, which presents Philip II in the figure of the “Souldan,” the Muslim sultan, and thus casts Protestant England’s military struggle with Catholic Spain as a holy war (Robinson 2007, 36-38). But other works from the early modern period similarly introduce the Western notion of the Muslim into what are essentially internal
European struggles with changing religious, economic, and political realities – a category that could accommodate Shakespeare’s explorations of alterity in *The Merchant of Venice*, *Othello*, and *The Tempest*.

Influenced by the rising influence of the Ottomans and by their own, limited understanding of the Muslim world, the early modern writers increasingly displace “Saracen” or “Moor” in favor of the catch-all descriptor, “Turk.” According to Benedict S. Robinson, such interchangeable usage forced the rich collection of Muslim cultures and histories into a uniquely Western fantasy of the Islamic world. “In a sense,” he writes, “Europe has always refused to treat Islam as a religion at all, preferring to inscribe it into theories of racial, political, and cultural difference, and thereby refusing to acknowledge Islam’s claim to universality while at the same time insisting that it is always the same, across vast reaches of time and space (2007: 5).

For these early modern interpreters and experts, there is no Islam *qua* Islam, only one that meets their own social and institutional demands. Each side in the European struggle over the Reformation sought to tar the other by rhetorical association with the violent and dangerous “Turk.” And each side invoked, understood, and accepted this discourse in identical terms. In this way, the anti-Islam discourse saw itself further entrenched and its traditional content further solidified in Western social, political, and intellectual life – even as it became increasingly divorced from the Muslims themselves.

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These same demands can be seen, albeit in a very different era and context, in another, seemingly cataclysmic threat to the West: the Indian rebellion of 1857, which, at least in the eyes of the British, threatened to
overwhelm their once-unquestionable rule over the subcontinent and even to shake the foundations of the empire itself. On the face of it, the insurrection began when mounting discontent among the Indian recruits who made up the overwhelming majority of the British-led armed forces exploded at Meerut on 10 May 1857 over fears of ritual pollution from the introduction of new Enfield rifles and their greased cartridges. The rifle itself featured a bored barrel that greatly increased its accuracy and range over those of existing weapons, but this same design required that grease be applied to the ball in order to coax it into place. Rumors of uncertain origin soon spread that the grease on the new paper cartridges had originated from the fat of cows – deeply offensive to Hindus – and that of pigs – forbidden by Islam. The alarmed troops mutinied, turned on their officers, killing them and some of the families, and then raced toward the old imperial capital of Delhi.

The intervening century and a half has seen the growth of a rich and varied historiographical tradition surrounding the causes and context of the revolt. Was the rebellion a glorified mutiny provoked by indifferent British leadership of the restive native armies, as was argued by many contemporary critics? Or was it, perhaps, the result of a vast religious and political intrigue, as the colonial administration maintained? Later assessments have found, among other interpretations, an outbreak of leaderless peasant revolts in the face of mounting economic distress (Stokes 1978, 1986); a restoration campaign on behalf of the fallen Muslim Mughal Empire (Buckler 1972); an anti-colonial resistance movement fueled by radical changes in land ownership (Mukherjee 2002); an expression of fundamental alterations in social, cultural, and sexual relationships between colonizers and colonized (Sharpe 1993; Paxton 1999; Park
2000); and a “fictive event” of epochal impact on Victorian and post-Victorian consciousness that decisively outweighed its objective historical import (Herbert 2008, 3).

At the time of the rebellion itself, however, Anglo-Indian officials had no doubt: this was nothing less than a “Mahommedan conspiracy,” fuelled by Muslim “fanaticism” and “lust” for religious warfare, which managed to suborn the traditionally placid Hindus to make common cause against the Christian interlopers. At the center of this conspiracy, said the victorious British, sat the aged Muhammad Bahadur Shah II, formally the latest in a long line of Mughal emperors but in reality little more than a British pensioner with a domain limited to the confines of the high walls at Delhi’s famed Red Fort palace.

Summing up the government’s case against the man now in the dock, listed with bureaucratic understatement in contemporary documents simply as the “ex-King of Delhi,” chief prosecutor Major F. J. Harriott told the grandly named European Military Commission:

The known restless spirit of Mahommedan fanaticism has been the first aggressor, the vindictive intolerance of that peculiar faith has been struggling for mastery, seditious conspiracy has been its means, the prisoner [Bahadur Shah] its active accomplice, and every possible crime its frightful result…

Thus the bitter zeal of Mahommedanism meets us everywhere. It is conspicuous in the papers, flagrant in the petitions, and perfectly demonic in its actions. There seems, indeed, scarce any exemption from its contagious touch (Parliamentary papers, 152).13

Harriott, the deputy judge advocate-general, had already led the successful prosecution of members of the king’s court and much of his male kin, many of whom were hanged for rebellion against British rule. A number of others had already been executed summarily in the immediate aftermath of the

British assault on the Red Fort. Much to the chagrin of Harriott, and that of other senior colonial officials, the ex-King would not face a similar fate, for he had been promised by the British officer on the spot that his life would be spared in exchange for his peaceful surrender.

Any disappointment Harriott may have felt over the promise to spare the king’s life, which the Anglo-Indian establishment loudly decried as “unauthorized” but nonetheless decided to honor, was more than compensated for by the zeal the prosecutor unleashed in describing the Muslim conspiracy. Still, it is clear that Harriott’s address to the military court was not merely his personal assessment of the events of 1857 but represented the collective opinion of British colonial officialdom after a lengthy investigation into the Rebellion conducted by local resident agents, linguists and translators, intelligence officers, and so on. “Our investigation has involved inquiry over a period of several months, when rebellion was rampant in this city; and I trust we have succeeded in tracing, with considerable minuteness, many of the different events as they evolved themselves,” Harriott told the military tribunal. “I, of course, allude to the causes, either remote or immediate, which gave rise to a revolt unparalleled in the annals of history” (Parliamentary papers, 133-34).

For Harriott and his teams of colonial investigators and intelligence bureaucrats, what they universally referred to as “the mutiny” began as a minor disturbance in the Bengal Native Army and was then cunningly manipulated by Indian Muslims, backed by an international Islamic revanchist movement that grouped together such disparate forces – and mutually distrustful rivals – as the Shi’ites of Persia, the Ottoman Turks, and the militant Sunni followers of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab.
At its center, sat the figure of Bahadur Shah, whose native cunning, scheming temperament, and bloodthirsty nature belied his eighty-three years, his gentle countenance, his love of calligraphy, and his skillful composition of Sufi poetry. This was, in short, the dominant discourse of the ruling Anglo-Indian elite, one taken up enthusiastically by the public at large back home in England and elsewhere in the West. And one whose echoes can still be heard in the discursive formation that comprises today’s war on terrorism.

Inflamed by the news media and the popular literary journals, the British public rallied in support of an aggressive, even bloodthirsty, stance against the defeated rebels. Relying on wild gossip, fear-mongering, and rampant rumor, especially reports – inaccurate, as it happens – of the widespread sexual abuse of English women before they were killed by their native captors, the Victorian press created an “imagined India,” a dark place that could be forcibly subdued and ruled but never wholly trusted, reformed, or uplifted (Park 2000, 87-89; Brantlinger 1988, 200). The idea of “empire” as an ennobling enterprise would never be the same again.

Pulp novels set in the times of the rebellion and fusing violence and sex with exotic Indian locales soon emerged as a popular and remarkably enduring literary form. By one count, at least fifty such works were produced before 1900, with another thirty or more appearing before World War II (Brantlinger 1988, 199). The popular journals of the day were not to be outdone. They quickly jettisoned any discussion of errant colonial administrators and incompetent military leaders that may have been to blame for the rebellion and asserted that an iron fist was the only way to tame “Asiatic barbarism” and “fanaticism.”
Thus, the *Illustrated London News*, under the personal direction of Charles Dickens, presented the conflict in clear tones of racial and religious essentialism: “Bengal Sepahees,\(^{14}\) who, from good and valiant soldiers, have, through the instrumentality of wild fanaticism and their own worse passions … become converted … into miscreant thieves and murderers” (8 August 1857, 186; cited in Peters 2000, 116). One month later, the journal introduced its readers to the king of the north Indian state of Adwadh, a “true Mahommedan type – bloodthirsty, vindictive, selfish and dissolute, and unrelenting” (12 September 1857, 257; cited in Peters 2000, 117). Such villains were juxtaposed to the figure of the valiant Englishman, hopelessly outnumbered but ultimately victorious and now avenging the lost honor of his countrywomen through bloody, but wholly necessary, reprisals. As such, he was transformed in the public imagination from the helpless victim of Indian violence to the powerful, righteous defender of Victorian womanhood and the British way of life (Park 2000, 87-88).

Dickens’ *Illustrated London News* had no time for half-measures, and it endorsed the proposed razing of Delhi in the name of British security, an idea the military authorities eventually dropped. “[N]o cry … of cruelty that may arise from the ultra-humanitarians, ‘who live at home in ease’, will prevent or retard consummation,” it thundered (12 September 1857; cited in Peters 2000, 121). Nor were such views restricted to a British Empire facing down the threat of insurrection. The American writer Oliver Wendell Holmes used the pages of the new *Atlantic Monthly* to endorse British vengeance and urge the “deletion” of the Mughal capital from the face of the earth: “The India mail brings stories of

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\(^{14}\) From the Persian and Urdu *sipahi*, soldier or horseman. The most common British usage is *sepoy*, which I have used unless the reference comes in a quotation as it does here.
women and children outraged and murdered; the royal stronghold is in the hands of the babe-killers. England takes down the Map of the World, which she has girdled with empire, and makes a correction thus: [DELHI] Dele. The civilized world says, Amen” (Holmes 1894, 96; cited in Stokes 1986, 92).

There were, to be sure, some discordant voices at the time. Most famous among them was that of Benjamin Disraeli, who used a long address to the House of Commons to identify “an accumulation of adequate causes” that included disruption of India’s social and economic order, general heavy-handedness by the colonial authorities, increased interference in local dynastic politics, and growing isolation and alienation of the British military and colonial administrators from the people, languages, and cultures of the subcontinent. Karl Marx, writing in the New York Daily Tribune, viewed the affair as nascent nationalist rebellion (Brantlinger 1988, 202).

J. W. Kaye, the early historian of the Rebellion, saw the revolt as grounded in the broader Indian civil society, a view with which his colleague, G. B. Malleson, generally concurred (Malleson 1858: 63; Stokes 1986, 5). Others, including the prominent correspondent from the Times, William Howard Russell, questioned whether the British even had the right to try Bahadur Shah. After all, the East India Company that ruled much of the region was formally still his vassal and agent, and so the legal theory that he could be in rebellion and guilty of treason against the Company and against England was tenuous at best (Russell 1860, 2:60-61; Dalrymple 2006, 399-400).

But there was no stopping the official diagnosis of a vast Muslim conspiracy, and Harriott offered the court a wealth of evidence and documentation to support this view. These included witness statements against
the king – often from Christian converts, Hindu courtiers, or those who had
remained close to the British – and official orders and proclamations said to bear
the imperial seal of Bahadur Shah. Yet, the heart of the case against the last of
the Mughals was essentially rhetorical, patched together from familiar elements
of the anti-Islam discourse, without which Harriott’s official version of the
Indian rebellion would have collapsed under its own shoddy legal construction
and sheer logical absurdity.

Among the evidence presented against the defendant, Harriott reminded
the court in his summation, was an order from the king at the outset of the
disturbances that his royal guards take full control of weapons, powder, and
ammunition stored in the magazine. This might seem like a wise precaution in
times of political instability and social unrest, when angry native soldiers were
swarming over the sacred precincts of the Red Fort and demanding the aging
king lead their cause against the British. But in Harriott’s hands it becomes
_prima facie_ evidence of well-planned criminal conspiracy, underpinned by the
inherent cognitive shortcomings and lack of rational judgment and forethought
of Bahadur Shah and his fellow Muslims:

We thus see with what alertness and dispatch this most important object, the
seizure of the magazine, was attempted. Is it, however, to be believed that such
was the ready, immediate, and, as it were, impulsive decision of the king, or of
those who formed the court? To attribute to them anything of this nature would
be to give them credit for a coolness of calculation, combined with a quickness
of apprehension, such as pertains only to the more gifted of mankind
(Parliamentary papers, 138).

Harriott also takes aim at the notion that there could have been any
rational grounds for rebellion against British colonial domination – as we have
seen, a familiar rhetorical device that serves to underscore the religious
fanaticism on the part of the Muslims, irrational and reflexive, as the only true
cause and to deprive them of any real voice. The affair of the greased cartridges was but a pretext; after all, any sepoy truly offended by the idea of coming in contact with animal fat could simply have resigned from the army and spared his religious sensibilities. Nor was the mounting Christian missionary zeal of many officers and colonial administrators to blame.

“It seems beyond the bounds of reason to imagine that these men were drawn into acts of such revolting atrocity by any grievance real or imagined. … I believe, indeed, that the facts elicited on this point may be ranged appropriately under the head of ‘Mahommedan conspiracy,’ this chief object of which seems to have been the spread of disaffection and distrust of British rule, and… to prepare all the people for change and insurrection” (Parliamentary papers, 135, 147). This must have originated with the king, as titular head of the Muslim community, and his court.

But Bahadur Shah was not working alone, Harriott asserted. Rather, he sat at the center of an international Muslim plot, backed by the Shi’ites of Persia and the Ottoman Turks and abetted by religious fanatics whipped up by itinerant Muslim preachers and other clerical leaders. The prosecution case on the former score rests on anonymous announcements and placards, supported by widespread newspaper reports, that popped up in Delhi heralding – falsely – the imminent arrival of the Persian armies, backed by the Turks and perhaps even by England’s rivals the Russians and the French, in support the rebellion. “Are we then to suppose in all this that there was no connection between the palace and the press? Were all these concurrences fortuitous? … Are the circumstances appealing to Mahommedan pride, to their superstitious bigotry, to their lust for
religious war, and to their hatred for the English, dwelt upon with a less perfect knowledge of their peculiar inheritances?” (Parliamentary papers, 150).

Finally, Harriott turns to the Muslims’ penchant for violence, a quality inherent to their faith. In doing so, he suddenly makes half the population of Delhi, much of north India, and the overwhelming majority of the rebellious Bengal Army, that is the Hindus, somehow disappear completely from the scene, and essentially absolves them from any meaningful role in the revolt.\textsuperscript{15} Harriott reminds the military court that one government witness, Jat Mall, one of a number of Hindus to testify against the king, had reported no enthusiasm for the rebellion among “respectable” Hindus, while “the Mahommedans as a body were all pleased at the overthrow of the British Government” (Parliamentary papers, 146).

In fact, the prosecutor’s investigation concluded that the Hindu population had been essentially forced to go along with their militant Muslim neighbors in revolting against India’s colonial masters:

[I]t is a most significant fact on these proceedings, that though we come upon traces of Mussulman intrigue wherever our investigation has carried us, yet not one paper has been found to show that the Hindus, as a body, had been conspiring against us, or that their Brahmins and priests had been preaching a crusade against Christians. In their case, there has been no king to set up, no religion to be propagated by the sword…

Hinduism, I may say, is nowhere either reflected or represented; it if be brought forward at all, it is only in subservience to its ever-aggressive neighbor. The arguments in reference to a Mahommedan conspiracy are now closed (Parliamentary papers, 148-49, 153).

It took the five-member European Military Commission only a matter of minutes to reach a unanimous verdict of guilty on all counts against Bahadur Shah, ratifying the government’s grand vision that a large Muslim conspiracy, fuelled by sectarian hatred and the violence of the faith, lay behind the worst

\textsuperscript{15} Percival Spear puts the total Delhi population at the time at around 160,000, more or less evenly divided between Muslims and Hindus (Spear 1980: 194).
native unrest to strike at the heart of the great British Empire. Had it not been for the promise of the officer who had arranged his surrender, the last of the Mughals would certainly have hanged. Instead, he was eventually transported to Rangoon where he died in captivity in 1862, aged 87.

On the face of it, the government case for a “Mahommedan conspiracy” looks unpromising at best. In the first place, the British themselves had, since the late eighteenth century, deliberately set out to create the very Bengal Army that was later to be at the center of the rebellion as a virtual Hindu institution, dominated by high-caste Hindu peasants and farmers: Rajputs, the traditional warriors of north India; the priestly class of Brahmins; or their military wing, the Bhumimars (David 2003, 20; Dalrymple 2007, 126). In British eyes, this approach conferred a number of important benefits, not the least of which was the heavy reliance on the very agrarian class that had served as the traditional backbone of their own armed forces back home. Further, members of the higher castes were seen as physically bigger and stronger than those of lower social groups. And high caste was presumed to carry with it greater loyalty to the British cause while at the same time providing the colonial masters with greater social and political legitimacy within Indian society (Alavi 1995, 39; David 2003, 19-20).

The deliberate recruitment of high-status Hindus was accompanied by a number of measures that tended to reinforce caste distinctions and play to the religious and social sensitivities of the Rajputs and Brahmins, a process Seema Alavi has called the “sankritization” of the armed forces (Alavi 1995, 76). These included the agreement, although later rescinded, not to deploy these sepoys across the “black water” – that is, across the sea, in violation of caste rules. Even
more important, was the elaborate attention paid to the requirements of caste dietary laws, efforts that often exceeded what the recruit might have been able to demand back in their native villages (Alavi 1995, 76). The net effect was creation of considerable esprit de corps in the Bengal Army regiments, grounded in a heightened awareness of Hindu caste and the notion of being part of an Indian military elite.

By 1815, upper-caste Hindus comprised around eighty percent of the infantry in the Bengal Army. This declined to around two-thirds by 1842 as the British began to incorporate more middle Hindu castes as well as Muslims, and it was further reduced somewhat in succeeding years. Yet, the mutinous regiments were virtually all dominated by high-caste Hindus, with Muslims typically comprising just twenty percent or so of recruits – on par with “middling” Hindu castes and well below that of the Rajputs and Brahmins taken together (David 2003, 22-24). Bengal Army regiments with a majority of upper-caste Hindus overwhelmingly sided with the mutiny, while those where Muslims predominated, such as the eighteen regiments of Bengal Irregular Cavalry, or the Bengal Artillery, were far less involved in the rebellion, if at all (David 2003, 25-26).

Second, there was the matter of packaging Bahadur Shah as the active genius behind a vast Muslim military and sectarian plot that cut across northern India’s complex politics and reached into Persia and Constantinople, and even extended to England’s Western rivals, the courts of Paris and Moscow. By the time hundreds of armed sepoy rebels, fresh from the mutiny at Meerut and the slaughter of British officers, administrators, women and children, burst into the Red Fort in May of 1857 and demanded he lead their rebellion against the
British, the king was eighty-two years old and had little of the energy, let alone the practical experience, that such an undertaking would have required. Rather, the last of the Mughals was, among other accomplishments, a major Sufi poet and a great connoisseur of the arts, but he evinced none of the political acumen, military prowess, or sweeping vision of his famed ancestors, Genghis Khan and Timur.

This incongruity was not lost on William Howard Russell, the *Times* correspondent. Escorted to see the royal prisoner after the recapture of Delhi, Russell could not help wondering: “Was he, indeed, one who had conceived that vast plan of restoring a great empire, who had fomented the most gigantic mutiny in the history of the world? … His eyes had the dull, filmy look of very old age” (Russell 1860, i:60; cited in Dalrymple 2006, 8).

Even Harriott, the prosecutor, had allowed that Bahadur Shah might have been swept up by the logic of Muslim militancy, although this in no way mitigated his own guilt: “Insignificant and contemptible as to any outward show of power, it would appear that this possessor of mere nominal royalty has ever been looked upon by Mahommedan fanaticism as the head and culminating star of its faith” (*Parliamentary papers*, 134). For his part, Bahadur Shah maintained his innocence and told the court, in a three-page written submission that comprised his entire defense, that he had been the virtual prisoner of the rebels: “What confidence could I place in troops who had murdered their own masters? In the same way that they murdered them, so they made me a prisoner, and tyrannized over me, keeping me on in order to make use of my name as a sanction for their acts” (*Parliamentary papers*, 133).
Other elements of the plot were equally problematic. Much was made in
British colonial circles and in the press of the role of volunteer detachments of
militant Muslim devotees, led by their maulavis, or learned preachers, and
committed to a *jihad* against the British. Certainly, there were significant
elements in and around Delhi who had long rejected the Mughal court’s historic
engagement with Sufism and its syncretic, heterodox approach to religion and
society – the king’s own mother was a Rajput, as were many of the royal
women. None of these religious figures were more influential than Shah
Waliullah and his followers, whose views and influence in the subcontinent
paralleled those of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the future Wahhabi movement of
Arabia.\(^\text{16}\)

Yet, there remain significant doubts surrounding both the actual numbers
and the military utility of these religious volunteers, untrained and poorly armed
as they were, in the face of the disciplined British units and their still-loyal
native forces. Standard accounts from the day put the defenders of Delhi
confronting the British assault at around thirty thousand (Roberts 1898, 13),
while General Hope Grant’s private journals report another seventy thousand
volunteers in support, “most Mahommedans … armed to the teeth and capable of
fighting even more desperately than the sepoys” (Grant 1873, 86-87).

More recent scholarship, relying in part on accounts from Delhi residents
and other Indian witnesses, has put the number closer to seven thousand to ten
thousand, roughly on par with a British-led attacking force backed by powerful
artillery units that made the final conquest of Delhi “relatively easy” (Stokes

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\(^{16}\) For a recent argument that the Indian Rebellion was in fact a Wahabbi-inspired plot and part
of a continuum with today’s militant violence, see Charles Allen, *God’s terrorists: The Wahabbi
1986, 94). Even contemporary British documents seem to cast some doubt on the theory of a revolt fuelled by widespread Muslim zeal. The so-called Descriptive Rolls, a most-wanted list of four hundred or so prominent rebels assembled by the colonial administration, included the names and other details of relatively few religious leaders (Llewellyn-Jones 2007, 43; Chick 1974, 163).

Moreover, there is considerable evidence that Bahadur Shah resolutely refused the play the card of religious war, despite the demands of the militant maulavis and the appearance of anonymous proclamations of *jihad* in Delhi’s main mosque. A courtier’s diary, published well after the events, recounts the king’s anger at attempts to stoke sectarian passions. “This day the standard of the Holy War was raised by the Mahommedans in the [main] Jumma Masjid,” recorded Mainodin Hassan Khan, the Delhi *kotwal*, or police chief, on 19 May 1857. “The King was very angry and remonstrated, because such a display of fanaticism would only tend to exasperate the Hindus.” The *kotwal* noted in the next day’s entry that Bahadur Shah successfully ordered the removal of the Green standard of holy war on the grounds that “such a *jihad* was quite impossible and such an idea an act of extreme folly, for the majority of the [native] soldiers were Hindus” (quoted in Metcalfe 1898, 98).

The successful prosecution of Bahadur Shah as the central figure in a vast Muslim conspiracy shows once again the benefit conferred by the anti-Muslim discourse. Here, it virtually dictated both the ways the British colonial regime apprehended the Indian Rebellion and its practical and policy responses to the crisis, as well as public willingness to accept them as fitting, natural, and just. This Western narrative of Islam as violent and fanatical dovetails neatly
with Harriott’s prosecution, and it was so clearly at work in preventing alternative approaches or explanations from receiving serious consideration.

As we have seen throughout this study, it is the power of a discourse to dictate what cannot be said that is among its most salient features. In the case of the Indian rebellion, it was the anti-Islam discourse that made it simply not possible for the public to wonder, as did a few isolated voices, how it was that an overwhelmingly Hindu army had so easily become the tools of revanchist Muslim militants under the leadership of an aged and infirm “shadow” emperor who spent his days composing mystical verse in Urdu, Persian, and Punjabi and practicing his exquisite calligraphy inside a fort that comprised the whole of his domain.

Not surprisingly, this same discourse was also in keeping with the self-interest of India’s colonial and military establishment, particularly that of its leading administrators and its leading experts on intelligence, security, and religious affairs. For the military and political leadership of British India, the notion of a Muslim conspiracy at the heart of the events of 1857 effectively inoculated them against any whiff of incompetence or malfeasance in allowing the outbreak of rebellion in the first place. Advancing and perpetuating the anti-Islam discourse advanced the interests of the entire colonial enterprise by marginalizing any possible, legitimate grievances – such as an end to foreign domination, or to British-fostered disruptions in the local economy, or to growing fears of Christian evangelism – that may have mobilized the rebels.
Likewise, it benefited a generation of Islam experts and Orientalist scholars who drew heavily on the anti-Islam discourse and their experiences in India.

* * *

Foremost among these scholars was the enigmatic figure of William Muir, who stood at the nexus of intelligence, scholarship, and the media – a powerful position that prefigures the role of today’s star “terrorism experts” at the center of the contemporary Islam discourse. Muir received a battlefield promotion during the earliest days of the uprising to head the British intelligence effort, a task he carried out with dedication and zeal. Colonial officials “had wisely organized an Intelligence department, of which William Muir had the chief direction. … [a]nd no man could have done the work better than Muir,” concluded J. W. Kaye, the first historian of the Indian Rebellion (Kaye 1876, iii:406). Like many other intelligence officers of the day, Muir was a scholar of Islam and author of a number of books and religious pamphlets on the subject. He also apparently led a secret life during the rebellion, filing news reports for the Times under the pen name Judex (Taylor 1996, 174).

Muir’s own intelligence findings, the reports of his spies and other informants, and his correspondence with leading military men, colonial figures, and resident agents across the areas affected by the uprising have been compiled into an invaluable collection, the Records of the Intelligence Department of the government of the North-West Provinces of India during the mutiny of 1857.17 Taken together, this collection offers important evidence of just how the prevailing discourse of Islam shaped the British perception and understanding of events unfolding around them and then determined their responses.

17 Hereafter, this two-volume collection will be referred in citations as Records. For the sake of clarity, I have substituted standardized, contemporary spellings for place names used in the original.
What is equally striking here is how this discourse also manages to crowd out or marginalize other interpretations – competing texts – that threatened to contradict or challenge it. The pervasive power of this “crowding” effect can be seen in the early historiography of the war. Some of the earliest accounts of the affair, including that of J. W. Kaye, saw the rebellion as an expression of deep discontent across Indian society and blamed the military and colonial administration for ignoring what was in essence a national insurrection. But subsequent colonial histories, including a later reworking of Kaye’s classic study, tended to give more and more weight to the notion of a Muslim conspiracy (Stokes 1986, 4-8).

Muir’s own intelligence reports and correspondence are dotted throughout with references to Muslim fanaticism. Alluding to the cartridge affair in a letter to his brother of 2 June 1857, Muir notes: “It is the very nature of the Mahometan faith to seize upon such an incident as a religious principle, impelling the more devoted or fanatical to an attempt for re-establishing the ascendancy of Islam” (Records, 35). Four months later in another letter to the same brother, Muir explains the rebels’ success at Aligarh: “All the ancient feelings of warring for the faith, reminding one of the days of the first Caliphs, were resuscitated” (Records, i:46).

Reporting from his base in Agra, which held out successfully against the rebels, Muir’s intelligence note of 6 October 1857 reads: “You will remember that a week or ten days ago the Mohammedan fanatics of this district, joined by some bad characters, ejected our adherent, Rajah Gobind Singh, who with … a few others, were holding [Aligarh] for us” (Records: i:174). He described nearby Akrabad as “a nest of fanaticism and disaffection” (Records: i:175).
Muir’s informants and colleagues all saw the rebellion in the very much the same light as the intelligence chief. One informant's brief note of 16 July 1857 reports that a town outside Aligarh was bent on Muslim holy war: “Coel is in disorder. The fanatical lower Mussulmans … raising the cry of “Deen – Deen” [faith – faith]. No traveler safe” (Records, ii:6). And Muir’s primary informant on Indian Muslim affairs was not a Muslim at all, but the pious Hindu Chaube Ghuanshaym Das, brother of Raja Jai Kishen Das. Like Muir and other colonial officials, both men saw the uprising exclusively as an exercise in restoring Islam to predominance in the region (Bayly 1996, 326). E. A. Reade, a senior administrator at Agra, meanwhile, reported that “mussulmanophobia” swept the town in the first two months of the rebellion (cited in Bayly 1996, 324). Trapped inside their fort and virtually cut off from all sources of information, the British of Agra nevertheless knew who was to blame for the insurrection and ensuing mayhem.

The same discursive formation at work here can be seen clearly in Muir’s own academic studies of Islam, reflecting the seamless union of security analysis and Orientalist scholarship that we have already seen in the works of Bernard Lewis, Steven Simon, and Richard Benjamin. Among his scholarly titles, are The life of Mahomet (1861); The Caliphate, its rise, decline, and fall: From original sources (1892); and The Coran: Its composition and teaching, and the testimony it bears to the Holy Scriptures (1896). Muir is also the author of The rise and decline of Islam (1883), which reveals striking parallels between his understanding of Islam and his earlier intelligence work during the Indian rebellion.
Reprising the themes of the Western discourse of Islam in general, Muir constructs an Islam that founders without the backing of military force and the promise of unlimited sexual gratification to its male followers. “The progress of Islam was slow until Mahomet cast aside the precepts of toleration, and adopted an aggressive, militant policy. Then it became rapid,” Muir writes in a one-page preface to *The rise and decline of Islam*. “As the first spread of Islam was due to the sword, so when the sword was sheathed Islam ceased to spread” (27).

Muir acknowledges that Islam’s teachings contain some philosophical truths, but he has no doubt that without armed force and material inducements, including men’s access to multiple sexual partners, it would have never progressed beyond the confines of Arabia and become a world faith. “The weapons of its warfare were ‘carnal’, material and earthly; and by them it conquered. … The license allowed by the Coran between the sexes – at least in favor of the male sex – is so wide, that for such as have the means and desire to take advantage of it, there need be no limit whatever to sexual indulgence” (20, 31).

He then seeks to scandalize his readers with lurid tales of sexual license among the Muslims of “modern times.” This includes an account of some unnamed “Malays of Penang” who had up to twenty wives by the age of 35; a report from Edward William Lane’s canonical Orientalist text, *Manners and customs of the modern Egyptians*, of men who take a new wife every month; and a tale of a 45-year-old Arab who divorced two wives and married two other women every year so that he had had fifty wives in all (1883: 33). I will explore further the discourse of Islam and women in Chapter Seven.
While both of these themes, the Muslim as inherently violent and as sexual deviant, clearly come straight from the Crusades-era discourse of Islam, Muir, himself, draws a straight line between his own thinking and that of the medieval polemicists whose legacy he inherits. In fact, Muir openly invokes the “author” of a famous medieval anti-Muslim text of uncertain provenance for many of the ideas presented in *The rise and decline of Islam*: “Such are the reflections of one who lived at a Mahometan Court, and who, moreover – flourishing as he did a thousand years ago – was sufficiently near the early spread of Islam to be able to contrast what he saw, and heard, and read, of the causes of its success with those of the Gospels, and had the courage to confess the same” (28).

This is a reference to no less than the *Apology of al-Kindi*, which purports to represent a ninth-century Christian’s adversarial dialogue with a Muslim friend who seeks the former’s conversion to Islam. Little is known about the actual origins of the text, although it is almost certainly not – as Muir confidently asserts – from inside the Abbasid court of Caliph al-Mamun, who died in 833. Rather, it represents one example in an established genre of pseudo-epistles tailored to fit the times and context of theological debate. In case of the *Apology*, it was most likely written in Arabic by a Nestorian Christian, with some borrowings from what appear to be tenth-century texts. Even the name of the “author” gives away its generic quality. The text itself identifies him only as al-Kindi, while a later work calls him Abd al-Masih al-Kindi, a clear reference to Jesus Christ (*Isa al-Masih*) and invoking his role as Christian champion (Daniel 1960, 6; Tolan 2002, 60-63; Burman 2007, 77). This same text was used by Peter the Venerable, the Abbot of Cluny, in the twelfth century in the preparation
of his own attacks on Islam, the *Summa totius haeresis Saracenorum* and the *Contra sectam sine haeresim Saracenorum* (Kritzeck 1956, 178-79).

As might be expected, the discourse of Muslims as inherently violent, treacherous, and fanatical determined British actions and policy responses throughout the crisis. And it paved the way for the widespread notion of the sexual abuse of English women and girls before they were killed by their Indian captors. At the outset of the uprising, it also impelled colonial administrators to purge the rolls of many skilled Muslim civil servants, depriving the system of much-needed talent and of valuable sources of information, understanding, and institutional memory.

In an entry dated 20 July 1857, Muir acknowledges the heavy British reliance on Muslims – Hindu civil servants were then comparatively rare – for “information and advice.” But, he laments, they were simply no longer reliable: “However excellent and trustworthy these men under other circumstances might have been, they were now placed in a peculiarly trying position from the religious and Mahometan element at this time dominant in the Mutineer movement.” He goes on to praises the “judicious” decision by his superiors to rely mainly on the Hindus, “whom alone we can, at this juncture, as a body depend upon….” (*Records*, i:12-13).

Just as the use of the anti-Islam discourse by George W. Bush and others set the stage for today’s war on terrorism and virtually ensured that any Western reaction would be confined solely to military and security responses, so the same narrative guaranteed the bloodthirsty repression of the Indian uprising by the victorious British. By stripping out other possible causes and eliminating competing texts, the prevailing view of violent Muslim conspiracy closed off all
avenues – such as economic or social reform; religious tolerance; recognition of local political tradition; and so on – that might have been used to redefine relations between British ruler and Indian ruled. Instead, the embedded notion of Islam as essentially violent, and implacably so, left the conquerors of Delhi with only one option – brute force to exterminate the threat.

Whole mahals, or city quarters, were raided, their civilian populations slaughtered and their goods plundered by giddy British forces and their loyal native soldiers. Not even those whose support for the colonial masters had never flagged, such as some of the big merchant families or the local nobility, were spared. One British “gentleman” recalled in letters to the British and Indian press the prevailing sentiment that saw the native populace not as human beings but as “fiends, or, at best, wild beasts deserving only the death of dogs” (quoted in Martin, 449; Herbert 2008, 180). In such circumstances, he continued, mercy was not on offer:

All the city people found within the walls when our troops entered were bayoneted on the spot; and the number was considerable, as you may suppose when I tell you that some forty or fifty persons were often found hiding in one house. They were not mutineers, but residents of the city, who trusted to our well-known mild rule for pardon. I am glad to say that there were to be disappointed” (quoted in Martin, 449; see also Herbert 2008, 180 and Dalrymple 2006, 336-37).

With the insurrection increasingly under control in the autumn of 1857 and Delhi now firmly once again in the hands of the British military, this same discourse continued to exercise its influence on both colonial policy and the official assessments of just what, exactly, had gone wrong in the first place. The British immediately set about reorganizing the colonial civil service, especially the police who had largely disappeared or even joined in the rebellion, with an eye to far greater use of Hindus. Likewise, this same narrative shaped the question of what to do with the conquered capital and its huge civilian
population, which had been effectively expelled to the countryside by British forces and was in dire need of adequate shelter, food, and water and subject to attack by roaming bands of local tribesmen.

Senior civil authorities, like William Muir and C. B. Saunders, the commissioner at Delhi, remonstrated with the military commanders to relax their grip on the vacant capital and to recognize a distinction between the Muslim enemy and more trustworthy Hindus among a refugee population of around 150,000 people. In a letter of 12 October 1857, more than three weeks after the recapture of the city, Muir approvingly quotes Saunders as having pressed his case on behalf of the Hindus:

I have been anxious to induce them [the armed forces], at any rate, to permit the respectable Hindu merchant families, bunyas [entrepreneurs], and trades people generally, to return to their occupations, but hitherto with little success. I conceive that there really is no good ground for excluding the above, as no danger need be anticipated from allowing them to re-enter the town and return to their avocations. The case is different with a very large proportion of the Mahometan population who have taken so prominent and violent a part against us (Records, i:190).

For his part, Muir argues that the extreme hardships faced by the expelled populace risk fuelling further rebellion and that exceptions must be made, at least for non-Muslims: “[A]mong the Hindu portion, at any rate of the one hundred and fifty-three thousand inhabitants, there must be numerous and large classes which one would have thought might have been easily distinguishable as not disaffected and as safely to be readmitted” (Records: ii:92). Elsewhere, Muir reacts to an intelligence report that the Hindus of Bareilly had fared badly in the rebellion, suffering financial losses and insults to their caste standing with a familiar response: “These facts should open the eyes of the Hindus to the
real object of the rebellion, and show them what they have to expect from their Mahommedan fellow-countrymen” (Records ii:178).

As with Harriott’s prosecution of Bahadur Shah, the intelligence officers and political administrators of British India could not escape the anti-Islam discourse, even when presented with evidence that seemed to challenge the accepted central narrative. Thus, the information compiled in the Records of the Intelligence Department can result ultimately in only one reading of the raw intelligence from spies, informants, the local Indian press, and other sources.

In the midst of the crisis, Lord Canning, the governor-general, directed Muir to investigate the alleged rape and sexual abuse of English women and girls held in captivity by the rebels and subsequently murdered. The result is thirteen pages of memoranda, reports, surveys, letters, and so on, collected under the heading of “Memo. on Treatment of European Females” (Records, i:367-379). Muir’s investigation leads him to conclude that there was, in fact, no pattern of sexual abuse although individual incidents may have occurred. Rather, the awe with which the Indians view their colonial masters, even as they sought to overthrow and kill them, “operated to chill and repress the idea of any familiar approach,” while the “cold and heartless bloodthirstiness” directed against the English remained “at the farthest remove from the lust of desire.” (Records, i:369).

Muir’s cover letter to Lord Canning offers the hope of a “melancholy satisfaction” from his findings that may “lighten many a heart bowed down with a grief which the thought of simple death even in its cruelest form would not occasion” (Records, i:367). Despite the conclusions of this top-level
investigation, tales of rape and other sexual abuse of the female prisoners became a staple of both the political discourse of the day and a recurring theme in the copious literary output inspired back home by the Indian rebellion. Given the established anti-Muslim discourse, it was unthinkable not to think that such outrages did not take place in the land of the “oriental” harem and the zanana. And so, no one did.

Similarly, on 8 January 1858 Muir notes that a police investigation under a Major Williams into the earliest days of the uprising, at Meerut, had made substantial progress into unraveling the causes of the rebellion: “Major Williams is getting on marvelously with his Meerut police investigation, and will have a mass of evidence as to the origin of the Mutiny which will not fit easily with the popular notion of a long preconceived plot” (Records: i:338). Four days later, Muir summarizes Williams’ preliminary findings that the insurrection was largely the work of “a disorganized mob” with no real discernible objectives or goals (Records: i:342).

But by now the case against Bahadur Shah and his international Muslim conspiracy – what Muir blandly calls the “popular notion” – was the official, agreed text of the Indian Mutiny, and the case against Bahadur Shah was about to go to court, sealing the acceptance of the official version of the events of 1857 as a vast Muslim conspiracy and all that has flowed from it ever since. There were simply too many institutionalized interests to allow any reassessment of the discourse of Islam and violence in light of what might actually have been happening on the ground.

As we have seen throughout this study, other Western social groups and institutions, in other times and other settings, have repeatedly benefited from this
same discourse. Medieval Europe’s considerable mobilization of men, money, and materiel for the First Crusade would have been impossible without a powerful narrative that cast the Muslim as the violent, death-dealing Other, intent on the destruction of Christendom and the enslavement of its people. In the hands of eleventh-century reformers and ideologues – Europe’s first “Islam experts” – this discourse advanced a program of radical restructuring of Church-state relations, opened the prospects to Latin Christendom’s eastward expansion, aided the purging of dissident theological voices, and enhanced the overall social standing of the established religious hierarchy.

The early modern period saw Europe effectively resigned to the continued presence of a large Muslim empire on its eastern flank. Yet, lively trade and growing diplomatic contact, and even the odd treaty, between the Ottoman court and the emerging European nation-states did little to break down or modify the established narrative of Islam and violence. Unable for a considerable time to contemplate anything except uneasy co-existence with its powerful neighbor, competing European diplomatic and religious factions instead invoked the discourse in their own internal rhetorical struggles. Thus, Protestant England could denounced the ruler of Catholic rival Spain as the new “Souldan,” or sultan, while both Luther and his enemies in the Church called down the Muslim scourge one another. This helped solidify the meaning and content of the discourse of Islam and violence in European consciousness and further separated it from the Muslims themselves.

For the senior colonial administrators and military leaders in India, Muslim fanaticism and predilection for violence provided the most useful and convenient explanation for the rebellion of 1857, one that diverted unwanted
attention from their own possible malfeasance. For the growing cohort of evangelical Christians in the colonial ranks, the discourse of Islam and violence justified and bolstered the importance of their expanding mission. For India’s Anglicized, non-Muslim elites, it reinforced their own reliability and value to the ruling British. For publishers and authors it produced an entire new literary genre of sensationalist tales of the abuse and even rape of Christian women and girls at the hands of their Muslim captors.

The same discourse freed the Victorian man to carry out bloody reprisals against the rebels and to avenge the flower of English womanhood, while the politicians and the public at large found in the discursive formation of Islam and violence invaluable support for the continued British presence in India and for England’s historic civilizing mandate. At the same time, it obscured any rational motivations or legitimate grievances on the part of the rebels, such as demands for an end to the British colonial presence, a halt to Western disruptions of local social and economic relations, or an end to Christian evangelism among the Hindu and Muslim populations.

Today, the discourse of violence in Islam securely underpins the war on terrorism. It colors its rhetoric and provides its political and academic language, with its own internal logic, as seen in the popular usage of such terms as jihad, crusade, martyrdom, and Islamofascism. As with the Indian rebellion one hundred and fifty years earlier, this discourse shapes official and public understanding of events, spells out policy responses, and determines their outcomes. It dismisses or eliminates altogether the enemy’s goals, motivations, or objectives, making negotiated settlement or other nonviolent resolution all but impossible. And it has served well a new generation of terrorism analysts,
military leaders, neo-conservative politicians, and corporate and media interests and allowed them to advance their own agendas within a powerful and established framework that effectively remains immune to serious challenge or revision.
Chapter Seven: Islam and women

Taken together, the discursive formations discussed in Chapter Five and Chapter Six have deprived the Muslims of any claim on modern science, that is, on the essence of modernity itself, and severely circumscribed their ability to defend themselves by force if necessary. These same narratives have left the Muslim world vulnerable to demands for radical social reforms along Western lines as the keys to material, political, and economic success. Nowhere is this more the case than in the relations between Muslim men and women. In fact, much of the Western discourse of Islam over the last two hundred years can be seen as a discourse of what the Victorians commonly referred to as women’s “degradation” within the tyranny of the Muslim family, which, in turn, stood for the despotism, violence, and backwardness of Muslim society as a whole.

Chapter Seven will trace the emergence of this discourse of Islam and women from within the greater anti-Islam narrative, from the Enlightenment to the war on terrorism. And it will show how the Enlightenment thinkers, beginning with Montesquieu, and their successors as Islam experts – from the classical Orientalist scholars, politicians, and travel writers of the nineteenth century to today’s experts and media commentators – have deployed and perpetuated the discourse of Islam and women by successfully harnessing the established narrative to advance their own social, political, and economic interests.

Beginning with the eighteenth century, the harem was the most frequently invoked symbol of such degradation and despotism. As Billie
Melman has argued, this notion of the harem came to encompass the entire Western critique of state and society in Islam:

From the earliest encounters between Christians and Muslims till the present, the harem as the locus of an exotic and abnormal sexuality fascinated Westerners. It came to be regarded as a microcosmic Middle East, apotheosizing the two characteristics perceived as essentially Oriental: sensuality and violence. … From the Enlightenment onwards, the harem came to be not merely a psychosexual symbol, but a metaphor for injustice in civil society and the state and arbitrary government (1992, 60).

By the early twentieth century, the institution of veiling had for the most part supplanted the harem as the focal point of Western attention, a position it still holds today. However, the underlying dynamics of the discourse of Islam and women remain unchanged. The end result is a “sexualization” of the general Western view of Islam and the Muslims, one in which the totality of Islamic beliefs, practices, even an entire civilization, is frequently reduced to Western perceptions and assessment of the male-female dynamic.

Witness the obsession with the veil – it use or disuse, its size and color, its degree of transparency, and so on – as a barometer of social progress and overall well-being within Islamic societies, which has become a commonplace of Western mass media coverage, social activism, and political discussion alike. The contemporary debate over the wearing of the veil among France’s large Muslim population, to present just one example for now, mirrors that of colonial Egypt under British rule.

The influence of Montesquieu on the early institutionalization of this process cannot be overlooked:

The most important work in this category was Montesquieu’s *Lettres persanes*. He used the whole accumulated apparatus of oriental legends to illustrate a variety of themes which have the central point of freedom. The political satire is clear, but it is not the most important element. It is the notion that women should be free that inspires this book. … Montesquieu conceived the family life in Islam as servitude. The image of the harem was of orgiastic license within, and the dead hand of jealousy without (Daniel 1967, 22).
The French novelist and thinker, for example, ignores relatively sophisticated contemporary accounts of actual Muslim beliefs and practices regarding women and sexuality – including works found in his own personal library – in favor of an imagined Orient that conforms to both the accepted discourse while simultaneously serving the author’s own polemical purposes.

Likewise, the later Victorian traveler – the *voyeur* par excellence – arrived in the Muslim world with a firmly fixed idea of Oriental society – cruel, sensual, languorous, and thus ripe for the picking, or at least for re-education. No degree of personal experience or observation could ever dispel what Leila Ahmed has called this “illusory familiarity” of the Orient (Ahmed 1978, 85).

When it failed to meet expectations or, worse, was simply off-limits or otherwise unattainable, as was generally the case with the precincts of the harem or the face of the veiled woman, it was simply conjured up from the existing discourse and accepted as an accurate representation of Eastern ways. In the Victorian mind, the degradation of Muslim women had to be addressed through an end to veiling and other practices that retarded social, political, and economic development and prevented the adoption of Western ways and the integration of Muslim Egypt into the worldwide capitalist order.

Today, this same argument can be heard loud and clear across the political spectrum, where the armed invasion of Muslim lands and the projected remaking of Muslim societies and their economies are routinely cast in terms of the liberation of the veiled woman and an end to Muslim backwardness. No wonder, then, that Bernard Lewis, one of the intellectual architects of the war on terrorism, has called the status of women “probably the most profound single difference between the two civilizations” (2002, 67).
As we have already seen in the literary and cultural responses of such disparate figures as Spencer, Shakespeare, and Luther, the economic, military, and political power and influence of the Muslim empires throughout Europe’s early modern period was simply too great to dismiss them or wish them away. The Muslims, it seemed, were destined to remain a permanent fixture on the periphery of the Western world, to be deplored and combated as existential enemies, to be engaged in trade, or to be called upon as allies or otherwise accommodated – or perhaps all three at once – as circumstances might require.

The confluence of two powerful trends began to change all that: the signs of erosion in the Muslims’ traditional economic and military supremacy; and the European Enlightenment, which started to grapple with profound questions of man’s proper relationship with the relatively new phenomenon of the nation-state. Here, then, were both opportunity, in the form of perceived and actual Muslim weakness, and motive, in the form of the already-established alterity of the Muslims against which to measure, judge, and then advocate Western “progress.” Not surprisingly, the usual suspects were drawn from the West’s latest social cohort of Islam experts, in this case the *philosophes* of the Age of Enlightenment.

On the military front, the late seventeenth century witnessed serial setbacks in Europe for the once-unassailable Ottoman Empire: the failed assaults on Vienna, followed by the loss of Hungary and the humbling Treaty of Carlowitz. Meanwhile, the Mughal Empire began its slow decline with the death of the accomplished Awrangzeb, in 1707, while the fall of the Safavid dynasty in
Iran in 1722 completed a new and unfamiliar Western picture of disarray and decline in the Muslim lands.

At the same time, these developments conferred enormous benefits on the rising social class of Enlightenment artists and intellectuals, who began to invoke examples of failed Muslim government as they sought to validate their own visions of proper social and political organization at home. Thus, the *philosophes* of the Enlightenment reached into the established anti-Islam discourse to advance their own agenda, principally an assault on the dangers of unchecked rule, typically decried as “despotism.”¹ For such leading figures as Montesquieu and Voltaire, the failings of Islamic society were rooted ultimately in bad governance, while the more classically inclined Gibbon blamed the Muslims for ignoring the spiritual uplift available in Greek and Roman works on morals and politics (Saunders 1963, 703).

Even before the Enlightenment, Europeans had begun to view the Ottoman Empire less as a legitimate political entity than as a bastion of tyranny, ruled solely by fear and characterized by a mixture of blind obedience and fatalist acceptance on the part of its enslaved subjects (Valensi 1993, 2-5, 31ff.; Kaiser 2000: 9-10). In this scheme, the religious imperatives of Islam were seen as reinforcing despotism by demanding unquestioned, and thus unreasoned, obedience to the ruler. Where, for example, the power of the French kings may have been *absolute*, that of the eastern sultans was *arbitrary* – a quality, we are told by the French apologists, that defies the dictates of reason and makes a mockery of the essential institution of private property (Venturi 1963, 134; 294-95).

Kaiser 2000, 16). Institutions that might appear similar from the outside, such as
the unrestrained rule of the French kings and that of their Ottoman
contemporaries, were nonetheless differentiated by the Otherness of Islam.

In contrast to what traditional notions of the history of ideas suggest,
growing familiarity with the world of the Muslims throughout this period did
little or nothing to create anything like a real paradigm shift – or Bachelard’s
“discontinuities” – in the Western idea of Islam. Far from it, for the anti-Islam
discourse functioned as effectively as ever to restrict the increasing volume of
reports from European travelers, diplomats, merchants, and even captive sailors
to that which remained “within the true” to the Western imagination.

Take the case of Joseph Pitts, a poor lad from Exeter who went to sea
only to be captured by North African pirates and sold into slavery before finally
making his way home fifteen years later. Pitts published a well-received
narrative of his ordeal and observations of Muslim society in 1704, under the
title of *A true and faithful account of the religion and manners of the
Mohammedans*. Pitts’ standing as a direct witness to Muslim life, eased greatly,
we are told, by his involuntary conversion to Islam under extreme physical
duress, conferred on his work enormous influence and authority in its day, and it
enjoyed numerous reprintings as late as 1774 (al-Azmeh 1996, 162).

Yet, *A true and faithful account* instills little confidence that it is, in fact,
just such an account. It offers little beyond the staples of the old, familiar
discourse: Islam as a hodgepodge of recycled legends, bastardized Christianity,
and Jewish imports; Muhammad as an imposter and debauchee; and the Muslims
as a perverse, unholy lot, who greatly prefer sodomy to the “Natural Use of the
Woman” (quoted in al-Azmeh 1996, 124). Daniel shows that Pitts’ narrative was
artfully crafted to meet the demands of his publishers and the expectations of his readers (Daniel 1967, 14).

Likewise, Lady Mary Wortley Montagu left behind some eyewitness accounts of social life in the Ottoman Empire, compiled between 1716 and 1718, when her husband was briefly the British ambassador to the Ottoman court. Montagu’s collected letters, first published in 1763, one year after her death, were to become what one modern scholar calls a “canonical text” on life in the East (Melman 1992, 2), and she does attempt at times to explain and clarify the true place of women in the elite Ottoman social circles in which she traveled.

In a letter dated 1 April 1717 from Adrianople, the summer capital of the Ottoman court, she takes aim at the prevailing European notion that the famed Turkish baths, like the harem itself, was the place of unbridled sexuality. As she joined the naked women in the baths, reclining on sumptuous sofas and surrounded by their slaves, “there was not the least wanton smile or immodest gesture among them” (Montagu 1893, 356). She also points out that Muslim women enjoy property rights that well in excess of those of their Western counterparts, and she goes on to suggest the many advantages to a women’s privacy that come with wearing the veil. Earlier, in November 1716, Alexander Pope had invoked the image of the harem as the locus of jealousy, sexual frustration, and licentiousness to tease Lady Montagu in a letter of his own about the dangers to her virtue as she traveled eastward: “I shall look upon you no longer as a Christian when you pass … to the Land of Jealousy, where unhappy
women converse with none but Eunuchs, and where the very Cucumbers are brought to them Cutt’ (Pope 1956, 368).²

Like Pitts, however, Montagu still cannot help but invoke the predominant Western narrative of Islam, one that overwhims any organic link between her own first-hand observations and experience on the one hand and moral and political evaluation and judgment on the other. Thus, she endorses the emerging Orientalist discourse, recently popularized throughout Europe in the widely successful and fanciful editions of *One thousand and one nights*, also known as *Arabian tales* or the *Arabian nights’ entertainment* (Daniel 1967, 21). In a letter dated 10 March 1718, to her confidante, the Countess Mara, detailing her visit to the wondrous palace of the Ottoman sultana, Montagu assures her interlocutor that, with a few obvious exceptions, everything Europe has heard about the East is authentic and true:

> Now, do I fancy that you imagine I have entertained you, all this while, with a relation that has, at least, received many embellishments from my hand? This is but too like (say you) the *Arabian Tales*: these embroidered napkins! and a jewel as large as a turkey’s egg! – You forget, dear sister, *those very tales were written by an author of this country, and (excepting the enchantments) are a real representation of the manners here* (Montagu 1893, 347; emphasis added).

One hundred and twenty years after the first appearance in French of *One thousand and one nights*, another recognized authority on life among the Muslims, in this case the British Arabist and ethnographer Edward W. Lane, concurred with Lady Montagu’s assessment: “There is one work, however, which represents most admirable pictures of the manners and customs of the Arabs, and particularly of those of the Egyptians; it is *The thousand and one nights, or Arabian nights’ entertainments.*” He goes on to add, “If the English

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² Pope’s reference to cucumbers was a favorite Western calumny of old but uncertain provenance. Among its early popularizers was Ottaviano Bon, Venetian ambassador to the Ottomans more than one century before Lady Montagu’s day.
reader had possessed a close translation of it with sufficient illustrative notes, I might almost have spared myself the labor of the present undertaking. (Lane 1860: xxiv, n. 1). In this way, the first-hand accounts of the Muslim world now being steadily amassed in Western travelogues, memoirs, letters and other such statements worked to strengthen and reinforce the existing discourse by adding to it the authority of direct, personal experience. Once again, the true subject of such works was not Islam itself but Islam of the Western discursive imagination.³

³ It is worth noting in passing that the Western text was a compilation from an oral tradition built up over many centuries, primarily from Indian, Persian, and Egyptian sources. It did not appear in Arabic until early in the nineteenth century (Melman 1992, 63). Some of the source material has never been traced. See also Reynolds 2006.

This acute sense of Muslim alterity reverberated throughout the Enlightenment and beyond. It provided new generations of Islam experts – Montesquieu, Voltaire, and later Herder and Hegel, to name just a prominent few, all commented widely on Islam and its intrinsic shortcomings – with a baseline or marker against which to assess, evaluate, and judge Western social, political, and intellectual life. Such comparisons between East and West invariably dismissed the former and privileged the latter. This was all the more the case as the need to explain the decline of the once formidable Muslim enemy increasingly intruded on Western consciousness.

In Lectures on the philosophy of history, published after his death in 1831, Hegel says that for all his undoubted energy and enthusiasm, the Muslim is in essence a fanatic and incapable of creating anything of a lasting or permanent nature. He has, in short, no real history and, thus, no possible interest or ability to fashion civil society: “With all the passionate energy he shows, the Mahometan is really indifferent to this social fabric and rushes on in the
ceaseless whirl of fortune.” The great Muslim dynasties and empires, concludes Hegel, “did nothing but degenerate; the individuals that composed them simply vanished” (1894, 372). For Hegel and his fellow Enlightenment thinkers, Islam was now “a deficient order of things, an order of deficient things” (al-Azmeh 1996, 168). In this way, it stood in direct contrast to Western plenitude and even perfection – or, more specifically, to the idea of Western perfectibility.

This notion of Muslim deficiency, coupled with growing Muslim geopolitical weakness vis-à-vis the West, set the stage for the lasting critique of the Islamic world, its society, practices, and mores that remains in effect today. It also charted a future course to rectify such obvious failings, by force if necessary. In other words, the documented shortcomings of the Islamic world were susceptible to rectification at the hands of the West. Here, then, lie the intellectual and moral foundations for the European colonial enterprise that was looming just over the horizon and which first began to take shape with Napoleon before reaching its full flower with wholesale Western occupation of Muslim lands.

But first such ideas had to manifest themselves in terms of the existing anti-Islam discourse, whose familiar themes – those pairs of mirror-opposites distinguishing Christian from Muslim – date back to the Middle Ages. And they had to be given consistent expression by succeeding cohorts of Islam experts – from the medieval clerics to today’s media commentators, academics, and terrorism experts – all of whom have benefited from the perpetuation of the predominant narrative they had received from earlier generations. Writing in Islams and modernities, Aziz al-Azmeh notes this progression through varying historical eras:
The discourse involved is one of contrasts, very much like the primitive logic that underlay medieval and early modern conceptions. Alongside the continuing contrast of good with evil, orthodoxy with heresy, moral probity with libertinism and sodomy, the Enlightenment scheme of things required the presence of other players in this game, which it could call its own. These were reason, freedom, and perfectibility, the three inclusive categories of the present epoch. Along with this, the birth of modern Orientalist scholarship in the Enlightenment was accompanied by the secularization of the profession. Clerics gave way to traders, dilettantes, gentlemen of leisure, and to consuls. In the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, journalists took the place of dilettantes, salaried academics that of gentlemen of leisure, while colonialists and sundry spies joined the ranks of all categories (130).

The nexus of the established anti-Islam narrative and the *philosophes’* concern with governance, with the dangers of despotism, and with the place of reason in the relationship between human society and the nation-state, found salient expression in the Western discourse of women and sexuality in Islam. For Montesquieu and his colleagues, the Muslim family unit as represented in such works popular works as *One thousand and one nights* with its seclusion of women and the titillating institutions of the veil and most of all the harem, provided the basic building block of Eastern despotism.

Here, we can discern the recognizable outlines of the traditional discourse of Islam and women, dating back at least to the West’s first serious, organized encounter with the idea of Islam, led by Peter the Venerable in the mid-twelfth century, and running through it ever since. As we saw in Chapter Four, Peter, the powerful abbot of Cluny, devoted much of two polemical collections, the *Summa totius haeresis Saracenorum* and the *Contra sectam sine haeresim Saracenorum*, to an assault on Muslim morality and sexual behavior, a theme already introduced to the Latin world by an earlier Islam expert, Petrus Alfonsi.

For Peter and his fellow clerics, Islam was a false faith, imposed by force and maintained by the promise of unlimited sexual license for its male followers. And Islam’s sanction of an active sex life between
husband and wife – specifically Sura 2, verse 223, of the Qur’an, which calls on husbands to enjoy their wives “as you will” – scandalized the abbot and his aides, who took this as an open invitation to sodomy.⁴ A letter from one of his translators assured Peter the Venerable that such practice was both accepted and widespread among the Muslims: “The chapter [sura] about using wives dishonorably which is also there should not scandalize you in any way, for it really is in the Qur’an and, as I have heard for certain in Spain … [that] all of the Saracens do this freely, as if by Muhammad’s command” (Peter of Poitiers, quoted in Kritzeck 1964, 56).

Even those in the medieval West who openly admired the Muslims for their intellectual prowess, such as Roger Bacon, balked at their supposed sexual excess. The thirteenth-century philosopher, an ardent student of learned Arab texts, writes in his Opus majus: “[W]ith Mahomet, many sins are allowed, as is evident in the Qur’an, and no perfection of life is observed since they are absorbed in sensual pleasures because of their polygamy” (814). Others were even less charitable. Guibert de Nogent, the Crusades chronicler, says Muhammad offered his followers a “new license of promiscuous intercourse,” while the fourteenth-century canon lawyer Guido Terrena declares the Muslims ready practitioners of “every shame of carnal intercourse,” including incest and bestiality (quoted in Daniel 1997, 169).

For the thinkers of the Enlightenment, as for their colonialist and modern-day successors, this same notion of the sexual perversity of the Muslims

⁴ Pickthall translates 2:223 as follows: “Your women are a tilth [tillage] for you (to cultivate) so go to your tilth as you will, and send (good deeds) before you for your souls, and fear Allah…” (45).
and their associated treatment of women were continuing sources of both horror and fascination. Only now, a new secular gloss was applied to the old theological framework. Islam’s inherent violence and reliance on force made room for an interrelated image of cruelty and despotism, while its intrinsic wantonness began to accommodate a romantic eroticism that the West found both forbidden and irresistible (Daniel 1967, 23). And soon, the entire question of women in Islam – a question that could not be posed in the West in any meaningful way until then – came to represent an intricate maze of Western attitudes, ideas, opinions, and proscriptions about the deficiencies of Muslim life and of Islam itself. As with other central elements of the grand narrative of Islam, what the Muslims actually did or actually thought about the subject was, as it still is today, largely irrelevant.

* * *

The newly discovered “deficiencies” of the Muslim world – its unexpected weakness and surprising impermanence, its lack of history, and its exclusive reliance on passion rather than on intellect – required an explanation from the philosophes of the eighteenth century. At the same time, these thinkers, artists and political theorists were engaged in their own project to introduce such notions as reason, freedom, and the perfectibility of man into the affairs of state and society, an implicit slap at the rigid and autocratic order of their day. This overlap in interests led to the creation of an effective Western critique of Islam and of Muslim societies that flowed from the existing anti-Islam discourse while simultaneously carving out social and political space for these new Enlightenment ideas and programs. In other words, it was to the direct benefit of the philosophes to perpetuate and strengthen the predominant discourse, rather
than to challenge or question it, even in the face of new evidence, additional information, or further learning.

At the center of this Enlightenment critique was the figure of the Oriental despot and his mirror image, the master of the Oriental harem, or seraglio, who holds the destiny of his women, children, and servants completely in his hands, just as the sultan controls the life and death of each of his subjects. Nowhere was the juxtaposition of these two universes, the private and the public spheres of Muslim life, as deliberate or as effective as in Montesquieu’s *The Persian letters*, and in particular in the highly eroticized inner tale of life in the seraglio left behind in Isfahan by Usbek, one of the novel’s two central figures.

During Usbek’s lengthy travels abroad, mostly in Paris, the weakness of his position as absentee master slowly reveals for Montesquieu the untenable position of all despots: Usbek can only stand alone and helpless as his wives eventually revolt, culminating in the collapse of the entire system and the suicide of his favorite, Roxane. In all, the tragic story of Usbek’s harem occupies just one-quarter of Montesquieu’s imagined correspondence, yet its intended preeminence is highlighted by the way it frames the entire work and serves as both introduction and conclusion (Vartanian 1969, 23).

The political lampoon aimed at the growing authoritarianism of France’s ruling Bourbons is clear, as is the implicit warning that the repression of self-fulfillment that is part and parcel of despotic rule inevitably leads to revolt, to violence, and ultimately to ruin (cf. Vartanian 1969; Shanley and Stillman 1982). But *The Persian letters* and its tale of the seraglio can also be read for what it tells us about the power and persistence of the anti-Islam discourse and the way it flows so seamlessly through the entire Western experience and draws so
effortlessly on the shared imagery, ideas, and conceptions – that is, on the discursive statements – of succeeding generations concerning Islam and the Muslims.

This, then, raises the question of identity, a topic much discussed in the early eighteenth century, when the arrival in Europe of exotic foreign texts, such as *One Thousand and One Nights*, and of equally exotic, alien objects and artifacts fed a mania for classification and taxonomy (Pucci 1990, 148). In one well-known passage in *The Persian letters*, Rica, the second of the two main characters, tires of being stared at and examined on the street and exchanges his Persian garb for Parisian fashion, so as not to disturb “the calm of a great city.” Suddenly, he is a nobody, abjectly ignored and woefully anonymous. Rica’s attempts to rekindle interest by dropping hints that he is, in fact, Persian prompt only disbelief from all sides: “Ah! Ah! The man is a Persian? How extraordinary! How can one be a Persian?” (129).

This anecdote prompted the modern French philosopher Louis Althusser, in an essay on Montesquieu’s theory of government, to ask: “If the Persian does not exist, where does a French *gentilhomme*, born under Louis XIV, get the idea of him?” (1972, 75). The answer, of course, lies with the prevailing Western discourse of Islam and with its stepchild, the relatively new European discipline of Arabic and Islamic studies. Thus, Montesquieu expropriates those statements about Islam that both fit the needs of his political philosophy and remain “within the true” of the broader discourse while discarding all others.

By Montesquieu’s day, educated Europeans had access to a number of relatively sophisticated and reliable accounts of Muslim beliefs and practices which sought to correct some of the West’s deeply held images of the faith. Still,
many of these same scholars proved unable to break out of the established
discourse in any significant way. Edward Pococke, the prominent Arabist at
Oxford who died in 1691, challenged a number of popular Western fables – for
example, that the Prophet had artfully used trained doves to contrive certain
miracles to impress his followers – but he retained the West’s fascination with
the exotica of the Muslim Orient as well as the deep-set hostility toward
Muhammad as a hypocrite and false prophet (Netton 1990, 28-29).

George Sale, whose English translation of the Qur’an appeared in 1734
and whose sympathy for his subject matter angered many – Gibbon, for
example, once dismissed him as “half a Musulman” – refuted the ideas then
common in the West that Muslims believed women had no souls, and thus could
not go to heaven, and that Islam was in fact a form of idolatry (Netton 1990, 30-
32). Yet, in his preface, or Preliminary discourse, Sale refers to Muhammad as a
“criminal” and attributes the success of such a patently false faith to its reliance
on force and violence: “It is certainly one of the most convincing proofs that
Muhammadism was no other than a human invention, that it owed its progress
and establishment almost entirely to the sword…” (quoted in Netton 1990, 33).

Prominent new French work in the field included Adrian Reland’s La
religion des Mahometans (1721), which accurately presents the meaning of
Islam as submission to God, and Henri de Boulainvilliers’ Vie de Mahomed
(1730), which emphasizes Muhammad’s consistent commitment to monotheism.
Montesquieu had a copy of La religion des Mahometans in his personal library
(Gunny 1978, 152, n. 4), while he got to know Boulainvilliers in Paris after
completing his law studies in Bordeaux (Richter 1977, 13-14).
Despite these direct connections to Reland and Boulainvilliers, Montesquieu ignores their work and that of other like-minded writers and instead constructs the political and social satire of *The Persian letters* on an idea of Islam that never strays outside the boundaries of the prevailing discourse. Among his preferred sources is the French translation of the Qur’an by André Du Ryer, who uses his preface to warn his readers: “This book is a long symposium of God, Angels, and Mahomet which this false Prophet has rather clumsily contrived. It has been glossed by a number of Mahometan theologians, their explanations are just as ridiculous as the text. It will amaze you that these absurdities have infected the greater part of the world (quoted in Gunny 1978, 152). Even when Du Ryer does manage to explain accurately some of the teachings of Islam, such as the belief that men and women alike may find a home in paradise, Montesquieu ignores these, as well (Gunny 1978, 154). In Letter XXIV, for example, Rica notes: “For since women are of a creation inferior to ours, and since our prophets tell us that they cannot enter paradise, why then should they scramble to read a book intended only to teach them the path to paradise?” (112). Letters LXVII and CXLI repeat this same notion.

Of course, Montesquieu is interested in much more than a few points of Islamic theology. He is, rather, determined to fashion his salutary tale of despotism and its inevitable human toll by invoking a stylized and a highly eroticized depiction of Muslim life. In one letter, we are told that one of the courtesans has had sex with fifty male slaves during a single night, while elsewhere Usbek bemoans the difficulties facing a Muslim man who must satisfy so many wives and concubines. In Letter CXIV, a dejected Usbek complains to his confidant Rhedi: “We lapse into this state due to the great number of women,
who are better able to exhaust than satisfy us” (359). That the Qur’an (4:3) states explicitly that a man must take only one wife unless he can treat up to three more equitably and fairly is beside the point. So is the fact that French scholars of Montesquieu’s time were well aware that contemporary practice in Persia involved only monogamous marriage (Gunny 1978: 161-62).

In one of its most explicit passages, the Persian letters recounts how Usbek was once called upon to resolve a quarrel among the women of the seraglio as to which one is the most beautiful and desirable. Still savoring her triumph, one concubine later recalls in breathless detail how Usbek directed the women to disrobe and to strip away their priceless ornaments and remove their elaborate makeup: “Long we saw you wander from enchantment to enchantment, without settling your uncertain soul. ... You cast your curious gaze to the most secret places; you made us take a thousand different poses; always new commands and always ever-new compliance” (59).

Here, as in every aspect of the women’s lives, Usbek is the determinant force, with only the mediating offices of his eunuchs, who keep outsiders from the harem and bar the inhabitants from leaving without an escort and their master’s consent. For Montesquieu and his readers, the parallels with the despotic state would have been unmistakable (Shanley and Stillman 1982; Vartanian 1969). And the author returned to this theme explicitly in his treatise on political theory, Ésprit des lois, twenty-seven years later: under despotism “everything is reduced to reconciling political and civil government with domestic government, the officers of the state with those of the seraglio” (Ésprit des lois, 53; cited in Shanley and Stillman 1982, 67). To underscore this point, The Persian letters includes a message from the chief eunuch in which he
declares, “I am in seraglio as if in a little empire, and my ambition, the only passion that remains to me, is appeased slightly” (72). In this way, the structure of Montesquieu’s seraglio mirrors that of the despotic state: Usbek is both husband and despot; his eunuchs enforce his will, as do ministers or other state functionaries; and the wives suffer without recourse, in the same way as the despot’s subjects (Shanley and Stillman 1982, 1967).

Of course, it all ends badly. The pretense maintained in the early correspondence between Paris and Persia that the seraglio is held together by love and mutual benefit fades over time, to reveal Montesquieu’s central point – that despotism must rely on fear and that such a system is necessarily fleeting, as is Muslim “history” in general; it crushes the human spirit and is ultimately doomed to destruction and failure. In the end, the women rebel and Usbek’s favorite, Roxane, subverts the authority of the eunuchs, takes a lover, and then commits suicide. With the poison already in her veins, she addresses a last letter – the novel’s final entry – to Usbek:

Yes, I deceived you; I seduced your eunuchs … and learned how to make your dreadful seraglio into a place of delights and pleasures. … How could you have thought that I was credulous enough to believe that I existed only to adore your caprices, that in permitting yourself everything, you had the right to thwart all my desires? No. I have lived in servitude. But I have always been free. I reformed your laws by those of nature, and my spirit has always clung to independence” (489).

It might be tempting to dismiss Montesquieu’s decision to set his parable of governmental malfeasance and its crippling effects on the human spirit in the exotic locale of a Persian harem as little more than a device to entertain his readers and an attempt to minimize confrontation with the French authorities. And certainly this may have played a role; the author also took the precaution of printing the first edition on a Dutch press, under the name of a fictitious German
publisher, and then smuggling the final volumes into France in early 1721, where it became an instant sensation and enjoyed a long success (Healy 1999, vii). Yet, as we have seen, *The Persian letters* binds up the emerging discourse of women in Islam together with the deeper historical narrative in some profound ways.

In the first place, there is Montesquieu’s selective use of the material available and the jettisoning of anything outside the confines of the prevailing Western narrative. Second, we have the association of tyranny with the peripheral lands, those outside the pale of the civilized, Western world. For Montesquieu and his legions of readers, as Althusser notes, “The location of despotic regimes already suggests their excess. Despotism is the government of extreme lands” (1975, 72). Further, Muslim life is transient; it lacks Hegelian “firmness,” and is characterized by both violence and sensuality, even if the latter proves on closer inspection to be largely hollow.

Most important of all, Montesquieu is both advancing his own interests and Enlightenment ideals while playing on what Vartanian has called Western “affinities with the inefficiency and self-destructiveness of Oriental tyranny” (Vartanian 1969, 33). In this way, Montesquieu helped establish in the Western canon an essentialist link between the social and political deficiencies of Islam and the Muslims on the one hand and the relations between the sexes on the other. In the nineteenth century, the golden age of Orientalism and its offspring, the colonial domination of the Muslims, would raise this tendency to an art form.

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Legions of Western merchants, adventurers, artists, scholars, and diplomats began to pour into the Middle East in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries in greater and greater numbers, and general awareness of Islam and the Muslims increased throughout Europe. However, the level of actual knowledge of the faith or its practitioners, or of Islamic civilization in general, continued to languish. As a result, this significant widening of contacts between East and West had no appreciable effect on the predominant discourse of Muslim society as captured in the narrative of women in Islam. Only now the emphasis began to shift from what it was Muslims were said to be believe to what it was they were said to actually do (Daniel 1967, 22-23).

In effect, popular ethnography took the place of popular theology. The gaze of the West, now emboldened by changes in its favor in the balance of power, shifted from religious rivalry and existential conflict to political and social contestation. Muslim women and sexuality, epitomized in the Western imagination by the harem and the veil, became a central focal point of the anti-Islam discourse. As we have seen already with the escaped captive Joseph Pitts and the well-traveled Lady Montagu, increased access to the world of Islam did not necessarily lead to an increase in the store of Western knowledge or understanding of Muslim life. Overwhelmed by the established anti-Muslim narrative, these travelers – as with Montesquieu in the comfort of his library – saw what they expected to see and found what they expected, or needed, to find.

Increasingly, they did so by bringing the idea of the Orient with them when they traveled, for the nineteenth century was the heyday of ethnographic exhibits, of the museum and its collections of Eastern exotica, of the arboretum and the zoo with its alien wonders, and of the great world expositions in London, Paris, and other capitals. Here, the tendency toward classification and taxonomy of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment took on the added power of
visualization and representation. Curators, organizers, and promoters spared no
effort to present a real Oriental experience for legions of visitors to these living
exhibits, even importing Egyptian donkeys and their handlers and replicating
exact Cairo street scenes, right down to the peeling and dirty paint (Mitchell

The facades of mosques, Egyptian coffee houses, and other tableaux
were all constructed in meticulous detail, all part of an effort to render the
essence of the East as something that could be imagined, managed, and
controlled – and eventually brought into the Western economic, political, and
social order. Like the anti-Islam discourse from which it was born, this move
toward public representation of the East created a reality that was more real than
anything the Western visitor might actually experience among the Muslims.

Frequently, artists, photographers, and theater designers who had never
seen the Middle East first created their own representations of the Muslim Orient
at home and then set out on their travels in search of confirmation. Four years
before his own visit to Egypt, Gustave Flaubert captured the scene from the top
of the Great Pyramid after an arduous climb under blistering sunshine:

But lift your head. Look! Look! And you will see cities with domes of gold
and minarets of porcelain, palaces of lava built on plinths of alabaster, marble-
rimmed pools where sultanas bathe their bodies at the hour when the moon
makes bluer the shadows of the groves and more limpid the silvery water of the
fountains. Open your eyes! Open your eyes!... (quoted in Steegmuller 1996,
48).

Many were disappointed or, at best, decidedly unimpressed or nonplussed by
their experiences on the ground.

Gerard de Nerval, whose Voyage en Orient became a classic work, once
confided to a friend that the Oriental cafes back home in Paris were more
authentic than those of the Orient itself, and he conducted much of his research
in a French-run library in Cairo rather than mingle with the Egyptians or see their lands firsthand (Mitchell 1991, 29-31). Instead, he relies heavily on Lane’s *Manners and customs of the modern Egyptians*, even expropriating whole pages as his own. Such intermingling of texts – to put the most favorable gloss on the practice of what today’s world would see as outright plagiarism – was characteristic of the seeming confusion in the mind of Orientalist travel writers and artists between what they saw and what they read, between the real and the imagined (de Groot 2000, 46). In fact, the former had no primacy over the latter and was often subordinate to it.

In a sympathetic account of Nerval as artist, Edward Said identifies an overwhelming impermanence and sense of loss that leaves the writer helpless to pursue his original aim:

> How else can we explain in the *Voyage*, a work of so original and individual a mind, the lazy use of large swathes of Lane, incorporated without a murmur by Nerval as *his* descriptions of the Orient? It is as if having failed both in his search for a stable Oriental reality and in his intent to give systematic order to his re-presentation of the Orient, Nerval was employing the borrowed authority of a canonized Orientalist text” (1995, 184).

On a more prosaic level, the American Herman Melville also came to grief in Cairo, finding it unmanageable due to a lack of order otherwise provided by city maps, reliable street names, or any discernable, logical layout (Mitchell 1991, 32-33).

This demand to represent the Muslim world in line with accepted and comprehensible categories already enjoyed a considerable political and intellectual pedigree. Its modern beginning may be seen with Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt, for the French general assembled not only a military force but also a small army of philologists, anthropologists, ethnographers and others to carry out a parallel scholarly conquest of the Muslims. The result was a twenty-
three volume encyclopedia, the *Description de l’Égypte*, published between 1809 and 1828, that would serve as the blueprint for much future research and would at the same time establish the Orientalist scholars, rather than the Muslims themselves, as arbiters of Islam:

The *Description* became the master type of all further efforts to bring the Orient closer to Europe, thereafter to absorb it completely – and centrally important – to cancel, or at least subdue and reduce its strangeness and, in the case of Islam, its hostility. For the Islamic Orient would henceforth appear as a category denoting the Orientalists’ power and not the Islamic people as humans nor their history as history” (Said 1996, 87).

This same principle of representation permeated Orientalist scholarship and dictated a preference for the analysis of texts, or more precisely of selected fragments of texts, over lived experience or personal observation (Said 1995, 93-99). Trends in scholarly methodology, particularly in philology, touched off a search for Biblical history and for textual correspondence and parallels between Christian and Jewish scripture and the Qur’an, reinvigorating the familiar medieval notion that Muhammad had slapped together the text from earlier teachings and then passed it off as the word of God (Daniel 1967, 29). The philologists even avoided the hardships of an eastward journey; the text contained all they needed to know and so there was no point in seeing for themselves.

On those occasions when personal observation or experience on the part of the travel writer, the memoirist, or the diplomat was somehow seen to be in conflict with textual evidence, the Orientalist discourse ensured that the latter prevailed. In other words, Islam cannot be what the Muslims say or do, or even what they say they mean, but only what a handful of texts – selected and then interpreted and canonized by the Western Orientalist – tell us it is and what it is
This is, of course, a classic example of what Michel Foucault means by discourse.

The power of Orientalist representation was joined at the hip to the earlier Enlightenment notion of Islamic civilization as timeless, dead, and without history. Everywhere, the Western imagination stepped forward to fill the void that was Islam. Only then could it be properly represented and, in due course, conquered, subdued, and colonized. It is important here to emphasize one of Edward Said’s cardinal arguments about Orientalism, namely that it preceded and put in place the necessary conditions for the Western colonial project and was not created after the fact. Said dates the birth of classical Orientalism to the work of Ernest Renan in the 1840s, while the period of great Western colonial expansion begins with the 1870s and ends with World War II (1995: 39, 139 ff).

Throughout this study, I have extended the life of the anti-Islam discourse, of which classical Orientalism is but a vital but transient sub-set, in both directions, tracing it back to the First Crusade through to its present iteration.

When it came to the women of the Muslim world, the vacuum created by the notion of an Islam without history was all the more glaring and provocative, for women, particularly those of the urban middle and upper classes, were commonly veiled and often secluded and thus inaccessible to the nineteenth-century European gaze. This “hidden” quality struck a nerve in the Western mind that went beyond common attitudes toward non-Western women elsewhere in the world and focused particular attention on the harem, presenting what was in effect an institution of the Ottoman court as symptomatic of Muslim family life in general (Mabro 1991, 6).
This elicited two powerful strategies, both aimed at revealing the previously unseen: to draw on the storehouse of the Western imagination to fill in the blanks left by the inaccessibility of the Muslim woman; and, later, to break down the walls of the harem and literally un-veil the women of Islam. Both responses drew on the anti-Islam discourse to produce an enormous quantity of Western statements about Islam and the Muslims, first in the form of Orientalist art and literature and then, beginning with outright colonial rule, in the shape of policies, reforms, and White Papers aimed at ending the degradation of Muslim women as part of general modernization of the Middle East.

The supreme emblem of the former impulse was undoubtedly the odalisque, captured in idealized, erotic detail by such artists as Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres (1780-1867) and Victor Eugène Delacroix (1798-1863). These painters, and their many like-minded colleagues, presented the West with an intimate portrait of Muslim female sexuality characterized by passive repose, overt submission, and sumptuous surroundings punctuated by symbolic reminders of captivity, restraint, or outright slavery. The nakedness of the odalisque – the word itself is a corruption of the Turkish term for a chambermaid, from oda, Turkish for “room” – is often accentuated by the presence of the fully dressed figure of a slave girl, a eunuch, or even her master. Scenes in the women’s hammam, or baths, were particular favorites, giving full rein to the popular Western idea that the forced seclusion of Muslim inevitably led to unbridled passions and “unnatural” practices. Interestingly, there was little interest in depicting the men’s baths, or life in the salamlik, the quarters for men and guests – both of which would have been accessible to the hordes of male visitors from abroad.
Naturally, Ingres, Delacroix, and their fellow Orientalist painters would never see the inside of a harem or a Turkish bath full of reclining, half-naked women and their servants and guards. Nor could they count on a variety of dispassionate Western accounts about harem life, or about Muslim women in general; almost all those that purported to reveal the truth about the harem were based on pure invention and hearsay. Delacroix’s first representations of Ottoman odalisques were made some five years before his first trip to the Muslim world, which took him to Algeria and Morocco and not to Turkey (de Groot 2000, 47, n. 24).

The few eyewitness reports that trickled out from a handful of Western women travelers were safely ignored. Thus, Lady Montagu’s account of correct and proper behavior of the women observed during her on visit to the hammam – “not the least wanton smile or immodest gesture among them” – fell on deaf ears. Ingres himself had copied out this same descriptive passage from a French translation of Lady Montagu’s letters (Fernea 1981, 330; Ahmed 1982, 525), yet his famous Le bain Turc, painted in 1862 and now in the Louvre, offers up a frank display of homosexual eroticism among the women bathers.

Those artists and intellectuals who actively sought out the Orient through personal travel and direct experience often fared little better than the studio-bound painters of the odalisques and hammams. Gerard de Nerval’s forced reliance on the work of another to document his own experiences has already been discussed, but even those who managed to produce original accounts and observations failed to penetrate the harem, ogle the bathers, or otherwise lift the veil from Muslim womanhood.
Instead, like Flaubert, they were left to construct their own Orient from the material at hand, in this case from the prostitutes and dancing girls with whom they could interact. Flaubert’s pen transforms the dancer and “famous courtesan” Kuchuk Hanem into Oriental woman writ large, even as it casts the East as the locus of sexual fantasy and sexual freedom and, by extension, as an antidote to Western strictures on both. Apparently, Flaubert was unmoved by the irony surrounding his brief but intense dalliance with Kuchuk Hanem. Several months before, he had complained to a friend that there were no dancing girls or “good brothels” to be found in Cairo, and so he had to travel all the way to Upper Egypt in search of the Oriental woman he craved (quoted in Steegmuller 1996, 83). In fact, an edict by the Egyptian ruler Muhammad Ali had banned them from the Egyptian capital as part of his modernization program.

Flaubert’s Orient was, of course, all an illusion, but such illusions turned out to be wonderfully enticing and long-lasting. They were also highly marketable. His Egyptian adventure, which he undertook in 1849 at the age of twenty-seven, was to provide a lifetime of material for a substantial literary career. Soon, an entire apparatus to manufacture and maintain the eroticized imagery of the Middle East was in place, bolstered by the relatively new art of photography, with its promise of greater realism and even authenticity.5 Yet this, too, was illusory, for the photographer, like the traveler, the painter, and the

5 Flaubert’s traveling partner was the French photographer, Maxime Du Camp. According to the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-lettres, Du Camp informed members he would be “equipped with an apparatus (photographic) for the purpose of securing, along his way and with the aid of this marvelous means of reproduction, views of the monuments and copies of the inscriptions. Thanks to the aid of this modern traveling companion, efficient, rapid, and always scrupulously exact, the result of M. Du Camp’s journey may well be quite special in character and extremely important” (quoted in Steegmuller 1996, 23).
writer before him, was largely excluded from his intended subject and could do little more than mirror or even recreate earlier images in the new medium.

Industrious European photographers set up local studios where they could gather appropriate props, hire prostitutes as models, and then stage the harem scenes that their audience back in the West sought and demanded (Alloula 1986, 4; Bullock 2002, 14-16). The finished photograph, often in the form of the erotic postcard, thus furnished “proof” that this imagined Orient was real and even provided the raw material for later paintings and other images (Graham-Brown 1988, 39-40).

The West’s overt sexualization of the Muslim East emerged from the broader anti-Islam discourse with the *philosophes* of the Enlightenment, who introduced human sexuality in its different forms and institutions into intellectual and artistic debate. The result of this new openness, however, was to reinvigorate the traditional notions of women and sex in Islam – now as represented by the fantasy of the veil and particularly the harem, with its teeming, captive population of lascivious, and thus dangerous, females (Melman 1992, 71). Any promise that the sensuality of the Muslims, with their institutions of polygamy and the harem, may have held out for the *philosophes* as a model of sexual liberation was dashed by the accompanying discursive notions of despotism, violence, and the resultant degradation of women (Porter 1990, 118).  

Growing traffic from West to East, from the early nineteenth century onward, saw the Muslim Orient, now weakening both militarily and economically, transformed from the locus of political rivalry and existential threat to one of passion, sexuality, and somnolence as captured in the image of

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6 Porter goes on to argue that this tension was set aside once the West had discovered Tahiti, with its own promise of a sexual idyll without the drawbacks of Islam (Porter 1990, 118).
the reclining odalisque and the erotic postcard, or as “documented” by writers such as Nerval and Flaubert. These statements effectively reduced social and, by extension, political life in Islam to the Western understanding of the harem, the hammam, and the veil, and they left no space for any independent activity or interpretation other than those of the overriding discourse.

As a result, the harem – from the Turkish haremlik, denoting either the women of a household or the space reserved for them, in contrast to the men’s salamlik (el-Guindi 1991, 25) – could not simply retain its original meaning as the women’s wing of a palace or grand residence. It had to be the locus of violence, wantonness, and free-for-all sexuality. The women of the harem could not simply be mothers or household managers or partners to their husbands, let alone social and economic actors in their own right – as described, for example, by the Egyptian feminist Huda Sharawi in her memoir of harem life (el-Guindi 1991, 26) – but only languorous odalisques devoted solely to pleasure.7

In this way, Western Europe, increasingly devoted to its own ideal of monogamous marriage and the emerging division of labor between the public world of men and the domestic sphere of women, advanced its own interests by deploying the anti-Islam discourse in order to exorcise the dangers of alternative social arrangements that might challenge its own (Ahmed 1978,151; Mabro 1991, 9). Specifically, the traditional narrative of sexual perversity in Islam, adopted from the prevailing discourse, acted as a bulwark of the emerging idea of Western womanhood as nurturing, sexually-passive, and economically dependent. As the anthropologist Jane Collier points out: “Images of oppressed

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Islamic women, who could neither marry for love nor develop intimate relations with polygamous husbands, must have played a crucial role in constructing images of Western women as consenting to their disempowerment within increasingly privatized and confining homes” (Collier 1995, 162).

At the same time, this discourse now cast the once-threatening Muslim world as a place of weakness, of impermanence, and of violence and passions that overwhelmed the precincts of reason, discipline, and order. The Muslim East was in need of reform, of a radical refashioning of its social and political structures, in a way that only Western guidance and, ultimately, Western domination could provide.

Here, as with our own era, the public was not in a position to challenge or question this idea of Islam offered up by the experts. Yet, the entire edifice was a house of cards – literally. “What the [Orientalist] postcard proposes as the truth,” notes Malek Alloula in his study of this new medium, “is but a substitute for something that does not exist” (Alloula 1986, 129, n. 10).

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By the second half of the nineteenth century, the Middle East had become increasingly enmeshed in the financial and political life of the West. This was particularly true of Egypt, a growing economic power in its own right and now at the center of the profound changes sweeping the Muslim world. Already, its ambitious leader Muhammad Ali Pasha had placed the production of agricultural staples, primarily cotton and wheat, under the direct control of the state and then sold them profitably into the European markets in order to finance his modernization effort and to reduce his dependence on his formal suzerain, the Ottoman sultan. This had the added advantage of undermining the traditional
class of Mamluk tax farmers, with its ties the Turkish-Circassian elite.

Muhammad Ali accompanied these policies with a far-reaching campaign to build factories capable of feeding his growing war machine and of producing textiles and other goods for export, in direct competition with England, France, and other European economies (Owen 2002, 64-76).

But a series of setbacks, including a temporary collapse in the price of cotton and the unrelenting hostility of the Western powers, doomed this bid for economic autonomy and eventually forced the Egyptian state into the arms of the European bankers. Muhammad Ali’s less able successors found themselves deeply indebted to Western creditors, who drew in their governments to support demands for repayment. The European powers also shared an interest in managing the decline of the Ottoman Empire, which retained at least nominal control of the Middle East, and they preferred to prop it up so as not to allow their rivals to profit from any collapse. This meant placing limits on Egypt’s ambitions for greater autonomy or even independence.

Increased financial pressures on Egypt’s coffers to service the enormous debt placed a growing tax burden on the lower and middle classes, while general mismanagement of the economy angered the rural notables. The result was the revolt led by Urabi Pasha, an Egyptian army officer, against both the ruling Egyptian Khedive and ever-growing European influence, particularly in the state’s financial affairs.

Alarmed by the threat to their financial interests and determined to maintain effective control over the recently-opened Suez Canal, the shortest route to the colonial riches of India, the British bombarded the rebels at the port of Alexandria on July 11, 1882. Two months later, a British force defeated Urabi
Pasha at the battle of Tal al-Kabir and occupied the country, for what was repeatedly declared to be a temporary conservatorship leading to the return of Egyptian sovereignty. Instead, they stayed until 1954.

The British occupation put the world’s greatest colonial power\(^8\) in charge of the world’s most important and influential Muslim nation. It also transformed the issue of women, already a major element of the Western discourse of Islam, into the fulcrum around which East-West relations have turned ever since. Only now this discourse was harnessed to raw, coercive power that would permit the West to move from only imagining what lay behind the veil and inside the shuttered walls of the harem, as with classical Orientalist art and travel writing, to destroying these institutions altogether in the name of progress:

Broadly speaking, the thesis of the discourse on Islam … was that Islam was innately and immutably oppressive to women, that the veil and segregation epitomized that oppression, and that these customs were the fundamental reason for the general and comprehensive backwardness of Islamic societies. Only if these practices “intrinsically” to Islam (and therefore Islam itself) could be cast off could Muslim societies begin to move forward on the path of civilization. Veiling – to Western eyes the most visible marker of the differentness and inferiority of Islamic societies – became the symbol now of both the oppression of women … and the backwardness of Islam, and it became the open target of the colonial attack and the spearhead of the assault on Muslim societies (Ahmed 1992, 151-52).

Leading this attack was the imposing figure of Evelyn Baring, later Lord Cromer, who effectively ruled Egypt as British consul-general from 1883 until 1907. Baring was from the prominent British banking family of the same name, but he never served the firm, nor did the family bank have financial interests in Egypt (Tignor 1966, 57). Rather, Cromer, an experienced colonial hand and one-time fiscal overseer in Cairo, was recalled from India, where he served as financial advisor to the new Viceroy, to wind down the British occupation.

\(^8\) In 1892, the president of the Ninth International Congress of Orientalists, Frederick Max Müller, was moved to declare: “England is at present the greatest Oriental Empire which the world has ever known. England has proved that she knows not only how to conquer, but how to rule” (Müller 1892, 67; cited in Mitchell 1991, 7).
Cromer was appointed, in large part, due to his well-known “anti-jingoist” views (Tignor 1966, 60), but he was also an astute enough observer of the international and colonial scenes to realize early on that a quick exit was highly unlikely. He was convinced that the changes Egypt required, and that both the British public and politicians were demanding, could not be carried out in anything but a gradual manner. As a result, he threw himself into the project of ruling Egypt, all the while seeking to reassure his political backers at home that evacuation was just around the corner.

If the British were truly stuck in Cairo, Cromer concluded, they had better make the best of it; besides, this really was the most beneficial outcome for all concerned: “The special aptitude shown by Englishmen in the government of Oriental races pointed to England as the most effective and beneficent instrument for the gradual introduction of European civilization into Egypt,” he wrote years later in his historical account and memoir, Modern Egypt, first published in 1908 (Cromer 2000: ii:28).

A reliable son of the Victorian Age, Cromer was steeped in the sense of civilizing and modernizing mission espoused by many in the British colonial service, such as the Indian intelligence officer and Islam expert William Muir, whom he cites sympathetically in Modern Egypt as a “high authority on Eastern affairs” (ii:524). Elsewhere, Cromer opens a section grandly entitled, “The Reforms,” with an epigraph from Walter Bagehot’s Physics and politics: “In the East, we are attempting to put new wine in old bottles – to pour what we can of a
civilization whose spirit is progress into the form of civilization whose spirit is fixity…” (ii:395).9

Surveying his new dominions, Cromer identifies two principle obstacles – familiar elements of the anti-Islam narrative – to the construction of the kind of Egypt he desires, one that is efficient, modern, civilized, and, most of all, integrated into the Western economic and political system. The first is the lack of reason: “The mind of the Oriental, … like his picturesque streets, is eminently wanting in symmetry. His reasoning is of the most slipshod description. Although the ancient Arabs acquired in a somewhat high degree the science of dialectics, their descendants are singularly deficient in the logical facility” (ii:146-47). As a result, Islam is inflexible and seemingly immune to history or historical development.

Cromer turns to Muir’s The Caliphate: Its rise, decline, and fall: From original sources for confirmation: “Swathed in the bands of the Koran, the Moslem faith, unlike the Christian, is powerless to adapt itself to varying time and place, keep pace with the march of humanity, direct and purify the social life, or elevate mankind” (Muir 1883, 598; Cromer 2000, 202). It bears repeating that one of Muir’s “original sources” was in fact that well-worn forgery dating from the medieval polemic against Islam, the so-called Apology of al-Kindi, yet another example of the persistence and longevity of the Western discourse.

The second obstacle is Islam’s treatment of women, which Cromer says, citing another Victorian authority on the East, acts as a “canker” that has

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9 The original can be found in Walter Bagehot, Physics and politics: Or thoughts on the natural application of the principles of ‘natural selection’ and ‘inheritance’ to political society, 6th edition (London: Kegan Paul, 1881), 181.
infected the entire social, political, and ethical system (ii,134). For Cromer, Europe has benefited enormously from its Christian faith, which “elevated” women and preserved her exalted status through the practice of monogamy, while Islam lagged behind due to the “degradation” of its women, as expressed in the institutions of seclusion, polygamy, and the veil (ii:152-53).

Here, then, lay a possible key to effective and lasting reform of the Muslim world, that is, to reshaping it to resemble the West:

Change the position of women, and one of the main pillars, not only of European civilization, but at all events of the moral code based on the Christian religion, if not of Christianity itself, falls to the ground. The position of women in Egypt, and in Mohammedan countries generally, is, therefore, a fatal obstacle to the attainment of that elevation of thought and character which should accompany the introduction of European civilization, if that civilization is to produce its full measure of beneficial effect” (ii: 539).

Cromer marshaled two influential, but very different, Western constituencies behind his campaign to elevate Muslim women: Egypt’s thriving community of Christian missionaries and the much smaller corps of Western feminists back home. As Leila Ahmed has shown, Cromer’s invocation of the language of the new European feminism was particularly cynical, for the virtual ruler of Egypt was himself extremely hostile to the feminist cause. On his return to England he helped found and then lead the Men’s League for Opposing Women’s Suffrage, while a number of his Egyptian policies, particularly on the economy and on state funding for education, including medical training, badly undercut gains already made by women and girls under Muhammad Ali and his successors (Ahmed 1992, 145-153).

10 The reference is from Stanley Lane-Poole, nephew of Edward Lane: “The degradation of women in the East is a canker that begins its destructive work in childhood, and has eaten into the whole system of Islam” Stanley Lane-Poole, Islam, a prelection delivered before the University of Dublin (Dublin: Hodges, Figgis & Co, 1903), 43.
Still, the discourse of feminism provided effective in supporting and justifying colonial policies that attacked traditional Muslim ways and Islamic values (Mabro 1991, 12; el-Guindi 1991, 181-82). This positioned Western feminism as vital “handmaid” to the colonialist enterprise, a status it sometimes retains today (Ahmed 1992, 155). It also gained a foothold among the small Westernized Muslim elite, fostered by the European presence in institutions of education, government, and the press. Thus, Huda Sharawi, protégée of the French feminist Eugenie Le Brun, famously cast off her veil in public after returning to Egypt from a women’s conference in Europe. And Qassim Amin published his tract, *On the liberation of women*, in 1899, in which he denounced the veiling of women in terms not dissimilar to those of Lord Cromer.

These and other like-minded intellectuals focused much of their attention on the need to catch up with Europe through the adoption of Western ways and the simultaneous rejection of central aspects of Muslim culture and practice, which they saw as incompatible with the modern society they sought to construct. To be sure, not all modernizing intellectuals of the day agreed. The religious thinker Muhammad Abduh and the Muslim feminists Zaynab al-Ghazali and Malak Hifni Nassef, to cite three prominent examples, saw no need to discard their faith or its values in the quest for a revival of Islamic political, social, and economic life. For them, it was the failure to honor these values and to live the true Islam that explained the East’s “backwardness.”

Cromer’s ties to the missionary project were more forthright, and his program for women’s rights in Islam struck sympathetic chords among those in
the field and others preaching back in Britain. Cromer’s own sympathies clearly lay with the evangelical effort, and he spoke the language of the missionary campaign: “Monogamy fosters family life, polygamy destroys it. The monogamous Christian respects women; the teachings of his religion and the incidents of his religious worship tend to elevate them. He sees in the Virgin Mary an ideal of womanhood, which would be incomprehensible in a Moslem country. The Moslem on the other hand despises women…” (ii:157). In a footnote, Cromer adds that Muslims could never appreciate the beauty of Wordsworth’s sonnet on the Virgin – an interesting notion given Islam’s veneration of Mary as the mother of a great prophet.

This also meshed nicely with the established discourse of Islam and women. One missionary told a meeting in London in 1888 that Muhammad’s later preaching had introduced the veil and justified his polygamous lifestyle as part of an effort to “extinguish women altogether” (quoted in Ahmed 1992, 153). Missionaries in Cairo and across the rest of the country, convinced that women were the primary carriers of religious and ethical values, openly encouraged an end to veiling and even advocated the adoption of Western dress in general as a way of weakening the hold of Islam over Egyptian society. Christian-run schools, often the only option for local Muslim families seeking an education for their children, did the same.

This hostility to Islam and Islamic culture on the part of the colonizing power, symbolized by antipathy toward the veil, transformed a simple article of clothing 11 into the primary battleground between the forces of Westernization

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11 The “veil” itself is not simple, only its Western representation has been reduced to a single concept and idea. El-Guindi points that the Western word “veil” cannot possibly accommodate the diversity seen in the practice of veiling. She points out that *The Encyclopedia of Islam*
and those of resistance, whether religious, nationalist, or – as was often the case – into some combination of the two. The Western discourse saw in the figure of the veiled woman many of the root causes of the social, economic, and political ills of the Muslim world. Of equal importance, it also positioned the veil as the primary symbol of Islamic identity, rejection of Western values, and resistance to outside domination (Ahmed 1992, 295-96). This, in turn, has thrust Muslim women into the broader contestation between West and East. From this point onward, then, the debate on veiling and on other aspects of women in Islam has rarely been about Muslim women themselves.

* * *

In the decades since the Golden Age of colonialism, the veil has retained its status as one of the key points of contention in the culture wars between Islam and the West. This has been all the more the case since the 1970s, when the vigorous reawakening of Islamic activism – part of a worldwide revival of popular religiosity – drew the battle lines anew (Abdo 2000, 140-41). In Cairo, for example, it became increasingly common to see veiled teenaged daughters walking side-by-side with their unveiled mothers, a powerful signal of generational change.

Throughout this period, Egypt’s battered economy was forcing more and more women to work outside the home in order to support their families. Meanwhile, men often little choice but to leave Egypt and to seek jobs overseas, mostly in the wealthy petro-states of the Persian Gulf, where they could earn large sums over the course of a three- or four-year contract. This has put urban women increasingly into the public sphere of offices, schools, and shops, and the

identifies more than one hundred terms for dress parts, many of which are used for “veiling.” Some are for men, some for women, some for both (EI2: 745-6; el-Guindi 1991: 6-7).
veil provides them with the means to negotiate this terrain and still maintain privacy of both space and body (el-Guindi 1991, xvii; Abu-Lughod 2002, 785).

Under the terms set by the Western discourse, that is of the veil as both symbolic and a practical obstacle to Westernization, the growing Islamic movement in Egypt and across the Muslim world promoted its adoption as sign of resistance to foreign intrusion on the one hand and of religious and cultural authenticity on the other. This has been particularly successful on university campuses, from which it then spread to the broader society. The secularized elite and their Western supporters were horrified by this emerging trend. Explanations from cabinet ministers to Western commentators for the newfound popularity of the veil ranged from the ridiculous – the women were too poor or too cheap to buy shampoo or visit the hairdresser – to the outright condescending – they were seeking attention and a remedy for their humdrum existence (Abdo 2000, 150-151).

With all sides heavily so invested in the established discourse, it is no wonder that the theological nuances and sociological aspects of veiling have been lost, and any prospect of deeper understanding of Islamic culture and practice has been squandered. In the first place, the scriptural foundation for the practice may be seen as ambiguous although contemporary practice among Muslims worldwide has largely accepted the veil as a religious obligation on women past the age of puberty.¹²

At the center of the debate is one of the very few explicit references to the practice in the Qur’an:

> And tell the believing women to lower their gaze and be modest, and to display of their adornment only that which is apparent, and to draw their veils over

¹² The routine veiling of prepubescent girls, as is common in contemporary Iran, is completely without religious foundation and must instead be seen in its proper political context.
their bosoms, and not to reveal their adornment save to their own husbands or
fathers or husbands’ fathers, or their sons or their husbands’ sons, or their
brothers or their brothers’ sons or sisters’ sons, or their women, or their slaves,
or male attendants who lack vigor, or children who know naught of women’s
nakedness (24:31).

Elsewhere, the holy text directs believers who approach the Prophet’s wives with
any request to do so from behind a curtain: “That is purer for your hearts and for
their hearts” (33:53). So do the proscriptions set out apply to all Muslim women,
or only to Muhammad’s wives? After all, the Hadith, or recognized sayings of
the Prophet, make a distinction between his wives and ordinary Muslim women,
and Sura 33 goes on to say that they may not follow common practice in the
community and remarry after their husband’s death. Jurists, theologians, and
ordinary Muslims have debated this question, off and on, for centuries.

Also buried under the weight of the discursive formation of women in
Islam are some very real differences in the approach to sex in the Christian and
Muslim traditions. Unlike the Christian view, Islam does not blame women for
the expulsion from the Garden of Eden, nor does it taint human sexuality with an
idea of original sin. Sexuality, then, was part of God’s order and enjoyment for
its own sake was encouraged and rewarded, but only within a strict social order
designed to regulate improper behavior (Bullock 2002, 162; el-Guindi 1991, 31).
The Christian world, for its part, has proven unable to accommodate Muslim
attitudes toward sex. This was all the more the case beginning with what
Foucault has called the “monotonous night of the Victorian bourgeoisie” (1978,
3), which as it happens coincided with the great period of Western colonization
of Muslim lands.

The resulting clash of these two very different approaches to human
sexuality, writes Fadwa El-Guindi in *Veil: Modesty, privacy and resistance,*

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feeds directly into a Western discourse that insists on seeing the veil and related institutions as inherently repressive and degrading to Muslim women:

Both Islam and Christianity provide moral systems to restrain improper and disorderly behavior that threatens the sociomoral order: Christianity chose the path of desexualizing the worldly environment; Islam of regulating the social order while accepting its sexualized environment.

The moral standards of Islam are designed to accommodate enjoyment of worldly life, including a sexual environment. It posed no tension between religion and sexuality. ... In their accounts of travels, scholars and writers with a Euro-Christian background had difficulty comprehending the challenge Islam had taken upon itself in opting for the latter path. The fertile imagination that embellishes accounts of ‘baths and harems and veils’ is woven out of an internalized culture of a desexualized society (31).

Contemporary experts and commentators rarely do better, as can be seen by following the public debate over Islam and women, or by glancing at the mainstream Western media. For years now, the veil has been a staple of seemingly endless news articles, books, documentaries, and it is captured in magazine and television images – all as shorthand for a society, a civilization, or a system that is backwards, alien, immobile, and inherently antithetical to human rights and dignity. Running throughout this public discourse is the persistent binary opposition of oppression and freedom, of veiled and un-veiled, of bad and good. Once again, Islam qua Islam is ignored in favor of an unquestioned Western construction.

* * *

By the autumn of 2005, U.S. prestige and influence around the world, and particularly among Muslims, had plummeted to record low levels amid widely held sentiments that its war on terrorism was really a war on Islam. Surveys by Pew Global Attitudes Project show that the centerpieces of the Bush foreign policy – chiefly the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the war on terrorism in general – animated most of the criticism in the Islamic world and badly tarnished America’s image. Many also feared the expanding U.S. military
presence worldwide and worried their own country could provide the next target (Wilke 2007).

Yet, Washington’s response to this precipitous state of affairs was not to argue its case directly on the world stage, or to attempt to present its policies in a better light – let alone to modify its approaches. Instead, the White House chose to invoke the established discourse of Islam and women in what effectively amounted to a massive propaganda campaign under the guise of “public diplomacy.” And so, in September of 2005, Bush dispatched his most trusted aide and advisor – the Texas TV reporter-turned-White House-counselor Karen Hughes – to tour three leading Muslim countries, Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, to press the U.S. line that its policies, including the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, were in the best interests of Muslim women everywhere. She would later visit Indonesia, with the world’s largest population of Muslims, on a similar mission.

The Hughes tours, now carried out in her new role as under secretary for public diplomacy and public affairs at the State Department, were the culminating moment in a multi-year public relations campaign to link the war on terrorism to the discourse of Islam and women as a way of mobilizing domestic and international support for the U.S. aims. Within twenty-four hours of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, Bush had named Hughes to head up “wartime communications” at the White House, and she later led the campaign to position the Afghan war as a battle to liberate women under Taliban rule. “When he [Bush] called me that morning, he told me that this will be an ongoing process of educating the public,” Hughes later told The New York Times of her discussions with the president. (The New York Times, 12 March 2005).
No effort was spared. Hughes was given a large budget and wide powers, stemming from her close personal ties to the president. Even Laura Bush, a traditional political spouse who rarely went beyond her ceremonial White House role, was drafted into the Hughes-led effort: the first lady made a groundbreaking radio address on 17 November 2001 to decry the past treatment of Afghan women and to proclaim their liberation by invading Western forces:

Because of our recent military gains in much of Afghanistan, women are no longer imprisoned in their homes. They can listen to music and teach their daughters without fear of punishment. Yet the terrorists who helped rule that country now plot and plan in many countries. And they must be stopped. The fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women” (Laura Bush 2001).

According to The New York Times, similar statements were prepared for Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Cherie Blair, the wife of the British prime minister, in what the newspaper called “an unusual international offensive by the Bush administration to publicize the plight of women in Afghanistan (The New York Times, 16 November 2001).

Soon, the discourse of women and Islam was popping up with increasing frequency whenever the administration discussed the Afghan campaign and, later, its war aims in Iraq. Afghan exiles in the United States – mostly professionals far from the field of battle – were invited to the White House to publicize the maltreatment of women back home. They were even given media training by their government handlers to better make their case to news reporters and to avoid any unwanted questions (The New York Times, 30 November 2001). Bush larded his public statements with regular references to those he called “women of cover,” and he used major speeches to reprise the administration’s central theme: that Washington’s differences with the Muslim world were, at
heart, cultural and centered on its treatment of women. “The last time we met in this chamber, the mothers and daughters of Afghanistan were captives in their own homes, forbidden from working or going to school,” he said in his 2002 State of the Union address. “Today women are free, and are part of Afghanistan’s new government (Bush 2002c).

Thirty months later, the official White House Web site posted collated comments by the president going back to the 2002 State of the Union, under the heading, “Rights and Aspirations of the People of Afghanistan.” Almost all of the thirty-six quotations, delivered as far afield as Canberra, Australia, and Hershey, Pennsylvania, frame the Afghan war as a fight for women’s rights.13 And in 2006, the president used the fifth anniversary of the attacks on New York and Washington once again to cast the fight as one against “a radical Islamic empire where women are prisoners in their homes” (Bush 2006).

Nor did the treatment of women in Iraq, an aggressively secular state under the Baath Party headed by Saddam Hussein, escape the interest of the White House. Seeking to build broad international support for a preemptive strike before Hussein could hand over weapons of mass destruction – weapons, it turns out, he never had – to terrorists, Bush told the United Nations on 12 September 2002:

If we meet out responsibilities, if we overcome this danger, we can arrive at a very different future. The people of Iraq can shake off their captivity. They can one day join a democratic Afghanistan and a democratic Palestine, inspiring reforms around the Muslim world. These nations can show by their example that honest government, and respect for women, and the great Islamic tradition of learning can triumph in the Middle East and beyond (2005: 89)

Throughout this campaign, we can clearly hear the echo of Lord Cromer and his own use of the language of feminism, backed by the anti-Islam

13 Available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/afghanistan/20040708.html.
discourse. Like the Egyptian consul, George W. Bush was no feminist. Nor was his administration supportive of initiatives sought by women’s groups worldwide. On his first day in office, the new president cut off all U.S. funding to international family-planning organizations which offered abortion services or even counseling (Viner 2002). A year later, he used a public proclamation to link his opposition to abortion, which remains legally protected in the United States, to the war on terrorism: both represented “a fight against evil and tyranny to preserve and protect life” (Bush 2000a, cited in Viner 2002).

Critics have also argued that the repressive conditions for women under Taliban rule, so frequently invoked by the U.S. administration and its allies, were of little interest to the West until the Afghan invasion in the aftermath of the terrorist strikes on New York and Washington. In fact, negotiations between the United States and elements of the Taliban on construction of an oil pipeline that would cross Afghan territory had been carried on for years and were well advanced (Rashid 2007; Cloud 2004). Moreover, some women’s groups in Afghanistan were opposed to the invasion, seeing an immediate threat to women and children from U.S. bombs, bullets, and occupation (Cloud 2004, 297; Oliver 2007, 53-55) All this recalls Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s critique of colonialist rhetoric as largely consisting of “white men saving brown women from brown men” (Spivak 1988, 295).

The United States government was able to mobilize considerable public support for two wars against overwhelmingly Muslim societies by tapping directly into the overarching Western discourse of Islam and its important subset, that of Islam and women. This appropriation of the rhetoric of women’s
rights and freedoms under Islam in order to unleash deadly violence on Muslim
countries shows clearly just how much the struggle for women’s equality has
become a discursive one rather than simply a material one (Oliver 2007, 40). On
the ground, it is impossible to say whether the women of Afghanistan or Iraq are
materially better off after the U.S.-led invasions and the imposition of pro-
Western governments. Certainly, the death, destruction, and disease that
invariably accompany war have taken an enormous toll on Muslim men, women,
and children, and promised expansion of participation by women in public life
has not been borne out.

Yet, the totality of discursive statements, in the media and the political
arena in particular, would remind us everyday that things in the new Iraq and the
new Afghanistan are better and that women there are more free and more happy
– that is, they are more and more just like us. And the more like us, the better.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the matter of women’s clothing, especially
the veil in its various forms. One study of “Kabul Unveiled,” a photo essay from
Time magazine viewed online by tens of millions from around the world, notes
the progression of images from those of veiled victims awaiting liberation to
“photographs of feminists and other unveiled, public women [who] dominate
and end the sequence” (Cloud 2004, 294). Bryan S. Turner, among others, notes
the importance in such media representations of the exchange by Afghan women
of the all-encompassing burqa for the right to go shopping, visit the hair salon,
and buy make-up: “Emancipation from the discipline of the Taliban was marked
by the early construction of the new Islamic identity, the consuming, post-jihadic
Muslim” (Turner 200, 35; see also Oliver 2007: 47ff).
Likewise, foreign correspondent John Lancaster can write a light-hearted feature on the front page of *The Washington Post* about the brisk trade in racy lingerie in a Cairo shopping district. After interviewing shopkeepers, customers, and even a Muslim scholar at al-Azhar University, all of whom make it clear that such behavior between married couples was acceptable and perhaps even admirable, Lancaster also cites scriptural authority for a healthy sex life between man and wife. Still, *The Washington Post* cannot stray from the established narrative: everything from the headline – “Egypt’s Unveiled Industry; Sexy Lingerie a Hit In Muslim Land” – to the narrative structure of the piece turns on the Western notion that “conservative” Muslims cannot possibly enjoy sex as much as their Western counterparts (*The Washington Post*, 24 April 1997).

Almost a decade later, ABC senior foreign affairs correspondent Jonathan Karl assures readers of *The Weekly Standard* that things are changing for the better in Saudi Arabia after meeting a group of women university students: “As I left the auditorium, I asked several students if I could email them. I was surprised by their addresses: ‘sweeteyes,’ ‘cuteygirl85,’ ‘blackrose,’ etc. There’s something going on in Saudi Arabia” (*The Weekly Standard*, 10 October 2005).

This narrative of the veil, sexuality, and Western notions of modernity and progress reaches its height, however, whenever the subject is post-revolutionary Iran. With the victory over the U.S.-backed shah in 1979 and the creation of the Islamic Republic, Iranian women have been required to veil in public. In the early years, dress requirements were extremely strict – no hair showing, no makeup or nail polish, closed-toe shoes, and so on – and at times brutally enforced by religious vigilantes. More recently, these practices have
been relaxed significantly, and some middle-class and upper-class urban women now adopt colorful and personal expressions of the hijab that do little to disguise the figure or fully cover the hair.

Both the official line and public opinion toward this dress code have a complex and nuanced history (Abdo and Lyons 2003), but it has been universally seen in the Western media as a reliable barometer of progress, or lack thereof, by secular civil society at the expense of the ruling religious establishment. In this schema, then, the more lipstick and hair visible to visiting foreign correspondents, the less secure the conservatives’ grip on power and the better the chances of popular revolt against the Islamic system.¹⁴

On a reporting trip to the southern Iranian city of Shiraz in the spring of 2004, Nicholas Kristoff, a columnist for The New York Times, concludes in “Those Sexy Iranians” that the transformation of the veil from shapeless, basic black to “light, tight, and sensual” marks the beginning of the end for the ruling clerics and their despotic regime. A troll through the city’s shops reveals new consumer demand for robes slit up to the armpits or tied to the legs to show off the curve of the hip. “Worse, from the point of view of hard-line mullahs, young women in such clothing aren’t getting 74 lashes any more – they’re getting dates,” he writes. Kristoff then waves off objections from the fashionable Iranian women he interviews against Westernization – “We totally reject that,” says one. “We don’t want that freedom” – to assert that a style revolution profoundly threatens the Islamic Revolution. “Ayatollahs, look out,” he concludes (The New York Times, 8 May 2004).

¹⁴ In fact, the opposite is generally the case. In 1998-2001, when I was based in Tehran as the Reuters bureau chief, social regulation on veiling, the intermingling of the sexes in public, and the prevalence of satellite dishes to receive foreign programming was generally most relaxed whenever the authorities felt most secure. It issued from a position of strength, not weakness.
This transposition of the material and the discursive, of the actual and the imagined Muslim East, clouds our ability to understand cultures other than our own, just as it hinders our ability to formulate appropriate and successful policies and responses to the inevitable conflict of interests in today’s globalized world. It also reveals the extent to which legitimate questions of history, economics, and politics are set aside whenever it comes to Western views of the Muslim world. Instead, questions of culture trump all. Assessing this phenomenon after the start of the Afghan war, Lila Abu-Lughod notes:

What is striking … is that there was a consistent resort to the cultural, as if knowing something about women and Islam or the meaning of a religious ritual would help one understand the tragic attack on New York’s World Trade Center and the U.S. Pentagon, or how Afghanistan had come to be ruled by the Taliban, or what interests might have fueled U.S. and other interventions in the region over the past twenty-five years. …

In other words, the question is why knowing about the “culture” of the region, and particularly its religious beliefs and treatment of women, was more urgent than exploring the history of the development of repressive regimes in the region and the U.S. role in this history. Such cultural framing … prevented the serious exploration of the roots and nature of human suffering in this part of the world. Instead of political and historical explanations, experts were being asked to give religio-cultural ones” (2002, 784).

This same confusion hopelessly entangled Karen Hughes, the Bush envoy to the Muslim women of the world, where the powerful under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs mistook her imagined East for the one now staring her in the face. At a meeting with professional and university women in Saudi Arabia, Hughes was surprised to find that American notions of freedom and social participation were not necessarily shared, universal values. “We in America take our freedom very seriously. … I have to tell you that – and I believe that women should be full and equal participants in society. And I feel as an American women that my ability to drive is an important part of my freedom (Hughes 2005).
Not surprisingly, members of her Saudi audience, prohibited from driving by the country’s strict social regime, was less than impressed. To these women, the educational opportunities and professional advancement which they clearly enjoyed were far more important and relevant to their lives. Nor were they impressed by Hughes’ repeated attempts to present herself as an ordinary “mom” – a notion that struck many as odd, or simply irrelevant. Similar debacles occurred before Muslim women in both Turkey and Egypt, and even some in the traditionally sympathetic U.S. media were withering in their reporting of the Hughes mission. What is crucial here is not that the worldview of any one government official should be shaped by life in suburban Texas, with its driving culture and “soccer moms,” but that the combined resources of the White House, the departments of state and defense – with their legions of consultants, public relations advisors, Islam experts, and envoys – could not foresee the coming train wreck.

Instead, the Bush administration adopted and perpetuated the established discourse of Islam and women for the benefit of specific Western interests, in this case the military occupation and political and economic domination of Muslim societies. By casting the wars in Afghanistan, and then in Iraq, as wars for the liberation of Muslim women from the veil and other social restrictions, it both invoked this familiar narrative and advanced it in new directions. At the same time, Bush and his fellow social conservatives were able to obscure their own opposition to women’s advancement at home by contrasting the freedoms of Western women with those of women suffering under Islam (Oliver 2007, 47, 55; Cloud 2004, 286).
Chapter Eight: Conclusion

A close reading of the anti-Islam discourse, from its inception, or “zero point,” in the run-up to the First Crusade to its present incarnation in the war on terrorism, reveals remarkable power, influence and – most striking of all – constancy. In fact, it is this latter quality that represents its most salient feature. And it is one that has so far eluded satisfactory explanation by the social sciences. After rummaging through Michel Foucault’s “tool box,” I have attempted in this thesis to complete a fundamental first step toward addressing this problem. This has largely involved the powerful technique of discursive archaeology, aided and abetted by particular notions of “truth” and “history” and, ultimately, by the strategy of “reversal” – that is, of asking what if the predominant discourse were suspended, turned on itself, or suddenly ceased to exist?

In more traditional terms of the sociology of religion, I have engaged here in the task set out at the beginning of this enterprise by Sutton and Vertigans in *Resurgent Islam*, with their call for a fresh approach to the Western understanding of Islam:

> If sociologists are to avoid contributing to the caricature of Islam as a war-like religion and civilization propagated by dogmatic Muslim militants, then there is a need to work towards a much more comprehensive sociological account which focuses on the social, cultural, political and economic contexts in which Islam is embedded. In doing so, sociology may add a new dimension to wider understandings of Islam and relations between ‘Islam and the West’ (31-32).

Whether one prefers to speak in terms of discursive formations or of the social contexts in which Islam is embedded, the challenge remains the same – to lay the foundations for a new and more useful way of looking at Islam and the Muslims that recognizes and, if possible, avoids the distortions inherent to past efforts.
Not surprisingly, such an approach would upend both the popular view and the scholarly consensus across a range of issues, ideas, and disciplines. Foremost, it challenges one of the cardinal precepts of the Western history of ideas—often reflected in the sociology of knowledge—that of the inevitable arc of historical change and progress. As we saw in Chapter Four, on the formation of the anti-Islam discourse, so-called serious speech on the subject of Islam has defied this basic notion of history. Everything in the established Western canon tells us that our knowledge and understanding of Islam should form and re-form in accordance with additional information and new interactions, that is, with new data amassed over succeeding centuries of trade, travel, study, warfare, and so on. This has not happened in any meaningful way. And so we must look for new ways to explain the so-far unexplained.

I have sought to do so by applying a sociological framework which has at its heart one central theoretical position—that the very idea of Islam has been perpetuated by those Western social groups and institutions that stand to benefit from the survival, intact and unexamined, of a thousand-year-old anti-Islam discourse, often for reasons that have nothing whatsoever to do with the putative subject. This, then, suggested three interrelated research questions, all of them the subject of sociological inquiry when applied to the discursive formation of Islam: How is this discourse formed? How does it operate? And, lastly, Cui bono? Who benefits?

Such an approach has allowed me to set aside, for the most part, claims of truth-value in the Western discourse of what it is Muslims say, do, or believe, and to focus primarily on how and why such statements are produced in the first place, processes that take place outside the conscious understanding of those
producing them. This is precisely what Foucault means when he refers to the effort “to reveal a positive unconscious of knowledge: a level that eludes the consciousness of the scientist and yet is part of scientific discourse, instead of disputing its validity and seeking to diminish its scientific nature” (1994b, xi).

For it is only by addressing the production of Western statements about Islam outside larger questions of their own validity that we can begin to acquire a deeper understanding of the sociological and epistemological phenomena at work in the background. This also reveals the ways in which the predominant discourse distorts the Western “discipline” of Islam and corrodes contemporary public debate and governmental policies with regard to the Muslim world. Lastly and perhaps most profoundly, it opens the door to Foucault’s principle of reversal – specifically, the negation of the accepted notion that the discourse accurately reflects a specific nondiscursive reality (Shumway 1993, 18). This, in turn, can reveal fruitful areas for future sociological research and study.

Let us examine these briefly with reference, in turn, to my three central thematic concerns: Islam and science; Islam and violence; and Islam and women. Chapter Five discussed the extent to which the Western discipline of history of science has effectively been held hostage to the discursive notion that Islam is inherently and fundamentally irrational. The achievements of Muslim science, for a time the wonder of the Western world and the widespread source of emulation among medieval Latin scholars, were quickly submerged under the weight of the broader anti-Islam discourse. The early Renaissance humanists set this process in motion at the beginning of fourteenth century by dismissing Muslim science and philosophy out of hand – and, with it, the Middle Ages in general – and instead directing the West toward new, idealized notions of
“classical” Greece and Rome as the proper source of values, ideas, culture, and learning.\(^1\)

By harnessing the anti-Islam discourse in this way and by adapting it to their own benefit, these new secular actors successfully carved out their own routes to social, political, and economic advancement – at court, in the universities, and even in the Roman Curia – in a rapidly urbanizing Europe traditionally dominated by the clergy. In a similar vein, the French mathematicians of the sixteenth century set out to create a European pedigree for the Muslim art of algebra as a way to lift arithmetic from a mere trade to a lofty science and thus advance their own professional standing. That this required wholesale rewriting of the history of mathematics was, of course, incidental. Today, this same discourse underpins the Western monopoly on science, technology, and the idea of modernity in general.

As seen in Chapter Six, this process of distortion, introduced by the operation of the anti-Islam discourse, takes on greater immediacy and urgency when we consider matters of contemporary public policy, such as the war on terrorism or the broader relationship between Islam and the West. Here, the discursive formation of Islam and violence colors virtually every aspect of Western thinking and response. Without it, the clash of civilizations thesis which underpins the present war on terrorism would likely never have arisen from relative obscurity to the position of prominence it enjoys today in the media, in the political arena and among the public at large, and in much of the Academy.

By deploying central elements of the anti-Islam discourse, U.S. neo-\(^1\)

\(^1\) Martin Bernal (1987) finds a very similar process in the modern historiography of ancient Greece, which he argues deliberately slights the huge contributions to “classical” culture of Egyptian, Phoenician, and other Eastern societies in favor of a Eurocentric model that tolerates no such outside influence.
conservatives and their allies in commerce, the media, politics, and academia have successfully advanced their desire to remake the Muslim world in the Western image.

Among the most corrosive derivative effects of the established narrative of violence in Islam is the way in which it obscures the possible motivations and delegitimizes the tactics of the enemy in the war on terrorism while valorizing the West’s approach on both scores. President George W. Bush’s insistence on portraying bin Laden simply as heir to the “murderous ideologies of the twentieth century” (Bush 2001b) – and the accompanying rise of the popular rhetorical slogan of “Islamofascism” – casts the attacks of 11 September exclusively as a totalitarian threat to the West’s values, culture, and way of life.

So does Thomas Friedman’s insistence, contrary to fact, that the al-Qaeda hijackers left behind no statement of demands. In other words, radical Muslims can have no other goal, objective, or interest except the wholesale annihilation of the Western world as we know it. Any rational political, social, economic, cultural, or religious grievances that might lie behind, or simply help shape and channel, violent antagonism toward the West must perforce be dismissed outright, or else ignored altogether. Clearly, this dooms any possibility of negotiated settlement to the current contestation between Western interests and those of a resurgent Islamic world and all but guarantees a militarized solution into the foreseeable future.

In the same way, the prevailing discourse of Islam and women, detailed in Chapter Seven, dictates that the West’s approaches and policy proscriptions toward Muslim societies be seen solely through the lens of its own flawed understanding of both women and gender relations in Islam. Nothing else can
adequately explain the Western fascination, obsession even, with the institution of veiling, and its general apprehension as the root and cause of the oppressive conditions faced by many Muslim women. As with the discourse on violence, the prevailing Western narrative of the veil, and of the associated “degradation” of women, creates the notion of an inferior Muslim world in need of rescue from itself, by force if necessary, even as it validates the West’s own approach to gender relations and the rights of women.

Thus, George W. Bush and his wife Laura – neither known for anything like feminist sentiments – so eagerly championed the rights of Afghan women as a way of mobilizing public support at home for the war against the Taliban. As we have seen time and time again with the workings of this discourse, the desires and opinions of Afghan Muslim women, a considerable number of whom opposed the U.S. invasion (Cloud 2004, 297), were of no consequence. Nor has the continued suffering of women under the post-Taliban regime, and under general wartime conditions, drawn anything like the Western attention and condemnation once directed their way.

This same campaign against the veil was used in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to support the colonial domination of the Muslim world and to bolster evangelical campaigns aimed at subverting Islam and gaining Christian converts, while at the same time co-opting the emerging Western feminist demand for greater women’s rights at home. Here again, as with science and war, varying Western social groups, interests, and institutions have continued to benefit from the discourse of Islam and women even as it has failed repeatedly to articulate anything like the discursive reality on the ground.
Having explicated the formation of the anti-Islam discourse and laid out a sociological framework for understanding its operation and perpetuation across the centuries and across a broad range of intellectual, social, and political issues, I would like to conclude by proposing a new model for approaching the world of Islam, a “hidden history,” as it were, of its practices, beliefs, and culture.

To begin with, we must acknowledge that the established Western discourse of Islam does not – or, at the very least, does not necessarily – reflect the reality of Islam itself, what I have referred to earlier as Islam *qua* Islam. Rather, it is the product of a socially-determined process that has embedded a particular discursive formation in Western thought. Here, then, are the roots of what Sutton and Vertigans have identified as the prevailing “caricature of Islam” (31). Chapters Five, Six, and Seven establish ample grounds for such an assertion, and many more examples, beyond the scope of the present inquiry, could likewise be marshaled in its support.

Next, we must deliberately remove the central pillars of the thousand-year-old anti-Islam discourse and examine what remains behind. Or, to return to the question posed in Chapter One: *When we open this particular window, what is it that we see that has not been seen before?* Were we to set aside these pillars – that Islam is inherently violent and spread by the sword; that Muslims are irrational, anti-science, and thus anti-modern; and that they are sexually perverse and hate women – as flawed representations of the nondiscursive reality of Islam, then whole new patterns of possible relationships between East and West open up before our eyes.

From this vantage point, we can now begin to recognize the emerging outlines of the West’s enormous debt to Islamic science and philosophy and the
accompanying need to re-examine the way we think about the history of ideas entirely. We can start to discern the deep fault lines that run through the predominant notion of Islam as inherently violent and the way this distorts the West’s understanding, conceals its own motives and interests, and renders appropriate and successful policy responses virtually impossible. And we can at last acknowledge that the near-total inadequacy of our understanding of gender relations in Islamic societies has obscured the claims of contemporary Islam to its own, non-Western idea of modernity.

Taken together, this involves involve shifting the broader problem of East-West relations from the traditional view of inter-cultural rivalry to one of intra-cultural contest. Rather than delimit what is a boundary between East and West, it would then be possible to assign one large “interactive space” that stretches across much of the globe. In effect, this marks a return to the view of the world captured in one of the most remarkable landmarks in the history of ideas: the atlas produced by the Muslim scholar al-Idrisi in the mid-twelfth century by commission of the Christian king of Sicily which was then multi-faith – Muslim, Catholic and Orthodox.

This effort to place Islam and the West in the same cultural space, a shared universe captured in the lapis lazuli shades of al-Idrisi’s mappa mundi, flows naturally from Max Weber’s classic analysis of Christianity and Islam as both “Western” religions. By opening up space in the idea of Western culture for the civilization of Islam, we are suddenly faced with a compelling new model of relations between the two– one of continuous interaction of cultures locked in relations for one thousand years – in which it is hard to say where one stops and the other begins. This, then, calls for the compilation of a new, hidden history of
Islam, one that fills in those areas declared off-limits by the anti-Islam discourse.

But, first, we must radically rephrase the West’s favorite polemical question – “What’s wrong with Islam?” – to a less comfortable query, “What’s wrong with us?”
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