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**The Neglected Reconquest –
Portugal as a European frontier (1064-
1250)**

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Summary

This thesis examines the evolution of Portugal between the mid-eleventh and the mid-thirteenth centuries, a period of Iberian history dominated by the *Reconquista*. Study of the reconquest in Portugal has often been neglected in favour of events in neighbouring Spain. Yet during this period Portugal grew from a small, frontier county into an independent kingdom. Portuguese territory was augmented through successful military campaigns against the Muslim states to the south; but at the same time a more subtle change was taking place, as greater contact with Latin Christendom brought cultural upheaval to the region. This thesis argues that both the territorial reconquest and Latin Christian influence were fundamental to the early development of Portugal. Local leaders sought advantage by embracing Latin culture, but attempted to use their special status as frontier defenders to mediate this outside influence to their own benefit. During the twelfth century these methods enabled the first Portuguese king, Afonso Henriques (1128-1185), to achieve independence and territorial security. His thirteenth-century successors, faced with a more complex world and changing Latin Christian attitudes to the frontier, were unable to consolidate these gains.

The thesis is organised chronologically. The first two chapters examine the characteristics of eleventh-century Iberian society and the impact of early Latin Christian influence in the peninsula. One unexpected result of this influence was the formation of the county of Portugal in 1095, and subsequent chapters address the policies of successive Portuguese leaders. Yet political developments cannot be divorced from contemporary economic and social trends, so large sections of the thesis are devoted to an analysis of changing attitudes in Portugal. Increasing contacts with northern Europe promoted economic growth and cultural transition. Urbanisation and the wealth generated by trade brought greater complexity and sophistication to

Portuguese society. At the same time, Portuguese people were gradually made aware of a Latin Christian identity that transcended local loyalties. This process of integration into a wider Latin Christendom created both opportunity and great tension throughout the Iberian peninsula. It also created a political environment in which the foundation of an independent kingdom of Portugal was possible.

Statement

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any degree or diploma in any university, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.



Stephen Lay

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List of Maps


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Abbreviations

- ADA 'Annales D. Alfonsi Portugallensium regis', ed. M. Blöcker-Walter.
- APV 'Annales Portugalenses veteres', ed. P. David.
- CAI *Chronica Adefonsi Imperatoris*, ed. A. Maya Sánchez.
- CCCM *Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis*.
- CMP-A *Chancelarias Medievais Portuguesas. Documentos de Chancelaria de D. Afonso Henriques*, ed. A. E. Reuter.
- DMP *Documentos Medievais Portugueses, Documentos Régios*, ed. R. Pinto Azevedo.
- DDS *Documentos de D. Sancho I (1174-1211)* eds R. de Azevedo, A. de Jesus da Costa, and M. R. Pereira.
- HC *Historia Compostellana*, ed. E. Falque Rey.
- JL *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, eds P. Jaffé, rev. S. Löwenfeld, W. Wattenbach, F. Kaltenbrunner, and P. Ewald, 2 vols (Leipzig, 1885-8).
- MGH *Monumenta Germaniae historica inde ab anno Christi quingentesimo usque ad annum millesimum et quingentesimum auspiciis societatis aperiendis fontibus rerum germanicarum medii aevi*, eds G. H. Pertz *et. al.*, (Hannover, 1826 –)
- MGH SS MGH *Scriptores in Folio et Quarto*.

- PL *Patrologiae cursus completus, series Latina*, ed. J.-P. Migne, 221 vols
(Paris, 1844-64)
- PMH *Portugaliae Monumenta Historica*, ed. A. Herculano.
- PMH SS *Portugaliae Monumenta Historica, Scriptores*.
- PP *Papsturkunden in Portugal*, ed. C. Erdmann.

Map 1. Regions of Portugal.



Introduction

Reconsidering the reconquest

In 1064 King Fernando I of León-Castile (1037-1065) laid the foundations of the county of Portugal by securing the strategically vital Mondego River; by 1250 the independent kingdom of Portugal had established borders that have remained largely unchanged until the present day. Portugal developed into a sovereign state against the backdrop of the reconquest – the struggle between Christian and Islamic worlds for control over the Iberian peninsula – and the two historical phenomena have long been seen as closely linked. A less commonly acknowledged force also shaped the formation of Portugal. From the end of the tenth century Latin Christian culture began to make an impact throughout the Iberian peninsula. This cultural influence took the form of direct immigration of individuals and institutions, growing commercial and social networks, and, perhaps most pervasively, the transfer of ideas and social mores. Thus, even as Iberian Christians contended with Iberian Muslims, the cultural orientation of the resulting frontier society was being subtly altered. Portugal's emergence from this military and cultural tumult provides unique insights not only into the political development of one small kingdom, but also into the forces which forged Latin Christendom as a whole.

Modern Portugal lies on the westernmost edge of the European continent and has a mainland territory of over 92,000 sq. km: 560 km from north to south, and on average 200 km east-west.¹ Although one of the smaller European nations, Portugal is also one of the most geographically diverse. In the northwest of the country is the fertile Minho area, containing two of the most important early towns: the first regional capital, Guimarães, and the religious centre of Braga. The mountainous territory to the east, Trás-os-Montes, forms a barrier to travel into the centre of the peninsula. South lies the Douro region; the river that gives the area its name meanders through deep, terraced gorges to reach the sea at the mercantile city of Oporto. Beyond the Douro lie the

Beiras, a broad band of territories stretching from the Atlantic coast to the Spanish border. The most important city in this region is Coimbra, the royal seat for much of the medieval period. Between the Beiras and the Tagus River are the wide lands of Estremadura and Ribatagus, an area famous for the raising of horses and cattle. This region contains some of the most significant cultural centres in Portugal, including the great Cistercian monastery of Alcobaça, the Templar stronghold of Tomar, and the important cities of Santarém and Lisbon.

The Tagus River divides the country in both geographical and strategic terms. The flat, dry topography of the south is markedly different from the green and mountainous north. The southern expanses of Portugal also remained longest under Muslim control; lingering traces of Moorish culture can still be seen. The Alentagus region, between the Tagus River and the Algarve, occupies almost a third of Portugal's total area. These vast, rolling plains are covered with wheat fields, cork trees, and olive plantations. The city of Évora lies in the centre of this wide expanse, a settlement which in the twelfth century became the base for an indigenous Portuguese military order, the knights of Évora (later the knights of Avis). South of the Alentagus is the fertile Algarve region. Here the Moorish legacy is particularly pronounced, as visible in the architecture as in the many ancient groves of orange and almond trees. The largest medieval settlement was Silves, but its importance was later eclipsed by the seaboard cities of Lagos and Faro.

Portugal to this day bears the clear geographical imprints of the long Muslim presence in the region. Nevertheless the actual nature of the Christian reconquest remains in many ways ambiguous. Islam reached the Iberian peninsula in 711, when the forces of the Ummayyad dynasty crossed from North Africa and routed the defending Christian Visigoths. Iberia was overrun and then absorbed into the Caliphate of Damascus. In the far north of the peninsula small pockets of resistance formed, which gradually grew to become independent Christian kingdoms. When these kings subsequently launched a southern expansion, apologists justified their actions as a repossession of stolen ancestral lands. The passage of time and the realities of close contact gradually encouraged less antagonistic relations between Christian and Muslim.

¹ For general geographical descriptions of Portugal see Ruth Way, *A Geography of Spain and Portugal* (London: Methuen, 1962) and David Stanislawski, *The Individuality of Portugal: a Study in Historical-Political Geography* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1959).

By the tenth century a distinct Iberian culture had emerged in which religious belief played only a secondary role in identity or political orientation. Warfare, even when waged in the name of reconquest, lacked strong religious overtones and was fought with relative restraint for clear secular ends.

During the eleventh century Iberian society experienced an upheaval more pervasive, if less dramatic, than the Ummayyad invasion of 711. Latin Christian influences began to impact ever more forcefully in the region. There was a steady increase in communication, trade, and immigration from northern Europe. Many of the distinctive characteristics of Latin culture were transplanted into the peninsula, such as the arrangement of new bishoprics, the enforcement of liturgical conformity with Roman usage, and ecclesiastical obedience to the papacy. The result was a fitful cultural reorientation in Iberia, creating opportunities and new tensions at all levels of society. Among both European and Iberian Christians there slowly emerged a sense of allegiance based on a shared faith and through it a shared culture. Yet even as community identity widened to include peoples widely separated geographically, those of alternative faiths were correspondingly excluded. This process was felt throughout the peninsula, but the effect in Portugal was unique.

Portugal and Spain share a long, often geographically arbitrary border. The two regions have much in common, both historically and culturally.² Despite this, Portugal has traditionally been resistant to influence or interference from its larger neighbour, and as a result, has frequently been perceived as isolated from the remainder of Europe. This impression is erroneous: while by road Portugal is indeed far distant from the heartland of European culture, the nautical perspective is quite different. The increasing use of maritime transport from the tenth century onwards saw Portugal become a vital link not only between Christian Europe and Muslim Spain and North Africa, but also between the seaboard of northern Europe and the Mediterranean world. Thus Portugal received cultural influences from France and Italy through the prism of Spain, but also and more directly through maritime contact with northern Europe.

² Nomenclature can prove a controversial issue in Iberian studies. The western region of the peninsula has at various times been known as Lusitania, Portucale and Portugal. Each term carries with it a host of implications and associations. In general, 'Europe' and 'Iberia' will be used in their modern geographical sense, while 'Latin Christian' and 'Hispanic' will refer to cultural forms that developed in these regions. 'Portugal' and 'Spain' will be used in their modern political and geographical sense; medieval names for places and political entities will be adopted as appropriate.

Portuguese history during the reconquest period has often been equated with, and indeed overshadowed by, the history of neighbouring Spain. Yet an important distinction between the two regions was the nature of their engagement with Latin Christendom. Foreign participants played a more direct role in Portuguese operations than they did elsewhere in the peninsula, and by so doing fundamentally altered the character of many campaigns. Yet European involvement in Portugal went far beyond tactical aid. Latin Christian cultural influence had a pervasive effect on Portuguese society. The gradual evolution from an Iberian frontier community to a largely integrated Latin Christian kingdom challenged traditional Portuguese ideas of identity, authority, and political legitimacy. Successful leaders were those who could take advantage of opportunities that might arise both from warfare against the Islamic states across their southern borders and, equally importantly, from the appearance of exotic peoples and ideas at the gates of their cities.

Dispatches from the frontier: Portuguese source material between the eleventh and thirteenth century

Early Portuguese sources present the historian with a unique series of challenges and opportunities. Iberian chronicles provide a threadbare but sometimes revealing picture of Portugal from the eleventh to the thirteenth century. Occasionally too, authors outside the peninsula, having either visited the region or corresponded with others who had, were able to add important information to that provided by local writers. In contrast to the uneven production of indigenous narrative histories, the Portuguese record of official documents is unusually rich, including town charters, land grants, confirmations of privileges, and letters. Historians have used both narrative and charter material to trace the events and also the attitudes of the reconquest period. Until recently, however, scholars have devoted far less attention to the insights Iberian sources provide on the impact of Latin Christian culture in the peninsula, an oversight all the more remarkable because the influence of northern Europe is clearly evident in the form such documents take.

Several late eleventh and early twelfth-century Iberian narrative sources can provide insights into developments in the west of the peninsula. Portuguese writers

produced two major chronicles: the *Cronica Conimbricensis* and the more extensive *Chronica Gothorum*.³ To these histories can be added the hagiographies of local saints and religious luminaries, along with longer descriptions of isolated ecclesiastical foundations or individual campaigns.⁴ Spanish chronicles, notably the *Historia Silense*, the *Historia Compostellana*, and the *Chronica Adefonsi Imperatoris*, also include significant information concerning Portugal.⁵ Moreover Muslim authors were active in southern Iberia during this period; brief reports of events in the distant west sometimes attracted their attention.⁶ A generation later, during the middle years of the thirteenth century, Bishop Lucas of Ty produced the *Chronica mundi* while his ecclesiastical rival, Archbishop Rodrigo of Toledo, wrote the *Historia de rebus Hispanie*. Unfortunately, due to circumstances unique to the westernmost Iberian kingdom at that time, Portuguese writers were less inclined to vie with the nimble pens of their Leonese and Castilian neighbours. While the reason for these sudden surges of historiographical effort in Iberia are highly debatable, a correlation between them and periods of

³ These chronicles were first brought to wide attention by Alexandre Herculano in the essential collection of medieval Portuguese sources, *Portugaliae Monumenta Historica, Scriptores*, ed. A. Herculano (Lisbon: Academia das Cincias, 1856). Subsequent editors have sought to clarify the relationships between these sources. Pierre David, 'Annales Portugalenses Veteres', in P. David, *tudes Historiques sur la Galice et le Portugal du VI^e au XII^e sicles* (Lisbon: Livraria Portugalia Editoria, 1947), 257-340; and 'Annales D. Alfonsi Portugallensium regis', in Monica Blcker-Walter, *Alfons I. von Portugal. Studien zu Geschichte und Sage des Begrnders der portugiesischen Unabhngigkeit* (Zurich: Fretz und Wasmuth Verlag, 1966), pp. 151-61. The complicated history and dating of these sources will be considered below.

⁴ Important hagiographies include: *Vita sancti Theotonii*, PMH SS, pp. 79-88; *Vita Tellonis Archidiaconi*, PMH SS, pp. 64-75; and *Vita sancti Geraldi archiepiscopi Bracarenensis*, PMH SS, pp. 53-9. Other locally produced accounts are *Indiculum foundationis monasterii S. Vincentii*, PMH SS, pp. 90-3; and *De expugnatione Scalabis*, Appendix 4, below, pp. 245-51.

⁵ Four of the principal eleventh and early twelfth-century Leonese and Castilian chronicles appear in translation with extensive commentary in Simon Barton and Robert Fletcher (trans), *The World of El Cid. Chronicles of the Spanish Reconquest* (Manchester: UP, 2000). In the early decades of the twelfth century the archbishops of Compostela commissioned a chronicle celebrating their achievements: *Historia Compostellana*, ed. E. Falque Rey, CCCM 70 (Turnhout, 1988). After a generation of relative quiet a new wave of historical writing arose with Lucas of Ty's *Chronica Mundi* ed. E. Falque, CCCM 74 (Turnhout, 2003) and Rodrigo Jimnez de Rada of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie sive Historia Gothica*, ed. J. Fernndez Valverde, CCCM 72 (Turnhout, 1987). More generally, see Colin Smith (ed. and trans.), *Christians and Moors in Spain*, 3 vols (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1988).

⁶ Accessible introductions to the Arabic sources and history in the Iberian peninsula are Hugh Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal. A Political History of al-Andalus* (London: Longman, 1996); and M. R. Menocal, M. Sells, and R. P. Scheindlin, *The Literature of Al-Andalus* (Cambridge: UP, 2000). A collection of Islamic documents pertaining to Portugal can be found in Antnio Borges Coelho, *Portugal na Espanha rabe*, 4 vols (Lisbon: Seara Nova, 1973); and Antnio Camilo-Alves, *Os nossos companheiros rabes* (Lisbon: Hugim, 1997).

intensified Latin Christian penetration of Iberia suggest that one factor in writing may have been the social tension such penetration provoked.⁷

Yet Latin Christian intervention in Iberia had a greater impact on the narrative record than as a possible impetus to the writing of local histories. Travellers from distant lands visited Portuguese shores and provided accounts of the events they witnessed there. In addition, writers who remained in their native lands used information provided by visitors returning from Iberia to add exotic details to their works. The very existence of such accounts suggests the growing relations between Portugal and other regions of Latin Christendom. Moreover Latin Christian visitors usually recorded what struck them as odd in the local society, and often it is the things they did not understand that are the most revealing.⁸ From these accounts it is possible to trace a convergence between the culturally inculcated attitudes of visitor and host.

The effect of Latin Christian cultural influence is even more evident in surviving official documents. Portugal can boast a rich collection of early charters, possibly because subsequent political unrest obliged landholders to preserve their confirmations of ancient titles. Not only do these charters provide a wealth of incidental knowledge, but their format often suggests wider social changes. Prior to the tenth century many official documents were written in Arabic, the most commonly known language among literate people in the mixed societies of frontier Spain. Gradually, in a clear testimony to hardening social boundaries and an aggressive Latin Christian culture, the official use of Arabic waned in favour of Latin. The eleventh century brought further change: local Iberian styles of calligraphy were seriously challenged by the northern Carolingian script. Finally, toward the end of the twelfth century, the increasing use of vernacular language in official documents hints at a greater level of literacy and perhaps also a resurgence of local self-confidence.⁹

⁷ Barton and Fletcher, *The World of El Cid*, pp. 6-7. For a more detailed study of Spanish historical writing see Peter Linehan, *History and the Historians of Medieval Spain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).

⁸ References to Portuguese events are included in Flemish and German chronicles, but the more numerous and extensive are those penned by English authors. These are often the only sources for important events.

⁹ Important collections of Portuguese documents include: *Portugaliae Monumenta Historica, Leges et consuetudines*, ed. A. Herculano (Lisbon: Academia das Ciências, 1856-68); *Documentos Medievais Portugueses. Documentos Régios*, ed. Rui Pinto de Azevedo (Lisbon: Academia Portuguesa da História, 1958); *Chancelarias Medievais Portuguesas. Documentos da Chancelaria de Afonso Henriques*, ed. A. E. Reuter (Coimbra: UP, 1938) and *Documentos de D. Sancho I (1174-1211)* eds R. de Azevedo, A. de Jesus da Costa, and M. R. Pereira (Coimbra: UP, 1979).

This wealth of local documents is augmented by a similarly rich collection of official communications between Portuguese leaders and other potentates of Latin Christendom. A few of these charters give evidence of the growing links between secular groups, between kings through their ambassadors or merchants through their intermediaries.¹⁰ A high level of communication was also maintained between the kingdom and the papacy. From a small beginning in the final years of the eleventh century, the trickle of papal correspondence became a torrent of adjudication and intervention in both ecclesiastical and – increasingly – secular matters.¹¹ The greater frequency and widening scope of these letters provides stark evidence for the depth and complexity of the relations that developed between Portuguese leaders and the papal curia.

Generations of Portuguese historians have deemed the period between the eleventh and the thirteenth century as fundamental to the formation of their country. Letters and papal bulls have provided information on the relationship between the monarchy, aristocracy, clergy and people. Scholars have drawn on narrative sources for information on sieges and campaigns, charters have been used to trace the capture of towns and the arrangements made for their organisation. Yet despite the role played by foreign authors in producing many of these chronicles, and the influence of Latin Christian ideals on local writers, modern commentators have not always acknowledged the impact of these external influences on the development of Iberian society. To understand the causes for this omission, it is necessary to consider briefly the historiography of the reconquest period.

¹⁰ Patrícia A. Odber de Baubeta, 'Some Early English Sources of Portuguese History', *Estudos Medievais*, 9 (1988), 201-10.

¹¹ Carl Erdmann, *Das Papsttum und Portugal im ersten Jahrhundert der portugiesischen Geschichte* (Berlin: Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Klasse Nr. 5, 1928); trans. by J. A. Providência Costa as *O Papado e Portugal no Primeiro Século da História Portuguesa* (Coimbra: Publicações do Instituto Alemão, 1935); B. X. Coutinho, *Acção do Papado na Fundação e Independência de Portugal* (Oporto: Livraria Lopes da Silva, 1940); Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão (ed.), *8.º Centenário do Reconhecimento de Portugal pela Santa Sé* (Lisbon: Academia Portuguesa da História, 1979). The first known papal document sent to Portugal was from Pope Calixtus II (1119-1124). For the whole of this pontificate there are three known papal bulls. In comparison, during the reign of Sancho II (1223-1245) over one hundred bulls are known to have been sent. Edward M. Peters, 'Rex inutilis: Sancho II of Portugal and thirteenth-century deposition theory', *Studia Gratiana*, 14 (1967), pp. 262-3, n. 18.

On writing the history of the reconquest

Few topics in Spanish history have attracted the level of scholarly and popular interest as the *Reconquista*. Latin Christian cultural expansion has also been the subject of numerous studies. Only recently have attempts been made to relate the reconquest in Iberia to Latin Christian expansion more generally. Iberian scholars have often been disinclined to examine the role of outside influences in what has traditionally been considered the formative period in the history of Spain and Portugal. Yet while historians working outside the peninsula have been more open to the impact of outside forces in the development of the Iberian kingdoms, their own spheres of scholarly interest have led to the period of the reconquest, particularly in Portugal, receiving less attention than its importance merits.

Spanish and Portuguese studies of Latin Christian cultural expansion in Iberia have been complicated by the patriotic agendas of local historians. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Iberian historical writing has been underpinned by patriotic questions of national identity and state formation. Spain and Portugal shared the experiences of gaining and then losing empire, of long periods of chronic political uncertainty, and of authoritarian government. Both Spanish and Portuguese writers have sought explanations for contemporary political problems in their respective countries' pasts. While radically different remedies to Iberian ills have been proposed, the very nature of the debate has marginalised the study of Latin Christian intervention in the peninsula during the reconquest period.

Spanish historians have commonly singled out for special censure the apparent inability of national governments to bind the disparate regions of the peninsula into a unified whole.¹² Dominant schools of Spanish historiography have sought to encourage political centralisation by emphasising the supposed historical precedents for

¹² 'Yet for all the variety of approaches adopted in the numerous works dedicated to the nature of Spain and the Spanish temperament, written by men of widely differing political and intellectual backgrounds, we are returned time and time again to the perennial question of the unity of Spain.' Simon Barton, 'The roots of the national question in Spain', in M. Teich and R. Porter (eds), *The National Question in Europe in Historical Context* (Cambridge: UP, 1993), p. 111. The problems posed by Spanish historiography have received an increasing amount of attention from non-Spanish authors, beginning with P. Russell, 'The Nessus-shirt of Spanish history', *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies*, 36 (1959), 219-25. Other recent studies include Peter Linehan, 'Religion, nationalism and national identity in medieval Spain and Portugal', in S. Mews (ed.), *Religion and National Identity*, *Studies in Church History*, 18 (Oxford:

nationhood, and in these constructions the reconquest takes on paramount importance. A popular national myth emerged of a unique Spanish character formed by geographical and historical factors and tempered in the forge of the reconquest to create a modern state.

The proposal to recover all the soil of the fatherland, which never ceased to appeal to the mass of the people, was felt to have been accomplished in the thirteenth century, and both the people and the kings considered the great work terminated, and were convinced that it had been the united enterprise of all Spain.¹³

This assessment, by the eminent Spanish medievalist Ramón Menéndez Pidal, is representative of those historians who have portrayed the reconquest as the test, the proof and the justification for nationhood. This enduring orthodoxy was most directly challenged by historians arguing for the importance of *convivencia* – the tolerant interaction between Christian, Muslim and Jew – in creating a unique Spanish culture.¹⁴ But even in contention, scholars of both schools agreed on one thing: ‘the medieval period [was] the chosen ‘battleground’ for those historians anxious to explain the evolution of the Spanish nation and psyche.’¹⁵ For as long as the primary interest of Spanish historians remained the quest for a ‘national spirit’, influences from beyond the peninsula have been viewed as at best irrelevant, or at worst an imposition of non-indigenous values on the nascent Spanish identity.¹⁶

Blackwell, 1982), 161-99, repr. in P. Linehan, *Spanish Church and Society, 1150-1300*; and by the same author *History and the Historians in Medieval Spain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).

¹³ Ramón Menéndez Pidal, *The Spaniards and their History*, p. 188, quoted in R. A. Fletcher, ‘Reconquest and crusade in Spain c. 1050-1150’, *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 37 (1987), p. 33.

¹⁴ For the classic statements of the opposing positions see Claudio Sanchz-Albornoz, *España: un enigma historical*, 2 vols (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1956); trans. as *Spain: an Historical Enigma*, 2 vols (Madrid, 1975), who insists on the centrality of the reconquest; and Américo Castro, *España en su historia: christianos moros y judios* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1948); trans. as *The Spaniards: an Introduction to their History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), who argues for the significance of *convivencia*.

¹⁵ Barton, ‘The Roots of the National Question’, p. 111.

¹⁶ Once again Menéndez Pidal provides a trenchant example in his seminal *La España del Cid*, 2 vols (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1969); trans. by H. Sunderland as *The Cid and his Spain* (London: Frank Cass & Co, 1971). On considering the impact of the crusades in Spain Mendéndez Pidal concludes: ‘From start to finish the crusades in Spain were feeble movements and so subordinate to Spanish actions as to lack any individuality whatsoever.’ *The Cid and his Spain*, p. 461. On the incursion of the Latin Church into Iberia,

While Portuguese historians have remained attuned to developments in Spanish scholarly opinion, they have also produced their own interpretations of the reconquest period.¹⁷ One essential difference in Portuguese assessments of their own past is that, rather than attempt to explain the failure of central government to create political unity, historians have sought to justify Portuguese national aspiration in opposition to any Pan-Iberian ambitions of Spain. Yet implicit in the traditional Spanish formulation of the *reconquista* was Castilian hegemony over the entire peninsula, and this uncomfortable corollary tended to set closer limits on Portuguese jingoism. As Derek Lomax has observed:

Official Portuguese historians have never shown much interest in the Reconquest... When dealing with the Middle Ages they have preferred to stress the individuality of Portugal as against the rest of the peninsula, and so have laid more emphasis on relations with the Leonese and the Castilians than with the Muslims.¹⁸

Portuguese writers developed explanations for a unique Portuguese character based on geographical factors or a supposed cultural inheritance stretching back to pre-Roman times. When nineteenth-century intellectual developments undermined such deterministic theories, Portugal's most famous historian, Alexandre Herculano (1810-1877), responded by placing the argument squarely within an historical framework and concentrating attention on the medieval period.

Herculano argued that Portugal owed its formation to the efforts of the monarchy and leading nobles during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.¹⁹ Many aspects of Herculano's thesis have been criticised, yet his work set the parameters for subsequent argument, both in the nature of the debate over national formation, and the form

on the other hand, the author writes: 'The task of stamping out the national spirit in Spain was entrusted [by the papacy] to the Cluniac monks who, once they had insinuated themselves into the monasteries, soon rose to episcopal rank.' *The Cid and his Spain*, p. 150.

¹⁷ I examine the development of Portuguese historical writing more closely, particularly in relation to foreign participation in the reconquest, in Appendix 1.

¹⁸ Derek W. Lomax, *The Spanish Reconquest* (New York: Longman, 1978), p. 6.

¹⁹ 'constituída como indivíduo político pelo esforço e tenacidade dos nossos primeiros príncipes e dos seus cavaleiros, o reino de Portugal formou-se pelos dois meios da revolução e da conquista.' Alexandre Herculano, *História de Portugal desde o começo da monarquia até o fim do reinado de Afonso III*, ed. J. Mattoso, 4 vols (Lisbon: Bertrand Editora, 1989), 1, p. 83.

subsequent historical work should take.²⁰ Over time, changing Portuguese political circumstances have influenced this debate over national origins, with monarchists, republicans, and Church apologists seeking historical precedents for their professed political positions. Despite the many differing interpretations of the medieval period forwarded by Portuguese historians, the over-riding interest in national creation has seldom flagged. This interest has continued to discourage careful assessment of the role of foreign participants and ideas during these critical centuries.²¹

International scholars have been relatively slow to address the many interpretative pitfalls caused by the overt patriotism of Hispanic historians.²² One reason for the slow pace of international reconquest studies was the tendency among historians working outside Iberia to link the reconquest with the wider crusading experience, for it shares central elements of religiously justified aggression, and indeed the two practices were closely linked by the participants themselves. Unfortunately, by emphasising the significance of this connection, scholars have encouraged the relegation of the reconquest to the status of a 'sideshow' campaign. Only in recent decades has there been a concerted effort by a small cadre of Hispanists to integrate the history of Spain more fully into that of other regions of Europe. Unfortunately such works have dealt only indirectly with the reconquest.

Latin Christian cultural influence is acknowledged as an important element in Spanish development in the royal biographies produced by Bernard Reilly, the religious studies of Peter Linehan and Charles Bishko, and the urban studies of James Powers, to

²⁰ Portuguese historiography is dominated by multi-volume general histories of the nation, which still remain the major repositories of historical scholarship. The most important of these, in addition to Herculano cited above, include: Fortunato de Almeida, *História de Portugal*, 6 vols (Coimbra: Editor Fortunato de Almeida, 1922-9); Luís Gonzaga de Azevedo, *História de Portugal*, 6 vols (Lisbon: Edições Biblión, 1939-44); and A. H. de Oliveira Marques and Joel Serrão (eds), *Nova História de Portugal*, 11 vols (Lisbon: Editorial Presença, 1996), esp. vol. 2: *Portugal das invasões germanicas a reconquista*, and vol. 3: *Portugal em definição de fronteiras (1096-1325)*.

²¹ There is to date no specific work on the Portuguese experience of the reconquest. The period between the Arabic invasions and the beginning of the twelfth century is approached in Oliveira Marques and Serrão (eds), *Nova História de Portugal*, 2, pp. 253-65.

²² For almost three decades the standard English-language reference for the reconquest was a single chapter, Charles J. Bishko, 'The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest, 1095-1492', in Kenneth Setton (ed.), *A History of the Crusades*, 5 vols (Madison-London: Wisconsin University Press, 1975), 3, 396-456. Derek Lomax's subsequent attempt to redress this dearth of material is, by the author's own admission, 'a fragmentary progress report'. Lomax, *The Spanish Reconquest*, p. 9. Bernard F. Reilly, *The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain, 1031-1157* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992), p. xii, echoes this candour, deeming his own recent study 'provisional'.

name but few of many.²³ Moreover those scholars examining the actual process of Latin Christian cultural expansion have offered different insights into the relationship between more central regions of Europe and the Iberian kingdoms. Such studies have emphasised the frontier character of Iberian society, while also underlining the significance of the frontier in understanding the beliefs and attitudes of Latin Christian culture as a whole.²⁴ Important as such insights have been, international scholars have frequently overlooked Portugal to concentrate on Spanish history. Such implied assumptions of commonality ignore the very real distinctions in the historical development of the two regions.²⁵ In many cases events in Portugal have simply been ignored.²⁶

²³ Bernard F. Reilly *The Kingdom of León-Castilla under King Alfonso VI, 1065-1109* (Princeton: UP, 1988), *The Kingdom of León-Castilla under Queen Urraca, 1109-1126* (Princeton: UP, 1982) and *The Kingdom of León-Castilla under King Alfonso VII, 1126-1157* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999); Charles J. Bishko, *Spanish and Portuguese Monastic History* (London: Variorum, 1984); and Peter Linehan, *The Spanish Church and Papacy in the Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge: UP, 1971), *Spanish Church and Society, 1150-1300* (London: Variorum, 1983), *Past and Present in Medieval Spain* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1992), and most recently *The Processes of Politics and the Rule of Law. Studies on the Iberian Kingdoms and Papal Rome in the Middle Ages* (Aldershot: Variorum, 2002); James F. Powers, *A Society Organized for War: The Iberian Municipal Militias in the Central Middle Ages, 1000-1284* (Berkeley: UP, 1988) and *The Code of Cuenca: Municipal Law on the Twelfth-Century Castilian Frontier* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000). An interesting example of the pervasive effects of Iberian historiographical preconceptions even on foreign authors is provided by Stanislawski, *The Individuality of Portugal*. This detailed physical description of the country is marred by a heady belief in the type geographical determinism dismissed by Herculano at the end of the nineteenth century.

²⁴ 'the expansionary power of [Latin Christian] civilisation sprang from its centres, even if it may be seen most starkly at its edges.' Robert Bartlett, *The Making of Europe. Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change 950-1350* (London: Penguin, 1994), p. 3. The development of the frontier concept in medieval studies, particularly in an Iberian context, is considered by Robert I. Burns, 'The Significance of the Frontier in the Middle Ages', in R. Bartlett and A. MacKay (eds), *Medieval Frontier Societies* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 313-30. The importance of the frontier is emphasised in Angus MacKay, *Spain in the Middle Ages: From Frontier to Empire, 1000-1500* (London: Macmillan, 1977).

²⁵ The period prior to the Portuguese voyages of discovery and foundation of empire in the fifteenth century has received little direct international attention. Perhaps the most noteworthy exception to this general rule is the work of Carl Erdmann. Ironically, however, Erdmann's pioneering work on Portugal, including *O Papado e Portugal* and 'Der Kreuzzugsgedanke in Portugal', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 141 (1929), 25-53; trans. by A. Pinto de Cavalho as *A Ideia de Cruzada em Portugal* (Coimbra: Publicações do Instituto Alemão, 1940), have been overshadowed by his seminal study of the crusade: *the Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, trans M. W. Baldwin and W. Groffart (Princeton: UP, 1977). For recent bibliographies see A. H. de Oliveira Marques *Guia do Estudante de História Medieval Portuguesa*, 2nd ed. (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1979) and more recently Douglas Wheeler, *Historical Dictionary of Portugal* (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1993), pp. 184-267. There have been many English language general histories of Portugal, the most readily available being Harold Livermore, *A History of Portugal*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: UP, 1974). This serves as an introduction only. Bailey W. Diffie, *Prelude to Empire: Portugal overseas before Henry the Navigator* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1960) includes valuable insights but covers a wide chronological period in relatively few pages.

²⁶ When reviewing several works on the reconquest, including Lomax, *The Spanish Reconquest* and MacKay, *Spain in the Middle Ages: From Frontier to Empire*, Bishko observes: 'the omission of the, in my judgement, inseparable Portuguese sector, creates the usual ethnic artificiality.' Charles J. Bishko, 'Addenda', in *Studies in Medieval Spanish Frontier History*, pp. 2-3. This focus on the Spanish experience can cause serious problems when applied to Portugal. For example Raymond McCluskey, 'Malleable accounts: views of the past in Twelfth-century Iberia', in P. Magdalino (ed.), *The Perception*

This thicket of historiographical concerns has had a decisive impact on the nature of the scholarship dedicated to medieval Portugal. While a few incidents have received considerable attention, by and large only a modest body of literature has been directed toward the impact of Latin Christian culture in early Portugal. The capture of Lisbon in 1147 by a mixed force of Latin Christian crusaders and Portuguese royal troops has been the subject of much recent interest, yet this comprehensive coverage has also highlighted the relative lack of attention devoted to the wider context of the operation.²⁷ Studies have addressed the activities of English, Flemish, French and German influences in isolation, but there has been no attempt at a comprehensive comparative work.²⁸ Similarly the role of the Church has been acknowledged, with scholars noting ecclesiastical promotion of the reconquest and papal involvement in the early legitimisation of the Portuguese monarchy. The activities of the papacy's sometimes wayward satellites, the religious orders, have also attracted recent attention.²⁹ Again, however, little effort has been made to relate these differing groups to each other, still less to the activities of secular groups.

Deeply-held historiographical traditions have long disinclined Hispanic scholars from examining the role of Latin Christian influence in the development of medieval Iberia. International scholars, labouring under theoretical assumptions of their own, have only recently moved to reassess those conclusions which minimise the impact of foreign ideas and participants during the reconquest period. These trends have proved particularly influential in the writing of Portuguese history. Nevertheless, in the western

of the Past in Twelfth-century Europe (London: The Hambledon Press, 1992), p. 222, approaches early Portuguese sources from a Spanish perspective. McCluskey refers to none of the major early Portuguese chronicles and so misleadingly concludes: 'The historical perception of Portugal as a nation with a distinctive story from the rest of the peninsula remained to be encapsulated by the writers of the thirteenth century and beyond.'

²⁷ See for example Matthew Bennett, 'Military aspects of the conquest of Lisbon, 1147,' in J. Phillips and M. Hoch (eds), *The Second Crusade: Scope and Consequences* (Manchester: UP, 2001), 71-89. Jonathan Phillips provides a comprehensive bibliography to the literature devoted to this operation in his notes to the recent re-edition of *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi: The conquest of Lisbon*, ed. and trans. C. W. David (Manchester: UP, 2001). [First edition: New York: Columbia UP, 1936].

²⁸ H. A. R. Gibb, 'English Crusaders in Portugal', in E. Prestage (ed.), *Chapters in Anglo-Portuguese Relations* (Watford: Voss and Michael, 1936), 7-17; Luís Saavedra Machado, 'Os Ingleses em Portugal', published sequentially in *Biblos* 8 (1932) – 15 (1939); Marcelin Defourmeaux, *Les Français en Espagne aux XI^e et XII^e siècles* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949); Erdmann, *A Idea de Cruzada em Portugal*; A. H. de Oliveira Marques, *Hansa e Portugal na Idade Média*, 2nd ed. (Lisbon: Editorial Presença, 1992).

²⁹ In addition to Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal no Primeiro Século da História Portuguesa*, important works include Fortunato de Almeida, *História da Igreja em Portugal*, 4 vols (Oporto: Portugalense

regions of Iberia the relationship between the reconquest and the Latin Christian expansion was both complex and decisive. The direct participation of outsiders in local actions changed the character and possibly the outcome of the Portuguese reconquest. At the same time Christian attitudes toward frontier warfare proved decisive in relations between Portugal and Europe.

The Portuguese reconquest (1064-1250)

An invidious but necessary first task for any historical study is the choice of terminal dates. The year of 1064 does not mark an obvious watershed of changing epochs in Portuguese history. Yet two events did occur in Iberia during that year which, though they appear unrelated, nonetheless signalled dramatic future change for Portugal. The northwestern Minho region had come under Christian control by the tenth century, but in 1064 Fernando I of León-Castile mounted a major campaign to establish the frontier at the Mondego River. During this advance several strategic towns, among them Coimbra, were secured by royal troops. This success laid the foundations for a viable Christian state to be created in the region. Yet 1064 was noteworthy for another incident which occurred far to the east. In that year a large army from southern France journeyed into Spain to launch an attack on the Muslim-held city of Barbastro, a strategic strongpoint to the north of the Ebro valley. The Barbastro campaign consolidated a tradition of direct Latin Christian military participation in Iberia. Thus 1064 marked a critical new phase of Portuguese development as well as a significant shift in the relations between Latin Christendom and the Iberian peninsula.


Eleventh-century Portuguese society was characteristically Iberian, combining a pragmatic tolerance for cultural difference with an ambition for territorial expansion. Yet the relationship that developed between Iberia and Europe offered Portugal unique dividends. Throughout the twelfth century, Portuguese leaders welcomed Latin Christian intervention as a means to bolster their regional authority and facilitate efforts toward political centralisation. Latin Christians were willing to assist such ambitions in order to ensure the successful prosecution of the reconquest. The first Portuguese king,

Editora, 1967-71); and P.^o Miguel de Oliveira, *História Eclesiástica de Portugal* (Lisbon: Publicações Europa-América, 1994).

Afonso Henriques (1128-1185), was able to take advantage of Latin Christian preoccupation with the defence of the frontier to secure political independence and a papal acknowledgement of his self-proclaimed royalty.

Subsequent Portuguese kings discovered that there were cultural and political implications to outside assistance. Closer association with Latin Christendom slowly changed Iberian attitudes of relative cultural tolerance; the gradual acceptance of the ideology of the crusade was simply the most obvious manifestation of this shift. Meanwhile, groups outside the royal court, notably the higher clergy, began to make more effective use of their own links with Latin Christendom to challenge royal power. During the thirteenth century Portuguese kings found papal demands incompatible with centralised authority. Royal resistance to ecclesiastical power became increasingly bitter through the reigns of Sancho I (1185-1211), Afonso II (1211-1223) and Sancho II (1223-1248). These kings continued to use the needs of the reconquest to mediate the demands placed upon them, but with limited success. Changing Latin Christian attitudes to frontier warfare, coupled with the Iberian kings' own military success, gradually undermined the political value of the frontier. The Portuguese reconquest came to a close in 1250 with the capture of the last Muslim stronghold at Faro. By this time, however, the anticlimactic completion of two centuries of intermittent struggle passed virtually unnoticed.

Map 2. The Reconquest



Chapter One

Portuguese society in the eleventh century: reconquest or *convivencia*?

By the eleventh century Portugal had become a frontier society in which expansionist ambitions were balanced by long familiarity with different cultures. In 1064 Fernando I of León-Castile (1037-1065) launched a major campaign into the Beiras region. The advance reached the Mondego River, securing much of what would later become the Portuguese heartland, and establishing a viable territorial base for future expansion. Although later authors portrayed a Christian society intent on reconquest, the participants themselves displayed more complex attitudes. Muslim culture had been a presence in the peninsula for over three hundred years prior to Fernando's coming to the throne. During this time Iberian governments, both Muslim and Christian, became increasingly tolerant of religious difference: a development Spanish historians have labelled *convivencia*. The dream of reconquest was occasionally articulated by individuals, but it had little relevance to the majority of people. By the middle of the eleventh century, a society had developed in Portugal which was moulded by Visigothic traditions, a religiously and culturally diverse population, and a highly permeable frontier.

The complex relationship between Christian and Muslim worlds informs every aspect of the medieval Iberian documentary record.¹ During the ninth century a remarkable series of chronicles were produced in Oviedo. The most famous of these, the *Crónica de Alfonso III*, was written in support of the political ambitions of Alfonso III of Asturias (866-910) and contains the earliest and clearest statements of the reconquest ideal.² The historiographical output of late ninth and early tenth-century Asturias was not matched for almost two hundred years when, in the early twelfth century, another sudden surge in literary effort is evident. Several of these twelfth-

¹ Because the historical literature of Spain and Portugal is unfamiliar to many, each chapter will begin with a brief introduction to the relevant sources and some of the more conspicuous historiographical issues.

century chronicles, most noticeably the *Historia Silense*, recall earlier events, but adumbrate them with a virulent sectarian gloss. These attitudes were by no means uniform. A very different picture of popular attitudes is presented in the accounts of León-Castile's most famous warrior, Rodrigo Díaz de Vilar, popularly known as El Cid.³

Unfortunately, locally written Portuguese chronicles provide a more threadbare coverage of events in the west from the eighth until the twelfth century. Those few accounts that do survive bear strong similarities, which led Pierre David to posit the existence of a common source, now lost.⁴ The most important of these derivative chronicles, the *Cronica Conimbricense* and the *Cronica Gothorum*, seem to rely on this common source for their account of early centuries; the similarity between their versions of events suggests that they remained true to their original. Differences are traceable, however, and these reveal something of the attitudes behind authorship. This is particularly true for the entries detailing events at the end of the eleventh century, where a sharp divergence between the two accounts suggests the authors had reached the end of their shared source.

Many Christian authors in Iberian displayed an apparent animosity toward Islam and presented such attitudes as being widespread. Yet surviving charters do not support this portrayal of constant cultural hostility. During the tenth and eleventh centuries the common use of Arabic in Christian documents hints at closer relations between the two faiths than most chroniclers describe.⁵ Many such documents detail arrangements between adherents of different religions entailing mutual respect and trust, including formal agreements reached between Christian and Muslim leaders, often to the

² *Crónica de Alfonso III*, ed. A. U. Arteta (Valencia: Textos medievales, 1971). For the background and authorship of the ninth-century chronicles see Roger Collins, *The Arab Conquest of Spain 710-797* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 141-5.

³ Dating for the earliest account of the Cid, 'Carmen Campidoctoris' has ranged between 1083 and 1095. 'Carmen Campidoctoris', ed. J. Gil, CCCM 71 (Turnhout, 1990), pp. 101-8. For the text and a commentary, Roger Wright, 'The First Poem of the Cid - The *Carmen Campi Doctoris*', in *Papers of the Liverpool Latin Seminar*, 2 (1979), 213-48. The twelfth-century chronicles *Historia Silense*, *Chronicon Regum Legionensium*, and *Historia Rodericii* are included in S. Barton and R. Fletcher (trans), *The World of El Cid: Chronicles of the Spanish Reconquest* (Manchester: UP, 2000). Also *Historia Roderici vel Gesta Roderici Campidocti*, ed. E. Falque Rey, in *Chronica Hispana Saeculi XII*, CCCM 71/1 (Turnhout, 1990), pp. 4-98. The career of El Cid was also recorded in the anonymous early thirteenth-century secular *Poema de mio Cid*, ed. and trans. by I. Michael as *Poem of the Cid* (Manchester: UP, 1975). For a discussion of these sources see Richard Fletcher, *The Quest for the Cid* (London: Hutchinson, 1989), ch. 7.

⁴ Pierre David, 'Annales Portugalenses Veteres', in P. David, *Études Historiques sur la Galice et le Portugal du VI^e au XII^e siècle* (Lisbon: Livraria Portugália Editora, 1947), 257-340 [APV].

detriment of co-religionists.⁶ Occasionally too, these documents include glosses or prefatory remarks, which can reveal a great deal about the author's motivation. Unfortunately, there is often considerable doubt as to whether the author of the original document also wrote the introductory comments, for many charters appear to have suffered significant interpolation by zealous copyists.⁷ Nevertheless, when used with due care, official records provide an invaluable means to balance the impression of sectarian antipathy created by narrative authors.

Even as the Christian kingdoms were consolidating in the northern reaches of the peninsula, Muslim al-Andalus developed a rich cultural heritage of its own. In the past, literary material produced in Islamic Spain has received less scholarly attention than the work of Christian authors, although on-going efforts are being made to redress this.⁸ Yet Muslim authors often included only limited information on Christian activities, moreover much of the material purporting to deal with the early centuries of cultural contact between Christians and Muslim is in reality the work of later compilers.⁹ Fortunately, some extant Muslim sources are both reliable and strictly contemporary. Of particular interest is the remarkable autobiography of Emir 'Abd Allāh of Granada (1073-1090), a vivid, first-hand account of the political pragmatism commonly practised by both Christian and Muslim leaders.¹⁰

The complexities of these sources are reflected in the often convoluted modern scholarship that rests upon them. Evidence emphasising conflict between faiths has proved most influential, and until recently Spanish historians accepted without reservation the central role of the reconquest in the formation of their nation. Such historical interpretations portray Spanish kings impelled by a sense of Visigothic heritage, leading their subjects in an unremitting campaign to win the peninsula back to Christendom. This struggle supposedly raged unchecked for seven centuries, only

⁵ An interesting example is a charter by Pedro I of Aragon (1094-1104) dated 1100, in which his signature is in Arabic. This document is reproduced by Fletcher, *Quest for El Cid*, p. 112, fig. 10.

⁶ Perhaps most well known of these is the arrangement between Sancho IV of Navarre (1054-1076) and al-Muqtadir of Zaragoza in 1073. José María Lacarra, 'Dos Tratados de paz y alianza entre Sancho e de Peñalén y Moctadir de Zaragoza, 1069-1073', in *Homenaje a Johannes Vincke* (Madrid, 1962), 121-34.

⁷ For the problems of such prefatory remarks, see R. A. Fletcher, 'Reconquest and Crusade in Spain, c. 1050-1150', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 37 (1987), pp. 38-40.

⁸ Hugh Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal: A Political History of Al-Andalus* (London: Longman, 1996), provides a general overview from an Islamic perspective. For a discussion of the literature of Islamic Spain see Maria R. Menocal, Michael Sells and Raymond P. Scheindlin, *The Literature of Al-Andalus* (Cambridge: UP, 2000).

⁹ Collins, *The Arab Conquest of Spain*, pp. 65-6.

ending with the final capture of Grenada in 1492. This explanation of the past has proved extremely pervasive. As recently as 1998 the monumental *Historia de España* could confidently assert:

The idea of the reconquest is of medieval origin; it already existed, of course, by the middle of the eleventh century, when commenced the great epoch of urgent warfare and conquest to the coast of al-Andalus. It was, without doubt, fundamental in the formation of the common historical consciousness of Christian Spain...¹¹

While Portuguese historians have been less focused on the role of the reconquest in the development of their country, echoes of these ideas can still be found. Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, for example, unequivocally states: 'Portugal was, above all, a product of the Christian Reconquest.'¹²

Scholars who emphasise the significance of the reconquest portray the centuries after the Arab invasion as a period of constant hostility between an alien occupying force and the indigenous resistance. In recent decades these interpretations have been challenged by scholars advancing the *convivencia* model of medieval Spanish society. Under this model, the critical cultural determinant of the Spanish character was the coexistence of different religious groups. During the 1940s Américo Castro attempted to refocus attention on the relationships forged and maintained across religious divisions throughout the period. From this perspective, the reconquest can be interpreted as the unfortunate result of royal aggrandisement, its religious overtones a foreign-inspired aberration. Many of the more florid aspects of Castro's argument have been dispensed with by his successors, yet the essence of his position has remained.¹³

¹⁰ 'Abd Allāh, *The Tibyān. Memoirs of 'Abd Allāh b. Buluggīn, last Zirīd amīr of Granada*, trans. A. T. Tibi (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986).

¹¹ 'La idea de reconquista es de origen medieval; ya existía, desde luego, a mediados del siglo XI, cuando comienza la gran época de presión guerrera y conquistas a costa de al-Andalus. Fue, sin duda, fundamental en la formación de la conciencia histórica común de la España cristiana...' José María Jover Zamora (ed.), *Historia de España*, 41 vols (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1998), 9, p. 15.

¹² Portugal foi, acima de tudo, um produto da Reconquista Cristã.' Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 13 vols (Lisbon: Editorial Verbo, 1977), 1, p. 13.

¹³ As Thomas F. Glick explains: 'Castro's *convivencia* survives. What we add to it is the admission that cultural interaction inevitably reflects a concrete and very complex social dynamic. What we retain of it is the understanding that acculturation implies a process of internalization of the "other" that is the mechanism by which we make foreign cultural traits our own.' 'Convivencia: An Introductory Note', in

Portuguese historians, led by António Borges Coelho, have raised similar questions concerning the influence of Islamic culture in early Portugal.¹⁴ Unfortunately, with these positions being mutually exclusive, and the very nature of Iberian nationality at stake, arguments between proponents of the reconquest and *convivencia* models have frequently degenerated into acrimonious wrangling.¹⁵

While the debate between the conflict and coexistence schools has dominated Iberian academic discourse, scholars outside the peninsula have voiced doubts of their own concerning traditional interpretations of the reconquest. Almost two decades ago Richard Fletcher took issue with a fundamental premise of the reconquest: the continual nature of intercultural hostility. Fletcher persuasively argued that there was a gradual dwindling of cultural animosity during the tenth century, with extant protestations of antipathy being interpolated or completely fabricated by later writers. The renewal of sectarian hostility was due not to memories of the distant past, but in sympathy with the rising tide of crusading enthusiasm in Latin Christendom as a whole, and a reaction to the appearance of the fundamentalist Islamic Almoravid dynasty in Iberia after 1085.¹⁶ Fletcher's argument for external influences re-igniting Iberian religious militancy has been widely accepted by historians working outside Spain. Unfortunately, however, not all expressions of sectarian animosity fit neatly into the timeframe Fletcher suggests.

In the wake of the eighth-century Arab invasions, the Iberian peninsula became a frontier between two different cultures. Although the relationship between these cultures has most often been portrayed as essentially adversarial, eleventh-century Portuguese society was not dedicated solely to the prosecution of the reconquest. Some later chroniclers chose to describe the decisive Leonese-castilian campaign of 1064 in sectarian terms, yet such militant statements do not accord well with actual events. The death of King Fernando in 1065 further complicated intercultural relations, for his successor, Alfonso VI of León-Castile (1065-1109), developed a pragmatic policy of

T. F. Glick (ed.), *Convivencia: Jews, Muslims, and Christians in Medieval Spain* (New York: George Braziller, 1992), p. 7.

¹⁴ António Borges Coelho, *Portugal na Espanha Árabe*, 4 vols (Lisbon: Seara Nova, 1975) and *Questionar a História. Ensaios sobre a História de Portugal*, 2nd ed. (Lisbon: Caminho, 1983), pp. 45-80.

¹⁵ For an introduction to these debates see Simon Barton, 'The roots of the national question in Spain', in *The National Question in Europe in Historical Context*, eds. M. Teich and R. Porter (Cambridge: UP, 1993), pp. 110-12; and more recently 'Spain in the Eleventh Century', in *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, IV, eds. D. Luscombe and J. Riley-Smith (forthcoming, scheduled February 2004). Peter Linehan, *History and the Historians of Medieval Spain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 18, is dismissive of the value of this debate: 'Castro and Sánchez-Albornoz debated the question whether medieval Jews and Moors as well as Christians had been entitled to Spanish passports...'

¹⁶ Fletcher, 'Reconquest and Crusade', pp. 35-43.

engagement with the surrounding Muslim leaders and also with minority groups within his own realm. In fact, those Iberian authors who ascribe an ambition for reconquest to the Spanish kings, or indeed their subjects, were actually motivated by factors unrelated to the frontier.

Western Iberia in the early eleventh century: local loyalties under pressure

Only a few local records of any kind survive from Western Iberia prior to the eleventh century. The occasional glimpses of society afforded by such documents indicate developments roughly paralleled those in other regions of the peninsula. In 1064 King Fernando's campaign to secure the Mondego River brought the area to the attention of more distant authors. Yet those descriptions emphasising a fervour for the reconquest have frequently been allowed to obscure actual eleventh-century attitudes. Locally produced Portuguese sources present a picture of widespread indifference toward the Visigothic past or to any overriding sense of Christian community. Events in the immediate aftermath of Fernando's campaign corroborate this impression: civil disorder engulfed the region following the king's death and continued through the brief reign of his son, King García (1065-1070). Throughout this period there is little to suggest that religious or cultural identities had overtaken purely parochial loyalties.

By the end of the tenth century a Muslim presence had become firmly established in western Iberia. The Arab invasions, the growth of Christian resistance in the far north, and the early struggles between the two cultures were all events in the distant past.¹⁷ The passage of time allowed the development of more complicated relations between Christians, Muslims and Jews. The caliphate of Cordova ensured Muslim political and cultural hegemony over the peninsula. A period of tolerance and relative peace created the environment for great artistic creativity and economic prosperity.¹⁸ The eleventh century brought a sudden, decisive change to the balance of power in the peninsula. In 1008 the caliphate descended into sudden civil war. After over two decades of conflict the Muslim-held territories fractured into a number of independent *taifa* states.

¹⁷ For a general introduction to the Arab invasions see Collins, *The Arab Conquest of Spain 710-797*. For a detailed, albeit uncritical account of the invasion in the west: José Garcia Dominigues, 'Invasão e conquista da Lusitânia por Muça Ben Noçair e seu filho Abdalaziz', in J. G. Dominigues, *Portugal e o Al-Andalus* (Lisbon: Hugin, 1997), 51-64.

In the western region of the peninsula, known to the Arabs as *al-Garb*, the largest of the newly emerged states was Badajoz. Initially the smaller territories Mertola, Silves, Gibrleon, Huelva, and Niebla remained autonomous, but in the decades after 1040 these were gradually annexed by Seville, bringing the most powerful states into direct rivalry.¹⁹ Local Christian forces were quick to take advantage of Muslim disunity. Apparently acting on his own initiative, Gonçalo Trastamires, a member of the powerful family of Mendes da Maia, captured the town of Montemor-o-Velho in 1034 and four years later also took Avenoso.²⁰ As discord among the Muslims deepened, King Fernando committed royal forces in a concerted effort to extend Christian influence beyond the Douro River.²¹ This southward push began in the summer of 1057 with the capture of Seia and then Lamego. This was followed in July 1058 with the reduction of Viseu, a fortified town overlooking the Mondego River.²² The task of securing the surrounding countryside was borne by local forces, for Fernando and the royal army were soon actively engaged on the eastern frontier. By 1064, however, the king was back in the west undertaking a six month siege that ended with the surrender of Coimbra early in July.²³ The capture of the city was a crucial strategic success, for by securing the banks of the Mondego River the process of resettling the captured territory was able to proceed relatively undisturbed.

These Christian victories were eagerly recorded by the anonymous author of the *Historia Silense*. The Leonese-Castilians are accorded a strong religious motivation.

Now secure in his native land, [King Fernando] ordained that the remaining time be given over to campaigning against the barbarians and strengthening the churches of Christ. Accordingly...the king set off for Portugal, over the greater part of which, from the provinces of Lusitania to Betica, the barbarians held sway, belching forth profanities.²⁴

¹⁸ Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, pp. 82-129.

¹⁹ David Wasserstein, *The Rise and Fall of the Party Kings. Politics and Society in Islamic Spain 1002-1086* (Princeton: University Press, 1985), pp. 82-98.

²⁰ APV, pp. 295-6; Damião Peres, *Como Nasceu Portugal*, 7th ed. (Oporto: Vertente, 1970), p. 50.

²¹ Fernando's campaign is described in *Historia Silense*, pp. 47-53. Additional details and dating are provided in APV, pp. 81-128, 296.

²² Alfonso V of León (999-1028) was killed by an arrow while besieging Viseu. The *Historia Silense*, pp. 39, 48-9, recounts that almost three decades later Fernando sought revenge on the archer involved by seeking him out after the city fell and ordering his hands cut off.

²³ The defenders surrendered on terms and were allowed to leave the city with little more than they could carry. *Historia Silense*, p. 52.

²⁴ *Historia Silense*, p. 48.

Later historians have been tempted into accepting this as an accurate portrayal of eleventh-century attitudes, yet textual clues indicate that the *Historia Silense* was in fact compiled during the early twelfth century at Oviedo – far away in time and space from the actions it describes. Thus, as an indication of eleventh-century ideals, the *Historia Silense* must be treated with caution.²⁵ Fortunately there are locally produced Portuguese chronicles which, while lacking the literary flourish of the *Historia Silense*, provide a more contemporary account of the eleventh-century southern expansion.

The two most important surviving Portuguese works from this period, the *Cronica Conimbricense* and the *Cronica Gothorum*, appear to share a common source; both the similarities and the differences between them are revealing. Both chroniclers displayed an awareness of the Visigothic kingdom and Arabic invasions, but neither openly espoused the ideals of reconquest. The destruction of the Visigothic civilisation was portrayed as complete.²⁶ The chroniclers did not appear to consider their kings, or indeed themselves, to be heirs to the Visigothic culture. Both chroniclers described the grinding progress of the southern expansion in similar, emotionless phrases. There was little suggestion that the campaign was being waged to right ancient wrongs. Only in the final years covered by the chronicles do they provide even faint glimmers of a rising sense of sectarian antipathy in Portugal; and this change is most apparent in the subtle differences between the two works. The *Chronica Gothorum* provides the more extensive and indeed more belligerent account. Only in this chronicle, for example, is allusion made to prior Christian ownership of Iberian towns.²⁷ The *Chronica Conimbricense* unemotionally records the coming to the throne in 1065 of Alfonso VI, who led his army 'against the Saracens for many years. To some he gave war; from others he accepted tribute'. The *Chronica Gothorum* describes the same Saracens as 'the enemies of the name of Christ'.²⁸ This is the sole reference in early Portuguese chronicles to religious militancy and, given the milder tone of the earlier sections and of

²⁵ 'Introduction to the *Historia Silense*', in Barton and Fletcher, *The World of the Cid*, pp. 9-21. The significance of the *Historia Silense* as a measure of twelfth-century views is considered below, pp. 38-9.

²⁶ 'Era DCCXLVIII expulsi sunt Gothi de Hyspania. /Era DCCL Sarraceni obtinuerunt Hispaniam. APV, p. 292. Iberian 'Era' dating begins its count 38 years before the AD system.

²⁷ The *Cronica Conimbricense* records the capture of Montemor-o-Velho in 1034 in simple terms: 'cepit Gonsalvus Trastimiriz Montem Maiorem.' To this simple description the *Cronica Gothorum* adds the significant phrase 'et reddidit eum Christianis.' APV, p. 295.

²⁸ *Cronica Conimbricense*: '...adversus Sarracenos per annos multos; aliis dabat bellum, ab aliis accipiebat tributum.' *Chronica Gothorum*: 'adversus Sarracenos christiani nominis inimicos; aliis bellum dabat, ab aliis tributum accipiebat.' APV, p. 298.

the *Chronica Conimbricense*, such sentiments would seem to represent a gloss added to the original source by later chroniclers. Events in the immediate wake of Fernando's push to the Mondego River further complicate simple portrayals of Portuguese motivation.

The long period of Christian success came to an end with the death of King Fernando in 1065. Spanish unity dissolved almost immediately, arguing against any strong Christian identity or deeply held animosity toward Muslims. In accordance with the king's last wishes, the realm was divided between his three sons. The eldest, Sancho II (1065-1072), inherited the Castilian component of his father's territories. Alfonso VI (1065-1109) succeeded to the royal lands of León. The territories of Galicia and Portugal were combined to become the kingdom assigned to the youngest, García (1065-1071). Portuguese historians have portrayed García's reign as crucial in the development of regional political self-consciousness; his policy of encouraging the restoration of bishoprics has been interpreted as an expression of pious intent.²⁹ Yet the internal unrest that troubled the new kingdom, and the unfortunate García's ultimate fate, suggest neither the ideals of reconquest, nor a nascent Portuguese nationalism, but instead demonstrate the absence of any binding sense of common identity among Iberian Christians.

Few documents survive from García's short reign, and the majority of these concern his attempts to restore the bishoprics of the kingdom. The ancient see of Braga was re-established in the 1070 under the authority of Bishop Pedro (1070-1091).³⁰ There are indications that the king was also manoeuvring to install new bishops in Lamego and Tûy. These initiatives do not appear to have been motivated solely, or even primarily, by the piety of either the king or his subjects. Instead, this ecclesiastical reorganisation was a conscious royal policy designed to consolidate the recaptured territory and, perhaps more importantly, to impose order on the fractious local Christian aristocracy. In uncertain times bishops were natural allies of the king, certainly they appeared so to a nobility used to controlling their own affairs. Episcopal interference in local affairs could have tragic consequences, as the murder of Bishop Gudestes of Iria

²⁹ The long term significance of García's reign is forcibly argued by Peres, *Como Nasceu Portugal*, pp. 52-4; cf. Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 72-4, and Serrão and Marques (eds), *Nova História e Portugal*, 2, p. 265.

³⁰ Avelino de Jesus da Costa, *O Bispo D. Pedro e a organização da diocese de Braga*, 2 vols (Coimbra: Faculdade de Letras, 1959), 1, pp. 25-8, 420-1.

(1068-1069) by a local noble, made abundantly clear.³¹ Indeed, far from reacting to popular religious desires, García's policy of founding bishoprics may have been a significant cause of opposition to his rule.

Although the sources for García's reign are limited, it is significant that no mention is made of warfare against the Muslims to the south. Rather the chronicles focus their few words on the struggles between the new king and his own people. Aristocratic disenchantment with García's rule culminated in a revolt by one of the leading local magnates, Nuño Mendes. This uprising failed to attract widespread support, Mendes was killed and the rebels defeated in 1071 at Pederosa, north of Braga.³² King García's triumph proved to be short lived. Attracted no doubt by this domestic turmoil, outside forces began to gather. Yet when external attack came, it was not launched by Muslim forces, but rather by García's own brothers. An uncertain series of events saw Sancho of Castile murdered in 1072 and García imprisoned by his brother Alfonso. The kingdom of Galicia-Portugal was then reabsorbed into a reunited León-Castile.³³ By assuming sole control of his father's territories, Alfonso VI secured a position of pre-eminence among both Christian and Muslim leaders in Spain.

By the middle of the eleventh century the western region of Iberia had been established as an important sector of the frontier between the Christian and Islamic worlds. There is little to suggest that a belief in the reconquest was strongly or widely held among the local population. To interpret the few extant statements as representative of a general Portuguese – or for that matter a general Spanish – attitude is tendentious, particularly when these articulations of common identity bore very little correlation to actual events. With Fernando's death the fragility of Christian cooperation became abundantly clear, as Spanish leaders descended into a vicious, fratricidal struggle for dominance. Alfonso VI emerged victorious and for the remainder of the century events in Portugal would be largely dictated by the policies this ruler adopted to deal with a changing world.

³¹ Bernard F. Reilly, *The Kingdom of León-Castilla under King Alfonso VI, 1065-1109* (Princeton: UP, 1988), pp. 24-6.

³² APV, p. 298. Despite the failure to attract widespread popular support, Mendes' rebellion has been portrayed as sign of Portuguese proto-nationalism. Peres, *Como Nasceu Portugal*, pp. 52-4.

³³ The process of events is uncertain. The murder of Sancho has usually been portrayed as preceding the imprisonment of García. For example, by Lucas of Tuy, *Chronica mundi*, ed. E. Falque, CCCM 74 (Turnhout, 2003), vi, 65-7, pp. 299-302. An alternative case, with García incarcerated prior to the murder of the king of Castile, is made by Reilly, *King Alfonso VI*, pp. 27-33, 67-9.

Political pragmatism and the development of the tribute economy

By 1072 Alfonso VI had re-established control over the briefly independent western region of the peninsula and reunited León and Castile under his authority. Yet this enforced Spanish unity did not lead to an immediate resumption of the reconquest; instead cross-cultural relations grew more complex as Christian rulers came to realise that coexistence could yield rich results. This is evident both in the relations Christian kings maintained among themselves, and in those they forged with their Muslim peers. Later historians, encouraged by Alfonso's adoption of the imperial title and capture of Toledo, the ancient Visigothic capital, have portrayed the Leonese-Castilian monarch as strongly motivated by a belief in the reconquest. Yet closer consideration of Alfonso's actions suggest that royal policy was seldom influenced by culturally or historically-based animosities, but rather by the pragmatic realities of governing a frontier kingdom.

One indication of a weak sense of cultural solidarity among the Christian leaders was their rancorous rivalry; another was their willingness to negotiate treaties across religious divisions without apparent compunction. The Christian kings made no pretence at a united front, with treaties between them and their Muslim counterparts being common. Perhaps the most sensational of these agreements was the mutual defence pact negotiated by al-Muqtadir of Zaragoza and Fernando I of León-Castile in 1062. King Ramiro I of Aragon (1035-1063) paid dearly for underestimating the strength of Fernando's resolve. In 1063 Ramiro's attempt to take the Zaragoza stronghold of Graus ended in disaster. The king was slain and his army routed at the hands of the Muslim defenders, ably reinforced by five hundred Castilian knights.³⁴ Such military support was by no means an unusual occurrence, and the texts of some agreements have survived to provide striking examples of *convivencia* in action. The arrangement reached in 1073 by Sancho IV of Navarre (1054-1076) and al-Muqtadir of Zaragoza bound the *taifa* leader to pay 12,000 gold dinars for Sancho's support against

³⁴ Derek W. Lomax, *The Reconquest of Spain* (New York: Longman, 1978), pp. 53, 58. This action is also well recorded because Rodrigo Díaz, the Cid, took part. See Ramón Menéndez Pidal, *La España del Cid*, 2 vols (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1969), 1, pp. 31-4. As Richard A. Fletcher, *The Quest for El Cid* (London: Hutchinson, 1989), pp. 113-4, observes: 'The Graus campaign is a fine example of the complexities which arose in the age of the *taifa* kings: A Castilian prince defeats and kills his Aragonese uncle to preserve the territorial integrity of a Muslim ally.'

both Christians and Muslims.³⁵ Royal ambassadors regularly crossed the permeable frontier; so too did individuals acting on their own behalf. Perhaps the best known of these expatriates was Rodrigo Díaz, 'El Cid', who served the *taifa* rulers as a mercenary, leading their forces to victory against both Christian and Muslim opponents.³⁶

The creation of such alliances presupposed, even encouraged, a degree of respect and trust between members of differing faiths. These alliances could be sealed with the closest of bonds. Alfonso VI entered into official concubinage with the Sevillian Princess Zaida as a means of cementing his 1084 alliance with her father al-Mu'tamid. Far from being considered in any way unsuitable, this relationship became grist for romantic literature, while a son from the union, Sancho, was later considered the primary contender for the throne of León-Castile.³⁷ A reputation for fair dealing among the Muslims was highly valued by Christian rulers. Despite the Cid's proven military prowess, he was exiled because he contravened Alfonso's agreements with al-Muqtadir by launching unauthorised attacks.³⁸ In his remarkable first-hand account of Iberian politics during the mid-eleventh century, 'Abn Allāh, the emir of Granada, recalled the Leonese-castilian monarch's eagerness to ensure a business-like atmosphere prevailed.

God forbid that people should say that a man as great as I among Christians came to you, equally great among your own kind, and then betrayed you.³⁹

In the volatile climate of Spanish politics rival leaders struck deals where they could: during the eleventh century the guiding principle in their actions was clearly political opportunism.

The disunity evident between the Christian kings, or more precisely the lack of any overriding sense of solidarity among them, did not merely hamper their efforts at driving an ancient foe from a long-stolen patrimony. There is every indication that by

³⁵ José María Lacarra, 'Dos tratados de paz y alianza entre Sancho el de Peñalén y Moctadir de Zaragoza, 1069 y 1073', in *Homenaje a Johannes Vinke* (Madrid, 1962), pp. 121-34.

³⁶ The seminal work on the career of the Cid is Menéndez Pidal, *La España del Cid*; trans. by H. Sunderland as *The Cid and his Spain* (London: Frank Cass, 1971). The subject is made more approachable by Fletcher, *Quest for the Cid*.

³⁷ Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 338-40.

³⁸ Fletcher, *The Quest for El Cid*, pp. 125-32.

³⁹ *The Tibyān*, p. 92.

the eleventh century they had abandoned such ambitions altogether. Christian monarchs demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice tactical positioning in any supposed reconquest strategy for short-term local advantage. For example in the treaty concluded in 1073 between Sancho IV of Navarre and al-Muqtadir of Zaragoza, Sancho agreed not only to defend al-Muqtadir's present territorial rights, but also to oblige his kinsman Ramiro of Aragon to return several Zaragozaan strongholds already taken. If his powers of persuasion proved insufficient, Sancho even agreed to use force to return the land from Spanish to Zaragozaan control. Significantly too, the Christian kings were willing to suspend their own southward territorial ambitions in pursuit of immediate goals. This is nowhere more evident than in their collection and protection of the fabulously lucrative tributes, known as *parias*, exacted from the *taifa* rulers.

The imposition of *parias* on Seville, Zaragoza and Toledo was initiated by Fernando I in 1062. Their payment continued fairly regularly for over twenty years – enhanced from 1074 by the imposition of similar obligations on Granada – until the Almoravid takeover of the *taifa* states during the final decade of the century. The Zaragozaan tribute has been calculated at between 10,000 and 12,000 dinars per annum. 'Abn Allāh ruefully records that to secure the friendship of Alfonso VI in 1074 he was forced to pay a lump sum of 30,000 dinars in advance and promise the Castilian king a further 10,000 annually.⁴⁰ Such huge payments allowed the Spanish monarchs who controlled them to field large professional armies, but they also dictated the uses to which such forces could be put. The Christian kings guarded their revenues jealously, mounting campaigns not to capture territory, but to menace defaulters into payment. Moreover great care was taken to ensure that these sources of income remained financially viable, a policy that often included strengthening chosen *taifas* against both Christian and Muslim incursion. The Christian kings even went to the extent of assisting their clients in expanding their territories to the detriment of their Muslim neighbours.⁴¹ During the eleventh century, the aim of the Christian kings was not so

⁴⁰ Charles J. Bishko, 'Fernando I and the Origins of the Leonese-Castilian Alliance with Cluny', in C. J. Bishko, *Studies in Medieval Spanish Frontier History* (London: Variorum, 1980), II, pp. 42-6; *The Tibyān*, pp. 91-2.

⁴¹ One notable example of from Fernando's reign was the assistance he gave Al-Ma'mūn of Toledo against Cordova in 1075. Alfonso continued this policy. Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, pp. 147-9, 152. A similar offer was also made to 'Abd Allāh, who refused. While he claimed pious motives, he also admitted to fearing the financial repercussions of further reliance on the Christian king. *The Tibyān*, pp. 132-3.

much to press ever southwards to reclaim ancestral lands, but to maintain control of the wealth those lands produced.

Christian settlement plans during this period also suggest that Spanish monarchs were largely content with the status quo. Fernando's actions in 1063 following his victory over the Sevillian king were not those of a ruler evaluating a potential future acquisition. Although the city was at his mercy he merely forced terms upon the citizens including the payment of the inevitable tribute. In addition to money, Fernando also demanded the mortal remains of Christian saints held in the city of Seville. These relics were returned to León to be the prize possession of the city's newly built cathedral, regardless of the feelings of the helpless Sevillian Christian population.⁴² Alfonso VI also pursued policies directed toward consolidation rather than aggressive expansion. An important goal of royal policy was the elevation of an archbishop within the realm. In 1080 Pope Gregory VII (1073-1085) communicated his overall agreement with this scheme, his only reservation concerning Alfonso's suggested candidate.⁴³ The city being considered for this honour is not specified, but Palencia seems the most likely option.⁴⁴ Alfonso's initiatives strongly suggest that his ambitions at this point did not extend southward toward those ancient Visigothic metropolitans still in Muslim hands: Toledo, Seville, Tarragona, and Mérida.

Against this background of apparent indifference to the Visigothic past, what is to be made of Alfonso IV's claim to the imperial title and his subsequent, highly symbolic seizure of the ancient Visigothic capital of Toledo? At first glance Alfonso's assumption of imperial dignity appears to have been an attempt to link his own regime and that of the Visigothic kings. Yet political developments outside Spain provide a more cogent explanation. In 1073 the newly-elected Pope Gregory VII made sweeping claims for authority over the whole of Spain, claims which he reiterated in 1177. This was also the year Alfonso first adopted the title *imperator totius hispanie*. Thus the assumption of imperial dignity appears to have been intended as a counterweight to

⁴² *Historia Silense*, pp. 55-60.

⁴³ *Das Register Gregors VII*, ed. E. Caspar, 2nd ed., MGH *Epistolae selectae*, 4-5 (Berlin, 1955), 9. 2, pp. 569-72; *The Register of Pope Gregory VIII*, ed. and trans. H. E. J. Cowdrey (Oxford: UP, 2002), pp. 399-400.

⁴⁴ Pierre David 'La Crise de 1080', in P. David, *Études historiques*, p. 423 suggests Alfonso's personal preference was for Braga, but he was wary of investing authority in Pedro, who was an appointment of his predecessor, King Sancho. Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 112-3 considers Palencia more likely, due to its central location and the apparent lack of contact between Alfonso and the higher clergy of Braga.

papal claims for authority in the peninsula.⁴⁵ Similarly the Leonese-Castilian occupation of the ancient Visigothic capital was certainly a pivotal point in Alfonso's long reign, but caution is required when assessing the motivation behind the action. Simply because Toledo was the ancient capital, Alfonso's triumph is portrayed as the culmination of a long campaign of reconquest.⁴⁶ On closer examination, however, the occupation of the city appears more as an exercise in damage limitation than the fruits of a slowly maturing plan.

Even before coming to power Alfonso had enjoyed close relations with al-Ma'mūn, the ruler of Toledo. When al-Ma'mūn was poisoned at Cordova in 1075 his son, al-Qādir, inherited his father's office, but little popular support. Throughout al-Qādir's troubled reign the Leonese-Castilian monarch was forced to intervene to maintain his client in power. To better achieve this end, Alfonso gradually took control of the fortresses surrounding the city, always with al-Qādir's agreement. Only when it became impossible to maintain the Muslim leader any longer did Alfonso finally take personal control. The takeover was a relatively peaceful one, with Alfonso later installing al-Qādir as governor in Valencia.⁴⁷ Whatever laurels later authors might heap upon Alfonso as a result of this conquest, the immediate results were negative: a buffer state that had been one of his major sources of income had instantly become a heavy liability demanding constant supervision and defence.⁴⁸

By 1065 Alfonso was able to re-impose political authority in Christian Spain, but rather than use this hegemony to lead the reconquest, he developed a more profitable relationship with Muslim leaders. The assumption of the imperial title and the capture of Toledo, far from being the result of a royal desire to restore the Visigothic state, were essentially unrelated to past relations between Christians and Muslims in Iberia. Eleventh-century Spanish rulers were not motivated by the desire to expel their Andalusí neighbours from the peninsula, but rather to profit from them. This attitude was evident not only in the relations Christian rulers maintained with their Muslim

⁴⁵ Menéndez Pidal, *España del Cid*, 1, pp. 233-7. See also Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 103-4 and J. F. O'Callaghan, 'The Integration of Christian Spain into Europe: the Role of Alfonso VI of León-Castile', in B. F. Reilly (ed.), *Santiago, St Denis, and St Peter: the Reception of the Roman Liturgy in León-Castile in 1080* (New York: Fordham, 1985), pp. 103-4. The nature of Gregory's claims and the resistance to them will be considered in greater detail in the following chapter.

⁴⁶ For example J. Miranda Calvo, *La Reconquista de Toledo por Alfonso VI* (Toledo: Instituto de Estudios Visigóticos, 1980).

⁴⁷ Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 161-71.

⁴⁸ A point noted by Richard Fletcher, *St James's Catapult: the Life and Times of Diego Gelmírez of Santiago de Compostela* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 117.

peers, but also in royal policies toward the substantial minority groups actually living within their realms.

Alfonso VI and the successful governing of minority groups

One key pillar of Alfonso VI's authority was his ability to impose effective rule over Christian, Muslim and Jewish peoples. Large Jewish and Muslim communities continued to live peacefully in lands captured by the Spanish. During the eleventh and early twelfth century there were some attempts, usually initiated by the Church, to isolate these minority groups from the wider community, but such measures met with limited success. In contrast, a third major sub-culture, the Christian Mozarabic community, required a different approach on the part of governments. Containment proved even less successful, and Mozarabic communities were able to wield considerable political influence, particularly in Portugal.

Under Muslim rule Jewish communities were accorded similar status to Christians as *dhimmi* or 'people of the book'; in al-Andalus they were free to practise their faith and govern themselves under their own religious laws.⁴⁹ Jews were able to pursue artistic and literary excellence, several were also to fill high administrative offices within the Muslim state. Thus, when large Muslim cities were captured by Christian armies their viability was heavily dependent on the mercantile and administrative skills of their Jewish citizens. This importance allowed Jewish communities to retain significant rights under Christian rule. While the situation of Jews in the western regions of the peninsula is poorly documented, those traces which remain suggest that similar conditions prevailed, with Jews appearing as merchants and property holders in major cities.⁵⁰ This situation was viewed with disapproval by the papacy. Gregory VII admonished Alfonso against allowing Jews any authority over

⁴⁹ The standard introductions to Judaism in Medieval Iberia are Eliyahu Ashtor, *The Jews of Moslem Spain*, trans. A. Klein and J. Machlowitz Klein, 2 vols (Philadelphia: Jewish Publications Society of America, 1973) and Y. Baer, *A History of the Jews in Christian Spain*, 2 vols (Philadelphia: Jewish Publications Society of America, 1978).

⁵⁰ M. Keyserling, *História dos Judeus em Portugal* (São Paulo: Anita Novinski, 1971). Descriptions of the foundation of the monastery of Santa Cruz suggest a large Jewish population was resident in Coimbra. There was a Jewish quarter and individual Jews owned important land in the city. E. Austin O'Malley, *Tello and Theotónio, the Twelfth-century Founders of the Monastery of Santa Cruz in Coimbra* (Washington DC: Catholic University Press, 1954), p. 55; *Vita Tellois Archidiaconi*, p. 65a.

Christians. The repetition of such papal injunctions suggests that secular powers were slow to obey.⁵¹

The situation for Muslims under Christian authority in many ways paralleled that of the Jews.⁵² The Muslim minority was known to their Christian rulers as 'Mudejars', from the Arabic *al-mudajjan* (those allowed to remain). There was a certain irony in this designation, for it referred not only to those Muslims who elected to remain on their land after it had come under Christian control, but also to those unfortunates captured and enslaved during military operations.⁵³ Even those choosing to accept Christian authority often had little real alternative. With Muslim legal scholars arguing that the duty of the faithful was to withdraw rather than submit, the majority of wealthy Muslims able to relocate to Muslim-held areas did so. Those who stayed appear chiefly to have been agricultural workers and the urban poor.⁵⁴

Nevertheless, when gathered in sufficient numbers, these people could obtain rights of jurisdiction and freedom of worship. The Cid's capture of Valencia in June 1094 provides a famous example. Rodrigo sought to reassure the anxious citizens, and his speech was recorded by the Muslim author al-Qama.

God has bounteously given me Valencia and I rule it. If I conduct myself justly here and put affairs in order, God will leave me in possession of the city; but if I do wrong here by injustice or out of pride, I know that He will take it from me. From today, let each one go to his estate and possess it as was his wont. If anyone finds his irrigated plot or his vineyard or his land empty, let him take possession of it at once. If he finds that his estate has been worked, let him compensate the occupier for whatever he had spent, and resume ownership of it as the law of the Moors requires....Everything that I grant or do is to be

⁵¹ *Das Register*, 9. 2, pp. 571; Cowdrey, *The Register*, pp. 399-400. See also James M. Powell, 'The Papacy and the Muslim Frontier', in J. M. Powell (ed.), *Muslims under Latin Rule, 1100-1300* (Princeton: UP, 1990), 175-204.

⁵² James O'Callaghan, 'The Mudejars in Castile and Portugal in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries', in Powell (ed.), *Muslims under Latin Rule*, 11-56; R. I. Burns, 'Muslims in the Thirteenth-Century Realms of Aragon', in Powell (ed.), *Muslims under Latin Rule*, 57-102; J. P. Harvey, 'The Mudejars', in S. Jayyusi, *The Legacy of Muslim Spain* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), 176-187; and David Nirenburg, 'Muslims in Christian Iberia, 1000-1526: varieties of Mudejar experience', in P. Linehan and J. L. Nelson (eds), *The Medieval World* (London: Routledge, 2001), 60-76.

⁵³ O'Callaghan, 'The Mudejars', p. 13.

⁵⁴ Nirenburg, 'Muslims in Christian Iberia', p. 65, observes: 'the result was a society that was remarkably flat...Mudejar society lacked the economic and political resources to generate the types of literary and

respected, for I respect and love you well, and wish to give due attention to your needs and welfare, and I grieve at how much harm and suffering you have endured from all the terrible starvation and great slaughter. If you had only done earlier what you are doing now, you would not have reached the state you did...⁵⁵

In this address Rodrigo makes no reference to a religious or historical mandate of any kind. Instead he bases his claims on his own ability and the recognition that God will grant justice on strictly non-sectarian lines. Similar tolerance is displayed in Portuguese documents, such as the charter granted to Santarém when it was ceded to Alfonso by al-Mutawwakil of Badajoz in 1090. The agreement guaranteed both Christian and non-Christian peoples freedom of worship under their own law codes.⁵⁶ Royal measures to protect Muslim minorities were maintained throughout the eleventh and the twelfth century, underlining the importance this group retained.

Jews and Muslims were allowed to live within Spanish society under certain, clearly delineated conditions. A third distinct cultural group, the Mozarabic Christian minority, was far less easily brought under control. In the wake of the Arabic conquest many Visigoths remained on their land and accepted Muslim authority. Even as these communities gradually adopted the manners and language of their overlords, they clung tenaciously to the religion of their forefathers.⁵⁷ The very name 'Mozarab' highlights their ambivalent position. The word appears derived from Arabic *musta'rab* or *musta'rib*, (one who claims to be Arab) Yet this was not a designation used by the Arabs themselves.⁵⁸ The Spanish Christians adopted the word during the eleventh century, thus defining a branch of co-religionists in cultural terms.⁵⁹ Unlike the Jews or

artistic cultures which tend to spring up around the patronage of the powerful.' Cf. O'Callaghan, 'The Mudejars', pp. 18-21.

⁵⁵ Smith, *Christians and Moors in Spain*, 1, pp. 115-7.

⁵⁶ António Brandão, *Crónica do Conde D. Henrique, D. Teresa e Infante D. Afonso* (Lisbon: Biblioteca Histórica, 1944), pp. 276-7; Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, p. 164.

⁵⁷ The major study remains F. Simonet, *Historia de los mozárabes de España: dudada de los mejores y más auténticos testimonios de los escritores cristianos y arabes* (Amsterdam: Oriental Press, 1967). Wasserstein, *The Rise and Fall of the Party Kings*, p. 224, calls the Mozarabs of the eleventh and twelfth century a 'forgotten community.'

⁵⁸ In al-Andalusi society Christian minorities were defined religiously as *nasará* (Christians) or *mu'ahid* (keepers of the agreement). M. de Epalza, 'Mozarabs: An Emblematic Christian Minority', in Jayyusi, *The Legacy of Muslim Spain*, p. 148; cf. D. Urvoy, 'Les aspects symboliques du vocable <mozarat>', *Studia Islamica*, 78 (1993), 117-53.

⁵⁹ de Epalza, 'Mozarabs,' pp. 149-50.

the Mujedar Muslims, the Mozarabic Christians could not be easily contained; efforts to do so were to have wide-reaching effects in both Spanish and Portuguese society.

The religious forms used by the Arabicized Christians have misleadingly been termed 'Mozarabic'; they were in fact the same Visigothic rites followed by their northern co-religionists. If the Mozarabs differed at all it was in their greater resistance to change due to the centrality of religious ceremony to their cultural identity. This identity was consistently under siege. Despite the general tolerance of Arabic authorities to religious minorities, they nevertheless exerted a subtle but unrelenting pressure upon them. Even when resistance to cultural disintegration flared, it generally appeared to be the rearguard action of a desperate and largely isolated minority.⁶⁰ By the end of the tenth century the Mozarabic community seemed destined for the same oblivion that had overwhelmed the Christian enclaves in North Africa.⁶¹

During the eleventh century Christian military successes encouraged a renewal of confidence in the Mozarabic communities of southern Iberia. This revival was marked by an increased interest in the Visigothic past, and witnessed a minor boom of copying the works of Orosius of Braga and Isidore of Seville. Many of these Latin manuscripts included extensive marginal notes in Arabic, and the first Mozarabic Latin-Arabic glossary was written at this time. Mozarabic Christian apologetics disputing articles of Muslim faith soon followed.⁶² This growing cultural assurance was enhanced by the concentration of the Mozarabic community into several large urban centres. The Christian capture of Toledo in 1085 provided a focal point with deep historical reverberations for the Mozarabs. The attraction of living under Christian rule was reinforced by a deteriorating situation for Mozarabs living in Muslim states. Spanish military success led to rising tensions between communities in al-Andalus, a situation which worsened still further with the Almoravid intervention in the peninsula after 1085. These pressures forced many Mozarabs to relocate northwards.

⁶⁰ The most well-researched example of such resistance is the ninth-century martyr movement in Cordova. J. A. Coope, *The Martyrs of Córdoba* (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1995).

⁶¹ For this comparison, Michael Gervers, *Conversion and Continuity: Indigenous Christian Communities in Islamic Lands, Eighth to Eighteenth Centuries* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1990).

⁶² Thomas E. Burman, *Religious Polemic and the Intellectual History of the Mozarabs c. 1050-1200* (Leiden: L. J. Brill, 1994), pp. 16-9, 157-62; P. Van Koningsveld, *The Latin-Arabic Glossary of the Leiden University Library. A Contribution to the Study of Mozarabic Manuscripts and Literature* (Leiden: L. J. Brill, 1976), pp. 45-52. Also John Victor Tolan, *Saracens. Western Christian Responses to Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 147-9.

The growing Mozarabic population in Christian lands had a disproportionate effect in Portugal. Perhaps the most famous Mozarabic leader of the period, Sisnando Davides, came from the Coimbra region. Captured during a Muslim raid and brought up in Seville, he reached high office in the *taifa* government until an argument with the leader, al-Mu'tamid, urged him northward in search of new opportunities. King Fernando installed him as governor in the area of his birth.⁶³ The presence of a sympathetic ruler was only one factor encouraging the Mozarabic community to gather in the region. Braga was of great cultural significance to the Mozarabs; until the capture of Toledo in 1085 Braga was the only Visigothic religious centre in Christian hands. Moreover the region was also one of the last to retain Mozarabic bishops.⁶⁴ These factors all encouraged the formation of a numerous and committed Mozarabic community in the region.

The presence of significant cultural minorities dictated much of the fluid character of Iberian society. While the roles of Jews and Muslims were circumscribed by convention and by law, because they did much to ensure the prosperity of frontier society these restrictions could be lightly borne. The Mozarabs formed an intermediate group between the Christian and non-Christian worlds, and united a tradition of cultural resistance with a highly developed sense of past injustices. The protection extended to these cultural minorities in Christian Iberia provides a striking example of the official tolerance required to successfully govern frontier communities.

The reconquest under Alfonso VI: ideas and realities

Emperor Alfonso's policy in lands under his control – Portugal among them – was characterised by a pragmatic acceptance of religious and cultural difference. Yet many authors during this period describe sharp sectarian hostility in Iberian Christian society. How are these statements of belligerence to be reconciled with the more tolerant policy

⁶³ For an overview see José Mattoso, 'Os Moçárabes', in J. Mattoso, *Fragmentos de uma Composição Medieval* (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1993), 19-35. The remarkable career of Sisnando Davides is examined by Emilio Garcia Gómez y Ramón Menéndez Pidal, 'El conde mozárabe Sisnando Davidiz y la política de Alfonso VI con los Taifas', *Al-Andalus*, 12 (1947), 27-48.

⁶⁴ Bishop Crescónio of Coimbra (1092-1098). Possibly too there remained a Mozarabic bishop in Lisbon until the time of its capture in 1147. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi: the Conquest of Lisbon*, ed. and trans. C. W. David (New York: Columbia Press, 1936), pp. 114-6, 176-7. For the Mozarabs in Coimbra see Peter Linehan, 'Utrum reges Portugalie coronabantur annon', in P. Linehan, *The Processes of Politics and the Rule of Law. Studies on the Iberian kingdoms and Papal Rome in the Middle Ages* (Aldershot: Variorum, 2002), p. 392.

of secular leaders? A closer examination of the particular social and political pressures influencing these authors suggests their writings did not always reflect general attitudes. In its earliest manifestations, the ideal of the reconquest was more an invention of historians than a popularly held belief. Those late eleventh and early twelfth-century writers who articulated unremitting sectarian hostilities were following in this literary tradition. Nevertheless they were isolated voices, pursuing agendas that had little to do with actual relations between the Christian and Islamic worlds.

The idea of reconquest first appeared in the ninth century. Under the auspices of the Asturian kings, authors produced dramatic accounts of the foundation of the Christian kingdoms. The anonymous author of the *Crónica de Alfonso III* portrayed the first Asturian king, Pelayo, as thrillingly defiant in the face of Muslim numerical superiority and the blandishments of Bishop Oppa, who spoke for those Christians willing to accept the domination of the invaders.

[The bishop began] 'I think that you are not unaware, my son, that all Spain was formerly governed as one realm under the rule of the Goths, and outshone all other lands in wisdom and learning. Also, as I have said before, the whole army of the Goths when gathered together did not have the strength to withstand the attack of the Ishmaelites. How will you therefore be able to defend yourself...?'

To this Pelagius replied: 'Have you not read in Holy Scripture that the Church of God can become as small as a grain of mustard and can then, by God's mercy, be made to grow again much larger?'

The bishop answered: 'Indeed it is so written.'

Pelagius said: 'Christ is our hope [that] Spain may be saved and the army of the Gothic people restored.'⁶⁵

This account has been taken as a classic statement of the reconquest ideal. Yet the wide temporal gulf between the writing of the chronicle and the actual battle undermines its value as an indication of eighth-century attitudes, a point which has been noted by recent authors.⁶⁶ Is it then an accurate representation of later attitudes? Here too there

⁶⁵ 'Chronicle of Alfonso III', in C. Smith, *Christians and Moors in Spain*, 3 vols (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1988), 1, pp. 26-28; also included in Olivia Remie Constable, *Medieval Iberia: Readings from Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Sources* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1997), pp. 39-42.

⁶⁶ For example Collins, *The Arab Conquest*, p. 65; and Fletcher, 'Reconquest and Crusade', pp. 33-5.

are problems. These histories were written to support the authority of the newly established Asturian monarchy; one of the primary means of doing this was to link the king of Asturias with his Visigothic predecessors.⁶⁷ As there was little justification for such a claim, war against the Muslims was a valuable means to reinforce a doubtful historical association, and so legitimise the pretensions of a fledgling monarchy. Thus, while the speech placed into Pelayo's mouth is questionable as a reflection of eighth-century attitudes, it is equally problematic as a representation of ninth-century ideals. This impression is reinforced because, following the short-lived historiographical boom that produced these works, articulations of cultural antagonism dwindled away.

The theme of the reconquest was eventually taken up again by the anonymous author of the *Historia Silense*. This chronicle includes the dramatic description of the campaigns of King Fernando I in Portugal during the middle decades of the eleventh century. Although of uncertain value as a source for eleventh-century attitudes, it may reflect more accurately the mindset of the author's twelfth-century contemporaries. Many of the same motivations attributed to Pelayo by the author of the *Crónica de Alfonso III* were also ascribed to Fernando's followers in the *Historia Silense*. The post-invasion Spanish are referred to as the people of the Goths (*gens Gotorum*) and the campaign waged by their kings justified by the need to rectify the crimes of the past.⁶⁸

Some barbarians were slaughtered, others at his [King Fernando's] command he humbled in slavery to himself and his men. It would be tedious to note down one by one the settlements and the many castles of the barbarians laid waste by the ever-victorious King Fernando. Accordingly I have sought to record [only] the names of the principal cities over the churches of which once upon a time bishops presided, which stoutly fighting he dragged from their sacrilegious hands.⁶⁹

Despite the inference of some recent scholars, there is a strong thread of religious animosity woven into this narrative.⁷⁰ Furthermore, the author also included more direct

⁶⁷ 'the Asturian kings hijacked a corpse [the Visigothic kingship], acquired its papers, and assumed its historical identity.' Linehan, *History and the Historians*, p. 82.

⁶⁸ For the author's terminology see *Historia Silense*, p. 39, n. 90.

⁶⁹ *Historia Silense*, p. 48.

⁷⁰ When arguing for a late twelfth-century rise of militancy Fletcher adroitly sidesteps the belligerence in this source by pointing to the arrow from Viseu as a *causus belli*. 'Reconquest and Crusade', p. 41. Yet

references to the king's pious intents. The intercession of God and St James were earnestly sought before battle; captured Moors were put to work repairing and rebuilding churches.⁷¹

Once again, however, it is uncertain how accurately this portrayal of religious militancy actually reflects reality. The anonymous author of the *Historia Silense* did not reserve his culturally-derived hostility for the Muslims alone. He also betrayed a comparable animosity for fellow Christians from outside the peninsula. The French were portrayed as religiously dubious and militarily inept. Early Franks, the author claims, fostered heresy in the Visigothic kingdom while Charlemagne, the paladin of Frankish arms, is ridiculed for his abortive expedition into Spain and subsequent failure to support the struggling Spaniards. Significantly too, the author of *Historia Silense* subtly, but clearly, rejects the claims forwarded by Pope Gregory VII for authority in Spain.⁷² Thus descriptions of early Spanish animosity toward Islam may simply be another symptom of the author's own more general xenophobia. To better establish the pervasiveness of the ideals expressed in the *Historia Silense*, it is necessary to consider briefly the political situation in which the chronicle was penned, as well as the attitudes revealed by writers contemporary with the anonymous author.

Even as the author of the *Historia Silense* was producing his chronicle of royal deeds another literary cycle was being created elsewhere in the peninsula. One of Spain's most famous historical figures, Rodrigo Díaz – 'the Cid', rose to prominence in the final decades of the eleventh century. His deeds were first recorded in an anonymous poem, *Carmen Campi Doctoris*, penned between 1083 and 1094.⁷³ A chronicle, the *Historia Roderici*, was completed early in the twelfth century.⁷⁴ A third work, the *Poema de Mio Cid*, was written in the first decade of the thirteenth century.⁷⁵

on closer consideration the *Historia Silense* seems to be implying something else: in an example of royal implacability Fernando seeks out and punishes the bowman responsible, even though three decades had passed since the fatal arrow was loosed. See above, n. 22.

⁷¹ *Historia Silense*, pp. 49-52.

⁷² 'Introduction to the *Historia Silense*', in Barton and Fletcher, *The World of the Cid*, pp. 19-21.

Unfortunately one of the passages referred to in this section (ch. 18) is not included in the subsequent translation.

⁷³ The dating and background to the 'Carmen campidoctoris' are discussed by Fletcher, *Quest for the Cid*, pp. 92-3; and Roger Wright, 'The First Poem of the Cid – The *Carmen Campi Doctoris*', *Papers of the Liverpool Latin Seminar* 2 (1979), 213-48.

⁷⁴ For a discussion of the dating for this work see Fletcher, *The Quest for the Cid*, pp. 93-8. This dating is reaffirmed in the 'Introduction to *Historia Roderici*', in Barton and Fletcher, *The World of the Cid*, pp. 92-8.

⁷⁵ Menéndez Pidal believed the *Poema de mio Cid* was written in the 1140s and represented the recording of a more ancient oral tradition. This dating has subsequently been brought into question and the likely

These sources do not deal directly with events in Portugal, but they are highly revealing for the social and intellectual environment surrounding those authors whose work did address the west of the peninsula.

The earliest of these works, the *Carmen Campi Doctoris*, contains no indication of religious motivation in the Cid's actions. Rodrigo fought both against and on behalf of Muslim leaders. His army was made up of Muslim and Christian soldiers, as were those of his enemies. In a small but striking indication of cross-cultural relations, the Cid's warhorse was not booty, but rather had been purchased from a Muslim trader.⁷⁶ The *Historia Roderici* also portrays Rodrigo pursuing fundamentally mercenary intents. The Cid's willingness to fight on behalf of the Muslims for personal gain is blandly described and no censure is implied. During Rodrigo's greatest triumph, the capture of Valencia in 1094, the chronicler gave primary emphasis to the huge wealth of booty taken by the successful army. Faint indications of a religious dimension to warfare with the Muslims can be found, and the author observes with approval that when Valencia had been secured, the city mosque was converted into a Christian church.⁷⁷ Yet such statements are hardly evidence for a deep-seated cultural animosity; moreover neither source contains any suggestion that the dream of reconquest was a motivating factor for the Cid's triumph. Such attitudes seem to stand in marked contrast to those presented in the *Historia Silense* and they underline the problems in accepting the militancy expressed by that anonymous author as being truly representative.

Yet while the sources describing the life of the Cid share little of the sectarian animosity to be found in the *Historia Silense*, they do suggest a possible source for this negative portrayal of cross-cultural relations. A striking characteristic of Alfonso's rule was the king's eagerness to adopt many of the cultural forms of Latin Christendom. This included the recruitment of foreign clergymen for high Spanish office and the importation of new forms of liturgy, calligraphy, and canon law.⁷⁸ Such changes were met with considerable suspicion and resistance by local peoples, particularly from those clergymen who felt their own positions directly threatened. The immigrant clergymen were predominantly French, which may explain the hostility toward earlier French

date of authorship accepted as the first decade of the thirteenth century. Colin Smith, *The Making of the Poema de mio Cid* (Cambridge: UP, 1983), pp. 49-72.

⁷⁶ 'Carmen Campidoctoris', pp. 107-8.

⁷⁷ *Historia Roderici*, ch. 73, p. 146.

⁷⁸ The growth of Latin Christian influence in Spain during the reign of Alfonso VI will be considered in greater depth in Chapter 2.

intervention in the peninsula shown by the author of *Historia Silense*. This also renders more explicable one of the puzzles presented by the *Historia Roderici*.

A leading figure in the Cid's career was left unmentioned in the *Historia Roderici*: Jerónimo, the French clergyman installed as the first bishop of Valencia.⁷⁹ Interestingly, the thirteenth century *Poema de mio Cid* paints a valiant picture of 'the well-mitred man' who offered both important spiritual counsel as well as a conspicuous presence on the battlefield.⁸⁰ The earlier author's omission of this important ecclesiastical figure may actually be indicative of the animosity felt by many Spanish clergymen for their French brethren. In popular memory Bishop Jerónimo's most outstanding characteristic was his eager belligerence; even among the Cid's most grizzled followers the bishop's martial enthusiasm was widely recognised. Yet this may have struck the Spanish clergy on a raw nerve. Those clergymen familiar with earlier historical writings were uncomfortably aware of the Quisling role the Visigothic clergy had purportedly played during the Arabic invasions – as exemplified by the turncoat Bishop Oppas.⁸¹ A natural response from Iberian clerical writers to the threat of immigrant French clergymen would have been the composition of literary works celebrating their own military heritage – works such as the *Historia Silense*. Thus, although the pressures that provoked such works were largely unrelated to the Muslim presence in the peninsula, they may nonetheless have tended to encourage an emphasis on sectarian difference as a measure of local self-definition.

This point is complicated by the several non-clerical, indeed non-Christian authors who also bore witness to a Portuguese ambition for reconquest. Once again, however, there are grounds on which to doubt the accuracy of such claims. The celebrated memoirs of the Muslim emir of Granada, 'Abd Allāh, provide numerous insights into the relations between Christian and Muslim Iberians. In one well-known vignette the emir described his reception of an ambassador sent by Alfonso VI to conclude a treaty and collect the required tribute. Interestingly this ambassador, Sisnando Davídes, was Portuguese. He had been born in Coimbra and later returned to

⁷⁹ Fletcher dubs this omission 'one of the puzzles' of the chronicle. 'Introduction to the *Historia Roderici*', in *The World of El Cid*, p. 97. For a discussion of the historical Bishop Jerónimo of Valencia see Fletcher, *The Quest for the Cid*, pp. 183-5.

⁸⁰ *Poem of the Cid*, vs. 78-9, pp. 69-70; vs. 116-7, pp. 115-7.

⁸¹ In this context see Peter Linehan, 'Religion, Nationalism, and National Identity in Medieval Spain and Portugal', in S. Mews (ed.), *Religion and National Identity*. Studies in Church History 18 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), pp. 169-73; repr. in P. Linehan, *Spanish Church and Society 1150-1300*.

the region as a royal governor.⁸² Along with his king's terms, Sisnando also brought 'Abd Allāh a warning.

Al-Andalus originally belonged to the Christians. Then they were defeated by the Arabs and driven to the most inhospitable region, Galicia. Now that they are strong and capable, the Christians desire to recover what they have lost by force. This can only be achieved by weakening you over time. In the long run, when it has neither men or money, we'll be able to recover it without any difficulty.⁸³

Such an attitude seems to support the picture presented in the *Historia Silense* and refute those of the sources detailing the life of the Cid. Certainly 'Abd Allāh claimed this statement reflected the attitudes of both Alfonso VI and the majority of his subjects. Yet this expression of implacable hostility may be less clear-cut than it seems.⁸⁴ The emir was writing in exile and with the benefit of considerable hindsight. An underlying motive of self-justification for his own political failures may have led 'Abd Allāh to emphasise cultural hostility. Moreover, even if Sisnando did make statements of this kind, there is every possibility that these may have been a result of his own Mozarabic background, rather than a reflection of the attitudes of his royal master.

Powerless under Muslim rule, frequently distrusted by their co-religionists to the north, the Mozarabs had lost the most in the Arab invasions and so were the ones most likely to look back to the Visigothic period as a golden age. Moreover, there may also have been a personal element to Sisnando's apparent hostility. The ambassador had been brought up in Muslim society, and before taking service with Alfonso had moved in the highest of al-Andalusian court circles. The Granadan leaders would have been his previous associates, even his rivals, so it is easy to imagine the snide asides and subtle insults he would receive on returning to those courts as the representative of King Alfonso, a ruler whom the urbane Muslim courtiers deemed little more than a barbarous brigand with a powerful army. It would have been natural for Sisnando to seek the

⁸² García Gómez y Menéndez Pidal, 'El conde mozárabe Sisnando Davídiz', pp. 30-1, 35.

⁸³ *The Tibyān*, p. 90.

⁸⁴ For example MacKay, *Spain in the Middle Ages*, p. 20.

moral high ground by appealing to the distant past; what is not self-evident, however, is the degree to which such an appeal reflected wider Christian Spanish opinion.⁸⁵

In fact among Christian leaders there appear to have been sharply divergent attitudes concerning the correct means of dealing with the Muslims. This created a certain tension in royal policy, a tension most dramatically highlighted in the aftermath of the capture of Toledo in 1085. Under the terms of surrender the inhabitants of Toledo had the option of leaving with their moveable goods or remaining in possession of their property. Those who chose the latter course were guaranteed their security, laws and freedom of religion. The largest mosque in the city was to remain in Muslim hands. Separate agreements were reached with the Jewish and Mozarabic populations, reflecting the terms granted to the Muslims. Significantly, the Mozarabs specified the maintenance of their own liturgy within the six churches they held in the city. In a move calculated to reassure the local population Alfonso appointed Sisnando Davides, the Mozarabic governor of Coimbra, to rule in Toledo.⁸⁶

No sooner had the city been secured under the authority of the king's lieutenant than the details of the surrender treaty were broken. In direct defiance of these agreements the Christian authorities took control of the Great Mosque and consecrated it as a cathedral. Fortunately the sequence of events leading up to this breach of faith is well documented by both Arabic and Spanish writers, allowing their attitudes to be seen in comparison.⁸⁷ Sisnando was portrayed by both groups as a quietly efficient administrator. Through his even-handed approach to all members of the city's diverse population he personified the Mozarabic attitude of 'tolerant reconquest'; so successful was his policy that, according to Ibn Bassam, he won many converts to Christianity.

⁸⁵ Some recent historians have accepted the fourteenth-century Moroccan author Ibn Idhari's report that the Spanish monarch expressed an implacable ambition to expel Islam from the Peninsula to a group of Toledan ambassadors. Ibn 'Idhārī, *Al-Bayān al-Mughrib*, ed. É. Lévi-Provençal, G. Colin, and I. Abbas, 4 vols (Paris: P. Geunthner, 1930; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1948; Beirut: Dar al-Thaqafair, 1967), III, p. 282. The passage is translated in Wasserstein, *The Rise and Fall of the Party Kings*, p. 250 and again by O'Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain*, p. 9. O'Callaghan rather breezily dismisses the impact of the chasm of time between the eleventh-century events and the fourteenth-century record. Yet three hundred elapsed years must surely have coloured the author's representation of this event. Fletcher, 'Reconquest and Crusade', p. 37, is more circumspect: 'I do not think we can accept Ibn Idhari's account for what it purports to be without misgivings.'

⁸⁶ Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 171-4.

⁸⁷ Ibn Bassam de Santarém, 'Aldaquira,' in *Portugal na Espanha Arabé*, 3, pp. 127-31. Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie sive Historia Gothica*, ed. J. Fernández Valverde, CCCM, 72 (Turnhout, 1987), VI. 24, pp. 205-7. This incident has attracted an enormous amount of scholarly comment. For recent discussion and bibliography see Linehan, *History and the Historians*, pp. 204-5.

Yet the basic creed of his governance was decisively challenged. It is in assigning the blame for this change in policy that the two accounts diverge markedly.

Ibn Bassam believed the source of calumny to be King Alfonso himself. Filled with Castilian hauteur the king overrode Sisnando's moderate advice:

[Sisnando objected] 'To proceed in this way will inflame popular unrest, undermine all past policies, alienate any who might assist us, and deter those who are leaning in our direction.' But Alfonso (Allāh curse him!), blinded by pride, ignored him and heeded only the voices of his own madness...⁸⁸

Yet the thirteenth-century account by Rodrigo of Toledo presents Alfonso in a more favourable light.⁸⁹ It was not he who broke the accords, but a conspiracy of his wife, Queen Constance, and the newly appointed bishop of the city, Bernard de Sédillac. Overriding Sisnando's objections, they seized and consecrated the mosque. When news of this act of bad faith broke in the royal court the king was enraged. Alfonso stormed back to Toledo intent, if the chronicler is to be believed, on burning both bishop and queen alive in punishment for their actions. This precipitous response was prevented by an embassy of Moors from the captured city. On bended knees the wronged Muslims convinced the king to take no action, for they prudently foresaw that any backlash of popular anger would inevitably fall on them.

The aftermath of the capture of Toledo in 1085 presents three distinct eleventh-century attitudes in high relief. On one side there was the Mozarabic Sisnando of Coimbra, impelled by the Visigothic past, while remaining sufficiently aware of other cultures to rule them efficiently. This position could usually exist in harmony with the more pragmatic attitudes of Alfonso IV, with its fundamental basis in *realpolitik* rather than ideas of ancient glories. Queen Constance and Bishop Bernard, on the other hand, presented a perspective incompatible with the other two. Both queen and bishop were of French origin and were relative newcomers to Spain. Their views reflected the attitudes

⁸⁸ 'Proceder assim será inflamar a cólera dos peitos, inutilizar a política (empreendida), deitar para trás os que estão dispostas (a ajudar-nos) e deter os que se movem já a nosso favor. Mas Afonso – Deus o amaldiçõe! – cego pelo orgulho, não fez caso e só prestou ouvidos as vozes de sua loucura...' Ibn Bassam, 'Aldaquira,' p. 129.

⁸⁹ Although Rodrigo was writing over a century after these events, he was archbishop of Toledo, and so had access to both records and traditions of what would have been considered a central event in the history of the city. Moreover there seems little cause for him to fabricate this story, since by the thirteenth

of religious exclusivity and intolerance developing in Latin Christendom. The consecration of the mosque was the first great victory of these views over the more moderate policies championed by Sisnando and, to a lesser extent, Alfonso. It was a victory, moreover, that should not be seen as an isolated incident, but as critical point in a long process of cultural permeation between the relatively isolated Spanish kingdoms and the cultural and intellectual developments in Europe.

Medieval Iberian society presents the historian with an apparent inconsistency between the sectarian hostility described by authors and the clear evidence of official social tolerance. How is this tension to be resolved? Eleventh-century Portugal, in common with other regions of Christian Iberia, had developed into a multicultural society encompassing communities of Jews, Muslims and Mozarabs. Taking pragmatism as a guide, the Christian kings exercised considerable tolerance in order to ensure their own prosperity. This was, however, a society which also spoke with many voices, and several of them articulated dreams of reconquest. While traditional historical analysis has interpreted such statements as representative of general attitudes, in fact the influences at work on these authors were as varied as their own political agendas. During the reign of Alfonso VI the Iberian kingdoms began to experience the cultural influence of an expansionist Latin Christendom. Initial manifestations of this influence can be seen in the vociferous statements of sectarian antipathy made by those of the educated elite who felt most threatened by Latin Christian mores. Yet as this outside influence grew more pervasive its effects became more direct. In fact this process of cultural permeation would become the crucial factor in social development throughout Iberia as the eleventh century drew to a close.

century the consecration of captured mosques had become standard practice. The archbishop candidly describes this occurring on other occasions, e.g., *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 9. 27, pp. 299-300.

Chapter Two

Latin Christian influence in the Iberian Peninsula during the eleventh century

By the middle of the eleventh century Iberian society had developed into a unique amalgam of ethnic subgroups, a culture in which Muslims, Jews and Mozarabic Christians lived under the relatively tolerant rule of the Spanish kings. Pragmatic laissez-faire was the guiding principle of government, and relations between members of differing faiths were usually conducted without overt sectarian antipathy. Individuals might articulate the ideals of reconquest and the re-establishment of the Visigothic regime, but such ambitions were not pursued by the majority of the population or by political leaders. Yet pressure for change was beginning to be felt. During the long reign of Alfonso VI of León-Castile (1065-1109) the cross-cultural *modus vivendi* came under increasing threat from influences originating outside the peninsula. The Leonese-castilian monarch, impressed by the possibilities Latin Christian culture offered, fostered the transfer of ideas and personnel from beyond the Pyrenees. Growing Latin Christian cultural influence had a dramatic impact throughout the peninsula. In the western regions, as an unexpected corollary of Alfonso's policies, Portugal re-emerged as a separate political entity under the authority of Count Henry of Burgundy (1095-1112).

Latin Christian cultural permeation of the Iberian peninsula left a deep impression on contemporaries. Charters recording grants of land to international religious orders, letters between leaders, and papal bulls, are only some of the documents that yield significant details of changing relationships both in Iberia and further afield.¹ The impact of Latin Christian influence is also evident in the form many of these documents take. The earliest Spanish records were written using the Visigothic script, a characteristic Iberian style of calligraphy. During the eleventh century, in a clear demonstration of the pressures for cultural change, this style was gradually

¹ For a brief introductory discussion of Spanish documents see Bernard F. Reilly, *The Kingdom of León-Castilla under King Alfonso VI, 1065-1109* (Princeton: UP, 1988), pp. xiii-xiv; and more extensively

replaced by the Carolingian script – the form which had become the standard throughout Latin Christendom.²

While official documents offer a rich source of information for this period, narrative sources are less comprehensive. Early in the twelfth century Bishop Pelayo of Oviedo (1101-30 and 1142-3) completed the brief *Chronicon Regum Legionensium*. Although the focus of this chronicle is the reign of Alfonso VI, historians have questioned its value as a source due to Pelayo's wide-scale falsification of documents. Critical use of this material is only possible if guided by the recognition that the overriding aim of the bishop's forgery was always the promotion of his own see.³ More extensive and generally more reliable is the *Historia Compostellana*. Written by several authors under the auspices of the archbishops of Compostela, this chronicle is a partisan but nonetheless important account of events in Iberia.⁴ Even though such chronicles clearly indicate growing communication between Europe and Spain, Iberian scholars have often understated the impact of Latin Christian influence on events in the peninsula. This has been the case for studies dealing with both Spain and Portugal, although for different reasons.

The tendency of traditional Spanish scholarship has been to ignore influences from outside the peninsula as immaterial to the central theme of national formation. Studies dealing with the rule of Alfonso VI are further complicated by issues specific to this particular monarch. Alfonso's person and policies have long been overshadowed by his most famous subject, Rodrigo Díaz, the Cid. In the Cid's adventures his liege-lord Alfonso is portrayed as a foolish, short-sighted autocrat.⁵ Only in recent years has this misconception been redressed. Alfonso VI has been the subject of a penetrating biography by Bernard F. Reilly, while the agents of the Latin Christian permeation of

¹ 'The chancery of Alfonso VI of León-Castile', in B. F. Reilly (ed.), *Santiago, Saint-Denis and Saint Peter. The Reception of the Roman Liturgy in León-Castile in 1080* (New York: Fordham, 1985), 1-40.

² Barbara A. Shailor, 'The Scriptorium of San Sahugún: a period of transition', in Reilly (ed.), *Santiago, Saint-Denis and Saint Peter*, 42-61.

³ Bishop Pelayo of Oviedo, *Chronicon Regum Legionensium*, in Simon Barton and Richard Fletcher (trans), *The World of El Cid* (Manchester: UP, 2000), pp. 65-89.

⁴ *Historia Compostellana*, (ed.), E. Falque Rey, CCCM 70 (Turnhout, 1988) [HC]. For the issues of multiple authors see Bernard F. Reilly, 'The "Historia Compostellana": the Genesis and Composition of a Twelfth-Century Spanish "Gesta"', *Speculum*, 44 (1969), 78-85; and more recently E. Falque Rey, 'The Manuscript Transmission of the "Historia Compostellana"', *Manuscripta*, 29 (1985), 80-90, and by the same author '¿El último manuscrito de la *Historia Compostellana*?', *Compostellanum*, 30 (1985), 317-22.

⁵ Fletcher, *The Quest for El Cid*, pp. 118-9; Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, p. xiii; Peter Linehan, 'The Cid of History and the History of the Cid', *History Today*, 37 (Sept. 1987), pp. 26, 32.

the peninsula during this period have also been the subject of important studies.⁶ Slightly different concerns have directed Portuguese historical studies of the same period.

At the end of the eleventh century, Portugal once again emerged as a distinct political entity, this time under the control of Count Henry the Burgundian. The factors leading to this situation have been of intense interest to Portuguese historians, but many of the resulting studies have been deeply influenced by specific, regional issues. Count Henry became the progenitor of the Portuguese royal family, yet his origin and path to power troubled some historians. Count Henry was himself a manifestation of Latin Christian expansion. Despite his critical role in the eventual formation of Portugal, perceptions of the count as essentially a foreigner have complicated studies of this period.⁷ More problematically, Henry's position was gained through marriage to Alfonso's natural daughter, Teresa. Portuguese historians have suggested that the grant of the county was in fact an acknowledgement of Henry's military prowess, a satisfying but very partial explanation. The role of Latin Christian intervention was more subtle, and in the long term more profound, than the success story of an isolated, itinerant mercenary.

Communication between Europe and the Iberian peninsula increased dramatically during the eleventh century. One aspect of the resulting cultural transfer has attracted a high level of scholarly interest: the relationship between the reconquest and the development of the crusade. French military expeditions into Iberia – the so-called 'proto-crusades' – have been the focus of considerable scholarly debate, but little consensus has been reached. The pioneering work of Carl Erdmann on the origin of the crusade set much of the framework for subsequent understanding of the phenomenon. Erdmann believed the participation of French knights in operations against the Spanish Moors provided inspiration for a far wider crusading movement. This influential

⁶ Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, passim. Several collections of articles are particularly important in this context, including Reilly (ed.), *Santiago, Saint-Denis and Saint Peter*; Charles J. Bishko, *Studies of Medieval Spanish Frontier History* (London: Variorum, 1980) and by the same author *Spanish and Portuguese Monastic History* (London: Variorum, 1984); and Peter Linehan, *The Processes of Politics and the Rule of Law. Studies on the Iberian Kingdoms and Papal Rome in the Middle Ages* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002).

⁷ Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 13 vols (Lisbon: Editorial Verbo, 1977), I, p. 78, characterises Henry as 'o bom cavaleiro francês' – the good French knight; central to the Portuguese cause, but not himself Portuguese. Carl Erdmann, 'Der Kreuzzugsgedanke in Portugal', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 141 (1929), 25-53; trans. by A. Pinto de Cavalho as *A Ideia de Cruzada em Portugal* (Coimbra: Publicações do Instituto Alemão, 1940), p. 7, opines: 'Mas Henrique não pode ser tomado como tipo representativo da nacionalidade portuguesa. Era francês...'

argument has recently been questioned, for critical scrutiny of the source material for these early expeditions has raised doubts over the actual motivation and ultimate results of French involvement.⁸

Although early military expeditions have attracted the majority of recent scholarly attention, their impact on the development of either Latin Christian militancy or the popular conception of the Iberian frontier was limited. Other, more subtle manifestations of Latin Christian cultural expansion had deeper, long term implications. Alfonso was induced to support a foreign-inspired ecclesiastical reform program, despite resistance from his own disgruntled subjects. Furthermore, to reinforce his own authority, Alfonso established stronger links with the aristocratic houses of Burgundy and Aquitaine. These ecclesiastical and secular initiatives were undertaken by a monarch eager to consolidate his authority; but they had unexpected ramifications in Portugal. Widespread disenchantment with unwanted change fostered a stronger sense of regional solidarity, even as an ambitious foreign knight, Henry the Burgundian, came to power in the region.

Early Latin Christian military intervention in Iberia

Between the eighth and the eleventh century Spanish Christian forces had been able to make substantial territorial gains at the expense of the Muslim states to the south. Although the motivation for this gradual expansion was locally derived and the campaigns were carried out by Spanish troops, events in the peninsula drew the attention of soldiers from beyond the Pyrenees. Early examples of foreign military intervention in the peninsula have attracted considerable scholarly attention, both as potential conduits of Latin Christian cultural ideals, and as antecedents to the declaration of the crusade in 1095. In general, however, uninvited northerners found an indifferent or even hostile reception from local peoples; as a result their impact on the progress of the reconquest, or indeed on the development of the crusade, was limited.

⁸ Carl Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, trans. M. W. Baldwin and W. Goffart (Princeton: UP, 1977), pp. 136, 288-9. That the early foreign expeditions were proto-crusades is assumed by James O'Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), pp. 24ff. Marcus Bull, *Knightly Piety and the Lay Response to the First Crusade* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), ch. 2, argues for a limited transfer of ideas between the two regions prior to the First Crusade in 1095.

The most famous of the early northern visitors to Spain was Charlemagne, who led a large army through the Pyrenees in 778, possibly with the aim of taking Cordova and incorporating Spain into the western empire. Carolingian hopes were quickly dashed by the turbulent reality of Iberian politics, and the most enduring product of the expedition was literary, the *Chanson de Roland*.⁹ Yet the chivalric poetic cycles so popular in northern courts found little echo in the peninsula: from Iberian chroniclers Charlemagne elicited little beyond disdain.¹⁰ Nevertheless, despite the epic failure of Carolingian intervention in the peninsula, communication between southern France and Spain did not end when Charlemagne returned to the north. Inspired by heroic tales of the Spanish frontier, by the increasing popularity of Santiago de Compostela as a focus for international pilgrimage, and by pragmatic hopes of securing booty, kings, nobles and bands of less exalted warriors occasionally undertook the journey into Spain. Their activities left little record beyond infrequent references in chronicles to an exotic visitor alleviating the routine of monastic life.¹¹

During the eleventh century the scale and ambition of Latin Christian intervention in Iberia began to grow. In 1064, the same year as the capture of Coimbra, a mixed force of mainly Norman and Catalan soldiers launched an assault on the Muslim-held stronghold of Barbastro. There has been considerable controversy over the wider significance of the conglomerate army that mounted this attack. Although the actual role played by the Latin Church is unclear, the enthusiastic participation of northern troops has encouraged some scholars to interpret this campaign as a precursor to the First Crusade of 1095, while others have portrayed the attack as a defining moment for Spanish attitudes to the frontier.¹² When considered within the context of

⁹ Despite the failure of Carolingian forces to make any real impression in Spain, they inspired a poetic cycle and later a cult which would do much to keep the Spanish frontier at the forefront of European popular imagination. B. Sholod, *Charlemagne in Spain: The Cultural Legacy of Roncesvalles* (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1966).

¹⁰ Disparaging Muslim accounts are collected by António Borges Coelho, *Portugal no Espanha Árabe*, 4 vols (Lisbon: Seara Nova, 1975), 4, pp. 59-61. Christian reports are to be found in Colin Smith (ed.), *Christians and Moors in Spain*, 3 vols (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1988), 1, 30-41.

¹¹ This evidence is gathered by Prosper Boissonade, *Du Nouveau sur la Chanson de Roland* (Paris: Édouard Champion, 1923), pp. 1-70, and Marcelin Defourneaux, *Les Français en Espagne aux XI^e et XII^e siècles* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949). See also Bull, *Knightly Piety*, pp. 71-2.

¹² The 'proto-crusade' position is put forcefully by Boissonade, *Du Nouveau sur la Chanson de Roland*, pp. 257-301; Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, pp. 138-42; and O'Callaghan *Crusade and Reconquest*, pp. 24-5. O'Callaghan substantially weakens his position by simply ignoring the contrary cases made by Alberto Ferreiro, 'The siege of Barbastro 1064-65: a reassessment', *Journal of Medieval History*, 9 (1983), 129-44; and Bull, *Knightly Piety*, pp. 72-81. Richard Fletcher, 'Reconquest and Crusade in Spain c. 1050-1150', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 37 (1987), p. 42, adds: 'I regard [the Barbastro campaign] as a red herring in the history of crusading in Spain.'

Iberian politics, however, the Barbastro campaign actually reveals the unsentimental realities behind eleventh-century Latin Christian military intervention in Spain.

The original impetus for the campaign came not from Latin Christendom, but from an Aragonese request for aid, and appears to have had little to do with sectarian animosity. A northern geographical position coupled with the threatening presence of stronger neighbouring states, both Christian and Muslim, encouraged the kings of Aragon to establish early links with the aristocratic houses in southern France and with the papacy. A local disaster drove the Aragonese to make use of these close relations. In 1063 Ramiro I (1035-63) fatally misjudged the strength of the alliance forged five years earlier between Fernando of León-Castile and al-Muqtadir of Zaragoza by attacking the strategically important Zaragoza city of Graus. Strengthened by the arrival of five hundred Castilian reinforcements, the Muslim defenders routed the attacking army and killed the Aragonese king. In the aftermath of this defeat Ramiro's heir, Sancho I Ramírez (1063-1094), sought aid from his northern allies.¹³ Thus, far from being a precursor to crusade, the Barbastro campaign was a direct result of the political pragmatism of *convivencia*. Events during the campaign confirm this impression.

The actions of the visiting troops provide little indication that they were motivated by, or even aware of, any ideas of reconquest. Graus was the logical target for further Christian expansion in the Ribagorza region, a fact well known to both Aragonese and Leonese-Castilian monarchs. In the event, however, the northern army was directed against the less strategically significant city of Barbastro. Charles Bishko attributes this redirection to the political adroitness of King Fernando, who would otherwise have been placed in the invidious position of once again defending his Muslim ally, this time against not merely Aragonese but also French and Catalan troops.¹⁴ Yet the apparent ease with which the object of the campaign was switched also betrays the indifference of the foreign troops to any overall strategy of reconquest. This essentially mercenary attitude was again displayed in the aftermath of the siege. After massacring the surviving citizens the majority of the northern troops, laden with booty, turned for home. Their departure left the city fatally undermanned, and several months

¹³ For the Aragonese efforts to make use of external influence see Charles J. Bishko, 'Fernando I and the Origins of the Leonese-Castilian Alliance with Cluny', in C. J. Bishko, *Studies in Medieval Frontier History* (London: Variorum, 1980), II, pp. 65-7; see also above, p. 27, n. 34.

¹⁴ Bishko, 'Fernando I and the Origins', pp. 62-3.

later it fell to a vengeful Muslim army with great loss of life.¹⁵ Thus, the assault on Barbastro failed to make any great strategic impact on the Spanish frontier, largely because the foreign soldiers had little understanding or apparent interest in local political realities.

The capture of Barbastro brought little tangible benefit to the Spanish cause. Nevertheless, modern historians have pointed to the significance of the incident both in the development of the crusade itself, and for the transfer of crusading ideology to Spain.¹⁶ Yet serious doubt has recently been cast on those documents supposedly demonstrating that the papacy appointed leaders for the expedition and offered participants the type of spiritual benefits normally associated with crusade.¹⁷ Similarly too, any active role by the monks of Cluny in recruitment for the operation now seems highly unlikely.¹⁸ There was, however, a more subtle ecclesiastical impetus behind the participation of the foreign troops. This influence can best be detected in the differences in attitudes exhibited by visiting northerners and local Iberians.

During the assault on Barbastro the northern soldiers demonstrated deep cultural hostility toward non-Christians; Iberian troops displayed no comparable animosity. The massacre of the citizens of Barbastro left Muslim commentators shocked at the brutality of the victors toward the vanquished. Significantly though, the Iberian Catalans were also appalled by the behaviour of their comrades-in-arms. This widespread unease was reflected by a treaty concluded in 1069 between Sancho of Pamplona and al-Muqtadir of Zaragoza agreeing not to accept alliances with French or other foreign forces.¹⁹ The impression of undifferentiated cultural animosity among the visiting troops is confirmed by the papal bull Alexander II wrote to the bishops of Spain in 1065 acknowledging their efforts in protecting the local Jews from the violence of those journeying 'to fight against the Saracens.'²⁰ Thus, rather than providing an example of Latin Christian cultural permeation of the peninsula, the Barbastro campaign highlights the fundamental differences between popular Latin Christian and Iberian attitudes to the frontier.

¹⁵ Ferreiro, 'The siege of Barbastro', p. 141.

¹⁶ Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, pp. 288-90.

¹⁷ The first of these, the attribution of leadership to 'The commander of Rome', is now considered to be a translation error. Ferreiro, 'The siege of Barbastro', p. 131. The second, the 'Spanish' privilege of Alexander II promising remission of penance, cannot be definitively linked to the Barbastro campaign. Marcus Bull, *Knightly Piety*, pp. 72-6.

¹⁸ Ferreiro, 'The siege of Barbastro', pp. 131-2 Bishko, 'Fernando I and the Origins', pp. 53-68.

¹⁹ Ferreiro, 'The siege of Barbastro', pp. 140-1.

The year after the Barbastro campaign a long period of Spanish success came to an end with the death of Fernando I of León-Castile. The resulting partition of the kingdom between his three sons produced a decade of political instability. In this climate there was little attempt to extend Spanish territory southwards and little encouragement for Latin Christian forces to take an active role on the frontier. The reunification of Fernando's kingdom under Alfonso in 1073 brought a greater measure of stability to León-Castile, but did not lead to an immediate resumption of the southward expansion. During the same period, Latin Christendom also experienced an unsettled political climate due to rising conflict between the reform papacy and secular authorities; 1073 heralded further tension with the accession in Rome of an energetic new pontiff: Pope Gregory VII (1073-1085).

Gregory and his supporters consistently espoused the right of the Church to use military might in the pursuit of papal policy.²¹ While Gregory most often advocated such coercive action against enemies within Latin Christendom, he also encouraged contingents of troops to fight on his behalf in the east and in Iberia. His attempt to send aid to the Byzantines in 1074 pre-empted Pope Urban's declaration of crusade by two decades, but enjoyed little real success. Gregory's proposals did not attract widespread enthusiasm because the pope focused primarily on the potential advantages the papacy stood to gain from military adventures, rather than the benefits that might accrue to those who actually took part.²² The Iberian frontier presented a very different case. Popular enthusiasm for a peninsular campaign was not lacking, instead the expedition failed because of Gregory's own incomplete knowledge of the political situation in Spain.

Two of Pope Gregory's earliest letters, both dated 30 April 1073, dealt with a proposed expedition to Spain.²³ The initial arrangements for this enterprise were undertaken during the pontificate of Alexander II (1061-1073), but Gregory

²⁰ PL 146: 1386-7.

²¹ 'The Gregorians unanimously favoured a war of the Church, utilizing armed force for the sake of religion, whereas all the Imperial authors opposed it.' Erdmann, *Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, p. 264.

²² H. E. J. Cowdrey, 'Pope Gregory VII's 'Crusading' plans of 1074', in B. Z. Kedar, H. E. Mayer, and R. C. Smail (eds), *Outremer: Studies in the History of the Crusading Kingdom of Jerusalem Presented to Joshua Prawer* (Jerusalem, 1987), 27-40; repr. in H. E. J. Cowdrey, *Popes, Monks and Crusaders* (London: Hambledon Press, 1984). While Gregory offered potential recruits certain spiritual benefits, the nature and justification of these benefits remained uncertain. See Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The First Crusaders, 1095-1131* (Cambridge: UP, 1997), pp. 49-51, 66.

²³ *Das Register Gregors, VII*, ed. E. Caspar, *MGH Epistolae. Selectae*, 2nd ed., 4-5 (Berlin, 1955), I.6, I.7, pp. 8-21; H.E.J Cowdrey, *The Register of Pope Gregory VII, 1073-1085* (Oxford: UP, 2002), pp. 5-8.

enthusiastically embraced the operation as his own. Cardinal-Bishop Gerald of Ostia was replaced with Cardinal-Priest Hugh Candidus as legate who, in conjunction with Abbot Hugh of Cluny (1049-1109), was to encourage local knights to journey to Spain. A second papal bull was sent to any French barons contemplating campaigning beyond the Pyrenees. This letter made sweeping claims for papal authority in the peninsula through ancient right – no doubt the Donation of Constantine – although this is not specified. Count Ebles of Roucy, a French nobleman of uncertain reputation, was nominated as a papal operative who would hold any lands he managed to secure from Muslim control as a vassal of Saint Peter.²⁴ Pope Gregory also warned other nobles contemplating similar operations that if they wished for St Peter's blessing they must similarly pledge themselves to papal authority. Remarkably the pope made no mention whatsoever of the Spanish leaders in his plans.

The tone of these letters suggests there was a reasonable level of interest among ambitious French knights; Count Ebles had no apparent recruitment problems. Gregory's intentions in mandating this campaign are far less clear. Possibly he envisaged the creation of French enclaves on the Spanish march. Whatever hopes the pope may have harboured, in the end the campaign came to nothing. Sancho IV Garcés of Navarra responded to the threat of unwanted northern interlopers by concluding a defensive alliance with al-Muqtadir of Zaragoza in May 1073.²⁵ Fernando of León-Castile appears to have acted indirectly, for the ultimate failure of Ebles of Roucy's expedition has been attributed to the monks of Cluny taking a hand to protect Castilian interests.²⁶ Therefore, far from indicating any substantial early links between Latin Christendom and the Iberian peninsula, the clumsy attempt by Pope Gregory to encourage unwanted military intervention in Spain simply emphasised the papacy's extremely partial understanding of the actual situation in Spain, possibly as a result of a heavy reliance on Aragonese informants.

²⁴ Given the earlier association between Rome and the Aragonese royal house, this singling out of Ebles of Roucy is significant. Ebles' sister Felicia appears to have been married to the Aragonese king. Joseph F. O' Callaghan, 'The Integration of Christian Spain into Europe: The Role of Alfonso VI of Leon-Castile', in Reilly, *Santiago, Saint-Denis and Saint Peter*, p. 102. Abbot Suger of St Denis, *Vie de Louis VI le Gros*, ed. H. Waquet, 5 vols (Paris: Champion, 1964), p. 26, did not remember Ebles fondly: 'Qui quanto militiae agebatur exercitio (erat enim tantae magnanimitatis, ut aliquando cum exercitu magno, quod solos reges deceret, in Hispaniam proficisceretur) tanto insanior et rapacior his explendis depraedationibus, rapinis et omni malitiae insistebat.'

²⁵ Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, p. 80.

²⁶ Bishko, 'Fernando I and the Origins', pp. 54-6.

The impact of Latin Christian soldiery was felt most intensely in those northern and eastern regions of Spain most accessible to contingents from beyond the Pyrenees. Yet the western regions of Iberia also encountered a different, even more baneful, manifestation of European belligerence. Throughout the eleventh century the Galician and Portuguese coastlines were menaced by maritime raiders from the north. Major Norse raids were recorded in 1014, 1016 and several times between 1046 and 1066. One Norse leader became known as Ulf the Galician because of his incessant raiding in the region.²⁷ Yet the pernicious activities of these raiders did have some positive results. Centralised rule gradually spread to outlying areas as the need for defence gradually outweighed parochial pride. Moreover, these fleets were establishing sea-routes that would later be used by less ferocious navigators on mercantile rather than raiding expeditions.²⁸ Thus, with hindsight, these raids were the antecedents of a tradition of seafaring that would later be translated into mercantile or crusading expeditions embarking from the northern kingdoms bound for warmer Portuguese waters.

Instances of eleventh-century Latin Christian military operations in Iberia have attracted widespread attention from historians eager to relate such campaigns with the early development of the crusade. In reality, the few recorded contingents of foreign troops visiting Spain reveal the general lack of understanding or sympathy between northerners and Iberians. Yet these military actions, while in themselves of limited long-term significance, were but one manifestation of a more general Latin Christian cultural influence reaching into the peninsula. During this period there was a significant growth in communication between the Spanish monarchs and the great religious institutions of Latin Christendom. These strengthening contacts were to play a decisive role in the cultural realignment of the peninsula and, ultimately, in the political development of Portugal.

Early relations between Alfonso VI and the Latin Christian Church

Direct military intervention by northern troops into Iberia reinforced difference rather than cultural commonality. In contrast, the more subtle insinuation of Latin Christian

²⁷ Coelho, *Portugal na Espanha Árabe*, 2, pp. 107-24; Luís Saavedra Machado, *Biblos*, 9 (1933), 139-54, 378-95; Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 1, p. 66.

²⁸ Bailey W. Diffie, *Prelude to Empire: Portugal overseas before Henry the Navigator* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1960), pp. 7-8.

clergymen and ecclesiastical ideals was to bring widespread, fundamental change to Iberian life. Alfonso of León-Castile was attracted by many of the religious forms developing north of the Pyrenees. The monks of Cluny found early favour with the Leonese-Castilian monarch: in return for spiritual and political support the monks received massive financial tribute and lands in Spain. Throughout Alfonso's realm foreign clergymen were promoted to high ecclesiastical office and took the lead in instituting widespread liturgical, canonical and administrative reforms. This importation of novel religious practices was deeply distrusted by many Iberian Christians, but circumstances unique to Portugal made such religious novelty particularly unwelcome. Thus, many of the most sensational scenes of resistance were played out in the west of the peninsula.

The first known direct contact between Rome and the re-established Spanish church is an isolated document from the curia of Pope Clement II (1046-1047) to the monastery at Oña in May 1047. After a silence of some twenty years Cardinal Hugh Candidus visited the peninsula between 1063 and 1068 as the first known papal legate.²⁹ Oña lies within the territory of Aragon, and it was here too that the cardinal's activities were focused. The Aragonese kings Ramiro I (1035-1063) and Sancho I Ramirez (1063-94), proved receptive to papal influence, with contacts drawing ever closer until in 1068 Sancho Ramirez formally conferred his kingdom on St Peter and agreed to pay an annual tribute.³⁰ There is no indication that similar relations were entered into by their great rival, Fernando I of León-Castile (1037-1065).

Rather than compete with Aragonese efforts to win papal approval, Leonese-Castilian diplomatic initiatives were directed toward the great monastery at Cluny. Fernando was impressed by the monks' spiritual authority as well as by their ability to intervene directly in both the local politics of southern France and in policies emanating from Rome. Fernando's initially sporadic gifts of shares of booty won during successful campaigns eventually became formalised into an annual tribute. While the dating of this change is uncertain, the wealth gained by Fernando as a result of his protective alliance with al-Muqtadir of Zaragoza in 1058-9 is a likely cause.³¹ These policies may well

²⁹ Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, p. 96.

³⁰ Erdmann, *Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, pp. 216-7.

³¹ Bishko, 'Fernando I and the Origins', pp. 41-2. One contemporary recalled Fernando promising to grant 1000 maravedis annually for life. The motivation for this act of generosity was portrayed as personal piety and the source of largess the king's own income. *Historia Silense*, p. 62.

have borne fruit in 1063 when, much to Fernando's relief, the northern army summoned by Aragon was diverted away from Graus, and directed toward Barbastro.³²

After the death of Fernando I in 1065 the tribute paid to Cluny fell into abeyance. The monks were eager to recoup this financial loss and in the uncertainty following Fernando's death Abbot Hugh found an opportunity to strengthen Cluny's relations with Spain. The rising tension between Fernando's three sons was finally released at the battle of Golpejera in 1072. When Sancho emerged victorious, García was exiled to the Muslim city of Seville, while Alfonso found himself languishing in prison at Burgos. This situation provided the opportunity for outside agencies to intervene again in Spanish politics. Acting on his own initiative, Abbot Hugh interceded on Alfonso's behalf by petitioning Sancho to send his imprisoned brother into exile. Sancho grudgingly agreed, and in the winter of 1071 he allowed Alfonso to seek refuge in distant Toledo. Before the end of the year the abbot's efforts were well rewarded. Political fortunes in León-Castile changed dramatically with the unexpected death of King Sancho. Alfonso secured the crown before the end of November 1072. As reward for their earlier intercession on his behalf, Alfonso granted the Cluniacs four houses between 1073 and 1077: San Isidro de Dueñas, San Salvador de Palaz del Rey, Santiago de Astudillo, and San Juan de Hérmedes de Cerrato.³³ After 1077 the relationship between the monks of Cluny and the ruling house of León-Castile became even closer, primarily in response to papal policies.

Pope Gregory VII had come to the throne of St Peter in 1073 and immediately adopted a confrontational posture toward the Spanish kings. The pope's ill advised attempt to intervene directly in Spain through the agency of Ebles of Roucy drew an immediate and hostile reaction from the peninsular monarchs. De Roucy's expedition ultimately came to nothing, a failure that has been attributed to the monks of Cluny taking a hand to protect Leonese-Castilian interests. The summary replacement of the Cluniac Gerald of Ostia as papal legate with the pro-Aragonese Cardinal Hugh Candidus in 1073 suggests Gregory's doubts over the abbot's commitment to the expedition.³⁴

Despite the failure of his first intervention in Iberia, Gregory reiterated his claims directly to the Spanish leaders on 28 June 1077, advising them that St Peter's

³² See above, p. 51, n. 14.

³³ Bishko, 'Fernando I and the Origins', pp. 29-32.

³⁴ Bishko, 'Fernando I and the Origins', pp. 54-6; see above pp. 53-4.

long-neglected ancient rights must be restored through the payment of tribute and the acknowledgement of papal authority.³⁵ Alfonso of León-Castile responded by taking an increasingly forceful line of resistance. In 1077 the monarch aligned himself more closely to the monks at Cluny by recommencing payment of the tribute instituted by his father, Fernando. To demonstrate his commitment, Alfonso doubled the amount to the astronomical figure of two thousand gold dinars per annum.³⁶ In return for this generosity, the largest single benefaction the monks ever received, Cluny became a stalwart supporter of the Leonese-Castilian monarch's interests in Spain, France, and perhaps most importantly, in Rome. Alfonso further signalled his resistance to papal claims for authority in Spain by officially adopting the title of emperor in 1077. While the pope refused to acknowledge the title, beset as he was by threats closer to home, he found himself unable to challenge it.³⁷

The alliance between Alfonso and the monks of Cluny proved highly effective in thwarting papal attempts at direct control in the peninsula. Gregory tacitly acknowledged this by quietly shifting his ground. Rather than continuing to press for secular acknowledgement of papal authority, Gregory initiated a campaign to impose ecclesiastical conformity and obedience on the Spanish Church. In the pursuit of these new goals, old opponents could become effective allies. Alfonso and the monks of Cluny were willing to support such a campaign and so papal efforts met with far greater success.

The primary aim of Pope Gregory's programme was the imposition of the Roman liturgy on the Spanish church. The local Spanish religious forms have come to be known as the 'Mozarabic liturgy' a term which can sometimes obscure the actual situation. While the constant cultural pressure placed upon the Mozarabs tended to make them more defensive of their traditions, the liturgy itself was the ancient Hispanic rite shared by all Spanish Christians.³⁸ The suitability of this ancient liturgy had been raised during Hugh Candidus' first legatine mission in 1064-8. At that time the local clergy had sent several books to Rome, where they received the endorsement of

³⁵ *Das Register*, 4. 28, p. 343; *The Register*, pp. 242-5.

³⁶ *Recueil des chartes de l'abbaye de Cluny*, ed. A. Bruel, 6 vols (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1876-1903), 4, pp. 625-29.

³⁷ Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 98-104; O'Callaghan, 'The Integration of Christian Spain into Europe,' pp. 103-4.

³⁸ Gregory himself ordered the expunging of 'the Toledan or any other' non-Roman liturgy. *Das Register*, 1.64, pp. 93-4; *The Register*, p. 68.

Alexander II.³⁹ Gregory proved far less flexible on this issue. The pope began his campaign in March 1074 by praising the king of Aragon for his success in imposing the Roman liturgy throughout his realm, further letters petitioned the kings of Navarre and León-Castile to do likewise.⁴⁰ For his part, Alfonso appeared personally willing to comply. An anonymous monk in Burgos recorded that the Leonese-castilian monarch attempted to have the rite more generally accepted by arranging a judicial duel. In a detail that warns against ethnic generalising, the Castilian knight defending the local liturgy triumphed over the Mozarabic champion of Roman novelty. Undeterred, Alfonso ordered an ordeal by fire. When the Mozarabic books survived he kicked them back into the flames while shouting in true autocratic style: 'The horns of the law must bend to the will of kings!'⁴¹

The papal campaign for acceptance of the Roman liturgy came to a climax in 1080 when the legate, Cardinal Richard of St Victor in Marseilles, convened the council of Burgos. At this gathering King Alfonso finally agreed to enforce the rite throughout his territories.⁴² This policy provoked considerable resistance, and in a letter to his most stalwart ally, Abbot Hugh of Cluny, Alfonso bemoaned the desolation the change had cast over the people.⁴³ In some regions older forms of liturgy were maintained with tacit or even overt official approval.⁴⁴ Portugal, with its large Mozarabic population and ancient tradition of ecclesiastical pre-eminence, was one region where this resistance was strongly maintained. Thus, the push for religious conformity had the unanticipated effect of exciting local feelings of parochial solidarity.

The leading religious centre in Portugal was Braga, an ancient city with a glowing history of intellectual and ecclesiastical achievement. The see of Braga was refounded in 1070-1 under the leadership of Bishop Pedro (1070/1-1091). Bishop Pedro was strongly opposed to the new forms of liturgy. His personal documents were written in Visigothic script and throughout his incumbency they betrayed no Carolingian influence. He also maintained traditional forms of worship and ecclesiastical

³⁹ Ramón Gonzálves, 'The Persistence of the Mozarabic liturgy in Toledo after 1080', in Reilly (ed.), *Santiago, Saint-Denis and Saint Peter*, pp. 160-1.

⁴⁰ *Das Register*, 1.63-4 p. 91-4; *The Register*, pp. 66-9.

⁴¹ 'ad libitum regum fletantur cornua legum.' *Chronica Naierensis*, ed. J. A. Estévez Sola, in *Chronica Hispana Saeculi XII*, CCCM, 71A (Turnhout, 1995), III. 18, p. 177; *Alfonso VI*, pp. 98-102; O'Callaghan, 'The integration of Christian Spain', pp. 107-8.

⁴² Pelayo of Oviedo, *Chronicon Regum Legionensium*, p. 84, n. 67. For the dating of the council H. E. J. Cowdrey, *The Cluniacs and the Gregorian Reform* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. 237-8.

⁴³ *Recueil des chartes... de Cluny*, 4, pp. 551-3.

⁴⁴ Gonzálves, 'The Persistence of the Mozarabic liturgy', pp. 157-79.

organisation. His successor, Bishop Gerald (1096-1108), was obliged to write to Rome inquiring whether church officials ordained 'following the Toledan manner' were valid. Pope Pascal II (1100-1108) allowed the ordinations to stand. In subsequent years, after the new forms of worship had been accepted, Bragan clergymen wrote critically of their first bishop's conservatism.⁴⁵

Even as Bishop Pedro fought his rearguard action against unwanted ecclesiastical innovation, other Portuguese clergymen were also experiencing unsettled times. The see of Coimbra lacked the glittering historical pedigree of Braga; its foundation had been the result of local enthusiasm in a frontier district. Given the large Mozarabic population, including the local governor Sisnando Davídes, it is not surprising that the first known bishop was also a Mozarab, Paternus (1078-1088). Little is known about the tenor of his rule, but the final reference to the bishop – his leaving to undertake an indefinite pilgrimage to the Holy Land – does not suggest success.⁴⁶ Bishop Paternus' replacement, Martín, has been identified as prior of the cathedral chapter and a protégé of Sisnando.⁴⁷ A dispute of uncertain cause seems to have arisen, with Martín never appearing in documents as other than a bishop-elect. Although there has been a tendency among scholars to down-play the depth of feeling this imposition of foreign novelty aroused among the Mozarabic population, the delay in appointing Martín may well reflect the struggle between Roman and Mozarabic liturgical rites.⁴⁸ Certainly it was only after the death of Sisnando in 1091 that Alfonso felt able to impose his own choice, Cresconio, the former abbot of Saint Bartholomew of Túy, on the church at Coimbra.⁴⁹

The imposition of an unpopular liturgy provoked great unrest among both laity and clergy in Portugal; yet there was another aspect of Latin Christian ecclesiastical intrusion which, if less culturally unsettling, was to create more sensational and longer-lasting discord. In addition to the imposition of the Roman liturgy, Alfonso of León-Castile and the papacy found common cause in seeking to reorganise the ecclesiastical hierarchy in the peninsula. The reform of Church administration furthered royal policies

⁴⁵ Avelino de Jesus da Costa, *O Bispo D. Pedro e a Organização da Diocese de Braga*, 2 vols (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, 1959), 1, pp. 36-42. For Pope Pascal's bull on the ordinations 'secundum Toletanum morem', PP, p. 161.

⁴⁶ Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, p. 199; PMH, *Diplomata et chartae*, pp. 340-1; 419-20.

⁴⁷ Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, p. 237.

⁴⁸ Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 101-3 tends to minimise the depth of Mozarabic feeling. Linehan, *History and the Historians*, takes a contrary view, pp. 218-20.

⁴⁹ PMH, *Diplomata et chartae*, pp. 485-6.

of centralisation while also following papal ideals of institutional propriety. This policy had unsettling implications for a Bragan clergy jealous of their ancient dignity. Frustrated ambition eventually goaded clergymen to circumvent both king and pope, with disastrous results.

On his return to power in 1072 Alfonso VI of León-Castile had confirmed Bishop Pedro of Braga as the leading ecclesiastic in western Iberia. This reinforcement of his newly-won position encouraged the bishop to seek even greater preferment. Prior to the Arabic invasion of 711 Braga had been one of Spain's five metropolitan cities. The other four – Tarragona, Toledo, Mérida, and Seville – remained under Muslim control. This being the case, the bishop of Braga clearly believed he was justified claiming overall authority within the peninsula. In early documents issued at Braga, phrases such as *cathedre Bracarensis metropolitanae* and *baselica metropolitana* occasionally appear.⁵⁰ While such pretensions received no outside recognition, they signalled the direction of Pedro's ambition. Unfortunately for Bragan hopes, while Alfonso also desired the elevation of an archbishop within his realm, he favoured a more central location. As a result, the king refused to support Pedro's attempts to advance his see. Such treatment excited a rising level of dissatisfaction among many Portuguese clergymen.

Clerical unrest at Alfonso's ecclesiastical policies may have been a contributing factor in the remarkable action of Bishop João II of Oporto. In 1083 Pope Gregory's long struggle against Emperor Henry IV reached a crisis point when the German ruler finally tired of negotiation. He seized Rome, deposed Gregory, and installed Clement III (1080-1100) as pope. Until then João of Oporto had been one of Gregory's closest advisors, but at this critical juncture he defected to Clement's camp, taking with him a dozen other cardinals.⁵¹ While the reasons for this action are unclear, João's own experiences in Oporto may have been a contributing factor in his disillusionment with the reform papacy's cause; the crisis also brought Portugal to the attention of the imperial court.⁵² Gregory responded by dispatching the papal legate Abbot Jarento of

⁵⁰ Carl Erdmann, *Das Papsttum und Portugal im ersten Jahrhundert der portugiesischen Geschichte* (Berlin: Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Klasse Nr. 5, 1928); trans. by J. da Providência Costa as, *O Papado e Portugal no Primeiro Século da História Portuguesa* (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, 1935), p. 7, n. 1.

⁵¹ Cowdrey, *Pope Gregory*, pp. 228-32.

⁵² MGH, *Diplomatum regum et imperatorum Germaniae, Heinrici IV diplomata*, ed. D. v. Gladiss, 3 vols (Weimar, 1952-78), 2, no. 453, pp. 611-2.

Saint-Bénigne with letters for the royal governor, Sisnando Davides.⁵³ Unfortunately the contents of the letters are unknown.

This crisis provoked by Bishop João's defection did nothing to further Bishop Pedro's campaign for recognition of Braga's ancient prestige, but a worse blow came only two years later. In 1085 Alfonso captured Toledo, ending Braga's valuable distinction of being the sole ancient metropolitan in Christian hands. The newly installed Bishop Bernard of Toledo (1086-1124/5), a Cluniac, was firmly of the opinion that any Spanish primacy should be held by Toledo. By 1088 Bernard's new position was secure enough for him to pursue his purpose in Rome. He received a sympathetic hearing from Pope Urban II (1088-1099), who was also a former monk of Cluny. The resulting papal bull, *Cunctis sanctorum*, formally established the archbishop of Toledo as the primate of all Spain, enjoying extensive, loosely defined rights and privileges. Bernard's complete success during his visit to Rome in 1088 was bitter news to Bishop Pedro.⁵⁴ Nevertheless the redoubtable bishop of Braga remained unwilling to relinquish his perceived rights without a struggle.

In 1090 the legate Cardinal Ranier, future Pope Pascal II, assembled a court in León to discuss outstanding ecclesiastical business. Pedro may have seized the opportunity to demand the restitution of Braga's ancient pre-eminence. If so, his efforts were once again to no avail.⁵⁵ This continuing failure to achieve satisfaction proved too much for Pedro's wounded pride, and he came to the same decision Bishop João of Oporto had reached almost two decades earlier. In 1091 Pedro took his case to the imperial pope, Clement III. Clement immediately acceded to his requests and restored Bragan independence. Pedro's rash action was to prove a hollow victory. The majority of the Spanish clergy united in opposition to the bishop of Braga, and Alfonso quickly forced him into monastic retirement. His replacement was Gerard, a former monk of Moissac and close associate of Bernard of Toledo.⁵⁶ Bernard's appearance in Braga on 28 August 1092 to consecrate the new cathedral was a signal that, for the time being, the struggle for the restitution of ancient Bragan rights was over.⁵⁷

The strongest and most important initial contact between the monarchs of León-Castile and the Latin Christian Church was through the monks of Cluny; early relations

⁵³ Hugh de Flavigny, MGH SS, 8, p. 463.

⁵⁴ JL 5366; PL 151: 288; Fletcher, *Saint James's Catapult*, p. 47.

⁵⁵ Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, pp. 12-3.

⁵⁶ *Vita sancti Geraldi archiepiscopi Bracarenensis*, in PMH SS, pp. 53-4.

with the papacy were far more strained. Papal claims for secular authority were successfully opposed by Alfonso, and if the Spanish monarch was willing to support Pope Gregory's demands for the removal of the Visigothic liturgy, he was also prepared to manipulate papal preoccupation with liturgical conformity when his own interests required it. Alfonso and Gregory found a common interest in centralising Spanish ecclesiastical administration, and to this end were able to cooperate effectively. Nevertheless, Alfonso was careful to influence the resulting reorganisation in accordance with his own future plans. These reforms also had a significant impact on the wider Spanish population. Many Iberian people resented change, and local disenchantment with central government could easily be transformed into a local sense of solidarity. This was particularly true in Portugal, where Alfonso's use of Latin Christian religious novelty to promote political centralisation had the unintended corollary of consolidating regional identity.

Alfonso VI and the aristocratic families of southern France

Even as Alfonso's relations with the Latin Christian Church improved, the Leonese-Castilian monarch began to recognise the advantage of closer links with aristocratic families outside Iberia. The resulting policy of royal engagement with the southern French nobility would have dramatic long-term implications for Portugal. The final decades of the eleventh century saw a changing situation on the frontier. The Christian capture of Toledo on 25 May 1085 provoked a strong Muslim response, and in the years immediately afterwards Spanish armies suffered a series of disastrous setbacks. As the strategic situation deteriorated, Latin Christian military intervention, which had once been an unwelcome and unreliable force, began to be more actively solicited by Iberian leaders. As a result of these quickening relations increasing numbers of Latin Christian knights began to journey to Spain; many of them saw great advantages in choosing to stay. Among these immigrant knights was Henry of Burgundy, the future count of Portugal.

⁵⁷ Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, p. 238.

The capture of Toledo in 1085 was to have a dramatic effect on all spheres of political and cultural life in Spain.⁵⁸ The most immediate result was the provocation it offered to the Muslim world. The Almoravids of North Africa used the loss of Toledo to justify their intervention into Andalusi affairs. The arrival in the peninsula of an army professing the more fundamentalist Almoravid expression of Islamic faith swung the balance of power against the Christians. Although Alfonso seemed to have initially treated the appearance of the Almoravids with a certain insouciance, this was to change when the Castilian army was scattered by the combined Almoravid-Andalusi army at Zalaca in 1086. The king barely escaped the rout with his life.⁵⁹ News of the destruction of the army reverberated through Spain and was heard even beyond the Pyrenees. While claims that a panic-stricken Alfonso threatened to convert to Islam unless immediate assistance was forthcoming are certainly fabulous, there are more reliable expressions of widespread dismay at the Spanish losses.⁶⁰ Both the monks of Cluny and the new pope Victor III (1086-1087) roused themselves to impassioned appeals for aid from the knighthood of Christendom. They found many receptive listeners. Once again, however, the attitudes of the Latin Christian knights can be seen to differ quite markedly from those of their Spanish hosts.

Some of the knights who journeyed southwards with these relief forces left testament to their motivation in charters. In some respects these statements resemble those later expressed by crusaders. Hugh IV of Lusignan, who did in fact join the First Crusade, formally put his earthly affairs in order because he was 'about to go to Spain against the Saracens'. In an acknowledgement of his pious intent the clergy undertook to safeguard the arrangements he made. Another knight recorded his sense of defending fellow Christians by stating 'the Saracens invaded Spain against us.'⁶¹ By the spring of 1087 Duke Eudes I of Burgundy and William the Carpenter of Mélnun had mustered a substantial army for a campaign in Spain. Yet by the time the army was actually in the field the situation in Iberia had already changed.

⁵⁸ The significance of the capture of Toledo was recognised by contemporaries. For a recent consideration of the several accounts of the campaign see Linehan, *History and the Historians*, pp. 204-45.

⁵⁹ Abd Allāh, *The Tibyān*, pp. 116-7 provides a reliable eye-witness account from the Muslim side. For general description of the campaign see Wheeler, 'The Reconquest in Spain before 1095', pp. 78-80.

⁶⁰ Rumours of Spanish panic are recorded by 'Historiae Francicae Fragmentum', in *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France*, ed. M. Bouquet and L. Delisle, 24 vols (Paris, 1840-1904), 12, p. 2; and Hugh of Fleury, *Opera historica*, MGH SS, 9, p. 390.

⁶¹ Bull, *Knightly Piety*, pp. 83-4.

Although after the disaster of Zalaca the outlook for the Spanish kingdoms appeared perilous indeed, the immediate threat soon receded. Due to the questionable loyalty of their half-hearted Andalusí allies, the Almoravids were unable to capitalise on their victory and they returned in disgust to Africa before the end of 1086. In the absence of this unifying force, the fragile alliance of *taifa* leaders rapidly broke down. Alfonso moved eagerly to exploit this fragmentation, but his strategy was placed in serious jeopardy by the imminent arrival of a host of foreign belligerents. In order not to upset Alfonso's diplomatic initiatives the newcomers were persuaded to attack the strategically unimportant Zaragoza stronghold of Tudela. After some desultory siege-work the army dispersed northwards in April 1087.⁶² Once again northern expeditions, even when well-intentioned and guaranteed at least some measure of local support, proved themselves unable to accomplish lasting results amid the shifts and complexities of Iberian power politics.

Many aspects of this military expedition echo the earlier attack on Barbastro and the abortive campaign of Ebles of Roucy, but there were some significant differences. Unlike earlier examples of foreign military intervention, the army in 1087 had been invited by Alfonso. More importantly, the leaders of the army were not land-hungry knights or disreputable adventurers, but respected members of noble houses who were linked by friendship and marriage to the royal family of León-Castile. The expedition therefore, while not a military success, was a triumph of a policy Alfonso had developed, in consultation with Cluny, over at least two decades.

The bedrock of Alfonso's foreign relations was, to use Bernard Reilly's phrase, 'serial monogamy.'⁶³ Alfonso's first wife, Inés, was the daughter of Duke William III of Aquitaine. Duke William maintained close relations with Cluny, and had knowledge of the Spanish situation gained during the expedition to Barbastro in 1064. The betrothal appears to have occurred in 1069, with the actual marriage taking place in 1073 or 1074. Representatives of Cluny probably assisted in the arrangement, meeting with Alfonso at Burgos at the same time they received the Leonese monastery of San Isidoro.⁶⁴ Unfortunately this marriage was not to prove a successful one, with the lack of an heir leading Alfonso to repudiate Inés some time after 1077.

⁶² Boissonnade, *Du nouveau sur la Chanson de Roland*, pp. 33-5.

⁶³ Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, p. 73; The royal spouses are listed by Bishop Pelayo, *Chronicon*, pp. 87-8.

⁶⁴ Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 79-80.

Alfonso's choice for his second wife drew him even more firmly into the web of alliances involving both Cluny and the French noble houses. In 1078 Duke Hugh I of Burgundy campaigned in Spain, and so became aware of Alfonso's situation.⁶⁵ His relationship with Cluny was closer even than that of William of Aquitaine, for he was Abbot Hugh's cousin.⁶⁶ Constance, the sister of both Eudes and Hugh of Burgundy, was married to Alfonso before the end of the year. This arrangement provoked a storm of protest from Pope Gregory, but he allowed himself to be persuaded in return for promises concerning his over-riding interest, the abolition of Visigothic liturgy in the kingdom.⁶⁷ As a result of these negotiations relations between León-Castile and Burgundy were greatly enhanced.

An important corollary of these marital arrangements was that military expeditions from the north were brought increasingly under Alfonso's control. As Marcus Bull concludes:

As far as the peninsular rulers were concerned, foreign marriages created opportunities to summon, and no less importantly, to limit military aid from France. Their policy made sense if they wished simply to create the potential for occasional, moderately sized expeditions disciplined by the control of relatives and compatible with the pursuit of their own peninsular policies.⁶⁸

The benefits of this policy became clear in the uncertain times following the capture of Toledo. The most powerful leaders of the 1087 relief expedition were magnates related to the royal house. Yet the significance of these links went beyond the occasional provision of small bands of disciplined troops. Through the contacts built up during this period Alfonso was able to recruit suitable candidates for high secular office in Spain. This use of Cluniac and Burgundian influence was to prove decisive in the formation of the county of Portugal.

When Alfonso assumed authority over the former kingdom of his brother García in 1073 he made few immediate administrative changes. The governorship of the region

⁶⁵ Boissonnade, *Du nouveau sur la Chanson de Roland*, pp. 30-1.

⁶⁶ Indeed, to the considerable discomfiture of Pope Gregory, Hugh subsequently retired to the monastery, allowing his brother Eudes I to assume authority in his place. *Das Register*, 6. 17, pp. 423-5; *The Register*, p. 298.

⁶⁷ Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 106-16; Cowdrey, *Gregory VII*, p. 477. Pope Gregory was uneasy on canonical grounds due to the close relationship between Alfonso's first and second wives.

was granted to the local Mozarabic magnate, Sisnando Davídes.⁶⁹ Sisnando discharged his duties efficiently, with the southern frontier remaining stable throughout his term of government. Alfonso was clearly satisfied with his subordinate's efforts, for he subsequently invested major trust in Sisnando by appointing him governor of Toledo for a time after its capture.⁷⁰ When Sisnando died at Coimbra in August 1091 there was a widespread expectation that his son-in-law, Martín Moniz, would succeed him.⁷¹ Unfortunately for Muñoz, political machinations in the distant royal court intervened.

Perhaps the most pressing internal question during the second half of Alfonso's reign was that of the succession. Despite the Leonese-Castilian monarch's two marriages and many extra-marital relationships he had fathered only one legitimate daughter. This presented an opportunity ambitious northern nobles could not ignore. After the disaster at Zalaca the Duke of Burgundy had come south to assist Alfonso; for much of 1087 he languished outside Tudela undertaking a fruitless siege. Not prepared to return home empty-handed, he took the opportunity to arrange the betrothal of his cousin, Raymond of Burgundy, to Alfonso's sole legitimate heir, Urraca. As dowry Raymond accepted the regions of Galicia and Portugal combined into a new county.⁷²

When this arrangement became widely known in Galicia it sparked revolt. Incensed by the tacit recognition of Raymond as the heir to the throne, Bishop Peláez of Compostela incited rebellion among the local magnates. The extent of the revolt is difficult to gauge, but it may have been no coincidence that the Mozarabic bishop of Coimbra was ushered on his way to the Holy Land shortly after royal control was restored. The likely aim of the rebellion was to free Alfonso's brother García, the previous king of Portugal-Galicia, from imprisonment. It was a desperate hope. Despite claims that they enjoyed English support, when local assistance was not forthcoming the insurrection was doomed. Two years later the still imprisoned García died, making future rebellion much less likely.⁷³

⁶⁸ Bull, *Knightly Piety*, p. 89.

⁶⁹ Emilio García Gómez and Ramón Menéndez Pidal, 'El conde mozárabe Sisnando Davídiz y la política de Alfonso VI con los Taifas', *Al-Andalus*, 12 (1947), pp. 35-48. Sisnando's first appearance in the Portuguese documentary record is dated 1 May 1070. PMH *Diplomata et chartae*, p. 303.

⁷⁰ Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, p. 173.

⁷¹ José Mattoso, 'A nobreza Portucalense dos séculos IX a XI', in J. Mattoso, *A Nobreza Medieval Portuguesa*, pp. 264-5.

⁷² Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 196-8. Reilly notes the difficulty in dating this document with any certainty, a problem also noted by Damião Peres, *Como Nasceu Portugal*, 7th ed. (Oporto: Vertente, 1970), pp. 58-60.

⁷³ Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 195-201.

Raymond's good fortune continued. The Muslim ruler of Badajoz, al-Mutawakkil, distrusted the intentions of the Almoravids and sought the reassurance of an alliance with León-Castile. Alfonso's price was high: the ceding of Lisbon, Sintra and Santarém into Christian hands. A measure of al-Mutawakkil's unease is that he accepted such terms, despite the uproar this provoked among his own subjects. In April and May 1093 the cities were passed into Leonese-Castilian control. When this territory was added to Raymond's county he became the second most influential figure in the kingdom.⁷⁴ By the final decade of the eleventh century the ascendancy of the Burgundians in the Leonese-Castilian court had reached its zenith. Alfonso's queen, his heir, his leading ecclesiastic, all were closely linked to Cluny and the Dukes of Burgundy. Yet at the point of their greatest influence, this faction – for so it can justly be called – met a series of setbacks. These reverses brought Raymond's cousin Henry to prominence.

Unfortunately the documents bearing on Henry of Burgundy's rise to power are fragmentary and open to wide interpretation. Moreover many of the conclusions drawn from them have been heavily influenced by national pride. Despite – or perhaps in response to – al-Mutawakkil's new alliance, the Almoravids launched a surprise attack on Badajoz in 1094. The attack was a complete success, but in the aftermath the unfortunate al-Mutawakkil was murdered along with his sons.⁷⁵ The Almoravid leader, Sirr, followed up his advantage by attacking into Portugal. A defending army led by Raymond was out-manoeuvred near Lisbon and driven back with heavy casualties. The three cities newly ceded by al-Mutawakkil were then recaptured by the Almoravids.⁷⁶

Past Portuguese historians have portrayed Raymond's military discomfiture as the beginning of his fall from grace. Under this interpretation, when Alfonso learned of this disaster he lost faith in his son-in-law's ability to defend against the Almoravid threat, and began looking for a more suitable field commander. The man chosen was Raymond's cousin, Henry of Burgundy. To induce Henry to take on the task, Alfonso offered the hand of his illegitimate daughter, Teresa, in marriage. Raymond's unwieldy county was divided into Galician and Portuguese sections, with the more dangerous

⁷⁴ Pierre David, 'Annales Portugalensis Veteres', in *Études historiques sur la Galice et le Portugal du VI^e au XII^e siècle* (Paris: Livraria Portugalia Editora, 1947), pp. 300-1, 305 [APV]. Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 238-9.

⁷⁵ Hugh Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal. A Political History of al-Andalus* (London: Longman, 1996), p. 164; Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 238-9, 242.

⁷⁶ APV, pp. 301-2; Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 74-5.

southern portion granted to Henry on terms that as compensation were particularly generous. Unlike Raymond, Henry proved equal to the challenge posed by the Almoravids and was able to secure the frontier against further incursion.⁷⁷

This explanation of events has proved very satisfying to Portuguese pride: Raymond was, after all, the ancestor of the Spanish royal house, while Henry founded the line of Portuguese kings. Yet two events that occurred in León-Castile prior to the Almoravid attack on Badajoz cast Alfonso's division of Raymond's territory and the appointment of Henry to govern Portugal in a completely different light. Some time in 1093, probably between July and October, Raymond lost his most influential court ally with the death of his aunt, Queen Constance.⁷⁸ At approximately the same time, possibly 13 September, Alfonso's concubine Zaida, the daughter of his one-time ally al-Mu'tamid of Seville, gave birth to a son, Sancho Alfónsez.⁷⁹

Alfonso was eager to see his natural son succeed him, yet for Sancho to claim the throne, other contenders had to be neutralised. The greatest obstacle between Alfonso's son Sancho and the throne was the claim of Count Raymond through his wife – a claim that could easily attract the support of the Latin Christian influence at court. The Burgundian party, which had been so constant an asset to the king, now became a threat to his new goal. In 1094, the year after Sancho's birth, the king's third marriage was arranged; his new wife, Berta, was Italian. This choice marked a significant shift in policy away from Burgundy.⁸⁰ In order to further weaken the Burgundian faction, a logical gambit from the politically adroit king would be to divide his opponents by pitting Henry and Raymond against each other. Seen in this light, the decision to divide Raymond's county becomes an action not of disappointment or anger, but rather of high politics.⁸¹

⁷⁷ This portrayal is forcefully presented in Peres, *Como Nasceu Portugal*, pp. 61-70. See also T. de Sousa Soares, 'Carácter e limites do condado Portugalense (1096-1128),' in *Papel das Áreas Regionais na Formação Histórica de Portugal* (Lisbon: Academia Portuguesa de História, 1975), 9-21.

⁷⁸ For this dating see Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 240-1.

⁷⁹ Pelayo of Oviedo, *Chronicon*, p. 88; Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 234-5, 338-40.

⁸⁰ Pelayo of Oviedo, *Chronicon*, p. 87, n. 85; Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 247-9.

⁸¹ Bernard F. Reilly, *The Kingdom of León-Castilla under Queen Urraca, 1109-1126* (Princeton: UP, 1982), p. 26, n. 55, and p. 38, n. 78, dates the document known as the 'pacto successorio' to 1093-7 and includes it in his discussion of this period. The *pacto*, an agreement between Henry and Raymond mediated by the monks of Cluny, has provoked a good deal of scholarly controversy. Charles J. Bishko, 'Additional Note IX', in C. J. Bishko, *Spanish and Portuguese Monastic History, 600-1300* (London: Variorum, 1984), p. 190A considers Reilly's dating to be too early and suggests 1106-7. In addition to the careful comparison of documents given by Bishko, the tone of the document suggests a certain desperation on the part of the monks that seems more in keeping with the later date. See below, p. 91.

The growth of relations between the Iberian frontier kingdoms and Latin Christian society during the eleventh century was a gradual, often painful process. Direct Latin Christian military and political intervention in Iberian affairs was hampered both by European ignorance of the situation in Spain and the sharp resistance to such intervention from the Spanish themselves. Yet over time the Spanish kings began to recognise the potential advantages in a careful embrace of some aspects of Latin Christian culture. Through adept choice of policy, Alfonso of León-Castile was able to mediate the demands of the Latin Christian Church and the expansionist southern French nobility to his own advantage. For the population of western Iberia, however, this policy was to cause deep unrest and fundamental change. For reasons specific to the region, ecclesiastical reforms were unusually traumatic for the Portuguese people. At the same time the tensions created by the Burgundian influence in a distant royal court caused Count Henry, an unfamiliar foreign knight, to be given authority over them. Few areas of Iberia were as deeply unsettled by the early phases of the Latin Christian cultural permeation as Portugal. Yet political stability would prove elusive. As the eleventh century came to an end, a rising tide of civil disorder threatened to engulf all the Spanish kingdoms.

Chapter Three

A loss of momentum: Latin Christian expansion in a changing Iberia (1095-1121)

Alfonso VI of León-Castile (1065-1109) promoted an extensive transfer of Latin Christian culture into the Iberian peninsula. One unanticipated result of this policy was the establishment of the county of Portugal under the authority of the immigrant knight Henry of Burgundy. Yet even as Henry took up his responsibilities in Portugal, the forces that had carried him into power were flagging. One reason for the dwindling of Latin Christian influence in Iberia was the declaration of the First Crusade in 1095. The fervour generated by the crusade was directed toward the Holy Land, drawing potential support away from the Iberian frontier. Subsequent efforts by the Latin Church to extend the ethos of the crusade to peninsula warfare enjoyed only partial success. The effects of this eastward shift of European attention were compounded by a deteriorating political situation in Iberia following the death of Alfonso VI in 1109. The transfer of Latin culture relied heavily on the support of local leaders, but as the Spanish kingdoms moved inexorably toward civil war, Iberians became preoccupied with regional affairs. Those Latin Christians already resident in the peninsula, Henry the Burgundian among them, found their own positions becoming increasingly dictated by purely Iberian factors.

Although the end of the eleventh century was a period of considerable social turmoil in the Iberian Christian kingdoms, important documentary source material continued to be produced. The most significant narrative sources for events in the west of the peninsula remain the *Historia Compostellana* and the *Chronica Gothorum*.¹ Official documents were also drawn up in great numbers. Given the political uncertainty of this period, the signature lists from official documents can prove particularly useful for establishing the whereabouts of leading secular and ecclesiastical figures, allowing stronger inferences to be drawn concerning their activities and the

¹ *Historia Compostellana*, ed. E. Falque Rey, CCCM 70 (Turnhout, 1988) [HC]. Versions of the *Chronica Gothorum* can be found in PMH SS, pp. 5-17 and more recently 'Annales Portugalenses

relationships between them.² Unfortunately the charter material from Portugal is fragmentary, particularly during the early years of Henry the Burgundian's administration. Moreover many of the most important documents are undated, allowing widely divergent interpretations of their significance.³

The early years of the twelfth century saw a sudden increase in the production of historical narrative in many areas of Latin Christendom. One impetus for this surge in literary effort was the declaration and eventual triumph of the First Crusade.⁴ Chroniclers of the crusade focused their attention on the expedition to Jerusalem, and their writings contain only occasional, incidental references to the Iberian frontier. Moreover, with little direct Spanish participation in the early stages of the crusade, the resulting historiographical boom largely passed Iberia by.⁵ Nevertheless, even though accounts of the crusade include few references to Spanish kingdoms or people, they do describe an important trend in Latin Christian thinking that would later prove decisive in relations between Europe and Iberia. Yet the first impact of these ideas in Iberia was muted by local circumstances.

Modern scholars have directed a good deal of attention to developments in the western regions of the peninsula during the first decades of the twelfth century. The Leonese-Castilian monarchy has been meticulously examined in Bernard F. Reilly's biographies of Alfonso IV (1065-1109) and Queen Urraca (1109-1126).⁶ More specific areas of Iberian religious and secular life have also received attention in several important studies.⁷ Although these studies have focused on León and Castile, events in

Veteres', in P. David, *Études historiques sur la Galice et le Portugal du VI^e au XII^e siècle* (Lisbon: Livraria Portugalia Editoria, 1947), 257-340 [APV].

² Possible approaches to such charters, with an emphasis on the use of signature lists to trace the whereabouts of leading figures, are considered by Bernard F. Reilly, 'The Court Bishops of Alfonso VII of León-Castilla, 1147-1157', *Mediaeval Studies*, 36 (1974), 67-75.

³ For a discussion of the procedures for record keeping in the county of Portugal, DMP, 1, pp. xvii-lx.

⁴ The commentary on the sources for the first crusade is extensive. Seminal is A. C. Krey, *The First Crusade. The Accounts of Eyewitnesses and Participants* (Princeton: UP, 1921); more recently Jonathan Phillips (ed.), *The First Crusade: Origins and Impact* (Manchester: UP, 1997) and Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The First Crusaders, 1095-1131* (Cambridge: UP, 1997).

⁵ This was even more the case in Portugal. No mention is made of the declaration of the crusade or the capture of Jerusalem in the early Portuguese chronicles gathered together by Pierre David, APV, 257-340.

⁶ Bernard F. Reilly, *The Kingdom of León-Castilla under Queen Urraca, 1109-1126* (Princeton: UP, 1982), and *The Kingdom of León-Castilla under Alfonso VI, 1065-1109* (Princeton: UP, 1988).

⁷ In addition to the studies previously noted, see Richard Fletcher, *The Episcopate in the Kingdom of León in the Twelfth Century* (Oxford: UP, 1978); and by the same author *Saint James's Catapult: The Life and times of Diego Gelmírez of Santiago de Compostela* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); and Simon Barton, *The Aristocracy in Twelfth-Century León and Castile* (Cambridge: UP, 1997). Also, more generally, Peter Linehan, 'Spain in the Twelfth Century', in *The New Cambridge Medieval History IV* (forthcoming, scheduled February 2004).

Portugal are also touched upon when they impacted on wider regional developments. Less work has been directed specifically at the situation within Portugal; this has remained the purview of Portuguese historians, and no major monograph tracing social developments in the far west has yet been completed.⁸

What was the impact of the crusade on Iberian society? In fact the question has several distinct facets. Firstly, to what degree was crusading ideology transferred into the peninsula; and secondly, did wider populations, both Iberian and Latin Christian, see such a transfer as justifiable? These problems must be approached by considering the nature of crusade itself, although at the outset such a consideration produces only more questions. The origins of the crusading movement are in many respects uncertain, but have traditionally been traced to the council of Clermont in November 1095. At the close of this council Pope Urban preached a stirring sermon in which he asked the soldiery of Latin Christendom to undertake an armed expedition to the East, promising those who did so the spiritual benefits usually associated with penitential pilgrimage. Urban appears to have been offering his audience a radically new form of spiritual endeavour in which ecclesiastical theories of holy war were fused with the popularly accepted concept of pilgrimage.⁹ The details of the relationship and relative significance of the two distinct facets of the 'crusading formula' have been debated by generations of scholars, but the ramifications of this debate on the potential impact of the crusade in Iberia have not always been recognised. Yet the willingness of medieval peoples to accept holy war as a facet of the crusade was in fact also the extent to which the crusade could be effectively applied to the Spanish frontier.

Writers of Spanish history have sometimes overlooked the implications of the dual nature of the crusade. Before the 1950s Spanish historians avoided debating the

⁸ Torquato de Sousa Soares, 'O governo de Portugal pelo Conde Henrique de Borgonha: suas relações com as monarquias Leonesa-Castelhana e Aragonesa', *Revista Portuguesa da História*, 14 (1974), 365-97; and by the same author, 'O governo de Portugal pela infanta-rainha D. Teresa (1112-1128)', in *Colectânea de Estudos em Honra do Prof. Doutor Damião Peres* (Lisbon: Academia Portuguesa da História, 1973), 99-119.

⁹ For discussions of the long development of crusade historiography see Marshall W. Baldwin's foreword to Carl Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, trans. M. W. Baldwin and W. Goffart (Princeton: UP, 1977), pp. xv-xxxii. A recent consideration is Giles Constable, 'The Historiography of the Crusades', in *The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World*, eds. A. E. Laiou and R. P. Mottahedeh (Washington DC: Dumbarton Oaks, 2001), 1-22. The nebulous nature of the activity during the twelfth century is discussed by Christopher J. Tyerman, 'Were there any crusades in the twelfth century?', *English Historical Review*, 110 (1995), 553-75. This article also appears in C. J. Tyerman, *The Invention of the Crusade* (London: Macmillan, 1998). See also Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The First Crusaders, 1095-1131* (Cambridge: UP, 1997), pp. 7-80; and by the same author *What Were the Crusades?*, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

means by which crusading ideology was directed toward Iberia by simply insisting that a crusading mentality developed independently within the peninsula.¹⁰ Such nationalistic theories were challenged when the Spanish scholar José Goñi Gaztambine produced an exhaustive examination of the papal extension of crusader privileges into Iberia.¹¹ His conclusions of early and complete Spanish acceptance of crusading ideology have proved influential.¹² Nevertheless, studies of the crusade based on papal offers of spiritual reward frequently make the unacknowledged assumption that Church pronouncements accurately represent lay attitudes. Such an assumption is now considered tendentious within Latin Christendom itself, it becomes even more so when the ideals of the Latin Church were applied to an Iberian situation.¹³ Moreover studies of early Spanish expressions of crusading militancy have tended to emphasise evidence from Aragon. Yet the close relations the Aragonese maintained with Latin Christendom encouraged them to embrace crusading ideology far more quickly than did Spaniards further to the west. The danger of extrapolating general Iberian attitudes from the Aragonese experience is highlighted by Carl Erdmann's conclusions on the impact of the crusade in Portugal.¹⁴ Far from being immediate converts to the notion of holy war, Erdmann believed the hard-headed Portuguese resisted the lure of the crusades until at least the thirteenth century.

The final decades of the eleventh century brought considerable turmoil to Portugal. Latin Christian cultural influence had brought significant regional change, but the declaration of the crusade then redirected the spiritual and expansionist energies of Latin Christendom toward the Holy Land. At the same time, political uncertainty in Iberia was growing. As the Leonese-Castilian monarchy wavered, Henry the

¹⁰ '[crusading ideology] was a pendant to and, partly, a consequence of the war waged by Alfonso VI and the Cid against the Almoravids in the west.' Ramón Menéndez Pidal *La España del Cid*, 2 vols (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1969), 2, p. 578; trans. by H. Sutherland, *The Cid and his Spain* (London: Frank Cass, 1971), p. 407. Américo Castro's view of Spanish history was diametrically opposed to that of Menéndez Pidal, he nonetheless argued for an autochthonous development of the crusade. Castro explains the appearance of religious militancy in the peninsula as a cultural transfer of Jihad ideas from Islamic society. This position has won few adherents. See James O'Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), pp. 13ff.

¹¹ J. Goñi Gaztambide, *Historia de la Bula de la Cruzada en España* (Vitoria: Vitoriensia 4, 1958).

¹² For the significance of Goñi Gaztambide's work see O'Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain*, pp. x-xii. O'Callaghan himself also relies heavily on papal offers of crusading indulgence to argue an unconditional transfer of crusading ideology.

¹³ Marcus Bull, *Knightly Piety and the Lay Response to the First Crusade* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 11-4.

¹⁴ Carl Erdmann, 'Der Kreuzzugsgedanke in Portugal', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 41 (1929), 23-53; trans. by A. Pinto de Carvalho as *A Idea de Cruzada em Portugal* (Coimbra: Publicações de Instituto Alemão da Universidade de Coimbra, 1940).

Burgundian was obliged to assimilate more closely into local Portuguese society. His relations with the great noble houses of southern France, once so valuable, became a liability. Similarly, Cluniac influence in Spain had been instrumental in Henry's rise; in the new political climate the support of the distant monks dwindled in significance. Even the papacy was unable to remain aloof from the bitter regional wrangling, and a series of unfortunate decisions brought the leading Portuguese clergymen into open revolt. Thus, while the dawn of the twelfth century brought remarkable European expansion in the eastern Mediterranean, these same years brought a sharp reduction of Latin Christian influence in Portugal.

The implications of the crusade for the Iberian frontier

Pope Urban II has traditionally been cast as the primary architect of the First Crusade. The pope's actual goal in promoting the expedition to Jerusalem has been the subject of considerable debate, but his message seems to have been interpreted by most of his listeners as a mandate to undertake an armed pilgrimage to 'liberate' the holy city. While the commonly accepted idea of pilgrimage appears to have been uppermost in many minds, the crusade also drew on emerging ecclesiastical theories of holy war. As the popularity of the crusade exploded, and Latin Christian attention turned inexorably eastwards, leading clergymen attempted to highlight the wider duties of crusaders to Christendom as a whole. These attempts to extend popular crusading enthusiasm beyond the Holy Land had important implications on the Iberian frontier. Yet the problems the papacy faced in broadening the scope of the crusade is nowhere more apparent than in the difficulty clergymen encountered when attempting to discourage aspiring Spanish crusaders. Nevertheless the refocusing of Latin Christian enthusiasm on the Holy Land, and the changing patterns of Latin Christian contact with Iberia that resulted, had important implications for Portugal. The transit of crusader fleets along the Portuguese coastline suggested opportunities for the future, but only if these potential allies could be effectively recruited.

The origins of the crusade were recorded in a number of contemporary or near contemporary sources. Although there are significant problems and inconsistencies with

these sources, an outline of events has been established.¹⁵ In November 1095, in obedience to the commands of Pope Urban, a council of churchmen gathered at the southern French town of Clermont. While the ostensible purpose for this gathering was to settle a backlog of ecclesiastical problems, the pope also hoped to direct attention toward a slightly different issue.¹⁶ Rumours circulating Europe of a Muslim threat in the East seem to have been fuelled by the arrival at the council of Piacenza in March 1095 of a Byzantine embassy requesting Western military assistance. In response to what he perceived to be a deteriorating strategic situation in the East, Urban took the opportunity provided by the council of Clermont to launch a relief expedition. The pope summoned together all available clerical and lay delegates and preached an impassioned sermon proposing military operations in the Holy Land. While earlier plans for papal military intervention in the East had failed to attract widespread support, Urban's proposal met with immediate enthusiasm: the crusading movement was born.

While Urban's words had a dramatic impact on his audience, the details of the sermon are in fact unclear. This uncertainty arises not from a lack of evidence, but rather from its over-abundance.¹⁷ Several descriptions of Urban's sermon were provided by clergymen who claimed to be eyewitnesses, others were produced by authors relying on second-hand reports. Unfortunately these accounts present an inconsistent picture on many key elements of Urban's offer, including the fundamental motivation for the expedition. Some authors portrayed a pope eager to bring military assistance to the Eastern Christians: in these accounts Urban emphasised the obligation of Christian knights to defend their co-religionists through the waging of holy war. Other authors lay weight on the importance of pilgrimage in Urban's initial appeal by underlining the central position of Jerusalem in the sermon. Official documents do little to clarify the situation. The records of the council are incomplete, while letters the pope himself wrote provide contrary indicators. While the centrality of Jerusalem in the

¹⁵ These sources are considered by Susan Edgington, 'The First Crusade: reviewing the evidence', in Jonathan Phillips (ed.), *The First Crusade: Origins and Impact* (Manchester: UP, 1997), 55-77.

¹⁶ Robert Somerville, 'The council of Clermont (1095), and Latin Christian Society', *Archivum Historiae Pontificae*, 12 (1974), 55-90, repr. in R. Somerville, *The Papacy and Canon Law in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1990).

¹⁷ An early attempt to sift commonality from the various accounts was made by Dana Carleton Munro, 'The speech of Pope Urban II at Clermont, 1095', *American Historical Review*, 11 (1906), 231-42. The difficulties in reconstructing the sermon are re-examined by J. O. Ward, 'Some principles of rhetorical historiography in the twelfth century', in E. Breisach (ed.), *Classical Rhetoric and Medieval Historiography* (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 1985), 122-48. For an analysis of the sermon in the context of medieval preaching see Patricia J. Cole, *The Preaching of the Crusades to the Holy Land, 1095-1270*, (Cambridge, MA: Medieval Academy of America, 1991), ch. 1.

pope's message is clear, the justification for the operation is frequently cited to be a response to the suffering of Eastern Christians under Muslim rule.¹⁸ In its origins, therefore, the crusade was already exhibiting the protean character that would provoke and frustrate historical analysis even until the present day.

Numerous attempts have been made to assess Urban's original aims for the expedition, but it seems clear that the majority of participants, whether in obedience to the pope's order to undertake an armed pilgrimage, or in misunderstanding of wider papal aims for the defence of a threatened Christendom, focused their attention on Jerusalem. Jonathan Riley-Smith concludes:

Crusaders knew that they had been summoned by the pope to fight a war-pilgrimage on God's behalf – indeed they claimed their decisions to take the cross had been made under divine inspiration – and the liberation of Jerusalem was their goal from the start, but they were far more interested in freeing the place that in the sufferings of the eastern Christians...The crusade was for them as individuals only secondarily about benefiting the Church or Christianity; it was primarily about benefiting themselves.¹⁹

Even as the participants were narrowing their focus upon the holy city ecclesiastical theorists were attempting to widen that viewpoint by re-emphasising the obligations of holy war. This attempt had profound implications for the struggles between Christians and Muslims in those other border regions that had previously benefited from Latin Christian participation in frontier warfare. The difficulty faced by the papacy in broadening crusader enthusiasm beyond Jerusalem is highlighted by the situation in Iberia in the years following the successful conclusion of the First Crusade.

The sensational events in the Holy Land at the end of the eleventh century directed a great deal of Latin Christian popular enthusiasm away from Iberia, moreover the same lure of Jerusalem was also strongly felt by many Iberians. The cool papal response to Spanish enthusiasm for the Holy Land strikingly highlights the friction that existed between ecclesiastical hopes for a wider use of the crusade and the popular secular response. Rather than encourage Iberians to undertake the eastward journey,

¹⁸ Riley-Smith, *The First Crusaders*, pp. 60-1.

¹⁹ Riley Smith, *The First Crusaders*, pp. 75-7.

successive popes ordered knights and soldiers to remain in Spain to assist in its defence. Often such orders were given in vain. Even when the papacy extended comparable spiritual benefits to the defence of the Iberian frontier, Spaniards continued to undertake journeys to Jerusalem. Following the natural suspicion that the miraculous can never occur at home, many people were unwilling to accept that a spiritual benefit found locally could be as efficacious as one gained through arduous journeys to distant sacred sites.

The first tidings of the crusade to reach Iberia were borne by the Spanish delegates actually present at the council.²⁰ Several Spanish nobles are known to have responded favourably to the news.²¹ Another enthusiastic recruit was Bernard of Toledo, who declared his intention of joining the expedition immediately on returning to Spain. Gaining grudging approval from Alfonso he set off, only to be forestalled by a Mozarabic rebellion against his lieutenants in the city. He was forced to return and reassert his authority before departing once again. When he did at last reach Rome he was to be disappointed, for Pope Urban personally ordered his subordinate back to Spain.²²

The pope's peremptory treatment of Bernard typifies the attitude Urban adopted to Spanish participation in the eastern crusade. Even after the declaration of the crusade, Rome continued to emphasise the merit of defending Christians – the holy war facet of crusading – in the face of popular enthusiasm for the idea of an armed pilgrimage. Between 1096 and 1099 Urban attempted to bolster the defence of Tarragona by dissuading local knights from setting out for the East.

²⁰ Bishop Dalmace of Compostela obtained exemption from the authority of Braga at the council. Presumably Bragan representatives also attended in an attempt to counter Compostelan machinations. Bernard of Toledo took an active role at Clermont, arbitrating a dispute between two abbots from Languedoc. There are also suggestions that the bishops of Tarragona, Lugo, Pamplona and Vich made the journey north. Also, because the status of the major Castilian monastery of Sahagún was under consideration, representatives from that house would probably also have been on hand. Somerville, 'The council of Clermont,' pp. 71-3, 87.

²¹ Pedro Gutiérrez of León and Fernando Díaz of Asturias are known to have returned from the East in 1100 bearing a valuable relic to the monastery of Sahagún. Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, p. 305. Other participants identified from charter evidence include Fortún Sanchez, Anzar Garcés of Medineta, the brothers Fortún and Sancho Iniguez, and Anzar Jiménez of Aois. Bull, *Knightly Piety*, pp. 97-8. Two knights of Burgundian background, Bernard II of Besalú and Hugh II of Empurias may also have joined the expedition. Riley-Smith, *The First Crusaders*, pp. 201, 212. Several additional possible Spanish crusaders are identified by Simon Barton, 'From Tyrants to Soldiers of Christ: the nobility of twelfth-century León-Castile and the struggle against Islam', *Nottingham Medieval Studies*, 44 (2002), pp. 35-6.

²² Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada of Toledo, *Historia de rebus hispanie*, VI. 26, pp. 209-10. Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, p. 263.

Since the knights of other lands have unanimously resolved to go to the aid of the church of Asia and to liberate their brethren from the tyranny of the Saracens so also — I admonish you to this — so you assist the church adjoining you in continuous efforts against the assaults of the Saracens! Whoever falls on this campaign for love of God and his neighbour, let him not doubt that he will find the forgiveness of all his sins and eternal life through God's gracious mercy. And if one of you has resolved upon the journey to Asia, let him rather fulfil his pious purpose here. For it is of no service to liberate Christians from Saracens in one place and to deliver them in another to Saracen tyranny and oppression.²³

Nor is this an isolated missive. In a letter to Bishop Pedro of Huesca in May 1098 Urban was willing to compare recent Aragonese gains with the actions of the crusaders in Palestine, linking both fronts with the struggle against Muslim aggression.²⁴ Yet even secular leaders were caught up in the general excitement. King Pedro of Aragon took the cross in 1100 with the intention of journeying eastwards, but was persuaded by Urban's successor, Pascal II (1099-1118), to direct his energies against the Muslim-held city of Zaragoza.²⁵ Count Henry of Burgundy also left the peninsula, ostensibly to travel to Jerusalem, but actually went no further than Rome.²⁶ Ultimately Bishop Diego Gelmírez and Pope Paschal formally forbade any Spanish troops to leave for Jerusalem when their own kingdom was in danger of Muslim attack.²⁷ The frequent iteration of this point by subsequent popes indicates that belief in the merits of defending Christendom was not as widely held as they would wish.

In addition to discouraging departures from Iberia, the papacy also offered spiritual inducements to those prepared to stay. When in 1114-6 Italian and Catalan forces launched an assault on the Balearic Islands they proudly wore their crosses and were assured of spiritual indulgences.²⁸ At the council of Toulouse in January 1116 the assembled nobility were called on to take the *via de Hispania* to the Holy Land; Pope

²³ *Papsturkunden in Spanien, I. Katalanien*, ed. P. Kehr. (Abhandlungen der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Phil.-hist. Kl., NS 18; Berlin, 1926), 287, no. 23. Translated in Erdmann, *Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, p. 317. These letters are also discussed by Barton, 'From Tyrants to Soldiers of Christ', pp. 35-8.

²⁴ PL 151: 504.

²⁵ Bull, *Knightly Piety*, p. 96.

²⁶ See below, p. 86.

²⁷ HC, I, 9, pp. 25-6; and I, 39, pp. 77-8; Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, p. 301.

²⁸ PL 163: 508, 515; Bull, *Knightly Piety*, pp. 108-9.

Gelasius II offered plenary indulgence to those who agreed to do so.²⁹ This call attracted the support of numerous warriors from southern France, including several veteran crusaders returned from the Holy Land. The assault was launched against Zaragoza and, unlike the unfortunate inhabitants of Jerusalem in 1099, the Zaragozans surrendered on terms in December 1118 and were allowed to leave unmolested. The surrounding towns capitulated soon after.³⁰ Despite this success, papal efforts to organise further expeditions proved fruitless. In 1123 Pope Calixtus II formally established the spiritual equivalence of the Spanish and Palestinian theatres, a correlation that was confirmed by the Lateran Council of the same year.³¹ Yet no major campaigns followed.

The early crusades present a confused picture in which, regardless of Pope Urban's actual intentions, the participants focused their efforts on Jerusalem; and the ramifications for the Iberians were profound. The popularity of the crusade was potentially very detrimental to the Spanish kingdoms, because not only Latin Christian but also local attention was diverted toward the distant Holy Land. Papal authorities were aware of the dangers posed by this situation and sought to extend the ethos of the crusade to the Iberian frontier. This, though, was essentially an exercise in damage limitation, and popular opinion never completely accepted these ecclesiastical assurances of equivalence. In Portugal, however, the popularity of the crusade had slightly different implications. Before 1095 the Atlantic coastal regions of Iberia had experienced little direct contact with Latin Christian cultural militancy. This soon changed, as fleets from the north began to appear with ever greater frequency. Attacks by northern fleets were nothing new to these coastal peoples; in the tenth and eleventh centuries Norse raiders had indiscriminately assaulted Christian and Muslim settlements. These attacks had dwindled away by the end of the eleventh century, but after the council of Clermont fleets manned by crusaders began to appear.

²⁹ PL 163: 508.

³⁰ José María Lacarra, 'La conquista de Zaragoza por Alfonso I (18 diciembre 1118)', *Al-Andalus*, 12 (1947), pp. 65-69.

³¹ For Calixtus' famous letter, JL 7116. The letter is translated and discussed by Jonathan and Louise Riley-Smith, *The Crusades. Idea and Reality, 1095-1274* (London: Edward Arnold, 1981), pp. 73-4. For the pronouncement of the Lateran Council see *Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio*, ed. J. D. Mansi, 55 vols (Florence/Venice), 21, p. 284.

Northern flotillas operated in the eastern Mediterranean during the First Crusade and rendered valuable service to the land forces.³² While such fleets must have stopped in Portugal during their voyage, it is not until some years later that evidence survives of their activities. In 1107 King Sigurd of Norway led a large, heavily armed flotilla to Jerusalem. After accepting the hospitality of Henry I of England, the Norwegian fleet crossed to the Portuguese coast in 1108. As they sailed southwards the Norwegians attacked Sintra, Lisbon and Alcácer do Sal, slaying those Moors who would not renounce their faith. After similar activities in the Balearic Islands the fleet reached Palestine, where they served for a time with King Baldwin I of Jerusalem.³³ The Norwegian fleet was not the only northern squadron to impact on the documentary record. In 1112 ships carrying Englishmen bound for Palestine arrived off the Galician coast. They found a region in political turmoil and were induced to lend support to some rebellious nobles. Taking this as license for mayhem, the sailors savagely plundered coastal settlements until they were caught in the act of looting a church by the avenging fleet of Bishop Diego Gelmírez of Compostela. Several of the looters were slain, the others were captured. Their pilgrimage would have ended there, except that the bishop took pity on them. After exacting an oath of good behaviour he released them to continue their voyage.³⁴ Such maritime raiders provide an early example of an on-going tradition that would prove decisive in Portugal's later development. In the early years of the twelfth century, however, they offered little practical aid to the Iberian Christians, nor did they present an inspiring example of a new form of spiritual expression. Instead they were generally regarded as a dangerous nuisance.

To what degree then was the enthusiasm for the crusade able to permeate into the west of the peninsula? An interesting insight into the arrival of crusading ideology into the region can be found by comparing two sermons given by the native-born Galician Bishop Diego Gelmírez. The first of these sermons was given in 1113 at Burgos. The looming threat of the Almoravids had become very real, their armies were advancing across the frontier, and the bishop was called upon to inspire the defenders.

³² 'The First Crusade as a naval enterprise', *The Mariners' Mirror*, 83 (1997), 389-97; *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi: The Conquest of Lisbon*, ed. C. W. David (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936), pp. 12-26; Susan Rose, *Medieval Naval Warfare 1000-1500* (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 34-5; William L. Rogers, *Naval Warfare under Oars, 4th-14th Centuries* (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1967), pp. 53-8.

³³ Saavedra Machado, 'Os Ingleses em Portugal', *Biblos* 10 (1933), p. 379, n. 1; Snorri Sturluson, *Heimskringla: History of the Kings of Norway*, trans. L. M. Hollander (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967), pp. 689-91.

Despite the danger, Gelmírez could only assure his audience that because they fought in defence of their own land their cause was just, as such they would surely have God on their side.³⁵ A decade later the same man, now an archbishop, preached a very different sermon. Speaking to a gathering of his suffragans at Compostela in 1124, Gelmírez proposed nothing less than a full crusade directed against the Almoravid menace. This offer included spiritual reward and ecclesiastical protection of lands, yet there are reasons to suspect Bishop Diego's motives. During the 1120s the Almoravid threat receded, but the bishop's own position had been compromised by his interference in royal politics. There is an air of desperation in the bishop's support for the crusade, not so much for the sake of Christian Spain, but for his own political future.³⁶ Gelmírez's deteriorating authority would have been significantly bolstered by the formation of a local crusading army. As it was the crusade came to nothing, and the lack of support the call elicited strongly suggests that the bishop's efforts did not reflect popular Galician sentiment.

Far from initiating a new wave of Latin Christian intervention in Iberia, the declaration of the crusade provided an alternative avenue for expansionist enthusiasm. Despite the desire of the higher clergy to enlist secular efforts in the defence of Christendom as a whole, popular desire for the more familiar form of spiritual experience, the pilgrimage, dominated Urban's original plan and focused the crusade squarely on the Holy Land. While for most regions of Spain this threatened a manpower crisis on the frontier, in Portugal the situation was slightly different. The popularity of the journey to Jerusalem brought crusader fleets along the Atlantic coastline, and so provided the Portuguese with their first direct contact with Latin Christian militancy. Yet before such fleets could become anything other than a potentially dangerous group of unwanted foreigners, local peoples would need to identify more closely with Latin Christian cultural values. The arrival of these fleets themselves could not initiate

³⁴ HC, I, 76, pp. 118-9; *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 18-9.

³⁵ HC, I, 86, p. 139.

³⁶ Fletcher, *St James's Catapult*, pp. 298-9; HC, II, 78, pp. 378-80. Some historians have been inclined to take Gelmírez at his word, for example Simon Barton, 'Traitors to the Faith? Christian Mercenaries in al-Andalus and the Maghreb, c. 1100-1300', in *Medieval Spain: Culture, Conflict, and Coexistence. Studies in Honour of Angus MacKay* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 23; and again, 'From Tyrants to Soldiers of Christ', p. 38. Yet Gelmírez's attempt to superimpose the attraction of pilgrimage to the Spanish campaign was tenuous in the extreme. He claims the route to the Holy Sepulchre: 'per Hispanie partes breuius et multo minus laboriosum est'. The transparency of such a claim must have been apparent to all but the least travelled of his audience.

cultural change. Such a role could only be played by individuals or institutions already resident in the region.

Henry the Burgundian: Harbinger of Latin Christendom or ambitious local magnate?

Henry the Burgundian seems in many ways an emblematic example of the Latin Christian expansion, yet he did not use his position to facilitate any further growth of European influence in Portugal. On coming to power the count's authority in the region was tenuous, allowing him little scope to impose cultural mores on a resistant population. In the longer term, however, Henry was not so much hindered by the conservatism of his subjects as he was lacking any real interest in initiating change. Even as he secured his rule over Portugal, Henry's future ambition was directed beyond the county to the royal court of León-Castile. In Henry's estimation, Portugal was above all a valuable base for operations; if local activities did not distract him from his larger aspirations, he seemed content to preserve the status quo.

The circumstances under which Henry received the county of Portugal sharply limited the nature of his early influence in the region.³⁷ Ruling on behalf of Alfonso of León-Castile, there is little evidence that Henry brought with him any of his fellow Burgundians.³⁸ Those changes he did institute were cosmetic ones. Regional administration was unchanged, with entrenched local aristocrats continuing to witness charters after 1095, as did the *merinos* or royal estate officials.³⁹ In addition to a powerful local aristocracy, Henry also had to contend with a numerous and potentially restive Mozarabic population. Already disillusioned by the attack on their liturgy, the

³⁷ Torquato de Sousa Soares, 'Carácter e limites do condado Portugalense (1096-1128)', in *Papel das Áreas Regionais na Formação Histórica de Portugal*, (Lisbon: Academia Portuguesa da História, 1975), pp. 15-21; Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 75-6.

³⁸ Charter evidence for other foreign elements in Portugal during this period is fragmentary. One Frankish immigrant, Uzberto, and later his son Pedro Uzbertz appear in documents, although they hold no offices. José Mattoso, 'A região de Arganil: De Fronteira a Terra Senhorial', in J. Mattoso, *A Nobreza Medieval Portuguesa. A Família e o Poder* (Lisbon: Editora Estampa, 1994), p. 322. In 1121 land was also granted to the Franks living in Guimarães, but nothing further is known of these people. DMP, 1, p. 69.

³⁹ Henry brought new office titles to Portugal, DMP, 1, p. xxvii, and in a document dated 3 November 1197 these officials are named. Yet these changes were simply new names for existing power structures. Diagus Gundislaviz remained *merino*, while his nephew Pelagus Suarez adopted the title of *majordomo*. DMP, 1, pp. 6-7; PMH *Diplomata et chartae*, pp. 512-4. For the relationship between the two men: PMH *Diplomata et chartae*, p. 512. Nor was Pelagus a newcomer to the court, for he appears as a signatory in documents in the years before Henry's arrival. DMP, 1, pp. 476, 479. For further examples of continuity

Mozarabs then lost in rapid succession their Bishop Paternus, the bishop-elect Martín, their ruler Sisnando Davídes, then his son-in-law and heir Martín Muñoz.⁴⁰ Nor could the count look to unqualified support from the local Church. The dioceses of the county – Braga, Coimbra, Oporto, Viseu, Lamego, and Tûy – were all in contention as they jealously protected their accrued rights and privileges.⁴¹ All were nominally under the authority of Bernard of Toledo, although this was a situation the Bragan clergy hoped to change. Such was the turbulent, fragmented county Henry accepted in 1095. The count would have been slow to complicate this precarious situation by attempting widespread social change.

One common means of imposing regional authority was military triumph, unfortunately Henry enjoyed limited success in the prosecution of border wars. The major burden of frontier defence was in fact borne by the urban militias of border towns. Count Henry was aware of the importance of these communities and sought to cultivate them.⁴² Henry's offensive efforts were directed toward the cities of Sintra, Santarém and Lisbon.⁴³ At the beginning of the twelfth century efforts to retake these regions were made, with mixed results. In 1108, possibly taking advantage of the damage inflicted by the Norwegian fleet under King Sigurd, Count Henry captured Sintra; in the same month the Portuguese also managed to recapture Santarém.⁴⁴ This proved an ephemeral success, for a Portuguese army marching to support Santarém was ambushed at Vatalandi and scattered with heavy casualties.⁴⁵ The following year the Almoravids recaptured Santarém.⁴⁶ At a stroke, the creeping Portuguese advance was turned back again.

of signatories, José Mattoso, *Ricos-Homens, Infanções e Cavaleiros*, 2nd ed. (Lisbon: Guimarães editores, 1985), pp. 48, 56, 60.

⁴⁰ For Sisnando's heir see Mattoso, *A Nobreza Medieval Portuguesa*, pp. 262-3.

⁴¹ Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, pp. 14-5.

⁴² Count Henry early recognised the importance of the towns in defence. His first extant document is a *foral* (town charter) for the political centre of Guimarães (1095/6). DMP, 1, pp. 1-3. Further charters followed, stipulating economic arrangements, legal rights, and military obligations. PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 350-60. For these urban developments in general see James F. Powers, *A Society Organized for War: The Iberian Municipal Militias in the Central Middle Ages* (University of California Press, 1988), pp. 13-33. The importance of urban development will be considered further below, pp. 192-8.

⁴³ No doubt Henry felt particular pressure to recapture these towns, which had been briefly under Christian control prior to the Almoravid offensive in the 1090s.

⁴⁴ APV, pp. 300-1.

⁴⁵ Including the two important nobles Suero Fromerges and Mendo Cresconius. The source also distinguishes among their enemies between Saracens, Moabites, and Arabs. APV, pp. 301-2.

⁴⁶ APV, p. 301.

Yet it was not simply the difficulties Henry encountered in governing the county of Portugal that limited the cultural change his government brought to the region. Henry had gained his position through his intimacy with the Leonese-Castilian court. His position rested heavily on royal good-will.⁴⁷ Thus it was a rare gathering of court nobles that did not include both Henry and his cousin Raymond of Galicia in attendance. Henry was a frequent signatory to documents emanating from the court, but his role went beyond simply witnessing official business and taking part in court routine. The count commanded royal armies in actions far from Portugal. In November 1101 Henry led a large force to defeat south of Toledo near the hamlet of Malagón, although he emerged unscathed himself. The following March Henry again took command of the armies south of Toledo. On this occasion the Christians were on the defensive and seemed to have enjoyed greater success.⁴⁸ Throughout this period Henry appears more as an agent of the crown than an independent magnate.

The count of Portugal's close attendance on the Leonese-Castilian court became ever more important as an uncertain century dawned. In January 1103 an ecclesiastical council was convened at Carrión de los Condes by Bernard of Toledo. Among the usual complement of court nobles was the significant addition of Sancho Alfónsez, the young son of Alfonso's official concubine Zaida of Zaragoza. Prince Sancho's official appearance at the council marked him as a potential heir to the throne. Three years later Henry's sister-in-law Urraca gave birth to Alfonso Raimundez on 1 March 1106. The appearance of a legitimate male heir in Galicia provoked a certain consternation in the royal court, for it seriously lessened the chances of a simple succession of the crown. The ambitious Raymond of Galicia was a strong candidate, but Alfonso remained adamant that his own natural son would succeed him. To that end the king worked to strengthen Prince Sancho's position. In May 1106 Alfonso married his long-time concubine Zaida, who took the name Elizabeth.⁴⁹ This was a precursor to Alfonso's official declaration the following year of Sancho as his successor. From March 1107

⁴⁷ Henry's reliance on Alfonso's support was made clear when the news of the king's death in 1109 reached Portugal. In the town of Sintra, 'audientes enim Sarraceni mortem regis D. Alphonsi ceperunt rebellare.' APV, p. 301. More serious revolts occurred in the Portuguese heartland. In 1111 Coimbra received a new city charter including tenets exiling several townsmen, forbidding alliances with local nobles, and promising not to raise arms against the count. DMP, 1, pp. 32-3.

⁴⁸ Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 290-314.

⁴⁹ Pelayo of Oviedo, *Chronicon regum Legionensium*, pp. 87-8. Although Pelayo is specific, later readers have frequently confused the renamed Zaida and Alfonso's previous wife, Elizabeth of Burgundy. Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, p. 339.

Sancho appeared in official documents as heir-apparent to the kingdom. The Burgundian star looked to be waning.

Soon after the council of Carrión de los Condes Henry dropped from view for several months, but his whereabouts are hinted at by a Portuguese document. Issued in May 1103, this document records the nobleman Soeiro Mendes assisting Infanta Teresa because Count Henry was journeying to Jerusalem.⁵⁰ That Henry's sudden departure followed so closely Sancho's appearance at court has led Portuguese historians to suggest that the count was actually making a covert journey to Rome to obtain papal support for regional independence.⁵¹ This argument owes more to Portuguese patriotism than weight of evidence. The document may equally have reflected Henry's actual intention but, like Bernard of Toledo before him, he was sent back to Iberia by the pope. In any event, Henry had returned to Portugal by the following July. Count Henry's brief sojourn is one of the few references to early Portuguese interest in the crusade, indeed Carl Erdmann suggests that this incident demonstrates that Henry remained at heart a Frenchman, isolated from those he was supposed to rule.⁵²

In the final years of the decade the succession was thrown into confusion again and Henry suddenly seemed in contention for the throne. On 20 September 1107 Count Raymond of Galicia succumbed to an unexpected disease.⁵³ A council was quickly convened at León to organise the situation in Galicia. Among the delegates was Archbishop Guy of Vienne, Raymond's brother and future pope Calixtus II (1119-1124), who ensured that the rights of his family were respected. At this council Urraca was confirmed as ruler in Galicia, while her son Alfonso Raimúndez was given into the care of Bishop Diego Gelmírez of Compostela. No sooner had the kingdom been reorganised than a second tragedy occurred. In the spring of 1108 a large Almoravid army advanced toward Toledo. The young Prince Sancho Alfónsez was in titular command of the defending army. On May 29 the two forces met at Uclés where, after initial success, the Christian army was overwhelmed by superior numbers. Although the prince and his

⁵⁰ 'usque ad venitam comitis de Jherusalem' DMP, 2, 96-7; For the belief that Henry reached Palestine see António Brandão, *Crónica do Conde D. Henrique, D. Teresa e Infante D. Afonso*, ed. A. de Magalhães Basto (Lisbon: Biblioteca Histórica, 1944), pp. 108-12.

⁵¹ Soares, 'O governo de Portugal pelo Conde Henrique de Borgonha', p. 376; Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 77.

⁵² Carl Erdmann, *A Cruzada em Portugal*, pp. 6-7.

⁵³ HC, 1, 7, pp. 54-5. For the exact dating of the count's death see John E. Slaughter, 'Sobre la fecha de la muerte del Conde Raimundo de Galicia', *Anuario de Estudios Medievales*, 13 (1983), 93-106.

bodyguard managed to flee the rout, on seeking shelter in the nearby village of Belinchón they were slain by the Muslim inhabitants.⁵⁴

In the space of a day the kingdom lost not only the designated heir to the throne but also a large number of the king's most trusted nobles. When the depleted court met again at Sahugún in September Count Henry was present. The Almoravids had withdrawn and the most pressing question was the succession: the count of Portugal was suddenly very close to the throne. Although the aging king had married once again, to Beatrice of Burgundy, the marriage produced no children.⁵⁵ Alfonso was rapidly running out of options: he was faced with a choice between a widowed legitimate daughter with an infant son and a illegitimate daughter with an experienced husband. Aware perhaps of the depth of suspicion in the kingdom over a Burgundian succession, Alfonso was able to conceive of another, unexpected alternative.

Alfonso decided to marry his recently widowed daughter to his long-standing rival, Alfonso I 'el Batallador' of Aragon (1104-1134). The majority of the nobility seem to have opposed this scheme. They suggested instead one of their own number, Gomez González, as a more popular alternative. The clergy were also unsettled by their king's choice, with Bernard of Toledo voicing deep reservations on the grounds of consanguinity.⁵⁶ Refusing to be gainsaid, the old king opened negotiations with Aragon. By 1109 these arrangements were well in hand and in May of that year Alfonso formally declared Urraca to be his heir. This was one of his final acts, and by 1 July 1109 Alfonso had died in Toledo. Despite their many misgivings both nobility and clergy followed their monarch's last commands. Urraca was proclaimed queen and arrangements for her marriage to King Alfonso of Aragon were completed.⁵⁷ With their rights ignored and their hopes dwindling, Henry and Teresa left the royal court, never to return.

On failing to secure a place in the succession Henry resolved to extend his own territory at the cost of his royal rivals. Time was on Count Henry's side. The royal

⁵⁴ Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 348-50; John E. Slaughter, 'De nuevo sobre la batalla de Uclés', *Anuario de Estudios Medievales*, 9 (1974-1979), 393-404.

⁵⁵ Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, p. 352, n. 23.

⁵⁶ Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus hispanie*, VI. 33, pp. 145-6.

⁵⁷ This interpretation of events at the close of Alfonso's reign is based on that of Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 356-63. Reilly relies primarily on documents and the *Historia Compostellana* for his account. It should be noted that the thirteenth-century author Lucas of Túy presented a different picture. Under his interpretation Henry was already a partisan of the King of Aragon at this time and in fact advised him to offer his hand to Urraca. Lucas of Túy, *Chronica Mundi*, ed. E. Falque, CCCM (Turnhout, 2003), VI. 73, p. 309.

marriage was undermined by a hostile Leonese-Castilian nobility and clergy, the personal incompatibility of the partners, and the failure of the royal couple to produce children. By April 1111 the couple had separated and negotiations between them had been broken off; when Alfonso occupied Toledo it became clear that arms would decide the issue.⁵⁸ This confrontation between Urraca and Alfonso was complicated by the peripheral claims of supporters of Alfonso Raimundez, who feared the marriage would undermine his hereditary rights, and by the ambitions of the Portuguese leaders.

These years were characterised by military skirmishes and protean alliances in which Count Henry offered his support to whichever faction might best forward his own ambitions. Henry joined the fray in 1110 by assisting Count Pedro Froilaz, a leading supporter of the Raimundist party, in capturing a group of Queen Urraca's Galician partisans. They were used as hostages to obtain the surrender of a border castle on the Minho River. Following the breakdown of the royal marriage Henry offered his support to Alfonso of Aragon, who found that the count's cooperation came at a high price: the secession of half his potential gains in León-Castile. Nevertheless, Henry quickly proved himself a powerful ally and the combined army routed Urraca's forces.⁵⁹ Yet the very scale of the victory caused Henry to doubt the advisability of too close a relationship with the warlike King of Aragon. When agents from Urraca offered him similar spoils for his support he joined forces with his erstwhile enemy; together they moved against Aragonese king, who retreated before them. Once again, however, potential victory was complicated by diplomatic intrigue. Daunted by the price of Portuguese assistance, as well as by her half-sister's royal pretensions, Urraca entered into secret negotiations with her estranged husband. A brief alliance followed, but was soon destroyed by the mutual distrust of the former husband and wife.⁶⁰ In this environment of shifting alliances Henry was able to play both sides against each other in order to increase his own holdings. Throughout 1111 and into 1112 shrewd political manoeuvring brought him control of Zamora, Salamanca, possibly Ávila and much of the modern region of Extremadura.⁶¹ At that point, as Henry was well on the way to

⁵⁸ Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, pp. 62-72.

⁵⁹ Including Count Gómez González, the local noble earlier suggested as a local alternative to King Alfonso for Urraca's hand. He was slain by Count Henry himself. Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, p. 74, n. 100.

⁶⁰ Reilly *Queen Urraca*, pp. 74-86.

⁶¹ These holdings are delineated in an agreement between Urraca and Teresa early in May 1112. DMP, I, p. 42.

achieving a dominant position in the peninsula, ill-fortune intervened. On 22 May 1112 Count Henry died in Zamora, possibly from wounds received in an attack on Astorga.⁶²

In a remarkable career Henry the Burgundian rose to become one of the leading figures in Iberia. Count Henry came to power in the first wave of Latin Christian influence in the peninsula, but the family relations which proved so valuable in his early career were largely ineffectual amid the turbulent politics of early twelfth-century Iberia. In order to maintain his position and later to pursue his further ambitions, Henry was obliged to assimilate more closely into Iberian society. He was in no position to attempt to subvert the norms of his society nor to impose external cultural mores upon his own subjects. There is no indication that he appointed or favoured foreign candidates for office. While he did attempt to maintain links with the great ecclesiastical institutions of Latin Christendom, such relations also foundered amid the social destabilisation of the early twelfth century.

The waning influence of Cluny following the death of Alfonso VI

The monks of Cluny had been instrumental in Henry's rise to power, and the count of Portugal made strenuous efforts to attract further support from the great monastery. The Cluniacs were willing to enter into a closer relationship with the Portuguese magnate, for amid the turbulence of Iberian politics they were anxious to find reliable allies in the peninsula. Yet this readiness to make agreements wherever they could ultimately ended the period of Cluniac influence in Spain. In Alfonso VI's great days of wealth and political puissance he had been able to monopolise the monks' goodwill; because they lobbied for him alone their voices could be decisive. In the confused period after Alfonso's death the monks sought to maintain their relations with all contending parties. But by spreading their attentions in this way, they eventually compromised their moral authority, and their influence in the peninsula waned.

The relationship forged between Alfonso VI and the monks of Cluny had been critical to the development of both monastery and kingdom. The wealth gained by coercing *paria* tributes from the *taifa* kingdoms enabled Alfonso to maintain exclusive access to Cluniac spiritual and political influence. The Almoravid offensive

⁶² Henry's death is acknowledged in a dedication to Gonçalo Goçaves, DMP, 1, p. 45. The sources establishing this date are considered at some length by Rui de Avezedo, DMP, 1, pp. lv-lvi. More generally, Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 77-8.

progressively reduced this income until by the beginning of the twelfth century it was cut off altogether. Alfonso's financial embarrassment allowed Pedro of Aragon to ingratiate himself at Cluny by offering generous cash grants in 1097 and 1101. These grants were one-time payments, probably shares of the spoils from the captures of Huesca and Barbastro respectively, rather than the annual tribute arrangement entered into by Fernando and Alfonso of León-Castile. Nevertheless this generosity secured for Pedro a place in the monastery's daily prayers and in Cluniac policy.⁶³ More importantly, Alfonso's monopoly of access to the monks had finally been broken.

This steady erosion of Alfonso's ability to dominate Cluniac attention also encouraged Count Henry of Portugal to make several donations of land and assets to the monastery. The first was São Pedro de Rates, which was granted to the Cluniac dependency of Sainte-Marie de la Charité-sur-Loire in March 1100.⁶⁴ Why was this gift not made directly to Cluny? Charles Bishko believed this strategy avoided the donation interfering with, or indeed being subsumed by, those of greater magnates. Bernard Reilly, however, has suggested that the wider political situation best explains this arrangement. Following the death of Alfonso's third wife Bertha early in 1100 the prior of La Charité had been instrumental in ensuring her successor was Burgundian. This was of potential advantage to Henry and so was rewarded with a donation to the prior's own house. Of course these explanations are not mutually exclusive, Henry may well have been aware of both benefits when making this grant. In any event, the following February Henry donated another house, Santa Justa de Coimbra, to La Charité.⁶⁵ A third Portuguese house granted to Cluny, Vimieiro, was transferred by Teresa in 1127.⁶⁶

Count Henry also granted assets outside Portugal to the monks. One such grant, made in January 1105, has attracted particular attention. The count donated land and portions of harvests in Galicia to S. Isidro de Dueñas, the first and greatest Cluniac house in Iberia. These arrangements necessitated a journey outside Portugal, Henry

⁶³ Charles J. Bishko, 'Liturgical Intercession at Cluny for the King-Emperors of León', in C. J. Bishko, *Spanish and Portuguese Monastic History, 600-1300*, (London: Variorum, 1984), VIII, pp. 79A-82A.

⁶⁴ DMP, I, p. 10. For the Cluniacs in Portugal see also José Mattoso, *Le monachisme ibérique et Cluny. Les monastères du diocèse de Porto de l'an mille à 1206* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1968) and more recently the collection *Portugal Medieval. Novas interpretações*, 2nd ed. (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1993).

⁶⁵ Charles J. Bishko, 'Count Henry of Portugal, Cluny, and the antecedents of the Pacto Sucessório', in C. J. Bishko, *Spanish and Portuguese Monastic History, 600-1300*, IX, pp. 180-1; Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 296-7.

⁶⁶ This final donation was closely linked to a power struggle between Teresa and her son, Afonso Henriques, and will be considered in the next chapter, p. 115.

took with him a surprising number of local nobles to meet with an equally large contingent of predominantly Leonese aristocrats. The size and complement of this group encouraged Bishko to read political motives into Henry's actions. The eclectic collection of nobles and high-level Cluniac monks gave Henry the opportunity to establish contact with potential allies in the face of a looming civil war.⁶⁷ If so, then the ultimate result may not have been exactly what Henry had hoped for.

Rather than throwing their influence behind Henry, the monks of Cluny took the more practical alternative of mediating a compromise between the two Burgundian magnates.⁶⁸ In a remarkable document, known as the Pact of Succession, Count Henry agreed to support Raymond's bid for the crown in return for a third of the treasury and possession of either Toledo or, should the city be unavailable, Galicia. This agreement was witnessed by Dalmace Geret, the trusted Cluniac chamberlain who in happier times had collected the annual tribute. Not surprisingly, this agreement has attracted a great deal of speculation over its context and implications, with interpretation being complicated by uncertainty over the dating of the document. Yet Cluniac involvement in what was a treasonable conspiracy can only have occurred after a major rift between the monks and Alfonso. Such desperation is difficult to imagine prior to the aging king's acceptance of his natural son Sancho Alfónsez. A logical trigger for participation in this arrangement would have been Alfonso's public recognition of the boy as his heir in 1103, even over the remonstrations of his stalwart supporter Abbot Hugh of Cluny. In any event, the death of Raymond in 1107 sets a final possible date for the agreement as well as rendering it void.

Raymond's death marked the beginning of a descent into political turmoil as the deaths of Prince Sancho and Emperor Alfonso himself were followed by the breakdown of Urraca's marriage to Alfonso of Aragon. Despite this, the monks of Cluny were not yet prepared to abandon their profitable relationship with the Spanish kingdoms. The opportunity for further intervention came in 1110. Pope Paschal had watched events in Iberia with dismay. In the hope of averting full-scale civil war he dispatched a legate to negotiate a settlement between the various contending parties. Abbot Ponce of Cluny was entrusted with this responsibility, and while he was unable to establish a lasting peace, the abbot may have enjoyed more success in a subsidiary goal. Following Abbot

⁶⁷ Bishko, 'Count Henry of Portugal', pp. 173-7.

⁶⁸ DMP, I, pp. 3-4; PL 166: 944-6.

Ponce's visit Queen Urraca began a series of land grants to Cluny, in return for which the monks finally made public their support for her authority. Ponce appears to have used the opportunity the embassy provided to renegotiate the Alfonsine tribute into a form the financially embarrassed Queen could accept.⁶⁹ This proved a questionable investment, for Urraca was subsequently to find that the loyalty of the monks could not be relied upon.⁷⁰

Throughout Alfonso's reign the monks of Cluny had been providers of unrivalled spiritual comfort as well as mediators, albeit expensive ones, for the Leonese-Castilian monarch in his dealings with nobles and churchmen north of the Pyrenees. The monastery could also furnish clerics trained along orthodox lines for high office. But as royal financial resources dwindled and secular authority became more confused, the monks began to look elsewhere for support. While they were successful in obtaining alternative patrons, by sacrificing an earlier exclusiveness they compromised their effectiveness. The monks' eagerness to maintain an income from Spain undermined their ability to intervene either in the peninsula itself or on the behalf of their Spanish patrons elsewhere. As a result their significant as a cultural or a political force soon dwindled.

Spanish ecclesiastical politics and the papacy, 1090-1122

In the uncertain political climate of twelfth-century Iberia both the immigrant French nobility and the Cluniac monks succumbed to cultural assimilation. The papacy continued to attempt a mediating role, but with limited success. Ecclesiastical appeals to Rome for arbitration in local disputes increased in frequency. While the papacy made valiant efforts to settle these problems, distance, imperfect knowledge, and errors of judgement undermined efforts at impartiality. These problems became particularly acute as Church politics became inextricably bound up with the agendas of ambitious secular rulers. The Portuguese ecclesiastical leadership were subjected to a frustratingly

⁶⁹ Charles J. Bishko, 'The Spanish Journey of Abbot Ponce of Cluny', in C. J. Bishko, *Spanish and Portuguese Monastic History*, X, pp. 311-9; and H. E. J. Cowdrey, 'Abbot Pontius of Cluny (1109-22/6): Two Studies in Cluniac History (1049-1126)', *Studi Gregoriani*, 11 (1978), 200-11.

⁷⁰ Most notably during the confrontation between the Queen Urraca and Archbishop Gelmírez of Compostela. In 1120 Gelmírez was arrested and cast into prison, precipitating a crisis in which Pope Calixtus threatened to excommunicate the queen and place the kingdom under interdict. Urraca was forced into a personal plea to Rome. Throughout this confrontation Cluny remained steadfastly behind the archbishop. HC, II. 42-50, pp. 286-307; Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, pp. 153-61, 364.

inconsistent series of papal decisions. The result was widespread unrest, and in some quarters even outright rebellion. As relations deteriorated, the ability of the papacy to encourage cultural or social reform was increasingly compromised.

The final decades of the eleventh century had been a difficult time for the Bragan clergy. The precipitous action of Bishop Pedro in seeking the support of the Imperial Pope Clement II in 1091 had proved to be a major miscalculation. Pedro himself was deposed and his office kept vacant for several years under royal control. This absence of strong leadership allowed Braga's ecclesiastical rivals to advance their causes unhindered. Neighbouring bishops laid claims to territories previously held by Braga, while the burning issue of Braga's relationship with Toledo had yet to be satisfactorily defined.⁷¹ These existing problems were further complicated by the claims of an increasingly wealthy, prestigious, and ambitious Santiago de Compostela. In 1095 Bishop Dalmace succeeded in freeing his see from either Toledan or Bragan control, a development that would have wide ranging implications throughout the peninsula.⁷²

A Bragan resurgence began in 1097 when the saintly Gerald of Moissac was appointed bishop. This former Cluniac monk came to the disheartened city with the support of Emperor Alfonso, Bernard of Toledo, and the recently installed Count Henry.⁷³ His task was complicated almost immediately by the death of Bishop Cresconio of Coimbra in 1098. Cresconio's replacement, Maurice, was an independent-minded, former Cluniac monk recruited by Bernard of Toledo in the Limousin.⁷⁴ A dispute of unknown cause arose between them, although Gerald ultimately journeyed to Rome to put his case personally to the papal court.⁷⁵ This action was a defiance of Bernard of Toledo's position of overall authority in the peninsula; nevertheless the direct approach soon bore fruit. In 1100 a new papal legate, Cardinal Richard of Marseilles, arrived in Spain. Despite Bernard's own legatine status, Cardinal Richard

⁷¹ Compostela laid claim to the churches of St Vitor and St Frutuoso; Astorga over the parishes of Ledra, Alist and Bragança; Mondofiedo over rights in Dume. Carl Erdmann, *Das Papsttum und Portugal im ersten Jahrhundert der portugiesischen Geschichte* (Berlin: Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Klasse Nr. 5, 1928); trans. J. da Providência Costa as *O Papado e Portugal no Primeiro Século da História Portuguesa* (Coimbra: Instituto Alemão, 1935), p. 15.

⁷² The original bull has not survived, but was quoted in June 1121 in a missive from Calixtus II (1119-1124). Erdmann, *PP*, pp. 174-77; and by the same author, *O Papado e Portugal*, p. 13; Fletcher, *Saint James's Catapult*, p. 107.

⁷³ *Vita sancti Gerald archiepiscopi Bracaraensis*, PMH SS, p. 54. Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 265-6, draws on this account to argue that Henry was not consulted on the appointment. Documents in Braga, however, report that 'archiepiscope Toletano ac rege Adefonso comiteque Henrico' were all in attendance. Da Costa, *O Bispo D. Pedro*, 2, p. 422, doc. 70.

⁷⁴ Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, p. 14.

convened a council at Palencia. At this council Bragan rights were formally acknowledged and Gerald gained the cherished status of archbishop.⁷⁶

Even as Gerald of Braga was enjoying this measure of success, a far greater threat was rising to the north. The death of Bishop Dalmace of Compostela in 1096 led to a disputed succession. Only after papal intervention did Diego Gelmírez, a native of Galicia and long time administrator of the see, emerge victorious.⁷⁷ Bishop Diego quickly demonstrated his boundless ambitions for Santiago, along with a willingness to use forceful, unscrupulous methods to gain his ends. The new bishop's political style was well demonstrated in his early relations with Archbishop Gerald of Braga. One point of contention between the two administrations was Compostela's claims over the churches of St Vitor and St Fructuoso in the suburbs of Braga. Fearing, perhaps, that Gerald's strengthening position would see Santiago divested of these assets, Gelmírez resorted to plundering them. Under cover of an assessment of his holdings, the bishop seized the relics of several saints and transferred them back to Compostela.⁷⁸ While the Galicians could describe this *pium latrocinium* in terms of divine will, the local Portuguese were filled with an outrage still echoed by modern writers.⁷⁹

In the face of such provocation Archbishop Gerald once again set out for Rome, possibly meeting with Count Henry, who was also in Italy, supposedly as a potential crusader. Once again Gerald's direct petition was well received. In April 1103 the pope confirmed the actions of the council of Palencia, recognising Gerald as archbishop and metropolitan for Galicia. Moreover the dependent bishoprics were named: Astorga, Lugo, Tüy, Mondoñedo, Orense, and Oporto. Compostela was exempted by virtue of the papal grant gained by Bishop Dalmace in 1095. The contested status of Coimbra was also addressed. Although Coimbra was critical for Portuguese territorial coherency, authority over it was claimed by both Toledo and Compostela. In 1103 the see of Coimbra and its two dependent dioceses, Viseu and Lamego, were all placed under Bragan authority.⁸⁰ Bishop Diego refused to be discouraged, and two years later he returned to Rome by way of Cluny, hoping to secure the elevation of his own see to

⁷⁵ *Vita sancti Gerald*, p. 56.

⁷⁶ *Vita sancti Gerald*, pp. 56-7.

⁷⁷ Fletcher *Saint James's Catapult*, pp. 108-12.

⁷⁸ HC, I, 15, pp. 31-6; Fletcher, *Saint James's Catapult*, pp. 114-5.

⁷⁹ Da Costa, *O Bispo D. Pedro*, p. 19, observes caustically that even the hostile Muslims refrained from plundering the tombs of saints.

⁸⁰ Realising the controversial nature of these decisions Pascal addressed letters to Mondoñedo, Santiago, Astorga and Coimbra advising them to respect the new arrangements. PP, pp. 157-60.

metropolitan status. Pope Paschal was unwilling to comply, although he soothed the ambitious prelate by granting him the right to wear the regalia of an archbishop on certain feast days.⁸¹ As a result of these decisions Bragan predominance in the region appeared to have been established.

In 1108 or early 1109 the death of the widely-respected Archbishop Gerald changed the situation dramatically. Bishop Maurice of Coimbra was elevated to the metropolitan of Braga, but the new incumbent lacked the status of his predecessor. Maurice was immediately assailed by his ecclesiastical rivals. These manoeuvres came to a crisis at a council convened at Palencia in October 1113. Gelmírez, with the support of Bernard of Toledo, turned the gathering into a sustained attack on the Portuguese church. Maurice of Braga was deposed for disobedience to Bernard in his role of papal legate, while Maurice's supporter, Bishop Pedro of Lugo, was also removed on the same charge. Urraca's own chaplain, a second Pedro, was chosen as the replacement. Finally Mondoñedo was removed from Bragan authority. When on 17 April 1114 Pope Paschal was persuaded to confirm the suspension of Maurice, Bernard instructed Gelmírez to circulate copies of the letter to Maurice's suffragans and also to Infanta Teresa.⁸²

Maurice of Braga refused to be a compliant victim of this assault and moved quickly to restore his position. Resorting to the increasingly familiar journey to Rome he was able to plead his case personally. By the end of the year the pope had sent a letter to Braga confirming territorial borders in which Maurice was addressed as archbishop once again.⁸³ On 23 July 1115, the pope wrote to Maurice advising him of the translation of Mondoñedo, but suggesting he might reopen the issue with the next papal legate.⁸⁴ On 15 August the pope took Oporto directly under his control, five days later he ruled in its favour in a dispute with Coimbra.⁸⁵ Finally, on 3 November 1115, the pope forwarded two letters that constituted a sweeping defence of Bragan claims. The first was to Bishop Gonçalvo of Coimbra, insisting that he submit to Bragan authority. The second cancelled Bernard of Toledo's legatine authority over Braga on the grounds of mismanagement.⁸⁶ Yet far from settling the crisis, these papal judgements merely

⁸¹ HC, I, 17, pp. 36-42.

⁸² HC, I, 97-9, pp. 161-4; Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, pp. 95-100.

⁸³ PL 163: 361-2.

⁸⁴ PL 163: 383; JL 6460.

⁸⁵ PL 163: 385-7; JL 6463-4; PP, pp. 167-8.

⁸⁶ PL 163: 391.

provoked further unrest. An attempt by the papacy in 1116 to bring the feuding bishops together in Rome to present their grievances in open session came to nothing. Only the Bishop of Oporto and the Abbot of Sahugún are known to have attended. Instead the bishops simply arrived at their own pleasure to petition the pope with specific complaints or requests: during the year the bishops of Oporto, Coimbra and the archbishop of Braga all appeared in Rome.⁸⁷

Much of the bitterness in these disputes arose because in the uncertain political situation after 1109 judgements on ecclesiastical matters had wider implications. Each of the major clerical disputants became closely allied to a secular ruler with parallel aims.⁸⁸ Thus Diego Gelmírez identified himself with the faction of Galician nobles gathering around Alfonso Raimúndez, while Maurice of Braga found support in his desires for autonomy from the like-minded Infanta Teresa. Archbishop Bernard of Toledo sought to impose obedience over the other Spanish bishops, a desire that complemented Urraca's intention to re-establish her father's authority. These demarcations became increasingly unyielding as animosities hardened. In the face of Iberian leaders' growing inability to reach any kind of consensus Paschal dispatched a papal legate to impose a settlement.⁸⁹

Understandable as the pope's decision was, the choice of legate had dramatic consequences. The delicate task fell to Cardinal Boso of St Anastasia; and he took his advice from the Toledan camp. The cardinal called a council at Palencia in 1117 to render his judgement. Finding against Braga, he placed Coimbra under the control of Mérida. Because that metropolitan remained under Muslim control its rights devolved onto Bernard of Toledo. The outraged Archbishop Maurice of Braga was goaded into a dangerous and ultimately disastrous course of action. Only months after these decisions were made, Pope Paschal died in Rome. His successor, Gelasius, quickly alienated Emperor Henry V. Their rising animosity peaked with Henry seizing control of Rome. Maurice was known and trusted in the imperial court, the emperor offered him the papacy and he accepted on 8 March 1118, taking the name Gregory VIII.

⁸⁷ Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, pp. 103-4.

⁸⁸ A measure of the growing secular implications of the clerical wrangling can be seen in the threat Pope Pascal circulated in 1113 to excommunicate any who damaged Church property or assailed clergymen. PL 163: 321-2; JL 6350.

⁸⁹ PL 163: 385; JL 6462. Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, pp. 120-1.

The new imperial pontiff sent a letter to the Bragan clergy explaining his actions, but was quickly outmanoeuvred in the resulting propaganda war.⁹⁰ Gelasius responded with a letter to the Spanish bishops advising them of the former archbishop's deposition and excommunication. The election of a new archbishop was authorised.⁹¹ Maurice, meanwhile, attracted little ecclesiastical support. Even worse for the imperial pope, the unremitting efforts of Abbot Ponce of Cluny and Gelasius' more diplomatic successor Calixtus II persuaded Emperor Henry to abandon him. Maurice retired to Sutri in 1119, where in 1121 he was besieged by papal troops, captured, and confined to the abbey of La Cava.⁹²

These events were a disaster for the Bragan cause. The removal of Archbishop Maurice allowed Bernard of Toledo to arrange matters in Braga to his own liking. Archbishop Bernard called a council at Segovia on 2 June 1118, at which he announced the elevation of the archdeacon of Braga, Paio Mendes (1118-1137). Immediately this appointment became public it drew the ire of Infanta Teresa. Archbishop Paio was initially forced into exile in Zamora; when he dared return to Braga he was promptly imprisoned. Papal fulmination secured his release but he did not appear in any Portuguese royal charters until late in 1122.⁹³ Meanwhile Diego Gelmírez of Compostela was preparing to make use of papal discomfiture to pursue his dream of archepiscopal status. While the actions of Maurice may not have been enough to swing papal opinion to the radical changes he sought, Bishop Diego added to his petition the support of Abbot Ponce of Cluny and the duke of Burgundy. In addition, the bishop forwarded to Rome rich tributes of treasure and coin. On 27 February 1120 Pope Calixtus yielded to his entreaties and translated the metropolitan status of Mérida to Santiago de Compostela. He also granted to Gelmírez legatine authority over Galicia and Mérida. Included in this arrangement were the dioceses of Salamanca and Coimbra as suffragans.⁹⁴ Although Gelmírez subsequently overreached himself by dabbling in royal politics, and so lost many of these benefits, the translation of Mérida's rights to Compostela had dramatic long term implications. Historically the southern regions of Portugal had been under the authority of Mérida; they would now devolve upon

⁹⁰ PP, pp. 173-4.

⁹¹ PL 163: 491-92; JL 6637.

⁹² The basic study of Maurice's career remains Pierre David, 'L'enigme de Maurice Bourdin', in P. David, *Études historiques sur la Galice et le Portugal*, 441-501. More briefly, see Fletcher, *Saint James's Catapult*, pp. 202-3.

⁹³ 3 November 1122. DMP, 1, pp. 79-80; Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, p. 241.


Compostela. The ground was thus prepared for still more acrimonious wrangling in the future.

These confused, seemingly interminable ecclesiastical disputes had important repercussions in Portugal. One turbulent decade had brought a complete reversal of the cultural background of the highest Portuguese clergy. From a situation in 1108 where both the archbishop of Braga and bishop of Coimbra had been French Cluniacs, these same offices were by 1118 filled by locally born clergymen. This transition was the most obvious aspect of a deeper change. Local ecclesiastical and secular interests had converged, the focus of both became increasingly parochial, and the papacy proved unable to impose change or even maintain a visible independence. Portuguese frustration with this situation provoked open rebellion from leading churchmen, but less sensationally it enhanced a sense of regional solidarity. Moreover, although the Bragan clergy were unable to make significant headway against the forces arrayed against them, they did manage to maintain their sense of grievance. Because local clergymen refused to concede either the authority of the archbishop of Toledo or the pretensions of the archbishop of Compostela, they remained in a position to play a decisive role in the political struggles to come.

The first three decades of the twelfth century were tumultuous ones for the Iberian kingdoms. Even as Latin Christian culture was extending itself into the east, borne on the crusading fervour that erupted at Clermont in 1095, that same cultural expansion was foundering in Spain. Under the strong government of Alfonso VI of León-Castile cultural permeation had been encouraged, with both secular nobility, the monastery of Cluny, and the reform papacy exercising a fundamental influence on the development of the Spanish kingdoms. When that strong government fragmented, both immigrant nobles and Cluniac monks were forced to adapt themselves to the confusion around them, but in doing so they compromised their own ability to effect wider social or political change. The papacy attempted to remain aloof from such local entanglements, but conspicuously failed to do so. Rulers in Portugal had sought to profit from the turmoil around them; this policy was continued and as the century progressed they enjoyed first prolonged setback and then spectacular success.

⁹⁴ Fletcher, *Saint James's Catapult*, pp. 203-6; see also below, map 3, p. 99.

Map 3. Ecclesiastical boundaries in Western Iberia



Chapter Four

The nascent kingdom: Infanta Teresa, Afonso Henriques, and the path to royalty (1124-1143)

Portugal was constituted as a political unit under Henry of Burgundy as an indirect result of Latin Christian influence in eleventh-century Iberia. In the early decades of the twelfth century this foreign influence waned, due to growing enthusiasm for the eastern crusade, and a rising social disorder in Iberia. The ambitious Count Henry had taken advantage of widespread political unrest to augment his own power. After Henry's death in 1112 his wife, Infanta Teresa (1112-1128), and son, Afonso Henriques (1128-1185), pursued their own ambitions, but with a varying degree of success. Teresa was unable to maintain the advances made by her husband, and a faction supporting her son eventually ousted her from power. Afonso, on the other hand, gradually enhanced his authority and prestige until by 1140 he was in a position to proclaim himself king. While Afonso's greater success was partially due to a more effective relationship with the great institutions of Latin Christendom, it was most firmly grounded in his assimilation into Iberian society and the astute local policies he pursued.

A relatively rich body of locally produced source material illuminates the administrations of Teresa and Afonso Henriques. The Portuguese chancery became more organised over time and the volume of official documents steadily grew.¹ Conspicuous among these documents are the numerous town charters granted to frontier communities to encourage settlement.² The increased efforts of the chancery were matched by a growing number and variety of narrative histories. One of the early cultural landmarks of Henriques' reign was the founding of the Augustinian monastery of Santa Cruz at Coimbra in 1132. The monks produced many of the most important

¹ Henriques' chancery is introduced by Rui de Azevedo, *DMP*, 1, pp. lxi-cxviii; and Avelino de Jesus da Costa, 'La Chancellerie Royale Portugaise jusqu'au milieu du XIII siècle', in A. de Jesus da Costa, *Estudos de Cronologia, Diplomática, Paleografia e Histórico-Linguísticos* (Porto: Sociedade Portuguesa de Estudos Medievais, 1992), pp. 157-8.

² These sources are discussed in James F. Powers, *A Society Organized for War: The Iberian Municipal Militias in the Central Middle Ages, 1000-1284* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); and by the same author, 'The Creative Interaction between Portuguese and Leonese Municipal Law, 1055-1279', *Speculum*, 62 (1987), 53-80.

biographies and chronicles of the period.³ Among the works completed at Santa Cruz was the *Chronica Gothorum*. This chronicle falls into two distinct parts. The first section covers the period from the coming of the Goths until the year 1122. Initially laconic and formulaic, the entries become more detailed as events become contemporary with authorship. The second section of the *Chronica Gothorum*, which takes up the task of recording events after 1122, is markedly different in tone. To all appearances the work of a different author, this second section focuses on the career of the monastery's great patron, Afonso Henriques.⁴ This material can occasionally be augmented by the brief records held in regional monasteries.⁵

Locally produced Portuguese chronicles are complemented by several important Spanish works. The *Historia Compostellana* provides invaluable coverage of events until 1139. The narrative is also taken up by the *Chronica Adefonsi Imperatoris*, the major narrative source for the reign of Alfonso VII of León-Castile (1126-1157). The last event mentioned in the *Chronica Adefonsi Imperatoris* is the Christian attack on Almería in 1147. Since the author claims to have written the chronicle prior to his subject's death, the early 1150s seem the most likely date of composition.⁶ Because Alfonso VII was the primary threat to Henriques' ambitions, this chronicle is also of critical importance to the early reign of the first Portuguese king.

³ These include *Vita sancti Geraldi archiepiscopi Bracaraensis*, PMH SS, pp. 53-9; *Vita Tellonis Archidiaconi*, PMH SS, pp. 64-75; *Vita S. Martini Sauriensis*, PMH SS, pp. 60-3; *Vita sancti Theotonii*, PMH SS, pp. 79-88. Alternative editions of the two hagiographies are *Vita S. Martini Sauriensis* in *Acta Sanctorum*, ed. J. Carnandet, Januarii tomus III (Brussels, 1863) and *S. Theotonii vita* in *Acta Sanctorum*, Februarii tomus III. The circumstances of these sources are discussed by Aires A. Nascimento, 'Vida de D. Telo', in Giulia Lanciani and Giuseppe Tavani (eds), *Dicionário da literatura medieval Galega e Portuguesa* (Lisbon: Caminho, 1993), pp. 661-63; and E. Austin O'Malley, *Tello and Theotonio, the Twelfth-century Founders of the Monastery of Santa Cruz in Coimbra*, (Washington: Catholic University Press, 1954) pp. 1-12, 42, n. 33. The monks also produced or copied the most important surviving early Portuguese chronicles. For a general overview of these narrative sources see José. Mattoso, 'Anais', in Lanciani, *Dicionário da literatura medieval Galega e Portuguesa*, pp. 50-2; and Fernando Venâncio Peixoto da Fonesca, 'Les Chroniques Portugaises des *Portugaliae Monumenta Historica*', *Revue des Langues Romains*, 77 (1967), 1-30.

⁴ *Chronica Gothorum*, PMH SS, pp. 8-17. The second section has been re-edited and published with a commentary by Monica Blöcker-Walter, 'Annales D. Alfonsi Portugallensium regis', in M. Blöcker-Walter, *Alfons I. von Portugal. Studien zu Geschichte und Sage des Begründers der portugiesischen Unabhängigkeit* (Zurich: Fretz und Vasmuth Verlag, 1966), pp. 151-62 [ADV].

⁵ Notably the 'Annales Lamecenses', PMH SS, pp. 19-20, from Lamego.

⁶ *Cronica Adefonsi Imperatoris*, eds A. Maya Sánchez and J. Gil, in *Chronica Hispana saeculi XII*, CCCM 71 (Turnhout, 1990), pp. 149-267 [CAI]; and in Simon Barton and Richard Fletcher (trans), *The World of the Cid. Chronicles of the Spanish Reconquest*, pp. 162-263. Unfortunately little can be gleaned of the author himself: Castilian, Catalan, and even French authorship have been proposed. These issues are further complicated by Peter Linehan's suggestion that the manuscript as it survives was subject to significant later gloss. 'Introduction to the *Cronica Adefonsi Imperatoris*', in Barton and Fletcher, *The World of the Cid*, pp. 148-61.

Afonso Henriques' assumption of royal authority has been of enduring interest to modern Portuguese historians, sometimes to the detriment of other important aspects of the period. The government of Infanta Teresa, despite its significance as a rare example of female rule, has attracted little attention and less approbation from Portuguese historians.⁷ Both contemporary and subsequent authors have portrayed Teresa's rule as a period in which erratic leadership caused a steady erosion of local autonomy. This descent into disorder and Spanish subjugation was only halted at the eleventh hour by her dynamic son's intervention. Afonso, on the other hand, has attracted such a high level of attention that present-day historians can comment wryly on the difficulty of finding anything to add to the picture.⁸

Yet Portugal's first king has been a major focus for those trends of insularity and excessive patriotism that have undermined much Portuguese historical writing. His political success has traditionally been interpreted in military terms. After a series of campaigns which culminated in a climactic battle at Ourique in 1139, Henriques had amassed such a reputation as to deserve royal status. The 'Legend of Ourique' developed around a document, supposedly dictated by Henriques, describing a vision he experienced on the eve of the battle. In this vision God appeared to the startled king, promising victory and authorising the founding of an independent kingdom. This divine mandate was accepted as fact until the nineteenth century, when the document was revealed as a fifteenth-century forgery.⁹ Mythmakers added that in the aftermath of this

⁷ The fundamental study remains Torquato de Sousa Soares, 'O governo de Portugal pela infanta-rainha D. Teresa (1112-1128)', in *Coleção de Estudos em Honra do Prof. Doutor Damião Peres* (Lisbon: Academia Portuguesa de História, 1973), 99-119. Other major works include: Alexandre Herculano, *História de Portugal desde o começo da monarquia até o fim do reinado de Afonso III*, ed. J. Mattoso, 4 vols (Lisbon: Bertrand Editoria, 1989), 1, pp. 314-80; Damião Peres, *Como Nasceu Portugal*, 7th ed. (Porto: Vertente, 1970), pp. 104-24; Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 13 vols (Lisbon: Editorial Verbo, 1977), 1, pp. 78-81. In a recent article by Armin Wolf, 'Reigning Queens in Medieval Europe: When, Where and Why', in *Medieval Queenship*, ed. John Carmi Parson (New York: St Martin's Press, 1993), 169-89 Teresa is neither mentioned nor included in the extensive list of European female rulers.

⁸ This weight of scholarly attention led José Mattoso to preface one article with the caveat: 'Tentar dizer alguma coisa de novo sobre o primeiro rei de Portugal é um verdadeiro desafio.' José Mattoso, 'A realeza de Afonso Henriques', in J. Mattoso, *Fragments de uma Composição Medieval* (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1993), p. 213. Several Portuguese biographies can be noted, including José Idalino Ferreira da Costa Brochado, *D. Afonso Henriques* (Lisbon, 1947); José Tomaz da Fonseca, *D. Afonso Henriques e a Fundação da Nacionalidade Portuguesa* (Coimbra, 1949); and the often reprinted D. Freitas do Amaral, *D. Afonso Henriques. Biografia*, 15th ed. (Chiado: Bertrand Editora, 2002). Beyond the efforts of Portuguese historians, the most important study remains Blöcker-Walter, *Alfons I. von Portugal*. There has been no English language biography of Afonso Henriques.

⁹ António Brandão, *Crónica de D. Afonso Henriques*, ed. A. de Magalhães Basto (Lisbon: Biblioteca Histórica, 1944), pp. 7-29, accepted the miracle of Ourique and reproduced the document in question. The document is also reproduced in DMP, 1, pp. 511-2. For a discussion of the 'miracle of Ourique' see

miraculous victory Henriques was acclaimed as king at a large public gathering at Lamegon. The 'court of Lamegon' has also been exposed as a pleasant fallacy.¹⁰ Another legend holds that the shields of the five Moorish kings who fled the battlefield were gathered together to form Afonso Henriques' coat of arms. The famous five shields still appear on the Portuguese national flag.¹¹

Patriotic historians have often found it difficult to reconcile their own enthusiasm over Afonso Henriques' assumption of royalty with the apparent indifference among Henriques' contemporaries toward this supposedly decisive act. During the fifteenth century forged documents were used to paper over these gaps. Even after these impostures were revealed, attempts to explain away the absence of sources continued.¹² Yet modern assessments of Henriques' success have commonly overlooked a subtle anachronism. Twelfth-century Iberian royal status is assumed to have been much the same as that found in contemporary Latin Christendom, and indeed equivalent to subsequent Spanish royal dignity. Yet this assumption obliges historians to explain the unexplainable: how Afonso was able to rise from relative obscurity to such dizzying heights. The essential question should be not how Afonso Henriques made such a remarkable leap in status, but rather what royal authority actually meant in twelfth-century Portugal.

Both medieval and modern commentators have tended to be hostile toward Teresa and approving of her son Afonso Henriques. Yet in aspiring to royal status the two rulers faced significantly different situations, and so formulated their own distinct policies to meet them. Iberian ideas of political authority appear to differ substantially from the Latin Christian model. The peninsula monarch remained a secular figure, largely devoid of ceremonial accoutrements. This made royal status easier to gain, but more difficult to secure. On coming to power in Portugal, Teresa sought to bolster her territorial and political autonomy by claiming royal status in defiance of her half-sister, Queen Urraca. Teresa relied primarily on external alliances to give substance to her royal pretensions. Ultimately, however, Urraca was able to isolate Teresa from such outside support, forcing the Portuguese leader into a disastrous reliance on long-

Luis R. Torgal, José A. Mendes, and Fernando Catrogo, *História da História em Portugal*, 2 vols (Lisbon: Temas e Debates, 1998), 1, 84-7; and below, pp. 317-8, 324.

¹⁰ Brandão, *Crónica de D. Afonso Henriques*, pp. 57-68.

¹¹ Brandão, *Crónica de D. Afonso Henriques*, pp. 33-5; Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 83-5; also Roger Pye, 'The Development of the Arms of Portugal in Fact and Legend', *Coat of Arms*, 38 (1959), 187-90 and 39 (1959), 252-5.

neglected regional resources. Afonso Henriques adopted the reverse policy and initially concentrated on establishing a local powerbase. Only when he was locally secure did Henriques attempt to re-engage with outside forces to support his own royal ambitions. Thus, while international prestige was important to the successful adoption of royal dignity, self-elevation could only be firmly established on strong local foundations.

Iberian monarchy: secular rule in a changing society

To underline their bids for local autonomy, both Teresa and Afonso Henriques adopted royal status. Yet such self-elevation was by no means unprecedented in peninsular politics; other contemporary rulers also claimed higher dignities without explanation or ceremony.¹³ Iberian monarchs and their subjects followed a less rigid ideal of kingship than was common among Latin Christian peoples. This more flexible attitude toward secular authority was a direct result of frontier life. The proximity of the Muslim world subjected the Spanish to pressures and opportunities unknown in other regions. Moreover the dangers of frontier life encouraged a high level of social mobility, and the fluidity that allowed a runaway slave to become a citizen in a frontier community could also serve the restless ambition of more powerful local magnates.

By the twelfth century Latin Christian secular society had solidified into a stratified feudal hierarchy that was defined in strict legal and ritualistic terms. At its summit stood a monarch, theoretically pre-eminent in power and prestige, and mandated by clerical consecration.¹⁴ The degree to which similar feudal structures were to be found in Iberian society has been a subject of considerable scholarly controversy.¹⁵ Ultimately questions over the existence of feudal institutions have

¹² For example Freitas de Amaral, *D. Afonso Henriques*, pp. 74-90.

¹³ Alfonso VI of León-Castile (1065-1109) styled himself emperor in 1077 and continued to do so until his death. Alfonso I of Aragon (1104-1134) adopted the title after 1109 and used it with decreasing frequency thereafter. Bernard F. Reilly, *The Kingdom of León-Castilla under Alfonso VII, 1126-1157* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), p. 23, n. 24.

¹⁴ For example W. Ullman, *Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages* (London: Methuen, 1961), p. 122, claims that during the twelfth century 'the acquisition of divine grace was not something that could be proved by mere assertion' for a monarch 'was not king until the oil had transformed his being'.

¹⁵ Because the feudal system was equated with European culture, arguments concerning feudal institutions became enmeshed in wider issues of Iberian nationality. For a discussion of Spanish historiographical debates on feudalism see Peter Linehan, *History and the Historians of Medieval Spain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 227-38; and more recently by the same author 'The Church and Feudalism in the Spanish Kingdoms in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries', in P. Linehan, *The Processes of Politics and the Rule of Law. Studies on the Iberian Kingdoms and Papal Rome in the*

obscured rather than clarified social developments in the peninsula. Latin Christian society grew increasingly structured due in large measure to the growing expense and complexity of warfare. Elite warrior status became the birthright of those possessing the wealth and training to participate as knights. This social stratification, reinforced with ritual demarcation of various kinds, was exemplified in a king distinguished from his subjects by the sacramental act of coronation. The situation in Iberia appears substantially different. Many of the preconditions for this form of social crystallisation were absent, and while the king remained at the political apex, he stood upon a lower social pyramid with stones less firmly set.

Attitudes toward kingship were most prominently displayed when royal authority was transferred during a coronation or following the death of the reigning monarch. A growing tension – between a secular ideal of the king as primarily a war-leader and the efforts of higher clergymen to ritualise the office – was particularly evident at such times. Clerical efforts to mark the elevation of a king with elaborate ceremony were widely mistrusted as an attempt to impose ecclesiastical authority upon wider society, and so were met with official indifference or suspicion. This friction between popular and clerical attitudes to secular rule was highlighted in the multiple coronations of Alfonso VII of León-Castile and the events following the death of Alfonso I of Aragon in 1134.

Alfonso VII underwent his first coronation in 1111, at the age of six. Bishop Diego Gelmírez crowned the young prince at Compostela in a carefully orchestrated ceremony that included the familiar Latin Christian elements of consecration and anointing with oil. Yet as Queen Urraca was still on the throne in 1111, the purpose of this ceremony is unclear. While probably intended to reassure the boy's supporters outside Spain, this action also underlined Bishop Diego's own position as Alfonso's ward.¹⁶ Certainly when Queen Urraca died in 1126 no mention was made of the earlier ceremony; Alfonso deemed another exhibition necessary to formalise his authority. The tone of the second gathering was completely different and Diego Gelmírez was conspicuously absent. The king was simply acclaimed publicly by a gathering of

Middle Ages (Aldershot: Variorum, 2002), 303-31. For a Portuguese focus, José Mattoso, 'Feudalismo peninsular', in Mattoso, *Fragmentos de uma Composição Medieval*, 115-50.

¹⁶ *Historia Compostellana*, ed. E. Falque Rey, CCCM 70 (Turnhout, 1988), I, 66, pp. 106 [HC]; Linehan, *History and the Historians*, pp. 235-6; Fletcher, *St James's Catapult*, pp. 133-4.

people, nobles and clergy in León. There was little ceremony, with the only symbolic gesture being the militaristic unfurling of the royal standard.¹⁷

This absence of elaborate ritual was repeated when the León-Castilian monarch claimed the title of emperor. Alfonso called a great council at León in 1135 consisting of clerical and lay magnates, along with a large crowd of non-noble onlookers. The papal legate to Spain, Cardinal Guido de Vico, had been present in the peninsula in 1134 and came again in 1136, but in the critical year of 1135 he had returned to Rome. At this predominantly local gathering Alfonso claimed the status of emperor on the grounds of his dominion over kings and foreign potentates. This suggestion was met with the acclamation of the crowd; from that time on Alfonso described himself in imperial terms.¹⁸

Other Spanish kingdoms shared this indifference to political ceremony. The unexpected death of Alfonso 'el Batallador' of Aragon in 1134 produced a succession crisis. The warlike king of Aragon initially sought to place his kingdom under the protection of the military orders, but this impossible provision was quickly overturned.¹⁹ In Navarre the local nobility rallied behind García Ramírez, the scion of the old royal line, whom they declared king before either Alfonso of León-Castile or the Aragonese could move to prevent it. Haste was foremost in all minds and ceremony was virtually non-existent.²⁰ In Aragon too, there occurred an unconventional transfer of power. Faced with serious Muslim incursions on the southern borders, the Aragonese aristocracy moved quickly to re-establish royal authority. The sole surviving son of the royal line was pried out of his monastery and rushed on to the throne as Ramiro II (1134-1137). Although well aware of the canonical objections to this course of action, the Aragonese aristocracy placed military necessity above the objections of Church legalists.²¹ The guiding principle was expediency; the central action was not ritual anointing or even the placement of the crown, but the publicly voiced consent of subjects.

¹⁷ CAI, I, 1, pp. 149-50. HC, II, 80, pp. 382-5 insists Gelmírez was invited, a claim dismissed by Linehan, *History and the Historians*, p. 237, n. 111. Cf. Fletcher, *Saint James's Catapult*, p. 256.

¹⁸ CAI, I, 69-70, pp. 181-83. Significantly, the *Historia Compostellana* makes no mention of Alfonso's imperial claims whatsoever.

¹⁹ E. Lourie, 'The will of Alfonso I, "el Batallador", king of Aragon and Navarre: a reassessment', *Speculum*, 50 (1975), 635-51.

²⁰ CAI, I, 58-62, pp. 177-9; José María Jover Zamora (ed.), *Historia de España*, 41 vols (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, S. A., 1998), 9, pp. 608-612; Reilly, *Alfonso VII*, pp. 45-7.

²¹ Zamora, *Historia de España*, 9, pp. 664-678; Reilly, *Alfonso VII*, pp. 44-5.

Military exigencies alone do not explain Iberian attitudes toward royal authority. Much of the character of medieval Iberian society was dictated by the reality of the frontier: local concepts of kingship were no exception. Spanish attitudes toward secular rule may have been influenced by their exposure to Muslim systems of political authority. Moreover the risks of frontier life encouraged a greater degree of social mobility among the Iberian Christians than was common in more settled northern regions. Also significant were the military and social implications of the *paria* tribute system imposed by Christian leaders on their Muslim rivals. In combination, these factors created a political situation unlike any other in Latin Christendom.

The long interaction between Christians and Muslims bequeathed to the Iberian kingdoms a host of unique offices and titles unknown in other areas. For example the prestigious office of *alfarez* (*alfaraz*, *alferice*), which derived from an Arabic term denoting high military position, continued to appear in Portuguese documents until at least 1147.²² At the same time, Christian attempts to define the social structure of their opponents by according them Latin titles tended to blur these categories further. The term 'king' was used for virtually any Muslim leader of repute. Thus the Almoravid leader at the battle of Ourique was called King Esmar; similarly the leader who submitted to Alfonso VII was known as King Zafadola. In none of these cases is royal blood implied, rather such titles appear as a nebulous honorific for military leadership.²³

Such cultural interactions complicated Iberian attitudes toward political authority, but it was the concrete implications of the frontier that most influenced Spanish society. Life on the frontier was more fluid than in more settled regions. Populations were transient and ever ready to move should better opportunities present themselves. Settlers were in demand, with monarchs and magnates obliged to compete for those willing to form borderland communities. To lure citizens to newly founded towns, charters provided significant opportunity for social advancement. In the volatile Toledo sector, for example, Mozarabs were granted full *caballeros* rights if they could provide and effectively use a horse.²⁴ Similar examples are known in Portugal. Many towns included provision that any who settled there, even escaped slaves, were eligible for full citizenship. In borderland towns anyone who could provide a horse might

²² DMP, I, p. cxvi.

²³ See for example CAI, II, 52-5, pp. 219-20. Interestingly the HC, II, 24, p. 267, makes this relationship explicit: 'eorum principes, qui lingua sua 'alciada' dicitur...'

²⁴ Powers, *A Society Organized for War*, p. 22.

choose to be numbered among the *miles*.²⁵ Such social fluidity undermined any tendency toward political ossification in the Iberian kingdoms.

Frontier opportunity was not the only factor in Iberian cultural flexibility. Latin Christian social stratification had its origins in the need to maintain large bodies of mounted warriors. By providing service in return for grants of land these warriors gradually coalesced into an aristocratic elite that monopolised military force into their own hands. Such arrangements were long delayed in Spain by the presence of the *taifa* kingdoms and the lucrative *paria* tributes they provided. For over a century the extortion of these payments dominated the policies of the Christian rulers. This situation enabled kings to create large armies that served for pay and booty, both of which were provided by the Muslim states. Without the stability that came from permanent grants of land these mercenary forces were unable to crystallise into an exclusive aristocratic elite. The entry of the Almoravids into the peninsula brought an end to the tribute payments, and Christian kings were obliged to obtain military service through means other than simple cash payment.

To meet the needs of frontier defence the kings were forced into negotiation with the citizens of towns, for they were able to meet at least basic requirements of income and training. In the wake of the battle of Zalaca in 1087 – the Christian defeat that marked the end of the *paria* system – Alfonso VI of León-Castile issued town charters that included more comprehensive military obligations in return for additional civic privileges.²⁶ During the endemic internal disunity that beset the Christian kingdoms following the death of Alfonso VI, the local militias formed the backbone of Christian defence. By the third decade of the twelfth century townsmen were initiating independent large-scale raids into Muslim territory.²⁷ As these local military units became increasingly proficient they formed a counterweight to the military aristocracy and were thus able to protect the various privileges they had gained.

Due to the extraordinary situation on the frontier a unique social structure evolved in the Iberian kingdoms. A relatively fluid society persisted in which a permeable warrior aristocracy was balanced in military potential by the militias of the

²⁵ For example the charter of Frexno (1152) extended citizenship to Moors who became Christians or runaway slaves: 'Maurum qui fuerit christianum vel seuum et ad fresno venerit sedeat liberum.' PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, p. 379. In the code of Leiria (1142) is the provision: 'Peon si habuerit equum sit miles si vult.' PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 376.

²⁶ The relationship between the battle of Zalaca and the rise of the militias is discussed by Powers, *A Society Organized for War*, pp. 20-3.

towns. It was a society, moreover, with limited patience for royal pretension. This attitude is best represented in the sensational events that occurred in Compostela in 1117. The townsfolk, outraged by royal attempts to exact unfair concessions, turned on Queen Urraca. The unfortunate monarch was stripped and pelted with stones and garbage in the city square; she was only saved when the timely intervention of less passionate citizens allowed her to escape. While the extreme actions of the angry mob were astounding, more surprising still was the moderate reaction of Urraca to the outrage done to royal dignity. The worst of the malefactors was merely banished from the city and the remainder fined.²⁸

By the middle of the twelfth century political culture in Iberia had become quite distinct from the forms common in northern Europe. Where Latin Christian kings accrued religious and ceremonial characteristics, the peninsula monarchy remained a strictly secular office. Ritualistic or sacramental aspects were ignored or even actively resisted by kings wary of ecclesiastical interference. A closer association with Muslim society may have been partially responsible for these differences, but more influential were the pragmatic necessities of frontier governance. Teresa and Afonso Henriques aspired to this Iberian form of kingship; both were to find that the achievement of royal dignity required a combination of effective local policies and a successful engagement with Latin Christendom.

The reign of the uncrowned queen (1112-1125)

During the first decade of the twelfth century Henry the Burgundian and Infanta Teresa pursued a successful policy of local aggrandisement. After Henry's death in 1112, Teresa assumed sole rule of the county. Teresa formed alliances with dissatisfied Galician magnates and bolstered her position by adopting royal titles. Queen Urraca of León-Castile, Teresa's half-sister and titular overlord, moved quickly to bring the Portuguese leader to obedience. Uncertain alliances and self-bestowed titles proved insufficient in the face of Urraca's military superiority, and Teresa's prospects appeared bleak. Yet the unusual situation, in which two female rulers each wielded only partial authority within their own territories, was particularly open to outside interference. The

²⁷ Powers, *A Society Organized for War*, pp. 31-46; and below, pp. 198-201.

²⁸ HC, I, 114, pp. 199-209; Fletcher, *St James's Catapult*, pp. 186-7; Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, p. 124.

unexpected intervention of Pope Calixtus into peninsula affairs brought relations with Latin Christendom, which had been allowed to wane, back into the foreground. Ultimately Queen Urraca proved the more adept at utilising this foreign influence, forcing Teresa to fall back on local resources. Unfortunately her activities outside the region had antagonised the Portuguese aristocracy, and she could propound no effective policies to deal with a rising tide of local resistance.

For several years after the death of Count Henry, Teresa and Urraca were kept apart by their own local concerns. The queen of León-Castile confronted internal disunity and the territorial encroachments of her ex-husband, Alfonso of Aragon. The Portuguese infanta faced a growing Almoravid threat from the south. In June 1117 the Muslims launched a major assault that reached the walls of Coimbra. The city endured three weeks of siege before the Almoravid forces withdrew.²⁹ Urraca took advantage of this distraction to attack Portuguese strongholds in the north, but the garrisons were able to resist all assault. Military success bolstered Teresa's sense of autonomy, the Portuguese ruler's growing confidence was reflected in the new titles she adopted. Since coming to power in Portugal Teresa had styled herself simply 'Infanta', but in a move of calculated defiance, from May 1117 Teresa began to refer to herself as queen.³⁰ With the benefit of hindsight, however, 1117 can be seen as the zenith of Teresa's independent authority: from this point her position deteriorated.

During the 1110s Queen Urraca's political situation began to improve as she dealt diplomatically with some of the greater threats to her power. Taking advantage of her former husband Alfonso of Aragon's preoccupation with a planned attack against the Muslim-held city of Huesca, the queen was able to secure a truce on her eastern border.³¹ The other major source of tension within the kingdom came from her son, Alfonso Raimúndez, who had become a focus for aristocratic discontent in Galicia. The youth was also a major asset to his appointed guardian, Bishop Diego of Compostela, in his numerous political schemes. In 1116 Urraca shrewdly granted Raimúndez independent rule of the Toledo region. Not only did this satisfy both her son and his powerful outside supporters, but it removed him from close association with his Galician partisans. This act also loosened the control Bishop Diego had exercised over

²⁹ 'Annales Portugalenses Veteres', in P. David, *Études historiques sur la Galice et le Portugal du VI^e au XII^e siècle* (Lisbon: Livraria Portugalia Editoria, 1947), pp. 302, 308 [APV].

³⁰ DMP, 1, pp. 59-62.

the boy since the agreement following Count Raymond's death in 1108. With his assumption of authority in Toledo the prince came under the tutelage of the unswervingly loyal Bernard of Toledo.³²

Even as Urraca was freeing herself from troublesome family disagreements, Teresa suffered a series of setbacks. In 1118 the vicissitudes of ecclesiastical politics goaded Archbishop Maurice of Braga to make the ill-starred journey to Rome that culminated in his election as the Imperial Pope Clement II. This crisis had profound ramifications for Teresa and indeed for subsequent Portuguese history. Archbishop Maurice was replaced in Braga by Paio Mendes, a partisan of Queen Urraca and Bernard of Toledo.³³ Meanwhile Bishop Diego of Compostela took advantage of Bragan discomfiture to obtain metropolitan status for his own see. This success encouraged the new archbishop into more ambitious schemes that would ultimately rebound against Teresa.

Seemingly secure in his elevated position, Archbishop Diego began to ferment unrest. Ostensibly he acted on behalf of Alfonso Raimúndez, but his true aim was the humiliation of his arch-rival Bernard of Toledo. When Queen Urraca became aware of these plans she led a royal army into Galicia. After forcing contrition on her son's partisans, including the archbishop of Compostela, she took the opportunity to launch an attack against her half-sister. Teresa retreated to her castle at Lanhoso, some ten kilometres from Braga, there to withstand a siege. Urraca's forces, meanwhile, raided as far south as the Douro River.³⁴ On 17 June Urraca issued a charter to the church at Braga that was confirmed by both Archbishop Diego and Alfonso Raimúndez.³⁵ Then, in July 1120, the queen pressed her advantage by ordering the arrest of Archbishop Diego and the seizure of his castles. Even while trapped in Lanhoso Teresa suspected her half-sister's intentions, and sent the archbishop a warning, which he chose to ignore.³⁶ In this action, however, Urraca had overreached herself, for although the

³¹ At Burgos in 1117. The Huesca campaign in 1118 was promoted as a crusade by Pope Gelasius II and attracted considerable support from French noblemen. Reilly, *King Alfonso VII*, pp. 9-10.

³² Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, pp. 114-8.

³³ Bishop Paio was also a member of a powerful family. His father, Mendo Gonçalves of Maia, was to become one of the leading nobles in the faction surrounding Afonso Henriques. Archbishop Paio's election might therefore be the first indication of the existence of this faction. Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, p. 241.

³⁴ Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, pp. 144-6.

³⁵ Possibly Afonso Henriques also acknowledged Queen Urraca's authority at this point. Luís Gonzago de Azevedo, *História de Portugal*, 6 vols (Lisbon: Edições Biblión, 1935-44), 3, pp. 123-5.

³⁶ HC, II, 40, pp. 284-6.

archbishop's imprisonment was a brief one, it brought Pope Calixtus directly into the fray.

Strident defence of an incarcerated archbishop was the reaction expected from an effective pope. In this instance, however, the ferocity of Pope Calixtus' response should not be interpreted as evidence of a general papal policy of intervention in the region. Certainly the Iberian leaders, caught up in their local disputes, seem to have been surprised by papal fury. Yet the situation in 1121 was complicated by the identity of the protagonists and the relationships between them. Twelfth-century secular and ecclesiastical leaders in Latin Christendom tended to be wary of female rule; by and large it would only be countenanced when a clear male successor needed to be cultivated.³⁷ For Queen Urraca this could make foreign intervention in her affairs more dangerous than it might have been to a male ruler. In the queen's case too, there were personal considerations due to the relationship between Pope Calixtus and the royal family: the pontiff was Count Raymond's brother and so uncle to Alfonso Raimúndez. Thus Pope Calixtus' personal interest in the youth's future was clearly a central factor in his forceful intervention and his process for dealing with the crisis.³⁸

On 7 October 1120 Pope Calixtus addressed letters to the major players in the unfolding drama. Queen Urraca was given chill commands; Alfonso Raimúndez received warm greetings. Letters were also sent to the papal legate Cardinal Boso, to Archbishop Bernard, and to the bishops of Spain. The pope advised all these correspondents of his intention to excommunicate Urraca and place the kingdom under interdict if full restitution to Archbishop Diego was not forthcoming within forty days.³⁹ Urraca's enemies moved quickly to take advantage of papal anger. Archbishop Diego and Cardinal Boso organised a council at Sahugún on August 25. Although none of Urraca's supporters answered the summons, representatives from Galicia and Portugal did, and León-Castile was placed under interdict.⁴⁰ Given the unsettled state of the

³⁷ For an initial exploration of medieval attitudes to queenship see Lois L. Huneycutt, 'Female Succession and the Language of Power in the Writings of Twelfth-Century Churchmen', in J. C. Parsons (ed.), *Medieval Queenship* (New York, St Martin's Press, 1993), 189-201. The observations on Queen Melissande of Jerusalem (1131-1161) are particularly relevant for Teresa and Urraca due to the significance of the frontier for political and social structures in both Iberia and the Holy Land.

³⁸ This interest preceded the crisis of 1121. For example, one reason Calixtus agreed to the translation of Mérida's metropolitan status to Compostela the previous year was the advantage it might bring to Alfonso. HC, II, 16, pp. 254-8; Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, p. 242.

³⁹ For the letters: PL 163: 1219-21; JL 6926-30. There are some difficulties with the dating of these documents, as observed by Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, p. 151.

⁴⁰ PP, pp. 177-81.

kingdom, this level of ecclesiastical sanction could easily mean the end of Urraca's rule.

The queen's only recourse was a direct appeal to the pope himself. The aging Bernard of Toledo hastened to Rome to put the queen's case to the papal curia. This mission, perhaps the most important of Bernard's distinguished career, was a complete success. The decisions reached at the council of Sahagún were overturned and the kingdom-wide interdict raised. In addition Bernard was granted sweeping authority: his primacy over Spain was confirmed, and his legatine authority re-imposed over every region except Braga and Mérida. Toledo's metropolitan rights were extended to cover León and Oviedo. In his granting of these concessions, the pope made clear that his major consideration was the welfare of his nephew Alfonso.⁴¹

By 1121 Queen Urraca had been able to severely curtail the independent authority of her half-sister Teresa. Careful regional diplomacy and occasional use of military force had proved decisive, yet all the queen's plans had almost been upset by the unexpected intervention of Pope Calixtus into peninsula affairs. Although this intervention had been largely motivated by Calixtus' own family loyalties, both Teresa and Urraca were made acutely aware that successful secular rule required control over the communication between Iberian churchmen and Rome. This presented serious complications for the Portuguese ruler. While bishops throughout Spain could in theory present independent petitions, only the three archbishops possessed sufficient standing to make an enduring impact in Rome. Archbishop Bernard of Toledo was an unwavering supporter of Queen Urraca. Similarly, Archbishop Paio of Braga was firmly within the queen's faction – his election had prompted Teresa first to exile and then arrest him.⁴² Only the archbishop of Compostela presented a possible ally for Teresa.

Even after the setbacks of 1121, Archbishop Diego remained locally powerful. He enjoyed the support of Cluny, and could still rely on influential clergymen in Rome. Nevertheless, his support proved to be of questionable value. While the archbishop was willing to accept Teresa's aid to restore his own fortunes, he was slow to commit

⁴¹ PL 163: 1222-3; JL 6931-4.

⁴² PL 163: 491-2; JL 6637. Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, pp. 240-41. The archbishop was only released after Teresa was threatened with excommunication. PL 163: 1255-6; JL 6988. Paio was not received back into the royal court until 1122, and made infrequent subsequent visits. DMP, 1, pp. 79-80.

himself to her cause in the wake of his own success.⁴³ The archbishop's primary concerns were the restitution of his confiscated territory and to upstage Bernard of Toledo. The first of these aims was fulfilled in 1122 when Urraca returned the disputed castles.⁴⁴ The subsequent arrival of the papal legate Cardinal Deusdedit, a man sympathetic to his cause, allowed Diego to recoup a measure of his status. The archbishop also secured a conspicuous mark of favour over Bernard when Alfonso Raimúndez travelled to Compostela to be knighted on 25 May 1124.⁴⁵ A few months later Archbishop Diego accomplished his most cherished goal when he persuaded Pope Calixtus to make permanent the temporary transference of the metropolitan status of Mérida to Compostela.⁴⁶ During these years Archbishop Diego found détente with Queen Urraca more profitable than supporting the pretensions of the Portuguese infanta.

As was frequently the case throughout Diego Gelmírez's turbulent career, at the very point his fortunes reached their zenith, clouds were gathering on the horizon. On 25 December 1124 Pope Calixtus breathed his last. His successor, Honorius II (1124-1130), harboured a deep suspicion for the archbishop of Compostela. Diego Gelmírez's legatine rights were cancelled and the frigid tone of subsequent papal communiqués made their renewal unlikely.⁴⁷ On 25 April 1125, the stalwart Archbishop Bernard of Toledo died. Yet Diego could take little comfort from the passing of his greatest ecclesiastical rival. In November 1125 Honorius confirmed Bernard's successor, Raymond of Osma (1125-1153), as archbishop of Toledo with primacy and legatine rights for the whole of Spain. Diego also received letters from both Urraca and Alfonso Raimúndez warning him against attempting to undermine the new primate's position.⁴⁸ If the archbishop had been unwilling to support Teresa prior to 1125, his subsequent beleaguered position rendered him incapable of greatly influencing events in Portugal. By holding aloof, however, he withheld not only his own assistance, but also his influence in Rome and his privileged access to the monks at Cluny.

As the possibility of obtaining assistance from the archbishop of Compostela waned Teresa made her own, largely unsuccessful attempts to resurrect her relations

⁴³ Fletcher, *St James's Catapult*, pp. 148-51; Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, pp. 153-4.

⁴⁴ PL 163: 1219-21; JL 6926-30. Fletcher, *St James's Catapult*, pp. 150-1. For problems with the dating of papal intervention see Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, p. 151, n. 108.

⁴⁵ Diego was able to persuade Deusdedit to hold his council at Compostela rather than Valladolid, against the objections of Bernard. Fletcher, *Saint James's Catapult*, p. 154; Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, pp. 185-8.

⁴⁶ HC, II. 63-4, pp. 347-56; JL 7160; Fletcher, *St James's Catapult*, pp. 211-2.

⁴⁷ Fletcher, *St James's Catapult*, pp. 212-6.

⁴⁸ HC, II. 73, pp. 372-3; Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, pp. 197, 228.

with Latin Christendom. Early in 1125 the possibility of forging an alternative link with Rome emerged when Pope Honorius took the long-disputed see of Coimbra directly under papal control.⁴⁹ Any potential advantage was lost, however, because Bishop Gonçalo remained loyal to Toledo. Thus the pope's action merely exacerbated what one modern commentator described as 'the lamentable decomposition of the Portuguese church.'⁵⁰ Certainly there is no evidence Teresa attempted to coerce Gonçalo with grants of territory or privilege – as her son was later to do – nor was the bishop a frequent signatory in court documents.⁵¹ Teresa also made another attempt to win the sympathy of the abbot of Cluny by donating property at Vimieiro to his monastery. This was to be Teresa's only direct grant to Cluny, but seems to have brought little benefit beyond the prayers of the grateful monks.⁵²

Failure to secure alliances outside the region proved disastrous for Teresa. In the absence of other support Teresa was forced closer to her remaining ally, the Galician magnate Pedro Froilaz. This policy enjoyed initial success. Teresa was able to extend her influence into the Minho region.⁵³ With this success the relationship grew closer, soon becoming more than simply a political convenience. From 1121 Pedro's son Count Fernando Pérez of Trava was romantically associated with the infanta and as a result became increasingly prominent in the region. In January of that year he was described as 'Lord of Coimbra and Portugal.' His standing was improved with the granting of estates in Montemor-o-Velho, Soure, and the castle of St Eulalia.⁵⁴ While it is unclear if Fernando and Teresa were ever formally married, they had a daughter who was old enough in 1132 to be included in a charter of donation to the Trava family monastery at Jubia.⁵⁵

The growing prominence of the Galician nobles in Portugal soon provoked resistance. The impropriety of Teresa's relationship with Fernando unsettled many

⁴⁹ PP, pp. 183-5.

⁵⁰ The stinging judgement is Erdmann's, *O Papado e Portugal*, p. 34.

⁵¹ Afonso Henriques' dealings with the see of Coimbra and the complications provoked by the foundation there of the monastery of Santa Cruz will be considered below, p. 125-6.

⁵² 23 May 1127. DMP, 1, p. 96-8.

⁵³ In 1122 Teresa could grant generous privileges in Orense. DMP, 1, pp. 75-6. By 1125 opportunistic nobles had secured Túy on Teresa's behalf. DMP, 1, pp. 87-9. Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, p. 192, notes that the second of these charters may be a copy based on the first.

⁵⁴ DMP, 1, pp. 78-80.

⁵⁵ For the debate on the nature of this relationship see Peres, *Como Nasceu Portugal*, p. 98. The links between Galician and Portuguese noble houses are examined by Bernard F. Reilly, 'Alfonso VII of León-Castilla, the House of Trastámara, and the Emergence of the Kingdom of Portugal', *Mediaeval Studies*,

observers, particularly among clergymen. On two occasions Teresa crossed verbal swords with St Theotonio, a local religious leader.⁵⁶ The unconventionality of the couple's relationship may have tried the patience of a saint, but the political implications caused a more general alarm. From 1122 Count Fernando was a regular signatory to Teresa's charters and frequently lent his support in official duties.⁵⁷ Other members of his family also began to accrue authority in Portugal, with Fernando's brother Bermundo marrying Teresa's daughter Urraca in 1122 and appearing in charters from 1126 as the lord of Viseu.⁵⁸ In response to this growing Galician presence the local Portuguese nobility rallied around the obvious focus of opposition, Afonso Henriques, the son of Teresa and Henry of Burgundy. The formation of this faction was the beginning of the end of Teresa's authority in Portugal.

The significance of Teresa's reign has often been overshadowed by the achievements of her son Afonso Henriques. Teresa made sweeping claims for regional authority, yet it is never clear if her aim was to insinuate herself and her son into the line of León-Castilian succession or to rule independently in Portugal.⁵⁹ In the former case her reign was a failure; but in the latter, a partial success. Teresa could rely only on the disunity of her rival; when Urraca was free from distractions the Portuguese ruler was unable to resist her half-sister's authority. The unexpectedly vigorous intervention of Pope Calixtus in peninsula affairs awoke both Teresa and Urraca to the possibilities of Latin Christian influence in the region. In response Teresa attempted to lift the conflict above the regional by accessing outside influence, but was thwarted at each turn by her half-sister. In the face of growing local unrest in Portugal Teresa was unable to prevent the rise to power of her son, Afonso Henriques.

63 (2001), 193-222. A brief biography of this important noble is also included in Simon Barton, *The Aristocracy in Twelfth-Century León and Castile* (Cambridge: UP, 1997), pp. 241-2.

⁵⁶ On one occasion, seeing the couple sitting in his congregation, Theotonio delivered a sermon on loosening public morals. The two blushing lovers were forced to leave the church in shame. A second incident followed. While preparing for the Mass, Theotonio received a message from the impatient Teresa ordering him to complete the ceremony as quickly as possible. The indignant cleric refused, suggesting that Teresa could either patiently wait or immediately leave. This uncompromising reply forced contrition on Teresa, who sought Theotonio's forgiveness. This he gave, but only after sternly commanding her to mend her errant ways. *Vita sancti Theotonii*, p. 81a. The background to Theotonio's moral stance is considered by P. Linehan, 'Santo Martino and the context of sanctity in thirteenth-century León', *Isidoriana*, 1 (1987), 689-97; repr. in Linehan, *Past and Present in Medieval Spain*.

⁵⁷ For example in negotiating with Alfonso VII of León-Castile, CAI, I, 5, pp. 151-2.

⁵⁸ DMP, I, pp. 496-97. While believing this document accurately represents the situation, Azevedo raises some doubts over the accuracy of the copyist responsible.

⁵⁹ That Teresa focused her attentions outside Portugal is perhaps most evident in her desire to be buried at Compostela. HC, II, 89, pp. 410. She did not seek to create a local royal tomb, as her son subsequently did at Santa Cruz. For Reilly's assessment of Teresa's motivation, *Queen Urraca*, pp. 117-8.

Afonso Henriques: the first Portuguese king

As Queen Teresa's Galician entanglements deepened, the dissatisfaction of the local Portuguese nobility found a rallying point in her son, Afonso Henriques. Civil war broke out between the two factions in 1128; the victory of Henriques' supporters marked the beginning of a new phase of Portuguese history. While both Count Henry and Queen Teresa had aspired to the greater prizes to be won in León-Castile, Henriques focused his considerable energies on securing Portuguese independence. After a decade of gradually establishing his local authority, Henriques openly claimed royal status in 1139. Four years later, Alfonso VII of León-Castile grudgingly accepted the situation. Several contemporary authors explained Henriques' success as a direct result of his martial prowess, an explanation that was eminently satisfying for generations of Portuguese historians. Yet political success relied on more than military reputation. To establish his local authority Henriques was also obliged to effectively manage the same aristocratic families that had initially placed him in power. This required a gradual realignment of royal interest toward the frontier and a careful oversight of the Portuguese church.

Although Henriques' declaration of independent kingship has justly been considered a watershed in Portuguese history, contemporary authors provide only the vaguest outline of the actual events.⁶⁰ The *Annales Portugalenses Veteres* does not even mention Henriques until after the battle of Ourique in 1139, and always refers to him as king.⁶¹ The longer *Annales D. Alfonsi Portugallensium Regis* provides slightly more detail. Henriques is called *infante* until 1131 then, without explanation, he is given the title *rex*.⁶² The *Chronica Adefonsi Imperatoris* also includes a brief description of the foundation of the Portuguese royal house. Yet this passage complicates rather than clarifies the situation through its intimation of popular acclaim being the decisive factor.⁶³ Fortunately a monk in Santa Cruz embellished the biography of St Theotónio with information concerning the political situation in the region. Henriques' elevation

⁶⁰ Mattoso, 'A realeza de Afonso Henriques', pp. 214-5.

⁶¹ APV, p. 308.

⁶² ADA, p. 152. The author does, however, make earlier mentions of the *regnum Portugallis*. Interestingly too, this chronicle numbers the years of Afonso's reign from 1128.

⁶³ 'Mortuo autem comite Enrrico, Portugalenses uocauerunt eam [Teresa] reginam; qua defuncta, filium suum regem, sicut et postea fuit, ad honorem nominis sui dixerunt.' CAI, I. 73, p. 184.

from *dux* to *rex* is noted, and explained as a result of the Portuguese leader's courage and military success.⁶⁴ None of these narrative accounts provide a reliable timeline for the assumption of the royal title, but the first official documents in which Henriques styled himself king date from 1139.⁶⁵

These sources present the first Portuguese king's military prowess as his defining characteristic. Certainly Henriques came to power in a military coup in 1128, and then waged almost constant border warfare against both Moors and León-Castilians. Henriques was able to maintain his territorial integrity, but made few strategic gains. Yet the creation of a military reputation relied not merely on the ability to win great victories, but also on the effective use of more modest success. In the first decade of his rule Henriques enjoyed mixed military fortunes, but was unremitting in his efforts to translate military endeavour into political advantage.

Afonso Henriques' early years set the tone for the remainder of his reign. Queen Teresa's policy of favouring Galician magnates over their Portuguese peers provoked serious local discontent and alienated her own son. On 25 May 1125 Henriques underwent his official arming ceremony, a ritual heavy with significance in medieval Spanish society, for it represented the passage to full adulthood and rights of inheritance. In an act of calculated defiance Henriques' ceremony took place at Zamora, seemingly without his mother being present.⁶⁶ Zamora was a border town between León-Castile and Portugal; the bishop of the city, Bernard of Perigord, was a staunch supporter of Bernard of Toledo.⁶⁷ The ceremony was conducted, the Portuguese chronicler observes, in the manner of royalty. In hindsight Henriques' defiance in 1125 was seen as the first step on the road to kingship.⁶⁸ Following this gesture of despite the relationship between mother and son deteriorated further.

On 8 March 1126 Queen Urraca died, to be succeeded by her son Alfonso Raimúndez as Alfonso VII. Merely by coming to power the new king had removed many of the divisions within the kingdom; he quickly brought the few recalcitrant nobles to obedience.⁶⁹ This was an unwelcome development for Teresa, who was forced

⁶⁴ *Vita sancti Theotonii*, pp. 83, 85. A similar opinion was expressed a century later by Lucas of Túy, *Chronica Mundi*, ed. E. Falque Rey, CCCM 72 (Turnhout, 2003), IV, 79, p. 317.

⁶⁵ By 1140 a standard formula had evolved: 'ego rex Alphonsus Portugalensium princeps comitis Henrici et reginae Tarasiae filius magni quoque regis Alphonsi nepos...' DMP, 1, p. 214.

⁶⁶ ADA, p. 151.

⁶⁷ Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, p. 245.

⁶⁸ Mattoso, 'A realeza de Afonso Henriques', pp. 214-5.

⁶⁹ CAI, I, 2-8, pp. 150-3.

to negotiate with a new monarch unencumbered by internal division. By 1127 Alfonso of León-Castile had stabilised his kingdom sufficiently to attempt action against the Portuguese queen. The young king invaded across the Minho River and caused widespread destruction until Teresa made a humiliating submission to his authority.⁷⁰ Afonso Henriques fared little better than his mother, enduring a siege at the Portuguese capital of Guimarães before similarly capitulating. Additions to the city's charter immediately afterwards underline Henriques' position of subordination to Alfonso VII.⁷¹

This humiliation seems to have goaded Afonso Henriques into casting off the last of his obedience to his mother. The new town charter for Guimarães was witnessed on his own authority, without reference to Teresa, in a step that has been interpreted as the first solid indication of a formal split between the two. Certainly they do not share in the granting of any further charters, although both continued to issue separate documents.⁷² Henriques' intentions were made clear in a donation made to Archbishop Paio of Braga in May. The grant was provisional on the prince's hoped-for assumption of power.⁷³ Hostilities deepened into civil war; but the conflict was a brief one that culminated in the battle of São Mamede, several kilometres from Guimarães, on 24 July 1128.⁷⁴ Henriques' supporters emerged victorious. Teresa and Fernando both survived the defeat and were exiled from Portugal.⁷⁵

Because Henriques had seized government from his mother by force of arms, an already uncertain legitimacy of authority was further complicated. Henriques had no official title of his own, inheriting neither the status of count conferred on his father nor the royalty his mother claimed for herself. The source for any formal renewal of these titles was the unpalatable one of submission to his León-Castilian cousin. The Portuguese leader's dilemma can be traced in the honorifics he adopted in official documents. As early as 1129 a characteristic formula had evolved that would continue to be used for the next decade: 'The illustrious infante lord Afonso nephew of the great Emperor Alfonso, of happy memory, son of Count Henry and Queen Teresa and also,

⁷⁰ Alfonso used the opportunity of the first appearance of the Templars in Spain to underline his victory. In the first Portuguese grant to the Templars on 19 March 1128 the signatories are headed by Alfonso VII with Teresa in a subordinate position bearing the honorific 'infanta'. DMP, 1, pp. 99-101.

⁷¹ 27 April, 1128. PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, p. 351; Azevedo, *Historia de Portugal*, 3, pp. 238-9.

⁷² Peres, *Como Nasceu Portugal*, pp. 122-3.

⁷³ 'Et quando habuero portugalensem terram adquisitam, civitatem tuam et sedem tuam et ea, que ad eam pertinent tibi tuisque successoribus in pace dimittam sine aliqua controversia.' CMP-A, p. 10.

⁷⁴ ADA, p. 152.

by the mercy of God, the prince of Portugal'.⁷⁶ This formula, excluding as it did his cousin Alfonso from the line of authority, suggested the nature of Henriques' ambition. Yet because Henriques had no title beyond the nebulous 'infante' he was forced to emphasize his pedigree; his reference to divine authorisation for his position merely underlined his lack of official sanction.

Nevertheless, by April 1129 Afonso Henriques was prepared to claim an independent authority throughout Portugal.⁷⁷ It was also clear to onlookers that he intended to extend his territory to the detriment of his cousin, Alfonso VII.⁷⁸ In 1130 Henriques attempted to reassert Portuguese influence in Ty, but the appearance of Alfonso in Galicia, along with unrest among Henriques' own northern nobles, forced the Portuguese leader to withdraw. A subsequent expedition two years later similarly ended in defeat at the hands of Henriques' old enemy Fernando Perez and the Galician noble Rodrigo Vela.⁷⁹ A third attempt met with greater initial success. After advancing into the Lima region the Portuguese built a castle at Celmes to ensure continued control. After provisioning and garrisoning the new castle Henriques returned to Portugal. King Alfonso unexpectedly returned, assaulted the castle, and killed or captured the entire garrison.⁸⁰ News of this failure cast the Portuguese court into deep despondency. For several years Henriques made no further attempts at northern expansion, instead he turned his energies to strengthening his own border defences to the east and south.⁸¹

The unexpected death of Alfonso I of Aragon in 1134 provided Henriques with another opportunity to extend his authority into Galicia. On hearing of Alfonso's death the Navarrese created a king of their own, Garca IV (1134-1150). Garca allied himself with Afonso Henriques in opposition to Alfonso VII. Taking advantage of this alliance, Henriques marched into Galicia in 1137. He was welcomed by several enterprising local nobles, who surrendered their castles without resistance. Fortune then turned against Henriques when the Muslims suddenly attacked from the south. By destroying

⁷⁵ Serro, *Histria de Portugal*, 1, pp. 80-1.

⁷⁶ 'egregius infans domnus Alfonsus bone memorie magni Adefonsi imperatoris Hyspanie nepos comitis Henrici et regine Tarasin filius atque per Dei clementiam Portugalensium princeps...' DMP, 1, p. 120.

⁷⁷ 'Ego infans alfonsus et comes enrici filius ab omni pressura alienus et colimbriensium ac totius urbium portugalensium dei providentia dominus securus effectus.' CMP-A, p. 23; DMP, 1, p. 121.

⁷⁸ 'Ipse etenim infans uitio superbie elatus regis dominationi subici noluit, sed adepto honore contra eum arroganter intumuit.' HC, III, 24, p. 458.

⁷⁹ Herculano, *Histria de Portugal*, 1, p. 299.

⁸⁰ CAI, I, 74-7, pp. 185-6; Reilly, *Alfonso VII*, pp. 42-3.

⁸¹ DMP, 1, pp. 166-85.

the newly-built castle at Leiria the Moors directly threatened the Portuguese heartland.⁸² In the meantime, Emperor Alfonso had re-imposed obedience on King García and appeared in Galicia at the head of his army.⁸³ Faced with threats from all sides Henriques was compelled to sue for peace.

Agreement was reached at Túy on 4 July 1137, the terms of which have been preserved. The concessions forced upon the Portuguese ruler demonstrate the peril of his position. Henriques restored territory to his cousin and promised to support him in war against both Christian and Muslim enemies; Alfonso merely agreed to allow Henriques to continue to rule in Portugal.⁸⁴ While some Portuguese historians have interpreted Emperor Alfonso's willingness to negotiate at all as indicative of Henriques' growing status, such an optimistic appraisal overlooks the terms of the treaty itself. Little less than capitulation was demanded and received from the Portuguese leader.⁸⁵

With peace imposed upon him in Galicia, Afonso Henriques turned his attention to the Muslims. By 1139 the Portuguese leader had built up sufficient forces to attempt a substantial southward advance; possibly this attack was launched to coincide with an offensive by Alfonso VII as stipulated in the Treaty of Túy. The Portuguese incursion culminated in the battle of Ourique, an encounter that was to have an impact far in excess of its military significance.⁸⁶ Although subsequent tradition embroidered this action to a remarkable degree, contemporary chroniclers record only a few sparse details. Even the location of Ourique is open to debate. The Portuguese army encountered a large Almoravid force reinforced by local troops from Seville, Badajoz, Elvas, Évora, and Beja. A prolonged battle took place on the feast day of St James (25 July) in which the Portuguese put their enemies to flight.⁸⁷ It was the first major victory Afonso had won against the Muslims and – since his actual role at São Mamede in 1128 is uncertain – possibly the first he had won in his military career.

⁸² The chronicler laconically observes that the Muslims were able to invest Tomar in central Portugal. ADA, pp. 152-3. A visiting crusader recalled descriptions of the devastation caused by this invasion. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi: The Conquest of Lisbon*, ed. and trans. C. W. David (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936), pp. 78-9.

⁸³ CAI, I, 77-8, pp. 186.

⁸⁴ DMP, I, pp. 194.

⁸⁵ Serrão, *História de Portugal*, I, p. 82-3; Reilly, *Alfonso VII*, p. 59.

⁸⁶ António Brásio, 'Ainda e sempre o problema de Ourique', in *Alexandre Herculano à Luz do Nosso Tempo* (Lisbon: Academia Portuguesa da História, 1977), pp. 35-48 and Luis da Câmara Pina, 'Da personalidade militar de Afonso Henriques', in *Alexandre Herculano à Luz do Nosso Tempo*, pp. 283-320. See also Reilly, *Alfonso VII*, p. 64.

Despite the traditional Portuguese portrayal of Afonso Henriques as an implacable warrior, his first decade of leadership produced mixed military results. Henriques was barely able to resist Muslim and León-Castilian attacks. The victory at Ourique, while lauded by later commentators as a monumental triumph, made only a passing impact on contemporary authors. Nevertheless the Portuguese leader did manage to maintain territorial integrity and his own autonomy in the face of considerable threat. Moreover, behind the more sensational campaigns and sieges, important regional developments were taking place. Henriques was able to consolidate his authority through an innovative policy toward his own aristocracy and an effective relationship with the Portuguese church. While the military aspects of Henriques reign have attracted the greater share of comment, it was in fact these quieter developments that allowed his later successes.

The Portuguese aristocracy had relied on distance from the central authority of León-Castile to ensure their local predominance. Appointed governors could experience serious problems in dealing with these powerful local nobles. When Afonso Henriques came to power in 1128 his position in relation to his own supporters was a weak one. Although Henriques has been popularly credited with the victory at São Mamede, the battle was actually fought and won by his aristocratic supporters. The young Henriques could command only limited personal resources, and even the royalist account of the battle cannot hide the decisive role played by powerful local nobles.⁸⁸ As a result Henriques was initially reliant on their continued backing. Although Henriques was perhaps seventeen years old in 1128, he moved quickly to initiate an innovative policy aimed at easing this reliance on his aristocratic co-conspirators.⁸⁹

The first sign of a changing policy came when Henriques moved his base of operations from Guimarães, his birthplace and long-time seat of regional government, south to Coimbra on the Mondego River. This relocation, which took place in 1131 or 1132, was both a highly symbolic and eminently practical action. Not only did Henriques emphasise a break with the policies of the past, but perhaps more

⁸⁷ ADA, p. 268; *Crónica Lamecense* in PMH SS, p. 20; APV, p. 308. Only *Vita sancti Theotonii*, p. 86 adds a religious dimension to the victory. For a discussion of these sources see José Mattoso, 'Notas de Fim de Volume', in Herculano, *História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 654-9.

⁸⁸ ADA, p. 152.

⁸⁹ Maria João Branco, 'The Nobility of Medieval Portugal (XIth - XIVth centuries)', in A. J. Duggan (ed.), *Nobles and Nobility in Medieval Europe. Concepts, Origins, Transformations* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2000), pp. 232-8. This article draws heavily on José Mattoso, *Ricos-Homens, Infâncias e*

importantly, was able to distance himself geographically from the Portuguese aristocracy, for their major strongholds were in the more settled region north of the Douro River. The southern marches of the county, between the Douro and the Mondego Rivers, had been under Christian control for a far shorter period of time. This was frontier territory populated by small, independently-minded settlements and ambitious younger sons. More importantly, this was also a region in which the dense encrustation of aristocratic privilege that so hampered centralised government in the north had not yet formed. By moving his court to Coimbra Henriques was openly pledging his future to these new territories.⁹⁰

In the years that followed an increasing number of these southern knights appeared as signatories in Henriques' charters.⁹¹ Similarly the scions of the old aristocratic families were gradually displaced from the highest offices in Henriques' court by members of newer families.⁹² More and more it was these frontier troops who waged Henriques' battles. This trend is strikingly illustrated during the attack on Santarém in 1147. The capture of this strategic city was a turning point in the Portuguese southern expansion. When Henriques initially proposed the attack, the northern aristocrats refused to take part, leaving their titular overlord to conduct the campaign with his own forces and those of his sole reliable noble follower, Fernando Pedro of Coimbra.⁹³

Cavaleiros. A nobreza medieval portuguesa no séculos XI e XII (Lisbon: Guimarães Editores, 1985), pp. 181-227. Unfortunately Mattoso's illuminating study is weakened by an absence of referencing.

⁹⁰ Mattoso, *Ricos-Homens, Infâncias e Cavaleiros*, pp. 159-60.

⁹¹ Many such knights appear in charters in the king's company, such as Martim Anaia (first appears in 1132, DMP, 1, pp. 147-8); the Mozarab Randulfo Soleimás (first appears in 1125, DMP, 1, pp. 73-4); and Gonçalo Dias, the alcaide of Coimbra (appearing from 1126, DMP, 1, pp. 91). Gonçalo's sons Fernando, Salvador and Gonçalo continued the family tradition, appearing in documents between 1154 and 1167. (DMP, 1, pp. 307-8, 379-80). His nephew Pedro Salvadores was dapifer in the court from 1179 until 1185 (DMP, 1, p. cxxv-cxxvi). José Mattoso, 'A região de Arganil: de fronteira a terra senhorial', in J. Mattoso, *A Nobreza Medieval Portuguesa. A Família e o Poder* (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1994), p. 322.

⁹² Members of the Maia house dominated Portuguese politics in the 1120s. Soeiro Mendes was one of Henriques' early supporters, Paio Mendes became archbishop of Braga, and Pedro Pais occupied the important office of *signifer* (later title for the office of *alferes*) between 1147 and 1169. (First appearance in office: DMP, 1, p. 275). The death of Soeiro and then Paio lessened clan influence, while Pedro Pais was obliged to leave the kingdom, appearing later in the court of León. Similarly the house of Bragança enjoyed early prominence, with Fernando Mendes 'O Bravo' appearing at court until 1157. His son, Mem Fernandes, briefly held the office of *alferes-mor* before also abandoning his homeland for León (DMP, 1, pp. cxxii-cxxiii). Perhaps the leading magnate of Afonso's early years, Egas Moniz, of the Riba Douro family, appeared consistently in documents until his death in 1146. Although he had at least three sons, none of them appear in later court documents. José Mattoso, 'A nobreza de Entre Douro e Minho na história medieval de Portugal', in Mattoso, *A Nobreza Medieval Portuguesa*, pp. 301-6.

⁹³ *De expugnatione Scalabis*, Appendix 4, below, p. 348.

Henriques' close association with 'frontier knights' from the southern marches of his territory became a major asset in his bid to control the power of the entrenched noble families and centralise authority into his own hands. Equally crucial to his ambitions was ecclesiastical support. A loyal local clergy could offer Henriques numerous benefits, not least their ability to counter the regional authority of the northern aristocracy. Henriques established a more constructive relationship with the Portuguese clergy than his mother had been able to maintain, and was also more fortunate in the calibre of personnel he could draw upon. Foremost among the rising clergymen was João Peculiar, one of the founders of the monastery of Santa Cruz, later bishop of Porto (1136-1138) and finally archbishop of Braga (1138-1175).⁹⁴ In addition to establishing effective relations with the secular clergy, Henriques also encouraged the foundations of new monasteries in the region. The political benefit of such institutions was twofold: not only did they offer Henriques valuable local prestige, they also reinitiated significant cultural contacts between Portugal and Latin Christendom.

Soon after he took power in Portugal Afonso Henriques signalled the future direction of his ecclesiastical policy. Teresa had alienated the archbishop of Braga by seeking accommodation with the distant metropolitans of Toledo and Compostela, Henriques moved quickly to reverse this policy. In 1128 a replacement for the recently deceased Bishop Gonçalo Pais of Coimbra (1109-1128) was required. Before being ousted from power Teresa had nominated Archdeacon Tello of Coimbra for the position, but Henriques overturned this decision in favour of Archdeacon Bernard of Braga.⁹⁵ It appears that Tello had been willing to submit to Compostela, but Bernard offered his obedience to Archbishop Paio of Braga. The archbishop of Compostela vigorously objected to this development, obliging Bishop Bernard to journey to Rome to plead his case personally.⁹⁶ Before a final decision could be reached the death of

⁹⁴ João Peculiar gained his cognomen because he was thought to be peculiarly the Lord's own. His origins are uncertain: Tello's biographer believed João was French, while Theotonio's claimed João's family held land in Portugal. E. Austin O'Malley, *Tello and Theotonio, Twelfth-century Founders of the Monastery of Santa Cruz in Coimbra* (Washington: Catholic University Press, 1954), pp. 51-2. See also Maria João Branco, 'The king's counsellors' two faces: a Portuguese perspective', in P. Linehan and J. L. Nelson (eds), *The Medieval World* (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 520-3.

⁹⁵ O'Malley, *Tello and Theotonio*, pp. 46-9. Tello's biographer explained Henriques' decision as being due to youthful indecision, bending 'like a reed' to the false counsel of others. *Vita Tellois*, p. 64.

⁹⁶ Archbishop Paio subsequently also journeyed to Rome to support his bishop in this controversy. *PP*, p. 185; *JL* 7381.

Pope Honorius II (1124-1130) plunged the papal court into the turmoil of schism, and Bishop Bernard's *de facto* installation was allowed to stand.⁹⁷

Afonso's ecclesiastical policy continued to enjoy good fortune. The death of Archbishop Diego Gelmírez of Compostela in 1131 relieved the external pressure on the Portuguese church. Four years later Pope Innocent II (1130-1143) granted his protection to the canons of Coimbra, a move probably intended to support Bishop Bernard against Compostelan machinations.⁹⁸ Bishop Hugo of Porto, a stalwart ally of Compostela, died in 1136. Henriques had no apparent difficulty in securing the election of his own preferred candidate, João Peculiar. When Archbishop Paio of Braga died in 1138, Henriques was also able to usher the faithful João into this vacancy. João quickly demonstrated himself to be an indefatigable champion of regional ecclesiastical rights. In 1139 Archbishop João appeared at the Second Lateran council to secure Bragan metropolitan status. Pope Innocent II acceded to this request and officially placed Coimbra under Bragan control. He also added the less welcome caveat that Archbishop João must acknowledge the primacy of Toledo.⁹⁹ Although the curia continued to insist that the archbishop of Braga render obedience to his rival in Toledo, for several years João was able to prevaricate successfully.

Even as João Peculiar strove to establish the ecclesiastical prominence of Braga, Afonso was increasingly involved in the foundation and support of new Portuguese religious institutions. The foremost of these institutions, the Augustinian monastery of Santa Cruz in Coimbra, was founded in 1132. The leading agents in the establishment of the monastery were Theotonio, Tello, and João Peculiar.¹⁰⁰ The original grant of land was made by Afonso Henriques on 9 December 1130, after a chance encounter with Tello on the road to Coimbra.¹⁰¹ From the outset Santa Cruz was organised according to the Augustinian rule, for both Theotonio and Tello were widely travelled, and called on

⁹⁷ It was during this period that the mysterious 'Black Bishop' supposedly appeared in Portugal. Fifteenth-century legend holds that when churchmen remonstrated with Henriques over his treatment of Teresa the Portuguese leader created a Moor as bishop. When a legate was sent to Portugal Afonso Henriques threatened him physically and expelled him from the kingdom. The kingdom was placed under interdict as a result. *Crônicas breves e memorias avulsas de S. Cruz de Coimbra*, in PMH SS, pp. 27-8. This tale may in fact allude to Bishop Bernard, a former Benedictine monk. O'Malley, *Tello and Theotonio*, p. 48, n. 55.

⁹⁸ Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, p. 26.

⁹⁹ Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, pp. 40-1; PP, pp. 188-9.

¹⁰⁰ For the foundation of Santa Cruz see O'Malley, *Tello and Theotonio*, pp. 36-86.

¹⁰¹ The charter is extant. CMP-A, pp. 42-4. The background story is from *Vita Tellois*, p. 65.

this experience when arranging the organisation of the new monastic house.¹⁰² The canons regular soon developed an international reputation and their growing status attracted additional support from Afonso Henriques.

As the status of Santa Cruz grew so did the animosity of rival groups. From their earliest days the canons found themselves embroiled in jurisdictional and demarcation disputes with the local bishop.¹⁰³ A campaign of obstruction by the clergy of Coimbra finally goaded João Peculiar to petition Pope Innocent II directly. His efforts proved successful and on 26 May 1135 Santa Cruz was placed under papal protection.¹⁰⁴ The Augustinian monastery was the first in Portugal to be thus recognised, but four years later a second Portuguese house, at Grijó, was also taken under the papal aegis.¹⁰⁵ These ecclesiastical developments had important political repercussions. The privileged position of the two monasteries opened a direct dialogue with Rome, thus reintroducing Portugal into papal considerations, and allowing Henriques to demonstrate his piety directly to a grateful pope.¹⁰⁶ Finally, the growing reputation of these institutions gave Henriques the prestige of internationally recognised religious houses under his patronage.

Henriques' martial reputation has attracted the greater share of scholarly attention, despite the fact that during the first decade of his rule Portuguese military operations produced few tangible results. Far more important in the longer term was Henriques' success in consolidating a regional power base and his ability to use every possible means to increase his own prestige. The Portuguese leader developed imaginative policies toward the local aristocracy in a successful bid to free himself from the influence of the entrenched northern noble houses. His relations with the Church were similarly adroit. He found common cause with Portuguese clergymen and was quick to advance those seeking to establish a strong regional Church. He also embraced religious developments that might enhance his status both locally and outside Portugal.

¹⁰² The *Vita Tello* recounts that Tello had been inspired by his pilgrimage to the Holy Land, where he had made a careful study of various religious institutions. *Vita Tello*, p. 64. Theotonio had similarly journeyed to the Holy Land. The monastery also seemed to draw considerable inspiration from St Ruf in Avignon. One of the canons of Santa Cruz, Domingo, was charged with copying the customs of St Ruf. O'Malley, *Tello and Theotonio*, p. 82.

¹⁰³ O'Malley, *Tello and Theotonio*, pp. 75-80.

¹⁰⁴ *Vita Tello*, pp. 65-6.

¹⁰⁵ Erdmann, PP, pp. 190-2.

¹⁰⁶ In letters dated 20 May 1135 and 27 April 1139 Pope Innocent addressed Henriques in the warmest terms and urged him to honour and protect the monastery. *Vita Tello*, pp. 66, 68; the earlier letter also includes an acknowledgement of Henriques' requests concerning the status of Coimbra, confirming the two-way nature of communications.

With his position strengthened by this combination of factors Henriques was prepared to enter a decisive new phase in his relationship with Alfonso VII of León-Castile.

Henriques found the submission forced upon him at Tùy increasingly difficult to accept. In 1140, in direct defiance of these accords, Henriques launched another expedition into Galicia. Alfonso was quick to respond, and in the spring of 1141 the armies of León-Castile and Portugal confronted each other at Valdavez. The Portuguese description of this encounter has a suspiciously chivalric gloss. To avoid full-scale battle a tournament of single combats was arranged. Brought together by their mutual admiration for martial prowess, the two monarchs met after the tournament where, amidst much wine and feasting, they reached a more equitable agreement.¹⁰⁷ Accounts from the Castilian side are less romantic. Rather than an organised encounter, several impulsive young Portuguese knights began skirmishing without orders and were all unhorsed, leading older and wiser heads to fear a general action would prove disastrous. Portuguese concerns were complicated by news that the Muslims had again taken advantage of Christian disunity to destroy the newly-rebuilt castle at Leiria and were attacking the nearby town of Trancoso.¹⁰⁸ Under the mediation of Archbishop Paio of Braga and Bishop João of Porto a short truce was negotiated.

The details of the agreement has not survived, yet must have been more accommodating to Henriques' growing status, for tentative arrangements were made for a subsequent meeting.¹⁰⁹ The major narrative sources give no indication as to the details of these arrangements, but the few clues to be found among minor chronicles and charters suggest that the two monarchs met in Zamora in September 1143 in the company of the papal legate Cardinal Guido de Vico. During this meeting the two monarchs issued joint charters, and the signature lists hint at the changing relationship between them. Alfonso VII heads the list as emperor, beneath his signature is placed that of King Afonso of Portugal. The same arrangement appeared in another charter the

¹⁰⁷ ADA, pp. 156-7.

¹⁰⁸ CAI, I. 82-7, pp. 188-9.

¹⁰⁹ 'Altera autem die comites imperatoris coniuncti sunt cum principibus regis et fecerunt pacem inter imperatorem et regem non absolute sempiternam, sed per aliquot annos, et iurauerunt eam ut iterum, dum pax esset, firmitus pacificarentur, sicut placuerat utrisque.' CAI, I. 86, p. 189. For discussion of the accords reached by the two monarchs see A. Botelho da Costa Veiga, 'Ourique-Valdavez,' in *Anais da Academia Portuguesa da História*, 1st series, I (1941), pp. 99ff. It has been suggested that the coincidence of two attacks on Leiria is unlikely. This fortress was, however, the key to the southern frontier and the documents are explicit. Mattoso, 'Notas de Fim de Volume', in Herculano, *História de Portugal*, p. 603.

following month.¹¹⁰ Thus, while Alfonso VII conceded the royal status of his cousin, he received in return an acknowledgement of his own imperial authority from Henriques.¹¹¹ The agreements therefore represent a mutually beneficial arrangement that did not substantially change the actual power relationship between the two.

Afonso Henriques' rise from relative obscurity to royal dignity is perhaps the most outstanding example of the social flexibility of the Iberian frontier. A comparison of this success with Teresa's failure reveals still more about what royal authority actually implied in peninsular society. When Teresa assumed a royal status in Portugal, the action was primarily a gambit in her struggle with Queen Urraca. Her primary ambition was directed outside the region. Similarly, Teresa's dealings with Latin Christian institutions were intended to support her own political position, and they soon foundered amid the ruins of failed alliances. Henriques' situation, his aims and his ultimate level of success were completely different. Rather than use royal dignity as a political lever, Henriques concentrated his efforts on establishing a firm local powerbase. Moreover, when he did claim royal dignity, his aim was to consolidate his pre-eminent position in Portugal; it was not a direct defiance of his León-Castilian overlord, the self-proclaimed Emperor Alfonso VII. Under these circumstances, Latin Christian influence in the region became a means to acquire valuable prestige – and in this role such influence proved highly effective. Yet as Henriques established himself in power, and the political turmoil of previous decades eased, Latin Christian cultural permeation in the region became more pronounced, and its implications for Henriques' authority more acute.

¹¹⁰ For a meticulous consideration of these fragments of information see Mattoso, 'Notas de Fim de Volume', in Herculano, *História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 661-4.

¹¹¹ Reilly *Alfonso VII*, pp. 70-1, 80-1. Portuguese historians have emphasised the importance of the meeting at Zamora in the development of the kingdom. For example Pedro Soares Martínez, *História Diplomática de Portugal* (Lisbon: Editorial Verbo, 1986), p. 23: '[Zamora marks] o início da história portuguesa, do ponto de vista das relações externas.'

Chapter Five

Brilliant improvisation or integrated strategy? Latin Christian participation in the Portuguese advance to the River Tagus (1143-8)

By 1142 Afonso Henriques (1128-1184) had elicited an acknowledgement of his self-proclaimed royalty from Alfonso VII of León-Castile (1126-1157). Uniquely Iberian circumstances made this achievement possible, but in the following decade Henriques was able to reinforce his authority through a careful manipulation of the growing Latin Christian presence in the region. The Portuguese leader's prestige was enhanced as links with secular and religious institutions grew stronger and more complex. At the same time, the popularity of the crusade brought increasing numbers of maritime crusaders to Portugal. The participation of such visitors at the siege of Lisbon in 1147 proved decisive in the Portuguese campaign to push the frontier southward to the River Tagus – a triumph that virtually doubled Portuguese territory. Yet while Henriques was eager to take advantage of the opportunities offered by a resurgent Latin Christendom, neither he nor his subjects showed any great enthusiasm in embracing the ideological developments behind it. Any assistance offered to the Portuguese was predicated on the growing sense of Christian community being fostered by the Church, yet these attitudes were themselves slow to permeate Iberian frontier society.

The advance to the Tagus River generated a considerable documentation from Portuguese sources. The capture of large expanses of territory required the production of official documents, particularly land grants and town settlement charters, to order its disposition. The impression of activity conveyed in these official sources is confirmed by narrative authors. General histories record the military advance in enthusiastic terms.¹ In addition, several actions were recorded in greater detail. The Portuguese capture of Santarém in 1147 was described in a unique document purporting to be a

¹ For example 'Annales D. Alfonsi Portugallensium regis', in Monica Blöcker-Walter, *Alfons I. von Portugal. Studien zu Geschichte und Sage des Begründers der portugiesischen unabhängigheit* (Zurich: Fretz und Wasmuth Verlag, 1966) [ADA], pp. 155-7 records the capture of important strong points as well as a battle, deemed miraculous, where a small force of 60 Portuguese troops routed a Moorish force of 500.

first-hand account given by the king himself.² The single extant manuscript was produced in Santa Cruz in a thirteenth-century script, but repeated sentences and ornate capital letters suggest the copying of an earlier document.³ Several months after the fall of Santarém the Portuguese joined forces with visiting crusaders to capture Lisbon. In the wake of victory Afonso Henriques established the monastery of St Vincent de Fora, just outside the city. A chronicle recording this foundation includes a description of the fall of Lisbon and the first decades of Christian occupation.⁴

The Portuguese success at Lisbon in 1147 was made possible by the participation of northern crusaders, some of whom produced their own eye-witness accounts of the action. Several of these letters are similar enough to suggest a common origin, a document known as the 'Lisbon Letter' or the 'Teutonic source'.⁵ Despite their basic similarity these letters differ significantly in detail and emphasis.⁶ An Anglo-Norman account of the siege of Lisbon, the *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, was written independently.⁷ Several possible authors have been proposed, including Osbert of Bawdsley, Ranulf of Glanvill and most recently Harold Livermore's suggestion of an Anglo-Norman priest known only as Raol.⁸ Of the various candidates offered, the latter

² Unlikely as this seems, the date of authorship does not preclude Henriques' involvement, while the details provided in the account do suggest the input of an eyewitness.

³ *De expugnatione Scalabis*, Appendix 4, below, pp. 345-51. The manuscript is described by Thomas L. Amos, *The Fundo Alcobaca of the Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon. Descriptive Inventories of Manuscripts Microfilmed for the Hill Monastic Manuscript Library: Portuguese Libraries*, 2 vols (Collegeville, MN: Hill Monastic Manuscript Library, 1988), 1, pp. 181-2. Traditionally designated *Codice 207 Monasterii Alcobacensis* the manuscript has been reclassified as *Portugal 416* in the Hill Monastic Manuscript Library.

⁴ *Indiculum fundationis monasterii beati Vincentii*, PMH SS, pp. 90-3.

⁵ For recent discussions on the Lisbon letter see Jonathan Phillips, 'St Bernard of Clairvaux, the Low Countries and the Lisbon Letter of the Second Crusade', *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 48: 3 (1997), 485-97; and Susan B. Edgington, 'The Lisbon Letter of the Second Crusade', *Historical Research*, 69 (1996), 328-39, and by the same author, 'Albert of Aachen, St Bernard and the Second Crusade', in Jonathan Phillips and Martin Hochs (eds), *The Second Crusade: Scope and Consequences* (Manchester: UP, 2001), 54-70. Three variants of the letter are known: From Duodechin of Lahnstein to Abbot Cuno of Disibodenburg, *Annales sancti Disibodi*, MGH SS, 18, pp. 27-9; from Arnulf to Bishop Mio of Thérouanne, *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France*, ed. M. Bouquet and L. Delisle, 24 vols (Paris, 1840-1904), 16, pp. 325-7 and PMH SS, pp. 406-7; and from Winand to Archbishop Arnold of Cologne, Edgington, 'The Lisbon Letter', pp. 336-339. Edgington believes that this letter is in fact the original.

⁶ Only Duodechin, for example, confirms the fleet's ultimate arrival in the Holy Land. *Annales sancti Disibodi*, p. 28.

⁷ *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi: the Conquest of Lisbon*, ed. C. W. David (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936). This text was republished (Manchester: UP, 2001) with additional notes by Jonathan Phillips.

⁸ Discussions of authorship include David, *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 40-42; Josiah Cox Russell, 'Ranulf de Glanville', *Speculum*, 45 (1970), 69-79; Harold Livermore, 'The "Conquest of Lisbon" and its Author', *Portuguese Studies*, 6 (1990), 1-16; and Jonathan Phillips, 'Ideas of crusade and holy war in *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi* (*The Conquest of Lisbon*)', in R. W. Swanston (ed.), *The Holy Land, holy lands and Christian History* (Woodbridge: 2000), 123-41.

has been most widely accepted.⁹ Certainly Raol is an attractive option. A charter places Raol at Lisbon undertaking high-level ecclesiastical negotiations in the wake of the siege. Circumstantial evidence does not discount him from authorship: Raol's initial 'R' matches that in the author's greeting; he was an Anglo-Norman priest; he was among the first to land and took an active role in the siege. From this rather tenuous link Livermore goes on to explore the exciting possibility that Raol was closely allied to Bernard of Clairvaux, perhaps even his official representative on the expedition.

Despite a general acceptance of Raol as the author of *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi* some difficulties remain. The charter which places Raol at Lisbon was confirmed in April 1148. Duodechin explicitly states that the fleet left Lisbon at the beginning of February of that year.¹⁰ Consequently Raol must have remained in Lisbon for several weeks after the majority of his companions had continued the journey to Jerusalem. Such a splitting of the crusader fleet runs quite contrary to the ideal of cohesion the author consistently espoused; it seems odd that if such an event occurred he did not foreshadow it in some way. Moreover, the major source we have for the identity of the author, the text of *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi* itself, gives little indication of being written by as vaunted a personage as Raol. Charles David, the most recent editor of the manuscript, characterises the author as being a man of modest educational and literary accomplishments.¹¹ Finally, to suggest that the author was a leading cleric and confidant of St Bernard seems unlikely given his confusion concerning the officially-sanctioned nature of the crusade. Many of the most important justifications made for holy war by Bernard and other crusading advocates find no echo in this letter.¹² The complexity of authorship has been further complicated by Phillips, who suggests the author's unstated agenda was a self-justification for the decision to pause at Lisbon. Nevertheless, the account remains a valuable eyewitness account written soon after the events it describes. While the identity of the author has remained

⁹ Both Edgington, 'The Lisbon Letter', p. 335 and Phillips, 'St Bernard of Clairvaux', p. 486 accept Raol as the author of *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*.

¹⁰ The latest event mentioned in the *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi* is the election of Gilbert of Hastings as bishop of Lisbon on 1 November 1147. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, p. 181, n. 1. The date of departure is given in *Annales sancti Disibodi*, p. 28.

¹¹ 'His Latin style is undoubtedly against him, and his range of reading, so far as can be seen from his work, may hardly have extended beyond the Bible and Solinus; and of the latter he made a not very intelligent use.' *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, p. 45.

¹² See below, pp. 144-5.

difficult to establish with certainty, he remains – in David's words – 'neither known nor yet wholly anonymous. He is none the less a singularly appealing figure.'¹³

In addition to the eyewitness accounts by foreign participants in Portuguese campaigns, descriptions of these events were included in chronicles compiled in other parts of Latin Christendom. The success at Lisbon stood in stark contrast to the overall failure of the crusading movement during this period, and almost twenty contemporary authors from all corners of Latin Christendom mention the capture of the city.¹⁴ The level of knowledge displayed by chroniclers far from the events they describe demonstrates a significant widening in the mental geography of many Latin Christians. Where early Latin Christian chroniclers referred to Spanish campaigns only when notable local figures were involved, from the middle decades of the twelfth century such authors begin to demonstrate an interest in the Spanish frontier for its own sake.¹⁵

The early decades of the kingdom have remained of enduring interest to modern Portuguese historians, yet it is an area of study highly susceptible to patriotic pressures. The decisive campaign of 1147 has been steadfastly interpreted as locally inspired, with Afonso Henriques accorded full credit for initiating the advance. The crucial alliance with the visiting crusaders is portrayed as a display of the Portuguese king's canny opportunism and diplomatic skill.¹⁶ The majority of scholars outside Portugal have found little cause to object to such an appraisal. International scholarship has generally perceived the siege of Lisbon as a minor event in the history of the crusade, rather than a crucial point in the Portuguese expansion. Thus, whether historians have used the success in 1147 to highlight the overall failure of the Second Crusade, or have examined the significance of the siege in the development of the wider crusading movement, the events at Lisbon are assumed to have been fortuitous, unplanned, and singular.¹⁷ In recent years, however, there has been a general reconsideration of the

¹³ *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, p. 45.

¹⁴ Constable, 'The Second Crusade as seen by contemporaries', *Traditio*, 9 (1953), p. 228; Alexandre Herculano, *História de Portugal desde o començo da monarquia até o fim do reinado de Afonso III*, ed. J. Mattoso, 4 vols (Lisbon: Bertrand Editora, 1988), 1, pp. 528-30.

¹⁵ An interesting example of this is offered by *The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis*, ed. and trans. M. Chibnall, 6 vols (Oxford: University Press, 1969-80). Changing attitudes toward Spain are clearly discernible. Marjorie Chibnall, *The World of Orderic Vitalis* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 25, 151-2, 210.

¹⁶ For changing Portuguese historiographical views of the capture of Lisbon see Appendix 1, below, pp. 318-19, 324-5.

¹⁷ See for example Charles Bishko, 'The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest, 1095-1492', in K. M. Setton (ed.), *A History of the Crusades*, 5 vols (Madison-London: Wisconsin University Press, 1975), 3, 409-10.

purpose and scope of the Second Crusade. Rather than a direct attack on the Holy Land, the crusade has been reinterpreted as a general assault on the enemies of Christendom on several fronts. From this insight historians have begun to examine the degree to which events in Lisbon were a part of this overall strategy.¹⁸

As Afonso Henriques' firm rule brought greater stability to western Iberia his contacts with Latin Christendom multiplied. Closer relations with foreign noble houses, further contact with the papacy, and additional patronage for international religious orders could all serve to consolidate the newly-won kingship. These relations also placed Henriques in a position to be aware of the planning of the Second Crusade. Nevertheless it seems unlikely that the cooperation between crusaders and Portuguese was prearranged by crusade organisers. Rather than waiting for scheduled assistance, the Portuguese appear to have been prepared to take whatever opportunity might arise. Moreover, while the participation of the crusaders proved to be decisive in the capture of Lisbon, there is little indication that the ideology of the crusade permeated Portuguese society. Instead, the events at Lisbon demonstrate the lingering inconsistencies within the concept of the crusade, as well as the sharp differences between Iberian attitudes and those of the Latin Christian visitors.

Afonso Henriques' early contacts with Latin Christendom

The newly established Portuguese monarchy was a fragile construction. Immediately after the assumption of royal title in 1143 Henriques began a careful re-engagement with Latin Christendom specifically intended to add substance to his brave claims. To consolidate his rule the Portuguese king married, but to emphasise his status he chose a wife from outside the peninsula. On a regional level too, closer relations with the papacy and increased support for international religious orders offered Henriques invaluable prestige, along with concrete local advantages. The primary aim of the Portuguese ruler was to consolidate recent political gains, not to encourage Latin Christian permeation of the kingdom. Nevertheless, because of these deepening contacts, he was increasingly drawn into the networks of relationships binding Latin Christendom together.

¹⁸ Giles Constable, 'The Second Crusade as seen by contemporaries', *Traditio*, 9 (1953), pp. 221-4, 226-35. For the argument that Lisbon was an integral part of the planning from the outset see Livermore, 'The "Conquest of Lisbon"', pp. 8-12; and Phillips, 'St Bernard of Clairvaux', pp. 492-7.

Among the most important of a monarch's duties was the provision of an heir. The establishment of the succession was also an important step in the consolidation of the kingdom. By the time Afonso Henriques gained his royal status he had already delayed marriage for longer than was usual. Henriques was perhaps seventeen when he came to power in 1128, yet he remained unmarried for more than a decade. Henriques eventually sought a partner outside the peninsula, settling at last on Mafalda, the daughter of Count Amadeus III of Maurienne and Savoy. The marriage negotiations were probably conducted through Burgundian family contacts, for Henriques retained important links in southern France through his father's relations, while Mafalda's mother, Mafalda of Albon, was also from Burgundy.¹⁹ The arrangements were carried through successfully and the couple married in 1145. The first of their many children was born soon afterwards.²⁰

Chroniclers speak highly of Mafalda's probity and kindness, but this marriage also reintegrated the Portuguese royal house into the Burgundian nobility. Was the reinvigoration of Henriques' Burgundian links the goal of this marriage, or simply the means by which it was accomplished? There were considerable local benefits for Afonso Henriques in selecting a marriage partner from outside the peninsula. To take an exotic wife was one visible characteristic of monarchy, a means by which the king could distinguish himself from his leading nobles. Henriques' grandfather, Alfonso VI of León-Castile, had married six times; only one of his wives had been Spanish.²¹ Therefore, rather than establishing links with external noble families, the primary advantage Mafalda brought to Henriques was an underlining of his own preeminent position among the Portuguese nobility and a reinforcement of his royal status locally.²²

Afonso Henriques' early relations with the papacy follow a similar pattern to these secular initiatives. The Portuguese leader sought above all to attract papal influence in support of his own authority. Prior to the agreements reached at Zamora in 1143 Henriques' ecclesiastical policies had enhanced his local reputation, but in the

¹⁹ Livermore, 'The "Conquest of Lisbon"', p. 8. G. Ferreira Borges, 'Saint Bernard et le Portugal: la legende et l'histoire', in *Mélanges de Saint Bernard* (Dijon: Association de Amis de Saint Bernard, 1953), p. 138 erroneously states Mafalda's mother was Gisle of Burgundy.

²⁰ ADA, pp. 156-7 attests 1145. The couple appear together as signatories possibly in June and certainly by July 1146, CMP-A, pp. 198-9. Their first child, Henry, was born in 1147. *De expugnatione Scalabis*, Appendix 4, below, p. 347.

²¹ Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. xii, 73.

²² Thus the ADA emphasises Mafalda's exotic origin in contrast with other wives. This would also become significant as consanguinity became an increasing problem in Iberian royal marriages. Peter Linehan, *History and the Historians of Medieval Spain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 255, n. 35.

critical period immediately after the assumption of royal status, the Portuguese leader sought a more direct commitment from the papacy. On 13 December 1143, in a carefully calculated gesture, Henriques surrendered his territory into the authority of Rome and promised Pope Innocent II (1130-1143) an annual tribute of four ounces of gold. The letter making this offer was witnessed by the local clerical and secular nobility along with Cardinal Guido as papal legate, while Afonso conspicuously employed his new royal title.²³

This letter drew an ambivalent reaction from Rome. By the time Afonso's emissaries reached the curia Pope Innocent had died. His successor, the short-lived Celestine II (1143-1144), made no move to reply to the Portuguese initiative. It fell to Pope Lucius II (1144-1145) to draft an adequate response. Yet the delay was not merely a result of changing papal administrations, it also reflected doubt in Rome over the advisability of encouraging Afonso Henriques in his ambitions.²⁴ Thus Pope Lucius received the offer graciously, accepted the tribute, but carefully entitled Henriques *dux*.²⁵ This compromise was doubtless intended to facilitate peace between Christian rulers, a cause the Latin Church consistently espoused and occasionally intervened to bring about.²⁶ Extending papal protection to Portugal might provide a deterrent to Leonese-Castilian military action in the area. Emperor Alfonso's objections were pre-empted by a series of complimentary bulls and a vigorous papal effort to limit Portuguese autonomy through ecclesiastical means. The archbishop of Braga had long dissembled over papal demands to submit to the authority of Toledo. On 9 May 1145 Pope Eugenius' patience was finally exhausted. Archbishop João Peculiar was given three months to render the necessary obedience; when he failed to do so the pope ordered him suspended.²⁷

²³ DMP, 1, p. 250.

²⁴ Conservative papal policy tended toward support of the dominant monarch. Carl Erdmann, *Das Papsttum und Portugal im ersten Jahrhundert der portugiesischen Geschichte* (Berlin: Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Klasse Nr 5, 1928); trans. by J. da Providência Costa, as *O Papado e Portugal no Primeiro Século da História Portuguesa* (Coimbra: Publicações do Instituto Alemão, 1935), pp. 48-9. Papal support for the imperial model will be further considered in Chapter 6.

²⁵ JL 8590; PL 179: 860.

²⁶ The role of bishop of Oporto and archbishop of Braga in mediating between Henriques and Alfonso VII at the battle of Valdevez in 1141 and the presence of Cardinal Guido at the resulting meeting between the two monarchs at Zamora provide ready examples of ecclesiastical concerns for the maintenance of peace. See also Richard Fletcher, *The Episcopate in the Kingdom of León-Castile in the Twelfth Century* (Oxford: OUP, 1978), pp. 217-20.

²⁷ Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, pp. 52-3; JL 8752; PL 180: 1036. For the suspension JL 9255, 9363; PL 180: 1345, 1405.

Although Afonso Henriques' early relations with the papacy were sometimes problematic, they also brought the king considerable advantage. Portuguese territorial security had been guaranteed by papal decree, and the threat of direct military action from León-Castile receded. On the other hand, the papacy was not prepared to sanction complete Portuguese independence from León-Castile, or to recognise Henriques' royal status. Yet Henriques' relations with the Latin Church did not end with the papacy. The Templars had been a presence in Portugal since 1128; over the next decade the Cistercian order also received their first grants in the kingdom. These new institutions offered valuable local prestige in addition to more concrete services on the frontier. Portuguese support of the international orders could also have wider implications, for such generosity brought the situation in Portugal to the attention of the most influential spiritual leader of the age: Bernard of Clairvaux.

The transfer of the Knights Templar to Portugal was a fitful process. The order found an early welcome in Portugal when on 13 March 1128 Infanta Teresa granted the knights land at Soure.²⁸ The promise of this early reception was not immediately borne out. On assuming power Afonso Henriques confirmed these holdings but did not augment them.²⁹ After over a decade of silence the Templars are recorded suffering defeat in 1144 at the hands of Abu Zakaria of Santarém.³⁰ Possibly in response, three years later they appear to have played a role in the capture of Santarém, and received assets within the town as a reward. These properties proved to be of uncertain benefit to the order, for they were to become the cause of a complex and acrimonious wrangle between the knights and the bishop of Lisbon.³¹ Yet inauspicious as these early years seem, the foundations were laid for the extraordinary development of the order through the second half of the century.

The Cistercian monks first appeared in Portugal a decade after the Templars.³² From as early as 1138 monasteries such as Santiago de Sever, S. Cristóvão de Lafões

²⁸ Interpreting Teresa's motivation is complicated by the agency of Emperor Alfonso VII, who may have instigated the grant in an attempt to underline his own suzerainty over the region. See above, p. 119, n. 70.

²⁹ '... quoniam in vestra fraternitate et beneficio omni sum frater.' DMP, I, p. 101. See also Malcolm Barber, *The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple* (Cambridge: UP, 1994), pp. 32-3; and Maur Cocheril 'Les Ordres militaires Cisterciens au Portugal', in *Bulletin des Etudes Portugaises* NS, 28-9 (1967-8), pp. 24-5.

³⁰ *Vita Sancti Martini Saurienseis*, PMH SS, p. 62; Herculano, *História de Portugal*, I, p. 472.

³¹ DMP, I, p. 272; CMP-A, pp. 209-10.

³² Unfortunately details from the early years of the Portuguese Cistercians are difficult to establish with certainty due to the destruction of the Cistercian archive at Viseu in 1841.

and S. João de Tarouca received grants that suggest links with the Cistercian reform, but only in 1144 does a charter make this relationship explicit.³³ These first houses were in the settled north of Portugal, rather than in the borderlands where the order would ultimately make its greatest impact. After 1153 vast tracts of land were granted to the order to establish the great monastery of Alcobaça, which flourished in the wilderness and became a rival to Santa Cruz as Portugal's pre-eminent cultural and religious centre.

Afonso Henriques garnered considerable personal prestige by supporting these orders. There were also more practical benefits as the Templars took a role in frontier defence and the Cistercians introduced their own agricultural efficiency to the region. The opportunities appearing in Portugal for the development of the orders also attracted the attention and possibly the involvement of Bernard of Clairvaux, the great religious figure behind both the Templar and Cistercian orders. While there can be little doubt that contact was maintained between Clairvaux and Portugal, the timing and significance of these relations is less certain.

Contemporary Portuguese sources contain few references to Bernard conducting relations with local leaders before 1150. St Theotonio's biographer recorded that when Bernard heard of the sanctity of the prior of Santa Cruz, he sent his greetings and, as a token of his esteem, a staff with curative powers. While the author does not indicate exactly when this gift was dispatched, the early 1150s seems the most likely date.³⁴ The Cistercians may have been active in Portugal during the 1130s, but the first document that confirms Bernard's involvement with Henriques is dated almost two decades later and concerns the foundation of the monastery of Alcobaça.³⁵ Yet while earlier official documents do not provide direct evidence of early communications between Henriques and Abbot Bernard, other less reliable sources purport to do so.

Fifteenth-century historians claimed the extensive territory granted to the Cistercians for the foundation of Alcobaça monastery was offered by Henriques in redemption of a vow. According to this story, messages of support from Bernard

³³ DMP, 1, pp. 251-2. See also Maria Alegria Fernandes Marques, 'A introdução da Ordem de Cister em Portugal', in M. A. Fernandes Marques, *Estudos sobre a Ordem de Cister em Portugal* (Coimbra: Edições Colibri, 1998), pp. 33-4.

³⁴ The touch of the staff proved highly efficacious in easing the aging saint's arthritic pains. *Vita sancti Theotonii*, PMH SS, p. 87. For the probable date of the gift see E. Austin O'Malley, *Tello and Theotonio, the Twelfth-century Founders of the Monastery of Santa Cruz in Coimbra* (Washington: Catholic University Press, 1954), pp. 149-50.

³⁵ CMP-A, pp. 234-6.

reached the king on the eve his attack on Santarém, prompting this display of pious generosity.³⁶ Unfortunately no surviving contemporary source supports this picturesque account. Similar plausibility problems surround a letter supposedly sent by Bernard to the Portuguese king. Among the abbot of Clairvaux's extensive correspondence is a letter responding to an unspecified request from King Afonso.³⁷ In his reply, Bernard assured the king that his request would be promptly honoured, with a Cistercian brother, Roland, bringing letters making clear the generosity of the (unnamed) pope. This document has long been considered doubtful; even those scholars who accept its veracity have differed widely when interpreting it.³⁸ Of the many problems this letter poses, the most serious is the references it makes to Afonso Henriques' brother, Pedro. No other contemporary source records the existence of this figure, and it seems unlikely that if Henriques actually had a brother he could have remained unmentioned.³⁹ Thus, while it appears Bernard was aware of events in Portugal during the 1140s, there is no clear evidence that he maintained any direct contact with Henriques.

Immediately after securing Leonese-Castilian acknowledgement of his royal status, Henriques sought to bring Latin Christian influence to the support of his newly-established throne. Links with the noble families outside the peninsula, with the papacy, and with the new religious institution were all used to reinforce Henriques' position

³⁶ *Crónica de Cinco Reis de Portugal*, ed. A. de Magalhães Basto (Oporto: Biblioteca Histórica, 1945), pp. 82-3; and the more recent edition of this chronicle: *Crónica de Portugal de 1419*, ed. A. Calgado (Coimbra: Universidade de Aveiro, 1998), pp. 37-9. Antonio Brandão, *Crónica de D. Afonso Henriques*, ed. A. de Magalhães Basto (Lisbon: Biblioteca Histórica, 1944), pp. 140ff, refers to a dedicatory inscription in support of this claim – unfortunately the inscription has since been destroyed. Nevertheless guides and guidebooks continue to assure the visitor of its veracity. See for example Julia Wilkins, *Portugal* (Melbourne: Lonely Planet Publications, 1997), p. 322. Confusion may have been caused by Afonso Henriques' son Pedro, who does appear in documentary records, e.g. *Bulário Português Inocencio III (1198-1216)*, eds A. de Jesus da Costa and M. Alegria F. Marques (Coimbra: UP, 1998), p. 197.

³⁷ Letter 308, SB08, 228; PL 182: 511-2. English translation and comments can be found in Livermore, 'The "Conquest of Lisbon"', p. 9.

³⁸ Brandão, *Crónica de D. Afonso Henriques*, pp. 146-50, presumes that the letter concerns the establishment of Alcobaça monastery. G. Ferreira Borges, 'Saint Bernard et le Portugal', pp. 134-5 dates the letter to 1148 and links it to Portuguese unease concerning the agenda of the council of Rheims. Perhaps most controversial is the attempt to link this letter to Henriques' territorial ambitions. Livermore, 'The "Conquest of Lisbon"', pp. 8-12.

³⁹ This problem has long been recognised by scholars. Brandão, *Crónica de D. Afonso Henriques*, pp. 146-8 notes the common confusion between Afonso's son Pedro and his supposed brother of the same name. Livermore, 'The "Conquest of Lisbon"', pp. 10, asserts that Pedro did exist. His evidence for this is a fifteenth-century chronicle, *Crónica de Cinco Reis*, Ch. 18, p. 83 (*Crónica de Portugal de 1419*, p. 38). The reference to Pedro is brief and unclear. Moreover the chronicle itself is unreliable, being both uncritical and several centuries after the event. See Giulia Lanciani and Giuseppe Travani (eds), *Dicionário da literatura medieval Galega e Portuguesa* (Lisbon: Caminho, 1993), pp. 185-6; and Appendix 1, below, pp. 318-9. Phillips, 'Saint Bernard of Clairvaux', pp. 492-4, accepts Livermore's contention on the letter, naming Pedro as Afonso's 'half-brother' without explanation.

locally. Although the Portuguese leader's focus was primarily regional, closer relations with Latin Christendom necessarily engaged him in wider concerns. In the 1140s Latin Christendom was intent on the organisation of the Second Crusade. Henriques' closer relations with Latin Christendom brought him into the orbits of the leading figures of the crusading movement. Pope Eugenius and Bernard of Clairvaux were the primary motivators behind the crusade, while Henriques' new father-in-law, Count Amadeus, commanded the Italian contingent of crusaders.⁴⁰ Therefore, because of this association with the leaders of the crusading movement, potentially the most important result of Afonso Henriques' re-engagement with Latin Christendom was the launching of the decisive advance to the River Tagus.

The advance to the Tagus as a campaign of the Second Crusade

Communication between Portugal and northern Europe improved even as Latin Christendom was convulsed with preparations for the Second Crusade. The coincidental timing of the Second Crusade and the Portuguese advance to the Tagus suggests that some form of collusion took place. The success of the Portuguese campaign rested on the capture of two strategic cities, Santarém at the head of the Tagus estuary and Lisbon at the mouth of the river. The first of these attacks was mounted by the Portuguese unaided, and while the timing implied contact with the organisers of the crusade, contemporary sources make no mention of such a connection. Latin Christian participation was far more direct in the assault on Lisbon three months later. Fleets bound for the Holy Land joined with the Portuguese to mount the attack and played a decisive role in the Christian victory. Yet the tension and misunderstanding that soured relations between the different attacking contingents argues against a high level of advance-planning.

The Second Crusade was launched in 1145 by Pope Eugenius and enthusiastically supported by Bernard of Clairvaux, who undertook preaching tours to encourage recruits. Although ostensibly triggered by the loss of the Christian state of Edessa in the Holy Land, the Second Crusade grew to become a general assault on the enemies of Christendom launched on several fronts: against the Wends in the east, the

⁴⁰ Odo of Deuil, *De profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, ed. and tr. Virginia Berry (New York: Columbia Records of Civilization 42, 1948), pp. 24, 66-8. Also C. W. Previté Orton, *The Early History of the House of Savoy* (Cambridge, 1912), pp. 309-13.

Saracens in the Holy Land, and the Moors in Spain.⁴¹ On the Spanish front, the major focus of planning was Alfonso VII of León-Castile's attacks on Almería and Tortosa in 1147-8. These attacks were explicitly linked to the wider campaign against Islam and Pope Eugenius extended official crusading status to those taking part.⁴² Although several authors also included Lisbon in this overall strategy, such claims were made long after the event, and in the knowledge that other crusading campaigns had ended in dismal failure.⁴³ Contemporary sources provide little indication of coordinated planning in the attacks on Santarém or Lisbon.

Two contemporary sources, *De expugnatione Scalabis* and the *Vita sancti Theotonii*, describe the Portuguese attack on Santarém. Both authors emphasise that local initiative was the motivating force. Protected by formidable natural and man-made defences, rich in resources and through trade, and with numerous warlike inhabitants, Santarém was a dangerous advance base for Muslim attack. As recently as 1144 an expedition from Santarém had struck deeply into Portuguese territory, investing the Templars at Soure and capturing large numbers of prisoners.⁴⁴ Afonso Henriques first ordered a reconnaissance to ascertain the chances of a surprise attack, and on receiving a positive report, led a small force against the town.⁴⁵ Because surprise was critical to the success of the operation, the details of the attack were kept secret. No contemporary document suggests that the Portuguese leader sought advice outside the kingdom.

Although eyewitness accounts do not mention Latin Christian involvement in the decision to attack Santarém, there are hints that outside forces may nevertheless have played a part. The fifteenth-century contention that Henriques founded Alcobça as a result of his contact with Bernard of Clairvaux is difficult to credit, but other international religious orders may have been involved. Although the narrative sources make no mention of the Templars taking an active role in the attack, the disposition of the spoils in the town in the aftermath of victory do indicate they were present. More significantly, given earlier evidence of contact between Clairvaux and Santa Cruz, one

⁴¹ Constable, 'The Second Crusade', 213-279. More recent accounts of the launching of the crusade include J. G. Rowe 'Origins of the Second Crusade: Pope Eugenius III, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Louis VII of France', in M. Gervers (ed.), *The Second Crusade and the Cistercians* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992), 79-89; and George Ferzoco, 'The Origin of the Second Crusade', in M. Gervers (ed.), *The Second Crusade and the Cistercians*, 91-9.

⁴² Constable, 'The Second Crusade', pp. 227-34.

⁴³ Phillips, 'Saint Bernard of Clairvaux', p. 496.

⁴⁴ Herculano, *História de Portugal*, 1, 472; Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 13 vols (Lisbon: Editorial Verbo, 1977), 1, pp. 92-3.

⁴⁵ *De expugnatione Scalabis*, pp. 347-8.

of the few people Henriques discussed his plans with was Theotonio. The prior of Santa Cruz was advised of the exact time of the attack so that the monks could offer special supportive prayers.⁴⁶ Given Theotonio's known communications with both Bernard of Clairvaux and Pope Eugenius, it is possible that he was able to advise Henriques on the general details of the crusade.⁴⁷ Nevertheless events four months later, during the attack on Lisbon, suggest Portuguese knowledge of crusader plans was quite vague.

In the spring of 1147 a fleet of almost two hundred ships gathered in Dartmouth harbour. The major contingents were Anglo-Norman, Flemish, and German, but groups of Scots, Bretons, and even a Pisan engineer are mentioned in various contexts.⁴⁸ Before setting sail a council was held to arrange for the disposition of the fleet; a detailed code of conduct was drawn up to ensure that order was maintained. When the fleet eventually arrived in Oporto they were met by Bishop Pedro Pitões (1146-1152). The bishop was not surprised by the appearance of the fleet, for both he and the king had been forewarned of the crusaders' imminent arrival. A market was organised to cater to their immediate needs, and when the crusaders had been mollified, the bishop addressed them with a prepared sermon. The king, meanwhile, had already moved against the Muslims at the head of the royal army, promising to meet the crusaders closer to Lisbon.⁴⁹ Could these Portuguese preparations indicate the guiding hand of Bernard of Clairvaux?⁵⁰

There is in fact a more mundane explanation for the advance warning the Portuguese received. After making landfall on the Galician coast the crusader fleet did not sail directly southwards. Instead the mariners paused to visit several places of interest along the way, including the shrine of St James at Compostela. Meanwhile, one of the ships separated from the main fleet during the perilous crossing of the Bay of Biscay sailed directly into Portuguese waters. This single harbinger gave the Portuguese ample time to ready themselves to greet the remainder of the fleet a week later.⁵¹

⁴⁶ 'Ad virum Dei veniens consilium illi soli detexit', *Vita sancti Theotonii*, p. 86.

⁴⁷ Santa Cruz, it should be remembered, had been taken under the direct protection of the papacy in 1132.

⁴⁸ The three main contingents of Anglo-Norman, Flemish and German are described at the outset. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 53-7. Also mentioned are groups from Scotland, Bretagne, and Bologne. p. 105. The Pisan engineer is mentioned in *Annales sancti Disibodi*, p. 28.

⁴⁹ '... adventum nostrum se prescisse nobis indicavit; sed et ab heri litteras regias accepisse...' *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, p. 68.

⁵⁰ This seems to be the implication drawn by Livermore, 'The "Conquest of Lisbon"', pp. 12, 16. Other scholars have also suspected Bernard's influence in the organisation of the crusader fleet and some of the themes developed in Bishop Pedro's sermon. Constable, 'The Second Crusade', pp. 222, 247.

⁵¹ *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, p. 99.

Moreover the progress of the initial meeting between the Portuguese and the crusaders does not suggest any prior plans for cooperative action were in place. The Anglo-Norman account vividly describes the dissent that broke out among the crusaders as a result of the Portuguese request. While the disagreement itself suggests that no previous arrangements were made, the silence of the Portuguese would seem to confirm it. Had the celebrated Abbot Bernard made any undertaking to the Portuguese king, there could be no obvious reason for it remaining unmentioned. In fact, Bishop Pedro of Oporto compliments the crusaders on their spontaneous enthusiasm, since they had undertaken the journey without the encouragement of any preacher.⁵²

Is it possible then to detect any trace of Bernard's influence in the first crucial meetings between the Portuguese and the crusaders? Although Bishop Pedro makes no allusion in his sermon to Bernard of Clairvaux, his audience at this point was the predominantly Anglo-Norman crews of perhaps fifty ships. These represented the advance party of the storm-scattered fleet; both the Flemish leader, Christian of Gisteltes, and the commander of the men of Cologne, Arnold of Aerschot, were absent.⁵³ Therefore the bishop's praise of self-motivation applied only to the majority of those actually present. While the Anglo-Normans received their notification of the crusade either second-hand or by letter, Bernard of Clairvaux did undertake an extensive preaching campaign in Germany and the low countries.⁵⁴ It is significant therefore, that when the fleet regrouped the two contingents reacted quite differently to the Portuguese proposition.

The proposal to halt the voyage to assist the Portuguese caused serious discord among the Anglo-Normans, but the men of Flanders and Cologne accepted it without apparent qualms. This could not have been a case of Bernard directly advising those he had seen personally of his plans, since in this case the continental crusaders would have had time enough, possibly during the negotiations in Dartmouth, to make the full scope of the operation known to all. Instead this readiness to accommodate the Portuguese request may well represent the shadowy presence of the greatest preacher of the age on

⁵² *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, p. 73.

⁵³ *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, p. 85. Since the author of *Annales sancti Disibodi*, p. 27 was able to confirm the absence of Christian of Gisteltes and Count Arnold it would appear that at least his ship managed to stay in touch with the Anglo-Norman contingent.

⁵⁴ The limited preaching undertaken in England prior to the Second Crusade is described by Christopher Tyerman, *England and the Crusades 1095-1588* (Chicago: UP, 1988), pp. 30-33, 165-7. The preaching of the crusade in Flanders is the subject of Phillips, 'St Bernard of Clairvaux', passim. A more general

the consciousness of those who had been in a position to hear his words first-hand. While little is known about what Bernard actually said during his preaching tours, one important theme was the shift from a strictly terrestrial concept of Jerusalem to a spiritual ideal. Only thus could Bernard's hopes for a general expansion of Latin Christendom be met.⁵⁵ From the willingness of the Flemish and German mariners to pause in their pilgrimage it seems they had heeded and understood Bernard's wider meaning.

The timing of the Christian advance to the Tagus River suggests it was initiated to coincide with the Second Crusade. Portuguese leaders maintained adequate links with Latin Christendom to be aware of the rough timetable of the crusade; it is less certain these contacts would have allowed detailed planning or prearranged agreements. Henriques' attack on Santarém was prompted by local factors, similarly the subsequent siege of Lisbon was an example of Portuguese opportunism. Bernard of Clairvaux did not play a direct role in arranging the campaign, but his influence can be traced not only in the numbers of crusaders undertaking the journey, but also in the familiarity many of them had with newer concepts of holy war. While Bernard's view of the crusade may have been able to impel much of Latin Christendom into battle, it seems to have had a less explosive effect on the Portuguese themselves. This can be seen most clearly in a comparison of the two major actions of the Christian advance to the Tagus: the capture of Santarém and the siege of Lisbon.

The first phase of the advance to the Tagus: the capture of Santarém (3 May 1147)

On the night of the 3 May 1147 Afonso Henriques launched a surprise attack on the Muslim-held city of Santarém. Although his army was small, Henriques caught the defenders unprepared and seized the strategic strongpoint. This success became even more significant when the capture of Lisbon several months later secured the northern bank of the Tagus River for the Portuguese. In light of this subsequent importance, chroniclers imputed aspects of the crusade to the attack on Santarém. These hints of a nascent holy war mentality among the Portuguese have the appearance of literary gloss,

coverage of the preaching of the Second Crusade is provided by Patricia Cole, *The Preaching of the Crusades* (Cambridge, MA: Medieval Academy of America, 1991), pp. 37-52.

and while there were some traces of Latin Christian influence in the progress of the attack, overall it was carried out using the relative restraint of Iberian secular warfare.

Afonso Henriques himself was no crusader. Simmering border warfare was a constant feature of life on the Portuguese frontier. Christians and Muslims both mounted frequent incursions aimed at causing material damage and capturing prisoners.⁵⁶ Despite the fame the Portuguese monarch was later to gain through his success against the Moors, during the early years of his rule the Muslim kingdoms to the south were viewed primarily as a distraction from his negotiations with Alfonso of León-Castile. The Portuguese king concentrated on defending the existing frontier by placing trusted lieutenants in strategic southern strongpoints and building castles at Mondego and Soure.⁵⁷ Royal forces were bolstered by the formation of city militias whose responsibilities were stipulated in increasing detail.⁵⁸ Only after his agreements with Alfonso VII closed Galicia to further Portuguese expansion did Henriques seriously consider the southern frontier as an outlet for his restless ambition.

Santarém was the first target for this new expansionism. According to the *De expugnatione Scalabis*, early in 1147 Henriques sent his trusted lieutenant Mem (or Menendes) Ramirez to reconnoiter the town's defences.⁵⁹ Ramirez returned with a positive report, and after discussing his plans with a few close advisors, Henriques decided to proceed with the attempt. On 10 March he left Coimbra at the head of a few knights and some 250 men-at-arms. The attackers approached by night with numerous scaling ladders, but the final climb by Mem Ramirez was largely unplanned. After clambering on to a potter's house and dropping his scaling ladder with a dangerous clatter, Ramirez hoisted a boy called Moqueme onto the battlements. This boy then secured the ladder with a rope and several soldiers were able to reach the wall and raise Afonso's standard. Lulled by a recent truce, the guards were slow to react and in the

⁵⁵ Constable, 'The Second Crusade', p. 247 summarises Bernard's conception of crusade. This subject is considered further by Hans Dietrich Kahl, 'Crusade eschatology as seen by St Bernard in the years 1146-1148', in Gervers (ed.), *The Second Crusade and the Cistercians*, 35-47.

⁵⁶ The anonymous author of *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 61-9, 77-9, painted a bleak picture of the devastation caused by constant warfare. Ruined coastal towns and churches were observed from the ships. On their arrival at Oporto Bishop Pedro informed the crusaders that only seven years previously the city had been sacked by the enemy. While this may have occurred during the 1140 campaign that saw the reduction of the castle of Leiria, it could also have been a result of the strong Muslim naval presence. CAI, II, 9, pp. 199-200 claims that Muslim fleets operated along the coastline as far north as England.

⁵⁷ Serrão, *História de Portugal*, I, pp. 92-4.

⁵⁸ James F. Powers, *A Society Organized for War: The Iberian Municipal Militias in the Central Middle Ages* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 32-5; and below, pp. 198-203.

⁵⁹ The account which follows is drawn from *De expugnatione Scalabis*, pp. 346-51.

resulting confusion the Christian advance party was able to gain control of the gates. As soon as the bulk of the army forced an entry the unprepared citizens of Santarém were quickly overwhelmed. The *De expugnatione Scalabis* concludes with the poignant vignette of a philosophical King Afonso standing beneath the broken gate ruminating on the workings of divine providence, while from within came sounds of mayhem.

One striking feature of the capture of Santarém is the contrast between the attitudes attributed to the people involved and their actual actions. In the introduction to the *De expugnatione Scalabis* the anonymous author exalts that the Muslims have been cast down and a wonderful inheritance granted to those favoured by heaven. To bring this to pass, the author maintains, God has decreed 'new wars for our times'.⁶⁰ There are suggestions of both reconquest and crusade in these comments, but it is left to the king to underline what this new form of belligerence entailed.

Tell me, for the love of God, how can there be any difficulty in killing those who are unarmed and still half asleep? Listen to me carefully: spare neither age or sex, kill the elderly and infants; maidens and grandmothers! Strengthen your hands! Because the Lord is with us, each of you will be able to kill a hundred of them! I believe the canons of Santa Cruz, to whom I confided our task, pray for us. On them I rely, as well as the rest of the clergy and all the people. Beyond this, some of the sentinels will admit us! (Forgive me Lord, the sin of this lie, indeed that I consciously lied to raise up their spirits).⁶¹

The centrality of Santa Cruz in the development of these new modes of thinking is further attested in the *Vita sancti Theotonii*. Theotonio, who was charged by Afonso to offer these prayers on the army's behalf, dutifully beseeched of heaven that a city so hostile to the Christian people might fall, the nefarious Muslims be cast out, and the

⁶⁰ '...magnificatus est enim gloriose subiciendo gentes Mahometh adorantes sub pedibus nostris, elegit nobis hereditatem speciosissimam quam delexit. (...) Audite reges auribus percipite principes universe terre, quam Dominus elegit nova bella in diebus nostris...' *De expugnatione Scalabis*, pp. 345-6.

⁶¹ 'Cuiusmodi erit difficultas interficiendi, dicite mihi pro amore Dei, nudos et male sopitos? Sed hoc erit quod observabitis attentius, nulli etati vel sexui parcatis: moriatur infans ad ubera pendens, et senex plenus dierum, adolescentula, et anus decrepita. Confortentur vestre manus, Dominus est enim nobiscum, nam unus e vobis poterit ex eis percutere C. Hodie, sicut credo, fit pro nobis communis oratio et a canonicis sancte crucis, quibus predixi hoc nostrum negotium, et in quibus confido, et a cetero clero simul cum omni populo. Preterea quidam de vigiliis sunt nos recepturi. Parcat mihi Deus huius crimen mendacii, quia ideo scienter sum mentitus, ut eorum animi consolidarentur fortius.' *De expugnatione Scalabis*, p. 349.

name of God glorified thereby.⁶² This is the rhetoric of crusade and it was being propagated by the monks of Santa Cruz, the major conduit of Latin Christian influence in Portugal. Yet to what degree were such attitudes held outside the monastery walls? Both accounts were written by the monks of Santa Cruz, their intent was to emphasise the role of their own house in Henriques' victory. Moreover, for all that Theotonio was an accomplished preacher capable of reducing even the stalwart Henriques to tears of contrition, in this case there is cause to mistrust the sincerity of the king's sectarian wrath. The chilling lack of mercy is a novelty to his audience and is included beside an acknowledged lie simply to inspire confidence among the soldiers. Certainly these comments do not accord well with the events as they actually unfolded.

Despite the crusading sentiments attributed to the king, his stated motivation for the attack was not the religion of Santarém's inhabitants, but rather the wealth of the city and the threat it posed to Coimbra.⁶³ This battle was fought for secular goals under the constraints of limited, as opposed to total war. The agreements made earlier between the Portuguese and the citizens of Santarém were respected by both parties. Mem Ramirez was able to scout out the city because a temporary truce had been declared. Similarly the Portuguese were scrupulous in sending messengers to cancel this truce prior to the attack.⁶⁴ Throughout the operation the Portuguese demonstrated a familiarity with their neighbours that quite clearly came from relations other than war. Among their own number there were numerous Mozarabs, including the leaders Mem Ramirez and Martin Moab.⁶⁵ Furthermore, the Portuguese displayed sufficient knowledge of the Arabic tongue to record Muslim geographical names and their meanings.⁶⁶ The attackers also demonstrated a familiarity with spoken Arabic, they knew immediately what the startled guards shouted in challenge and reacted accordingly.⁶⁷ Most importantly, despite Henriques' purported exhortations toward atrocity, there is no evidence that the taking of the town was done with unusual

⁶² ... victoriam propitius concedere digneris de inimicissima christiani populi civitate. Quatinus excluso inde spurcissimo ac nefando mahometis ritu, laudetur ibi nomen tuum domine deus.' *Vita sancti Theotonii*, p. 86b. This prayer bears striking similarity to the introduction to the king's account in *De expugnatione Scalabis*, pp. 345-6.

⁶³ *De expugnatione Scalabis*, p. 347.

⁶⁴ *De expugnatione Scalabis*, pp. 347-8.

⁶⁵ Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 94-5.

⁶⁶ When describing the city defences, for example, the author was aware that the torturous path toward the city was called 'Alhanse' meaning 'the Snake' and that the precipitous slope called Alhafa, or 'Dread' was the point where criminals were executed. *De expugnatione Scalabis*, p. 346-7.

⁶⁷ *De expugnatione Scalabis*, p. 350.

savagery. While Muslim sources comment sadly on the loss of Santarém they make no mention of a slaughter taking place.⁶⁸ Refugees from Santarém subsequently found their way to Lisbon to endure another Christian attack there, but no shadow of such an atrocity darkened the negotiations that preceded this second siege.

In the brief interlude between these two confrontations Afonso Henriques reorganised administration in Santarém. Among the beneficiaries of the Christian takeover were the Knights Templar, who received possession of the city's churches. The relevant grant also included an unusual proviso. The Santarém churches were granted to the Templars on the understanding that if Lisbon should subsequently fall into Christian hands the properties in the first city would be exchanged for similar holdings in the second.⁶⁹ Some modern historians have cited this proviso as evidence that Henriques' was motivated by the ideal of reconquest.⁷⁰ Yet the wording of the grant does not support such heavy interpretative weight. Instead the implication seems to be that the capture of Lisbon was merely a future possibility, not the expected result of a clearly envisaged campaign.⁷¹

The attack on Santarém was undertaken by a small number of Portuguese troops; it was prompted by local events and unexpected opportunities. Descriptions of the action indicate a growing Portuguese awareness of crusading attitudes, but a consideration of actual events suggests acceptance of holy war remained the purview of a small group of educated ecclesiastics with wider horizons and international contacts. The Portuguese capture of Santarém was not a victory of the Second Crusade, and the role played by Latin Christians, either directly or ideologically, was negligible. Yet what made this local success of a wider importance was the subsequent capture of Lisbon. In this Portuguese success the direct participation of Latin Christian crusaders proved to be decisive.

⁶⁸ The capture is noted without special comment by the contemporary Muslim author Ibn al-Athir, *al Kitâb al-Kâmil*, in Manuel Silveira Alves Conde, 'Para um corpus da documentação relativa à paisagem de Santarém', *Media Aetas*, 2 (1999) pp. 107-8.

⁶⁹ DMP, 1, pp. 272; CMP-A, pp. 209-10.

⁷⁰ For example Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 1, p. 97.

⁷¹ 'Sed si forte evenerit ut in aliquo tempore michi Deus sua pietate daret illam civitatem, que dicitur Ulixbona....' DMP, 1, p. 272.

The second phase of the advance to the Tagus: the capture of Lisbon (24 October 1147)

Four months after the capture of Santarém the arrival of the crusader fleets provided Henriques with sufficient manpower to mount an attack on Lisbon. The resulting siege is the most well-known of the actions in which foreign crusaders took part in Portuguese campaigns.⁷² The northerners played a crucial military role at Lisbon, but the wider implications of their participation are less easily assessed. The new arrivals have traditionally been called 'crusaders', yet their actual status and motivation is unclear. Their actions seem to blur the distinctions between religious and secular warfare. In many ways the northern mariners reveal the crusade to be a developing institution, by no means consistently adhered to by all participants. Thus, rather than providing local people with a clear example of crusading ideology, the northerners presented a complex and often contradictory picture. Moreover, throughout the attack, the Portuguese demonstrated their own, fundamentally different, concept of sectarian warfare.

The decisive military value of the new arrivals was demonstrated almost immediately. The crusaders divided into two camps: the Anglo-Normans to the west of the city; the Flemish and Germans to the east. The Portuguese account of the action has the royal army forming an independent unit attacking the city from the north, but this is not confirmed by other chroniclers. In fact the only substantial mention the Anglo-Norman author made of Portuguese activity was the dispersal of the majority of the local troops midway through the siege. This inability to maintain a sizeable force in the field for an extended period of time underlined the difficulty the Portuguese king faced in conducting successful siege warfare without outside assistance. Only the royal household and some of the Portuguese clergy remained to see the siege to its

⁷² The most authoritative account remains David, *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*. This account is largely repeated in H. A. R. Gibb, 'English Crusaders in Portugal', in *Chapters in Anglo-Portuguese Relations*, ed. Edgar Prestage, (Watford: Voss and Michael, 1935), 7-17; Caron Hillenbrand, 'A Neglected Episode of the Reconquista: A Christian success in the Second Crusade', *Revue des Études Islamiques*, 54 (1988), 163-70; and Matthew Bennet, 'Military aspects of the conquest of Lisbon, 1147', in Jonathan Phillips and Martin Hoch (eds), *The Second Crusade: Scope and Consequences* (Manchester: UP, 2001), 71-90. A commonly cited Portuguese account is Luís Saavedra Machado, 'Os Ingleses em Portugal', *Biblos*, 9 (1933), 226-44 and 10 (1934), 573-90.

conclusion.⁷³ The Anglo-Norman author remained ambivalent concerning the Portuguese commitment to the siege, but the Teutonic sources were openly negative. In the sole Teutonic reference to the local troops in action they were routed by the concentrated missile fire of the defenders, and their panic-stricken flight almost cost the attackers their siege tower. The situation was only saved by the fortuitous arrival of a stout company of Germans.⁷⁴ Whatever the reality of this incident, it is difficult to imagine the siege being attempted, let alone carried to a successful conclusion, without the crusaders.

While the northerners played a decisive role in the capture of Lisbon, there is little to suggest their military success impacted on the basic attitudes of their Portuguese hosts. Many of the visiting mariners exhibited openly mercenary attitudes and there was little to differentiate them from other, all too familiar, seaborne raiders.⁷⁵ Even those individuals who espoused more pious motives no doubt presented a confused picture to Iberian observers. The crusade has been described as an amalgam of holy war and pilgrimage traditions, an uneasy fusion that the Church attempted to strengthen with increasingly elaborate ritual and legal obligation. The maritime crusaders appeared only vaguely aware of these developments. The fundamental tension in the concept of crusade, between the individual experience of pilgrimage and the collective responsibility of holy war, was conspicuous in the crusader fleet. The Anglo-Norman contingent display the greater unease concerning the righteousness of holy war; the continental crusaders seemed far less troubled by such qualms.⁷⁶

When Bishop Pedro first approached the crusaders with his request for assistance a vocal group of Anglo-Normans railed against delay. Many of them had sour memories of earlier involvement with the Portuguese in a previous failed attempt

⁷³ *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, p. 141. It is unclear whether this was a result of limits on royal authority or the need to defend the border. Portuguese historians have been understandably uncomfortable with this development. See also David's comments, *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, p. 140, n. 1.

⁷⁴ 'Arnulf's letter', p. 138.

⁷⁵ For earlier maritime raiders harrying the Portuguese coasts see *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 12-7; and above, pp. 54-5, 81.

⁷⁶ Admittedly the Anglo-Norman source provides far more material on the attitudes of the crusaders, but this in itself is suggestive. The basic narratives of the *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi* and the Teutonic source are similar, with the former extended through the inclusion of lengthy speeches placed into the mouths of leading figures. These provide the most direct statements of differences of opinion and doubts over courses of action. One reason for the writing of *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi* in the first place was seemingly to explain the decision to pause in Lisbon. That the author of the Teutonic source felt no need to similarly justify their actions is in itself indicative of a fundamental difference in attitude.

to take Lisbon.⁷⁷ They argued that the prevailing winds were particularly favourable for the eastward journey to Jerusalem, adding for good measure that greater profit could be gained through piracy in the strait between Spain and Africa. They would only agree to remain in Portugal in return for the right to pillage the city and exemption from mercantile tolls throughout Portugal, to be held in perpetuity.⁷⁸ Similar financial expectations were displayed, even more brazenly, by the Flemish contingent.

As the siege ground to a conclusion the cupidity of many of the attackers reached fever pitch. The Portuguese king sought to negotiate a surrender, but the Flemish rank and file rose in revolt over the generous terms he offered. Henriques withdrew in disgust and was only mollified by pledges of temporary fealty from the leaders of both crusader camps. Yet no sooner had this settlement been accepted than greed overcame many of the crusaders, who cast off all restraint and indulged in a violent sack of the city. Portuguese, Muslims, and the author of the *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi* all expressed deep disgust at the actions of the predominantly Flemish rioters.⁷⁹ The surrendering citizens suffered numerous atrocities during the mayhem, including the murder of the elderly Mozarabic bishop. When order was restored the city was duly handed over to the Portuguese, and the surviving citizens expelled. An Anglo-Norman cleric, Gilbert of Hastings, was installed as the new bishop of Lisbon. The crusaders wintered in the city before continuing on early the following year. Contingents from the fleet subsequently carried out further raiding attacks on Faro and assisted in the Leonese-Castilian assaults on Almería and Tortosa in the hope of further booty.⁸⁰

Such behaviour can hardly have inspired the Portuguese with admiration for the crusaders. This equivocal local reaction could only have been complicated by the uncertainty the northerners themselves displayed concerning the nature of the crusade.

⁷⁷ Significantly this disgruntled group had previously undertaken activities of much the same type as those proposed in 1147, but without any form of crusading indulgence being offered. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 101-111. The author characterised those wishing to sail on as ill-disciplined malcontents, a conclusion that has remained unchallenged.

⁷⁸ They also demanded oaths and hostages from the king. The king's acceptance of these stipulations appears to confirm the accusations of some of the crusaders of earlier failure by Henriques to maintain agreements with previous maritime forces. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, p. 114, n. 1.

⁷⁹ *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 173-9.

⁸⁰ *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 179-81. Duodechin claims that the Flemish fleet set sail early in February 1148, *Annales sancti Disibodi*, p. 28. After leaving Lisbon the fleet made an abortive attack on Faro in 1148 then broke up. Some joined the Spanish in the attacks on Almería and Tortosa, while others continued on to the Holy Land, where they took part in the ill-conceived assault on Damascus that was

The fundamental basis of crusading was the commitment to a vow of service in the expectation of spiritual reward. This special status was denoted by the wearing of a cloth cross. Yet the armed pilgrims who joined forces with the Portuguese bore little resemblance to this model. The first element of the crusading equation, the vow, had certainly not been uniformly applied. When debate arose among the Anglo-Normans over the advisability of remaining in Lisbon, those who wished to continue their voyage made no mention of the need to fulfil sacred pledges. Only the Teutonic source displayed any recognition of the importance of the crusader vow.⁸¹ The primary reward for taking the vow, the grant of some form of remission, was barely alluded to.⁸² Furthermore, the most visible aspect of the crusade, the wearing of a cloth cross, is virtually omitted. The symbol of the cross appeared most openly on the banner that was paraded into the captured city. Yet even this appears to have been an inclusive symbol for the entire Christian force and did not represent any special crusader status.⁸³ Moreover, just as the members of the fleet exhibited no firm understanding of those features that would later distinguish the crusade from other activities, they also lacked any great consistency of motive for their actions.

Even among the crusaders themselves there was significant unease concerning the moral justification for remaining in Lisbon. On meeting the crusaders at Oporto Bishop Pedro attempted to win them over with an emotional sermon. The bishop addressed the newcomers as pilgrims and praised them for their strength of purpose. He then provided a succinct delineation of the two facets of the crusade and placed the emphasis heavily on holy war, as opposed to pilgrimage.

To you the mother church, as it were with her arms cut off and her face disfigured, appeals for help; she seeks vengeance at your hands for the blood of her sons. She calls to you, verily, she cries aloud. 'Execute vengeance upon the

the dismal climax of the Second Crusade. Giles Constable, 'A note on the route of the Anglo-Flemish crusaders of 1147', *Speculum* 28 (1953), 525-6.

⁸¹ Indeed those wishing to stay and assist the Portuguese appealed to their own 'oath-bound association' as a reason for the dissenters to remain with the larger group. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 104-5. The Teutonic source speaks of the arrival at Jerusalem in terms of the fulfillment of an oath. *Annales sancti Disibodi*, p. 28.

⁸² And even then by Bishop Pedro, who speaks obliquely of their being 'reborn of a new baptism of repentance' (novo penitentie renati baptisate), *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 72-3.

⁸³ *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 156-7, 174-5. Christopher J. Tyerman, 'Were there any crusades in the twelfth century?', *English Historical Review*, 110 (1995), p. 562, draws attention to the difference between the raising of the king's banner at Santerém and the use of a more inclusive banner at Lisbon.

heathen and punishments upon the people.' [Psalms 149:7] Therefore, be not seduced by the desire to press on with the journey which you have begun; for the praiseworthy thing is not to have been to Jerusalem, but to have lived a good life while on the way; for you cannot arrive there except through the performance of His works.⁸⁴

Although the Anglo-Normans allowed themselves to be convinced, they continued to display lingering doubts about the righteousness of their decision. No trace of the same hesitancy can be seen in other crusader contingents.

In the final days of the siege, the camp was disturbed by unnerving portents when the bread used in the Mass was found to be permeated with blood. The Anglo-Norman author recalled his fellows interpreting this omen to mean that the ferocity and bloodthirstiness of the Flemish was not pleasing to God.⁸⁵ The other crusader contingents were unperturbed; indeed their bloodlust was not easily sated, as the unfortunate citizens discovered when they sought to surrender.⁸⁶ Yet it is in their final comments that the respective accounts most clearly articulate the distinction between the attitudes of the Anglo-Norman and the continental crusader. The author of *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi* ends his letter with a melancholy consideration of the suffering of the defeated, taking it as a salutary warning against the dangers of sinful pride – a fault, he implies, from which the victors are by no means free.⁸⁷ The dispatches sent home by the Flemish and German correspondents include no such introspection. Here the triumphant arrival of the fleet in Jerusalem is tempered by acknowledgement of the fallen. Described as martyrs, they were considered capable of rendering miracles to those who petitioned them at their tombs.⁸⁸

It is difficult to see how the concept of crusade, as it was displayed by members of the northern fleet, could have greatly impressed the Portuguese. Little about the northern mariners' activities or appearance distinguished them from earlier pilgrims or pirates, while their aims and motivations were confused. Far from being influenced by the coming of the crusaders, it was in fact the Portuguese themselves who banked the

⁸⁴ *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, p. 79.

⁸⁵ *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, p. 135. While this omen goes unmentioned in the Teutonic sources, it made a deep and lasting impression on the Portuguese. *Indiculum fundationis monasterii S. Vincentii*, PMH SS, p. 92.

⁸⁶ *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 171-7.

⁸⁷ *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 180-5.

fires of holy war in many of the newcomers; it was they who appealed to the nascent sense of Christian identity. Yet to what degree did the Portuguese actually subscribe to the concepts with which they sought to sway their co-religionists? The attitude the Portuguese displayed at Lisbon was essentially the realistic one imposed upon them by the necessities of frontier life. This practicality is evident not only in their relations with the Muslims, but also in their attitude toward the Mozarabs.

The Portuguese remained the most moderate of the contingents in their dealings with the citizens of Lisbon. This was due to their greater familiarity with Muslim culture and the constraints of the local strategic situation. Whenever possible, Henriques attempted to open negotiation with the enemy and invariably expressed a willingness to accept generous terms of surrender. Indeed this tolerance excited growing distrust from many crusaders.⁸⁹ Nonetheless, such a policy had clear advantages, since it was far easier for the Portuguese to secure a negotiated surrender than commit themselves to the uncertainties of besieging a strongpoint. Diplomatic engagement also allowed Henriques to divide his enemies. In a policy that recalled the great *paria*-tribute days of Alfonso VI of Léon-Castile half a century earlier, Henriques had arranged truces with several local Muslim leaders. During the siege of Lisbon this proved decisive, as one of these agreements prevented Abu Muhammad Sidrey ibn Wazir, ruler of Évora and Beja, from sending aid to the beleaguered citizens.⁹⁰ Such strategic advantage provided ready explanation for Henriques' punctiliousness over the ending of his truce with the citizens of Santarém. Moreover the potential benefits of negotiated settlements also exercised a moderating influence on the Portuguese when dealing with defeated adversaries. To encourage surrender and to ensure disunity among their enemies it was crucial that the Portuguese should not present themselves as an overwhelming threat to all of them.

The Portuguese also displayed greater understanding of cultural difference through their attitudes toward the Mozarabs. Christian in faith and Arabic in culture, this group formed a substantial minority in both Christian and Muslim territories. In the early twelfth century the cultural uniqueness of the Mozarabs usually went

⁸⁸ *Annales sancti Disibodi*, p. 28; *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 132-3.

⁸⁹ *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, p. 171. Once again the division between the Anglo-Norman and continental crusaders is clear. The former are willing to accept a Portuguese-negotiated cease-fire, while the latter insist on recourse to arms.

unmentioned and they were considered an integrated part of whichever society they resided in. Earlier in his career Henriques had commonly treated Mozarabic and Arabic prisoners indiscriminately. Although eventually brought to contrition by Theotonio's impassioned sermons, the views championed by the saint appear to have been slow to percolate through wider society.⁹¹ The presence of a Mozarabic bishop in Lisbon suggests a large population, yet there was no indication these people were considered a possible fifth column by either the Portuguese or the citizens. In fact the Mozarabs shared the trials of the siege along with the suffering and bloodshed in its aftermath. From the outset the crusaders demonstrate no understanding of the distinction between Mozarab and Arab; the Portuguese did nothing to correct this error and the northerners remained in ignorance.⁹² The fact that neither Portuguese nor Muslims made overt reference to the Christianity of the Mozarabs suggests that religion was only one of several factors on which alliances and political groupings were based.

Although the Portuguese were unready to embrace the concept of holy war they were nonetheless eager to legitimise their own aggression. Much has been written concerning Bishop Pedro's speech to the newly arrived crusaders, for it was unlike traditional crusading sermons.⁹³ The arguments Bishop Pedro raised do not reflect the ideology of the crusade as it had developed by the middle of the twelfth century. The bishop cited venerable authorities such as the Bible, Isidore of Seville, St Augustine, and St Jerome to stress the obligation of the strong to defend the weak. The principles appealed to were the ancient ones for establishing Just War (*iustum bellum*) – a term the bishop used freely. This appeal has an anachronistic flavour. Such language was more common in the sermons preceding the First Crusade or in the efforts of Gregory VII to launch a 'proto crusade' in 1074.⁹⁴ The rhetoric that launched the Second Crusade was

⁹⁰ In fact the truce seemed to provide the Muslim leader with an excuse rather than act as a constraint. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 137-139. During this period Muslim Spanish defence was undermined by the emergence of the Almohads in North Africa. Reilly, *Alfonso VII*, pp. 75-6.

⁹¹ Theotonio encountered Henriques recently returned from a raid with numerous prisoners, Muslims and Mozarabs mixed indiscriminately. All were to be enslaved until Theotonio intervened on behalf of the Mozarabs. As fellow Christians, the saint explained, they could not be so treated. Afonso required considerable persuasion to accept this loss of potential revenue. *Vita sancti Theotonii*, pp. 84-5.

⁹² The aging bishop was murdered by Flemish soldiers, while many other Mozarabs succumbed to disease in the wake of the siege. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 177, 183-4.

⁹³ Carl Erdmann, 'Der Kreuzzugsgedanke in Portugal', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 141 (1929), 25-53; trans. by A. Pinto de Cavalho as *A Ideia de Cruzada em Portugal* (Coimbra: Publicações do Instituto Alemão, 1940), p. 23; Richard Fletcher, 'Reconquest and Crusade in Spain c. 1050-1150', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 37 (1987), pp. 43-4; Tyerman, 'Were there any crusades in the twelfth century?', pp. 563-5.

⁹⁴ See above, p. 53, n. 22; p. 76, n. 19.

devoid of such legalistic justifications.⁹⁵ Bishop Pedro stressed that it was not merely because the enemy were Muslim that the crusaders must assail them, but because they were oppressing fellow Christians. While Pedro's speech has been dismissed as a poorly crafted crusader sermon the bishop's words in fact simply represented the Portuguese attitude.

Rather than the confused motivation of the crusaders, the Portuguese claimed as a mandate the right of reconquest.⁹⁶ Emissaries sent to the city prior to the siege made this position abundantly clear.

We demand that the see of this city shall be under our law; and surely, if a natural sense of justice had made any progress among you, you would go back unbidden to the land of the Moors from whence you came, with your baggage, money, and goods, and your women and children, leaving to us our own... For how otherwise there could be peace between us I know not, since the lot assigned to each from the beginning lacks its rightful possessor. You Moors and Moabites fraudulently seized the realm of Lusitania...⁹⁷

This speech is one of the strongest and clearest surviving articulations of the reconquest ideal. Nonetheless there are grounds for questioning the sincerity of the Portuguese emissaries. Although their claim to a historical mandate was strongly made, they displayed confusion over the relationship between the Moors and the Visigothic political system, for they spoke of the invasion as a breach of fealty. Moreover the Portuguese were even uncertain about the date of the fall of the Visigothic kings, which they placed in 789 rather than 711.⁹⁸ The attitude of the Lisbon Mozarabs to Portuguese claims also suggest that this historical argument was recognised as a convenient fiction. The Mozarabs had been the primary custodians of the reconquest tradition between the eighth and eleventh century; yet their reaction to the pretensions of their co-religionists

⁹⁵ The development of crusading propaganda is considered by Cole, *Preaching the Crusades*, pp. 47-60.

⁹⁶ For a further discussion of the different forms of sectarian militancy presented in these speeches see S. Lay, 'The Reconquest as Crusade in the Anonymous *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*', *Al-Masaq. Islam in the Medieval Mediterranean*, 14: 2 (2002), 123-30.

⁹⁷ *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 115-7.

⁹⁸ *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 116-7. David points out that the date given, 789, in fact marks the end of a period of consolidation under Abd-ar-Rahmand I (756-88). This is not the only instance of Christian confusion over the date of the Arabic invasions. Aragonese kings displayed a similar lack of precision. See Peter Linehan, 'At the Spanish Frontier', in P. Linehan and J. L. Nelson, *The Medieval World* (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 41.

was indifference or even hostility. The Muslims, who knew their Portuguese neighbours well, cut to the heart of the issue in their reply to the emissaries' evocation of the past.

As to what you have advanced above concerning the lot assigned to each, truly you interfere with our destiny. Labeling your ambition zeal for righteousness, you misinterpret vices for virtues. For your greed has already grown to such proportions that base deeds not only please you but even delight you... This city did indeed, as I believe, once belong to your people; but now it is ours. In the future it will perhaps be yours. But this shall be in accordance with divine favour.⁹⁹

In this reply the citizens of Lisbon rejected Portuguese protestations to either crusade or reconquest. Religious justifications for aggression are dismissed as an attempt to cloak evil deeds. The claims of the Portuguese to prior ownership were rejected outright as irrelevant. The citizens perceived behind the glib words of the emissaries the desire for territorial expansion. As far as they were concerned, the Portuguese were indulging in nothing other than political aggrandisement, poorly camouflaged in a superficial pastiche of historical legality and even sanctity. For the Portuguese king this was a political struggle for dominion in which religious militancy was merely a weapon to be used whenever he deemed it useful.

In the decade after Afonso Henriques obtained Leonese-Castilian acknowledgement of his royal status he was able to use his strengthening relations with Latin Christendom to reinforce his local authority. Yet the most sensational success of this decade was the military advance to the Tagus River. Although the participation of crusaders proved decisive, the ideology of crusading had little effect on local attitudes. Portuguese self-identity remained essentially an Iberian one, with its pragmatic tolerance toward cultural difference. Latin Christian contacts proved decisive to Afonso Henriques' ongoing success, but Latin Christian culture could make only superficial impact on Portuguese society. Yet in the wake of success, the Portuguese ruler was able to extend his contacts outside the peninsula. This would draw the region still further into the Latin Christian sphere of cultural influence.

⁹⁹ *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 121-3.

Chapter Six

Papal recognition of Portuguese royalty (1148-1179)

During the 1140s Afonso Henriques made great progress toward securing political independence from León-Castile. The Portuguese ruler's royal title was accepted locally; his territory was protected by papal decree. Military success combined with careful diplomacy allowed Henriques to consolidate these gains. By 1148 only one further success was required to establish a Portuguese royal house, but this final achievement proved elusive. The papacy displayed deep reservations toward Portuguese independence, and successive popes prevaricated over Henriques' official status. Not until 23 May 1179 could Pope Alexander III (1159-1181) be persuaded to formally acknowledge Henriques as king. The pontiff's action has traditionally been interpreted as a recognition of Henriques' dogged defence of the kingdom and the successful resistance of the Portuguese church to ecclesiastical initiatives designed to limit regional autonomy. Less openly acknowledged has been the critical propaganda struggle fought and won by Henriques. The central issue was frontier defence, but the battlefield was the papal curia.

Although the final decades of the twelfth century brought fundamental political and social change in the Iberian peninsula, this period was poorly served by writers of narrative history. The author of the *Annales D. Alfonsi Portugallensium regis* recorded events until 1184, although it is often difficult to corroborate this material. Moreover, the Portuguese author showed scant interest in other regions of the peninsula.¹ In the absence of further contemporary material, heavy reliance has been placed on the thirteenth-century authors Lucas of Túy and Rodrigo of Toledo. Yet not only were these authors distant in time from the events they recorded, their value is further compromised by flagrant regional biases.² Due to this shortage of reliable narrative histories, particular onus must be placed on the official documentary record, especially the communications maintained between the papal curia and Iberian leaders.

¹ 'Annales D. Alfonsi Portugallensium regis', ed. Monica Blöcker-Walter, *Alfons I. von Portugal. Studien zu Geschichte und Sage de Begründers der portugiesischen Unabhängigkeit* (Zurich: Fretz und Wasmuth Verlag, 1966) [ADA], 151-162.

² There has been a growing interest in the nature and value of these sources. See Peter Linehan, *History and the Historians of Medieval Spain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 248, 357-8; Bernard F. Reilly, 'Sources of the Fourth Book of Lucas of Túy's *Chronicon Mundi*', *Classical Folia*, 30 (1976), 131-2.

Modern historians have based numerous studies on this sometimes problematic body of evidence. Many scholars have identified Pope Alexander's bull, *Manifestis probatum*, as marking the true emergence of an independent Portuguese monarchy.³ Unfortunately this focus on national legitimisation has encouraged a trend toward oversimplification of papal motives. Royalist writers often interpreted the grant as a reward for Henriques' military success against the Moors. Other scholars, who disapproved of external clerical intervention, portrayed a pope motivated solely by desire for the increased tribute promised by a grateful Henriques.⁴ Such simplistic interpretations were challenged most successfully in Carl Erdmann's exhaustive *Das Papsttum und Portugal im ersten Jahrhundert der portugiesischen Geschichte*, which remains the most commonly cited work almost eighty years after its original publication.⁵ Erdmann's heavy reliance on ecclesiastical documents, particularly for the critical years after 1157, led him to emphasise the struggle waged by the Bragan church for independence from Toledan oversight as a necessary first step to the acknowledgement of the Portuguese monarchy. To attain their mutual goal of regional independence, Afonso Henriques and Archbishop João Peculiar of Braga (1138-1175) formed a close partnership. What remains unresolved in this argument is the reason why freeing the church of Braga from a token submission to Toledo became such a point of secular contention.

Papal policy in the Iberian peninsula was often torn between two inconsistent imperatives. One papal priority was to impose obedience on the peninsula clergy and, to a lesser extent, the Iberian laity. At the same time, the defence of the frontier by secular hands was to be promoted and assisted wherever possible. Although the papal curia demonstrated a readiness to sanction limited Portuguese regional autonomy, both tradition and recent practical experience led the curia to imagine Iberia as an imperial

³ Furthermore, the papal concession guaranteeing ownership of all land conquered from non-Christians provided later apologists with valuable justification for the Portuguese maritime empire. Luís Ribeiro Soares, 'A bula <manifestis probatum> e a legitimidade portuguesa', in Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão (ed.), *8.º Centenário do Reconhecimento de Portugal pela Santa Sé* (Lisbon: Academia Portuguesa da História, 1979), p. 151.

⁴ Henriques undertook to pay an annual census of two marks of gold in addition to the one-off payment of one thousand marevedi gold coins. Foremost among those historians who distrust the motives of the papacy is Alexandre Herculano, *História de Portugal desde o começo da monarquia até o fim do reinado de Afonso III*, ed. J. Mattoso, 4 vols (Lisbon: Bertrand Editora, 1989), 1, pp. 582, 682-4.

⁵ Carl Erdmann, *Das Papsttum und Portugal im ersten Jahrhundert der portugiesischen Geschichte* (Berlin: Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Klasse Nr. 5, 1928); trans. by J. da Providência Costa as *O Papado e Portugal no Primeiro Século da História Portuguesa* (Coimbra: Instituto Alemão, 1935).

structure in which overall authority could most safely be vested in an emperor. During the eleventh and early twelfth centuries secular authority had become centralised under the energetic rule of the Leonese-Castilian monarchy; this authority had been further legitimised by linkage to the venerable tradition of the Visigothic kings. From the vantage point of Rome, this appeared a natural and advantageous political arrangement. Hence, while the papacy might occasionally attempt to accommodate the demands of other Iberian leaders, maintenance of this imperial framework informed all such concessions. Afonso Henriques could be granted papal protection within his own territories, but was discouraged from directly challenging the authority of the emperor. This was to prove an unwieldy policy which ultimately satisfied nobody.

When Henriques set himself the goal of gaining papal acknowledgement of the Portuguese crown, his major task was to convince Rome that papal aims could no longer be best accomplished under an imperial structure. Success came gradually, as papal attitudes toward the peninsula kings evolved through several distinct phases. After the spectacular military success of 1147-8 the Portuguese advance flagged; Emperor Alfonso of León-Castile assumed the military initiative on the frontier and the papacy moved to support his imperial authority. The sudden death of Emperor Alfonso in 1157 seriously compromised Leonese-Castilian hegemony, although for another decade popes continued to hope that their favoured political structure might still be re-imposed. By the 1170s this hope had dwindled before the reality that frontier defence was in the hands of roughly equal, mutually distrustful monarchs. Only then could the Portuguese king hope for an acknowledgement of his self-proclaimed status.

The Portuguese expansion falters (1148-1155)

The military triumphs of 1147, particularly the successful siege of Lisbon, brought Portugal and Henriques to international attention. By forcing the frontier south to the Tejo River the Portuguese opened a huge area to further Christian occupation and resettlement. Yet these great successes appear to have exhausted the expansionist drive of the Portuguese people. Records surviving from Henriques' court convey the serious obstacles faced in effectively utilising and defending newly captured territory. The resettlement of land won from the Muslims proved to be a prolonged and difficult process, while attempts to push the frontier still further to the south, both by the

Portuguese themselves and in conjunction with visiting foreign troops, were completely unsuccessful.

The dangers of frontier life were unattractive to the majority of those fortunate enough to have an alternative. The bulk of surviving documents record grants made to monasteries, bishops and faithful followers from lands which had been secure for at least a generation.⁶ To speed the re-population of newly conquered territories, Henriques offered generous privileges to those willing to settle in perilous borderlands. Yet few seem to have been attracted by such terms and only a handful of town charters survive from this period: Louza in 1151, Freixo, Mesão-Frio and Banho in 1152, and Sintra in 1154.⁷ While several further charters granted to foreign settlers may have been offered to those soldiers who remained after the successful capture of Lisbon, they could just as easily represent later arrivals. An undated charter refers to William Lacorni or Descornes and his followers at Atouguia, another to Jourdan, leader of the Franks who had settled in Lourinhã. In 1160 a Frank named Alardo was granted title to lands in Vila Verde. These charters carefully delineate the privileges allowed to townsfolk, including the right to live according to the traditions of their lands of origin.⁸ Yet when compared to the number of charters from subsequent decades the establishment of this handful of towns suggest that during the 1140s and 1150s the re-population of the Extramadura was at best a halting process.

This impression of frontier hardship is reinforced in the grants made to religious foundations during the same period. By far the greatest beneficiary of royal largess was the Cistercian order. The two earliest houses, Tarouca and Sever, were established in northern Portugal prior to the capture of Santarém. In 1152 the Cistercians received a donation of land at Mazoura. This initial attempt to establish a settlement in the wilderness was a failure, with the monks returning to the north in the same year.⁹ A second party set out from Cîteaux in late 1152 or 1153. This group, consisting of the first Abbot Ranulphus and a dozen monks, received a substantial grant of land at Alcobaça.¹⁰ Henriques clearly harboured doubts over their chances of success, for the

⁶ e.g. CMP-A, pp. 238-40.

⁷ CMP-A, pp. 224, 226-30, 237; PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 377-83.

⁸ DMP, 1, p. 274; PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 447-451; CMP-A, pp. 274-5.

⁹ CMP-A, pp. 230-1. A charter dated 29 September 1153 notes the desertion. See also Maur Cocheril, 'L' Ordre de Cîteaux au Portugal. Le Problème Historique', *Studia Monastica*, reprinted with minor changes in M. Cocheril, *Études sur le Monachisme en Espagne au Portugal* (Paris and Lisbon, 1966), p. 205.

¹⁰ For Radulphus as the first abbot see Thomas L. Amos, *The Fundo Alcobaça of the Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon. Descriptive Inventories of Manuscripts Microfilmed for the Hill Monastic Manuscript Library:*

Alcobaça grant stipulated that if the monks abandoned their efforts the land would revert back to the crown.¹¹ Although the monastery at Alcobaça would eventually grow to become the largest Cistercian house in Europe, its foundation was an uncertain enterprise involving prolonged hardship and danger.

The difficulties the Portuguese faced in utilising the lands they had secured in 1147 were coupled with an inability to make any further significant southward advance.¹² This failure was all the more striking because Muslim forces in al-Andalus were themselves undermined by civil war. Responding to the Christian successes of 1146-7, and the resulting perception of Almoravid weakness, the Almohad (Mawahhid) sect invaded the Iberian peninsula from North Africa.¹³ The Almohads, an even more fundamentalist Muslim sect, usurped the Almoravids as they had in their turn usurped the cosmopolitan *taifa* kings. By the winter of 1147 the newcomers had taken control of the entire Algarve. A year later they succeeded in capturing Seville. Their triumphant advance was only halted in 1149 when the Almohad leaders were recalled to North Africa to put down a rebellion of local mountain tribesmen. Yet despite the political turmoil behind them, Muslim frontier communities maintained a stubborn resistance to the Portuguese.

The stronghold of Alcácer do Sal formed the bulwark of the Moorish defence. In 1151 the Portuguese launched a sneak attack of the same type that had worked so successfully at Santarém four years earlier. On this occasion, however, the result was quite different. Detected by Muslim sentinels long before they reached the city, the Portuguese were ambushed by a numerically superior force. In the resulting battle their desperation saved them and they managed to beat off the attack and extricate themselves. Although the chronicler describes this escape as miraculous, the expedition

Portuguese Libraries, 2 vols (Collegeville, MN: Hill Monastic Manuscript Library, 1988), 1, p. xvii n. 14. For the foundation charter see CMP-A, pp. 234-6.

¹¹ The willingness of the Cistercians to persevere in the face of such ominous auguries could have been the result of the slackening of support for the order elsewhere, possibly as a result of the widespread disillusionment at the failure of the Second Crusade. Brenda M. Boulton, 'The Cistercians and the aftermath of the Second Crusade', in M. Gervers (ed.), *The Second Crusade and the Cistercians*, 131-40; and Michael Gervers, 'Donations to the Hospitallers in England in the wake of the Second Crusade', in M. Gervers (ed.), *The Second Crusade and the Cistercians*, 155-61.

¹² For Leonese-Castilian activities during the same period see Simon Barton, 'A Forgotten Crusade: Alfonso VII of León-Castile and the Campaign for Jaén (1148)', *Historical Research*, 72: 182 (2000), 312-20.

¹³ For the development and expansion of the Almohads see Hugh Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal. A Political History of al-Andalus* (London: Longman, 1996), pp. 196-236.

itself was an overall defeat.¹⁴ Three years later, possibly with the assistance of Anglo-Norman soldiers gathered by Bishop Gilbert of Lisbon (1148-1164?) in a preaching tour of his homeland, a second assault was made. Once again, however, the defenders of Alcácer do Sal stood firm and after a period of fruitless siege the attacking force disbanded.¹⁵ With this second failure Afonso Henriques' army had reached stalemate; the military initiative in Christian Iberia moved inexorably eastwards.

The successes of 1147 had exhausted the Portuguese potential for further expansion; the resettlement of the captured territory was a halting process. Despite the deteriorating political situation in Muslim lands, the Portuguese were unable to make further advances. Unfortunately this was a dangerous time for the Portuguese king to lose the military initiative, for his growing regional authority was had drawn a reaction from neighbouring León-Castile. Emperor Alfonso launched a series of ecclesiastical initiatives to re-impose his authority, and the good graces of the distant papacy became crucial for Portuguese resistance to these measures.

Ecclesiastical struggles between Braga and Toledo: the long slide to Valladolid (1148-1155)

Portuguese ecclesiastical leaders, in common with their secular counterparts, sought to take advantage of the military gains of 1147. Initially successful, the Portuguese church soon found itself the unwilling testing ground for Leon-Castilian imperial authority. With the encouragement of Emperor Alfonso, the archbishops of Toledo renewed their campaign to impose their primacy over other Iberian churches. In pursuing this policy the Toledan church enjoyed invaluable papal support. A long period of dogged, but ultimately failing Portuguese resistance came to a nadir in 1155. In that year the papal legate Cardinal Hyacinth of St Maria de Cosmedin, the future Pope Celestine III (1191-1198), called a general council at Valladolid to arbitrate outstanding ecclesiastical and political questions. This conclave quickly became a spectacle of Leon-Castilian authority in which Emperor Alfonso comprehensively demonstrated that he alone held command in the fight against the Muslims, and with it the full support of the papacy.

¹⁴ ADA, pp. 157-8; Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 13 vols (Lisbon: Editorial Verbo, 1977), 1, p. 100.

¹⁵ ADA, pp. 158. For Bishop Gilbert's preaching tour *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi: The Conquest of Lisbon*, ed. and trans., C. W. David (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936), p. 178, n. 4.

From the moment he assumed office, Archbishop João Peculiar had striven with every possible means to advance the cause of his own church. His major goals had been to secure the obedience of as many suffragan bishoprics as possible, while at the same time casting off the obligation to render similar obedience to Toledo. The early 1140s had been difficult years for the archbishop of Braga. His continued refusal to acknowledge the primacy of Toledo had finally led to his suspension from office in 1145 by Pope Eugenius III (1145-1153). Portuguese military success provided valuable support for the hard-pressed Archbishop João, but in the longer term entangled him in a new and complex series of disputes. One immediate result of the capture of Lisbon was the appointment there of a sympathetic bishop, Gilbert of Hastings, who immediately offered his loyalty to Braga.¹⁶ Afonso Henriques also initiated the restoration of the newly-occupied bishoprics at Viseu and Lamego.¹⁷ Unfortunately for Portuguese ambitions, all three of these suffragans were claimed by Compostela through the ancient rights of Mérida. The only means by which Archbishop João could secure their loyalty for Braga was to obtain papal sanction.

Although still under suspension, the archbishop of Braga undertook a personal visit to Rome in 1148; despite recent disobedience he could hope for a sympathetic reception. Against the background of general crusading failure the advances made by Afonso Henriques and the founding of three new bishoprics shone all the more brightly. Moreover Archbishop João was able to take with him financial tributes from the monasteries of Santa Cruz and Grijó, along with a letter of support from the Templars.¹⁸ In the event, however, these offerings brought the archbishop only a respite, rather than the hoped-for victory. While the suspension was lifted and the metropolitan status of Braga confirmed, Archbishop João was ordered to present his obedience to Toledo.¹⁹

The reason for papal intransigence on this point was a new, and for the Bragan clergy discomfiting, development. Although secular rulers had maintained a close interest in the ecclesiastical politics of their realms, the actual skirmishing had been left to the clerics themselves. Faced with Henriques' brazen defiance, Emperor Alfonso

¹⁶ *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 178-81; For the declaration of obedience to Braga see *Liber fidei Sanctae Bracarensis Ecclesiae*, ed. Avelino de Jesus da Costa, 3 vols (Braga: Junta Distrital de Braga, 1965-1978), 1, fol. 71, n. 217.

¹⁷ Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, pp. 52-3.

¹⁸ JL 9294 and PP, pp. 213-4; PMH SS, p. 69.

¹⁹ JL 9363; PL 1890: 1405; PP, p. 21. See also Erdmann *O Papado e Portugal*, p. 54, n. 1.

became increasingly attentive to the issue of Toledan rights.²⁰ Nor could the Portuguese take comfort that the emperor's attentions might be prompted by pious feelings, for Alfonso exhibited scant interest in Toledan rights over the similarly disobedient metropolitan see of Tarragona.²¹ Thus the summons to Rheims for a general council in 1148, only the sixth such gathering of the century, was a cause for serious concern among the Portuguese clergy.²² News of the council led the archbishop of Braga to call a gathering of his own suffragans to discuss a suitable response. Significantly, Afonso Henriques was also present.²³

In the end the Portuguese chose the dangerous option of abstaining: João Peculiar remained in his cathedral, but observers were sent to report on events. In contrast, the Leonese-Castilian church sent a strong contingent led by the primate, Raymond of Toledo (1125-1153). The council convened on 9 March and continued until 18 April. Afterwards Pope Eugenius travelled to Clairvaux and from there, with Abbot Bernard on hand, dictated his reply to the demands brought by Emperor Alfonso's representatives.²⁴ Pope Eugenius declined to discuss his relations with the 'duke' of Portugal, and in answer to Leonese-Castilian complaints merely recalled the memory of Emperor Alfonso VI, who had focused his attention on the defence of the Church and the war against the enemies of the faith. Nevertheless the pope accorded all dignity to the present emperor, offering him the gift of a golden rose, and accepting his complaints against the archbishop of Braga. In this at least, he promised swift action in support of Toledo.²⁵

Even when news of these decisions reached Braga, Archbishop João continued to delay his compliance. This prevarication soon roused the Emperor Alfonso to speed further complaints to Rome.²⁶ This time papal response was more effective, for at last Eugenius had a trump card to play. Rather than the usual issuing of threats, a pending

²⁰ 'Throughout the late 1140s, as often as the pope was urged to recognize Afonso Henriques as king of Portugal he was reminded by the emperor that the see of Braga was subject to Toledo.' Linehan, *History and the Historians*, p. 269.

²¹ Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 85-6; Linehan, *History and the Historians*, p. 269.

²² I. S. Robinson, *The Papacy, 1073-1198: Continuity and Innovation* (Cambridge: UP, 1990), p. 131 numbers the gathering at Rheims in 1148 as one of the seven twelfth-century 'general councils'. Their decisions were held to be binding on all regions of Latin Christendom. The others were: Rheims (1119), First Lateran (1123), Rheims (1131), Pisa (1135), Second Lateran (1139), and Third Lateran (1179).

²³ Richard Fletcher, *The Episcopate in the Kingdom of León in the Twelfth Century* (Oxford: UP, 1978), pp. 138-9.

²⁴ G. Ferreira Borges, 'Saint Bernard et le Portugal: la légende et l'histoire', in *Mélanges Saint Bernard* (Dijon: Marilier, 1953), pp. 139-40.

²⁵ JL 9255; PL 180: 1345.

papal judgement concerning the status of the border bishopric of Zamora provided leverage. The rights over this see were claimed by both Braga and Toledo; João Peculiar rightly saw submission as the price for securing papal support in this issue. In May 1150 Archbishop João finally consented to papal demands.²⁷ The ceremony in Toledo became a scene for high politics. Under the watchful eye of the papal legate, Cardinal Guido, ambassadors sent by Afonso Henriques met with the emperor's representative, his son Fernando, to conclude a seven-year peace treaty. In the game of political brinkmanship between the two monarchs Bragan submission had become the price for continued peace.²⁸ What is less clear is exactly why both Portuguese and Leon-Castilian secular leaders placed such a high value on this act of ecclesiastical obedience.

Carl Erdmann championed the idea that ecclesiastical autonomy was a crucial prerequisite to the independence of the kingdom itself.²⁹ This relationship has been accepted without reservation or indeed clarification by subsequent authors. During the reigns of Afonso Henriques' father, Henry the Burgundian (1095-1112), and mother, Infanta Teresa (1112-1128), external intervention could impose unwanted ecclesiastical arrangements on the Portuguese church. The most direct application of this was the appointment to Portuguese sees of bishops who were hostile to the ambitions of local leaders.³⁰ Yet by the middle years of the twelfth century Henriques' own energetic leadership had limited the influence other rulers could exert on the Portuguese church. From his coming to power in 1128 Henriques appears to have enjoyed complete control over the election of bishops, a process that was ultimately reliant on the pressure that could be exerted locally.³¹ After the death in 1136 of Bishop Hugh of Oporto, who had been a staunch supporter of Compostela, the Portuguese bishops were consistently loyal

²⁶ JL 9362; PL 180: 1405; PP, p. 108.

²⁷ Fletcher, *The Episcopate in the Kingdom of León*, pp. 196-8.

²⁸ Such at least is Erdmann's view. *O Papado e Portugal*, pp. 54-5.

²⁹ Erdmann, *Papado e Portugal*, pp. 1-5. This view remains unchallenged by subsequent Portuguese historians. Eduardo Brasão, 'O papado e Portugal desde a conferência de Zamora (1143) até à bula de Alexandre III <Manifestis Probatum> (1179)', in Serrão, 8.^o *Centenário do Reconhecimento de Portugal*, 83-114.

³⁰ The most striking example being the election of Archbishop Paio of Braga in 1122. He was the choice of Queen Urraca of León-Castile and Archbishop Bernard of Toledo. Immediately news of his election broke at Teresa's court she ordered him arrested. See above p. 113.

³¹ The Spanish kings were generally spared the distractions of the investiture contest. They were sheltered, it would seem, by distance, local loyalty, and their consistent support for the reform papacy. See Linehan, *History and the Historians*, pp. 149-52; and Bernard F. Reilly, 'On getting to be a bishop in León-Castile: the "emperor" Alfonso VII and the post-Gregorian Church', *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History*, 21 (1978), 35-78.

agents of Henriques' policies. Thus there arises a paradoxical element to the notion that ecclesiastical independence was a necessary first step to local political autonomy. The installation of the very churchmen who would champion the Portuguese cause demonstrates the freedom of action Henriques already enjoyed in ecclesiastical preferment. There are also problems in positing too close a concordance between the ambitions of the archbishop and those of the king. Every successful archbishop placed the status of his metropolitan church at the apex of his ambition. Archbishop João was no exception: the prestige of the Bragan church was uppermost in his mind. Frequently João Peculiar's objectives were in step with royal policy, but not in every case.³² Why then did both Leonese-Castilian and Portuguese leaders continue to intervene in an issue of ecclesiastical disobedience that appears to have had limited practical significance?

Bragan acceptance of Toledan authority clearly had implications beyond the sphere of ecclesiastical administration. Prestige, that most important of royal currencies, was at stake. Even if the direct influence Toledo might wield in Portugal was limited, the act of submission itself was a sharp blow to regional pride. Given the personal nature of rule in these societies, leaders needed little other motive for action. In short, the primacy could be used as a symbol to reinforce a dwindling imperial authority. There was, however, an unstated dimension to this conflict that may indeed have eluded even the protagonists themselves, but was perhaps of greater long-term significance. Only papal recognition could legitimise Portuguese royalty, but such an acknowledgement required a radical alteration of the attitude of papal policy-makers toward the Spanish frontier. Under these circumstances, the struggle for local church autonomy could prepare the ground for the more difficult, more decisive objective of political independence. Not only did the confrontation between senior ecclesiastics become a conspicuous symbol of the relative strengths of the two monarchs, but also a gauge of papal attitude toward Spain itself. By 1150 it was a struggle that Alfonso Henriques was in danger of decisively losing.

³² The danger of positing too close an alliance between royal and archepiscopal interest can be seen in the appointment of Bishop Juan of Lugo in 1152. Because this bishopric was a suffragan of Braga Emperor VII wrote to Archbishop João Peculiar asking for his consecration. The emperor made no effort to support Compostelan claims for that privilege; the archbishop raised no difficulty or delay in the emplacement of the emperor's choice in a see disputed by Afonso Henriques. In the event Bishop Juan proved consistently loyal to both Braga and the emperor. Richard Fletcher, *The Episcopate in the Kingdom of León in the Twelfth Century* (Oxford: OUP, 1978), pp. 66-7.

The peace between contending archbishops lasted barely three years. The death of Archbishop Raymond of Toledo in 1153 allowed Archbishop João of Braga to let the grudging submission lapse. In the face of João's continued refusal to comply, the newly installed Archbishop Juan of Toledo (1153-1166) turned to Rome for assistance. Pope Anastasius VI (1153-1154) was quick to support him, issuing two separate letters to enforce Toledan primacy, once again under threat of suspension.³³ When these had no effect the pope ordered his legate, Cardinal Hyacinth of St Maria de Cosmedin, to investigate further.³⁴ Cardinal Hyacinth was in Spain to shore up relations between the Christian kings, yet it soon became clear that peace between the kings meant obedience to the older idea of political submission to the emperor of León-Castile. At the instigation of the emperor the legate announced a council at Valladolid where not only Braga but also Tarragona and Compostela were to be called upon to renew their obedience to Toledo.³⁵

Meanwhile, Archbishop Pelayo of Compostela (1153-1155) had been observing these events carefully and was well aware of the potential discomfiture facing his Bragan rivals. Therefore, after a peaceful interlude of some twenty years, Compostela renewed its petitions for control over the bishoprics of northern Portugal, of Viseu, Lamego and Coimbra itself. Thus, of all the archbishop of Braga's suffragans, only Oporto was not the focus of counterclaims by rival metropolitans. Naturally the Bragan clergy objected strongly to this latest Compostelan campaign, and so Cardinal Hyacinth postponed any decision until the rival cases could be heard before a wider audience.³⁶ In the interim the legate toured Portugal in order to assess the situation first-hand. On 8 October 1154 he was received by the canons of Santa Cruz and confirmed a donation there four weeks later. After confirming a second grant to a nearby house, he left the region early in November.³⁷

Two months later the council of Valladolid was convened; it was intended to be a showcase of imperial power. Emperor Alfonso had invested intense effort in promoting the council and it was one of the most well attended of the decade. The emperor himself was present, along with his two sons Sancho and Fernando. The papal

³³ JL 9858, 9795; PL 188: 1053. For complications over the dating of these documents see Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, p. 56, n. 1.

³⁴ JL 9901.

³⁵ The documents relating to the council of Valladolid are reproduced in Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, pp. 83-94.

³⁶ Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, pp. 83-8.

legate Cardinal Hyacinth headed an assembly of ecclesiastics that included the archbishops of Toledo and Compostela, and a host of their dependent bishops. Representatives of the greater monastic houses were also in attendance. Significantly, the first order of business was the provision of full crusading privileges for the defenders of the Iberian frontier. It was the first such grant since that provided for the combined attack on Almería almost a decade earlier.³⁸

Notable by his absence was Archbishop João of Braga. Realising that he could not resist the combined weight of these gathered opponents, the archbishop refused to attend. Dean Pedro Martins of Braga and Bishop Mendes of Lamego attempted to excuse Archbishop João's absence on the grounds of ill-health. This flimsy pretext was accepted by nobody and the emperor was outraged by the perceived insult to his dignity. No less offended was the papal legate, who brought rapid punishment down on the head of the absent archbishop. Viseu and Lamego were released from their obedience to Braga and the bishop of Coimbra was given favourable judgement in a suit against João. The archbishop himself was suspended for his disobedience, a penalty that was subsequently confirmed by Rome.³⁹ The pope also wrote the following year to advise the simmering Emperor Alfonso that a letter had been dispatched to command Afonso Henriques to give satisfaction to the bishop of Coimbra or suffer an interdict over the whole country.⁴⁰

The council of Valladolid and its immediate aftermath marked the nadir of Portuguese ambitions. Any advantage the military successes of the 1140s had brought in Rome faded before the slow pace of resettlement and the failure to achieve any further territorial gain. Attempts by the Portuguese church to assert local autonomy had met only discouragement from the papacy, and increasingly onerous penalties. The burden of military leadership on the frontier, and with it papal favour, had clearly

³⁷ For this itinerary see PP, pp. 112, 219-222 and Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, p. 58.

³⁸ This grant of indulgence is also significant for the early statement it provides of the nature of the crusading indulgence. 'Cognitis itaque Christianorum multis et magnis [per S]arracenos oppressionibus factis illis subvenire et gentis adverse spurcitiam et infestationem de medio tollere paterno affectu desiderantes de meritis apostolorum Petri et Pauli con[fi]si tam clericis quam laicis in remissionem peccatorum suorum iniungimus, ut secundum vires et facultates divinitus concessas ad christianitatem defendendam et Sarracenorum malitiam reprimendam omnimode nit[antur], eandem veniam indulgentes illis, quam papa Urbanus indulsit profectis Iherosolimam ad liberationem orientalis ecclesie.' Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, p. 84.

³⁹ Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, pp. 88-94; JL 10125.

⁴⁰ Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, pp. 60-1.

passed to the emperor. Yet the uncertainties of frontier life were soon to intervene to frustrate both imperial and papal hopes.

The waning of the imperial ideal in Iberia (1157-1170)

The papal ideal of Iberian political authority suffered a decisive blow with the unexpected death of Emperor Alfonso VII in 1157. The subsequent division of León-Castile between his two sons, Sancho and Fernando, radically altered the balance of power within the peninsula and seriously complicated the passage of imperial authority. Papal support for an Iberian emperor was further shaken by the inability of King Fernando of León, the most likely candidate to inherit the imperial mantle, to fulfil the role assigned to him in the papal world-view. Less than a year after León-Castile was divided, Portuguese fortunes suddenly changed for the better. The capture of Alcácer do Sal in 1148 opened the Baixo Alentejo region to a series of rapid Portuguese campaigns. The position of the Portuguese church also improved as Toledan claims for primacy became increasingly untenable. An ecclesiastical administrative structure emerged which bore little correspondence with secular borders, but which nevertheless reflected new political realities. As uncertainty engulfed his Leonese and Castilian rivals, Afonso Henriques was able to emerge once more into papal view as a champion of Christendom against the threat of Islam.

The first sign that Leonese-Castilian political stability might be threatened came in June 1156 when the emperor fell seriously ill.⁴¹ The exigencies of the frontier gave him little chance for recuperation. Before the end of the year the Almohads landed in force on the peninsula and began a major assault against the Christians on several fronts.⁴² Although not yet completely recovered, Emperor Alfonso rushed to the support of Almería, but the city fell before relief could arrive. This was a serious setback, not only because the capture of the city in 1147, with the aid of visiting crusaders, had been such a glittering triumph, but also because its loss a decade later forced the general evacuation of the surrounding Christian settlements. Still greater

⁴¹ Charter references to this illness suggest that it was considered serious from the outset. Bernard F. Reilly, *The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain, 1031-1157* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 221-2.

⁴² Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, pp. 196-236.

disaster was to follow. During the retreat Alfonso suffered a relapse and died at Las Fresendas on 21 August 1157. He was fifty-two years of age.⁴³

Fortunately for the Spanish, their Muslim foe was unable to capitalise on these events. Almohad control over large regions of North Africa was tenuous. Tribal unrest forced the Almohad leaders to recall the bulk of the army from al-Andalus almost immediately. Yet great damage had already been done to the Christian cause: three decades of relatively stable leadership in León-Castile ended with the division of the kingdom between the emperor's surviving heirs. The eldest son was crowned Sancho III of Castile (1157-1158) while the younger became Fernando II of León (1157-1188).⁴⁴ Aware of the dangers of disunity the brothers arranged a meeting at Sahugún where they agreed to support each other against all enemies. Their fraternal commitment was never put to the test. The following year King Sancho died suddenly, and the crown passed to his young son, Alfonso VIII (1158-1214). The unexpected deaths of Emperor Alfonso and his son King Sancho created a fraught political situation in Spain as neighbouring states, both Christian and Muslim, saw opportunities for themselves in this power vacuum.

The separation of León and Castile into mutually suspicious kingdoms produced a far more balanced distribution of power in the peninsula. Four of the Christian states – Portugal, León, Castile, Aragon – were now of comparable size and strength, while the smaller Navarre nonetheless remained staunchly independent. The situation advanced Afonso Henriques immeasurably. The emperor of León-Castile had been Henriques' titular overlord, his presence a constant threat to regional political autonomy. With the death of the emperor and the splitting of his authority, Portuguese technical obedience was no longer clearly defined, while the ability of either heir to re-impose that obedience was dramatically reduced. In the rapid diplomacy that followed the emperor's death, Henriques was offered valuable opportunities to emphasise his practical parity with the more established Iberian monarchs. Meanwhile, on the other side of the frontier, Muslim al-Andalus had been divided between the hostile Almoravid and Almohad regimes. In this complicated situation relations between the rival states began to revert to the pragmatic opportunism that had characterised Christian-Muslim

⁴³ Bernard F. Reilly, *The Kingdom of León-Castilla under King Alfonso VII, 1126-1157* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), pp. 132-4.

⁴⁴ For the details and reasoning behind this division see Reilly, *The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain*, pp. 227-30.

relations a century earlier.⁴⁵ King Fernando of León, the most logical inheritor of imperial dignity, found it politic to ally himself with Muslim leaders against his own co-religionists, including Afonso Henriques. This action tarnished the imperial ideal, while at the same time enhancing Henriques' reputation as a reliable defender of threatened Christendom.

After Emperor Alfonso's death his sons Sancho and Fernando had been able to maintain cordial relations, but the situation was seriously complicated on Sancho's death when the young Alfonso took the throne. Neighbouring rulers eyed events in Castile carefully, ready to take advantage of any sign of vulnerability. Tension between Fernando and his nephew finally broke in 1160 when the king of León led an army into Castile, ostensibly to defend the frontier against a growing Almohad threat. The attempt sparked resistance from the Castilian nobility: as the struggle grew more intense frontier warfare was all but forgotten.⁴⁶ Afonso Henriques, meanwhile, took advantage of Leonese distraction to extend his own influence in the Minho region.⁴⁷

The deteriorating relations between León and Castile also produced several advantageous diplomatic initiatives for the Portuguese ruler. A marriage was planned between Henriques' daughter Mafalda and Count Raymond Berenguer of Barcelona, later Alfonso II of Aragon. The parties met in 1160 in Túy to negotiate the details of the match, only to have the untimely death of Mafalda ruin their plans. Nevertheless the two monarchs took the opportunity to formalise an alliance without the added cement of a marriage. There may also have been a meeting between Afonso Henriques and Fernando of León at Cellanova later the same year to discuss further marriage plans with Henriques' second daughter, Urraca. Whether or not the meeting at Cellanova actually took place, Urraca of Portugal was married to King Fernando in 1165. The Leonese monarch no doubt intended the marriage to secure his Portuguese border and allow him a free hand in Castile.⁴⁸ These treaties and marriage alliances demonstrate

⁴⁵ See map 4, p. 184. There had been signs of greater communication between Muslim and Christian Spain even before 1157. Although the Almoravids had come to the peninsula eager to chastise the *taifa* leaders for their cosmopolitan attitudes, in time the multicultural society of al-Andalusi began to undermine their resolve. By the second generation of occupation the Almoravid ruler Ali, the son of the conquering Yūsuf ben Tāshfin, was favouring Christians in his court and had assembled a large force of Christian soldiers for his wars against the Almohads. CAI, II, 10-1, pp. 200-1.

⁴⁶ José María Jover Zamora, *Historia de España*, 44 vols (Madrid: Espasa Calp, 1998), 9, pp. 481-90.

⁴⁷ Herculano, *História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 555-62.

⁴⁸ Pedro Soares Martínez, *História Diplomática de Portugal* (Lisbon: Editorial Verbo, 1986), p. 30; Herculano, *História de Portugal*, 1, p. 546.

that, perhaps through necessity, Henriques had come to be considered an equal by other peninsula monarchs. Yet the papacy remained unwilling to make a similar concession.

Because the death of Alfonso VII marked an end to Leonese-Castilian unity it also ended a period of co-ordinated military effort on the frontier. In contrast, the Portuguese enjoyed a period of success against Muslim forces. After a hard-fought two month siege the strong-hold of Alcácer do Sal finally capitulated to the Portuguese on 24 June 1158.⁴⁹ This opened the important cities of Beja and Évora to further Christian attack, indeed both were either attacked or possibly even briefly taken in the immediate aftermath of the victory at Alcácer do Sal. In 1161 these subsidiary gains were lost to the Almohad offensive, which also recaptured the city of Palmela.⁵⁰ Only Alcácer do Sal remained in Portuguese hands, to become just as much a bulwark of their defence as it had formerly been for the Muslims.

The machinations of rival Christian monarchs frequently diverted Afonso Henriques during the years that followed. He was fortunate, however, to find other hands able to press the advance against the Almohads. The Portuguese leader offered encouragement, occasional support, and garnered much of the credit. In December 1162 the Santarém city militia under the command of Fernão Gonçalves, possibly acting on their own initiative, recaptured Beja.⁵¹ Other attacks were organised and carried out by local bands of adventurers. The most famous of these, and the most successful, was Gerald *Sem Pavor* (the fearless). This colourful mercenary-adventurer in the tradition of the Cid provided important service to Afonso Henriques in the conquest of the Alentejo.⁵² With a small band of followers he perfected techniques of surprise attack. Choosing moonless, stormy nights Gerald would approach in stealth and lift numerous siege ladders against the walls. The first the shocked inhabitants would know of the assault was the dreaded cry of 'St James!' from their own battlements.⁵³ In 1165 Gerald used these commando-style tactics to capture Trujillo and Évora, which he then reputedly sold to Afonso Henriques. Gerald went on to capture Cáceres, Montánchez,

⁴⁹ Christian authors claim that the garrison was allowed to leave under terms; Muslim sources describe a massacre after the fall of the city. ADA, p. 158; Herculano, *História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 538-40.

⁵⁰ Possibly with great loss of life. There are hints in Arabic sources of a disastrous defeat inflicted by the Almohads that cost the Portuguese over 6,000 casualties. Herculano, *História de Portugal*, 1, p. 549.

⁵¹ Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 100-2.

⁵² Derek W. Lomax, *The Spanish Reconquest* (New York: Longmans, 1978), pp. 113-5; David Lopes, 'O Cid Português: Geraldo Sem Pavor', in *Revista Portuguesa da História*, 1 (1941), 93-111; A. Huici Miranda, 'Los Almohads em Portugal,' *Anais Academia Portuguesa da História*, NS, 5 (1954), pp. 13.

⁵³ Muslim descriptions of Gerald's depredations are collected by António Borges Coelho, *Portugal na Espanha Árabe*, 4 vols (Lisbon: Seara Nova, 1975), 3, pp. 277-90.

Serpa, and Juromeña in 1166. Finally he over-extended himself. In May 1169 Gerald attacked Badajoz, breaching the walls and besieging the garrison in the citadel. Henriques hurried southward to assist in the takeover. This time, however, Portuguese enterprise was to be resisted from an unexpected quarter.

Fernando of León had watched Henriques' success with jealousy and unease. Badajoz had great strategic importance, being the key to the future conquest of Andalusia. The Portuguese king's possession of the city did not accord with Fernando's own long-term expansionist plans. Moreover, in an effort to secure the region, he may already have promised the governor of the city his support. In a move reminiscent of the events a century earlier at Gaus that brought about the death of King Ramiro I of Aragon (1035-1063), the Leonese offered their support to the defending Muslims rather than their co-religionists.⁵⁴ The unlikely allies slipped into the city and fell upon the surprised Portuguese. In the resulting panic Afonso Henriques suffered a riding mishap and broke his leg; he was subsequently captured by the Leonese. Judging by the kind treatment Fernando quickly offered his father-in-law, the Leonese monarch knew he had overstepped the bounds of probity. Royal physicians tended to the injured Henriques while negotiations for his release were speedily carried out.⁵⁵

It is difficult to be certain of the reaction to these events in wider Latin Christendom. Roger of Hoveden's rather garbled description of Henriques' discomfiture included otherwise unknown details of the Portuguese king's terms of release. Roger did not allude to any connivance between Fernando and the Muslims, but rather points to Henriques' own folly in trusting to a truce with the besieged Muslims and releasing his army to forage.⁵⁶ Yet there are serious problems with Roger's account, for while it does provide the most detailed review of events, many of these details are in fact incorrect on a most basic level. For example Roger dated these events to the 1180s and placed them at Silves, rather than Badajoz. Moreover, Roger was writing in the final decade of the twelfth century, a period in which the Portuguese monarchy had been lowered in the estimation of many Englishmen.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, if Roger of Hoveden had little sympathy for Afonso Henriques, others closer to the events would

⁵⁴ See above, p. 27.

⁵⁵ Fletcher, *The Episcopate in the Kingdom of León*, pp. 52, 134; Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 102-3.

⁵⁶ *The Annals of Roger de Hoveden*, trans. Henry T. Riley, 2 vols (New York: AMS Press, 1968), 2, p. 78. Roger reports that the price of release was 25 towns, fifteen sumpter horses laden with gold, and twenty chargers.

have reacted to the actions of the Leonese with angry dismay. Where possible Henriques moved to encourage such feelings, particularly in Rome.

Henriques was well aware of the papal concern for the integrity of the frontier. He sought to keep his own role in the struggle against Islam firmly in papal thoughts both directly in communications to Rome, and in carefully considered grants to religious orders. Only a few of Henriques' letters to the papal curia survive, but the tone the Portuguese leader adopted is revealing. In 1156 or 1157 Henriques assured Pope Hadrian VI (1154-1159) that he remained a loyal soldier and faithful son to the church. A subsequent letter in 1163 reminded Pope Alexander III (1159-1181) of Henriques' loyalty as a vassal of St Peter and his success in extending papal territory into Muslim lands.⁵⁸ In addition to this calculated self-promotion the Portuguese ruler also sought to maintain his place in papal consciousness through strategic donations to religious orders.

Afonso Henriques was an enthusiastic supporter of the military orders. In 1160 the Order of Calatrava was founded in Castile, their first recorded grant in Portugal came six years later. The Knights of Évora, a purely Portuguese order, was also established in 1166 to assist in the defence of the newly-captured city.⁵⁹ Yet it was the Templars who received the greater share of Henriques' largesse. The order, under the leadership of the first Portuguese-born Master, Gualdim Pais, was granted numerous territories culminating in a substantial donation at Tomar in 1158. This town quickly became the centre of Templar activities in Portugal.⁶⁰ Other grants and confirmations followed, but it was shortly after his release from Leonese captivity in 1169 that Afonso Henriques made his most splendid donation.

In a sweeping gesture the Portuguese leader promised the order one third of all future conquests. By making this grant to the Templars, rather than the indigenous military orders, Henriques sought the widest possible audience for his generosity; that it was a portion of future conquests underlined the fact that he was expecting such conquests to be made. This generosity also had direct concrete benefits. The Portuguese

⁵⁷ See below, pp. 236-7.

⁵⁸ Both these letters are included in the cartulary at the end of the *Vita Tellois Archidiaconi*. Letter to Hadrian: PMH SS, p. 71; PP, p. 78; CMP-A, p. 249; Letter to Alexander: PMH SS, p. 73; CMP-A, p. 283.

⁵⁹ The implications of the emergence of local military orders will be considered below, pp. 227-31.

⁶⁰ DMP, pp. 318-344. The famous *Carta de Couta* (DMP, 1, p. 342), purporting to list the holdings of the order during the time of Afonso Henriques, has been shown by Rui Pinto de Azevedo to be a thirteenth-

leader expected the Templars to develop and protect their new holdings, to ensure this he specified that the rents derived from these lands could not be taken from Portugal while a Muslim threat remained.⁶¹ This canny grant did much to emphasise both in Iberia, but more importantly in Rome, that Portuguese loyalty and commitment to the cause of Latin Christendom was undiminished.

A united León-Castile had enjoyed imperial hegemony over political and social life in the Iberian kingdoms since the reign of Emperor Alfonso VI (1065-1109). With the death of Emperor Alfonso VII in 1157 this dominance quickly broke down. In the uncertainty following the separation of imperial territory into its constituent kingdoms, Afonso Henriques made every effort to secure a favourable papal reaction to his campaign for regional autonomy. Central to this policy was a subtle comparison of his own piety, obedience and military prowess against the instability of his rival, Fernando of León. The Portuguese king was ably assisted in this endeavour by the parallel struggle waged by the archbishop of Braga for ecclesiastical independence from Toledo.

Local ecclesiastical support for the royal pretensions of Afonso Henriques (1157-1170)

In 1157 Archbishop João Peculiar was fighting a war on two fronts: both against the Toledan primacy, and against the archbishops of Toledo and Compostela for the loyalty of suffragans. The relationship between Afonso Henriques and João Peculiar has been portrayed as a partnership aimed at securing an independent Portuguese 'national church' as a first step to an independent Portuguese nation.⁶² In fact, rather than a close political marriage, the ambition of the archbishop complemented that of the aspiring king. The partial success achieved by Archbishop João Peculiar, while not constituting

century forgery. Maur Cocheril, 'Les Ordres militaires Cisterciens au Portugal', *Bulletin des Études Portugaises*, NS, 28-9 (1967-8), p. 25, n. 26.

⁶¹ DMP, 1, p. 384. The wealth the Portuguese Templars quickly amassed is nowhere as evident as in their well-preserved administrative complex in Tomar. The remarkable sixteen-sided twelfth-century chapter house is the most extensive Templar construction still in existence. Henriques' generous grant was not unique: other peninsula monarchs also granted proportions of future conquests, beginning with Ramón Berenguer IV of Aragon (1137-1162), who promised the Templars a fifth of all captured territory in 1143. A. J. Forey, 'The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries', *Traditio*, 40 (1984), p. 223. As Forey notes, these promises were never fulfilled.

⁶² For a recent introduction to João's role as a royal agent, with an emphasis on his legal skills, see Maria João Branco, 'The Kings' Counsellors' Two Faces: a Portuguese Perspective', in P. Linehan and J. L. Nelson (eds), *The Medieval World* (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 520-3.

a 'national church', did substantially undermine the imperial ideal in Rome and so provided crucial support to Henriques' campaign for papal acknowledgement of his royal status.

On the eve of the emperor's death João Peculiar's resistance to Toledan authority had drawn the weight of papal anger down on Portugal. The archbishop had been suspended and Afonso Henriques threatened with interdict. After 1157 the situation quickly changed. The Archbishop of Toledo was suddenly bereft of his greatest champion, with a short-lived youth and then an infant king providing but poor replacement. The energetic Fernando of León could only be seen as a threat. Moreover, with the kingdom of León now interposed between Castilian and Portuguese territory, effective ecclesiastical domination of Braga had become even more problematic. The Portuguese clergy moved rapidly to take advantage of their new circumstances.

Whether through luck, or a remarkable foresight on hearing of Alfonso's initial ill-health, in 1156 João Peculiar had set off for Rome accompanied by the bishops of Lamego and Lisbon. The party carried with them a generous grant to Santa Cruz in which Henriques declared himself to be a knight of St Peter and loyal son of the Church. In addition the party carried with them the balance of Henriques' outstanding papal tribute. The mission was a complete success. João Peculiar was granted a confirmation of his metropolitan status on 6 August 1157, while the bishoprics of Coimbra, Viseu, and Lamego were confirmed as suffragans. The next year, after the confused situation in Spain had become known in Rome, Afonso Henriques received a warmly worded reply to his grant to Santa Cruz in which no mention was made of the threatened interdict or indeed of any tension between the pope and the Portuguese leader.⁶³

Meanwhile, undaunted by recent setbacks, the Toledan church continued petitioning an increasingly lukewarm papacy to support the re-imposition of the primacy. Although Pope Alexander ordered the archbishop of Braga to submit under pain of losing his rights over Zamora, João Peculiar knew time was on his side, for the position of the Toledan church was deteriorating rapidly.⁶⁴ In 1162 King Fernando of León invaded his nephew's realm, ostensibly to safeguard the Christian frontier. The rapid capture of Toledo was a major triumph, but proved short-lived. Both the Toledan

⁶³ *Vita Tullonis Archidiaconi*, PMH SS, p. 71; PP, pp. 379-80; JL 10412.

⁶⁴ Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, pp. 69-71.

clergy and the majority of the citizens remained loyal to the boy-king Alfonso VIII. In 1166 a conspiracy of citizens, notably the Mozarabic members of the community, churchmen, and Castilian soldiers drove the Leonese from the city.

Meanwhile, Archbishop Juan of Toledo called a synod at Segovia in which he imposed the obligation of swearing allegiance to Alfonso VIII on every Castilian under pain of excommunication. All were bound to render military service as required, a demand that was sweetened with the promise of pilgrim indulgences.⁶⁵ Although the synod attempted to paper over the significance of this latter injunction by imposing excommunication and denial of Christian burial for those taking service with the Muslims, a serious precedent had nonetheless been set. This was the first known attempt by the Spanish church to use the force of the crusade against fellow Christians.⁶⁶ It was a dangerous novelty that ultimately brought the Toledan church no benefit. Five months later the city was retaken by the now openly hostile Fernando of León. There was little solace to be had from Rome. Archbishop Juan's requests for clarification of his primacy brought an equivocal response from Alexander III, who made no mention of authority beyond Castilian borders.⁶⁷ Toledan claims for authority over Braga were effectively over.

If the struggle to resist the primacy had been won, victory merely cleared the way for a still more complicated series of ecclesiastical skirmishes as each metropolitan sought to lay claim over the obedience of suffragan bishops. Following the death of Bishop Gilbert of Lisbon, probably in early 1164, his successor, Bishop Alvaro (1164-1184), turned to Braga in defiance of Compostelan claims. This action subsequently received papal approval.⁶⁸ When the Portuguese captured Évora two years later, Afonso Henriques secured the election of Bishop Soeiro (1166-1180). Although Évora was technically under the control of Compostela the election was given a special exemption by Rome.⁶⁹ In each case, however, although the single election was allowed to stand, the papacy underlined that neither should be held up as a precedent. Compostela continued to pressure for the return of these subverted bishoprics, along with pursuing

⁶⁵ Peter Linehan, 'The Synod of Segovia (1166)', *Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law*, 10 (1980), 31-44. Repr. in *Spanish Church and Society*. See also, Linehan, *History and the Historians*, pp. 279-87.

⁶⁶ Norman Housley, 'Crusades against Christians: their Origin and Early Development, c.1000-1216', in P. W. Edbury (ed.), *Crusade and Settlement* (Cardiff: UP, 1985), pp. 23-5.

⁶⁷ Linehan, *History and the Historians*, pp. 286-7.

⁶⁸ PP, p. 124.

⁶⁹ Bishop Soeiro successfully excused himself by claiming that the ongoing threat on the frontier prevented him from risking the journey to Compostela. PP, pp. 244-5, 304.

on-going claims over Lamego, Viseu, and Coimbra. Yet Braga was by no means on the defensive in these ecclesiastical campaigns, being involved in wrangles with both Toledo and Compostela, particularly over the obedience of Zamora.⁷⁰ Despite the intense amount of energy and money invested in these struggles, only modest results were achieved. By the end of the twelfth century the situation between the metropolitans remained in deadlock, with ecclesiastical boundaries continuing to bear no relation to political divisions. Thus, while Compostela could lay claim to at least half of the Portuguese bishoprics, Braga could command the technical obedience of all but three of the Leonese bishops.⁷¹

How important were the struggles waged by the archbishop of Braga against his ecclesiastical rivals? Certainly the disputes produced a large number of documents, particularly when compared with the paucity of other sources for this period. Yet the significance of this ecclesiastical wrangling in the wider political situation can be overstated. Commentators outside the dispute seemed oblivious that it was even taking place.⁷² Yet the ecclesiastical struggle did have an importance beyond the pride invested in a local church. The ultimate result was an exhausted stalemate and a hopelessly tangled pattern of suffragan loyalties. Yet even though the ecclesiastical boundaries bore little relationship to political borders, in one important respect they did reflect secular political reality. The Toledan primacy was the last vestige of Leonese-Castilian imperial pretension; the balance of competing claims that replaced it was a reflection of the greater equality of status that now existed between rival monarchs. As such it was a situation that these monarchs were prepared, however grudgingly, to accept.

The death of Emperor Alfonso VII in 1157 marked the end of the imperial ideal in Spain. In the political uncertainty that followed Afonso Henriques was able to improve his position substantially. Yet because Henriques' aim of political independence was reliant on papal support, his leading clergymen had a crucial role to play. Archbishop João sought to protect and extend the dignity of Braga, a policy that

⁷⁰ Fletcher, *The Episcopate in the Kingdom of León*, pp. 195-204.

⁷¹ Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, p. 70.

⁷² For example Roger of Hoveden blandly named the seven Portuguese bishops as suffragans of Braga, while the eleven Leonese bishops, also named, are assumed to be obedient to the archbishop of Santiago. *Annals of Roger de Hoveden*, trans. H. T. Riley, 2 vols (New York: AMS Press, 1968), 2, p. 264. This obliviousness was shared by the author of *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, who, despite probably being a cleric himself, made no allusion to João Peculiar's suspension (which was in force throughout the siege of Lisbon) or the implications of his consecration of Gilbert of Hastings, pp. 178-81.

required staunch resistance to encroachments from rival archbishops. From a royal perspective the major significance of this struggle was that the archbishop's success seriously compromised the imperial ideal as held in Rome. Yet to secure the final approbation he desired, Afonso Henriques had to demonstrate to the papacy that independent kings, rather than any resurrection of the imperial ideal, were the best hope for the future defence of the frontier. His chance to do so came more quickly than he might have expected.

The politics of kingship: 1170-1179

Manifestis Probatum, delivered on 23 May 1179, is the most famous single document in Portuguese history. Within the bull itself Pope Alexander makes clear that the reason for its promulgation was Afonso Henriques' piety and military prowess.

It has been demonstrated with manifest proofs that through martial efforts and battles you have been an intrepid destroyer of the enemies of the name of Christ and a diligent supporter of the Christian faith; and as a good son and Catholic prince you have also shown various benevolent attitudes to your mother the Holy Church, leaving to posterity a praiseworthy name and an example to imitate.⁷³

The characteristics Henriques had striven so unceasingly to display to the papacy had at last been acknowledged. Yet Henriques had adequately demonstrated these attributes for many years. Why then, after this long papal delay, did Alexander take this final step?

Throughout his pontificate Alexander had faced a series of rival popes supported by the German emperor. This situation substantially weakened the pope's political position, not least because of the financial uncertainty it brought to the curia. The Iberian kings and clergy had been quick to offer Alexander their moral and material support. In return, the pope exhibited a greater interest in Iberia than his predecessors

⁷³ 'Manifestis probatum est argumentis, quod per sudores bellicos et certamina militaria inimicorum Christiani nominis intrepidus extirpator et propagator diligens fidei Christiane sicut bonus filius et princeps catholicus multimoda obsequia matri tue sacrosancte ecclesie impendisti, dignum memoria nomen et exemplum imitabile posteris derelinquens.' in Appendix 1, below, p. 351.

had done. While Alexander would have wished to stay in close contact with his supporters, the primary papal interest appears to have been pecuniary. Indeed Alexander was the first pope to send representatives to Iberia specifically to gather funds.⁷⁴ Significantly, more charters were sent to Portugal than to any of the other Iberian kingdoms, suggesting important support was being provided by Henriques and his subjects. This papal fiscal crisis has been considered by historians of the Herculano school sufficient to explain the grant of *Manifestis Probatum*.⁷⁵

The promulgation of the bull certainly brought substantial monetary benefit for the papacy. The annual tribute agreed between Henriques and Pope Celestine II in 1143 of four ounces of gold was quadrupled in 1179 to two marks. The bull also specified a one-off payment of a thousand gold coins.⁷⁶ What exactly did this mean in terms of relative values? A century earlier Count Berengar Raimund II of Barcelona agreed to pay 25 marks of silver to Rome each year. The king of Aragon, on the other hand, paid an annual tribute of 500 gold coins.⁷⁷ The Portuguese offering was, therefore, a sizeable amount, but should also be put into a wider perspective. The entire papal revenue from Spain by the end of the twelfth century was perhaps a quarter of that garnered from England.⁷⁸ It would seem that the financial inducement, while substantial, should not be seen as the decisive factor in the issuing of the papal bull.

Yet Alexander's need for funds and the closer relations it encouraged with Spain and Portugal did ensure that the pope was well informed on developments in the peninsula. Even from Rome the imperial ideal must have seemed moribund. The only viable candidate was Fernando of León, but his position and reputation were rapidly fading. Fernando's ill-conceived intervention in Castile had sparked war with the supporters of his nephew. To the dismay of the clergy, the high cost of these wars, coupled with his own poor financial administration, led Fernando to the usual recourse

⁷⁴ Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, pp. 66-7.

⁷⁵ Herculano, *História de Portugal*, I, pp. 582, 682-4. Moreover Herculano saw the bull as a means to secure the succession rather than the legitimacy of the crown. See also Fernando Catroga, 'Alexandre Herculano e o Historicismo Romântico,' in *Historia da História em Portugal*, I, pp. 45-101.

⁷⁶ The tribute of four ounces (120 grams) was augmented to two marks (460 grams). The coins were *morabitinos*, Portuguese coins minted in imitation of Muslim dinars. Edouard Brasão, 'O papado e Portugal desde a conferência de Zamora (1143) até à bula de Alexandre III <<Manifestis probatum>> (1179)', in J. Serrão (ed.), *8º Centenário de Reconhecimento de Portugal pela Santa Sé*, (Lisbon: Academia Portuguesa da História, 1979), P. 100.

⁷⁷ Robinson, *The Papacy 1073-1198*, pp. 273-5.

⁷⁸ W. E. Lunt, *Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages* (Columbia: Columbia Records of Civilization 19, 1934), pp. 77-8.

of embarrassed monarchs: tapping the resources of the Church.⁷⁹ Meanwhile the rapidly-maturing Alfonso IX of Castile was beginning to display skill and resolve, along with vengeful hostility toward his uncle. Perhaps most seriously, from the papal perspective, Fernando demonstrated a complete inability to forge a united Christian front against the threat of Islam.

In 1171 the Almohads launched a fresh offensive, reputedly with an army of 100,000 troops, against the Portuguese in Baixo Alentejo. Even taking exaggeration into account, the Christian situation was dire. The Almohads overran much of the territory taken by the Portuguese over the last decade; Beja was recaptured and the Muslim army pressed on to invest Santarém. News of a Leonese army marching eastwards did little to reassure the beleaguered Portuguese. With the memory of Badajoz fresh in every mind, the defenders were filled with uncertainty over Leonese intentions. The Leonese king protested his good intentions to messengers sent from the city, but his sincerity was not put to the test. On hearing of his arrival the Almohads lifted the siege and retired southwards to Seville. Despite this reprieve, Henriques doubted the mercurial Fernando could be relied upon, and in 1173 concluded a five year truce with the Almohads. Muslim authors speak of the relief this brought to their citizens, who used the respite to rebuild and strengthen their frontier defences. The Portuguese, however, were forced to turn their attention to the machinations of their Christian neighbours.⁸⁰

Reports of the deteriorating situation prompted the pontiff to offer what assistance he could. In 1172 the curia's most experienced envoy, Cardinal Hyacinth, was once again dispatched to the peninsula in an attempt to bring the Christian kings together. The legate who almost two decades earlier had been a driving force behind the council of Valladolid, and the imperial ideal exemplified there, could now make little headway among the fiercely suspicious monarchs.⁸¹ Cardinal Hyacinth was unable to establish trust between the secular rulers or even to reorganise the tangled patterns of ecclesiastical authority. Papal attempts to muster direct military support outside the peninsula were similarly fruitless. Partially to blame for this was the Church's own

⁷⁹ Fletcher, *The Episcopate in the Kingdom of León*, pp. 20-2.

⁸⁰ Herculano, *História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 569-70; Coelho, *Portugal na Espanha Árabe*, 3, pp. 289-90. For the tumultuous situation in Spain during this period see Zamora, *Historia de España*, 9, pp. 465-516.

⁸¹ Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, pp. 66-7. The claim of Roger of Hoveden that Afonso Henriques threatened the legate with violence and expelled him from the country seems difficult to credit, given the amicable relations the two later displayed. *Annales of Roger de Hoveden*, 2, pp. 77-8.

recent policy, for in the wake of the disastrous Second Crusade the higher clergy had been wary of associating themselves too closely with further crusading efforts. As late as 1159 Pope Hadrian successfully dissuaded King Louis VII of France from joining with Henry II of England in a major military expedition to Spain.⁸² When a decade later Pope Alexander suggested hopefully to King Henry that such an expedition would constitute penance for the murder of Thomas Becket, the response was muted.⁸³ Neither through adjudication nor the provision of direct assistance could the papacy aid the Spanish defence or arrest the slide into regional loyalty.

Two events in particular may have provided a trigger for Alexander to finally acknowledge Afonso Henriques' self-proclaimed royalty. In March 1179 clergy from throughout Latin Christendom gathered for the Third Lateran council; bishops from all regions of Iberia were in attendance. These delegates provided first-hand accounts of the confused situation in Spain; no doubt their own inability to unite in the face of these pressing issues brought the reality of frontier disunity to the direct attention of the curia.⁸⁴ This experience was freshly in mind when news reached Rome of a remarkable agreement made by the kings of Castile and Aragon at Cazola. Under this treaty the two monarchs, negotiating on a basis of strict equality, agreed on the partition of future conquests. The significance of this agreement was twofold. The future direction of the reconquest, the focus of so much papal investment, could no longer be the monopoly of a single king. Equally importantly, the willingness of Alfonso of Castile to reach such an agreement demonstrated that he was unlikely to provide a more viable alternative to his profligate uncle as a candidate for future imperial status.⁸⁵ Less than eight weeks after the agreement at Cazola Pope Alexander issued *Manifestis Probatum*.

The explanation behind Afonso Henriques's remarkable rise to royal status ultimately lies in the tension between local Iberian and Latin Christian ideas of authority. Only in the more fluid milieu of the frontier could Henriques successfully claim for himself the title of king, but it was an elevation that held only limited

⁸² JL 10546; PL 188:1616. The letter is discussed in Giles Constable, 'The Second Crusade as seen by Contemporaries', *Traditio*, 9 (1953), p. 275.

⁸³ See below, p. 234, n. 66.

⁸⁴ Linehan, *History and the Historians*, pp. 287-8. See also Alberigo Tanner, *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, 2 vols (London: Sheed & Ward, 1990), 1, pp. 205-25.

⁸⁵ As Linehan, *History and the Historians*, p. 288 has observed: 'The remains of the notional imperial system which had survived until 1157 were unceremoniously swept away.' A translation of the Treaty of Cazola is included in Olivia R. Constable (ed.), *Medieval Iberia. Readings from Christian, Muslim and Jewish Sources* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), pp. 162-3. Note, however that in this book the treaty is erroneously dated 1178.

currency beyond the peninsula. The full legitimisation of a Portuguese kingdom lay within the purview of the papacy alone. While the goodwill of Rome could be attracted by pious gestures, any final acknowledgement of Afonso Henriques' crown was withheld for as long as the papacy believed an imperial political structure was the best chance of ensuring social orthodoxy and frontier defence. Henriques was fortunate to find a concordance of aims with Archbishop João, for although their ambitions were not identical, they were nevertheless able to assist each other in achieving them. By allying with the archbishop of Braga, Henriques was able to present himself as a serious candidate for kingship. This, in conjunction with the abject failure of the monarchs of León or Castile to fill the void at the centre of papal imperial dreams, finally persuaded Alexander to accede to Henriques' requests. The elevation to royal status would bring the Portuguese leader wider opportunities and fresh challenges. While these new influences began to emerge in Henriques' final years, they would ultimately define the reign of his son and heir, Sancho.

Map 4. The Iberian Peninsula, c 1157



Chapter Seven

Consolidation and opportunity (1179-1211)

In 1179 the royal dignity assumed by Afonso Henriques almost four decades earlier was at last acknowledged by the papacy. Henriques' elevation in status brought fresh challenges and opportunities, which in turn forced wide-ranging changes to Portuguese administration. Foremost among these changes was increased royal interest in the settlement of captured territory and the fostering of urban communities. The first signs of these trends can be detected in the last years of Henriques' rule, but they became more pronounced during the reign of his son, Sancho I (1185-1211). Although these developments were regional in focus, they also had important international implications. Afonso Henriques owed much of his success to an adroit use of Latin Christian influence, particularly from southern France and Italy. Under Sancho's leadership links between Portugal and the northern maritime regions – where mercantile development and urbanisation were also becoming more pronounced – grew stronger. Gradually the relationships between Portugal and the Atlantic seaboard states began to supplant earlier contacts maintained with continental Europe. This shift of focus had fundamental significance for the long term development of the kingdom.

The official documentary record provides the most reliable information for the final years of Afonso Henriques' reign and for that of his son Sancho.¹ Those documents relating to the development of urban communities are particularly rich. Numerous foundation charters (*forais*) have survived. These include law codes and details governing urban organisation, and have been aptly described as 'windows, partly screened, opening into medieval townships.'² Unfortunately the relative wealth of Portuguese charters during this period is not matched by narrative sources. Foremost

¹ The most important collections of documents for these two reigns include: *Chancelarias Medievais Portuguesas. Documentos da Chancelaria de Afonso Henriques*, ed. A. E. Reuter (Coimbra: UP, 1938) [CMP-A]; *Documentos de D. Sancho I (1174-1211)* eds R. de Azevedo, A. de Jesus da Costa, and M. R. Pereira (Coimbra: UP, Coimbra, 1979) [DDS]; *PMH Leges et consuetudines*, ed. A. Herculano (Lisbon: Academia das Ciências, 1856-68). Of the several collections of papal letters from this period special mention should be made of *Bulário português. Inocêncio III (1198-1216)*, ed. A. de Jesus da Costa and M. A. Fernandes Marques (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, 1989).

² Heath Dillard, *Daughters of the Reconquest. Women in Castilian town society, 1100-1300* (Cambridge: UP, 1984), p. 8. For a typical example see the Foral of Santarém (1179), Appendix 4, pp. 353-61.

among the locally produced chronicles is the invaluable *Annales D Alfonsi Portugallensium regis*, which concludes in the year 1184. No Portuguese chronicler of similar calibre continued recording the kingdom's fortunes after this date. The few locally produced Portuguese monastic histories completed during this period are both brief and laconic.³ Later and more distant Spanish sources are sometimes the only evidence available.⁴

In fact non-Portuguese authors provide much of the information concerning events in western Iberia during this period. Developments in the kingdom were observed with keen attention from across the frontier in Muslim lands. One important history was produced by Ibn Sāhib al-Salāt, and while the surviving fragment of this chronicle ends in 1173, a subsequent section – now lost – was used as the basis for the work of a later author, Ibn 'Idhārī. This second-hand account is the primary source for events in Iberia from the Almohad perspective.⁵ More distant Latin Christian authors also referred to events in Portugal. The crusader involvement in the capture of Silves in 1189 was recorded in a vivid eye-witness account.⁶ Although the author remains anonymous, where his information can be corroborated from other sources it has proved accurate. There is no reason to believe it was not compiled soon after events it narrated.⁷ The role of English crusaders in Portugal was also recounted with evident pride by contemporary authors Ralph of Diceto and Roger of Hoveden.⁸ Occasionally

³ 'Annales D. Alfonsi Portugallensium regis', in M. Blöcker-Walter, *Alfons I. von Portugal. Studien zu Geschichte und Sage des Begründers der portugiesischen Unabhängigkeit* (Zurich: Fretz und Vasmuth Verlag, 1966), pp. 151-62 [ADA]. Other minor works are collected in PMH SS pp. 1-25.

⁴ In the absence of more contemporary sources thirteenth-century Spanish authors are often invoked. Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie sive Historia Gothica*, ed. Fernández Valverde CCCM 72 (Turnhout, 1987); and Lucas of Tuy, *Chronica Mundi* ed. E. Falque Rey, CCCM 72 (Turnhout, 2003) are the most important. The relationship between these two sources is considered by Peter Lineham, *History and the Historians of Medieval Spain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), ch. 10-11.

⁵ Ibn 'Idhārī, *Al-Bayān al-Mughrib*, ed. É. Lévi-Provençal, G. Colin, and I. Abbas, 4 vols (Paris: P. Geunthner, 1930; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1948; Beirut: Dar al-Thaqafair, 1967). Ibn 'Idhārī is discussed by Hugh Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal. A Political History of al-Andalus* (London: Longman, 1996), p. 231.

⁶ *Narratio de itinere navali peregrinorum Hierosolymam tendentium et Silviam capientium, A.D. 1189*, ed. C. W. David, *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 81 (1939), pp. 591-666.

⁷ David reviews what little is known about identity of the author in his extensive introduction to *Narratio de itinere*, pp. 598-604. Little can be stated with certainty beyond his Germanic origins: it is not even clear whether he was clerical or lay.

⁸ Ralph of Diceto, *Ymagines Historiarum. Opera Historica*, ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols (London: Rolls Series, 1876); Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, ed. W. Stubbs, 4 vols (London: Rolls Series, 1868-1871) and *Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi*, ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols (London: Rolls Series, 1867).

too, tales from Portugal reached England and were recorded for their own sake, rather than because of any direct English participation in them.⁹

The administrative nature of much of the extant source material has encouraged Portuguese historians to interpret the years after 1179 as a period of slow, largely uninteresting, consolidation. This picture has been reinforced by a venerable Portuguese historiographical tradition of focusing on the specific character of individual monarchs. Thus Henriques' reign has been portrayed as a time of territorial expansion in which the belligerent monarch won political independence for the kingdom through military endeavor. While subsequent authors lauded Henriques' many achievements, his successor Sancho has received far fewer accolades. Sancho's active encouragement of settlement and urban growth caused later writers to accord him the cognomen *O Povador* (The Settler). His contribution has been portrayed as regional in focus and defensive in outlook.¹⁰ Even as Portuguese historians acknowledged Sancho's important support for the resettlement of conquered territory, they also implied that he was simply unable to pursue more direct policies of aggrandisement.¹¹ Nevertheless, royal policies during this period had important implications both for the evolution of the kingdom and the formation of wider international relationships.

Urban development brought distinct advantages for the monarchy. Citizens generally looked to the king as a protector against aristocratic and ecclesiastical interference in their affairs. Properly cultivated, the towns could become ideal allies to a monarch eager to centralise power into royal hands. Portuguese urban communities, in common with those in other regions of Europe, provided easily tapped sources of revenue. Moreover, because of the dangers of frontier life, these towns also had important military responsibilities, both in local defence and increasingly in the provision of militia levies to support the king's campaigns. Thus vision rather than weakness could encourage an ambitious monarch to foster urban growth as a means to

⁹ An interesting example is the scurrilous tale of Portuguese royal jealousy and murder recorded by Walter Map, *De Nugis Curialium: Courtiers' Trifles*, ed. and trans. M. R. James, revised by C. N. L. Brooke and R. A. B. Mynors (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 30-5.

¹⁰ There have been no recent monographs dedicated to the reign of Sancho I. For a general overview, José Veríssimo Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 13 vols (Lisbon: Editorial Verbo, 1977), 1, pp. 107-50.

¹¹ 'O novo monarca não possuía os dons militares do progenitor, mas encontrava o Rheino assente, sobredito na zona ao norte do Tagus, para realizar uma notável obra de formento.' Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 1, p. 107.

secure royal dominance within the kingdom. In addition, the development of the towns also had implications for wider royal policies.

As commercial interests grew in significance, Portuguese cities and towns established stronger links with distant mercantile centres. The most important of these trading partnerships were forged with the northern Atlantic states, particularly England and Flanders. To protect this trade the Portuguese constructed their first naval squadrons; soon these fleets were contending with Muslim flotillas for control of coastal sea-routes.¹² Relations between Portugal and the northern maritime states quickly grew beyond mercantile exchange as both societies found further common interests. The Portuguese kings were able to take advantage of these growing links to secure both direct support and important confirmations of their royal status. In this way Sancho gradually turned from continental Europe to the northern maritime states to reaffirm the independence of the kingdom. The significance of this realignment is difficult to overestimate, for it marks Portugal's emergence as a future sea-power, and as a people who looked toward the Atlantic ocean as their link to the future.

The consistency of royal policy between Afonso and Sancho: A court divided?

Soon after the papal acknowledgement of Portuguese independence, royal attention began to shift from military expansion to territorial consolidation. Historians have interpreted this change as the result of the differing characters of Henriques and his successor Sancho, yet there are problems with this explanation. Even though the effects of new royal policies became apparent in Sancho's reign, the policies themselves were initiated during the final years of Henriques' life. To explain this inconsistency a 'co-regency' between father and son has been suggested, in which Sancho ran the kingdom in his ailing father's name. Hence a crucial first question in approaching this important period in Portuguese history concerns the nature of political authority, and whether or

¹² The early development of the Portuguese navy has been widely overlooked, particularly outside Portugal. Thus A. R. Lewis and T. J. Runyan, *European Naval and Maritime History, 300-1500* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), p. 120, suggest: '[following the Castilian capture of Cadiz in 1262] their Portuguese neighbours, who had completed the conquest of the Algarve, established their own navy.' This reticence concerning early Portuguese maritime history has recently been challenged in a series of important studies published under the auspices of the Academia da Marinha, including Fernando Gomes Pedrosa (ed.), *História da Marinha Portuguesa. Navios, Marinheiros, e Arte de Navegar, 1139-1499* (Lisbon: Academia de Marinha, 1997); and Humberto Baquero Moreno (ed.), *História da Marinha Portuguesa. Homens, Doutrina, e Organização, 1139-1414* (Lisbon: Academia de Marinha, 1998).

not the change of monarch in 1185 actually triggered a fundamental reorientation in royal policy.

The theory of a 'co-regency' has developed from the emphasis Portuguese historians have traditionally placed on the martial prowess of their first king. The policy shift from frontier expansion to encouragement of urban growth is seen as reflecting the ascendancy of Sancho during the final years of his father's reign. The aging Afonso Henriques has been portrayed in an almost Shakespearean fashion, as a tired, wounded monarch increasingly willing to delegate official authority to his son, Sancho. Such an image had great appeal to the romantic spirit and laudatory aims of an earlier generation of Portuguese historians; for this reason alone it must be treated with suspicion – Afonso Henriques was no King Lear.¹³ In fact the political relationship between father and son has every appearance of being the customary one between a king and a prince.

From earliest childhood Sancho was associated with his father in charters and his position as heir-apparent emphasised.¹⁴ Sancho's knighting ceremony, marking his official coming of age, was held at Coimbra in 1170. Four years later a useful political marriage was arranged with Dulce, the daughter of Raymond Berenguer of Barcelona and sister of the future Alfonso II of Aragon.¹⁵ As the young heir grew into adulthood his role in government became a more active one. It is at this time that the possibility of the co-regency began to emerge. In the wake of Sancho's marriage the author of *Translatio et Miracula S. Vincentii* made the remarkable claim that Sancho shared royal authority with his father.¹⁶ There are problems with too ready an acceptance of this description of the relationship between father and son.

¹³ The 'co-regency' of Sancho was advanced by Alexandre Herculano, *História de Portugal desde o começo da monarquia até o fim do reinado de Afonso III*, ed. J. Mattoso, 4 vols (Lisbon: Bertrand Editora, 1989), 1, pp. 575, 681-2. Herculano's motives are suspect. He chose to portray Henriques as the towering figure of Portuguese history, the man without whom, 'não existeria hoje a nação portuguesa e, porventura, nem sequer o nome de Portugal.' *História de Portugal*, 1, p. 442. The more methodical royal policy after 1179 complicates this picture and so there was great temptation to attribute it wherever possible to Sancho.

¹⁴ For example a donation to the Templars in November 1165 of land at Idanha and Monsanto included the stipulation 'Do igitur uobis terram istam que iacet inter hec tria flumina tali uidelicet conditione, ut eam omni tempore hereditario iure firmiter habeatis et mihi et filio meo cui meam terram mandabo cum ea seruiatis... Igitur ego supradictus rex alfonsus et filius meus rex santius... hanc cartam propriis manibus roboramus.' CMP-A, pp. 296-7. At this date Sancho was perhaps ten years old.

¹⁵ For the ceremony of knighthood *Crónica Conimbricense*, in PMH SS, p. 3; for the marriage, ADA, p. 159.

¹⁶ 'Regni autem regis alfonsi XLV, vite vero eiusdem anno LXVII, filioque regis eiusdem sancio conregnante, XVIII annorum, adolescente mirabilis, indole...' *Translatio et Miracula S. Vincentii*, PMH SS, p. 97.

The documentary evidence provides an uncertain indication of the nature of political authority during Henriques' final years. When father and son witness charters both are given the same status, being invariably styled *rex*. Yet Sancho's wife Dulce and sister Teresa were also provided with the honorific *regina* without any equivalence of authority being implied.¹⁷ In fact strong indications of any actual division of power before 1180 are few and frustratingly vague.¹⁸ From 1178 Sancho took command of military operations, both against the Moors and the Leonese, but there is no suggestion that his authority was an independent one.¹⁹ Henriques appears to have retained executive power while delegating to his son sufficient authority and responsibility to satisfy Sancho's own ambitions.

This cooperative state of affairs ended with the death of Afonso Henriques at Coimbra on 8 December 1185. There seems to have been no difficulty in establishing the succession, nor should there have been, since Afonso had associated his only son with him in government since infancy. For all that an untroubled succession was of immense benefit to the emerging kingdom, it has also obscured from subsequent view the nature of the kingship itself. Contemporaries never suggested that Henriques, who had gradually built up his own royal status, received a formal coronation. Similarly there is no account of Sancho undergoing any ceremonial conferring of royal authority. While a twelfth-century Portuguese pontifical held at Santa Cruz contains a ritual for the coronation of kings, and might conceivably have been used in 1185, this possibility has recently been challenged.²⁰ Ultimately, like his father before him, Sancho was

¹⁷ In the mid-1170s a standard form emerged: 'Rex domnus alfonsus una cum filio meo rege sancio et uxore eius regina domna dulcia et filia mea regina domna tarasia...' CMP-A, pp. 357ff.

¹⁸ Herculano, *História de Portugal*, I, p. 682 singled out a charter given by the Master of the Templars to the town of Pombal in 1174, in which can be found the phrase 'Regnante Domino Ildefonso portugalensi rege...et cum eo rege Sancio filio suo.' [Italics are Herculano's]. The full text of the charter gives a slightly different impression however: 'Regnante domno ildefonso portugalensium rege...et cum eo rege sanchio filio suo et uxore eius domna regina dulci nomine.' PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 398-9. Nobody has argued, however, that Dulce also shared the co-regency!

¹⁹ ADA, p. 159. In a charter dated December 1183 rewarding one Gocinda Peres for his service to Sancho, it is Henriques, rather than Sancho himself, who makes the grant. CMP-A, pp. 394-5. Significant too is Henriques' final dated charter, a donation to Bishop Paio of Évora of a tenth of the royal share of locally obtained booty. Sancho's name does not appear on the charter. The old king maintained control over the rewards of military expeditions, even when his son was commanding in the field. CMP-A, pp. 398-9.

²⁰ José Mattoso, 'A realza de Afonso Henriques', in J. Mattoso, *Fragmentos de uma Composição Medieval* (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1993), p. 222, argues most strongly for the use of this ritual: 'Este ritual foi certamente usado na coroação de Sancho I...'. Linehan, *History and the Historians*, pp. 243-4, n. 137, argues against Sancho receiving coronation and further elaborates these points in 'Utrum reges Portugalie coronabantur annon', in P. Linehan, *The Processes of Politics and the Rule of Law. Studies on the Iberian Kingdoms and Papal Rome in the Middle Ages* (Aldershot: Variorum, 2002), 389-407 and 'Addenda', in *The Processes of Politics and the Rule of Law*, pp. 1-4.

forced to seek his mandate to rule from Rome. A petition for the confirmation of *Manifestis probatum*, sent to a papacy distracted by events in the Holy Land, was only granted by Pope Clement III (1187-1191) on 7 May 1190.²¹

Although Sancho's accession to the throne in 1185 made little impact on contemporary chronicles it did bring considerable reorganisation to the court. Yet the changes made in the highest royal offices should not be interpreted as an influx of 'new men' or as a stark generational change. In the final years of Henriques' reign the identity of court officials became fairly consistent: Velascus Fernandi was the majordomo, Petrus Alfonsi the *signifer* (standard bearer), Petrus Salvadoris the *dapifer* (steward) and Julian Pelaiz was notary or occasionally the chancellor.²² Two of these top officials, Petrus Alfonsi and Julian Pelaiz, retained their positions through the transition of leadership. The changes that did come, however, came quickly. In Sancho's first official document, a confirmation of the privileges of Santa Cruz monastery in January 1186, Petrus Salvatoris is absent from the list. By February he had been replaced in the office by João Fernandi.²³ For a short time João's star seems to have been in the ascendant, for in October he was recorded in the office of majordomo. This proved a short-lived promotion, for João was quickly returned to the lower office of *dapifer*, while the office of majordomo fell to Menendus Gunsalui, who subsequently retained the position into the next century.²⁴

João Fernandi's sudden appearance and rapid promotion through offices to which he appeared ultimately unsuited suggests close friendship with the new king. Menendus Gunsalui, on the other hand, was a different case entirely. Menendus was one of the oldest and most trusted courtiers: during Henriques' administration he frequently appeared at court and was a royal vassal for the Lisbon region.²⁵ The appointment of this venerable court figure as majordomo would hardly have been construed as a break with the past. Nevertheless, although Menendus was a familiar figure at court, his elevation could also reflect a shifting of royal priorities. The new

²¹ See below, pp. 244-5.

²² For example, in Afonso Henriques last dated charter of donation, to the bishop of Évora, all four of these officials appear as signatories. CMP-A, pp. 398-9.

²³ DDS, pp. 5-10, 15-6.

²⁴ João Fernandi appears as majordomo in a donation to the bishop of Évora dated 1 October 1186, DDS, pp. 20-1. Before the end of the month he had been replaced by Menendus Gunsalui in a donation to the Order of Santiago. DDS, pp. 22-3.

²⁵ In a confirmation to Santa Cruz in 1187 and another to the inhabitants of Seia in 1188 several of the major vassals are listed. In both is found the formula: 'Menendus Gunsalui tenebat Vlixbonam.' DDS, pp. 5-6, 13-14.

majordomo's interest in Lisbon, the burgeoning urban centre of the kingdom, and the talents that brought him such a position, would also have been in close accordance with Sancho's own vision for the kingdom. It was a vision in which Lisbon, along with the other major towns, would play a key role.

As Afonso Henriques' fifty-seven year reign drew to a close his son served as royal lieutenant, fulfilling every expectation held for a dutiful prince. Sancho accepted his long apprenticeship with good grace. When he did ascend to the throne there was little change in personnel or policy. Rather than being a retreat from royal initiative, supporting urban growth was a far-sighted policy aimed at lessening royal reliance on a fractious aristocracy and a dangerously independent clergy. Fostering the towns provided important economic, political and military benefits to the reigning monarch. If there was a difference in the attitudes between Henriques and Sancho, it was the son's greater appreciation of the international implications of urban growth.

Urban development under Afonso Henriques and Sancho I: the merchant's tale (1179-1189)

Between the granting of *Manifestis probatum* in 1179 and the declaration of the Third Crusade in 1189 a steady stream of merchants, pilgrims, and crusaders passed along the Atlantic coast and into the Mediterranean Sea. Although the Portuguese received little direct military assistance during this period, the growing volume of maritime traffic had other, wider implications. Commercial links were strengthened by foreign traders, some of whom may well have been resident in Portuguese towns; they also brought home to many Portuguese, not least the kings, how lucrative coastal trade could be. Meanwhile the swift resettlement of captured territory remained a primary concern for both monarchs and magnates. The developing towns brought both defensive forces and social stability to the frontier, and quickly became an important financial resource. Mercantile activity and urban growth were closely interrelated, acting in tandem they supported and encouraged each other. This upward spiral of development created both social pressures and military opportunity.

Portugal is remarkable for the number of *forais* (settlement charters) that have survived from the eleventh century onwards. Such charters were invaluable for the encouragement and organisation of frontier communities, as well as the establishment

of some form of royal authority over them. For the historian they provide an invaluable source of information about the social dynamics that lay behind the process of resettlement.²⁶ In the final years of Henriques' reign there was a dramatic increase in the number of new *forais* granted to towns, as well as several updated charters issued to already-established cities. This high rate of charter issuance continued through the reign of Sancho o Povador. From these documents can be traced the royal emphasis on bringing land under cultivation, on building communications between the towns, and on fostering trade.

In May 1179, the same month the Portuguese crown was recognised in Rome, a new form of *foral* was issued simultaneously to three major Portuguese cities: Coimbra, Lisbon, and Santarém.²⁷ The new format became a frequently used pattern for subsequent royal charters. These documents marked an attempt by the crown to exercise greater control over the activities of the towns, and included painstaking attention to details of prices, exemptions, and obligations. Much can also be inferred about royal attitudes toward local trade.

Toll remissions were granted on goods being transported between major cities to encourage local trading expeditions. Trade between Santarém and Lisbon was singled out as particularly important – this would have been predominantly river trade, as in the twelfth century the Tagus was navigable between the two cities. New officials were responsible for facilitating trade between the towns.²⁸ To further encourage travel in the kingdom the legal rights guaranteed to citizens from a chartered town were generally portable, holding good even in settlements without charters of their own. Frequently too, a citizen in possession of such rights arrested while travelling enjoyed a temporarily higher social standing in the eyes of the law. Urban charters also occasionally gave citizens accused of crimes in other regions the right to be tried under the more advantageous rules of their own town.²⁹ In an attempt to lessen the perils of

²⁶ The basic study of these charters remains James F. Powers, *A Society Organized for War. The Iberian Municipal Militias in the Central Middle Ages, 1000-1284* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); and by the same author, 'The creative interaction between Portuguese and Leonese municipal military law, 1055-1279', *Speculum*, 52 (1977), 465-87.

²⁷ Appendix 4, below, pp. 355-62; PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 411-8. Discussion of these charters can be found in CMP-A, pp. 366-71 and Powers, *A Society Organized for War*, pp. 42-3.

²⁸ Both riverboat crews and *almocreves* (muleteers) received preferred status in the 1179 charters. Bailey W. Diffie, *Prelude to Empire: Portugal Overseas before Henry the Navigator* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1960), pp. 18, 30-1.

²⁹ Thus a footman accused of a crime outside his town could face the easier justice meted out to a horseman, a horseman would enjoy the privileges of a minor noble. For example Évora (166), Lisbon

the road harsh penalties were also imposed upon those who attacked merchants or travellers.³⁰

This encouragement of trade acknowledged no sectarian boundaries. The importance of the Moorish and Jewish populations to the developing urban economy can be seen in the special charters Henriques granted in 1170, which guaranteed personal safety and use of traditional law-codes to the Moorish merchants of Lisbon, Almada, Palmela and Alcácer. Sancho confirmed these rights and elaborated on them in a subsequent *foral* to the town of Almada in 1190.³¹ Nor was this promise of protection an empty gesture. When visiting crusaders rioted in 1189 against the presence of a sizeable population of non-Christians in Lisbon, King Sancho moved quickly to honour both his father's agreements and the economic importance of these people by arresting and forcibly expelling the trouble-makers.³² Perhaps the clearest indication of the equality of the market-place was the punishments imposed on highwaymen found guilty of preying upon merchants: the penalties for robbing Christian, Moorish, or Jewish wayfarers were identical.³³

Although the *forais* contain clear indications of royal encouragement to local merchants, they are less informative about Portugal's early engagement with international trade. Scholarly interest has recently turned to the strategic significance of land-based trading from southern France into Spain, and of the activities of Italian cities primarily in eastern Spain.³⁴ The activities of seagoing merchants along the Portuguese coast have received less attention. The existence of such trade is hinted at by scattered references. The mercantile concerns of at least some of the English crusaders who assisted in the 1147 capture of Lisbon is clear from their insistence on trade concessions as a component of their remuneration.³⁵ By 1190 there was an

(1179), Coimbra (1179), Santarém (1179) PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 392, 411-8; Appendix 4, below, pp. 353-60. Such provisions appear in one form or another in most subsequent charters.

³⁰ See below, n. 31.

³¹ Foral of the Moors (1170), PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 396-7; Almada (1190), DDS, pp. 71-75.

³² Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, pp. 42-5.

³³ For example Évora (1166), PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, p. 393. After 1179 similar clauses were repeated elsewhere, such as Coruche (1182): 'Testamur vero et perhenniter firmamus ut quicumque pignoraverit mercatores vel viatores christianos, iudeos, sive mauros...' PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, p. 427.

³⁴ Most recently Olivia R. Constable, *Trade and Traders in Muslim Spain: the Commercial Realignment of the Iberian Peninsula, 900-1500* (Cambridge: UP, 1994). In an interesting aside, the *Narratio de itinere navali*, p. 642, mentions traders from Montpellier being present in Almohad cities, apparently unmolested, even as the crusader fleet was menacing the coastline.

³⁵ *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi: the Conquest of Lisbon*, ed. and trans. C. W. David (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936), p. 113.

'alcayde dos navyos' (commander of the ships) in Almada, along with regulations governing the transport of various goods, including oil, foodstuffs and wine.³⁶ A Flemish cargo ship was wrecked off the Portuguese coast in 1194.³⁷

One repercussion of this growing level of trade was a concomitant rise in the status of merchants. From the middle years of the 1180s merchants began to appear in the signatory lists of official documents, although whether this was due to their standing in the community or as the representatives of specifically mercantile groupings is unclear.³⁸ Some charters also hint at the type of social tensions usually provoked by the growing wealth of merchants. Cavalry status, which previously had been an optional qualification solely reliant on possession of a horse and armour, gradually took on many attributes of a socio-economic class. In some towns membership of the cavalry became an hereditary as well as a skill demarcation, as is made clear in stipulations that such privilege could also be transferred to a youth by his mother. In the settlement charter of Penacova, granted in 1192, it was specified that while the children of a cavalryman assumed the status of their father, this was forfeited in the event of marriage outside that social group. The distinction between classes was underlined by the specification that the elevation of footmen was at the discretion of the local lord on receipt of a fixed fee. In a parallel development a wealth threshold was imposed, which obliged those with sufficient assets to take on the responsibility of the cavalry class.³⁹ Such an imposition was possible because the majority of horsemen were able to opt for payment of a fine in lieu of actual service. The upper echelons of town society became more closely defined, with membership a measure of social as well as military attainment.

Even as social stratification increased within the more established urban centres, distinctions were also being drawn between areas of the kingdom itself. A more structured society could be imposed on regions already brought into a reasonable state of development, but the precarious settlements of the borderlands continued to offer the opportunities for social advancement designed to attract those who possessed

³⁶ Almada (1190), DDS, pp. 71-5.

³⁷ A. H. Oliveira Marques, *History of Portugal*, 4 vols (New York: Columbia UP, 1975), I, p. 57.

³⁸ For example in the confirmation list of the Foral of Viseu (1187), '...Didacus Pelagii mercator ts, Fernandus Menendi mercator ts...' DDS, p. 28

³⁹ 'Mulier militis que perderit maritum suum stet in sua cavalaria. Et si habuerit filium talem qui possit facere cavalariam, faciat illum. Et si ista mulier militis casaverit cum pedone, faciat forum de pedite. Pedes qui voluerit esse miles, det domino terre unam fogazam de duobus alqueires, et unum almude vini, et unum caponem.' Penacova (1192), PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, p. 483a.

both courage and ambition.⁴⁰ This growing distinction was, moreover, obvious to the formulators of charters. In the *foral* granted to Urros in 1182 there is a clear recognition of the dangers of frontier life, all the more remarkable because the term is actually used.⁴¹ This growing awareness of the frontier as a concept had subtle but important implications for the development of Portuguese identity. The articulation of the frontier suggests a growing perception of the Muslims as a distinct and alien people.

By the turn of the century the pace of economic development was accelerating, the scanty references from earlier years gave way to a relative flood of information. In 1203 King John of England granted safe passage and trading rights to Portuguese merchants, additional documents were issued in 1205 and 1208.⁴² In Flanders too there are indications of a permanent mercantile settlement, with Oliveira Marques reasonably suggesting that the men of 'Lischebom' mentioned in Flemish charters of 1212 were in fact Portuguese from Lisbon.⁴³ This growth was reflected in Lisbon itself, where letters patent from 1204 and 1210 elaborate the role of the *alcaide dos navios* (commander of the ships), who later came to be known as the *alcaide do mar* (commander of the sea).⁴⁴ By the 1220s this trade appeared to be booming and in one year, 1226, English authorities issued more than one hundred safe-conducts to Portuguese merchants.⁴⁵ Just what these merchants were trading in is unclear, and while it is reasonable to hypothesise that agricultural products impossible to grow in northern climates made up the bulk of materials, the only definitive reference is to rabbit fur and wax.⁴⁶

How much of this flow of wealth was the king able to divert from the merchants' coffers into his own? While no detailed empirical data remains, there are many suggestions of growing royal financial strength. In 1147 Afonso Henriques had

⁴⁰ In Bragança, on the perilous Castilian border, 'Et servi aut homicide aut adulteri qui in civitate vestra habitare venerint sint liberi et ingenui.' Bragança (1187), PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, p. 463.

⁴¹ 'Et vos homines de orrios non faciatis fossado nec detis fossadeira pro qui estis in fronteira. Ergo si venerit mauros, aut malos christianos a la terra scorelos a poder et torment se ipso die a suam casam.' Urros (1182), PMH *Leges et consuetudines*, p. 424. This is a very early use of the term 'frontier', which did not gain common usage until the 1220s. See Linehan, *History and the Historians*, p. 263; and by the same author 'At the Spanish frontier', in P. Linehan and J. L. Nelson, *The Medieval World* (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 46.

⁴² Violet M. Shillington and Annie B. Wallis Chapman, *The Commercial Relations of England and Portugal*. (London: Routledge, 1907), pp. 24-6.

⁴³ In the same document 'Lischebom' is also referred to as 'Lischebonim' or 'Leschebom'. A. H. de Oliveira Marques, *Hansa e Portugal na Idade Média*, 2nd ed. (Lisbon: Editorial Presença, 1993), p. 97.

⁴⁴ Diffie, *Prelude to Empire*, p. 30. Diffie does not, however, mention the earlier reference to this office at Almada in 1190. DDS, p. 75.

⁴⁵ Shillington and Chapman, *The Commercial Relations of England and Portugal*, pp. 26-7.

been forced to admit that due to financial constraints he could only offer the visiting crusaders the right to pillage Lisbon and future trading concessions.⁴⁷ This situation had dramatically changed by 1189, when his son faced a similar dilemma. As the city of Silves was about to fall Sancho offered the crusaders 10,000 gold coins as an alternative to the previously agreed right to sack the city. Even when the king doubled the amount the crusaders refused: by then they deeply distrusted the Portuguese king and preferred ready loot to the possibility of some subterfuge on his part.⁴⁸ Further strong indications of Sancho's growing wealth can also be found in his will, drawn up in 1188 and then updated in 1210.⁴⁹ These documents present a remarkable picture of royal largess. While the bulk of this wealth was divided among the king's many children, sufficient funds remained to make grants of 10,000 coins to each of the three great Cistercian houses, 2,000 to the Archbishop of Braga, and 1,000 to each of the Portuguese sees. By Harold Livermore's calculation, the numerous bequests total more than a million gold coins.⁵⁰

The urban development and growth of trade that occurred in the decade after 1179 brought the Portuguese ever more closely into the maritime trading networks that bound Latin Christendom together.⁵¹ The growing prosperity resulting from an engagement with foreign trade encouraged greater social stratification in the towns and in the kingdom as a whole. Equally importantly, the prosperity of the towns, and the means by which that prosperity was gained, was to have a profound effect on the military capabilities of the kingdom, and thus on the ability of the Portuguese leaders to pursue wider political objectives.

⁴⁶ Odber de Baubeta, 'Some early English sources', pp. 206-7.

⁴⁷ Henriques told them, 'having been constantly harassed by the Moors, so that sometimes not even our life has been safe, it has surely not been our fortune to accumulate [great] wealth.' *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, p. 99.

⁴⁸ *Narratio de itinere navali*, p. 628.

⁴⁹ DDS, pp. 47-51; 297-301.

⁵⁰ Harold V. Livermore, *A History of Portugal* (Cambridge: UP, 1974), p. 72.

⁵¹ For the growth of this trade from an English perspective see Pamela Nightingale, *A Medieval Mercantile Community. The Grocers' Company and the Politics of Trade in London, 1000-1485* (Oxford: UP, 1995), pp. 38ff, who interprets the adoption of the English silver standard in Portugal and Spain as indicative of the greater significance of mercantile links.

The military significance of urban communities (1180-1189)

Sancho's emphasis on urban development has often been dismissed by Portuguese historians as the recourse of a ruler lacking in military skill. Nevertheless there were important tactical dividends from fostering settlement. While the defensive role of fortified towns had long been relied upon, the first two Portuguese monarchs did much to expand these military capabilities. By the end of the twelfth century the increasing size and wealth of the towns allowed them to make a substantial contribution to the offensive potential of the kingdom. The city militia forces were reorganised and began to take a proactive military role. At the same time the Portuguese were able to fight their first major naval engagements. These developments had immediate strategic importance and, given Portugal's subsequent naval power, they remain of enduring historical significance.

The truce agreed between the Portuguese and Almohads in 1174 brought a short period of relative peace to the region. Among the terms of this agreement was the return of Beja to Almohad control; but this town soon became the crisis point for the re-ignition of hostilities.⁵² Early in 1178 the military forces of Beja, Serpa and Seville launched an attack against Alcácer do Sal. This attempt met with disaster when the Muslim force was surprised and destroyed by the Santarém militia. News of the rout impelled the discouraged Muslim settlers to return southwards, abandoning the town of Beja to the Christians without contest.⁵³ The Portuguese were quick to follow up this success, with Sancho leading a wide-ranging expedition into Almohad territory. After successfully scorching a trail southward Sancho brought the foray to a destructive culmination by sacking the suburbs of Seville. The victorious forces were unhindered in their triumphant homeward march.⁵⁴

These reverses goaded a response from the Almohad leadership. In 1179 a combined land and sea offensive was launched against the Portuguese. Throughout the long campaign that followed, the militias of the various border settlements proved their abilities in stubborn defence and sudden attack. In the first action of the campaign the

⁵² For the Almohad offensives of 1179-1184 see Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, pp. 231-6. When attempting to reconstruct something of the struggle between the Portuguese and Almohad forces during these years serious difficulties arise from the often irreconcilable differences between Muslim and Christian accounts of the same events. Where there is conflict the Almohad account by Ibn Idhari, *Al-Bayan* is usually the more detailed and coherent version.

⁵³ Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, p. 233.

army of Seville marched against Abrantes and subjected it to a brief, unsuccessful siege.⁵⁵ The following year Almohad forces enjoyed greater success when they attacked and destroyed the Portuguese stronghold of Coruche, killing or capturing its defenders.⁵⁶ Yet even as the Muslim forces were occupied with this victory, the Santarém militia, possibly acting in concert with forces from Toledo, launched a diversionary attack into Guadalquivir. Despite this the Almohads attacked again in 1181, this time moving on Évora, where the citizens were able to resist a prolonged siege. Between 1182-1183 militia forces from Santarém and Lisbon combined in a successful assault on Sanlucar.⁵⁷

The finest hour of the civic militias came in 1184 with their successful defence of Santarém against a major assault led by the Almohad caliph Abū Yūsuf Ya'qūb. After besieging the city for three weeks, rumour reached the Muslim camp that reinforcements might be en route from León. Yūsuf attempted a redeployment of his troops to meet this possible threat, but during the manoeuvre confusion broke out among the Muslim army. Seizing the opportunity, the Santarém militia launched a sally from the city, the caliph's bodyguard was scattered and Yūsuf himself fatally wounded. Dismayed at this turn of events, the leaderless Almohad forces retreated southwards. Tidings of this remarkable victory sped quickly across Latin Christendom to be deemed miraculous by chroniclers.⁵⁸

The surviving *forais* illustrate many of the administrative initiatives that allowed urban communities to take such a pivotal role in the defence of the kingdom. Several important changes were made to the terms of service agreed between the king and the citizens which greatly enhanced the offensive capabilities of the militias without undermining the defence of the towns themselves. Two types of service were required of city militias: the defensive *apelido* and the offensive *fossado*. The former was an alarm raised if hostile forces were detected, it was obligatory for all soldiers in

⁵⁴ ADA, p. 159. *Historia Gothorum*, PMH SS, p. 16; *Chronica Conimbricense*, PMH SS, p. 3a.

⁵⁵ For the attack on Abrantes, see ADA, p. 159, which claims numerous Muslim casualties for the loss of only nine defenders.

⁵⁶ ADA, p. 159, records the capture and destruction of the town. This is confirmed by the town charter granted in 25 May 1182, which speaks of the re-population made necessary by the capture of earlier townfolk by the enemy. DMP, I, p. 348.

⁵⁷ Powers, *A Society Organized for War*, pp. 43-4.

⁵⁸ This reconstruction of events based on Arabic sources follows Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, p. 236, who in turn follows Huici Miranda. Ralf of Diceto, *Ymagines Historiarum*, p. 623, claims King Sancho was present. It seems unlikely, however, that Muslim chroniclers would have omitted this fact, particularly as the presence of the royal army would have mitigated somewhat the humiliation of this defeat.

the region to answer this summons as quickly as possible under penalty of heavy fines.⁵⁹ Such requirements remained central to the *forais* of both Henriques and Sancho. Far greater variation can be found in the terms governing the other form of service, the *fossado*, which involved participation in raiding operations against distant enemies. These more mobile expeditions, often consisting of horsemen only, entailed opportunities for rich booty but also a greater potential risk. This risk was not only to the individual, but to the town itself, for the mounting of such raids seriously weakened the militia's defensive capability. Early charters often stipulated that no more than a third of available horseman could be committed to a single raid each year, with time limits also occasionally included.⁶⁰ Gradually, however, charters appeared in which the ratio of horseman was reversed, with only a third of available cavalry forces obliged to remain on guard duty. To bolster the defence skilled archers might be granted a higher status – and with it greater obligation – equivalent to that of the absent horsemen. At the same time restrictions on the duration and frequency of raids became more flexible.⁶¹ These developments were directed toward ensuring the military potential created by the growing population and affluence of the towns could be used in the most effective way possible.

The Almohad offensive was also undertaken by sea, and only by marshalling the resources of the coastal cities could this threat be met. In 1179 the Almohad fleet stationed at Cueta was placed under the command of Ghanim ben Mardanish. This fleet sailed northward and attacked the suburbs of Lisbon in retaliation for Sancho's earlier assault on Silves. The Portuguese responded by outfitting a fleet of their own, which tradition maintains was placed under the command of Fuas Roupinho.⁶² Details

⁵⁹ The rate of 10 solidos for horsemen and five for footmen remained constant through the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and appears in most charters.

⁶⁰ The majority of Portuguese charters include details of *fossado* service. Early examples stipulating one third commitment include Mos (1162) and Linhares (1169), PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 390, 394. The limits imposed in Numão are characteristic: 'Et non faciatis fossatum nisi cum vestro seniore una vice in anno aut ibi vestra voluntas fuerit.' Numão (1130), PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, p. 368.

⁶¹ Évora (1166) stipulates that only a third should remain on guard duty. This ratio continues in those towns whose charters follow the Évora pattern, e.g. Coruche (1182), pp. 392, 426. Other charters soon also began to include this ratio, e.g. Centocellas (1194), PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, p. 487. Larger towns might agree to a fixed number rather than a percentage, thus Santarém (1179) was obliged to provide sixty horsemen. This charter also contains the common addition: 'Balistarii habeant forum militum.' Appendix 4, pp. 356, 358.

⁶² Ambrosio Huici Miranda, 'Los Almohads in Portugal', *Anais da Academia Portuguesa da História*, NS, 5 (1954), pp. 26-7. Colourful legend surrounds Roupinho, who built the Hermida da Memória at Nazaré in 1182. António Brandão, *Crónica de D. Afonso Henriques*, ed. A. de Magalhães Basto (Lisbon: Biblioteca Historica, 1948), pp. 298-306, recounted that Roupinho dedicated the chapel to the

of the skirmishes that followed are unclear, but the Portuguese seemed to have launched a retaliatory raid on the island of Saltes, at the mouth of the Rio Tinto. In 1180 Ghanim led his ships back to ravage the Portuguese coastline, only to be outmanoeuvred by the defending fleet. Nine Almohad ships were captured, including Ghanim's own flagship. The following year the Almohads returned to re-contest the waters, meeting the Portuguese fleet at almost the same spot off Cadiz. This time the Muslims were victorious, capturing twenty hostile ships for the loss of one of their own. Among the casualties of this engagement was Roupinho himself.⁶³ Dramatic as this defeat was, the nascent Portuguese fleet was able to recover. Less than a decade later ships of the Third Crusade were escorted and supported by a numerically significant and tactically able local flotilla.⁶⁴

Where did these ships come from? Clearly the ability of the Portuguese to conduct naval operations was linked to the growing importance of maritime trade, but the nature of this relationship bears consideration. A significant parallel exists with the development of the Galician naval force described in the *Historia Compostellana*. Threatened by both Muslim and Christian pirates, Bishop Diego of Compostela decided to equip ships of his own. This was a costly endeavour, for with local shipwrights lacking the necessary skills to construct warships, the bishop was obliged to import craftsmen from Italy.⁶⁵ This expense was supported and justified by the value of coastal trade, particularly the lucrative pilgrim trade. Similarly in Portugal, the growth of trade did not provide front-line warships – though merchant ships were doubtless also pressed into ancillary service – but provided both the financial means and the impetus to invest in the specialised ships which escorted the crusaders to the Mediterranean.⁶⁶ Without the international trade that had strengthened the towns and

Virgin after a vision of her saved him from a fatal hunting accident. This belief is still current. Julia Wilson and John King, *Portugal* (Melbourne: Lonely Planet, 1997), pp. 320-1.

⁶³ Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, pp. 234-5.

⁶⁴ That the Almohads maintained a rival naval presence is clear from the destruction of their galleys while moored in the harbour at Silves. *Narratio de itinere navali*, pp. 616-9, 623. The author was also specific when discussing the services the Portuguese ships rendered: 'Galee autem de Ulixibona eas comitate usque ad strictum mare [i.e. the Strait of Gibraltar]...', p. 617.

⁶⁵ HC, I, 76, pp. 118-9; I, 103, pp. 174-6; II, 21, pp. 262-4; II, 24, pp. 266-8; II, 75, pp. 375-6. The authors emphasise the specialised nature of these ships: 'Birremem namque, que vulgariter galea vocatur...'; as is their expense: '...duas naves, que vulgo 'galere' dicuntur, in Iria composuit, in quarum compositione archiepiscopus multam pecuniam multasque dispensas expendit.' HC, II, 75, p. 375; II, 21, pp. 262-3.

⁶⁶ The darker side of the naval buildup is hinted at in the charter of Almada (1190), which stipulated that the poor could not be pressed into service on royal ships. PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, p. 476. The role of galleys and the composition of fleets in northern naval warfare has been the subject of some debate.

established a merchant fleet, the Portuguese could have had neither the materials nor expertise to take the struggle against the Almohads onto the sea.⁶⁷

In the decade following papal acknowledgement of Afonso Henriques' royal status, trading links with the northern maritime states had a subtle but pervasive influence in Portugal. Increasing mercantile engagement was encouraged by the Portuguese kings in order to enrich their subjects and themselves. Along with significant social implications this process brought important military benefits. The Portuguese kings were increasingly able to rely on large bodies of effective and motivated militia forces, units which also proved themselves capable of acting independently in defence or attack. Moreover, a growing maritime trade provided the Portuguese with their first opportunity to create a naval presence. Thus, although Sancho made few territorial gains, and indeed by the end of his reign many of his father's gains had been lost, he was nevertheless able to call upon military forces far superior to those available to any previous Portuguese ruler. Urban development also reinforced Portuguese engagement with Latin Christendom, links that were further strengthened by the sudden resurgence of direct military intervention in the form of a new crusade.

Portugal and the Third Crusade (1187-1190)

In 1187 the terrible news that Jerusalem had fallen to Saladin's victorious Muslim armies reverberated around Europe. Christian dismay quickly turned to a renewed zeal for holy warfare. This outpouring of anger was soon channelled into a new military expedition to the East: the Third Crusade. As had been the case four decades earlier, many of the Jerusalem-bound crusaders chose the sea-route to the east, taking them along the coast of Portugal. While the crusaders would once more be persuaded to participate in Portuguese campaigns, their mixed successes proved to be of limited long-term strategic significance.

For an exploration of the situation in late twelfth-century England see John Gillingham, 'Richard I, Galley-Warfare and Portsmouth: The Beginnings of a Royal Navy', in M. Prestwich, R. H. Britnell, and R. Frame (eds), *Thirteenth Century England VI: Proceedings of the Durham Conference 1995* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1997), 1-15.

⁶⁷ For Christian naval operations off the Portuguese coast, see *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 115-6. More generally, Constable, *Muslim Trade and Traders*, pp. 21ff, and Susan Rose, *Medieval Naval Warfare, 1000-1500* (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 6-56. For Christian-Muslim naval warfare in a

When Saladin's forces shattered the massed Christian army at Hattin on 4 July 1187 the Muslims were able to capture Jerusalem and overrun the Holy Land. News of this disaster stunned Latin Christendom, the shock killed Pope Urban III (1185-1187) and his successor, Gregory VIII (1187), ruled for only fifty-eight days. It was left to Clement III (1187-1191) to promulgate the bull, *Audita tremendi*, which launched the Third Crusade.⁶⁸ The call was received enthusiastically across Europe, with kings and nobles pledging themselves to the journey. There is a questionable tradition that when the news reached Portugal, Sancho initially professed the intention to join his fellow monarchs. If so, he was quickly persuaded against it, ostensibly by the growing threat to his own borders, but possibly also in anticipation of the passing crusader fleets that might be diverted to his own purposes.⁶⁹

The Portuguese king's first opportunity to make use of crusaders journeying to the Holy Land came when a mixed Danish and Frisian fleet consisting of fifty or sixty vessels arrived in the spring of 1189. The newcomers linked up with a Portuguese fleet – evidence once again of the kingdom's growing naval power – and attacked the small fortress of Alvor on the eastern side of the bay of Lagos. This was taken and sacked with particular ferocity; there was no sign of the negotiation and restrained treatment of prisoners that had earlier characterised Portuguese relations with their Muslim neighbours. Enriched with the spoils, the crusader fleet continued its eastward journey, leaving the Portuguese to await further arrivals.⁷⁰

In July 1189 thirty-six ships from Germany and Holland sailed into Lisbon harbour bearing some 3,500 crusaders. While the majority were German and Flemish, a sizeable number of these new arrivals were English, primarily Londoners, who had boarded at Dartmouth. Sancho approached the fleet representatives with the usual proposals for a combined operation against the Moors. As had by now become a tradition, the crusaders were offered the opportunity to pillage in return for turning the city over to the Portuguese. When agreement was reached the Portuguese and Crusader fleets sailed southward together to attack the Almohad city of Silves. A siege

Mediterranean context see John Pryor, *Geography, Technology and War: Studies in the Maritime History of the Mediterranean, 649-1571* (Cambridge: UP, 1988).

⁶⁸ For a general survey on the origin and progress of the Third Crusade see S. Painter, 'The Third Crusade', in K. M. Setton (ed.), *A History of the Crusades*, 5 vols (Madison-London: Wisconsin University Press, 1975), 2, 45-86.

⁶⁹ António Brandão, *Cronicas de D. Sancho I e D. Afonso II*, ed. A. de Magalhães Basto (Lisbon: Biblioteca Histórica, 1945), ch. 4ff; Erdmann, *A Idea de Cruzada*, p. 8.

⁷⁰ *Narratio de itinere*, pp. 616-7, 660-6.

commenced on 21 July and lasted until 3 September. The crusaders appeared to have borne the brunt of the fighting, particularly after a general assault failed and the Portuguese began speaking of retreat.

Yet the city's defenders were suffering terribly from lack of water and soon began to sue for peace. After their long commitment the crusaders would accept nothing short of complete surrender, even when the king attempted to persuade them to accept a cash settlement rather than the promised right to sack. The crusaders refused any alteration in their agreements and ultimately received their long-awaited opportunity to pillage. After searching the city for spoils the crusaders became involved in a dispute with the Portuguese over the grain-store. King Sancho eventually sent his troops into the city and expelled the crusaders. After twelve days the crusaders tired of demanding readmission, divided their spoils, and continued on their way. Some pressed on toward the Holy Land, others returned home; all protested vigorously concerning the ungracious treatment they had received. Meanwhile Sancho set about disposing of his new holdings. The vacant see of the city was entrusted to a Flemish cleric, Bishop Nicholas (1189-1191).⁷¹

Yet English participants in the Third Crusade still had a role to play. By 1190 the Almohads had emerged from the political instability caused by the death of the Caliph Yūsef at the siege of Santarém in 1184. His son and successor, Abū Yūsef Ya'qūb (al-Mansūr), determined to avenge his father's failure with a new assault on Portugal. After crossing to the peninsula he ordered the local Andalusian troops to invest Silves, while he himself pressed on with his own Moroccan troops. In June 1190 this invading force crossed the Tagus River and entered the heartland of the kingdom.⁷² At this decisive point an advance squadron of ten ships from the English crusader fleet arrived off the Portuguese coast.

The notorious storms of the Bay of Biscay had scattered the ships; the first to arrive made a hesitant landfall at Silves. The hundred crusaders aboard were relieved to find the city in Christian hands, but were soon advised by Bishop Nicholas that this might not long remain the case. They were persuaded to aid in the defence of the town, not only manning the parapets themselves, but also allowing their boat to be broken up to strengthen the fortifications, on the understanding that it would be replaced.

⁷¹ *Narratio de itinere*, pp. 617-33. The attitudes of the different parties involved in the siege of Silves is considered in greater detail below, pp. 234-7.

⁷² Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, pp. 237-43.

Meanwhile the other nine ships of the small flotilla had reached Lisbon. On arrival they were told that King Sancho had hastened to Santarém, guessing correctly that the main attack would fall there. An appeal from the Portuguese induced five hundred crusaders to march to the king's aid. Their arrival heartened Sancho. He refused an Almohad offer of a seven year truce because it included the stipulation that Silves be abandoned.⁷³ Ultimately the Muslims did not press the siege at Santarém, and while English sources were sure that the enemy was dissuaded from continuing by the intervention of the crusaders, later Portuguese historians took the more phlegmatic view that the miasmal airs of the Tagus valley in summer caused widespread fever among the attackers.⁷⁴

Portuguese gratitude to the English crusaders was soon strained with the arrival at Lisbon of the sixty-three remaining ships of the crusading fleet. When the disembarking crews encountered members of the city's Moorish and Jewish populations they assaulted and robbed them; the violence quickly escalated into a general riot in the suburbs. When news reached Santarém, King Sancho hurried back down the river. No doubt still mindful of the valuable assistance he had received from the earlier crusaders, Sancho persuaded the commanders to re-establish order themselves. When the rioters had sworn an oath to keep the peace Sancho declared himself satisfied. The harmony lasted only three days, when a fresh dispute once more degenerated into a violent street brawl. With this second riot the Portuguese king acted more strongly: the city gates were closed and all English within the city were arrested. Some seven hundred crusaders were gaoled, to be released only after returning all goods and arms stolen, and swearing once again to act peaceably in all the ports of the kingdom. On the 24 July the fleet sailed onwards to the Holy Land, leaving a mixed reaction among the Portuguese.⁷⁵ This ill-disciplined flotilla was the last recorded contingent of the Third Crusade to pause in Portugal; it was to be the final English crusading fleet to involve itself in the reconquest.

The intervention of the soldiers of the Third Crusade had little long-term benefit for the Portuguese. Although the garrison at Silves weathered the 1190 siege, the main Almohad army went on to destroy the stronghold at Torres Novas, and invest

⁷³ Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta*, 2, pp. 89-90.

⁷⁴ H. A. R. Gibb, 'English Crusaders in Portugal', in E. Prestage (ed.), *Chapters in Anglo-Portuguese Relations* (Watford: Voss and Michael, 1935), p. 21.

⁷⁵ Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta*, 2, pp. 116-8.

the Templar base at Tomar. The following year Ya'qûb, whose exploits were to bring him the title al-Mansûr (the Conqueror), succeeded in capturing both Alcácer do Sal and Silves. By the end of these campaigns the Portuguese had been pushed back almost to the 1147 frontier. Worse was to follow for the Christian cause in Spain. In 1195 Alfonso VIII of Castile and Alfonso IX of León put aside their mutual distrust in order to cooperate against the Almohad threat. The attempt proved disastrous, with the impatient Alfonso of Castile refusing to wait for Leonese reinforcements before engaging Ya'qûb's forces at Alarcos. The Castilians were decimated, with the defeated king himself narrowly avoiding death in the ensuing rout.⁷⁶ Thus, within five years of the departure of the fleets of the Third Crusade, the position of their co-religionists in Portugal was worse than before their arrival.

The fruits of royalty: dynastic marriage (1184-1211)

The most important relationship that could be forged between ruling houses was the dynastic marriage. For the Portuguese royal family increasing maritime traffic and the growing popularity of sea-travel among crusaders had important implications for the pursuit of advantageous matrimonial alliances. Information was passed along trade routes more quickly than goods, and facilitated all other forms of diplomatic contact. Moreover the institution of the crusade was unique in providing introductions and fostering close relationships between like-minded aristocrats. Marriages with venerable aristocratic families were particularly desirable to a newly established Portuguese monarchy conscious of a sometimes fragile royal dignity. The successes the Portuguese enjoyed in the arrangement of advantageous marriages represent another facet of strengthening relations with the northern kingdoms.

International marriage was not new to the Portuguese ruling family, indeed the progenitor of the dynasty, Count Henry of Burgundy, had achieved his position through marriage to Infanta Teresa. The wife of Afonso Henriques, Mafalda, was also chosen from outside the peninsula. Mafalda's exotic origin was noted with pride by a later hand in the *Annales D. Alfonsi Portugallensium regis*, perhaps at the time claims of consanguinity were being brought against many proposed royal matches.⁷⁷ Thus

⁷⁶ Bishko, 'The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest', pp. 420-3.

⁷⁷ Linehan, *History and the Historians*, pp. 252-9.

there was no novelty in foreign spouses for Portuguese rulers, yet in the wake of Henriques' rise to the throne the direction of these marriage negotiations began to change.

Other Iberian monarchs had accepted Afonso Henriques' elevated status, and cemented their views with dynastic marriage, during the 1160s. But prior to the issuing of *Manifestis probatum* marriage offers from more distant ruling houses had been conspicuously absent. In 1184, however, Henriques' daughter Infanta Teresa was married to the recently widowed Philip of Alsace, count of Flanders (1157/67-1191). Where Portuguese writers have noted this marriage, they have tended to be dismissive of its wider importance.⁷⁸ Nevertheless, this agreement was an event of international significance and as such was faithfully recorded by scribes, both monastic and administrative, in regions far distant from Portugal. Such records suggest that the marriage of Philip and Teresa was in fact a product of the extensive pattern of alliance and understanding that linked the Atlantic maritime states together.

Although this union took place between the ruling houses of Flanders and Portugal, Patricia Anne Odber de Baubeta has demonstrated the extent of English involvement in the arrangement of the marriage. While chronicle sources mention that Henry II of England took an interest in seeing this alliance come to pass, official records demonstrate the English king's active participation in concluding the match.⁷⁹ Entries in the Pipe Roll accounts for the year 1184 record that the task of transporting the bride, along with the costs entailed, fell to the citizens of the English south coast.⁸⁰ What lay behind this remarkable series of negotiations?

The romantically inclined have chosen to see this marriage as the result of personal attraction between the principal people involved. Thus Ralph of Diceto portrays a love-struck Philip fervently petitioning an unenthusiastic Portuguese monarch. Although Ralph states that rumour alone was sufficient to inflame the count's ardour, the two could conceivably have met during Philip's earlier sojourn in Portugal

⁷⁸ As Odber de Baubeta, 'Some early English sources', pp. 202-3, has observed, the only point of debate this marriage has raised among Portuguese historians is the rather esoteric one of whether it occurred before or after the siege of Santarém.

⁷⁹ Ralph of Diceto, *Ymagines Historiarum*, pp. 28-9. Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, p. 622, reports that Philip 'dixit in uxorem sororem Sanctii regis portugalensis'. From this Herculano, *História de Portugal*, I, p. 588, n. 253 infers that Sancho was the prime-mover behind events. Yet at the time Roger was actually writing, Henriques was dead and Sancho – Teresa's brother – was on the throne. Ralph of Diceto, moreover, states clearly that Afonso managed the negotiations (see n. 81 below).

⁸⁰ Odber de Baubeta, 'Some early English sources', pp. 203-4.

while en route to the Holy Land in 1177.⁸¹ Herculano paints a poignant picture of an aging king doting over his daughter, yielding only to Philip's persistence.⁸² Subsequent writers, uneasy with a romantic explanation, have pointed to the growing trade relations between the two regions to account for the marriage.⁸³ Yet while such relations may explain how Philip came to know of the infanta, it seems unlikely that Henriques, jealous as he was over the dignity of his newly established throne, would have been willing to broker a favourite daughter to secure preferential treatment for his merchants. To explain this marriage it is necessary to consider the involvement of King Henry II of England.

The close relations that were developing between England and Flanders are well known; it has therefore been reasonably suggested that Henry was motivated by a desire to assist a friend or, less charitably, place a weight of obligation upon an ally.⁸⁴ Yet other issues might have induced Henry not only to support Philip's intention, but possibly also to initiate it. From Henry's point of view Teresa was a safe choice for the count, because such a match did nothing to encourage Flanders into the French sphere of influence. In fact, whether by chance or English design, the final marriage terms quickly embroiled Philip of Alsace in a disagreement with Philip Augustus of France.⁸⁵ Moreover, Henry had long demonstrated an interest in Spanish affairs. His first marriage was to a Castilian princess, Constance of Castile, while in 1176 his second daughter Eleanor married the Castilian king Alfonso VIII. In the same year Henry acted as an adjudicator in a territorial dispute between the kings of Castile and Navarre.⁸⁶ Thus, by accepting the marriage proposal of the count of Flanders, Afonso Henriques also won the gratitude of the Angevin king, arguably the most powerful monarch of his age.

⁸¹ 'Philippus comes Flandrensis Adelfonsum regem Portugalensium per internuncios saepius sollicitavit...' Ralph of Diceto, *Ymagines Historiarum*, p. 28.

⁸² Herculano, *História de Portugal*, I, p. 588. Although Philip was given a romantic gloss in this portrayal, in reality his reputation was not without blemish. Many harboured suspicions that Philip's 'crusade' in 1177 was actually an attempt to usurp the throne of the leprous King Baldwin IV (1174-1185) of Jerusalem. William of Tyre, *Chronicon*, ed. R. B. C. Huygens, CCCM 63/63A (Turnhout, 1986), 21. 13-18, pp. 979-87.

⁸³ Odber de Baubeta, 'Some early English sources', pp. 204-5.

⁸⁴ Odber de Baubeta, 'Some early English sources', pp. 205-6.

⁸⁵ Count Philip included in the territory granted to his new wife lands over which the French king claimed ownership. Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders*, p. 73.

⁸⁶ The safe-conducts granted to the Spanish diplomatic parties are among the earliest surviving in England. *Diplomatic Documents Preserved in the Public Record Office*, ed. P. Chaplais, (London: PRO, 1964), pp. 1-10.

The wedding of Philip and Teresa came in the year of Henriques' death. When Sancho came to the throne he already had several children of marriageable age, and so was able to continue his father's policy of negotiating international marriages. In 1199 the unexpected death of Richard I of England (1189-1199) reshaped the political map of Europe. John (1199-1216) succeeded to a troubled English throne and in the same year the new king sent embassies to Sancho in the hope of securing the hand of one of his daughters. While chroniclers claim John's attention was attracted by tales of the beauty of the Portuguese princesses, there were possible political motives in John's choice. His brother Richard had wed a princess from the border kingdom of Navarre, and with Philip Augustus' son already linked by marriage to Castile, it was perhaps logical that John's eyes should turn to Portugal. Sancho was sufficiently interested to send ambassadors, but by the time they arrived in England John had secured advantage closer to home by marrying Isabelle of Angoulême.⁸⁷ Although ultimately fruitless, these negotiations reveal that the royal houses of Europe were willing to accept the presence of the Portuguese rulers among their ranks.

In 1212 Portugal was drawn back to centre stage of European politics through a second marriage alliance with the ruling house of Flanders. In the years since Philip and Teresa had been married relations between the two areas had grown, yet it seems that the aging Teresa was the major motive force in this second marriage. She encouraged Philip Augustus of France to exercise his powers as guardian over Joanna, the daughter and heiress of Count Baldwin IX (1194-1206), in favour of her own nephew Fernando – Sancho's third son. If the French king expected the young Fernando to become a pliant puppet ruler, he was quickly disappointed. The new count immediately moved to arrest the gradual drift of Flanders into French control and opened negotiations with England. Ultimately he joined with King John in the system of anti-French alliances that culminated in the battle of Bouvines in 1214. Fernando was present at the battle, was caught up in the allied defeat, and endured capture and captivity as a result.⁸⁸ The marriage of his son Fernando was to be Sancho's last coup; it was not, however, the last of the significant matches made for his children. In 1214 Sancho's heir, Afonso II (1211-1223), negotiated a marriage between his sister Berengaria and the powerful Danish king Valdemar II. Among the Danes the

⁸⁷ Radulph of Diceto, *Ymagines Historiarum*, p. 701; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, p. 502.


⁸⁸ Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders*, pp. 151 ff. The political implications of these marriages will be considered in more depth below, pp. 276-80.

Portuguese princess came to be known as *Berngerd*, 'the Bear Keeper', and she was remembered in ballads as both beautiful and perilous. When she died in 1221 Valdemar demonstrated an eagerness to maintain his links with Portugal by marrying Alfonso II's daughter Leonor in 1229.⁸⁹

Throughout his reign Sancho pursued a far-sighted policy of engagement with external powers by fostering trade and urban growth, by making use of visiting crusaders, and by entering into the politics of marriage alliance. One result of this engagement was to draw the focus of royal policy northwards and to encourage the Portuguese to identify their own interests with those of the Atlantic maritime states. These policies were not substantially different from those pursued by Afonso Henriques in his final years. Where a distinction is detectable between father and son, it is in a certain subtlety of aims on Sancho's part. Henriques clearly regarded links forged in the north as additional to those already made with southern French and Italian powers; all alliances complemented each other in supporting his drive for security against both Muslim and Christian Spanish menaces. Sancho, however, was required not only to defend the borders of the kingdom from external threat, but also the institution of the kingship from local intrigue. The legitimising role of high level relations with other ruling houses, particularly in the arrangement of dynastic marriages, was of great strategic value in this second, political front. Yet the effects on Portuguese society of growing links with the Atlantic world went beyond economic and political spheres. These relations were also to have a fundamental impact on local Portuguese attitudes.

⁸⁹ P. Lauring, *A History of Denmark*, trans. D. Hohen (Copenhagen: Host & son, 1960), p. 83.

Map 5. Important urban and religious centres



Chapter Eight

Portuguese religion and identity in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries

By the beginning of the thirteenth century, increasing commerce with the northern maritime states had yielded significant economic, political and military benefits to the Portuguese. These changing patterns of engagement with Latin Christendom also impacted on Portuguese religious and cultural life. Existing relations with the Latin Church were maintained, but increased communication with the maritime states introduced the Portuguese to a wider range of intellectual and spiritual movements. New religious ideals proved influential, but unlike earlier waves of ecclesiastical reform, those of the thirteenth century brought more than simply a translocation of Latin Christian institutions into a frontier society. Instead the Portuguese modified foreign innovations to meet their own needs, with external influences most often becoming the inspiration for local experiment. Thus, while increased communication opened Portugal to a wider variety of cultural influence, the result was a unique fusion of ideas that actually enhanced local confidence.

Medieval Portuguese authors rarely referred directly to the effect of international influence upon their own society, yet indications of changing attitudes can be gleaned from many of the sources already introduced. Official documents are the richest primary source for late twelfth and early thirteenth-century Portugal. The form some of these documents take can be as revealing as their contents. Just as the later tenth century saw a phasing out of Arabic in official documents; and a century later Carolingian script usurped local Iberian styles of calligraphy, the end of the twelfth century brought a significant general change: the use of vernacular language. The dating of many of the earliest vernacular Portuguese documents has been debated, but production in the late twelfth century seems possible.¹ At the same time vernacular authors also produced more extensive works, particularly as the culture of the troubadours was enthusiastically embraced by the court nobility. By the beginning of

¹ The earliest extant Portuguese vernacular documents are the so-called *Auto de Partilhas* (deed of division) and the *Testamento de 1193*. The dating and significance of these documents is examined by Avelino de Jesus da Costa, 'Os mais antigos documentos escritos em português. Revisão de um problema histórico-linguístico', in P. Avelino de Jesus da Costa, *Estudos de Cronologia, Diplomática Paleografia e Histórico-Linguísticos* (Oporto: Sociedade Portuguesa de Estudos Medievais, 1992), 169-257.

the thirteenth century the tradition was firmly established and in 1214 Sancho's successor, Alfonso II (1211-1223), ordered his will written in the language most widely understood.² The use of a distinctive local dialect has long been recognised as a critical articulation of local identity and its appearance during Sancho's reign provides a strong indication of a growing Portuguese cultural confidence.³

Indications of changing Portuguese attitudes can also be gleaned from the few works of narrative history written during this period. An often overlooked chronicle, the *Indiculum foundationis monasterii S. Vincentii*, is particularly informative in this context. Although written in 1188, this history of the monastery of St Vincent de Fora near Lisbon was highly valued for its description of the capture of the city in 1147. Growing awareness among scholars of more contemporary eyewitness accounts led to the *Indiculum foundationis monasterii S. Vincentii* being relegated to a source for incidental information. Yet this emphasis on the chronicle's deficiencies as an account of the capture of Lisbon has allowed its wider value to be missed. While much of this late twelfth-century chronicle does deal with events half a century earlier, the attitudes illustrated are those of the time of composition. Moreover the monastery in question had a particularly cosmopolitan character, being founded in the cemetery for the Flemish and German crusaders killed during the siege, and initially housing monks from Flanders. This chronicle thus provides a unique insight into the Portuguese reaction to foreign influence toward the end of the twelfth century.⁴

Royal policy during Sancho's reign has attracted only limited interest from scholars; but corresponding developments in the ecclesiastical sphere have suffered still greater neglect. Studies focused on the relations between Iberian and the Latin clergymen have generally overlooked the unique characteristics of the Portuguese experience.⁵ In the past Portuguese historians, both apologists and opponents of the influential role played by the Church, have concentrated their interest on the conflict

² Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 13 vols (Lisbon: Editorial Verbo, 1977), 1, p. 238.

³ For example Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 1, p. 236: 'A evolução da língua portuguesa nos séculos XII e XIII, nos forais antigos, nas ordenações régias, nas hagiografias e textos processuais, comprova que a fundação do Estado se fez acompanhar de uma cada vez maior autonomia da língua, na robustez que a prosa foi adquirindo como meio de expressão de uma comunidade.'

⁴ *Indiculum foundationis monasterii S. Vincentii*, PMH SS, pp. 90-3.

⁵ Of the many studies dealing with papal development in the thirteenth century an accessible approach is Peter Linehan, *The Spanish Church and the Papacy in the Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge: UP, 1971). Relations at the turn of the century are considered in more detail by Joseph O'Callaghan, 'Innocent III and the kingdoms of Castile and Leon', in J. C. Moore (ed.), *Pope Innocent and his World* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 317-37; and Antonio García y García, 'Innocent III and the Kingdom of Castile', in Moore, *Pope Innocent and his World*, 337-351.

between ecclesiastical and royal power, rather than on the changing attitudes underpinning this growing friction.⁶ These problems have been compounded by the tendency to treat local religious developments in isolation from those in other parts of Latin Christendom. Thus, in his overview of Portuguese society at the turn of the twelfth century, the influential historian José Mattoso acknowledges a foreign presence in Portugal, but confines its ramifications to the economic sphere.⁷ In this way a fundamental shift in Portuguese attitudes has been allowed to go virtually unexplored.

The early thirteenth century brought a subtle, but pervasive change to Portuguese cultural life. Earlier waves of Latin Christian influence, from the monastic and military orders, and from the papacy itself, emphasised compatibility with orthodox ecclesiastical forms. But as the twelfth century drew to a close the Portuguese were exposed to a greater variety of religious thinking. One highly visible manifestation of these widening intellectual horizons were the northern clergymen who settled in Portugal. These men benefited from the desire of the monarchy to cement relations with the Atlantic states, and under the royal aegis they took up ecclesiastical office or founded new religious houses. At the same time those institutions already resident in Portugal were also changing. Both the Cistercian and Templar orders had flourished in Portugal due in large part to the advantages their privileged relationship with the papacy offered Afonso Henriques. When royal attentions shifted from expansion to consolidation these orders gradually abandoned their international aloofness in an effort to assimilate more closely into the local environment. At the same time, the international orders also became both template and inspiration for local institutions created in response to particular regional needs. The impact of such changes on wider secular society is most obvious in local attitudes toward the non-Christian world. Portuguese opinion slowly converged with that of Latin Christendom, yet the two never became identical.

⁶ Despite a patent bias in favour of the Church, Fortunato de Almeida, *História da Igreja em Portugal*, 2nd ed., 4 vols (Oporto: Portugalense Editora, 1967) remains the basic work on Portuguese ecclesiastical history. Carl Erdmann's more balanced *Das Papsttum und Portugal im ersten Jahrhundert der portugiesischen Geschichte* (Berlin: Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Klasse Nr. 5, 1928); trans. by J. A. Providência Costa as *O Papado e Portugal no Primeiro Século da História Portuguesa* (Coimbra: Publicações do Instituto Alemão, 1935), mentions isolated events from this period, but the major narrative concludes at 1179.

⁷ José Mattoso, 'Orientações da cultura portuguesa no princípio do século XIII', in J. Mattoso, *Portugal Medieval. Novas Interpretações*, 2nd ed. (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1990), 225-239.

A carpet-bag clergy: northern churchmen in Portugal during the reign of Sancho (1185-1211)

Throughout the twelfth century the Portuguese church had included a high proportion of foreign-born clergy in its ranks. Greater engagement with the northern maritime states led to increasing numbers of these clerics originating from England, Flanders, or Germany. Some took up high ecclesiastical office, others founded important religious houses that subsequently became foci for an international presence. Continued royal patronage was the only guarantee of success for these newcomers, as a result, the influx of northern churchmen was a phenomenon the crown quickly turned to its own advantage.

In the eleventh and early twelfth century the appointment of French, or French-trained clergymen had been common. These included the famous Bragan archbishops Gerald (1096-1108), Maurice Bourdin (1109-1118), and João Peculiar (1138-75), as well as less notable ecclesiastics such as Bishop Bernard of Coimbra (1128-1146). These appointments had been conscious efforts to bring the Portuguese church into the Latin Christian fold. In the later twelfth century the elevation of immigrant clergymen became less common. The two noteworthy exceptions, Bishop Gilbert of Lisbon (1148-1164?) and Bishop Nicholas of Silves (1189-1191) and subsequently Viseu (1192-1213), were not French, but rather from England and Flanders respectively. In both cases they owed their appointments to unusual circumstances; but both also offered the crown unique benefits.

Gilbert of Hastings accompanied the crusader fleet that assisted Afonso Henriques at the siege of Lisbon in 1147 and was appointed bishop immediately after the city was captured. His appointment marks the beginning of an enduring English presence in Lisbon. Gilbert was accompanied by a retinue of Anglo-Norman followers who brought with them some of the traditions of their homelands.⁸ Although nothing is

⁸ The *Livro de Sé* of Braga records the presence of the Anglo-Norman archdeacon of Lisbon, Eldebredus, at a council held by Archbishop João of Braga. António Brandão, *Crónica de D. Afonso Henriques*, ed. A. de Magalhães Basto (Lisbon: Biblioteca Historica, 1944), p. 131. Anne J. Duggan, 'Aspects of Anglo-Portuguese Relations in the Twelfth Century. Manuscripts, Relics, Decretals and the Cult of St Thomas Becket at Lervão, Alcobaça, and Tomar', *Portuguese Studies* 14 (1998), p. 14, n. 54, observes that of the twenty-two signatories to a charter issued by Gilbert in 1159: 'three are from England (Walter of Hastings, Gilbert of Kent, Luke of Selsey); one is Flemish (Walter of Flanders), two are Norman (Alfred of Carentan and Jocelin of Bayeux), and at least a further four are probably Anglo-Norman (Robert, the dean, Herbert, Master Arnulf, and Reginald)'. The original of this charter is reproduced in Fortunato de Almeida, *História da Igreja em Portugal*, 1, p. 148. David also considered Bishop Gilbert responsible

known of Gilbert prior to his arrival in Portugal, his actions as bishop indicate a careful and diplomatic royal official. Gilbert is mentioned in several documents, including a disagreement with the Templar order over the knights' possession of churches in Santarém.⁹ He was also remembered in the *Indiculum foundationis monasterii S. Vincentii* as a man of noteworthy learning and judgement. In dealing with the delicate issues surrounding distribution of properties following the capture of Lisbon, he appears as a flexible administrator well aware of his reliance on royal support.¹⁰

Similar, though not identical, circumstances surround the appointment of the Flemish clergyman Nicholas as bishop of Silves in 1189. Like Gilbert, Nicholas arrived in Portugal as a member of a crusading fleet en route to the Holy Land. After a successful joint assault on Muslim-held Silves, Nicholas was raised to the episcopate and brought with him numerous Flemish followers.¹¹ A year later the bishop still had several of his countrymen around him, for signatories in one of his charters include William the dean, Peter the treasurer, and Lambert the archdeacon.¹² Immediately on his election Nicholas began to exert himself on behalf of his adopted country. Although he failed to persuade his disgruntled countrymen to make further attacks on local Moorish outposts following the capture of Silves, he enjoyed greater success the following year. Faced with the Almohad counter-attack of 1190, Nicholas was able to induce passing English crusaders to assist in the defence of the city.¹³ Little else was recorded concerning his character or abilities, but Nicholas appears to have won royal confidence, for after Silves was retaken by the Muslims in 1191 the Flemish bishop was quickly installed in the more secure see of Viseu.¹⁴

for the introduction of the breviary and missal of Salisbury, both of which were used in Lisbon until the sixteenth century. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi: The Conquest of Lisbon*, ed. and trans., C. W. David (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936), pp. 178-80, n. 5.

⁹ Bishop Gilbert's challenge was noted in the charter granting the churches in Santarém to the Templars in April 1147. The dispute dragged on for over a decade, only ending in a compromise arranged by the king in February 1159 in which the Templars renounced rights over the churches in Santarém in return for possession of the castle at Tomar. CMP-A, pp. 209-10, 269-71.

¹⁰ *Indiculum foundationis monasterii S. Vincentii*, p. 92.

¹¹ 'Interea princeps milicie regis assumpsit [quendam] clericum Flammigum ad episcopatum Silvie, et cum ipso manserunt aliquot Flammigi.' *Narratio de itinere navali peregrinorum Hierosolymam tendentium et Silvam capientium A. D. 1189*, ed. C. W. David, *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 81: 5 (1939), p. 633. For the difficulties in identifying the 'princeps milicie regis', pp. 618, 632.

¹² *Narratio de itinere navali*, p. 633, n. 27.

¹³ For the refusal of the 1189 crusaders, *Narratio de itinere navali*, p. 633; for the assistance of the English crusaders, Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi*, ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols (London: Rolls Series, 1867), 2, pp. 89-90.

¹⁴ The defenders of Silves received permission from Sancho to surrender the city and were allowed to leave in safety by the besieging Almohads, *Narratio de itinere navali*, p. 659. Nicholas first appears as bishop of Viseu in a charter dated July 1192, DDS, pp. 92-3.

Both Gilbert and Nicholas offered particular advantages to their Portuguese hosts. Beyond being able to deal more effectively with visitors from the maritime states, they could also make use of existing links with their homelands. Thus in 1150 Gilbert assisted Afonso Henriques by returning to England to recruit volunteers for further campaigns against Moorish strongholds in Portugal.¹⁵ Nicholas, serving a different king in different circumstances, sent William the dean back to Flanders to induce settlers, rather than warriors, to hazard a southward journey.¹⁶ Foreign bishops also had a practical political value for the Portuguese monarchs. Their local powerbases extended no further than the king's favour, so their loyalty to royal policy could be relied upon. Thus, such bishops did not seek to bring major change to the ecclesiastical or political framework of the country. This task was instead taken up by locally born clergymen, frequently to the exasperation of the king.

Clergymen from the northern maritime states were also influential in the foundation of churches and monasteries. Religious leaders from England, Flanders and Germany journeyed to Portugal to establish monastic houses in newly captured Christian territory. The two most famous of these houses, Santa Maria dos Mártires and St Vincent de Fora, were built in the cemeteries of the foreign crusaders killed during the siege of Lisbon in 1147. From these common origins the two houses developed in different directions, and while the evidence for St Vincent de Fora is far more comprehensive, both houses appear to have become centres for the local expatriate communities, as well as highly visible symbols of their presence in the city. Numerous immigrant clergy were housed in Santa Maria and St Vincent, and for many years the abbots of the latter were exclusively northerners. Nevertheless, both houses remained under Portuguese control and by the end of the twelfth century their administration had come under the dominance of local men.

The church of Santa Maria dos Mártires was built over the cemetery for the English crusaders killed during the capture of Lisbon. The founding of Santa Maria dos Mártires was noted by the anonymous author of *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, who

¹⁵ 'Gilbertus episcopus Olisiponis, praedicans in Angliam, plurimos sollicitavit in Hyspaniam profisci, Ispalim obsessuros et expugnatos,' John of Hexam, *Historia*, in Simeon of Durham, *Opera omnia*, ed. Thomas Arnold, 2 vols (London: Lond & Co., 1882-85), 2, p. 324. Although John of Hexam believed the English recruits attacked Seville (Ispalim), it seems more likely that they in fact assailed Alcácer do Sal. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 17, 178-80.

¹⁶ Bailey W. Diffie, *Prelude to Empire: Portugal overseas before Henry the Navigator* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1960), pp. 26-7.

simply recorded the concurrent establishment of the two cemetery churches.¹⁷ The *Indiculum foundationis monasterii S. vincentii* provides a more detailed description of the parallel development, as well as the point of division between the two. According to the latter chronicler, the motivating force behind the foundation was Afonso Henriques, who was moved by the death of so many fellow-Christians. Additionally, in order to win divine support for the siege, the king promised God that if the city fell he would build churches to offer continual prayers for the dead. The optimistic monarch immediately charged Archbishop João Peculiar to mark out the sites for the churches in the cemeteries of the fallen.¹⁸ After the city capitulated, the newly installed Bishop Gilbert was called before the king to order these arrangements and, after consultation with the canons of Lisbon, took control of the church of Santa Maria dos Mártires while releasing St Vincent de Fora into the king's own keeping.¹⁹ Little is known of the early organisation of the church, although a charter exists detailing Bishop Gilbert's creation of its council of thirty-one canons.²⁰

Under this account the foundation of Santa Maria was undertaken by the Portuguese, but there exists another possibility. A visiting crusader, Raol, claimed in an undated charter to have expended his own effort and money building a hermitage in the cemetery of the English, which he then entrusted to the monks of Santa Cruz. Was this hermitage later to become the church of Santa Maria dos Mártires?²¹ The most obvious difficulty with this identification is the contrary information provided in the *Indiculum foundationis monasterii S. vincentii*. Despite the later date of composition, the anonymous author at St Vincent de Fora did name two credible eye-witnesses for his account, both of whom were alive at the time of writing.²² Raol's document, on the other hand, is uncorroborated. Problematically too, the absence of Bishop Gilbert of Lisbon from the signature list, a list which includes Afonso Henriques, Archbishop

¹⁷ *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 134-5.

¹⁸ *Indiculum foundationis monasterii S. Vincentii*, p. 91.

¹⁹ *Indiculum foundationis monasterii S. Vincentii*, p. 92b.

²⁰ Duggan, 'Aspects of Anglo-Portuguese Relations', pp. 13-4.

²¹ This seems to be the implication of Harold Livermore, 'The "Conquest of Lisbon" and its Author', *Portuguese Studies*, 6 (1990), p. 3.

²² The first, Otto was an aged German monk involved in the foundation itself; the second, Fernando Petriz, was a Portuguese nobleman. *Indiculum foundationis monasterii S. Vincentii*, p. 91a. Although Otto is otherwise unknown Fernando Petriz was a leading figure in the royal court, appearing as *dapifer* in numerous documents, including the well-known grant of the Santarém churches to the Templars in April 1147. CMP-A, pp. 209-10. He was also a signatory of Raol's document, although in this case his office is not mentioned. Livermore's translation rather confusingly renders his name as 'Fernando Peres'. Livermore, 'The "Conquest of Lisbon"', pp. 4-5 (translation and original).

João of Braga, and the bishops of Coimbra, Oporto, Lamego and Viseu, is difficult to explain. Moreover, no extant document from the Santa Cruz archive claims possession of the church.²³ On balance then, Raol's charter alone does not provide evidence enough to discard the sequence of events presented in the *Indiculum foundationis monasterii S. vincentii*. A possible explanation that allows for the veracity of both accounts is that Raol was in fact referring to another building altogether. In the absence of further evidence, however, such a suggestion must remain purely hypothetical.

While the English cemetery was located to the west of Lisbon, the Flemish and German dead were buried on the eastern side of the city. It was here that the monastery of São Vincente, the subject of the anonymous chronicle, was established. With the encouragement of Afonso Henriques a church was raised, a German named Roald or Vivardo named rector, another named Henry appointed to guard and clean the building, and to ring the church bell after the manner of his homeland.²⁴ When Bishop Gilbert renounced his claim over the site, the Portuguese king obtained the assistance of a small group of monks from Flanders. Under their leader, Gauthier, they had set out for Lisbon with the intention of establishing a religious house. Their timely arrival suggests the efficiency of communications between the two regions, and also that Portugal was considered to be an area ripe for further ecclesiastical growth.²⁵ The monastery retained its international character for many years, with the next three abbots being Flemish or English by birth.

The fourth successor in charge of the monastery, another Fleming named Gauthier, ended the untroubled relationship the monks had enjoyed with the king. On his arrival the new abbot sought to bring the monastery, which had until then been Augustinian, under the rule of the Praemonstratensians. The Portuguese king refused to sanction this change, possibly due to an unwillingness to place the monastery under the control of a distant French house.²⁶ Neither man would yield and eventually Gauthier returned to Flanders. His successor, another foreigner named David, similarly found it impossible to deal successfully with Sancho and so also returned to his homeland. After

²³ Livermore, *The "Conquest of Lisbon"*, p. 7. Significantly nothing in subsequent detailed confirmations of Santa Cruz's many holdings appears to represent this hermitage, e.g. *Bulário Português Inocência III*, ed. A. de Jesus da Costa and A. M. Fernandes Marques (Coimbra: Instituto Nacional de Inverstigação Científica, 1989), pp. 116-49.

²⁴ 'henricum laicum, qui more patrie sue pulsaret ad horas campanam, quam ibi suspenderant.' *Indiculum foundationis monasterii S. Vincentii*, p. 91b.

²⁵ *Indiculum foundationis monasterii S. Vincentii*, p. 93a.

these problems the Portuguese king became less enthusiastic about exotic abbots and the final three recorded in the chronicle, Godinus, Menendus and Pelayo were all local men.²⁷

Both Henriques and Sancho actively recruited foreign clergy who could couple a wide knowledge of religious developments in Latin Christendom with a virtually guaranteed loyalty. In contrast to their French predecessors, these ecclesiastics came primarily from the northern maritime states; their presence and their activities further strengthened relations between Portugal and their homelands. The actions of the immigrant clergy in widening Portuguese cultural horizons was sought from within the kingdom rather than imposed from without, and their relations with secular authority reveal a monarch confidently imposing his own will in ecclesiastical matters. Moreover, even as new ecclesiastical movements were appearing in Portugal, the religious orders already present were undergoing different, but ultimately complementary developments.

The Templar and Cistercian orders under Sancho I

By the beginning of the thirteenth century the most successful religious orders in Portugal were the Templar knights and the Cistercian monks. Afonso Henriques had granted extensive lands to the two orders in recognition of their ability to resettle frontier territory as well as the important political capital such support garnered in Rome. Fifty years later, in the climate of consolidation under King Sancho, members of both orders discovered that earlier success could compromise their international character. To justify and protect their own great holdings the Templars were obliged to focus much of their effort on the defence of the Portuguese frontier, rather than the succour of the distant Holy Land. The Cistercians, on the other hand, found that their growing wealth and local influence attracted the attention of a monarchy eager to impose royal authority throughout the kingdom. Continued Cistercian growth became reliant less on the international reputation of the monks than on their ability to negotiate the troubled waters of local politics.

²⁶ P. Maur Cocheril, 'Les Ordres Militaires Cisterciens au Portugal', *Bulletin des Etudes Portugaises*, NS 28-29 (1967/1968), p. 51.

²⁷ *Indiculum foundationis monasterii S. Vincentii*, p. 93b.

The military orders were warmly received by Afonso Henriques. The Templars, and to a lesser extent the Hospitallers, brought much needed military and organisational capabilities to the frontier, along with a unique means of providing Rome with timely reminders of the Portuguese king's own pious loyalty.²⁸ Unlike most other European branches of the military orders, which were primarily occupied with revenue-raising for the Holy Land, the Portuguese chapters also played an active role in defence and resettlement. The majority of Templars' holdings were in the region between the Mondego and Tagus rivers in central Portugal. In 1157 they gained the citadel of Tomar (Nabão) on the northern bank of the Tagus, which subsequently became the headquarters of the order. More grants followed, and by 1186 a papal confirmation of Templar holdings included Soure, Ega, Pombal, Tomar, Ozezar and Almoural.²⁹ Subsequently the Templars granted *forais* to the towns of Ferreira, Castelo Branco, Idanha-a-Velha, Idanha-a-Nova, Salvaterra, Cardossa, Açafa and, briefly, Monsanto.³⁰

When the Portuguese Templars were granted frontier territory they were obliged to play a role in its defence. The knights are known to have engaged Muslim invaders on several occasions, both on their own and in cooperation with other military units.³¹ Yet the order's military capabilities made neutrality a difficult posture to maintain in the tumult of Iberian politics; and some donations have been interpreted as royal attempts to secure the partisanship of military orders.³² Unfortunately there is no direct evidence on the vexed issue of whether the knights were also called upon to defend against fellow Christians during the incessant conflicts between the Spanish kings. On the difficult border between Portugal and León, however, members of the military orders were certainly made aware of royal expectations of unconditional support.³³

²⁸ For the Templars' arrival and early years in Portugal see above, p. 119, n. 70, pp. 135-6, 174-5. Among the copious scholarship dedicated to the order see in particular Malcolm Barber, *The New Knighthood. A History of the Order of the Temple* (Cambridge: UP, 1994). For a more detailed consideration of the Templar order in Portugal see Cocheril, 'Les Ordres Militaires Cisterciens', pp. 23-7; and Saul Antonio Gomes 'A presença das Ordens Militares na região de Leiria (séculos XII-XV)', in I. C. Ferreira Fernandes and P. Pacheco (eds), *As Ordens Militares em Portugal e no Sul do Europa* (Lisbon: Edições Colibri, 1998), 144-56.

²⁹ PP, p. 118.

³⁰ Serrão, *História de Portugal*, I, pp. 166-70.

³¹ Pedro Gomes Barbosa, 'Cavaleiros do Templo e Cavaleiros de Leiria', in L. A. Fonseca (ed.), *As Ordens Militares em Portugal* (Palmela: Estudos Locais, 1991), 191-204.

³² A. J. Forey, 'The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries', *Traditio*, 40 (1984), p. 216.

³³ Although there is no evidence for the Templars in operation against Christians, in 1172 Afonso Henriques granted Monsanto to the order of Santiago with the proviso that it remain under Portuguese control against both Muslim and Christians. Forey, 'The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest', p. 216. See also below, nn. 34-5. Moreover it has been suggested that the Hospitallers were given border

The need to defend the frontier against both Muslim and potentially Christian threat was not the only factor imposing a local orientation on the Portuguese Templars. The greatest period of expansion for the Templars came under the first locally-born master, Gualdim Pais (1157/8-1195). In 1169 Henriques grandiloquently promised the order a third of all future conquests. While this grant secured Templar prosperity it also imposed a change on the character of the order. Henriques included the stipulation that all revenues from these lands must be used in Portugal rather than forwarded to the Holy Land, for as long as a domestic Muslim threat remained.³⁴ This caveat had the intended effect of ensuring the focus of Portuguese Templars remained firmly on local defence, but equally, it implied royal oversight of Templar accounts. Since not all Portuguese Templar holdings were under this prohibition, monies that were sent to the Holy Land would have to have been accounted for. Thus, the very success of the Templars brought them more closely under royal authority. This on-going control is demonstrated by the re-granting of Monsanto, which was taken from Templar control and passed to the newly-formed Order of Santiago. Despite this usurpation of rights theoretically guaranteed by the papacy itself, there is no indication that the Templar knights attempted to resist this diminishing of their holdings.³⁵ Thus, rather than representing a tendril of Latin Christian cultural expansion into Iberian, the continuing growth of the Templars was ultimately reliant on their ability to adjust to a unique local situation.

The Cistercian monastic order also underwent a period of growth and transition during Sancho's reign. Effective Cistercian utilisation of previously barren land ensured healthy returns from their extensive estates. Such success soon attracted the attention of a monarchy jealous of royal authority. Moreover Cistercian expansion came not only from agrarian efficiency, but also from the conversion of unaffiliated houses to the Cistercian rule. Yet to interpret such conversions as indicating a perception of Cistercian superiority over earlier, locally established forms, is to overstate the case. Behind these conversions lay a complex interweaving of local realities and external

grants in León with the understanding they would defend the region against possible Portuguese attack. Richard Fletcher, *The Episcopate in the Kingdom of León in the Twelfth Century* (Oxford: UP, 1978), p. 171.

³⁴ September 1169, DMP, 1, pp. 384-5; CMP-A, pp. 319-20.

³⁵ Monsanto was granted to the Templars on 30 November 1165, DMP, 1, p. 370. The property was transferred to the order of Santiago in September 1172. DMP, 1, p. 415.

influences which provide particular insight into the confused tides of ideas pulling at the Portuguese ecclesiastical world.

During the reign of Afonso Henriques the Cistercians were given title to wide tracts of frontier territory, the most extensive being the 1153 grant to establish the monastery at Alcobaça. This monastery grew to become the dominant Cistercian house in Portugal, and subsequently one of the wealthiest in Europe. In many ways the early development of Alcobaça is representative of the growth of the Portuguese order as a whole. Two decades of land improvement saw the abbey in a position to establish its first daughter-house, at Bouro, in 1174. Abbot Martinho I, who oversaw this first expansion, also possessed the finances to initiate a major rebuilding program at Alcobaça, including the construction of the famous abbey church. A persistent legend that a number of monks were massacred in the new abbey during the Muslim invasions of 1195 appears to be a groundless sixteenth-century fable, for no such atrocity was reported in any contemporary document. Certainly the monastery's expansion continued apace: in 1195 a second daughter house was founded at Seiça, five years later a third subordinate house was established at Maceira Dão.³⁶

Although later pious invention created a myth of martyrdom at the hands of Almohad invaders, the real shadow over further Cistercian development was royal interference. Sancho, unlike his father, appeared eager to impose his own authority over the influential monks. A debate in the Cistercian Chapter General of 1208 offers a tantalising suggestion of the scope of royal interference. Among the many concerns facing the assembled abbots was a dispute over the election for the abbacy of Alcobaça. It was alleged that King Sancho had forced the monks to accept his preferred candidate, despite their own reservations and those of the *conversos*. Yet because the complainant, the abbot of Bouro, may well have harboured ambitions for the abbacy of Alcobaça himself, protestations of monastic dismay at this example of royal patronage should be treated with some suspicion. Unfortunately there is no record of the final decision taken by the Chapter, which would suggest the conclave of abbots allowed the election to

³⁶ Maur Cocheril, *Routier des Abbayes Cisterciennes du Portugal* (Paris: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, Centro Cultural Português, 1978); Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 175-6; Thomas L. Amos, *The Fundo Alcobaça of the Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon. Inventories of Manuscripts Microfilmed for the Hill Monastic Manuscript Library: Portuguese Libraries*, 2 vols (Collegeville, MN: Hill Monastic Manuscript Library, 1988), 1, p. xviii.

stand.³⁷ Regardless of the success of Sancho's intervention, however, that he was prepared to influence the selection of a new Cistercian abbot demonstrates an unusually high level of royal oversight.

While the white monks received royal donations from both Henriques and, to a lesser extent, Sancho, an equally important form of Cistercian expansion was the conversion of existing houses to the newer monastic rule. At first glance this process seems a clear example of Latin Christian cultural domination over Portuguese institutions, but in reality the picture was far more complex. Several of these conversions provoked serious opposition, and the resulting conflicts suggest that the real motivation for change was seldom any sense of local cultural inferiority. Adoption of the Cistercian rule was often the result of a perceived social, political or economic advantage.

Furore erupted in 1196 when the Benedictine monks of Castro de Avelãs were charged with unlawfully assuming the garb of the Cistercian order. Far from being moved by piety, the monks were attempting to avoid their obedience to the archbishop of Braga, Martinho Pires (1189-1209).³⁸ In response to the archbishop's complaints Pope Celestine III (1191-1198) charged the abbot of Salzeda, a formerly Benedictine monastery that had recently adopted the Cistercian *ordo*, and Bishop João of Lamego (1190-1196), with bringing the recalcitrant monks to submission. They were authorised to impose the complete Cistercian rule over the Avelãs monks if necessary, and the threat of being forced to undertake the more rigorous Cistercian observance appears to have been sufficient. The archbishop made no further complaints and the monastery of Avelãs retained its traditional organisation.

Several monasteries did make the change to the Cistercian rule. Occasionally the transfer met resistance, and some of the resulting disputes reveal the secular interests involved. Early in the thirteenth century the Benedictine monastery of Pombeiro was cast into a state of uproar. A Cistercian, Martinho, was raised to the abbacy and the monks objected, claiming that lay interference had secured him the office. When the new abbot then sought to bring the monastery under the Cistercian rule, the monks

³⁷ Unfortunately the few documents dealing with either monastery during these critical years do not name the respective abbots. On the difficulty of establishing the identity of individuals at Alcobaca Amos, *The Fundo Alcobaca*, 1, p. xv, laments, 'No list of abbots... agrees with any other list.' In this case, however, the winner of the contest for Alcobaca seems to have been Abbot Fernando, who appears in documents from January 1210 onwards, DDS, pp. 288ff. Abbot Fernando's unusually frequent appearances in royal documents hint, though cannot establish, that he was indeed Sancho's preferred candidate.

objected as vigorously to his initiatives as they did to the character of the abbot himself.³⁹ In a move that indicates the seriousness of the dispute, and perhaps also the interests involved, Pope Innocent III empowered canons from the royal monastery of St Vincent de Fora to force a compromise settlement. Under an agreement reached in 1214 the authority and actions of the abbot were confirmed, but numerous caveats guaranteeing future conditions within the monastery were also committed to writing.⁴⁰

Perhaps the most revealing of these Cistercian conversions was that of the monastery of São Mamede of Lorvão in 1210.⁴¹ Lorvão had been founded in the tenth century and adopted the Augustinian rule in 1085 or 1087. For the next century the monastery was an economic and cultural centre, enjoying the support and patronage of successive kings and bishops.⁴² At the turn of the century this changed dramatically.⁴³ In 1195 the marriage between King Sancho's daughter Teresa and Alfonso IX of León was annulled and the princess returned to Portugal. When Teresa decided to retire into a religious house, the wealthy and venerable abbey of Lorvão was deemed most suitable, but the gender of its present occupants presented a problem. King Sancho reached an agreement with Abbot Julian to surrender the house in return for a new residence and appropriate compensation. Yet when the time came to leave his ancient monastery, the abbot had second thoughts. Julian suddenly took his case to Rome, where he claimed undue force had been placed upon him to agree to the move. Pope Innocent III, ever vigilant of the rights of the clergy, threw his support behind the abbot and forced the deal to be dropped. There followed a war of words between the monks and Sancho's agent, the bishop of Coimbra. Eventually Innocent was persuaded that the monks had been guilty of numerous infringements, and agreed to reform them elsewhere under a

³⁸ 'monachi Castri de Auelanis solo habitu Cisteriensem ordinem imitantes', PP, p. 373.

³⁹ 'Martinho abbade delles foi monje Cistel e destendeo a regra mais laxa e menos apertada e tomou e ocupou o dito mosteiro onde moram monjes negros per poder de leigos, contradizendo e apellando os ditos monges.' *Bulário Português*, p. 359.

⁴⁰ *Bulário português*, pp. 359-362.

⁴¹ Maria Alegria Fernandes Marques, 'Inocência III e a passagem do mosteiro de Lorvão para a Ordem de Cister', in M. A. F. Marques, *Estudos sobre o Ordem de Cister em Portugal*, (Coimbra: Edições Colibri, 1998), 75-125.

⁴² The long history of Lorvão and its role in the capture of Coimbra in 1064 are celebrated in a donation to the monastery in January 1197. DDS, p. 161.

⁴³ This account follows that of Miguel de Oliveira, 'Origins da Ordem de Cister em Portugal,' *Revista Portuguesa de História*, 5 (1951), pp. 347-50.

Cistercian rule. In November 1210 Teresa took control of Lorvão and founded a community of nuns there, who also adopted the Cistercian rule.⁴⁴

One problematic aspect of this dramatic series of events is the precipitous action of Abbot Julian. By reneging on his agreement and antagonising the entire royal family, the abbot ultimately brought about the destruction of his monastic community. A recent examination of the holdings of the Lorvão scriptorium may shed some light into the mindset that drove the abbot to this unfortunate confrontation. The scriptorium contains a remarkable collection of material pertaining to the life of Thomas Becket, the recently canonised English saint.⁴⁵ In fact Lorvão was a centre for the rapid acceptance of the cult of Saint Thomas in Portugal, and within a decade of his death the monks possessed an original letter by Thomas and several accounts of his life. As a champion for the privileges of the Church against the interference of secular powers, Thomas Becket had few equals: his martyrdom may well have inspired a similar self-destructive obduracy on the part of Abbot Julian. At Lorvão then, we see the spectrum of international influence and local circumstances impacting on the process of conversion to the Cistercian rule. Any belief in the superiority the newer form of observance was simply one strand of a complex web.

By the beginning of the thirteenth century Portuguese royal policy had changed from the pursuit of the crown to the maintenance of authority. In this new political climate the role of the Templar and Cistercian orders as bridges between Portugal and the rest of Latin Christendom faded in importance. The Templars focused their efforts on the defence of the Portuguese frontier and accepted unprecedented royal oversight in return for generous financial concessions. The Cistercians were also subjected to higher levels of royal interference. The growth of the order, both through direct grant and through the conversion of existing houses, remained reliant on local circumstances and secular support. Yet there was another facet to the influence these two orders had on Portuguese society. Both the Templars and the Cistercians provided templates and inspiration for the formation of indigenous Iberian military orders.

⁴⁴ The documents detailing the struggle between king, bishop and monks are reproduced and examined in detail by Marques, 'Inocência III e a passagem do mosteiro de Lorvão', 75-125. See also: Bede Lackner, 'A Cistercian of the Royal Blood: D. Teresa of Portugal', *Vox Benedictina*, 6: 2 (1989), 106-19.

⁴⁵ Duggan, 'Aspects of Anglo-Portuguese Relations', pp. 1-19.

Local initiatives in frontier defence: the orders of Santiago, Calatrava, and Évora

The same forces that imposed a regional focus on the Portuguese Templars also brought another major change to the defence of the Iberian frontier – the emergence of indigenous military orders. Of the many fraternities that sprang up across Iberia in the closing decades of the twelfth century, three became prominent in Portugal: the Leonese order of Santiago, the Castilian order of Calatrava, and the Portuguese order of Évora (subsequently Avis). The origins of the Spanish military orders generally, and the order of Évora in particular, have provoked considerable debate. In both cases the point of contention is essentially the same: was the development of local military orders completely autochthonous, or a manifestation of external influence? Yet in reality this is a false dichotomy, for the final form taken by both Spanish and Portuguese orders appears to be a result of the interplay between external influence, local initiative, and a certain tyranny of circumstance. Ultimately the formation of these orders was both a symptom of, and an encouragement to, the strengthening of regional identities.

The origins of the Iberian military orders have been obscured by ignorance, invention and straight misrepresentation. Several recent attempts have been made to clear away this accrued inaccuracy. Perhaps the most controversial theory argues that the Muslim warrior fraternities, known as *ribat* bands, were the inspiration for the Spanish military orders. This most extreme of the attempts to insulate the development of the Spanish military orders from Latin Christendom is inherently unlikely given the close similarity between the various orders and the clear consolidation of links between Iberia and other regions of Europe during the same period.⁴⁶ Instead the development of the Spanish orders seems, like so many other Iberian innovations, to have been a translation of external ideas into a unique local context.

This modification of exotic ideas to local reality is most apparent in the order of Santiago of the Sword. This order emerged in 1170 from the union of a local military fraternity, the brothers of Cáceres, and the canons of Loya. In common with the Templars, they were originally conceived as a force to protect pilgrims from the perils

⁴⁶ E. Lourie, 'The confraternity of Belchite, the Ribat, and the Temple', *Viator*, 13 (1982), 159-76, attempts to establish this link. The importance of the Ribat bands are also accepted by Cocheril, 'Les Ordres militaires Cisterciens', pp. 16-21. This position is rejected by A. J. Florey, 'The emergence of the Military Order in the Twelfth Century', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 36 (1985), 175-95 and by Richard Fletcher, 'Reconquest and Crusade in Spain c. 1050-1150', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, p. 46, who states: 'such a borrowing seems to be inherently implausible'.

of the road. The knights of Santiago also followed a rule specifically drawn up for them after the pattern of the Templars, under which the knights lived a communal life ministered to by chaplains. In 1175 Pope Alexander III took the order under his protection and formalised their rule.⁴⁷

The knights received early support in Portugal. Afonso Henriques granted the town of Arruda to the order in 1172; fifteen years later Sancho confirmed this grant and added the castles of Almada, Palmela and Alcácer to the order's holdings.⁴⁸ The knights of Santiago also received the town of Monsanto, which was transferred from Templar control in 1172. While this grant indicates the authority the king retained over the Templars, it also suggests royal attitudes toward the order of Santiago. Because Monsanto was situated near the Leonese border Henriques stipulated that no non-Portuguese commander could be placed in command of the strong-hold.⁴⁹ Such a proviso suggests that the parochial forces behind the creation of local military orders also meant that their neutrality could not be assumed.

The most famous of the Spanish orders, the Castilian order of Calatrava, had no direct presence in Portugal. Nevertheless the knights of Calatrava were influential in the formation of the Portuguese knights of Évora and illuminate the nature of Latin Christian influence in Iberia generally.⁵⁰ The order was formed in 1158 through an unusual series of events. The strategic southern fortress of Calatrava was granted by Alfonso VII of León-Castile (1126-1157) to the Templars in 1147. A decade later, with the southern frontier menaced by Muslim resurgence, the Templars deemed the castle impossible to defend and returned it into royal hands. Fortuitously, the abbot of the Cistercian monastery of Fitero, Raymond Serrat, was at the court to secure confirmations for his abbey from King Sancho III (1157-1158). In the abbot's retinue was an aged knight, Diego Velásquez, who believed the fortress could in fact be held, and offered to do so on behalf of the monastery. Having nothing to lose, King Sancho

⁴⁷ Derek W. Lomax, *La Orden de Santiago (1170-1275)* (Madrid: Escuela de Estudios Medievales, 1965); J. L. Martín, *Orígenes de la orden militar de Santiago (1170-1195)* (Barcelona, 1974); Forey, 'The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest', pp. 200-1.

⁴⁸ CMP-A, pp. 339-40; DMP, I, pp. 409-10; DDS, pp. 22-3. The knights retained most of these holding for less than a decade, before losing them to the Almohads.

⁴⁹ DMP, I, pp. 370, 415.

⁵⁰ For the circumstances of foundation of the knights of Calatrava, 'Algunos estatutos primitivos de la orden de Calatrava', *Hispania*, 84 (1961), 2-14; J. F. O'Callaghan, *The Spanish Military Order of Calatrava and its Affiliates* (London: Variorum, 1975); and more recently, Teresa M. Vann, 'A new look at the foundation of the Order of Calatrava', in D. J. Kagay and T. M. Vann (eds), *On the Social Origins of Medieval Institutions. Essays in honor of Joseph O'Callaghan* (Cologne: Brill, 1998), 93-114.

agreed and in January 1158 signed possession of the fortress over to the monastery. Archbishop Rodrigo of Toledo, who recounted these events, added that his predecessor undertook a successful preaching campaign to gather recruits for the endeavour, with the knights then taking on the rule and the habit of Cistercian monks.⁵¹

The order of Calatrava did not receive grants in Portugal, but through their affiliation with the order of Évora they exerted an indirect influence there. Unfortunately the specific nature of the relationship between Évora and Calatrava, particularly during their formative years, is unclear.⁵² The evidence of locally produced chronicles fails to provide a plausible account of the origins of the Portuguese order, and so charter evidence must be relied upon. The complexity of the situation was apparent to contemporaries, and in 1189 a visiting crusader described his impressions thus:

Also there were knights of the Cistercian order, who when at home had the indulgence of being able to eat meat three days a week, but only one dish each time; when they were on active service they lived as other men. The head of the order is Calatrava in Castile and Évora in Portugal, but Calatrava is the mother and Évora is the daughter.⁵³

In this description the visiting crusader identifies a problem that has also troubled subsequent commentators. Was the order of Évora from its outset a branch of the order of Calatrava?

The order's existence was first documented in 1176, over a decade after Évora was captured from the Muslims, when Afonso Henriques granted resources to the knights to support their efforts to defend the city. Included in this first charter is the statement that the knights operated under the rule of St Benedict, which at least

⁵¹ Rodrigo Jiminéz de Rada of Toledo, *De rebus Hispanie sive Historia Gothica*, ed. J. Fernández Valverde, CCCM 72 (Turnhout, 1987) VII. 14, pp. 234-6.

⁵² The waters were muddied by the storytelling propensities of Bernard of Brito, who claimed Afonso Henriques created the order with his (mythical) brother Pedro in command. Recognising the baseless nature of such legends, both Herculano and Azevedo overcompensated by claiming, with similar lack of support, that Évora was founded by a group of knights from Calatrava. Cocheril, 'Les Ordres militaires Cisterciens', pp. 41-2.

⁵³ 'Item milites de ordine Cisterciensi, qui tantum eam indulgenciam habent quod carnibus vescuntur III. diebus in epdomada, sed una vice et uno ferculo cum domi sunt, sed cum in expeditione sicut reliqui homines; quorum caput est Callatravia in regno Castellae et Eborā in regno Portugalensi, sed Callatravia mater est et Eborā filia.' *Narratio de itinere navali*, pp. 630-1.

suggests the knights were not at the outset affiliated with either Calatrava or the Cistercians.⁵⁴ More indicative of an autonomous origin was the identity of the first master of the order, for he was the locally born noble Gonçalo Viegas.⁵⁵ Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in 1176 the knights of Calatrava had themselves only existed for a decade and were struggling to establish their own status while maintaining their first Castilian foothold.

The orders were expressly linked by papal documents in 1187. An interesting discordance in the documentary evidence quickly emerges, for while Portuguese records make no mention of the knights of Calatrava, papal documents never refer to the knights of Évora. The papal bull of 1187 formalising the status of Calatrava within the Cistercian hierarchy listed the possessions of the Castilian order as including those held 'in Portugal, in the city called Évora.' The same phrase was repeated almost exactly in the subsequent bull by Innocent III in 1199.⁵⁶ Yet any change in the affiliation of the knights of Évora was not reflected in local documents, with subsequent Portuguese grants never acknowledging the order of Calatrava in any context. Certainly the knights of Évora continued to maintain their own hierarchy and their own locally born masters. Problematically too, letters from Rome acknowledged the existence and authority of separate masters of Évora and Calatrava without defining the relationship between them. Maur Cocheril, who has examined this discordance most closely, seeks to divorce the religious and material organisation of the orders.⁵⁷ This seems to be only part of the answer. The knights of Évora appear to have made a pragmatic decision, accepting umbrella Calatravan membership for the benefits it conveyed – of which eating meat three times a week was only the most obvious. More important was the protection implicit in such an linkage: threats from secular authorities could be

⁵⁴ Cocheril, 'Ordres Militaires Cisterciens', pp. 47-8. The charter states '...ordinem sancti Benedicti in Elboram tenentibus...', CMP-A, p. 356. While the meaning of such a statement is debatable, an interesting parallel exists in the monastery of Santa Maria de Salzedas. Founded by Henriques' daughter Teresa, the monastery was 'sub regula beati Benedicti', CMP-A, pp. 246-9. In 1209 Innocent III stated expressly that this monastery was not initially Cistercian: 'Quas Villas idem Monasterium, antequam Cisterciensium Fratrum Instituta susciperet, possidebat'. Oliveira, 'Origins da Ordem de Cister', pp. 320-23. In addition, even relatively early Portuguese documents did sometimes draw the distinction between Benedictine and Cistercian observance. In a 1152 donation to S. Pedro de Mouraz can be found the phrase: 'quidam fratribus Claravalensis cenobii.' CMP-A, p. 230.

⁵⁵ Oliveira, 'Origens da Ordem de Cister', p. 34.

⁵⁶ 'In Portugal, in civitate que dicitur Estora.' (28 April 1199) *Bulário Português*, pp. 55-9; PL, 214: 590-3.

⁵⁷ '...pour les [i.e. the documents] concilier, il suffit de distinguer entre l'observance religieuse et l'organisation nationale.' Cocheril, 'Ordres Militaires Cisterciens', pp. 46-7.

redirected to Calatrava, to the Cistercian hierarchy, or ultimately to Rome. In return the local Portuguese order seemed to sacrifice little of their perceived or actual autonomy.

The Iberian military orders drew inspiration from the Templars and the Cistercians, but they were moulded by local needs and expectations. The formation of these innovative institutions demonstrates an Iberian willingness to experiment with Latin Christian models, while the immediate support they attracted indicates the growing confidence of secular authorities when dealing with ecclesiastical matters. Yet the popularity of the indigenous military orders also suggests a more fundamental change in the attitudes of Iberian peoples. The development of local military orders, even more than the support for their international counterparts, implies an acceptance of holy warfare as a meritorious act. Although the Iberian knights retained a regional character, their existence presupposed an identity based on the inclusion of the faithful and exclusion of all others. What is less clear, however, is the degree to which this essentially Latin Christian concept permeated Portuguese society beyond the narrow confines of the religious orders.⁵⁸

Changing attitudes to the Crusade in Portugal

During the Second Crusade the Portuguese reaction to the sectarian militancy of visiting crusaders ranged from confusion to polite indifference. The small numbers of identifiable twelfth-century Portuguese crusaders, in conjunction with the conspicuous inability of Iberian leaders to present a united front to the Almóhad threat, suggest that the ideals of holy war were slow to influence Portuguese society. On the other hand, the relations between Portuguese people and visiting crusaders did undergo significant changes as local Iberian horizons were widened by other forms of contact. There are indications that the concept of crusade was beginning to be more widely understood.⁵⁹ Yet in the same way that religious institutions were adapted to Iberian societies, so too the ideology of crusade, and the concepts of identity it presupposed, were modified by the local situation.

⁵⁸ For a consideration of the relatively small membership of the Spanish orders, see Forey, 'The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest', pp. 222-8.

⁵⁹ An unusual addendum to the *forais* of Valhelhas sorrowfully recording the capture of Jerusalem and the death of Fernando II of León (1157-1188) succinctly captured a growing Portuguese awareness that some events touched all Iberians, and still more widely all Latin Christians. 'Capta terra iherusalem a rege Sallaadim et in ipso anno mortuus rex F.' Valhelhas (1188), PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, p. 471.

The pioneering work of Carl Erdmann, *Der Kreuzzugsgedanke in Portugal*, remains the fundamental study of the development of crusading ideals among the Portuguese. Erdmann believed that holy war fervour was a late arrival to Portugal, only truly detectable from 1234, when Sancho II (1223-1248) became the first Portuguese king to take the cross. Erdmann's strongest argument rests on the small number of individuals from Portugal actually known to have journeyed to the Holy Land in this period. Only a handful of crusaders can be identified with any measure of certainty, and of these just one, Soares Raimundes, was not a member of a military order. While King Sancho I was frequently portrayed as an aspiring recruit for the Third Crusade, hampered only by the gathering Almohad threat on his southern border, Erdmann dismisses this as an invention by later court historians based on a misreading of a letter between the king and Pope Gregory VIII.⁶⁰

Doubts concerning crusading enthusiasm among the Portuguese are deepened by the behaviour of the Christian kings of Iberia. Arrangements between Christian and Muslim leaders were a common feature of frontier politics. Afonso Henriques had benefited from this by isolating Muslim cities prior to attack; but he had also been surprised by a combined Almohad-Leonese army at Badajoz in 1169. In the final decades of the twelfth century this willingness to negotiate political arrangements in defiance of religious divisions reached new levels that threatened the progress of the southern expansion, even the existence of some kingdoms, and so drew upon the Spanish kingdoms the censure of distant commentators and the outrage of the papacy.

Even as King Sancho was attempting to stem the Almohad advance into southern Portugal he was also obliged to engage in a complicated, and increasingly threatening, political contest with the neighbouring Christian kings. When al-Mansur began preparations for an assault on Portugal in retaliation for the death of his father in 1184, he was mindful of the possibility of Christian reinforcements; it was the threat of such support that had brought about the fatal redeployment of his father's forces before the walls of Santarém. The Almohad caliph reached early agreement with King Alfonso IX of León (1188-1230). Barely seventeen at the time of his accession, the Leonese monarch quickly found himself under threat from his step-mother as well as from the

⁶⁰ Carl Erdmann, 'Der Kreuzzugsgedanke in Portugal', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 141 (1929), 25-53; trans. by A. Pinto de Cavalho as *A Ideia de Cruzada em Portugal* (Coimbra: Publicações do Instituto Alemão, 1940), pp. 8-11, 19. A handful of possible Portuguese crusaders are identified by José Mattoso, *Ricos-*

neighbouring Christian kings. He was in no position to make more enemies and so quickly agreed to a truce with the Almohads.⁶¹ In 1190 al-Mansur was able to conclude another truce with Alfonso VIII of Castile which effectively gave him a free hand in Portugal.⁶² Even the Almohad caliph's subsequent devastating campaign was not enough to force reconciliation upon the Christian kings.

Rather than rallying together against the Almohads, the Christian kings showed a far greater suspicion of each other. Alfonso of León began a series of initiatives directed against Castile. Sancho allowed himself to be lured into an alliance with his traditional rival and the marriage between his daughter Teresa and King Alfonso IX in February 1191 marked the isolation of Castile. A few months later the distracted Portuguese faced a second invasion by al-Mansur, in which Silves and Alcácer do Sal were lost, while Palmela and Almada were razed. The Castilians, meanwhile, had not remained idle in the face of these threats. In response to their appeal, Pope Celestine III judged the marriage to fall within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity and ordered it dissolved.⁶³ Papal legates were sent to Spain and succeeded in brokering an uneasy truce between the Christian kings. Yet the high level of lingering distrust proved disastrous when Alfonso of Castile refused to await Leonese reinforcements before his disastrous attack on al-Mansur's Almohad army at Alarcos in 1195.

In the aftermath of the Castilian defeat the superficiality of Christian solidarity became abundantly clear. Rather than unifying the Iberian kings, this disaster proved the catalyst for still deeper discord. With the loss of many of his most experienced troops, Alfonso VIII attempted to negotiate a truce with the Almohads, but al-Mansur refused. Instead the caliph reopened negotiations with his erstwhile Leonese ally. The treaty that was duly ratified between them shocked distant observers, particularly Pope Celestine III, who responded in October 1196 by excommunicating Alfonso of León. The depth of papal anger can be seen in the grant of crusading privileges in the following year to the other Christian kings for subsequent attacks on León. Fortified by

Homens, Infanções, e Cavaleiros (Lisbon: Guimarães, 1985), pp. 198-9. Unfortunately Mattoso provides no references nor differentiates between crusaders and conventional pilgrims.

⁶¹ Joseph F. O'Callaghan, *A History of Medieval Spain* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), pp. 242-3.

⁶² Hugh Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal. A Political History of al-Andalus* (London: Longman, 1996), p. 242.

⁶³ The role of the papacy in the political machinations of this period is considered in greater detail in the following chapter.

this support, the Portuguese moved quickly to occupy Túy.⁶⁴ By the end of the twelfth century the Christian kings of Spain had demonstrated no greater religious solidarity than their predecessors half a century earlier, nor was there any indication that the ideology of crusade could be used as a means to unify them.

Did the development of the crusading ideal in other parts of Europe pass western Iberia by completely? Although militant Latin Christianity had little apparent impact on practical decision making, there are indications that at least some of the ideas it fostered did reach Portugal. As time passed, foreign visitors to Portuguese coasts were clearer in their own minds that the struggle waged against Islam on the Spanish frontier was indeed closely related to holy war in Palestine. Greater contact with such visitors, particularly in major urban areas, worked a subtle change on the mental landscape of many local people. While the Portuguese may not have been willing to emulate those who viewed holy war as a sacred duty, they could at least understand, and even sympathise with their beliefs. Traces of this mental shift can be found in the relations established between the Portuguese and the crusaders who aided them in 1189-1190, and also in the development during this period of a remarkable cult of martyrs focusing on those soldiers who had fallen in the siege of Lisbon in 1147. By the end of the century the Portuguese were themselves taking an active interest, and possibly also active participation, in crusading enterprises.

The extension of the crusading ethos to Iberia was a gradual process. Although the Spanish and Palestinian frontiers had been explicitly linked by the papacy as early as 1123, participants of the Second Crusade displayed doubts about the probity of such an extension. Churchmen worked hard to overcome such hesitancy and by 1157 crusading indulgences were granted for the purely Spanish campaigns launched by Emperor Alfonso VII of León-Castile.⁶⁵ The degree to which this was accepted by the wider community is less easy to ascertain. By the final quarter of the twelfth century the Church had clarified its position: the journey to the Holy Land was a highly meritorious act; the journey to Spain was a possible alternative for those lacking sufficient time or

⁶⁴ For the Spanish disunity after Alarcos see Colin Smith, *Christians and Moors in Spain*, 3 vols (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1988), 2, pp. 2-5. In 1197 Celestine offered 'eandem peccatorum remissionem auctoritate presentium indulgemus, quam Ierosolimitani itineris assummentibus gravitatem nos et predecessores nostros meminimus indulsisse.' PP, p. 376.

⁶⁵ See above, p. 168. In 1158 Pope Hadrian IV (1154-1159) allowed assistance given to the Spanish Templars to fulfill the obligations of a crusading vow. Forey, 'The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest', p. 210.

money for the long journey eastwards.⁶⁶ Thus, when soldiers of the Third Crusade arrived off the Portuguese coast, they displayed none of their predecessors' qualms in attacking local Muslim strongholds. Certainly the crusaders who marched in support of beleaguered Santarém in 1190 had no doubts, 'deeming it preferable to die in warfare for the name of Jesus Christ than to see the misfortunes and extermination of their own people.'⁶⁷

Increasing contact with visitors holding and expounding such views slowly altered Portuguese attitudes. The negotiations between King Sancho and the crusaders in 1189-1190 resembled those undertaken by Afonso Henriques a generation earlier, but they were not identical. Ironically, though the intervention of the warriors of the Third Crusade brought far less advantage to the Portuguese, the acrimony that arose between the visitors and their hosts was far greater. This tension has been interpreted as a symptom of a divergent attitude between crusader and Iberian about the treatment that should be accorded to the Muslim foe.⁶⁸ Yet while such differences were apparent during the siege of Lisbon in 1147, by 1189 they were far less obvious. In fact the discord had its basis in shared, rather than contrary assumptions on what were essentially practical issues. The Portuguese appeared to understand, even if they did not share, the attitudes of the crusaders.

In the spring of 1189 the vanguard of the crusader fleets took part in an attack on the castle of Alvor, which ended in a massacre of all the inhabitants. This act of brutality has been represented as the epitome of the difference between crusader

⁶⁶ This position is made clear in the penance laid upon King Henry II of England for his part in the murder of Thomas Becket, in which Henry was expected to campaign in either the Holy Land or Spain – at his option – to expiate his sins. *Councils and Synods with other Documents Relating to the English Church*, ed. D. Whitelock, M. Brett, and C. N. L. Brooke (Oxford: UP, 1981), 1.2 (871-1204), pp. 947-8, 953-5. The clerical opinion was as follows: 'Si vero interim pro urgenti necessitate contra Sarracenos in Hispaniam iuerit, quantum temporis in illo itinere consumpserit, tantumdem predictum spatium prolongare poterit.' pp. 953-4. These efforts were to no avail, for Henry chose instead a monetary option and pledged a fortune in silver to the defence of the Holy Land. Christopher J. Tyerman, *England and the Crusades* (Chicago: UP, 1996), pp. 37-8.

⁶⁷ '...elegurunt magis mori in bello pro nomine Jesu Christi, quam videre mala gentis suae et exterminium.' Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, ed. W. Stubbs, 4 vols (London: Rolls Series, 1868-1871), 3, p. 44.

⁶⁸ For example Charles J. Bishko, 'The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest, 1095-1492', in *A History of the Crusade*, ed. K. M. Setton, 5 vols (Madison-London: Wisconsin University Press, 1975), 3, pp. 420-1: '[At Alvor] contrary to peninsula practice, the northern crusaders barbarously slaughtered some six thousand prisoners of war. In mid July a second fleet... put in at the Tagus on its way east, Sancho I took his army overland to join the crusader fleet in an assault on Silves, the chief town of central Algarve. After a siege fought in midsummer heat amid the usual exacerbation of feelings between Iberians and crusaders, the city fell in early September. The Portuguese king this time succeeded in preventing a general slaughter of the vanquished.'

intolerance and Iberian pragmatism.⁶⁹ Significantly, however, there was no apparent disagreement between the two groups over the siege or its conclusion. The Portuguese were involved in the operation from the outset and there is no indication that they made any effort to restrain the blood-lust of their allies. Rather they displayed every sign of satisfaction with the outcome of events. Any hint of disquiet over the merit of these actions comes from Latin Christian writers.⁷⁰ Furthermore, the actions of the fleet could not have shocked Portuguese morality to any great extent, for King Sancho displayed no qualms about allying himself with the next contingent of crusaders for another attack. It was during this second co-operative effort that dissension did break out between the Portuguese and the crusaders.

Almost from the outset of this second action the crusaders were uncertain about the commitment of their Portuguese allies. Initially King Sancho delegated command to an unnamed lieutenant. When the crusaders suggested an attack on Silves, the Portuguese commander doubted their ability to take the city by storm and attempted to persuade them to attack a smaller target. Only when they refused did the local troops reluctantly join in the siege.⁷¹ For the crusaders, this perceived half-heartedness on the part of their allies became increasingly galling, and an eyewitness recalled that 'throughout the siege the Portuguese neither worked nor fought, but indeed taunted us for labouring in vain, because the town was impossible to take.'⁷²

The siege was undertaken in an atmosphere of acrimony, and after the city fell this distrust only deepened. Although there was a dispute between the parties over the treatment of the surrendering Muslims, the real cause lay deeper. When the surrendering citizens were mistreated by the crusaders, greed rather than religious antipathy lay behind it; the author of the chronicle was no less disgusted by this breach

⁶⁹ For an examination of the destruction of Alvor see David, *Narratio de itinere navali*, pp. 663-6.

⁷⁰ '...nulli etati vel sexui parcentes; et, sicut veraciter audivimus, circiter V. milia et sexcentos occiderunt. Galee autem de Ulixbona eas comitate usque ad strictum mare [i.e. the Straits of Gibraltar] tandem reverse, ipsas prospere procedere nobis renunciaverunt...' *Narratio de itinere navali*, pp. 616-7. Another contemporary Christian account of the attack on Alvor also notes the crusaders' ruthlessness and casts doubt on their motives: 'Albur oppugnant et capiunt atque aurum et argentum infinitum inde detrahunt, urbicis in ore gladii cesis. *Annales Colonienses Maximi*, ed. K. Pertz, MGH SS, 7, p. 796.

⁷¹ *Narratio de itinere navali*, pp. 626-7.

⁷² 'Sciendum etiam quod toto tempore obsidionis Portugalenses nec laborabant nec pugnabant, sed tantum insultabant nobis quod in vanum laboremus et quod inexpugnabilis esset munitio.' *Narratio de itinere navali*, pp. 629-30.

of the surrender terms than the Portuguese.⁷³ Moreover the author was suspicious that the anger of the Portuguese sprang more from their fears for the defenders' possessions than their persons.

With the city taken the king endeavoured to secure from us the foodstuffs, which were abundant and of greater value than any other thing, as his share. Yet because we had forbidden anything to be taken from the city, so that we could divide the booty there, some of our men, particularly the men of Flanders, secretly sold grain outside the walls to the Portuguese. This greatly angered the king, who declared that it would be better not to have captured the city than to lose it through lack of bread... In fact the king took all for himself and distributed nothing to us. So the crusaders, having been treated so badly, took their leave of the king with less friendship.⁷⁴

The crusaders were angered simply by the treatment they received from the king. Believing themselves to have borne the brunt of the fighting, they found it difficult to accept the demands placed upon them by their hesitant allies.

These experiences so soured the crusaders that they could not be prevailed upon by the newly-installed bishop of Silves, the Flemish cleric Nicholas (1189-1191), to take any further action against the surrounding Muslims. Moreover as the fleet sailed on along the coast the crusaders found a sullen satisfaction in ruminating on the opportunities for the advancement of Christendom which the king's shoddy treatment of them had brought to nothing.⁷⁵ Long association with the Muslims immured the Portuguese against the excesses of crusading enthusiasm, yet their attitudes had undergone significant change. Although they were unwilling to expose themselves to unnecessary risks in waging war against Muslim forces, they no longer required a

⁷³ '...populus noster satis turpiter quosdam exspoliavit contra pactum et verberavit. Unde pene mota fuit seditio inter regem et nostros... Quidam etiam contra pactum torquebantur pro pecunia monstranda.' *Narratio de itinere navali*, pp. 628-9.

⁷⁴ 'Possessa ergo munitione rex nitebatur a nobis impetrare annonam, que copiosa erat, et omnibus aliis multo melior, pro porcione sua. Sed cum prohibuissemus ne aliquid ferretur de civitate, ut in ipsa divideremus predam, nostri quidam et maxime Flammigi, furtive vendebant ultra muros frumenta Portugalensibus. Unde rex valde commovebatur, asserebat namque melius esse non fuisse captam urbem quam ammittere pro penuria panis... Rex vero omnia sibi vendicans nichil nobis reddidit, et ideo peregrini sic iniuriose tractati minus amice ab eo seperati sunt.' *Narratio de itinere navali*, pp. 631-2.

⁷⁵ *Narratio de itinere navali*, pp. 633-6.

contrived justification for such an attack. Nor did they exhibit great sympathy for the defeated. In this at least, they shared the views of the visitors.

The subtle change in Portuguese attitudes hinted at in the crusader's account of the attack on Silves is also apparent in an often overlooked locally produced chronicle. The anonymous *Indiculum foundationis monasterii S. Vincentii* describes events during the 1140s, although it was written four decades later. Other more contemporary accounts have come to be preferred as sources for the capture of Lisbon during the Second Crusade, yet the later description places a highly revealing gloss on events during the siege. For this reason, the *Indiculum foundationis* offers unique insights into the development of Portuguese attitudes. Moreover the chronicle also provides important information on the unusual cult of martyrs that formed around the crusaders killed during the capture of the city in 1147.

One of the outstanding features of the account of the capture of Lisbon provided in the *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi* is the unease many participants felt when applying holy war precepts to the attack. By 1188 such doubts had vanished. In the later Portuguese account of the action the crusaders attacked, 'without concern for the present life...so great was their love of God'; when they sustained casualties, these deaths were described as martyrdom.⁷⁶ One of the fallen crusaders, Henry the German, was singled out as a 'soldier of Christ' at whose graveside miracles were worked even before the city fell. Two of these miracles are of particular interest because they were also mentioned in the *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, but in quite different terms.⁷⁷

The anonymous Anglo-Norman crusader recalled the healing of two mutes, but it is the author of the *Indiculum foundationis* who adds that the fortunate youths were sitting vigil at Henry's tomb and there received a vision of the martyr bearing the symbols of pilgrimage. Both authors also described a terrifying portent in which the bread broken at mass oozed blood as if it was flesh. The Anglo-Norman author interpreted this as a divine warning to the more bloodthirsty of the crusaders, whose covetous nature had overcome their religious motivation. Thirty years later a more satisfying explanation had emerged. When the troubled clergy investigated further the source of the 'blood' was eventually traced to a store of discoloured grain. Since this

⁷⁶ *Indiculum foundationis*, p. 91b.

⁷⁷ *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 133-5.

grain had been the gift of a recently killed crusader, the miraculously bleeding bread could now be interpreted as a sign of his martyrdom.⁷⁸

After the city was captured churches were constructed at both the English and German cemeteries: Santa Maria dos Mártires and St Vincent de Fora respectively. Miracles continued, and they were miracles that had a definite crusading aspect to them. The most sensational of these came when a supplicant, presumably returning from Jerusalem, placed a palm frond as an offering at Henry's grave. Since this frond was the symbol of a crusader it found special favour with the martyr, becoming first green then sprouting into a complete tree. The sick soon found that the foliage had healing properties, and by the time the chronicle was written eager hands had completely destroyed the wondrous plant.⁷⁹

While it is difficult to imagine a more effective piece of crusading propaganda, the degree to which such beliefs were actually held by the wider Portuguese community is less clear. The descriptions of the same miracles in such diverse works as *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi* and *Indiculum foundationis* suggest they quickly gained wide currency, both in Portugal and further afield. Yet the monastery of St Vincent de Fora and the church of Santa Maria dos Mártires retained a certain aloofness from the indigenous population, for both institutions were conspicuously staffed and frequented by foreigners. Portuguese involvement in the early decades was limited to high court officials working at the behest of the king.⁸⁰ Perhaps the most important impact of the monastery and the nearby Santa Maria dos Mártires was the constant visible symbol they presented of the spiritual dimension to the pursuit of holy war.

By the beginning of the thirteenth century there are further indications that Latin Christian concepts of holy war and crusade had been accepted by many Portuguese. While there are few concrete examples of known Portuguese crusaders, it appears that many did seek to mandate warfare by fighting under the cross. A bull sent by Pope Celestine III explicitly authorised the granting of crusading indulgences to those seeking to attack the Muslims, without mentioning any specific location or campaign.⁸¹ Similarly, among the concessions wrung from King Sancho by his bishops in 1210 was

⁷⁸ *Indiculum foundationis*, p. 92a.

⁷⁹ *Indiculum foundationis*, pp. 92b-3a.

⁸⁰ The early abbots of the monastery are listed down to the apparently locally born Pelayo, who was still in office in 1188, *Indiculum foundationis*, p. 93b.

⁸¹ 'qui volunt impugnare paganos, cruces imponere et penitentias sollemnes iniungere tibi volumus pagina presenti licere.' PP, p. 369.

an exemption from any obligation to accompany the army on military campaigns. The desire to avoid danger and discomfort provided a strong motivation for this clerical demand, but it also suggests an eagerness to remain above secular wrangling and perhaps also a growing doubt over the suitability of any clerical sanctioning of warfare between Christians. Such an impression is strengthened by the significant caveat placed on the bishops' new exemption, for they were obliged to accompany the army in the event of a Muslim attack on the kingdom.⁸²

By the thirteenth century Portuguese society had adopted those aspects of the crusade most useful in their own situation. This judicious acceptance of militant ideology was also displayed in changing articulations of the reconquest. Even as the notion of crusade was finding increasing acceptance among the Portuguese, the idea of the reconquest appears to have fallen into disuse. In the wake of the capture of Lisbon there is scant evidence that the Portuguese continued to look to the distant past to justify their expansionist ambitions. Occasional *forais*, such as that granted to Évora in 1166, mentioned that a city was taken from the Muslims, but there is little sense of a recapture of ancestral lands.⁸³ Similarly, even those chronicles, notably the *Indiculum foundationis*, which display an extreme triumphalism over holy war, contain no suggestion of the recapturing of land long denied. When Afonso Henriques petitioned heaven for aid in the conquest of Lisbon, he asked that the city be granted, not restored, to the Christian peoples.⁸⁴ Nor is it to be wondered at that the reconquest ideal dwindled in Portugal, emphasising as it did the imperial authority of a single emperor. Any benefits that might accrue to Portuguese kings from recourse to the past were more than outweighed by the political liabilities of such an acknowledgement.⁸⁵ Appeals to holy war and the unity of Christendom, on the other hand, had no such drawback.

During the reign of King Sancho there was a gradual reorientation of Portuguese society from a continental to an Atlantic aspect. Older institutions of Latin Christian influence gradually adapted themselves to regional circumstances, while newer cultural models became inspirations for local innovation. There are indications that the

⁸² 'nangram vadant in fossatum neque in aliquam aliam expeditionem nisi contra mauros si venerint super regnum nostrum.' DDS, p. 309.

⁸³ 'volumus restaurare atque populare Elboram que a sarracenis abstulimus.' Évora (1166), PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, p. 392.

⁸⁴ 'Si dominus deus noster tradens tradiderit seruis suis civitatem hanc...' *Indiculum foundationis*, p. 91b.

⁸⁵ Different notions of the past in the peripheral Iberian kingdoms are noted by Raymond McCluskey, 'Mallorca accounts: Views of the Past in Twelfth-Century Iberia', in P. Magdalino (ed.), *The Perception of the Past in Twelfth-Century Europe* (London: Hambledon Press, 1992), pp. 221-3.

Portuguese were coming to understand the concepts of exclusion and identity by which Latin Christendom defined itself, but they were also able to select those aspects of Latin culture most attractive and useful within their own frontier society. This was true both of institutions and of ideologies. Thus, greater communication with Latin Christendom had the overall effect of increasing local Portuguese cultural confidence. Yet this growing confidence also exacerbated a new tension developing between secular and ecclesiastical authority.

Chapter Nine

Shifting priorities: Portuguese relations with the papacy at the beginning of the thirteenth century

During the twelfth century a careful embrace of Latin Christian influences brought significant advantages to Portuguese rulers, yet these benefits were not without price. Afonso Henriques (1128-1185) made many concessions to the Church in order to secure papal support in his bid for a crown; his successors soon found the resulting ecclesiastical power incompatible with their own policies for a centralised royal authority. Although the Portuguese kings were initially able to obstruct papal interference by appealing to the needs of frontier defence, as the century waned such tactics were undermined by a changing concept of crusade in Latin Christendom. During the long pontificate of Innocent III (1198-1216), ecclesiastical theorists increasingly emphasised the importance of the religious over the military aspects of the crusade. One implication of this changing attitude was the growing belief that success in holy war could only be guaranteed by secular obedience to clerical direction. Impelled by this conviction, the papacy intervened in the affairs of kings with a greater frequency than ever before. Understandably, Iberian leaders came to resent such interference, none more deeply than King Sancho of Portugal (1185-1211). By the end of the first decade of the thirteenth century, the stage was set for a bitter confrontation between royal and ecclesiastical authority.

By far the most important evidence for the struggle between the Church and the crown are the many letters dispatched between Rome and Portugal.¹ The rising tide of confrontation generated a storm of papal warnings and commands; royal replies ranged from the obstinate, even openly hostile, to the conciliatory. Although these letters tell a fragmentary and frequently one-sided story on particular events, they nevertheless present highly detailed snapshots of the conflict. Yet the social turbulence that produced this remarkable series of communiqués also imposed serious constraints upon other sources surviving from the period. Perhaps because clergymen bore the brunt of this

¹ The most important collection of papal letters is *Bulário Português Inocência III (1198-1216)*, ed. A. de Jesus da Costa and M. A. Fernandes Marques (Coimbra: Instituto Nacional de Investigação Científica, 1989). The majority of royal correspondences are collected by R. de Azevedo, A. de Jesus da Costa, and M. R. Pereira, (eds) *Documentos de D. Sancho I (1174-1211)* (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, 1979) [DDS].

political upheaval, historical writing in Portugal entered a period of decline that lasted until the end of the thirteenth century. The modern historian is increasingly reliant on chronicles written outside Portugal, either in Spain or even further afield.²

Relations between Portugal and the papacy during Sancho's reign have seldom attracted the attention they warrant. One reason why the long and debilitating struggle between the king and his clergy has proved discouraging for local historians, particularly those from the traditional Portuguese interpretative schools, has been the very ambiguity of the confrontation. Those writers engaged in bolstering the image of the monarchy have generally found the king's abject failure to maintain royal authority an episode best ignored. Yet the nature of the victory, with the clergy taking advantage of the fears of a dying king, was not a triumph Church apologists sought to highlight. Even historians outside Portugal, or those Portuguese historians uncommitted to either ecclesiastical or monarchist schools, have been slow to redress this neglect.³

This has been an unfortunate omission. While Afonso Henriques is frequently portrayed as the father of the kingdom, there is strong justification in applying that epithet to Sancho. As has been observed, an important corollary of Sancho's programme of regional development was the creation of mutual interest between the urban centres of the kingdom. In the ecclesiastical sphere too, there are indications of the formation of a wider sense of identity linking disparate socio-economic groups together into a broader political unit. A strongly positioned monarchy appeared to be approaching the point where it could weld the kingdom together under royal authority. Then, as this process appeared inexorably underway, it was halted by a series of unexpected, largely personal events within the royal household. The resulting victory for the papacy was contrary to emerging social trends and so could only provoke deeper conflict. This collision of determination and chance was a watershed event in the history of Portugal and deserves far more attention than it has heretofore received.

² Primarily Archbishop Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada of Toledo, *Historia de Rebus Hispanie sive Historia Gothica*, ed. J. Fernández Valverde, CCCM, 72 (Turnhout, 1987) in Spain; and Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, ed. W. Stubbs, 4 vols (London: Rolls Series, 1868-71) in England.

³ Portuguese examinations of this question include Alexandre Herculano, *História de Portugal desde o começo da monarquia até o fim do reinado de Afonso III*, ed. J. Mattoso, 4 vols (Lisbon: Bertrand Editora, 1989), vol. 2; and Fortunato de Almeida, *História da Igreja em Portugal*, 2nd ed., 4 vols (Oporto: Portugalense Editora, 1967-1971), 1, pp. 360-77. A more recent study is José Antunes, António Resende de Oliveira, and João Gouveia Monteiro, 'Conflitos políticos no reino de Portugal entre a Reconquista e a Expansão: estado do questão', *Revista de História das Ideias*, 6 (1984), 29-47. For significant works by non-Portuguese authors see below, n. 17.

When conflict between the papacy and the Portuguese monarchy erupted, Sancho's initial position seemed a strong one: he enjoyed great wealth, political dominance, and relative freedom from external threat. Fortune played against him, however, and when his health began to deteriorate so too did his resistance to the spiritual authority of the Church. Meanwhile, with Latin Christian attitudes to holy war changing and the reconquest becoming less effective as a lever in negotiations with the papacy, royal interest in the frontier waned. While Portuguese elements took part in the decisive Christian victory at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212, royal involvement was limited and in the aftermath of victory the position of the Portuguese monarchy was, if anything, even weaker.

Obligations deferred: Sancho's early relations with the papacy (1185-1198)

During the first decade of King Sancho's reign the Portuguese monarch was able to maintain a productive, if occasionally turbulent, relationship with the papacy. To ensure his own authority Sancho still required the legitimisation only Rome could provide. Papal policy aimed to unify the Iberian monarchs in the face of a resurgent Islam. To this end, successive popes allowed the kings wide latitude and were generally satisfied with vague professions of obedience. Where serious dispute arose, its cause was papal authority over spiritual matters coming into conflict with Iberian power politics, most explosively in the vexed question of consanguinous royal marriages. Yet here too, the papacy ultimately proved willing to reach accommodation with the kings in the interest of frontier defence.

In his first extant communication with the Rome, during the pontificate of Urban III (1185-1187), Sancho found it politic to emphasise his military role and acknowledge the importance of papal support with profuse expressions of loyalty.⁴ Three years later Pope Clement III (1187-1191), though distracted by the loss of Jerusalem and frenzied plans to organise a crusade, found time in May 1190 to reissue *Manifestis probatum*, and thereby reinforce the relationship between the papacy and the

⁴ The exact date of this petition for confirmation of the status of the royal monastery at Santa Cruz is uncertain, but would fall between January 1186, when the king confirmed the monastery's possessions, and May 1187, the month Pope Urban died. Sancho states his intended relationship with the papacy thus: 'Noverit sanctitas vestra me militem vestrum et Curie Romane devotumque filium esse velle sicut pater meus vestrorum extitit predecessorem vestramque admodum benedictionem promereri desiderantem, magnitudini vestre in omnibus obedientiam exhibendo.' DDS, p. 35.

Portuguese throne.⁵ Sancho acknowledged this relationship by publicly espousing the crusading cause, and if he did not himself take the cross, he certainly presided over a renewed offensive against the Almohads in southern Portugal.⁶

Yet even as Sancho was playing the role the papacy had assigned to him, he was also making subtle efforts to consolidate his own authority. One symbol of the subordination of the Portuguese throne to Rome was the payment of tribute. Under the provisions of Afonso Henriques' agreement with Pope Alexander III (1159-1181), in return for an acknowledgement of royal status, Henriques had agreed to pay an annual census of two marks of gold. On his accession to the throne Sancho allowed this tribute to lapse. Royal resistance appears to have been motivated by political rather than financial concerns, with Sancho disliking the implication of dependency inherent in this payment.⁷ Clement III (1187-1191) raised the question of the tribute, but Sancho prevaricated by claiming that the large cash grant made to the papacy in his father's will constituted an advance payment. There the matter rested until the end of the century. Only in 1198, when Pope Innocent insisted on the meeting of this obligation, did Sancho grudgingly make a partial payment.⁸ This eventual agreement seems to have resulted from Sancho's recognition of the value of papal support in the turbulent world of Iberian politics.⁹

The circumspect manoeuvring over the payment of tribute was completely overshadowed by the far more controversial disputes surrounding the canonical status of Iberian royal marriages. While papal interventions appear at first sight to have been a dogma-inspired attempt to impose Latin Christian standards on an unwilling Iberian society, they may also have been the result of a more pragmatic underlying policy. In 1191 King Sancho's eldest daughter, Infanta Teresa, was married to King Alfonso IX of León (1188-1230) as a means of cementing the alliance formed between the two

⁵ PP, pp. 342-3.

⁶ Sancho's military activities during this period are discussed above, pp. 197-206.

⁷ The final amount paid by Sancho was 504 morabitanos. Modern historians have estimated this sum represented two decades accrued tribute, e.g. Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 13 vols (Lisbon: Editorial Verbo, 1977), 1, p. 114. This seems to overestimate by a factor of five. In 1213 Sancho's successor, Afonso II (1211-1223), made a similar payment to Pope Innocent. The receipt explicitly states that 3,360 morabitanos equaled fifty-six marks of gold, or tribute for twenty-eight years. At this exchange rate of sixty morabitanos to the mark, 506 morabitanos is less than eight and a half marks, or about four years' tribute. For Sancho's payment, *Bulário*, pp. 42-4; PL 214: 419, 424-5; for that of his successor: *Bulário*, p. 355.

⁸ *Bulário*, p. 5; PL 214: 87-8.

monarchs.¹⁰ Almost immediately the marriage attracted the censure of Pope Celestine III (1191-1198), who declared the match uncanonical and ordered an annulment.¹¹ When the couple resisted, both Portugal and León were placed under interdict and they themselves were excommunicated.¹² By 1194 the pressure had become too great and the kings were forced to negotiate an agreement dissolving the marriage. Within two years Teresa had returned to Portugal.¹³

There are grounds for questioning the degree to which canonical issues alone prompted Celestine's opposition to the marriage. The alliance between Portugal and León had important strategic implications in the peninsula, and was part of a wider attempt by the Leonese king to encircle and isolate his Castilian rival by also negotiating agreements with the kings of Aragon and Navarre. Contemporary writers certainly suspected that the urgings of Alfonso VIII of Castile (1158-1214) lay behind the pope's intractability.¹⁴ Such a suspicion is corroborated by the events immediately following this enforced separation. A fragile peace brokered between the Iberian kings was shattered after the Castilian defeat at Alarcos in 1195. In alliance with the victorious Almohads the Leonese king attacked Castile, and was once again excommunicated as a result. Sancho of Portugal, now opposing his former son-in-law, obtained crusading privileges in a reprisal attack that led to the Portuguese occupation of Túy.¹⁵ Order was only restored by another marriage, this time between Alfonso of León and Infanta Berenguera, the daughter of Alfonso VIII of Castile. While this second match was no less consanguinous than the earlier marriage with Teresa, Celestine allowed it to stand. The reason for the pope's new flexibility was pure expediency, albeit expediency of the most positive sort: '*pro bono pacis*'.¹⁶

⁹ *Bulário*, p. 23; PL 214: 214. J. F. O'Callaghan, 'Innocent III and the Kingdoms of Castile and León', in J. C. Moore (ed.), *Pope Innocent and his World* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), p. 327 suggests that Sancho felt threatened by an arrangement of the Castilian and Leonese kings against him.

¹⁰ Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 7. 24, pp. 246-7.

¹¹ Much of this unrest arose from a critical difference between Iberian and Latin Christian definitions of consanguinity. Traditional Spanish interpretations allowed nine degrees of relationship, while the Latin Christian sought to limit legal marriages to seven degrees. Peter Linehan, *History and the Historians of Medieval Spain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 252-9.

¹² The severity of Celestine's measures are known only from a 1199 letter by Innocent III, who took them as a precedent. PL 214: 610-15; *Bulário*, pp. 60-1.

¹³ DDS, pp. 113-5.

¹⁴ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, ed. W. Stubbs, 4 vols (London: Rolls Series, 1868-1871), p. 685.

¹⁵ Celestine excommunicated the king of León, released his subjects from their allegiance, and proclaimed a crusade against him. PP, p. 376. See also O'Callaghan, 'Innocent III and the Kingdoms of Castile and León', p. 319.

¹⁶ The phrase is Roger of Hoveden's, *Chronica*, 3, p. 90.

During the first decade of Sancho's rule relations between the Portuguese crown and the papacy were characterised by a reasonable level of good-will on both sides. In return for ostensible obedience, Rome was prepared to allow secular rulers a wide latitude so long as their actions did not undermine the defence of the frontier. Even the canonical rules for marriage could sometimes be used as tools for securing concrete strategic advantage. While kings who were temporarily disadvantaged might resist such a policy, the ground-rules were understandable to them all. Moreover, the same rules that brought disadvantage in one circumstance, could as easily be turned to advantage at another time. Thus the resistance of secular rulers was not implacable. Yet Celestine did not live to see the dawning of a new century; and his successor was to bring dramatic change to papal relations with the Iberian kings.

Innocent III and the Iberian frontier

The elevation of the energetic Innocent III to the throne of St Peter on 8 January 1198 brought to an end the comfortable relationship between the papacy and the Iberian kings.¹⁷ Far from being disinterested in the frontier, Innocent exceeded most of his predecessors in crusading zeal. Yet this same zeal prompted the pope to increase, rather than lessen, his demands on secular leaders. Moreover, because Innocent conceived of the crusade as a clash of faiths far more than a clash of arms, victory required strong clerical leadership and strict secular obedience. By forcefully imposing this conception of frontier warfare, Innocent collided with the more pragmatic Iberian view that security required effective, independent royal leadership. In Portugal, the conflict between Sancho's plans for royal consolidation of power and Innocent's insistence on ecclesiastical autonomy led to a bitter confrontation.

One of Innocent's first actions on coming to power was to question his predecessor's acceptance of the Leonese-Castilian marriage alliance. Despite the desire of the Spanish kings and the majority of their bishops to maintain this stabilising

¹⁷ While C. Morris, *The Papal Monarchy. The Western Church from 1050-1250* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 413-51, provides a useful overview of Innocent's pontificate, relations with the Iberian peninsula are left largely unexplored. A closer study of Innocent's crusading ideology is found in J. M. Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade, 1213-1221* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), pp. 17-30. See also D. Mansilla, 'Inocencio III y los reinos hispanos', *Anthologica Annua*, 2 (1954), 9-49; and more recently, in addition to J. F. O'Callaghan's previously cited 'Innocent III and the Kingdoms of Castile and Leon', see A. García y García 'Innocent III and the Kingdom of Castile', also in J. C. Moore (ed.), *Pope Innocent and his World*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 337-52.

arrangement, Innocent declared the marriage uncanonical.¹⁸ A decision with such wide-reaching ramifications was quickly challenged, and a contingent of Castilian and Leonese clergymen attempted to change Innocent's mind. The arguments they raised in support of pragmatism over strict legal interpretation rested heavily on the needs of frontier defence.¹⁹ Yet Innocent rejected this petition angrily, reminding the bishops that sins committed by the king rebounded on his subjects.²⁰ What did the pope mean by this? While it has been suggested Innocent believed that the suffering of the people constituted a divine goad to prick the conscience of the king, a more direct relationship is also possible.²¹

Innocent was indefatigable in his efforts to organise the financial and political support required for the recapture of the Holy Land.²² It had long been assumed that a special sanctity was required of the crusaders themselves if success was to be achieved. In the wake of the disaster at Hattin in 1187 and the loss of Jerusalem to the victorious Saladin this belief was extended to encompass the whole Christian community. The arms-bearing soldiery came to be seen as only one factor in the success or failure of crusading enterprises, for the burden for the defence of Christendom must be shouldered by the entire society. This mode of thinking reached its zenith during the pontificate of Innocent III. As Christoph Maier observes:

¹⁸ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, 4, p. 79, believed King Alfonso of León offered the in-coming Pope Innocent 20,000 silver marks and 200 men for a year in defence of Christendom if the match was ratified. Linehan, *History and the Historians of Medieval Spain*, p. 258, n. 43, notes in support of Roger's claim that in the bull *Etsi necesse sit* (May 1199), advising the Spanish clergy of the sentence of interdict, Innocent included a congratulatory note to his legate, Rainier, for refusing any 'gifts'.

¹⁹ 'quoniam cum per exhortationes et remissiones ecclesie Hispaniarum populus consuevisset ad expugnationem paganorum induci, cessante predicatorum officio, populi etiam devotio tepescebat; quia cum se cum principe suo, quoad interdictum, eidem videret pene subjectum, a culpa, cui vel tacendo consenserat, forte se non credebat immunem; propter quod minus circa debellationem sarracenorum fervebat, ne decederet in peccato.' *Bulário*, p. 62; PL 214: 612.

²⁰ '...quia cum David in populi numeratione peccasset, Dominus in populum vasa sui furoris effudit, unde idem David dixisse legitur, peccatum suum Domino confitendo: <<ego sum qui peccavi, ego qui inique egi; isti, qui oves sunt, quid fecerunt? Auferatur, obsecro, facies tua, Domine, a populo tuo>> [2 Sam 24.17]'. *Bulário*, p. 62; PL 214: 613.

²¹ That the suffering of the people should force contrition upon the king is suggested by P. D. Clark, 'Innocent III, canon law, and the punishment of the guiltless', in J. C. Moore (ed.), *Pope Innocent III and his World*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), pp. 281-3; and by the same author, 'Peter the Chanter, Innocent III and theological views on collective guilt and punishment', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 52: 1 (2001), pp. 9-10.

²² Innocent's most complete expression of his concept of crusade is presented in the sermon, *Ad liberandam*, preached at the Fourth Lateran Council in November 1215. An English translation of this sermon is provided in L. and J. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades. Idea and Reality, 1095-1274* (London: Edward Arnold, 1981), pp. 124-8.

According to Innocent's theological concept of the crusade, only a society which was properly organized for participation in the crusade, in which everybody contributed to the business of the cross, could sway God's favour and ensure the success of the movement.²³

One rationale, therefore, for the wide-ranging re-ordering of Church and society undertaken during this period was the successful prosecution of holy war. Such a change in attitude had dramatic implications for future papal relations with Iberia.

Under this formulation of holy war the correct moral behaviour of Spanish society, particularly its leaders, was of fundamental importance to military success. Only by obedience to sacred laws could Christians hope to attract the favour of God and thereby secure victory. Moreover Innocent envisaged a central, active role for churchmen in protecting the frontier. A reformed, devout and independent clergy was, if anything, more critical to defence than castles or knights. Because secular obedience to clerical authority was seen as the crucial prerequisite for victory, the use of the threat of Islam in pleas for papal leniency received a less sympathetic hearing from Innocent than from his predecessors precisely because of his personal enthusiasm for the crusade. A disparity grew between papal and local views of the nature of frontier warfare. Such discordance could only increase tensions and exacerbate future conflicts: certainly this proved to be the case in Portugal.

The final decade of Sancho's reign brought a sharp deterioration in relations between Portugal and the papacy. Growing wealth and authority encouraged Sancho into greater defiance toward papal injunctions. Disputes over the Gordian Knot of Iberian ecclesiastical boundaries were merely a prologue for a far more heated confrontation. Sancho's consistent interventions in Church affairs and attempts to limit clerical privilege drew him into direct conflict with some of his most senior clergymen. Sancho proved to be an implacable opponent until failing health sapped his resolve: the result was total capitulation, and disaster for the cause of centralised monarchy.

²³ C. T. Maier, 'Mass, the Eucharist, and the cross: Innocent III and the relocation of the Crusade', in J. C. Moore (ed.), *Pope Innocent III and his World* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), p. 355. For the increasing use of liturgy and prayer in support of distant crusading operations see by the same author 'Crisis, liturgy,

The ecclesiastical re-organisation of northwestern Iberia

One of Innocent's early priorities was a large scale overhaul of the administrative structure of the Spanish church. Iberian ecclesiastical organisation had developed as an uneasy fusion of Visigothic traditions and post-reconquest developments: the result was a pattern of suffragan bishoprics owing allegiance to metropolitans widely separated by geography and political borders. In 1199 Innocent attempted to settle some of the most pressing outstanding issues, including the allegiance of the strategically sensitive border see of Zamora and the allocation of dependent sees to Braga and Compostela. Although Innocent's conclusions have puzzled modern commentators, the resulting arrangements were in accordance with his overall Iberian policy. Yet these arrangements also ran contrary to Portuguese hopes and so triggered the first rumbles of royal resistance.

Richard Fletcher has aptly titled the long and acrimonious dispute conducted by Compostela, Braga and Toledo 'The Zamora Imbroglia'.²⁴ On 5 July 1199 Innocent approached the problem by forwarding a letter outlining the long history of the debate, culminating in an implicit acceptance of the Compostelan claim by giving Braga leave to appeal against it.²⁵ Yet any case the Bragan representatives might make was almost immediately undermined by the pope's next decision. When Braga requested the confirmation of a crucial bull promulgated by Pope Eugenius, Innocent admitted the document was genuine, but denied it was binding on the proceedings.²⁶ With their cause thus undermined, the Bragan clergy appear to have abandoned the case. Zamora passed under the control of Compostela, where indeed it remains to the present day.

While the fate of Zamora would certainly have irked Sancho, further papal decisions on the allocation of Portuguese sees were far more detrimental to the royal cause. In June 1199 Innocent broached the issue with a bull delineating the parameters and history of the problem.²⁷ The following month reorganisation began in earnest with a letter forwarded to Archbishop Pedro Suárez of Compostela (1173-1206), confirming

and the crusade in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 48: 4 (1997), 628-58.

²⁴ Richard Fletcher, *The Episcopate in the Kingdom of León in the Twelfth Century* (Oxford: UP, 1978), pp. 195-203.

²⁵ *Bulário*, pp. 74-9; PL 214: 657-62.

²⁶ For Eugenius' letter concerning Zamora: PP, p. 218. Innocent's reaction to the Bragan request for confirmation is significant: 'litteras quasdam in predecessorum nostrorum regestis inventas bulla nostra duximus roborandas, non ex hoc auctoritatem eis aliam impendentes, nisi quod eas esse autenticas perhibemus...' *Bulário*, p. 81.

²⁷ *Bulário*, pp. 66-7.

his right to the obedience of the bishops of Lisbon and Évora.²⁸ Less than a fortnight later four more bulls were sent to Portugal. Archbishop Martinho Pires of Braga (1189-1209) was advised that while the dioceses of Coimbra and Viseu were to remain under Bragan control, Lisbon, Évora, Lamego and Idanha (Guarda) would pass to his rival. Pope Innocent added a warning not to allow local interests to compromise these decisions.²⁹ Another letter was sent to the bishops of Lisbon, Évora and Lamego, and the clergy and people of Guarda ordering them all to offer their obedience to Compostela.³⁰ A final bull was issued to the non-Portuguese suffragans of Braga, the bishops of Lugo, Astorga, Mondego, Orense and Táy, ordering them to intervene with both the archbishop of Braga and King Sancho himself to ensure the bishops of Lamego, Lisbon, Évora and Guarda recognised the authority of Compostela.³¹ Pope Innocent was correct to anticipate resistance from both clerical and secular interests in Portugal. In December 1200 the pope was obliged to forward another series of letters to Portugal. These bulls reiterated the decisions reached the previous year, while the bishops of Lugo, Astorga, Mondego, Orense and Táy were this time authorised to excommunicate the king should he continue obstructing papal policy.³²

When the dust had settled Braga commanded the obedience of the Portuguese bishops in Oporto, Coimbra, and Lamego; and the Leonese sees of Lugo, Astorga, Mondoñedo, Orense and Táy. Compostela held the obedience of the Portuguese sees of Lisbon, Guarda, and Évora; the Leonese bishops of Zamora, Coria, Salamanca, and Ciudad Rodrigo; and the bishop of Castilian Ávila.³³ Innocent justified this allocation through historical arguments, modern commentators have by and large accepted this explanation and criticised the results as an anachronistic imposition supported by neither geography nor political realities.³⁴ Certainly from an Iberian perspective this

²⁸ *Bulário*, pp. 69; PL 214: 653-6.

²⁹ 'Provideas igitur ne per potentiam regiam vel alia qualibet maquinatione impediatur episcopi memorati et predicti clerus et populi obedientiam secundum sententiam et preceptum nostrum eidem Compostellano archiepiscopo, ut prediximus, exhibere...' *Bulário*, pp. 92-3; PL 214: 689. For the second letter to Braga: *Bulário*, pp. 82-3; PL 214: 680-8.

³⁰ *Bulário*, pp. 93-4; PL 214: 689-90.

³¹ *Bulário*, pp. 94-5; PL 214: 690.

³² The bull states quite bluntly: 'Quod si rex [Sancius] Portugalie impediatur prelatos sui regni subditos archiepiscopo Compostelano eidem archiepiscopo exhibere obedientiam et reverentiam, excommunicationis sententiam non defferant innodare.' *Bulário*, p. 150. For other repeat letters, *Bulário*, pp. 150-1.

³³ Cf. Fletcher, *The Episcopate in the Kingdom of León*, p. 136. Note, however, that Fletcher omits Guarda, as it did not have a bishop until the thirteenth century.

³⁴ A characteristic opinion is that of Carl Erdmann, *Das Papsttum und Portugal im ersten Jahrhundert der portugiesischen Geschichte* (Berlin: Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,

distribution appears nonsensical, yet forcing the local clergy to forge links across secular political boundaries had specific advantages for the papacy.

Although Innocent claimed to be following venerable custom in his distribution of suffragans, on other occasions he displayed no compunction in overturning the pronouncements of earlier popes or ignoring inconvenient Iberian tradition. In his judgement on the allegiance of Zamora, for example, Innocent was more than willing to set aside his predecessors' decisions without explanation.³⁵ Despite this, there were those in Spain who, in common with later observers, saw in Innocent's handling of the organisation of metropolitans a return to the customs of an earlier time. Archbishop Rodrigo of Toledo seized this perceived opportunity to further his own dignity by resurrecting the long-moribund issue of the Toledan primacy. Yet his efforts attracted no papal encouragement, with his first request being tactfully delayed by Innocent in 1211.³⁶ Subsequent sallies, including a sensational tirade at the Fourth Lateran council in 1215 and again the following year at Rome, were similarly fruitless. Throughout his pontificate Innocent refused to render a clear judgement; nor was his successor Honorius III (1216-1227) more receptive to Toledan claims. Significantly, the reason given by both popes for their prevarication was their unwillingness to offend any of the Iberian kings.³⁷ Why then was Innocent prepared to antagonise these same kings over the issue of suffragan bishops?

One possible answer lies in the role Innocent intended the bishops to play in his wider dealing with the peninsula. A pillar of papal policy was the maintenance of a Church independent of secular influence and regional entanglements; the disposition of suffragans in north-western Iberia seems intended to facilitate this. The relationship between metropolitan and suffragan had been a ceremonial and largely symbolic one; Innocent sought to change this by imposing on the archbishops significant new duties in their dependant sees.³⁸ Under Innocent's leadership clergymen throughout Christendom

Phil.-hist. Klasse Nr. 5, 1928); trans. by J. A. Providência Costa as *O Papado e Portugal no Primeiro Século da História Portuguesa* (Coimbra: Publicações do Instituto Alemão, 1935), p. 77: 'Esta divisão, apesar-de geográfica e politicamente absurda, manteve-se 200 annos, ate que finalment as confusões do grande cisma ocidental obrigaram a uma renovação baseada nas fronteiras políticas.'

³⁵ See above, n. 26.

³⁶ *Bulário*, p. 305; PL 216: 423.

³⁷ For a detailed account of this phase of the long controversy see Linehan, *History and the Historians*, pp. 328-37.

³⁸ Fletcher, *The Episcopate*, pp. 140-1 suggests: 'Metropolitans wanted a following of loyal and obedient suffragans, but the rights they claimed to exercise over them were few, being limited in practice to consecration and the taking of a profession of obedience.'

were encouraged, then later obliged, to take a more active pastoral and administrative role.³⁹ In Spain this included pursuing their duties across secular borders and thus becoming visible symbols of ecclesiastical neutrality. In north-western Iberia Innocent encouraged the development of this function by forcing an agreement between the archbishops of Braga and Compostela guaranteeing the rights of visitation. The pope also ensured such visitations did not become an opportunity for provocative ostentation or divisive displays of parochial pride.⁴⁰ For the bishops to be effective in a mediating role, their neutrality had to be emphasised wherever possible, and so Innocent was wary of allowing any clergyman to accrue disproportionate personal authority. Thus Archbishop Rodrigo's hopes for a renewal of the primacy were in vain; and even more modest attempts at concentrating ecclesiastical authority upon individuals failed. Thus when King Alfonso of Castile requested legatine powers for the bishop-elect of Palencia, Innocent chose instead to entrust authority to a clerical committee.⁴¹ Innocent consistently sought to force the Iberian clergy to act across the boundaries of kingdoms and wherever possible prevented them from forwarding narrow regional agendas.

The tasks Innocent set the Iberian bishops provide further indication of the role he envisaged for the Iberian clergy. When there was a need to threaten King Sancho with excommunication due to his resistance to papal decisions over the distribution of dependent sees, the invidious task was delegated to the Leonese suffragans of Braga who, despite having a legitimate standing in proceedings through their relations with the Portuguese metropolitan, were far less susceptible to intimidation from the Portuguese king.⁴² Clergymen were also able to take a more positive role as mediators between rival secular leaders, and this function was enhanced by their having responsibilities in more than one kingdom. Thus in March 1206 the archbishops of Compostela and Toledo, along with the bishops of Coimbra and Tarazona were charged

³⁹ This determination can be seen most clearly at the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, where Innocent's second sermon dealt with the intended role of bishops. Brendan Bolton, 'A show with a meaning: Innocent III's approach to the Fourth Lateran council, 1215', in B. Bolton, *Innocent III: Studies on Papal Authority and Pastoral Care* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1995), XI, p. 62. Although the pope's sermon was disrupted by disputing bishops, the text has been preserved. PL 217: 679-88.

⁴⁰ Innocent insisted on official cross-border visits by archbishops in July 1199, *Bulario*, p. 80; PL 214: 663. In July 1207 the archbishop of Compostela was ordered to follow the mores of the regions he travelled through when making official visits. *Bulario*, p. 245.

⁴¹ Significantly this committee consisted of the Archbishop of Toledo, and the bishops of Zamora, Coimbra and Tarazona. Thus all kingdoms and metropolitans were represented. *Bulario*, p. 294; PL 216: 380-1.

⁴² See above, n. 32.

with mediating between the kings of León and Castile over a territorial dispute.⁴³ Five years later the Spanish clergy were ordered to intervene yet more forcefully to maintain Christian unity, with Innocent authorising the excommunication of monarchs undermining the peace.⁴⁴

Although Innocent's arrangement of ecclesiastical administration in north-western Iberia has been criticised as inconsistent with secular borders, the papal perspective was quite different. An independent clergy was central to Innocent's plans for ecclesiastical and social reform. Innocent encouraged clerical independence by maintaining what many have seen as archaic and outmoded organisational relationships in Portugal and León. This clerical freedom of action could then be used to enforce obedience on secular governments. As with so much else in his Iberian policy, Innocent pointed to the Muslim threat on the frontier to justify these interventions.⁴⁵ If in the long run Innocent believed his policies were vindicated by the Christian victory at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212, the price was severely strained relations with secular rulers. Nowhere was the growing tension between royal and ecclesiastical authority more pronounced than in Portugal.

King Sancho and the Portuguese bishops: personal animosity or a clash of ideas?

During the early years of his reign Sancho was obliged to maintain cordial relations with his clergy. But as his authority and confidence increased, these relations grew increasingly strained. In the final years of Sancho's reign smouldering royal irritation with ecclesiastical policy burst into open conflict between the king and two of his leading prelates, Bishop Martinho Rodrigues of Oporto (1191-1235) and Bishop Pedro Soares of Coimbra (1192-1233). Modern commentators have emphasised the local and personal animosities at work in these disputes, yet behind the confrontation there also lay the collision between a Latin Christian expectation of royal behaviour and a more

⁴³ *Bulário*, p. 230.

⁴⁴ *Bulário*, p. 293; PL 216: 379.

⁴⁵ The Muslim threat justified papal interventions between kings: 'si forte aliquis regum Hispanie cum quo predictus rex Castelle treugam vel pacem firmavit tempore quo idem rex vel filius ejus sarracenos impugnant ipsam presumpserit violare, vos eum per censuram ecclesiasticam, sublato appellationis obstaculo, compescatis.' *Bulário*, p. 293; PL 216: 379. Similarly it allowed troublesome issues to be shelved, as Archbishop Rodrigo of Toledo was bluntly told: 'Sed cum ex sarracenorum incursu grave nunc timeatur Hyspanie dispendium imminere, non oportet occasione hujusmodi primatie aliud in Hyspania modo scandalum suscitari, presertim cum tibi jus tuum minime negligenti providentiam ipsam nolimus esse dampnosam...' *Bulário*, p. 305; PL 216: 423.

traditional Iberian attitude to secular governance. While the issues in contention were those of ecclesiastical financial and legal privilege, at stake was the future role of the monarchy itself.

Sancho's interventions in local ecclesiastical affairs grew in frequency as his authority was consolidated. Initially he was able to secure his aims through long and frequently tiresome negotiations with the Church; a process that clearly tried royal patience. The dispute surrounding the status of the royal monastery of Santa Cruz was such a case. Because Santa Cruz housed his father's tomb, Sancho was particularly solicitous to its needs.⁴⁶ The bishop of Coimbra continually sought to encroach on the rights of the monastery, forcing the king to lend his support in the canons' defence. The resulting litigation reached from Coimbra to Rome and demanded a heavy investment of royal effort merely to secure the status quo.⁴⁷ Similarly, when the monks of Lorvão reneged on their agreement with Sancho to provide a suitable residence for his daughter Teresa, the outraged monarch was drawn into another unwanted distraction. Threatened by the pope for presuming to usurp the authority of the Church and intimidating the monks, the king was forced to conduct a long campaign to secure the terms of his earlier agreement.⁴⁸ Although Sancho was ultimately successful, a formal injunction against the wounding of clerics as satisfaction for injuries promulgated by the archbishop of Braga in February 1206 provides an ominous hint of dwindling royal patience with the limits and delays imposed by the Church.⁴⁹ This growing tension reached its destructive peak in a bitter struggle between the king and the bishops of Coimbra and Oporto.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Among Sancho's earliest extant documents is a petition to Pope Urban III to confirm the privileges of Santa Cruz. DDS, p. 35.

⁴⁷ Sancho diplomatically, but pointedly, prefaced his intervention in the dispute between the bishop and the canons with the observation, 'Nolo audire destructionem monasterii quod pater meus edificavit, sed vos iudicate vel dominus papa, quia istum negocium non est laicorum.' *Bulario*, p. 168. After a failed attempt to reach agreement in the royal court in 1201, Innocent charged the bishop of Zamora with the task of adjudication, who found in favour of the canons. *Bulario*, pp. 163-83.

⁴⁸ M. A. Marques, 'Inocência III e a passagem do mosteiro de Lorvão para Ordem de Cister', in M. A. Marques, *Estudos sobre a Ordem de Cister em Portugal*, (Coimbra: Edições Colibri, 1998), 127-81 and above, pp. 225-6.

⁴⁹ *Bulario*, p. 229.

⁵⁰ Unfortunately the fragmentary nature of the documents recording this struggle obscure the exact origins of the conflict and the precise order of events. The following reconstruction rests heavily on that of Antunes, 'Conflitos políticos', pp. 29ff. Portuguese historians are in general agreement over these events. Where more substantial differences are found, it is largely through the omission of important sections rather than any major reinterpretation of documents, e.g. Miguel de Oliveira, *História Eclesiástica de Portugal*, pp. 87-8.

Bishop Martinho of Oporto came from one of the most powerful of the Portuguese noble houses. His fiery temperament was too akin to the king's own for concord to be long maintained between them. The original point of dispute is unclear, but by 1208 open conflict had broken out. After Bishop Martinho declared an interdict over his diocese, Sancho arrested his brother, Pedro Rodrigues, seized episcopal assets, and obliged the bishop to flee the kingdom. Innocent instructed the bishop and dean of Zamora, along with the dean of León, to intercede with the angry monarch. Through their mediation Sancho released his prisoner, allowed the bishop's return, and made restitution to him. In return Bishop Martinho agreed to raise his interdict and to maintain concord with the king.⁵¹

This tranquil interlude proved to be a short one. In the final months of 1208 Sancho's eldest son Afonso married Urraca of Castile, daughter of King Alfonso and Eleanor of England.⁵² Once again the politics of royal marriage ran contrary to canonical prohibitions, but with the transgressions less flagrant than those of Alfonso IX of León, churchmen locally and in Rome seemed willing to overlook these complications. The bishop of Oporto was the sole exception. When the young couple visited his diocese, Bishop Martinho refused to welcome or even acknowledge them.⁵³ Whether these actions were motivated by obedience to canonical tenets or personal malice, Martinho soon found that he was ill-placed to make new enemies. His high-handedness had already alienated his own canons and the burghers of the town. Taking advantage of the king's wrath they rose up against episcopal authority, replying to his interdict by breaking open the church doors, bringing excommunicates inside, and arranging the burial of the dead themselves. The clergy were divided in their support for the bishop, and services continued in many churches. Meanwhile, city officials joined with the burghers to besiege Martinho in the episcopal palace for five months.⁵⁴ Only when Martinho submitted to the king and agreed to refrain from further trouble-making was he allowed to leave, but at the first opportunity he fled by night for Rome. His

⁵¹ *Bulário*, pp. 280-1; DDS, pp. 290-2; PL 216: 272-3.

⁵² Queen Urraca first appears in Portuguese charters in February 1209. DDS, pp. 272-3.

⁵³ The only information for these events comes from Innocent's brief to Bishop Martin of Zamora, Florencio the archdeacon, and Abbot Herbet of Morerola near Zamora. The pope warns them: 'Indignatus siquidem ei pro eo quod illicitus nati sui nuptiis interesse ac eidem transeunti per civitatem processionem facere denegavit...' *Bulário*, p. 283; PL 216: 276.

⁵⁴ '...in episcopali domo quinque pene mensibus per portarium suum et burgenses Portugalenses sic atrociter obsideri...' *Bulário*, p. 283; PL 216: 276. The depth of royal involvement is, therefore questionable. No royal soldiers are mentioned, nor is the affiliation of the gate-keeper (portarium) made clear. Sancho's role may simply have been one of inaction and behind-the-scenes encouragement.

bedraggled appearance on arrival provoked widespread sympathy, and Pope Innocent responded by speeding urgent bulls to neighbouring churchmen ordering them to attempt to intervene with the hostile King Sancho. Orders were given for widespread excommunication, both of city officials and their servants, along with a number of the leading burghers.⁵⁵

Even as the struggle with Bishop Martinho of Oporto was attracting the indignation of Rome, tension was growing between the king and another of his leading churchmen, Bishop Pedro Soares of Coimbra. The two men had come into early conflict over the rights of Santa Cruz, but in the final years of Sancho's reign their relationship became more acrimonious. Bishop Pedro was one of Rome's most active agents in Iberia and was a favoured choice when secular leaders needed to be cajoled into obedience to papal policy. Of all the Portuguese bishops, he was the most likely to feel impelled and indeed able to resist royal imposition on ecclesiastical rights.⁵⁶ According to the bishop, Sancho had appropriated ecclesiastical revenues and buildings for his own use without compensation, while also compelling clergymen to appear before secular courts and to take part in military expeditions. The bishop's continued resistance led to harassment and finally arrest, but a disguised messenger managed to escape the kingdom and reach Rome.⁵⁷ There followed a bitter correspondence between Sancho and Innocent. Sancho wrote an remarkable letter to the pontiff in which he threatened to seize the goods of the Church, wealth that had been unwisely lavished by his father, to the great detriment of those who would defend the kingdom. Papal outrage was plain.

No great prince, however powerful, unless perchance a heretic or tyrant, has ever attempted to write so irreverently or arrogantly to us or to our predecessors...⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Several are mentioned by name. Leading the list are João Album and Petrum Fedum. *Bulário*, p. 284; PL 216: 276. This list is extended to twelve ringleaders in a subsequent letter to the bishop and archdeacon of Zamora. *Bulário*, pp. 320-1.

⁵⁶ Delicate and high-profile papal business undertaken by Bishop Pedro included the negotiations in 1204 surrounding the fate of castles disputed after the annulled wedding of Berengaria of Castile and Alfonso of León, *Bulário*, pp. 213-5; PL 215: 373-6, and the imposition of peace upon all the kings on pain of excommunication in 1211, *Bulário*, pp. 293.

⁵⁷ An account of these infractions was sent to Sancho himself and a similarly phrased letter forwarded to the Archbishop Pedro of Compostela. *Bulário*, pp. 295-7; PL 216: 383-5; and *Bulário*, pp. 299-301; PL 216: 385-6.

⁵⁸ 'Sane nullus principum quantumlibet magnus nisi forsan haereticus aut tyrannus tam irreverentur et arroganter nobis aut praedecessoribus nostris scribere attentavit...' *Bulário*, pp. 296-7; PL 216: 384. The

Pope Innocent utterly rejected Sancho's complaints and insisted the goods of the Church remain inviolate. Yet the pope also displayed a certain perplexity at the Portuguese king's vehemence. Innocent attributed Sancho's hostility to the machinations of the royal chancellor Julian, for he believed this official was misrepresenting his position to the king. Thus the papal envoy was ordered to present letters to Sancho in person and explain them to him.⁵⁹ In this way Innocent hoped to avoid open conflict with the Portuguese ruler.

The pope had cause for anxiety over this expression of disobedience, even though it came from the distant edge of Christendom. Innocent's policies to limit and command secular leaders had led to conflict with monarchs on all sides; at the time Sancho was in conflict with his bishops Innocent was faced with a series of more serious threats. Innocent had supported the candidature of Otto VI as emperor, but after his coronation the new ruler of the Germans showed scant gratitude. Within a year an imperial army was menacing Rome and in March 1211 the emperor suffered excommunication.⁶⁰ King John of England was also in open defiance of Innocent's authority. As a result of John's resistance to the in-coming archbishop of Canterbury, Stephen Langton, the kingdom was put under interdict in 1208, while the king himself was excommunicated in 1209. Yet not until 1213, when Innocent threatened to release his subjects from their oaths of fealty, did John finally submit.⁶¹ While the French king was nominally obedient to the papacy, it was not a support that could be relied upon in a crisis.⁶² Nor could the Spanish monarchs be counted on as stalwarts, for they had been deeply antagonised by frequent papal interference in their affairs. By 1210, therefore, papal authority was being tested to the limit.

king's immoderate tone has been a source of some embarrassment for later Portuguese. As da Costa, *Bulário*, p. xiv, notes: '[the king] reagiu violentamente, mandando ao papa uma carta tão injuriosa e ofensiva que nunca outra semelhante tinha entrado na Cúria pontifical.' To explain this letter Sancho's sanity has been called into question. Antunes, 'Conflitos políticos', pp. 29-41.

⁵⁹ *Bulário*, p. 298; PL 216: 386-7. Interestingly Innocent made similar complaints about Latin literacy concerning Philip Augustus of France when the king flatly refused to accept papal interference in the affairs of the kingdom. PL 215: 1135-6; and 216: 36-7. See also B. Bolton, 'Philip Augustus and John: two sons in Innocent III's vineyard?', in B. Bolton, *Innocent III: Studies on Papal Authority and Pastoral Authority* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1995), V, p. 129.

⁶⁰ Morris, *The Papal Monarchy*, pp. 424-5.

⁶¹ Bolton, 'Philip Augustus and John', p. 123.

⁶² Bolton, 'Philip Augustus and John', p. 129, observes: 'Throughout his pontificate Innocent was never very sure as to Philip's real motives...'

Sancho, in contrast, suffered from none of the weaknesses that undermined other monarchs. During the first decade of the thirteenth century he was largely secure from external threat, as well as enjoying great wealth and a centralised authority. Although the bishops of Coimbra and Oporto were in opposition, they themselves could not command unconditional support from their own subordinates. Moreover, in 1209 Archbishop Martinho of Braga died, and his successor in the highest ecclesiastical office in the land, Pedro Mendes (1209-1212), was firmly behind the king.⁶³ It would appear that if any of the European monarchs could negotiate with Pope Innocent from a position of strength, it was Sancho of Portugal. Yet there was one crucial commodity which the Portuguese king lacked, and that was time.

During the final years of Sancho's reign the king suffered from the effects of a disease that ultimately proved fatal.⁶⁴ Exactly when Sancho's health began to trouble royal policy is uncertain, however in 1210 fear of mortality led the king to redraft his will.⁶⁵ In acknowledging this updated will, Innocent notes that although the disease had eroded the king's health, Sancho's mental faculties were unimpaired.⁶⁶ Yet the approach of the end, and fears of what might lie beyond, sapped the king's resistance to the Church. In a series of capitulations the king conceded virtually every issue he had for so long contended with his bishops. There was an extensive confirmation and extension of ecclesiastical rights. Notable among these was the agreement to exempt clergymen from all military service except when the kingdom faced Muslim invasion.⁶⁷ Bishop Martinho of Oporto was able to extract yet greater concessions from the dying king. The rights of the bishop over the city were confirmed, and the burghers ordered to

⁶³ Innocent was well aware of the new archbishop's loyalties and attempted to circumvent his local authority. '...ne Bracarensis electus ipsam praesumeret relaxare, vocem ad nos appellationis emisit.' *Bulário*, p. 296; PL 216: 383-5.

⁶⁴ 'Et morbo cronico diu detentus uitam finiuit, in monasterio sancte Crucis iuxta patrem traditus sepulture.' Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 7. 6, p. 228.

⁶⁵ Possibly there were rumours of ill-health as early as 1206. In this year Innocent forwarded a letter to Sancho likening his disobedience to the stain of leprosy. Was this merely metaphor or a more pointed warning? *Bulário*, pp. 237; PL 215: 1008. Sancho's original will was probably drawn up in 1188. DDS, pp. 47-51. The version two decades later included the king's many children and exceedingly generous grants to the Church. DDS, pp. 297-301.

⁶⁶ Innocent opined: '...dum corporali egritudine te affligens ad sanandas spirituales egritudines...' and 'licet infirmus corpore animo tamen sanus...' *Bulário*, p. 303; PL 216: 423. See also *Bulário*, pp. 301-2; PL 216: 424.

⁶⁷ A long series of grants confirming and adding to ecclesiastical rights and immunities began on Christmas day 1210 and continued until Sancho's death in March 1211. DDS, pp. 308-324. The exemption from military service was granted on 28 December 1210. DDS, p. 309.

accept his authority. Earlier charters establishing civic rights were quashed.⁶⁸ Only then was Sancho able to obtain absolution from the Church at the hands of the archbishop-elect of Braga, an action subsequently confirmed by Pope Innocent.⁶⁹

The struggle between Sancho and the bishops of Oporto and Coimbra was a watershed for the Portuguese monarchy. Gradual encroachment of royal power on Church privilege had provoked a crisis, from which the monarchy was in the stronger position to emerge victorious. In the event, however, due to the king's failing health, the confrontation left the monarchy fundamentally weakened. As royal attention focused on this confrontation the progress of the reconquest stalled. Without a political imperative to drive it, the southward expansion in Portugal quickly languished. Yet the papacy remained unstinting in its enthusiasm for holy war; a new Iberian campaign was initiated which culminated in the decisive Christian victory at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212. Because the Portuguese monarchy took little part in this campaign, in the aftermath of victory it suffered a further erosion of position.

The Portuguese monarchy and the reconquest (1191-1212)

Under the auspices of Pope Innocent III the practice and ideology of the crusade was forcefully applied to the Iberian frontier, yet calls to renew the reconquest were only slowly heeded. Distracted and mistrustful kings were unwilling to answer papal calls for united military action against Iberian Islam. This was particularly true in Portugal. Nevertheless papal encouragement for the Iberian frontier continued, reaching its apogee in 1211 when, in response to a growing frontier threat, Pope Innocent arranged a considerable crusading force to assist the Spanish Christians. The contingents proved unable to cooperate effectively and the campaign revealed the sharp distinctions that still existed between Iberian and Latin Christian attitudes to holy war.⁷⁰ Despite this disharmony, the Christians were able to emerge victorious from the decisive battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212. With the Almohad threat apparently over, Latin Christian

⁶⁸ DDS, pp. 313-9. Although thus abandoned by their royal ally, the burghers continued to resist the bishop for several months. *Bulário*, pp. 320-1, 329.

⁶⁹ *Bulário*, p. 301-2; PL 216: 424. In a second bull Innocent sought to extract still further concessions on behalf of the local church. *Bulário*, p. 303; PL 216: 423.

⁷⁰ For a general descriptions of the Las Navas de Tolosa campaign: Charles J. Bishko, 'The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest, 1095-1492', K. M. Setton (ed.), *A History of the Crusades*, 5 vols (Madison-London: Wisconsin University Press, 1975), 3, pp. 422-5. Papal involvement in the campaign is

participation on the frontier became less concentrated, and thus one important impetus to bridging the gap between Iberian and northern attitudes was lost.

During the early years of Sancho's reign the Portuguese king had enjoyed considerable success on the frontier, but as his deteriorating relations with other Christian monarchs and with the papacy consumed more of his attention, these gains were abandoned. The capture of the Muslim stronghold at Silves in 1189 by a mixed force of crusaders and royal troops proved to be the furthest extent of Portuguese expansion until the middle of the thirteenth century. Only two years later, the vengeful Almohad caliph al-Mansur captured the town of Alcácer do Sal, along with two fortresses, Almada and Palmela, guarding the southern approaches to Lisbon. Silves was besieged and, after gaining permission from Sancho, the garrison surrendered. By the end of 1191 the city of Évora was the sole Portuguese stronghold south of the Tejo.⁷¹ For the remainder of his reign Sancho showed no inclination to attempt to reclaim any of this southern territory. There were no major royal offensives, nor would the Portuguese king be tempted into adventures by the success of others.⁷² Later Portuguese monarchs were content to allow the frontier to remain largely static for another five decades.

In more easterly regions of Iberia papal attempts to turn the belligerence of the Spanish kings southwards were gradually being heeded. As the first decade of the thirteenth century closed King Pedro II of Aragon (1196-1213) and King Alfonso of Castile, ably assisted by his son Fernando, both launched independent campaigns against the Almohads.⁷³ The kings enjoyed modest success, but also provoked a reply from the Almohad caliph, an-Nāsir (1199-1213). In May 1211 the caliph led a large army into the peninsula intent on punishing Christian incursions.⁷⁴ The stronghold of

considered more closely by O'Callaghan, 'Innocent III and the Kingdoms of Castile and Leon', pp. 327-35.

⁷¹ *Narratio de itinere Navali*, pp. 657-60. David concludes: 'The Portuguese attempt to dominate a large part of the region beyond the Tagus had collapsed and for a good many years to come it seems to have been the deliberate policy of the monarchy not to renew it.'

⁷² In 1197 Silves was once again seized by a contingent of Jerusalem-bound crusaders, acting this time on their own initiative. After sacking the city the crusaders doubted the willingness or ability of the Portuguese king to hold it, so they razed the buildings themselves. *Narratio de itinere Navali*, p. 660, n. 101.

⁷³ In 1210 Pope Innocent instructed the archbishop of Toledo to exhort the king of Castile to support efforts against the Almohads personally or to allow his subjects to do so. Subsequent letters encouraged the martial efforts of Prince Fernando. O'Callaghan, 'Innocent III and the Kingdoms of Castile and Leon', p. 328.

⁷⁴ an-Nāsir, known to Christians as Miramamolín, was the son of Caliph Abū Yūsuf Ya 'qub al Mansūr, the victor of Alarcos. A forged letter attributed to him and dated 8 October 1211 gives form to Latin

Salvatierra, which had served as headquarters for the military order of Calatrava after their original, eponymous castle had fallen to the Almohads over a decade earlier, came under siege in July 1211. The garrison resisted throughout the summer, but as King Alfonso was in no position to forcibly raise the siege, he gave the knights permission to negotiate surrender terms. Content with the capture of a castle with such high symbolic and strategic value, the caliph left a strong force to garrison it and led the remainder of his army back to Africa. Castilian woes were compounded in October when the energetic Prince Fernando died unexpectedly from disease.⁷⁵

These setbacks prompted the dismayed Alfonso to speed ambassadors across the Pyrenees in search of assistance. Although these initial requests produced a mixed reaction in France, Pope Innocent moved immediately and decisively to offer whatever aid lay within his power.⁷⁶ At the end of January 1212 Innocent instructed prelates in France to offer remission of sins for those willing to support the Spanish, either materially or through personal involvement.⁷⁷ Meanwhile the pope took steps to ensure unity among the Iberian kings, by sending stern letters imposing concord among them and singling out King Alfonso of León for special admonition.⁷⁸ Additionally, in accordance with his own holistic view of the crusade, Pope Innocent instituted spiritual support in the form of elaborate liturgical ceremonies of intercession in Rome and possibly also in France.⁷⁹

These efforts soon bore fruit. In the spring of 1212 a conglomerate army gathered in Toledo under the overall command of Alfonso of Castile. The Iberian forces consisted of the Castilian royal host, the city militias, and the military orders of

Christian fears. In this widely circulated document the caliph reacted angrily to papal interference in his affairs and threatened to wage war against Christians to the very gates of Rome. O'Callaghan, 'Innocent III and the Kingdoms of Castile and Leon', p. 330, n. 63. The letter is transcribed in the Austrian *Continuatio Lambacensis*, MGH SS, 9, 557-8.

⁷⁵ Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 7. 38, pp. 258.

⁷⁶ While Philip Augustus resisted the personal petitions of Archbishop Rodrigo, other recruiters enjoyed greater success in Gascony and Poitou. O'Callaghan, 'Innocent III and the Kingdoms of Castile and Leon', p. 331. A groundswell of interest among the arms-bearing classes is suggested by troubadours such as Fulk of Toulouse producing songs in support of the Spanish cause. Brenda Bolton, 'Fulk of Toulouse: the escape that failed', in B. Bolton, *Innocent III: Studies on Papal Authority and Pastoral Care* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1995), III, p. 85. Not all their motives were pure, however, as another troubadour, Guilhem Adémar, longed for the crusade that would lure his lover's husband away from home! Colin Smith, *Christians and Moors in Spain*, 3 vols (Warminster: Aris&Philips, 1989), 2, pp. 12-3.

⁷⁷ PL 216: 513-4.

⁷⁸ PL 216: 553.

⁷⁹ C. Maier 'Mass, the Eucharist and the cross', p. 352, describes the ceremony and suggests: 'There is no doubt that the pope believed that the procession, which begged God for his assistance, had had a direct influence on the outcome of the battle'.

Santiago, Calatrava, the Temple and the Hospital. The kings of Aragon and Navarre also joined the muster with small forces of household knights. Neither Alfonso of León nor the newly crowned Afonso II of Portugal took part in the campaign, for border tensions between them in the Minho region had flared into open conflict.⁸⁰ Yet some Portuguese contingents answered the summons. The military orders sent their full strength while numbers of irregular Portuguese troops also joined the muster, apparently on their own initiative.⁸¹

In Toledo the local Iberian troops were joined by a sizeable force of northern crusaders. Accompanied by the Archbishops of Narbonne and Bordeaux, and the Bishop of Nantes, the crusaders were later numbered at 2,000 knights, 10,000 other horsemen, and 50,000 footmen.⁸² Although this is certainly an exaggeration, the combined army was the largest Christian host ever mustered for a reconquest campaign. Yet the unity of this composite army proved to be extremely fragile. A mere two weeks after commencing the southward march the crusaders ignominiously abandoned the enterprise and made for home.

Alfonso of Castile blamed this mass desertion on the crusaders' unwillingness to endure a long march in the summer heat.⁸³ This explanation, in addition to the disappointing quantities of booty secured, has been widely accepted as the basis for the northerners' disenchantment.⁸⁴ A less frequently acknowledged factor was the basic difference in attitude between the Spanish soldiery and the crusaders.⁸⁵ Accounts of the

⁸⁰ For this depth and causes of this confrontation see below, pp. 281-3.

⁸¹ Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 8. 2, p. 260, recalled the Portuguese contingent thus: 'Convenerunt etiam ad eandem urbem [i.e. Toledo] plerique milites de partibus Portugalis, peditum vero copiosa multitudo, qui mira agilitate expeditionis onera facile sustinebant et audaci impetu impetebant.' No Portuguese (or Leonese) nobles are mentioned. Rodrigo describes the muster in some detail in *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 8. 1-3, pp. 259-62. A more official Portuguese presence is suggested by Alberic of Trois Fontaines, *Chronica*, MGH SS, 23, p. 894.

⁸² This estimate was made by King Alfonso in a letter to Pope Innocent after the battle. The phraseology hints at the involvement of Archbishop Rodrigo in its composition. Smith, *Christians and Moors in Spain*, 2, p. 17.

⁸³ Although the king admits with a fine Castilian hauteur that 'ipsi [the crusaders] tamen attendentes laborem terre, quae deserta erat et aliquantulum calida, voluerunt accepto proposito retroire et ad propria remeare.' Smith, *Christians and Moors*, pp. 16-7.

⁸⁴ This explanation is accepted by Bishko, 'The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest', p. 423 and O'Callaghan, 'Innocent III and the Kingdoms of Castile and Leon', p. 332. García y García, 'Innocent III and the Kingdom of Castile' p. 340, ignores the desertion completely.

⁸⁵ This aspect is emphasised by Smith, *Christians and Moors*, pp. 14-5. The recent trend among scholars has been to minimise the difference in attitude between the Iberians and crusaders. For example Simon Barton, 'Traitors to the Faith? Christian Mercenaries in al-Andalus and the Maghred, c. 1100-1300', in R. Collins and A. Goodman (eds), *Medieval Spain: Culture, Conflict, and Coexistence* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 23-4, accepts the sincerity of Spanish protestations of fervour, while

campaign make clear the growing tension between the two groups, but also, and perhaps more interestingly, an Iberian awareness of the reasons for such tension. Two leading participants in these events, King Alfonso of Castile and Archbishop Rodrigo of Toledo, provide particularly vivid accounts of them. As much from the differences between these accounts as from their points of concordance, it is clear that while the Spanish understood the motivation of the northerners and accepted those aspects of holy war they deemed beneficial, they did not allow the religious intolerance of the crusaders to override the pragmatism instilled by close association with the Muslim world.

Almost immediately the contrasts between the two contingents were starkly displayed. On their arrival in Toledo the crusaders, unprepared for the cosmopolitan nature of the city, had to be forcibly restrained by royal troops from attacking the citizens.⁸⁶ The cultural and religious intolerance of the crusaders was soon in evidence again when they reached the Muslim-held stronghold of Malagón ahead of the Spanish contingents. The northerners immediately stormed the castle and slew the entire garrison.⁸⁷ A few days later the combined army undertook a siege of Old Calatrava, and rather than capturing it by force, the Spanish negotiated a settlement with the defenders. The garrison was granted much the same conditions as the Calatravan knights had themselves obtained two years earlier at Salvatierra: in return for abandoning the castle and their goods the Muslims were granted safe conduct out of the area. Given their own treatment of the unfortunate garrison at Malagón, the mercy shown by the Iberians to the defenders of Calatrava must have seemed incomprehensible to the crusaders. Immediately afterwards, the majority of the northerners broke ranks with the Spanish and made for home, initially intent on sacking Toledo en route as a token of their disillusionment with their erstwhile allies.⁸⁸

acknowledging that 'The crusading euphoria generated by the victory at Las Navas appears to have quickly evaporated, however.'

⁸⁶ Smith, *Christians and Moors*, pp. 14-5; Bishko, *The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest*, pp. 422-3. Both Jewish and Christian, possibly Mozarab, citizens were attacked.

⁸⁷ Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 8. 5, p. 264.

⁸⁸ Derek W. Lomax, *The Spanish Reconquest* (London: Longman, 1978), p. 126. Less than 150 crusaders remained, including the Archbishop Arnaud of Narbonne and one nobleman, Tibaldo of Blazon. Alfonso points out Tibaldo's feudal obligation to remain, Smith, *Christians and Moors*, pp. 18-9. Rodrigo happily adds that the single loyal crusader was of Castilian descent *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 8. 6, pp. 265-6.

This sensational incident aroused intense interest across Europe.⁸⁹ In recognition of this interest, and perhaps in anticipation of criticism, both King Alfonso and Archbishop Rodrigo alluded to the breakdown of relations after Calatrava, and their reasons reveal as much of their own awareness of Iberian cultural distinctiveness as they do about the incident itself. Archbishop Rodrigo, writing a general history for a predominantly Spanish audience, noted the difficulty of the siege and the desire of the king to avoid exhausting the army prior to the main engagement. Rodrigo explained the crusaders' intractability as resulting from the machinations of the devil.⁹⁰ The King of Castile, writing to Pope Innocent, had a more delicate task. The negotiation with the garrison might be construed as disobedience, for the pope had expressly forbidden such agreements.⁹¹ Thus, rather than adopt the essentially strategic arguments presented by his archbishop, Alfonso portrayed himself as eager to take the castle by force. It was the knights of Calatrava who petitioned for a negotiated settlement, for they feared that with the fortifications destroyed the castle would be impossible to defend afterwards. In addition, recognising a common complaint of unhappy crusaders, the king assured the pope that the booty was to be divided between the Aragonese and the crusaders, with the Castilians themselves receiving nothing.⁹² Nonetheless, the majority of disgruntled crusaders abandoned the campaign, and rather than admit the essential differences in their attitudes to frontier warfare, the king seized upon the convenient pretext of cold-blooded northerners unable to face the summer's heat.

With the departure of the crusaders the campaign became an almost wholly Iberian enterprise, and the Spanish army pressed on to contest the future balance of power in the peninsula with their Muslim adversaries. Although the northerners took much of the army's zealotry with them, Alfonso continued to portray the operation as a crusade to Pope Innocent. The gloss he gave to events clearly demonstrate his own

⁸⁹ Several Latin Christian authors recorded the events of the battle, based primarily on Alfonso's letter and another written by Archbishop Arnaud of Narbonne. Accounts were included in chronicles as far afield as Italy, France and Germany, including Alberic of Trois Fontaines, *Chronica*, pp. 894-5; *Continuatio Claustroneoburgensis*, MGH SS, 23, p. 622; and Ricardo of San Germano, *Chronica*, ed. C. A. Galufi, *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, 7 vols. (Bologna 1958) vol. 7/2, pp. 35-46. The archbishop's letter is also transcribed in *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France*, ed. M. Bouquet, 24 vols (Paris, 1840-1904), 19, pp. 250-4.

⁹⁰ Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 8, 6, pp. 265-6.

⁹¹ As Rodrigo of Toledo acknowledged when discussing a subsequent proposed agreement between the king and the garrison at Ubeda. See below, n. 98. Despite Innocent's prohibition on negotiations with the enemy, he himself on several occasions was willing to treat with Muslim rulers in the interest of *realpolitik*. See G. Cipollone, 'Innocent III and the Saracens: Between Rejection and Collaboration', in J. C. Moore (ed.), *Pope Innocent III and his World* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 361-76.

impression of Latin Christian attitudes; once again, however, the archbishop catered to a local audience and presented a slightly different picture, colouring small details to portray the campaign as a Spanish, or more particularly a Castilian, triumph.

When the crusaders abandoned the camp on 3 July, the Spanish army continued southwards alone. After recapturing Alarcos, scene of the disaster in 1195, they bypassed Salvatierra, even though the Muslim occupation of this stronghold had in fact prompted the campaign. Meanwhile the caliph attempted to block their progress at the narrow pass of Muradah. Fortunately for the Spanish, a local shepherd was able to lead them by another path down to the plains. For two days the armies faced each other across the barren lowlands, but not until 16 July was battle actually joined.

King Alfonso presented the resulting struggle in strictly crusading terms. The Spaniards were soldiers of God, fighting for the catholic faith, and the crisis of the battle came when the army's banner, bearing the cross and an image of the virgin and child, came under attack.⁹³ At this point the righteous wrath of the Spaniards flared, and they overbore their enemies, who were then routed with great slaughter. Alfonso's description ended on a poetic note, with the Christian soldiers gathering the arrows and lances of their enemies for firewood. The king, with a rather heavy-handed touch, added that his joy was only diminished by the regret that a mere handful of Christians were killed in the battle and thus granted the great gift of martyrdom.⁹⁴

The king's glowing description of Christian victory was greatly to Pope Innocent's liking and he was fulsome in his praise.⁹⁵ Archbishop Rodrigo, however, presented a slightly different picture. The language of the crusade so pronounced in Alfonso's account is notably lacking. Those characteristics which defined the crusade were referred to only obliquely, one rare example being the priests circulating among the army on the eve of battle bolstering morale with encouraging words and assurances of spiritual reward on the morrow.⁹⁶ Yet Rodrigo portrays a battle that, while fought

⁹² Smith, *Christians and Moors*, pp. 16-7.

⁹³ Alfonso reports 'omnes in Dei nomine armati processimus dispositis aciebus, cum eis pro fide catholica pugnatur.' Smith, *Christians and Moors*, 2, p. 20.

⁹⁴ 'nisi sit hoc dolendum sit: quod tam pauci martyres de tanto exercitu ad Christum martyrio pervenerunt.' Smith, *Christians and Moors*, 2, p. 22.

⁹⁵ Innocent's joyous reply to Alfonso's letter included mention of the thanksgiving celebrations held in Rome and the personal warmth felt by the pope, who offered 'to be present in all your serenity's affairs, as much as we can with God and with honesty.' Riley Smith, *Crusade: Idea and Reality*, p. 61. See also PL 216: 703-4.

⁹⁶ 'Toletanus autem et ceteri pontifices per singularum civitatum et singulorum principum mansiones verbum extortationis et indulgentie devotissime proponebant.' Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 8. 8, p. 270.

with divine support, was ultimately decided by human factors, in particular King Alfonso's personal resolve. At the height of the battle the Castilian monarch decided to risk total destruction by committing all reserves to counter the enemy assault. As for the Christian banner that provided the crucial trigger in Alfonso's own account, Rodrigo also gave it prominence but points out in a piece of parochial propaganda that the images on the banner were particularly sacred to the Spanish, and most of all to the Toledans.⁹⁷ Rodrigo's whole emphasis was on the local, most notably the Castilian, rather than the influence of Latin Christendom, in the Spanish victory.

In the wake of the battle the distance between crusading ideology and Iberian reality, particularly among the fighting men themselves, was once again in evidence. As the shattered Almohad army withdrew southwards, the Spaniards moved quickly to occupy strategic strongpoints. Several had been abandoned, but the last, Ubeda, was strongly fortified and prepared for defence. Knowing relief was impossible, the inhabitants offered the Spanish king large sums of money to be left unmolested. Although Alfonso was inclined to accept such a deal, the clerics, notably the Bishop of Narbonne, raised strenuous objection. The king was persuaded to undertake a siege, which ended with the destruction of the city and the capture of its inhabitants. Nevertheless this action exhausted the army and so proved to be the farthest extent of the Spanish advance. Soon after the city fell Alfonso found it politic to negotiate a peace treaty with the Almohads, re-establishing the relative stability of the frontier and allowing him to turn to the pressing concerns of his own kingdom.⁹⁸

Despite the gloss Alfonso sought to give to his own actions, the Castilian king showed a shrewd sense of practical politics both during and after the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa. The motivations of the other Spanish participants in the campaign are also open to question. Although the kings of Navarre and Aragon might be lauded as Christian paladins, their crusading credentials were in fact less than impeccable. In the years prior to the campaign King Sancho VII of Navarre (1194-1234) had maintained close relations with the Almohads, accepting their financial and military support in his struggles with rival Christian kings, and was even rumoured to have considered

⁹⁷ For the battle itself, Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 8. 9-11, p. 270-5. Rodrigo says of the banner: 'Erat autum in vexillis regum imago beate Marie Virginis, que Toletane provincie et tocius Hispanie semper tutrix extitit et patrona.' 8. 10, p. 273.

⁹⁸ Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 8. 12, p. 276. Significantly Alfonso makes no mention of the proposed agreement, emphasising instead high Muslim casualties. Smith, *Christians and Moors*, 2, pp. 22-3.

marrying the caliph's daughter.⁹⁹ King Pedro II of Aragon, on the other hand, was in flagrant opposition to papal policy less than a year after Las Navas de Tolosa. After allying himself with the Albigensians, the reconquest hero was slain by Innocent's crusaders under Simon of Montfort at the battle of Muret in 1213.¹⁰⁰ This customary Iberian ambivalence to crusading ideologies was also common among the rank and file of soldiers. Spiritual beliefs may have played their part, for example among those Portuguese who arrived without leaders but eager to take part in the battle, yet more fiscal concerns were also clearly in evidence. During the campaign Archbishop Rodrigo felt it necessary to take the expedient, but unusual, step of imposing anathema upon any soldiers who indulged in looting before the issue of a battle should be decided.¹⁰¹ Among the Spanish soldiery at all levels, there seemed to be a strong focus on the pragmatic realities of frontier warfare.

The Las Navas de Tolosa campaign provides little indication that crusading fervour, or the Latin Christian identity it relied upon, had come to dominate the Iberian consciousness. Events in the wake of the battle made such a domination increasingly unlikely. Beyond the enhancement of regional pride brought by the largely unassisted Spanish victory, the destruction of the Almohad army led many in both Spain and Latin Christendom to suppose the threat to the frontier ended.¹⁰² Papal attention turned to the Holy Land and Innocent became more stinting in the support he was willing to bestow on Spanish campaigns. Under the bull *Quia maior*, dated 30 April 1213, Innocent sought to channel potential crusaders eastwards by revoking the remissions and indulgences granted to foreign participants in Iberia. In order to protect gains already won, spiritual rewards were still available for local troops, and the pope left open the possibility of re-instituting further indulgences should circumstances warrant it.¹⁰³ Yet Innocent clearly hoped that no further direct international participation in the reconquest would be required.

⁹⁹ Sancho's acceptance of financial support from the Almohads led to his excommunication in 1197. When the kings of Castile and Aragon subsequently invaded Navarre, Sancho fled to seek aid from the Muslims. Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 7. 32, p. 254. The story of the proposed marriage was included by Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, 3, pp. 90-2. Translated in Smith, *Christians and Moors*, pp. 6-11.

¹⁰⁰ Bishko, *The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest*, p. 424.

¹⁰¹ Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 8. 10, p. 275.

¹⁰² For the wave of Spanish triumphalism resulting from the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa see Linehan, *History and the Historians*, pp. 295-7.

¹⁰³ Jonathan Riley-Smith and Louise Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: Idea and Reality, 1095-1274* (London: Edward Arnold, 1981), p. 122.

Although the campaign of Las Navas de Tolosa had many of the accoutrements of the crusade, beneath these trappings the participants maintained a characteristically Iberian attitude. Ironically, this essential pragmatism can be seen most clearly in the carefully crafted description of events King Alfonso presented for papal approval; and is confirmed by Archbishop Rodrigo's account of a purely Iberian action ultimately fought in regional terms. The fruit of victory was not an enhanced sense of Latin Christian identity in Iberia, but rather a greater sense of local confidence. Victory also allowed papal attention to shift to the Holy Land. The short-term implications of this shift for the Spanish were limited: the loss of the often unreliable crusaders could easily be borne. In the longer term, however, the Iberian kings were to find it even more difficult to counter the encroachments of the Church by recourse to the Muslim threat. For an already weakened Portuguese monarchy, this would prove to be the most decisive result of the Christian victory at Las Navas de Tolosa.

The struggle between Pope Innocent and King Sancho has traditionally been portrayed as a clash of personalities, yet more basic to the conflict was a bitter clash of ideas. Sancho cleaved to an Iberian concept of frontier warfare in which the Church was obliged to support the kings in meeting the practical military needs of the kingdom. Pope Innocent championed a different ideal, based on a belief that Christendom won divine approval through obedience to a clerically sanctioned order, and moving as one against the common enemy. As a result Innocent believed the Portuguese king to be destructively obdurate, while Sancho found the pontiff intrusive beyond the limits of right or tradition. Innocent's victory in the resulting struggle was not due to the strength of his position or the influence of his ideals, but rather through the essential weakness of monarchy: reliance on a single man. Yet Portuguese identity, like Iberian identity, retained a stubborn dominance over the minds of local people. The campaign of Las Navas de Tolosa demonstrated both the strengths and inherent weaknesses in the Latin Christian cultural permeation of the peninsula. Thus, while Sancho's successors inherited a greatly diminished authority, the struggle between the monarch and the Church was by no means over.

Chapter Ten

Re-establishing the balance: royal authority during the reigns of Afonso II (1211-1223) and Sancho II (1223-1248)

Changing papal attitudes to the defence of the frontier produced a new tension between Pope Innocent and King Sancho, but it was the actions of the king himself during the final years of his life that most undermined the Portuguese monarchy. Concessions to the Church and the wide distribution of royal assets dramatically weakened the authority Sancho passed on to his successors. Both Afonso II (1211-1223) and his son Sancho II (1223-1248) sought to reassert their authority, but neither was able to overcome the entrenched power of local ecclesiastical institutions. As a result, the first half of the thirteenth century brought an overall deterioration of royal authority, culminating in 1245, when Sancho's papal mandate to rule was revoked and the unfortunate monarch ousted by his brother, Afonso III (1248-1279). Only when Afonso III established a temporary truce with the Church could the long-delayed reconquest finally be completed. Yet by this time, the political importance of the struggle against Islam had waned: the capture of the last Muslim stronghold at Faro in 1250 went unrecorded in contemporary documents. All attention was instead focused on the struggle between the papacy and crown for the future of the monarchy.

A disappointingly small body of documentary evidence remains from the reigns of Afonso II and Sancho II. Official documents comprise the most important source, but while Afonso's rule saw considerable administrative effort, public records from Sancho's reign are less extensive, possibly due to their purposeful destruction by the administration of his usurping brother.¹ To these surviving official documents can be

¹ Unfortunately no recent collection of documents focusing on Portuguese relations with the papacy has emerged to continue the high-calibre presentation of A. de Jesus da Costa and M. A. F. Marques, *Bulário Português Inocêncio III (1198-1216)* (Coimbra: Instituto Nacional de Investigação Científica, 1989). Many Portuguese documents are, however, to be found in PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*; PMH, *Diplomata and chartae*; and PMH, *Inquisitiones*. The first volume (1143-1411) of the collection *Monumenta Henricina*, ed. A. J. D. Denis et. al., 25 vols (Coimbra, 1960-1974), includes material relating primarily to the conquest of the Algarve. Several important Portuguese documents are included in António Brandão *Crónicas de D. Sancho I e D. Afonso II*, ed. A. de Magalhães Basto (Lisbon: Biblioteca Histórica, n/d) and by the same author *Crónicas de D. Sancho II e D. Afonso III*, ed. A. de Magalhães Basto (Lisbon: Biblioteca Histórica, 1945). The monumental collection of Visconde da Santarem and Rebello da Silva, *Quadro elementar da relações politicas e diplomaticas de Portugal com*

added material from the aristocratic lineage books compiled during the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.² These purely secular works detail the ancestry of several noble houses, and are replete with revealing personal anecdotes and descriptions of several important events from the early decades of the thirteenth century.³

Chroniclers working outside Portugal make only brief and occasional reference to events within the kingdom. There is one noteworthy exception to this relative paucity of material. In 1217 a fleet of Jerusalem-bound crusaders assisted a Portuguese assault on the Muslim stronghold of Alcácer do Sal. Non-Portuguese participants in this action produced several accounts of it. The metered *Gosuini de Expugnatione Salaciae Carmen* and the *Gesta Crucigerorum Rhenanorum* reflect the experience of the German contingent in this operation, while the *De Itinere Frisonum* was written by one of the Frisian crusaders.⁴ The attack on Alcácer do Sal was to be the final close cooperation between Portuguese troops and visiting crusaders, and is important both for the attitudes displayed by different contingents as well as the complete absence of royal involvement.

Portugal's emergence from the political uncertainty of the thirteenth century encouraged a resumption of local historical writing, and one important product of this effort is the *Crónica da Conquista do Algarve*. This anonymous account of the final Portuguese campaigns against the Moors on the Iberian mainland was written under the auspices of neither king nor bishop, but rather by a member of the military order of

as diversas potencias do mundo 15 volumes (Paris: J. Aillaud, 1842-54) is extremely difficult to obtain outside Portugal and is cited only in the absence of other more accessible references.

² *Portugaliae Monumenta Historica a saeculo octavo post Christum usque ad quintum decimum, nova series*, i, *Livro Velho/Livro do Deão*; ii *Livros de Linhagens do Conde D. Pedro*, ed. J. Mattoso and J. Piehl (Lisbon: Academia das Ciências, 1980).

³ Maria João Violante Branco, 'The Nobility of Medieval Portugal (XIth-XIVth Centuries)', in *Nobles and Nobility in Medieval Europe. Concepts, Origins, Transformations*, ed. A. J. Duggan, (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2000), p. 228, provides a useful introduction to the lineage books and comments: 'In a country in which the chronicle tradition was both weak and dominated by churchmen, the secular narratives inserted into the lineage books provide the possibility of perceiving the nobility on its own terms.'

⁴ *Gosuini de expugnatione Salaciae carmen*, PMH SS, pp. 101-4; *Gesta crucigerorum Rhenanorum*, in *Quinti Belli Sacri Scriptores*, ed. R. Röhrich (Geneva: Soc. de L' Or. Lat., 1879), pp. 29-59; *De Itinere Frisonum*, in *Quinti Belli Sacri Scriptores*, 59-70 and also transcribed into the *Emonis et Menkonis Werumensium Chronica*, ed. L. Weiland, MGH SS, 23, pp. 478-83. It has been suggested that the *Gosuini de expugnatione Salaciae* in fact describes the attack of 1158. For example, T. Amos, *The Fundo Alcobaca of the Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon. Descriptive Inventories of Manuscripts Microfilmed for the Hills Monastic Manuscript Library* 2 vols (Collegeville, MN: Hills Monastic Library, 1988), 1, p. 182. This earlier dating has not been widely accepted, and the language of the chronicle, particularly the use of crusading vocabulary, suggests thirteenth rather than the twelfth-century authorship.

Santiago.⁵ Although the existing manuscript of the *Crónica* dates from the late fourteenth or possibly early fifteenth century, large sections are believed to have been taken from works completed at least a century earlier. In its extant form, the *Crónica* appears to have been written to bolster subsequent Portuguese and military order claims to the captured territory. The lack of other, less financially motivated, accounts of the final campaign in the Algarve indicates a widespread preoccupation with other concerns.

The anticlimactic conclusion to the reconquest has tended to deter extensive analysis of this period of Portuguese history. Many of the fundamental problems encountered in Portuguese historiography are also particularly acute in modern assessments of these two reigns. Scholarly analysis has traditionally been attempted within the framework of wider, general historical studies.⁶ National in focus, such work has been polarised between ecclesiastical and royalist apology; because the period culminating in a Church-sponsored deposition of the monarch, the tone of commentary has often been acrimonious.⁷ More recently, specific aspects or incidents from the reigns of Afonso and Sancho have been the subject of closer examination, but no major monograph focusing on the period as a whole has been attempted.⁸

King Sancho's final disposition of the kingdom in 1211 fundamentally compromised Portuguese royal authority. The heirs to this weakened throne, Afonso II and then Sancho II, were monarchs of very different tempers, but they shared an

⁵ 'Crónica da Conquista do Algarve', PMH SS, pp. 415-20. For the circumstances of authorship see Giulia Lanciani and Giuseppe Tavani (eds), *Dicionário da Literatura Medieval Galega e Portuguesa*, (Lisbon: Caminho, 1993), p. 176.

⁶ Leaders of the monarchist schools include Alexandre Herculano, *História de Portugal desde o começo da monarquia até o fim do reinado de Afonso III*, ed. J. Mattoso, 4 vols (Lisbon: Bertrand Editora, 1989), 2, passim; Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 13 vols (Lisbon: Editorial Verbo, 1977), 1, pp. 114-39; and J. Serrão and A. H. Oliveira Marques (eds), *Nova História de Portugal*, 11 vols (Lisbon: Editorial Presença, 1996), 3, *Portugal em Definição de Fronteiras, (1096-1325)*, pp. 89-123; the leading church apologist remains Fortunato de Almeida, *História de Portugal*, 7 vols (Coimbra: Editor Fortunato Almeida, 1922-9), 1, 187-214; and by the same author, *História da Igreja em Portugal 2nd ed.*, 4 vols (Oporto: Portugalense Editora, 1967-71), 1, 379-415.

⁷ As Edward Peters observes: 'Sancho's reign has had two different schools of interpreters. Most of the papal correspondence, documents from the reign of Afonso III, and some modern historians put the case for the legitimacy of the deposition in the strongest possible terms... On the other hand, other contemporary sources and other later historians suggest that Sancho was the unwitting victim of clerical avarice and papal political ambition.' E. M. Peters, 'Rex Inutilis: Sancho II of Portugal and Thirteenth-Century Deposition Theory', *Studia Gratiana*, 14 (1967), p. 266. This article is reprinted and contextualised in E. M. Peters, *The Shadow King. Rex Inutilis in Medieval Law and Literature, 751-1327* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1970).

⁸ A comprehensive work on thirteenth-century Portuguese politics is J. Antunes, A. R. Oliveira, and J. G. Monteiro, 'Conflitos políticos no reino de Portugal entre a Reconquista e a Expansão: estado da questão',

ambition to reinvigorate the monarchy by reclaiming the authority and resources Sancho had dissipated. Both Afonso II and Sancho II sought to use external influences in the kingdom, although in very different ways. Afonso fostered diplomatic links outside the kingdom to bolster his internal authority, while at the same time he attempted to overturn his father's will by recourse to Latin Christian legal principles. In both these initiatives Afonso enjoyed considerable success. His son Sancho, lacking the means or the patience for long negotiation, elected to pursue the war against Islam in order to secure crucial papal support. Again, this approach brought important initial benefits. In the longer term, however, neither of these strategies proved effective in countering the entrenched power of the Portuguese church. The two monarchs adopted seemingly distinct policies, yet these were in fact variations on the same theme. Each king tried to take advantage of Latin Christian cultural influence to reestablish the balance of authority upset in 1211. Both attempts ended in complete failure.

Part 1: the reign of Afonso II (1211-1223)

On the death of his father Sancho, Afonso II came into a depleted and divided inheritance. In addition, the new king was immediately forced to formalise his diminished position in a number of humiliating concessions to a gathering of the kingdom's nobility. From the outset of his reign, therefore, Afonso was forced to contend with a dwindling treasury, entrenched ecclesiastical authority, and over-mighty siblings. Yet Afonso inherited little of his forebears' military aptitude, and when attempts to impose royal authority by force failed, the king turned to alternative methods. Afonso recognised that the Latin Christian cultural expansion offered particular opportunities for a reigning monarch, even a weakened one, to re-establish the strength of the crown. To underline his own unique status Afonso opened negotiations with leaders in other Atlantic states. This policy brought modest dividends to the Portuguese king, although the ultimate failure of the Atlantic coalition against King Philip Augustus of France (1180-1223) meant greater potential rewards were denied him. Locally, meanwhile, Afonso made use of the legal principles of primogeniture to re-impose royal authority upon members of his own family. Yet these

Revista de História das Ideias, 6 (1984), 25-160. The study provides exhaustive analysis of the numerous political confrontations during the period, but the focus is local.

successes came at the dangerous price of acknowledging papal rights of adjudication in royal affairs.

In 1211 royal authority was at a low ebb. The dying king had granted major concessions to the Church and bequeathed much of his wealth to the sees and monasteries of the kingdom. In addition, the remaining royal assets had been divided among Sancho's many legitimate and illegitimate children.⁹ Immediately on his accession, Afonso II summoned a *cortes*, or general council, made up of representatives from the higher clergy and nobility. This gathering has traditionally been interpreted as a first gambit on the part of the newly-enthroned king to restore royal fortunes, and legal principles were established that in the longer term would bring important benefits to the king. In the short term, however, the gathered magnates were able to extract significant concessions from the crown.¹⁰ The secular nobility imposed restrictions on the king's right of taxation and also limited the arbitrary use of royal judicial rights.¹¹ Interestingly too, in an indication of the growing importance of international mercantile interests and indeed of the political power of merchants, the king was obliged to abandon his rights of salvage over shipwrecks.¹²

The Church secured still more sweeping guarantees: ecclesiastical law was upheld; royal officials were sworn to defend ecclesiastical privilege, and the clergy received further exemptions.¹³ The only condition placed upon the Church was the

⁹ Afonso received 206,000 morabitanos along with clothing, horses and arms. His seven siblings received 40,000 morabitanos each, as well as important territorial concessions; eight illegitimate children received between seven and eight thousand each, again in addition to substantial lands. The pope received 100 gold marks (i.e. 6,000 morabitanos) and 20,000 morabitanos were granted to Alcobaca and 10,000 to Santa Cruz. The bishops also profited handsomely: 3,000 to the bishop of Tui, 2000 to the archbishop of Braga, and 1,000 to each of the other Portuguese sees. In addition, numerous smaller gifts were made to the military orders and other religious institutions. C.f. Harold V. Livermore, *A History of Portugal* (Cambridge: UP, 1972), p. 72. For the text of the will, DDS, pp. 297-301.

¹⁰ Maria J. Branco, 'The General Laws of Afonso II and his Policy of "Centralisation": a Reassessment', in M. Gosman, A. Vanderjagt, and J. Veenstra (eds), *The Propagation of Power in the Medieval West* (Groningen: Egbert Forsten, 1997), 79-95; also Peter Linehan, 'The Church and Feudalism in the Spanish Kingdoms in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries', in P. Linehan, *The Processes of Politics and the Rule of the Law. Studies on the Iberian Kingdoms and Papal Rome in Middle Ages* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), pp. 327-9. The laws themselves are to be found in PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 168-73.

¹¹ Chief among royal concessions was the remission of the one-third sales tax on all foodstuffs sold in the kingdom and a 'cooling off' period of twenty days between sentencing and punishment in capital crimes. PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 163-4, 173.

¹² The ship and cargo remained the legal property of the original owner, regardless of nationality. PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, p. 164; see also Bailey W. Diffie, *Prelude to Empire: Portugal Overseas before Henry the Navigator* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1960), p. 31.

¹³ PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 168-73. The Church was relieved of the obligation to entertain the king during his travels around the kingdom, from extraordinary exaction, and from the upkeep of fortifications.

relatively hollow prohibition on ecclesiastical purchase of land.¹⁴ Stricter rules of segregation were imposed upon non-Christian minorities within the kingdom. In obedience to the dictates of the Fourth Lateran council Jews and Moors were forbidden from holding authority over Christians, even to the point of preventing them employing Christian servants within their homes. Moreover, non-Christians who converted were obliged not to live under the same roof as former co-religionists, while relapse to their previous faith was punishable by death.¹⁵ Thus, the assembly of 1211 became more than the humbling of royal authority. It also represented a triumph of Latin Christian ideological expectations over Iberian regionalism.

Afonso did not allow this erosion of royal authority to go unchallenged. The crown retained several important prerogatives, one of the most important being the ability to negotiate as equals with the rulers of other states. As a means of re-establishing the prestige of the royal house, Afonso turned to strengthening his relations with the Atlantic maritime states. This policy was to draw Portugal into an alliance of powers linked by a common distrust of the French king, Philip II Augustus (1180-1223) and his major supporter, Pope Innocent. Had this alliance of Atlantic states proved victorious, the potential advantage for the Portuguese monarch could have been decisive.

Afonso II and the Atlantic Alliance (1211-1216)

Relations with the Atlantic states became a major pillar of royal policy during the reign of Sancho I, with the king making concrete local gains from growing coastal trade and urban development, along with the political benefits of closer links with foreign rulers. Although the agreements forced upon Afonso in 1211 reduced the crown's ability to tap the flow of commercial wealth, monies extracted from merchants remained an important revenue, and the strength of the towns still constituted a valuable royal asset.¹⁶ Yet for a king striving to secure a position of preeminence in his own kingdom,

¹⁴ As Livermore *A History of Portugal*, p. 72, observes: the overwhelming majority of church lands came from grant rather than purchase. Moreover similar restrictions had long been used in other regions of Iberia. For example, James F. Powers, *The Code of Cuenca: Municipal Law on the Twelfth-Century Castilian Frontier* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), pp. 35, 66-7.

¹⁵ PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 178-9.

¹⁶ Discussions of Portuguese participation in Atlantic trade during the thirteenth century include: Violet M. Shillington and Anne B. Wallis Chapman, *The Commercial Relations of England and Portugal* (London: Routledge & sons, n/d), pp. 20-7; Yves Renouard, 'Les Relations de Portugal avec Bordeaux et

the prestige to be gained from alliances forged with foreign rulers was equally important. During Afonso's reign, marriages were negotiated with the ruling families of Flanders and Denmark. Such marriages formed the basis of a political re-engagement with the Atlantic states which promised significant benefits to the Portuguese crown.

Links between the royal house of Portugal and the county of Flanders had been initiated by the marriage of Afonso Henriques' daughter Teresa to Count Philip of Flanders (1157/67-1191) in 1183. After Philip's death Teresa, who had taken the name Mathilda after her marriage, remained in Flanders and so was in a position to forward the Portuguese cause during a crisis point of Flemish history. Count Baldwin IX of Flanders (1194-1206) was killed by the Bulgarians ending his brief reign as emperor of Constantinople, and rule over Flanders fell to his daughter, Joanna.¹⁷ When a suitable husband was sought for the heiress, Mathilda petitioned successfully on behalf of her nephew Fernando, the brother of Afonso II.¹⁸ This marriage was more than simply an added contact between Portugal and Flanders; it also became an integral link in the alliance of Atlantic states formed by King John of England (1199-1216) to oppose the growing power of Philip Augustus of France.

The greatest threat to Flemish independence had always been French expansionism. Even before Fernando had reached Flanders, his relations with the French monarch had been soured. While journeying to Flanders the Portuguese prince was ambushed by crown prince Louis, and as a price for release was forced to cede the strategic towns of Aire and St Omer.¹⁹ In the wake of this inauspicious beginning to Fernando's rule both personal affront and political reality determined he join those opposed to the French king. Fernando exiled prominent Francophiles among the Flemish nobility and opened negotiations with King John of England. The Flemish

La Rochelle au Moyen-Age', *Revista Portuguesa de História*, 6 (1955), pp. 244-248; A. H. de Oliveira Marques, *Hansa e Portugal na Idade Média*, 2nd ed. (Lisbon: Editorial Presença, 1994), pp. 97-8, 130-1; and Patrícia A. Odber de Baubeta, 'Some Early English Sources of Portuguese History', *Estudos Medievais*, 9 (1988), pp. 205-7.

¹⁷ R. L. Wolff, 'Baldwin of Flanders and Hainault, first Latin emperor of Constantinople: his life, death, and resurrection, 1172-1225', *Speculum*, 27 (1952), 281-322. For the marriage and subsequent events see David Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders* (London: Longman, 1992), pp. 152-3 and Oliveira Marques, *Hansa e Portugal na Idade Média*, pp. 97-8.

¹⁸ 'donec matrimonio copulavit eam [Joanna] Fernando filio regis Portusequalis, et hoc per industriam regine Mathildis, quondam Flandrie comitisse.' *Genealogiae comitum Flandriae*, ed. D. L. C. Bethmann, MGM SS, 9, p. 330. Joanna had become Philip Augustus' ward on the death of her father. The marriage took place in January 1212.

¹⁹ Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders*, p. 152. Jim Bradbury, *Philip Augustus. King of France 1180-1223* (London: Longman, 1998), pp. 285-6, does not mention that Fernando was actually captured and believes

towns were already inclined toward supporting the English, for they were heavily reliant on cross-Channel trade. In September 1208 the towns had sworn fealty to King John, saving only their loyalty to their own ruler. This pledge was renewed in April 1213. Meanwhile, many of the Flemish nobles were eased away from their pro-French orientation by the increasing burdens inherent in their French fiefs and by the carefully directed largess of the English king. Support for the English alliance grew, and on 10 July 1213 Fernando formally declared his support for King John. The allies' cause enjoyed early success, when the flotilla intended to carry a French invasion force to England was caught at anchor in Damme, the harbour of Bruges, by a combined English and Flemish fleet. In the resulting action the French fleet was completely destroyed. Although Count Fernando was forced to flee the vengeful French counter-attack, the alliance held firm. English money helped stiffen Flemish resolve, and in the spring of 1214 King John jubilantly welcomed Fernando to England to plan an elaborate campaign against the French king.²⁰

Distrust for Philip Augustus extended beyond England and Flanders, enabling John to conclude further alliances intended to contain the French king. John found an eager partner in Emperor Otto IV (1209-1214).²¹ Otto had enjoyed the constant support of the Plantagenet kings, to whom he was related, but by the second decade of the thirteenth century far more than kinship and gratitude for past favours bound Otto and John together. In 1212 Philip Augustus had openly supported the claims of Otto's rival, Frederick of Hohenstaufen, to the imperial throne. While the French king had in this way won the approbation of Pope Innocent, he had also attracted the antipathy of the emperor.²² Moreover, the emperor was strongly supported in this political orientation by the mercantile interests of his own countrymen.²³ The other leading protagonist in the coalition was Renaud of Dammartin, the exiled count of Boulogne, who acted as a negotiator and recruiter of further allies on John's behalf.²⁴ Such then was the coalition to which the Portuguese royal house had indirectly linked its fortunes.

Louis' hostility was of his own initiative, against his father's wishes. Yet Philip Augustus' failure to either mediate with or indeed compensate the injured count argues against his innocence.

²⁰ Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders*, pp. 152-3.

²¹ N. Fryde, 'King John and the Empire', in S. D. Church (ed.), *King John. New Interpretations* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1999), 335-46.

²² Bradbury, *Philip Augustus*, pp. 292-3.

²³ Fryde, 'King John and the Empire', pp. 341-2.

²⁴ Bradbury, *Philip Augustus*, pp. 290-2.

Unfortunately for the Atlantic allies operations against Philip Augustus proved disastrous. The southern force under King John met with dismal failure when local allies proved unwilling to face the French army under Prince Louis; the English king was forced into a hurried, ignominious retreat. In the north, an allied army led by Emperor Otto, Count Fernando, Renaud of Boulogne and King John's representative William of Salisbury, confronted an army led by Philip Augustus at Bouvines on 27 July 1214. After a prolonged struggle the allied army was routed. Otto managed to escape the field but found his political position at home fatally weakened; all the other leaders were captured and imprisoned by the victorious French king. Count Renaud of Boulogne ended his days chained in a royal dungeon, while Count Fernando was unable to secure his own release until 1226. Any Portuguese hopes for a strong alliance of Atlantic kingdoms was dashed as Philip Augustus became the dominant figure on the European stage.²⁵

There was another dimension to Portuguese involvement in the politics of the Atlantic seaboard. In 1214 Afonso's representatives negotiated a marriage between his sister, Berengaria, and King Valdemar II of Denmark (1202-1241). The details behind the marriage are obscure, yet the growing common interests among the Atlantic seaboard rulers seems to have played a key role. Although earlier in their respective careers the Danish king and Emperor Otto had been territorial rivals, by the end of the first decade of the thirteenth century they had established a workable *détente* and were moving toward formal arrangements of mutual support.²⁶ During this same period King Valdemar had good reason to feel considerable personal hostility toward Philip Augustus. In 1193 a marriage had been arranged between the French monarch and Valdemar's sister Ingeborg. This match proved to be a disaster. Immediately after the marriage, for unclear personal reasons, the French king repudiated and imprisoned his unfortunate wife. Philip Augustus then began a relationship with Agnes of Méran, whom he later married in defiance of ecclesiastical prohibition. Ambassadors sent by Valdemar to remonstrate with Philip Augustus were arrested; even the intervention of

²⁵ Bradbury, *Philip Augustus*, pp. 279-311.

²⁶ Danish support for the alliance between Otto and John was evident from at least 1207. In this year the Emperor was conveyed to England on Danish ships to secure an emergency subsidy of 6,000 marks from the English king. Fryde, 'King John and the Empire', p. 342.

Pope Innocent left the French monarch unmoved. Not until 1213, with the death of Agnes, was Ingebor allowed to return to court.²⁷

In the first decade of the thirteenth century two spheres of influence converged. One surrounded Emperor Otto and included King Valdemar, the other, focusing on King John, encompassed Count Fernando and, slightly more distantly, his brother King Afonso. This extended network of association provided the contacts required to sustain preliminary negotiations, while the animosity Fernando and Valdemar shared for the French king provided further encouragement for a marriage linking their two houses. A match was duly arranged in 1214 between the Danish king and Afonso's sister Berengaria. Unfortunately she was queen for only a few years and died in 1221. Nevertheless Valdemar was eager to maintain his links with Portugal and subsequently married Afonso's daughter Leonor in 1229.²⁸ For the Portuguese royal family these nuptials represented important milestones: they were the first to be concluded with a non-Iberian monarch. Through the Danish marriages of first Berengaria and then Leonor, the Portuguese monarchy at last secured its place among the crowned heads of Europe.

During the early years of Afonso's reign a re-engagement with the Atlantic maritime states offered opportunities for the hard-pressed monarch. While events beyond his control brought most of these possibilities to nothing, the Portuguese king was nevertheless able to extract some concrete benefit. The marriage of Fernando and Joanna in 1212 not only strengthened links between Portugal and Flanders, but also reinvigorated relations between the Portuguese and Fernando's Atlantic allies. This policy had the potential to yield spectacular gains. Victory over the French king would clearly have elevated Afonso's brother Fernando and his allies to political predominance in Europe. Equally decisively, French defeat would have dramatically weakened the influence of Pope Innocent, for the pontiff was involved in disputes with the leaders of the Atlantic alliance and had been a consistent supporter to Philip

²⁷ Jim Bradbury, *Philip Augustus King of France (1180-1223)* (London: Longman, 1998), pp. 177-84. For a feminist/postmodernist approach to Philip Augustus' first marriage see Nanna Damsholt, 'Medieval women's identity in a postmodern light. The example of Queen Ingeborg', in B. P. McGuire (ed.), *The Birth of Identities. Denmark and Europe in the Middle Ages* (Copenhagen: Reitzel, 1996), 225-41.

²⁸ These two marriages deserve a modern assessment. The standard reference remains Luciano Cordeiro, *Berenguela e Leonor, Rainhas da Dinamarca* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1984). This work is essentially a compendium of material originally published in the nineteenth century. A decade later these links again came to the fore when Afonso's second son, also called Afonso, married Mathilda, the heiress of Count Renaud of Boulogne in 1239. Serrão and Oliveira Marques (eds), *Nova História de Portugal*, 3, p. 115.

Augustus.²⁹ A weakened papacy could only have been to the long-term benefit of the Portuguese king in his struggle with the local Church. Yet these hopes, along with those of all the allies, were dashed on the field at Bouvines. Out of the wreckage, however, Afonso was at least able to rescue one corollary advantage. Marriage of his sister Berengaria and then his daughter Leonor to King Valdemar of Denmark brought the Portuguese monarchy visible proof of acceptance among other crowned heads of Europe.

Constraint by other means: the legal innovations of Afonso II

Numerous siblings could be a mixed blessing for a reigning monarch. Close relatives provided the means to establish links with other potentates, but an extended family could also drain royal resources and raise the spectre of pretence to the throne. Afonso's brothers, Fernando and Pedro, left the kingdom soon after his coronation. While relations with Fernando appeared amicable, Pedro demonstrated no love for his brother and a willingness to act against his interests.³⁰ Yet Afonso's sisters, Queen Teresa and the Infantas Sancha and Mafalda, posed the greatest problems for the king.³¹ The sisters held substantial lands and privileges, and were prepared to contend with the king to retain their positions of virtual autonomy. When military coercion failed Afonso turned to legal measures, seeking to overturn the dictates of his father's will by recourse to Latin Christian theories of primogeniture. Although this was at odds with common Iberian practice, Afonso was ultimately successful in gaining papal endorsement of his sovereignty. The price for victory, however, was a dangerous acknowledgement of papal authority.

²⁹ It is interesting to hypothesise on what the result of an allied victory might have been. Both John and Otto could certainly have maintained their resistance to Pope Innocent; the pontiff would have lost his primary supporter. It is not, therefore, too much to conclude that the French king was fighting not only for his own, but also for the pope's political survival. For the relations between the papacy and secular leaders see above, pp. 258-9.

³⁰ During the early years of Afonso's reign Pedro led a Leonese contingent in support of his sisters' defiance of Afonso II. Later Pedro took command of the Christian mercenaries employed by the Almohad caliph at Marrakesh. Simon Barton, 'Traitors to the Faith? Christian Mercenaries in al-Andalus and the Maghreb, c. 1100-1300', in R. Collins and A. Goodman (eds), *Medieval Spain, Culture, Conflict, and Coexistence* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 29. While there, he played a major role in the early history of the Franciscans. See Colin Smith, *Christians and Moors in Spain*, 3 vols (Warminster: Aris & Philips, 1988), 2, pp. 26-31. He later accepted an Aragonese offer to become ruler of the Balearic Islands, Herculano, *História de Portugal*, 2, p. 304.

³¹ Teresa gained the status of Queen through her marriage to King Alfonso IX of León in 1191. After their separation in 1196 she continued to use the royal title. Antunes, 'Conflitos políticos', pp. 47-62.

Under the terms of Sancho's will Teresa, Mafalda, and Branca had received huge, potentially autonomous estates. Anticipating Afonso's attempts to curtail their independence, the sisters moved quickly to gain papal confirmation of their rights under the will.³² Afonso, meanwhile, sought to impose royal authority over these lands by insisting that his troops garrisoned frontier castles and royal taxes were paid. The sisters resisted these demands by every means at their disposal. Mafalda attempted the subterfuge of granting her lands to the Hospitallers, to be taken over after her death, thus gaining the immunity of the order while enjoying the revenues of the estates during her lifetime.³³ The other sisters strengthened their fortresses and manned them with troops hostile to the king.

Afonso attempted to force his sisters into submission. Royal officials seized Mafalda's disputed lands from the Hospitallers; the knights raised a storm of protest and immediately petitioned Rome for aid. Teresa and Branca continued in their defiance and suffered sieges of their fortresses as a result. The infantas replied by seeking the support of Teresa's ex-husband, King Alfonso of León. Despite the papal truce imposed upon the Iberian leaders, the king of León promptly invaded the Minho region in the company of Afonso's brother Pedro and Teresa's son Fernando. The resulting war devastated the countryside and squandered the wealth of both sides.³⁴ Yet because the Portuguese king could be deemed to have launched the first attack, he was excommunicated by the archbishop of Compostela and the bishop of Zamora, while the kingdom was laid under interdict.

With his soldiers thus outmanouvered, Afonso turned the fight over to his lawyers, who enjoyed far greater success. Royal agents took their case to Rome and were able to induce Pope Innocent to concede the injuries done to Afonso along with his right to redress them. Crucial to the king's case was an attempt to overturn the terms

³² On 7 October 1211 Innocent sent letters to the archbishop of Compostela and the bishop of Zamora confirming the sisters' rights and authorising excommunication against anyone who sought to infringe upon them. Three days later similar letters were sent to the sisters themselves. *Bulário*, pp. 315-7, 318-20; PL 216: 473-5. In a sign of rising tensions, these bulls were repeated the following year. *Bulário*, p. 327.

³³ *Bulário*, pp. 330-1.

³⁴ '...rex Legionensis predictus, cum quo idem rex [i.e. Alfonso] firmam pacem se habere putabat una cum P(etro) ipsius regis Portugalie fratre ac cum Petro Fe(rnandi) et F(ernando) ejusdem T(arasie) filio ex inproviso regnum ejus invasit et, cum confinia regni communita non essent, pluribus villis campestribus incendio devastatis, quedam castra etiam occupavit quorum unum dicto fratri ejusdem regis Portugalie committens pro cetera per se ac filium suum contra justitiam detinet occupata.' *Bulário*, pp. 332. In a letter subsequently sent to the Pope, Sancha claimed the dispute had cost over 30,000 maravedis, while

of his father's controversial will through an insistence on the inviolability of the royal patrimony. Afonso's agents argued that Sancho did not have the legal right to alienate royal lands he had himself inherited. Although such theories were commonly acknowledged in Latin Christian society, from the Iberian point of view Afonso's interpretation of the law was a novel one.

Portuguese historians have long recognised the growing internationalism of royal administration, as epitomised by the long-serving, Bologna-trained Chancellor Julião.³⁵ When the king's agents argued that maintenance of the patrimony was a paramount royal duty, they were in reality appealing to a Latin Christian rather than a local tradition. Recent studies of Portuguese noble families suggest that while there was a trend toward primogeniture during the twelfth and thirteenth century, this change was by no means generally accepted.

...there are many examples of records of partible inheritance from which we may conclude that equitable divisions between all the children was frequently the norm. The eldest son might receive a slightly larger share, the *melhoras*, but the main practice was a division of patrimonial goods by which all heirs profited. Indeed, according to law of the late thirteenth century...all children had to receive equal shares. In short, we have to acknowledge that the system in place was a mixed one, in principle agnatic but retaining many residual cognatic elements.³⁶

The actions of the royal family have tended to obscure the realities of traditional Portuguese rules of inheritance. Both Afonso Henriques and Sancho came to the throne in unusual circumstances: the first through rebellion against his mother, the second following a long apprenticeship as heir-apparent. Neither monarch had to contend with numerous siblings. Sancho's division of the kingdom was, therefore, in perfect accordance with the mores of Portuguese society. Perhaps the clearest evidence of this

Teresa estimated her expenses at over 50,000. António Brandão, *Crónicas de D. Sancho I e D. Afonso II*, ed. A. de Magalhães Basto (Lisbon: Biblioteca Histórica, 1945), pp. 268-9.

³⁵ For the importance of Chancellor Julião, who served both Sancho I and Afonso II with distinction, see Antunes, 'Conflitos políticos', p. 48, n. 55, and p. 66, n. 120; and Maria J. Branco, 'The King's Counsellors' Two Faces: a Portuguese Perspective', in P. Linehan and J. L. Nelson, *The Medieval World* (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 524-8.

was the inability of royal agents to find local precedent for overturning a will dividing the patrimony. Instead they were forced to rely on the opinion of Pope Alexander III as phrased in the terms of the bull *Manifestis probatum*.³⁷

Nevertheless Pope Innocent was swayed by such arguments, and appointed the sympathetic abbots of Espina and Osera to bring the warring parties to agreement. The abbots were attuned to papal nuance and soon found in favour of the king.³⁸ In December 1213 Afonso gave his gratitude concrete expression by paying the arrears of the papal tribute. Despite this setback the sisters continued their resistance, and forwarded letters to the pope claiming the king had misled the unworldly monks.³⁹ A weary Pope Innocent agreed to allow representatives from both camps to argue the case before the papal curia in Rome; the result was an overwhelming victory for the monarchy.⁴⁰ Through recourse to legal measures Afonso won a resounding triumph, benefitting financially as well as emphasising the uniqueness of his position by establishing the special status of royal lands. Yet victory came at the high price of elevating Latin Christian cultural mores above local custom; along with an open acceptance of papal rights of adjudication.

King Afonso came to the throne in 1211 severely hampered by the tumultuous events at the close of his father's reign and by the disposition of royal assets dictated by Sancho's will. Those successes he did enjoy came directly from his ability to take advantage of Latin Christian cultural influence in the kingdom. Engagement with the Atlantic states brought stronger links with foreign powers and through them a reinforcement of royal prestige. Locally, Afonso was able to utilise novel legal concepts to recoup a measure of the royal authority dissipated under the terms of his father's will.

³⁶ M. J. V. Branco, 'The Nobility of Medieval Portugal (XIth--XIVth Centuries)', in A. J. Duggan (ed.), *Nobles and Nobility in Medieval Europe. Concepts, Origins Transformations* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2000), p. 235.

³⁷ Antunes, 'Conflitos políticos', p. 52; Branco, 'The Kings' Counsellors' Two Faces', pp. 526-7.

³⁸ In August 1212 Innocent accepted this argument on the indivisibility of the royal patrimony in the dispute provoked by Mafalda's grant of lands to the Hospitallers, *Bulário*, p. 330. A month later he informed the abbots that 'duo castra Alanker et Montem Maiorem, videlicet in non parvum regis et regni prejudicium et gra[vamem...] concessionem, rex idem asserit invalidam extitisse tum quia dictus pater ipsius tunc temporis positus extra mentem nequaquam intelli...get tum quia contra indulgentiam felicitis memorie Alexandri pape [III] predecessoris nostri extitit attentata qua cavetur [ut nullus] rex Portugalie regnum ipsum in prejudicium possit minuere sucessoris.' *Bulário*, pp. 331-2.

³⁹ *Bulário*, pp. 348-9; PL 216: 855-6.

⁴⁰ In April 1216 Innocent lifted the ecclesiastical penalties imposed upon Afonso, declared his actions against his sisters justified, and denied them any right of compensation. Provisos in Sancho's will limiting the authority of his successor were declared void. The castles which had sparked the controversy were to be given into the keeping of the Templars, on the understanding that they would not be held against royal interests. *Bulário*, pp. 376-8.

Thus royal success in the early decades of the thirteenth century was also a triumph for Latin Christian cultural influence. Yet Afonso also understood what the papacy expected of an Iberian monarch, and despite a personal dislike for military adventures, he began to associate himself more closely with the prosecution of the reconquest.

Observing from a distance: Afonso II and the reconquest (1211-1223)

Afonso II presided over a period of considerable frontier expansion. The Portuguese king played a limited personal role, but was nonetheless able to benefit from the efforts of others. Afonso took no part in the Christian victory at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212, and even when the focus of the reconquest shifted to Portugal four years later, the king declined to assume military command. In 1217, after a long siege and a major battle, the important Muslim-held stronghold of Alcácer do Sal was captured by a mixed force of local Portuguese troops and visiting crusaders. Although this success was achieved without royal participation, Afonso was clearly aware of the political value of being perceived as a defender of the frontier. Despite his own indifferent crusading credentials, the Portuguese king was careful to garner as much reflected glory as possible.

In 1215 Pope Innocent determined to promote a major expedition – the Fifth Crusade – to restore Jerusalem to Christendom. In obedience to the pope's call a large flotilla of ships from the Rhineland and Frisia set sail in May 1217.⁴¹ As had become common practice with such northern fleets, the ships gathered at Dartmouth, where they bound themselves with laws codifying the organisation of the fleet. Count George of Wied was elected to overall command while Count William of Orange, who had fought with the allies at Bouvines, took command of the rearguard. From the English coast the fleet struck out across the Bay of Biscay, where they suffered considerable loss from storms at sea. The battered flotilla made a brief stop at Compostela to visit the shrine of St James, before continuing down the coast to reach Lisbon in July. On their arrival the crusaders were met by Bishop Soeiro Viegas of Lisbon (1210-1232) and Bishop Soeiro II of Évora (1205-1229) along with the local commanders of the Templars, Hospitallers,

⁴¹ James M. Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade, 1213-1221* (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1986), pp. 124-127, provides a succinct account of the crusaders' participation but provides scanty and sometimes inaccurate information concerning the local contribution.

and the order of Santiago based in Palmela.⁴² The bishop of Lisbon took the lead in the negotiations, preaching a sermon to the newcomers in which a joint assault was proposed on the Muslim-held stronghold of Alcácer do Sal.⁴³ The extant sources agree on the essentials of the resulting discussion, but display significant differences in emphasis.

According to the more florid account of the bishop's entreaty provided by the *Gosuini de expugnatione Salaciae carmen*, Alcácer had become a staging area for devastating raids by land and sea on Portuguese lands. So effective had these attacks become, that an annual tribute of one hundred prisoners was sent to the Almohad caliph in Morocco. Yet Alcácer was more than a hazard for the Portuguese, the strategically-placed fortress was also the key to the defences of the remainder of Muslim Spain. Furthermore, the crusaders were assured, travelling conditions were worsening, and since the crusaders must soon pause in their journey, they might choose to turn a necessary delay into a worthwhile sojourn.⁴⁴ The *Gesta Crucigerorum Rhenanorum*, while in accord over most details, diverges slightly by emphasising the contribution made by the crusader leaders to the argument for attacking Alcácer. It was these men, rather than the bishop, who pointed to the deteriorating weather conditions. Moreover the crusader leaders advocated assisting at Alcácer because they were aware other contingents had been delayed and could not possibly reach the Holy Land until the following season.⁴⁵ Interestingly, the third source, *De iter Frisonum*, glosses over these points and emphasises pecuniary benefit. According to the Frisian author, the crusaders were simply offered the usual inducement of all moveable spoils in the city.⁴⁶ This distinction is significant in light of the varied reaction to the bishop's request.

Many of the crusaders, notably the leaders George of Wied and William of Orange, along with the majority of the Rhinelanders, responded well to the Portuguese

⁴² For the difficult voyage to Lisbon: *Gosuini*, pp. 101-2a; *Gesta*, pp. 29-30; *De Iter*, pp. 59-62. In his account of the first meeting between the contingents Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade*, p. 125, appears to misread the *Gesta* to include Bishop Martinho of Évora among the Portuguese dignitaries. The chronicler reports: 'Severus, episcopus Ulixbonensis, episcopus Eborensis, Martinus, commendator milicie de Palmela, templarii, hospitalarii cum aliis nobilibus...' *Gesta*, p. 30. 'Martinus' was in fact the military commander, rather than the bishop of Evora. The actual Bishop Martinho of Évora did not take office until 1248.

⁴³ Alcácer had been captured by Afonso Henriques and granted to the order of Santiago in 1158, but was recaptured by the Almohads in 1191. See above, pp. 174, 206.

⁴⁴ *Gosuini*, p. 202a.

⁴⁵ *Gesta*, pp. 30-1.

⁴⁶ 'utile hoc fore et honestum multis rationibus asseverans, suum et suorum et regum terre spondens auxilia, lucra promittens quam plurima...' *De Iter*, p. 62.

proposal. But not all agreed. Objections were raised by the Frisians, most volubly the abbot of Werde, and their reservations were serious ones. They argued that Pope Innocent had forbidden impromptu operations of this kind.⁴⁷ The Frisians insisted on total obedience to the papal will and refused to take part in an unauthorised campaign. They would not be reconciled with their fellows and on 28 July, amid considerable rancour, the 80 Frisian ships continued their journey. The remaining 180 crusader ships prepared to move against Alcácer.⁴⁸

Such discord among different contingents of northern crusaders was a common feature of their participation in reconquest campaigns. In this case, however, the points of contention had changed. Earlier disputes had generally revolved around the probity of extending crusading ideology to Iberian campaigns. Yet in 1217 both Frisians and Rhinelanders shared a conception of the crusade as incorporating both armed pilgrimage and the obligation to assist fellow Christians. On their arrival in Lisbon the crusaders drew considerable inspiration from the tombs of their predecessors killed during the siege of the city in 1147. These fallen northerners were clearly accepted by their latter-day fellows as martyrs capable of working miracles.⁴⁹ Equally revealing is the greater moral weight the thirteenth-century crusaders gave to their own motivation. While earlier northerners had been unselfconscious about their hopes for financial benefit, those who elected to stay in 1217 were reticent about such inducements. The departing Frisians, however, recalled the promise of spoils as the major point in the argument they rejected. It is difficult to escape the impression that both groups considered securing financial benefit from these campaigns, even to meet the expenses of pilgrimage, as unworthy of the higher aims of the crusade. Moreover none of the crusaders sought to deny the obligation to defend Christendom in Portugal, or that the Moors were a valid target for sectarian militancy.

If crusaders from both camps could accept the legitimacy of launching an attack against the Portuguese Muslims, where was the point of contention? The primary

⁴⁷ 'quod dominus Innocentius in concilio negaverat ipsi episcopo petenti, licere peregrinos in Hispania detineri...' *De Iter*, p. 63. Possibly they were alluding to the petition Bishop Soeiro made to the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 for crusading indulgences to be offered for an attack on Alcácer. Innocent had rejected the proposal, preferring to concentrate all efforts on the Holy Land. Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade*, p. 125.

⁴⁸ On this at least, all the chroniclers could agree: *Gosvini*, p. 103a-b; *Gesta*, p. 31; *De Iter*, pp. 62-3. The Rhinelanders noted with sullen satisfaction that several of the Frisian ships encountered the predicted adverse weather conditions and were forced to rejoin them at Alcácer anyway. *Gesta*, p. 31

⁴⁹ '[Heinricus], princeps milicie christiane, ante 70 annos ibidem cum suo armigero vitam finivit in Christo: qui nunc divina revelatione canonizatus....' *De Iter*, p. 62; cf. *Gesta*, p. 30.

objections were made by the abbot of Werde, on the grounds that Pope Innocent himself had forbidden wayside campaigning. Thus, in an ironic reversal, resistance did not come from lay soldiers pursuing an earlier, simpler concept of pilgrimage, but rather from the very clergymen who throughout the twelfth century had sought to broaden the concept of crusade to include an obligation to defend fellow Christians. Yet the explanation for this clerical volte-face was simple: from the outset of the crusading movement successive popes experienced great difficulty controlling a crusade once it had been initiated; one of the few effective levers the papacy possessed was the obligation represented by the crusader vow. In 1217 therefore, papal insistence on directing all aid to the Holy Land led to this anachronistic ecclesiastical re-emphasis of the pilgrimage aspect of the crusade.

Despite opposition from elements of their own clergy, the majority of the northern crusaders chose to add their support to the attack on Alcácer. Throughout August the allies maintained a fruitless siege of the town as attempts at assault and undermining were thwarted by the tenacious defenders. The governor of the city, Abu Abdulah, sought aid from his neighbours; they acknowledged the strategic importance of the fortress and moved quickly to assemble a relief force. Troops from Badajoz, Seville, the Algarve and other more distant towns were joined by cavalry from Cordova. To the dismayed crusaders this force appeared overwhelming: they estimated the enemy at as many as 100,000 troops led by either three or four 'Saracen kings' (*Sarracenorum reges*). Flagging Christian moral was lifted by the fortuitous arrival of reinforcements led by the commander of the Portuguese Templars, Pedro Alvaritis.⁵⁰ The two armies met on September 10 in sanguinary battle, and while the course of events is unclear, the Muslim line was eventually overwhelmed.⁵¹ Despite the destruction of the relief force the city continued to resist for several weeks, until finally capitulating on October 21. While the majority of the inhabitants were enslaved, a

⁵⁰ There is great variation in the accounts provided by observers. *Gesta*, pp. 31-32 claims four kings and 100,000 soldiers; *Goswini*, pp. 103 included only three kings and less than half as many troops. Although Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade*, p. 126 believed 'Petrus' the Templar commander, to be Peter of Montague, who was master of the Templar order from 1222 to 1232, Pedro Alvaritis appears in documents as master of the Portuguese chapter from 1213 until 1222. M. S. Dias, *Os Templários em Terras de Portugal*, (Coimbra: Dias, 1999), pp. 77-8, 96.

⁵¹ So unclear was the turmoil of battle that many among the crusader army accorded victory to the appearance of a spectral, white-clad army bearing red crosses. *Gesta*, pp. 32-33; *Goswini*, pp. 103-4.

number accepted Christian baptism, presumably to avoid this fate. Among them was the governor of the town.⁵²

In the wake of victory the Portuguese clergy attempted to maximise the possibilities the new strategic situation presented. The bishop of Lisbon sped a letter to Rome asking that the fleet remain for another year to complete the conquest of the peninsula. Count William of Orange added his weight to the request, pointing out the decisive nature of the victory and claiming the Muslim governor, Abu Abdulah, had converted to Christianity after witnessing miracles on the battlefield.⁵³ Pope Honorius offered his congratulations, but only permitted Bishop Soeiro to grant absolution from their vows to crusaders actually unable to continue their pilgrimage.⁵⁴ Obedient to these commands, the crusading fleet wintered in Lisbon then continued their eastward voyage in March 1218.

The actions of religious leaders during the Alcácer campaign provide an important insight into the internal social and political situation in Portugal. Local ecclesiastical institutions, both secular clergy and military orders, demonstrate a remarkable initiative, not to mention a startling disobedience to papal commands. Despite being forbidden to proceed with the plan by the Fourth Lateran Council, the Portuguese bishops continued planning for the operation without pause. Long preparation is clear from the speed with which local forces were mustered, and supplies sufficient for the combined force gathered. More importantly, victory was won without royal participation or encouragement. The majority of the Portuguese troops came from the three military orders, as did the commanders. Thus not only did the local clergy usurp, if only briefly, the papal control over the crusading fleet, the ecclesiastical institutions had effectively excluded the king from the cutting edge of the reconquest.

Where was King Afonso during these decisive months? No surviving source records his personal involvement, and his apparent animosity toward the bishop of Lisbon immediately after the campaign suggest that events occurred without his full approval.⁵⁵ In fact surviving royal charters indicate that the king and his court remained

⁵² 'Sed dominus castri, Abur dictus, cum pluribus obsidibus super pacto servando acceptis baptismum petiit, nec longe post in errorem pristinum est reversus. *Gesta*, p. 33. This is the first clear account in which the Portuguese apparently condone the common crusading practice of allowing defenders to avoid the worst repercussions of defeat by accepting baptism.

⁵³ MGH *Epistolae saeculi XIII* eds G. Pertz and C. Rodenburg, 3 vols (Berlin, 1883-94), no. 35, 36.

⁵⁴ *Regesta Honorii Papae III*, ed. P. Pressutti, 2 vols (Rome: Typographia Vaticana, 1888), I, 997, p. 170; I, 1027, p. 174.

⁵⁵ Antunes, 'Conflitos políticos', pp. 63-5; and see above, pp. 290-1.

in Coimbra, attending to what must have seemed a far greater threat in the north from his female relatives and the King of León. Nevertheless Afonso was aware of the political benefits of being associated with the reconquest and his agents in Rome acted accordingly. When writing to Pope Innocent concerning the dangers of the infantas' semi-autonomous position, Afonso was careful to place the conflict within the framework of sectarian warfare. In order to strengthen the royal case, the sisters were accused of undermining the king's ability to fulfil his primary task of campaigning against the Muslims.⁵⁶ The tactic was successful, with the pope becoming more sympathetic to Afonso's position. Royal agents no doubt continued to link their king with the military exploits of his subjects, for on 11 January 1218, only a matter of months after the fall of Alcácer, Pope Honorius reissued *Manifestis probatum*, conceding the king a papal mandate to rule. Implicit in this grant was the obligation to defend the frontier.⁵⁷

The capture of Alcácer do Sal proved to be the last documented instance of close cooperation between visiting crusaders and local Portuguese troops; it was a triumphant finale and confirmed the eclipse of Almohad power begun at Las Navas de Tolosa four years earlier. Beyond being an important military success, the campaign indicated that unresolved tensions still existed when crusade ideology was applied to reconquest campaigns. Moreover, while the central role of Portuguese church leaders in planning and conducting the campaign demonstrated that ecclesiastical institutions might usurp the process of the reconquest, the aftermath of victory confirmed that the wider political benefits of success were available only to the king.

Conflicts between crown and mitre in Afonso's final years (1218-1223)

By 1218 King Afonso had made great strides in re-establishing royal authority, largely through his calculated embrace of Latin Christian cultural expectations. Throughout this period the Portuguese clergy remained outside royal control, indeed the king's campaign to restore royal pre-eminence over his family had strengthened the position of the local Church. In the final five years of his life Afonso turned his attention to

⁵⁶ Pope Innocent appeared to accept Afonso's claim that the action against his sisters fell within the preparations for the campaign of Las Navas de Tolosa: 'cum karissimus in Christo filius [noster] rex Castelle illustris contra mauros pro defensione christiani nominis profecturus ad ferendum sibi auxilium regem sollicitaret eundem, ipse [i.e Afonso] prudenter statum considerans regni sui...' *Bulario*, p. 332.

limiting the wealth and privilege enjoyed by ecclesiastical institutions. His favoured method was legalistic, and he attempted to extend the precedents created by his victory over his own relatives as far as possible. This policy provoked sharp resistance. Against a background of rising tension Afonso became involved with a series of bitter confrontations with his bishops. While initially the king seemed prepared to brave the resulting ecclesiastical censures, circumstances largely beyond his control undermined his ability to resist. As a result, Afonso's attempt to limit the power of the Portuguese church ended in failure and left the monarchy in an even weaker position than it had been at his own accession.

In 1218, after over a decade on the throne and having secured the reissue of *Manifestis probatum*, Afonso felt able to begin testing the legal and financial privileges enjoyed by the Church. The recently established principle forbidding the alienation of the royal patrimony offered a useful precedent. Reasoning that many of his father's other donations might similarly be declared illegal, the king launched a formal investigation of land ownership and financial immunities. Between 1216 and 1220 royal agents scoured the kingdom, examining documents and questioning the oldest of local residents. Their findings were carefully tabulated for presentation to the king. The *Confirmações* examined the rights by which the aristocracy and Church held their lands, while the *Inquirições Gerais* sought to establish the legitimacy of earlier royal donations and exemptions. The result is a Portuguese Domesday Book, a snapshot of property ownership in many regions of the kingdom.⁵⁸ The royal auditors discovered numerous abuses and recouped a significant amount of dissipated royal revenues, but this success came at the cost of antagonising both the noble families and the Portuguese church.⁵⁹ Relations further deteriorated when Afonso began imposing additional financial obligations on churches, and bringing defaulting clerics before secular courts.

The first open breaches between the king and the higher clergy involved Bishop Pedro Soares of Coimbra and Bishop Soeiro of Lisbon; in both cases the central issue was royal interference in ecclesiastical affairs.⁶⁰ Few details of the crisis in Coimbra can be established, but there are indications that visiting Dominican preachers spoke out against Afonso's policies, then sought episcopal protection from the resulting royal

⁵⁷ *Regesta Honorii*, 1, 990, p. 169; Brandão, *Crónicas de D. Sancho I e D. Afonso II*, p. 278.

⁵⁸ For the surviving records of this survey, PMH, *Inquisitiones*, pp. 1-287.

⁵⁹ Branco, 'The General laws of Afonso II', pp. 79-85.

⁶⁰ Antunes, 'Conflitos políticos', pp. 62-73.

backlash.⁶¹ Events in Lisbon can be more satisfactorily reconstructed. When Bishop Soeiro was absent from the city and preoccupied with the attack on Alcácer do Sal, Vicente, the dean of Lisbon, took the opportunity to introduce several measures for local reform. On his triumphant return the bishop reacted angrily to these unauthorised initiatives. Vicente was ousted from office and expelled from the city. After successfully petitioning the king, Vicente conducted a campaign of intimidation against Bishop Soeiro and the canons. Faced with such strong secular interference in his affairs, the bishop turned to Rome for assistance. Pope Honorius ordered the abbot and prior of Alcobaça, along with the chanter of Coimbra, to bring the groups together in negotiation. The three were able to restore harmony and Vicente returned to office as dean in Lisbon.⁶²

Yet even as this conflict was being resolved other clergymen were finding reasons to defy royal authority. In 1218 or possibly 1219 King Afonso began demanding the *colheita* (maintenance of the court) from ecclesiastical institutions, in direct contravention of the agreements made at the *cortes* in 1211. The leading prelate in the kingdom, Archbishop Estêvão Soares da Silva of Braga (1212-1228), responded by summoning a church council where he publicly berated Alfonso's policies and moral character.⁶³ Possibly too, the archbishop opened negotiations with nobles hostile to the king, including Afonso's illegitimate half-brother Martim Sanches.⁶⁴ Royal officials replied by concentrating their auditing efforts in the Braga region and directly threatening archiepiscopal assets with confiscation. In response Archbishop Estêvão

⁶¹ For the possibility of Dominican instigation, Antunes, 'Conflitos políticos', p. 65. The history of the mendicant orders in Portugal during the early decades of the thirteenth century lacks an adequate modern assessment. The Portuguese took a leading role in the formation of the Franciscan order, with both Infanta Teresa and Infante Pedro figuring prominently in the early Franciscan missions. See Smith, *Christians and Moors in Spain*, 2, pp. 26-31. Among St Francis' early followers was St Anthony of Padua, who was in fact born and raised in Lisbon. *Vita sancti Antonii*, PMH SS, pp. 116-8. The Dominicans were to have a dramatic impact in Portugal, particularly during the period of the Inquisition. In the first half of the thirteenth century, however, the friars simply complicated an already tense political situation.

⁶² *Nolumus p: eteritarum*, 25 October 1218. *Regesta Honorii*, 1, 1652, p. 275; *La Documentación Pontificia de Honorio III (1216-1222)*, ed. D. Mansilla (Rome: Instituto Español de Estudios Eclesiásticos, 1965), 192, pp. 152-3.

⁶³ Honorius prefaced the bull *Quod solite solutionis*, 22 December 1220, with a long description of his views on the causes of the dispute. *Regesta Honorii*, 1, 2910, p. 480; *Documentación Pontificia de Honorio*, 343, pp. 253-6; Brandão, *Crônicas de D. Sancho I e D. Afonso II*, pp. 280-2.

⁶⁴ Martim Sanches had supported the infantas during their resistance to Afonso. After their discomfiture he travelled to León, where King Alfonso granted him substantial holdings on the Leonese border with Portugal, in the Trás-as-Montes region. In June 1218 Martim Sanches gave concrete evidence of his support by granting Archbishop Estêvão the hamlet of Ervededo in Galicia. Brandão, *Crônicas de D. Sancho I e Afonso II*, pp. 226-9.

excommunicated the king and his closest advisors, and imposed his interdict upon the kingdom. The angry king then ordered the systematic seizure or destruction of the archbishop's revenues. When the burghers of Coimbra and Guimarães enthusiastically joined forces with local knights and royal officials to obey the king's orders, the archbishop excommunicated everyone involved. Further violence followed, and Archbishop Estêvão was obliged to flee the kingdom with a few loyal companions.⁶⁵

On his arrival in Rome the archbishop received a sympathetic hearing at the papal curia. In December 1220 and January 1221 Pope Honorius ordered the suffragans of Braga to establish a special fund to support the archbishop financially during his struggle with Afonso; the collection and administration of this fund was placed in the care of the bishops of Osma and Palencia. Other Portuguese clergymen were given the delicate task of remonstrating with the king. At the same time a letter was sent to Afonso admonishing him against accepting evil council, with Pedro Anes and the chancellor Gonçalo Mendes singled out for special censure. Afonso was further warned that should he persist in disobedience the pope would absolve his subjects from their loyalty and authorise other princes to attack the kingdom and keep their gains.⁶⁶

These measures were far more comprehensive and indeed more threatening than those launched by Pope Innocent III against King Sancho I at the height of their dispute. Despite the escalation of papal censures, however, the Portuguese clergy may not have been completely committed to the archbishop's cause. Bishop Pedro of Coimbra, who

⁶⁵ Ironically the absence of these companions is only known because it is mentioned among the details provided by the royal officials undertaking the *Inquisitiones* in the Braga region. Herculano, *História de Portugal*, 2, pp. 294-5.

⁶⁶ On 21 December 1220 Honorius cancelled the rights of patronage over the Portuguese church granted by Innocent III on 23 March 1212 (*Bulário Português*, p. 324) in the bull *Cum felicis memoriae*. *Regesta Honorii*, 1, 2905, pp. 479-80; *Documentación Pontificia de Honorio*, 342, pp. 253. On the same date a bull, *Certantibus pro justitia*, was sent to the bishop of Osma and the bishop and dean of Palencia ordering them to arrange the fund; similar letters were sent to the suffragans themselves. *Regesta Honorii*, 1, 2906, p. 480; *Documentación Pontificia de Honorio*, 341, pp. 252-3. The following day, 22 December 1220, came the bull *Quod solite salutationis*, which included the description of the controversy, a particular attack on the royal officials Gonçalo Mendes and Pedro Anes, along with a stern warning that Afonso's subjects would be released from their oaths of loyalty and the kingdom be given over to the depredations of other kings and princes. *Documentación Pontificia de Honorio*, 343, pp. 253-6. On the same day another bull, *Cum te tanquam*, was sent to King Alfonso of León, asking him to support the archbishop. *Regesta Honorii*, 1, 2911, pp. 480-1. Furthermore, on 23 December 1220, further bulls, *Ad nostram noveris*, *Cum pro eo*, *Gravi nobis venerabilis*, and *Sua nobis venerabilis* were sent to ecclesiastical officials in Astorga, Orense and Tuy ordering them to remonstrate with King Afonso concerning his treatment of the archbishop, his use of civil courts against clerics, and his attempts to tax the Church. *Regesta Honorii*, 1, 2919-2922, p. 482; *Documentación Pontificia de Honorio*, 346-9, pp. 257-60. On 4 January 1221 the bishops of Tuy, Palencia and Astorga were sent a further command to counsel the king against heeding the evil counsel of Pedro Anes and Gonçalo Mendes. *Cum nonnunquam*

had been a steadfast defender of ecclesiastical rights during Sancho's reign, refused to promulgate the archbishop's interdict in his see until forced to do so by papal intervention.⁶⁷ Royal resistance was bolstered by such disunity, and Afonso was able to continue the business of royal government without apparent difficulty. Pedro Anes and Gonçalo Mendes remained in their offices and indeed were rewarded for their efforts; measures to restrict clerical privilege continued.⁶⁸ For three years the archbishop remained absent from his palace. On 16 June 1222, in a tacit acceptance of the failure of ecclesiastical censures to impose a settlement upon the king, Honorius issued a second wave of threats.⁶⁹ Yet what finally brought the royal party back to the negotiating table was not papal fulmination, but unexpected developments closer to home.

Despite Archbishop Estêvão's flight from the kingdom, his ally, Martim Sanches, continued to threaten the northern borders of the kingdom. Toward the end of 1219 Afonso's half-brother invaded, and a series of skirmishes saw the Portuguese defenders worsted. Several border towns, including Chaves, were occupied by Leonese troops.⁷⁰ While such border disputes no doubt unsettled the royal party, the threat was limited by the treaties still technically in force between the Portuguese and the Leonese.⁷¹ In fact a greater threat lay at the centre of the court itself. In November 1221 the king drew up his will, an action indicating serious fears concerning his health. Such fears proved well founded, but the king's rapid physical deterioration was only part of the problem. Equally devastating for the monarchist cause was the minority of the heir-apparent, Sancho, who was perhaps thirteen years of age at the time of his father's

mores, *Documentación Pontificia de Honorio*, 357, pp. 263-4. For further discussion of these documents see Antunes, 'Conflitos políticos', pp. 68-9, n. 125.

⁶⁷ *Sperebamus hactenus*, 23 December 1220. *Regesta Honorii*, 1, 2917, p. 481.

⁶⁸ Antunes, 'Conflitos políticos', p. 169, n. 126.

⁶⁹ Honorius forwarded three bulls to Portugal on 16 June 1222. In *Etsi venerabili* the pope contrasted the humility of the archbishop with the arrogant defiance of the king, and reiterated the threat to free Afonso's subjects from their oaths of loyalty and his rivals from any moral restraint. The bull *Noveritis nos* ordered the abbots of Osseira and Cela Nova to excommunicate any supporters of the king and to suspend from office Vicente, dean of Lisbon, along with the chanter of Oporto and the dean of Coimbra. A final, more hopeful bull, authorised Archbishop Estêvão to lift any of these ecclesiastical censures. *Regesta Honorii*, 2, 4045-6, p. 81; *Documentación Pontificia de Honorio*, 407, p. 301.

⁷⁰ The *Livro de Linhagens do conde D. Pedro*, 25G3, includes the chivalric tale of Martim Sanches' refusal to fight until the Portuguese banners had been removed from the field. Although poetic licence seems to be at work here, the story itself is of interest as an indication of nascent patriotism among the arms-bearing classes. Unfortunately it is not made clear whether he is uneasy about fighting fellow Portuguese, his brother, or an invalid.

⁷¹ Portuguese emissaries journeyed to the Leonese court, where they obtained the king's assurance that the treaties were still in force and that Martim Sanches' actions would not be the prelude to a more extensive campaign. Herculano, *História de Portugal*, 2, pp. 297-301; see also Antunes, 'Conflitos políticos', pp. 71-3.

decline. Afonso's own fears of mortality combined with the prospect of a long regency forced the king to seek reconciliation with his clergymen.⁷²

The trusted royal agent Vicente, dean of Lisbon, was commissioned to open negotiations with the archbishop of Braga. This proved to be a slow process. On 25 March 1223, before any agreement could be reached, the still-excommunicated king died. Archbishop Estêvão obdurately refused to allow Afonso church burial, so the monks of Alcobaça exercised their technical immunity from his control and laid the body to rest in their own chapel. Nevertheless, with their bargaining position weakened by the death of the monarch, royal officials were obliged to accept Archbishop Estêvão's terms in order to secure clerical support for young Sancho.⁷³

After almost a decade of gradual success in re-establishing royal authority Afonso felt ready to challenge the formidable strength of the Portuguese church. The king attempted to weaken the higher clergy by curtailing the privileges granted by his predecessors, privileges which he had been forced to confirm to the *cortes* at the beginning of his reign. Unfortunately for Afonso's plans, royal power proved unequal to the pervasive authority of the Church. Yet rather than the spiritual weapons wielded by the clergy, it was the threat posed by secular rivals, and by the king's own failing health, that finally forced the monarchist party to accede to papal demands. Thus, despite King Afonso's many efforts, he passed a diminished royal authority on to his son Sancho.

Part 2: The reign of Sancho II

Sancho II succeeded to a tottering throne and spent his reign fighting a rearguard action against the powerful secular and ecclesiastical nobility. Amid a rising tide of anarchy he sought to portray himself in the traditional mode of Christian warrior in defence of the frontier, and by doing so won initial support from the papacy. This support evaporated when the king attempted to limit the privileges of the local Portuguese Church. Sancho

⁷² Under the terms of Alfonso's will, completed even before a settlement had been reached, both the heir and the kingdom were placed under papal protection. Brandão, *Crônicas de D. Sancho I e D. Afonso II*, pp. 283-5. On 24 October 1224 Pope Honorius accepted responsibility for the kingdom and the young heir. He sent an Apostolic nuncio, Gosaldo, to assist Mestre Vicente in administering the kingdom after the king's death and made suitable provisions for overseeing the kingdom. *Regesta Honorii*, 2, 5135-7, p. 275.

⁷³ Agreements between the archbishop and the new government were duly ratified in June 1223. See below, n. 75.

was unable to control the rising tide of disorder in the kingdom and was eventually toppled in a Church-sponsored coup. The reconquest was completed by his successor, Afonso III, but the final campaign in the Algarve took on a completely secular character. In an atmosphere free from crusading or reconquest ideology, the last Muslim stronghold at Faro surrendered to the attacking army without fanfare or bloodshed in 1250.

An advance on two fronts: the early reign of Sancho II (1223-1241)

The reign of Alfonso II closed with the Church in the ascendant and the young heir, Sancho II (1223-1248), raised to the throne without a clearly established regency. The higher clergy remained hostile to the monarchy and many of the secular nobles had been alienated by Afonso's financial stringency. From this position of weakness, Sancho II attempted a restoration of royal fortunes. In the absence of a strong economic or political base, the young king adopted the only avenue remaining open to him: military leadership. By enthusiastically embracing the crusade, Sancho enhanced his reputation locally and at the same time attracted valuable papal support. Yet for the royal party, the primary threat to centralised authority remained the independence of the Church, and Sancho gradually renewed the campaign to limit ecclesiastical power. For a time military success against the Muslims blunted resistance to royal policy, but ultimately the rising chorus of clerical displeasure brought the process of the reconquest itself to an ignominious halt.

At the time of his father's death Sancho was perhaps fourteen years old and may himself have been of delicate health.⁷⁴ The vulnerability of the young monarch forced the royal court to seek rapid reconciliation with the most dangerous of its adversaries. Archbishop Estêvão of Braga was offered massive financial compensation for the depredations of royal officials during his conflict with King Afonso. In June 1223 the archbishop accepted the crown's offer and lifted the ecclesiastical censures laid on the

⁷⁴ The exact date of Sancho's birth is unknown. The age of fourteen has been arrived at from the date of his parents' marriage in 1208 or 1209 and a comment in the agreement with the infantas in 1223, which noted that the king was approaching his majority at that time. Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 123-4. Afonso's will made careful provision for the succession should Sancho die without heirs of his own. Brandão, *Crónicas de D. Sancho I, e D. Afonso II*, pp. 283-5.

kingdom.⁷⁵ In recognition of Sancho's youth and the threat of Muslim attack, Pope Honorius took Sancho under his protection.⁷⁶ Before the end of the year an agreement was also reached with Infantas Teresa and Sancha. Despite the setbacks they suffered in the papal courts, Afonso's sisters had continued the family feud, hampering domestic royal administration and souring relations with León. After Afonso's death the infantas negotiated a compromise with their nephew in which they retained most of their holdings for life. The lands would then revert to the crown.⁷⁷ Thus, in the first year of Sancho's reign two of his father's major crises had been defused, yet at considerable cost to the crown, in terms of both assets and prestige.

Although Sancho had come to the throne at a tender age, this was by no means unusual, nor did it preclude him from quickly taking command of the royal army.⁷⁸ The young king soon demonstrated a break with the style of leadership his father had offered, by launching a series of attacks against the Muslims to the south.⁷⁹ With the issue of the infantas no longer barring relations with León, Sancho was able to coordinate his campaign with that of his neighbour, King Alfonso. When the Leonese launched an assault on Badajoz in July 1226, Sancho led the Portuguese against the city of Elvas.⁸⁰ By 1232 royal forces had taken the important southern strong-points Serpa and Moura. Three years later Sancho captured Aljustrel, which was given into the

⁷⁵ Sancho paid 6,000 morabitanos outright to the archbishop. In addition a clerical committee was established to adduce the archbishop's further damages from a fund set aside of 50,000 morabitanos. Brandão, *Crônicas de D. Sancho II e D. Afonso III*, pp. 345-7.

⁷⁶ *Regesta Honorii*, 2, 5135, 5137, p. 275.

⁷⁷ The agreement was reached on 23 June 1223. Under this agreement Teresa and Sancha kept Alenquer for life, after which it passed back to royal control. Teresa also retained Montemor and Esqueira until her death, at which time they would pass to Branca. When Branca died Montemor would return to royal control, while Esqueira would be granted to the monastery of Lorvão. Brandão, *Crônicas de D. Sancho II e D. Afonso III*, p. 347-51; Antunes, 'Conflitos políticos', p. 62.

⁷⁸ Sancho's situation has many parallels. Philip Augustus, for example, was crowned in 1179 at the age of fifteen. He immediately assumed full authority and took control of his father's chancery seal. J. W. Baldwin, *The Government of Philip Augustus: Foundations of French Royal Power* (Berkeley: UP, 1986), p. 6. In Iberia, moreover, the tradition was to knight youths at around age fifteen, as had been the case for both Afonso Henriques and Sancho I. This represented their passage to full adult rights.

⁷⁹ As Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus hispanie*, 8. 6, p. 228 summarises: 'Sancius...succeserit in regno. Huius temporibus Helvus, Iurmenia, Serpia et multa alia castra Maurorum Christianorum victoriis accesserunt. Adhuc extat et Dominus dirigit vias eius.'

⁸⁰ Lucas of Túy, *Chronica mundi*, 6. 96, p. 336, recalled: 'Sancius rex Portugalie cum exercitu suo omnia que erant circumcirca Elvas vastavit, et ambo reges ad propria reversi sunt.' A charter granting a subsidy to Alfonso Mendes Sarracenes de Paredes suggests the king led from the front, for Sancho stated 'Et hoc facio pro multo bono servitio quod tu Alphonsus Menendi mihi fecisti, et maxime in Elvas, ubi intrasti in cavas expenendo corpus tuum morti pro me.' Brandão, *Crônicas de D. Sancho II e D. Afonso III*, p. 26. The three year interval between the initial attack and the granting of a charter has attracted attention from Portuguese historians, who have suggested two attacks took place, the first either failing, or managing only to sack the town. A subsequent attack in 1229 then brought the city under Christian control. It has

keeping of the knights of Santiago. Shortly afterwards the town of Arronches also fell to the Portuguese. At around the same time royal forces took Mértola and Alfajar de Pena, both of which were similarly granted to the military order.⁸¹

The Portuguese king's activities soon attracted the support of the papacy. In a sign of encouragement, on 19 October 1225 Pope Honorius granted Archbishop Estêvão the authority to absolve foreign crusaders from their vows to continue the journey to Jerusalem. Presumably this was to allow the archbishop to induce visiting crusaders to become involved in local campaigns.⁸² More importantly, Sancho's attempts to restart the southward expansion in Portugal led the papacy to pacify the more fractious members of the clergy. Between 1223 and 1228 there was a rising chorus of complaint from ecclesiastical groups. The bishops objected vociferously to royal impositions; monasteries accused secular clergymen of despoiling them; all railed against the king's leadership. Sancho's military initiatives encouraged a muted papal response.⁸³

Honorius' successor on the throne of Saint Peter, Gregory IX (1227-1241), displayed even greater interest in Portuguese efforts on the frontier. The new pope adopted a different strategy for dealing with the Portuguese situation. Rather than allow the local bishops further authority, he dispatched a legate, Jean d'Abbeville, to assess the situation. If the bishops hoped for action against the king, they were to be disappointed. The papal legate concentrated his efforts on purely ecclesiastical infractions, including the bishops' own abuses of power. In 1229 a council was held in Portugal to formalise the limits placed on bishops and to initiate a new offensive against the Muslims.⁸⁴ Following these events Portuguese bishops found their complaints to Rome elicited a less sympathetic response. In October 1232, and again in August 1234,

further been suggested that the initial failure to secure Elvas led to a rebellion against the king. Antunes, 'Conflitos políticos', p. 98.

⁸¹ In the absence of detailed chronicles the progress of the southward expansion must be deduced from the granting of *forais*. Sancho granted settlement charters to frontier settlements at Morão (1226) Sortelha (1228) Castelo Mendo (1228), Salvaterra do Extremo (1229) and Elvas (1229). Such charters sometimes include a brief acknowledgement of recent conquest, such as: 'volo populare Eluas quam habeo ha sarracenis.' PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 606-10, 616-20. For the repopulation in Sancho's reign see Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 126-7.

⁸² *Regesta Honorii*, 2, 5693, p. 377. Exactly who these crusaders were, however, is unclear. This is the sole hint of foreign crusaders active in Portugal after 1217.

⁸³ Fortunato de Almeida, *História de Portugal*, 1, p. 206, observes: 'Parece que o Pontífice não atribuiu demasiado valor ás queixas de Martinho Rodrigues [the most vocal complainant], algumas das quais não teriam sólido fundamento.' For the details of the papal response, *Regesta Honorii*, 2, 6187-8, p. 470.

Pope Gregory admonished the bishops for stirring unrest that might undermine the war effort.⁸⁵ The pope also supported Sancho directly. On 24 October 1234 Pope Gregory conceded indulgences equivalent to those received by crusaders to the Holy Land for campaigns undertaken by the Portuguese king. This grant was to last for four years and included forces under the king's brother, Fernando of Serpa, who acted as his lieutenant during these offensives.⁸⁶

Yet crusading success only masked the problems of the kingdom. The deterioration of centralised royal government allowed conflicts between feuding or extortionate nobles, both ecclesiastical and lay, to explode into violence and disorder. Meanwhile, these same magnates continued to rail against any royal attempts to limit their authority. The issues raised by bishops in their complaints to Rome were familiar ones: financial exaction by royal officials, secular courts attempting to try clerics, and royal interference in ecclesiastical affairs. Yet the 1230s brought an increased level of acrimony, while the lines of conflict came to be more clearly drawn between royal proponents on one side, and clerical on the other.⁸⁷

Much of this heightening of tension was due to the appearance of new protagonists in both camps. During the early period of Sancho's reign the administration of royal policy had been in the safe hands of Vicente, former dean of Lisbon, who held the office of chancellor from 1224 until 1235. His election as bishop of Guarda left a vacuum in the court, which came to be filled by the less capable Durando Froiaz. Froiaz lacked the delicate touch and grudging respect from the clergy required to maintain a policy of gradual erosion of ecclesiastical privilege.⁸⁸ During the same period, moreover, a new generation of clergymen took over several of the kingdom's highest ecclesiastical offices. Archbishop Estêvão of Braga died in 1228 and

⁸⁴ Almeida, *História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 206-7; Antunes, 'Conflitos políticos', pp. 81-2. The scope of the legate's re-organisation is indicated in a letter he sent to Rome reporting the removal from office of almost 2,000 clergymen. Peters, 'Rex Inutilis: Sancho II of Portugal', p. 269.

⁸⁵ 18 October 1232. *Les Régistres de Gregoire IX*, ed. L. Auvray (Paris: Bibl. Écoles fr. d'Athènes et de Rome, 1890-1916), no. 926; 31 August 1234. *Quadro elementar*, 9, p. 121; Peters, 'Rex Inutilis: Sancho II of Portugal', p. 272.

⁸⁶ Brandão, *Crônicas de D. Sancho II e D. Afonso III*, pp. 352-5. This was the first time crusading indulgences were offered specifically for a Portuguese campaign. Some historians have highlighted this as a watershed in local acceptance of the doctrines of Holy War. Carl Erdmann, 'Der Kreuzzugsgedanke in Portugal', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 141 (1929), 25-54; trans. by A. Pinto de Cavalho as *A Ideia de Cruzada em Portugal*, (Coimbra: Publicações do Instituto Alemão, 1940), p. 47.

⁸⁷ For an exhaustive discussion of the complex, intricate conflicts during this period see Antunes, 'Conflitos políticos', pp. 73-98. For a briefer and clearer description, Peters, 'Rex Inutilis: Sancho II of Portugal', pp. 269-72.

⁸⁸ Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 1, p. 130.

was replaced by Archbishop Silvestre Godinho (1229-1244), the next year Bishop Soeiro of Évora breathed his last and after several years of uncertainty was succeeded by Bishop Fernando (1235-1246). The death of Bishop Martinho of Oporto led to the election of Bishop Pedro Salvadores (1235-1247).⁸⁹ While each of these changeovers brought with it a period of confusion, the events following the death of Bishop Soeiro of Lisbon in 1232 provide a particularly illuminating insight into the unsettled state of the kingdom.

Bishop Soeiro of Lisbon was succeeded in 1234 by the short-lived Bishop Paio, who died only a few months after taking office. The unexpected death threw the city into confusion once again, for there were two strong episcopal candidates. The first was João Rolis (also known as Johannes Falbertus) who was the papal physician and dean of Lisbon. A strong proponent of ecclesiastical rights, João was opposed by Sancho Gomes, who enjoyed King Sancho's support. Violent partisan struggles erupted, in which royal troops played an active role on behalf of the king's favoured candidate. Events reached a tragic climax when Fernando of Serpa surrounded a group of João's supporters in a Lisbon church. The royal troops refused to attack holy ground, so Fernando incited the local Moors to launch an assault. The situation soon rapidly got out of control, and in the resulting riot several of João's supporters were killed and the church was looted. This thoughtless act of violence proved to be a public relations disaster. Sancho and Fernando had shared the glory of crusading success, now they were linked in infamy. Against a background of clerical outcry the royal brothers were forced into a humiliating submission and acceptance of heavy penance.⁹⁰

To secure concord with the clergy Sancho agreed to devote himself to the southward expansion. In 1240, with considerable help from the Order of Santiago, royal troops captured Ayamonte and the important port of Cacela on the southern coast of Portugal. In 1242 the Portuguese took control of the neighbouring harbour town of

⁸⁹ Peters, *Rex Inutilis: Sancho II of Portugal*, p. 270, concludes: '...the articulate hostility of a new generation of clerical opponents (and perhaps their greater legal skill), and the failure of Sancho's later advisors to measure up to the diplomatic and legal ability of the earlier great chancellors Mestre Julião and Mestre Vicente, all contributed to a unified opposition...' See also Branco, 'The Kings' Counsellors' Two Faces', pp. 528-30.

⁹⁰ These events are described in lurid terms in the papal bull *Tyrannidem Quam* promulgated in May 1238. Fernando was struck with remorse for his actions and journeyed to Rome to seek absolution. His penance included financial restitution, personal obeisance, and acts of contrition such as ransoming 20 Christian captives, having no further dealings with the Moors, and fighting on the frontier for three years. This penance was recorded in the bull *Contra omnem hominem* (13 December 1239). Peters, *Rex Inutilis: Sancho II of Portugal*, p. 270.

Tavira, which was also given over to the knights of Santiago.⁹¹ This advance to the sea effectively isolated the last Muslim strongholds in Portugal from their co-religionists to the east. Plans were then developed for a campaign to overwhelm this final Muslim enclave and crusading indulgences were obtained for operations by land and by sea. In the midst of these preparations, however, Sancho allowed himself to be distracted, his interest waned and eventually the campaign was ignominiously abandoned. This was to prove a decisive failure of royal policy for, as Edward Peters observes:

...in not having pursued the crusade, Sancho abandoned the one course of action which might have saved him. With support for his crusade gone, Sancho forfeited his strongest claim not only to a higher status than that of the clergy, but to any right to rule at all.⁹²

The Portuguese king returned his attention to domestic issues. By the end of 1242 the possibility of reconciliation between Sancho and his opponents was dwindling and a viable opposition had begun to coalesce outside the borders of the kingdom.

In the early years of his reign King Sancho pursued an aggressive expansionist policy against the disintegrating Almohad territories in the south. Success on the frontier enhanced the young king's reputation, but did little to improve the overall authority of the crown. Papal goodwill proved ephemeral in the face of royal heavy-handedness, while many of the concrete financial benefits of the territorial expansion were secured not by the king, but by the military orders. Thus Sancho, unlike his predecessors on the throne, was unable to translate military endeavour into lasting political advantage and his position remained a fragile one.

A descent into anarchy: the deposition of Sancho II (1241-1248)

In the final years of Sancho's reign the kingdom lapsed into political disorder. The clergy placed the blame for this situation squarely on the shoulders of the individual king, rather than on the inherent weakness of the Portuguese monarchy, and a radical solution was adopted. Whereas earlier popes had threatened deposition, in 1245 Pope

⁹¹ Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 126-30; Brandão, *Crónicas de D. Sancho II e D. Afonso III*, pp. 67-77. The donation charters for Ayamonte and Tavira are reproduced, pp. 356-8.

⁹² Peters, 'Rex Inutilis: Sancho II of Portugal', p. 273.

Innocent IV (1243-1254) actually intervened to remove the king. The result was a civil war in Portugal between King Sancho and his brother, Afonso of Boulogne. While Pope Innocent claimed to be acting in the interests of the Portuguese people, and of Sancho himself, he could not have been unaware of the striking example of papal power the deposition presented to other disobedient monarchs. Whatever Pope Innocent's ultimate motivation, the unhappy fate of King Sancho reverberated across Europe, while in Portugal it brought widespread social unrest in addition to a certain disenchantment with Latin Christian cultural mores.

By the end of the 1230s royal inability to contain social disorder produced a steady stream of complaint. Papal patience was further tested by the failure of the king to fulfil his promises to respect the rights of the Church and to continue campaigning against the Muslims.⁹³ Yet Sancho's next action only increased tension. Soon after 1240 the king married Mécia Lopes de Haro, the daughter of the lord of Biscay and the widow of Álvaro Peres de Castro. This match was politically sensitive due to the opposition of the clergy and the impact it might have on relations between the Portuguese noble houses. Not only did clergymen voice objection to Mécia's character, but the couple also fell within the forbidden degrees of consanguinity: the uncanonical marriage was seen by many in the Church as a direct insult.⁹⁴ Perhaps most importantly, Sancho's marriage seemed to goad his brother, Afonso of Boulogne, into negotiations with the king's many opponents.

King Sancho's younger brother Afonso, who in 1239 had married Matilde, the heiress of Boulogne, was second in line to the Portuguese throne and would remain so until Sancho had legitimate heirs; the king's marriage to Mécia made this a sudden possibility.⁹⁵ Afonso's early role in resistance to his elder brother is unclear, but by 1243 the count was certainly aware of the political opportunities arising in his homeland. On 29 June the patent rolls for Bordeaux record the grant of a safe-passage

⁹³ The papal view of the situation of the kingdom was graphically presented in the papal bulls *Inter alia desiderabilia*, demanding Sancho mend his ways or face deposition, and *Grandi non inmerito*, which actually ordered the deposition to take place. Innocent accused the king of allowing the abuse of churches, a general lawlessness, the rise of public immorality, and a neglect of the frontier. See below, n. 104.

⁹⁴ Antunes, 'Conflitos políticos', pp. 99-100; Peters, 'Rex Inutilis: Sancho II of Portugal', p. 271.

⁹⁵ Mathilde of Boulogne was the daughter of Count Renaud of Dammartin, who had been a leading figure in the alliance against Philip Augustus. He had been captured after Bouvines and died in captivity. See above, pp. 277-8. It has been suggested that Afonso was involved in an earlier rebellion against his brother in the 1220s, and it was this which led to his leaving the kingdom. Antunes, 'Conflitos políticos', p. 99.

for Afonso of Boulogne to undertake a pilgrimage to Compostela; French chronicles record his passage in 1244.⁹⁶ Such a journey suggests the count sought a first-hand appraisal of the kingdom. No doubt the signs of deteriorating central control and the large number of disgruntled magnates excited his ambition still further.

Events outside Portugal also had a decisive impact on the rising tension within the kingdom. In 1240 the higher clergy of Latin Christendom were summoned to a papal council in Lyon, to be held the following summer. In obedience to this call many Portuguese ecclesiastical officials undertook the journey. By the end of 1240 the archbishop of Braga and the bishops of Lisbon, Oporto and probably Coimbra all began a long sojourn in Rome. The absence of so many of his primary opponents encouraged King Sancho to extend his campaign against Church privilege. Unfortunately the grouping of so many dissident clergymen in Rome allowed them to present a particularly forceful case to the papal curia. Through the final years of Gregory's pontificate these men canvassed for decisive moves to be made against the Portuguese king.⁹⁷ This lobbying was halted by the pope's death in 1241, and the turmoil surrounding the appointment of his successor, but in December 1243 a pope highly receptive to their pleas was elected. Pope Innocent IV quickly demonstrated a determination to bring secular government into obedience. He immediately took up the cause of the Portuguese prelates by promulgating a series of bulls that constituted a direct attack on Sancho's kingship.

In the first of these letters, sent at the end of January 1245, Pope Innocent advised the count of Boulogne to raise an army for a crusade in the Holy Land.⁹⁸ The second bull, ostensibly in reply to a petition from Count Afonso, ordered the archbishop of Compostela and the bishop of Astorga to annul the marriage of King Sancho and Mécia.⁹⁹ In March Pope Innocent sent a letter directly to Sancho admonishing the king over the state of the realm, and warning him that the bishop of Oporto and the bishop and Dominican prior of Coimbra had been appointed to oversee his behaviour and

⁹⁶ Odber de Baubeta, 'Some Early English sources', pp. 208-9.

⁹⁷ In the final months of 1240 these prelates sent a petition to the weakened Pope Gregory, without apparent result. Peters, *Rex Inutilis: Sancho II of Portugal*, p. 273.

⁹⁸ 30 January 1245, *Terra sancta Christi dispersa*, Visconde da Santarém, *Quadro elementar*, 9, p. 121. Livermore, *A History of Portugal*, pp. 127-8, interprets this as permission to raise an army for use against his brother.

⁹⁹ 12 February 1245 *Sua nobis*, *Quadro elementar*, 9, p. 144; *Les Régistres d'Innocent IV*, ed. É. Berger (Paris: Bibl. Écoles fr. d'Athènes et de Rome, 1884-1920), no. 995.

report back to the Council of Lyon.¹⁰⁰ The following month a letter was sent to Count Afonso granting him and his troops crusader privileges in Spain.¹⁰¹ Finally, on 25 July, came the bull of deposition, under which the pope formally transferred the authority of the kingdom to Afonso, while allowing Sancho to retain the dignity and title of king.¹⁰² In September Count Afonso met with leaders of the Portuguese clergy in Paris and swore an oath to uphold their privileges and immunities.¹⁰³

What was Innocent's motivation for this unprecedented action? Papal documents claim the pontiff's overriding concerns were the security of the kingdom and the salvation of the king's soul. Sancho was portrayed as not so much evil (*rex iniquus* or *tyrannus*) as ineffective (*rex inutilis*).¹⁰⁴ Yet pressing issues far closer to the papal court may also have influenced Innocent's actions. On 17 July 1245, during the final session of the Council of Lyon, Pope Innocent took the dramatic step of deposing Emperor Frederick II.¹⁰⁵ It is possible that Pope Innocent saw the situation in Portugal as an opportunity to demonstrate the fullness of papal power to other monarchs, particularly the defiant emperor. Certainly Emperor Frederick himself interpreted Sancho's fate as such, and sped letters to other royal courts attacking the impropriety of the pope's actions and highlighting the danger it represented to all European monarchs.¹⁰⁶

Irrespective of Pope Innocent's ultimate aims in declaring his support for Count Afonso, his actions precipitated a civil war that convulsed Portugal for two years.

¹⁰⁰ 20 March 1245 *Inter alia desiderabilia*. *Annales Ecclesiastici*, ed. O. Raynaldi (Colonia Agrippina, 1664), 21, no. 6, pp. 318-9. Partial text in Peters, 'Rex Inutilis: Sancho II of Portugal', pp. 274-5, nn. 51-2.

¹⁰¹ 8 April 1245 *Cum zelo fidei*. *Regesta pontificum Romanorum inde ab anno 1198 ad annum 1304*, ed. A. Potthast, 2 vols (Berlin, 1874-5), no. 11625.

¹⁰² 24 July 1245. *Grandi non inmerito*. Brandão, *Crônicas de D. Sancho II e D. Afonso III*, pp. 358-9; *Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio*, ed. J. D. Mansi, 55 vols (Florence, 1759-1962), 23, cols. 652-3; *Les Régistres d'Innocent IV*, no. 1389.

¹⁰³ 6 September 1245. For the details of the agreement, Brandão, *Crônicas de D. Sancho II e D. Afonso III*, pp. 363-4; *Quadro elementar*, 9, pp. 153-7.

¹⁰⁴ Among the king's many failures his inability to defend the frontier against Muslim incursion is particularly highlighted: 'Terras insuper et alia christianorum bona in confinio Saracenorum posita non defendens, ea infidelibus devastanda, seu etiam occupanda es animi pusillanimitate relinquit.' Peters, 'Rex inutilis', p. 259, n. 8. For an extensive discussion on the technical legal ramifications of these terms see Peters, 'Rex Inutilis: Sancho II of Portugal', pp. 258-63.

¹⁰⁵ David Abulafi, *Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor* (London: Penguin, 1988), pp. 368-406. For the background to this dramatic step, Laurie Shepard, *Courting Power: Persuasion and Politics in the early Thirteenth Century* (New York: Garland, 1999), pp. 57-74, 189-207.

¹⁰⁶ 'Requirimus igitur, et affectionem vestram rogamus attente, quatenus diligentius advertentes, qualiter summus pontifex suis viribus qui nihil habere debet, cum gladio non contentus, in alienum messem falcem preasumptuosus immittit: et ut non longe petatur a nobis exemplum: qualiter in regno Portugaliae

Skirmishes between followers of the rival brothers were fought in Oporto in the final months of 1245. Afonso landed in Lisbon in the early in 1246, where he was received by the citizens, and the war commenced in earnest. In the absence of sufficient documentary evidence, the details of the conflict can only be guessed at. Despite papal claims of misgovernment and the ecclesiastical censures imposed on those who assisted King Sancho, many of the Portuguese people rallied to his cause. Along with many noble families, townsfolk and soldiers, his aunt Queen Teresa came out of retirement in Lorvão monastery to offer her support. Equally importantly, neighbouring monarchs offered no encouragement to the usurper. Fernando III of León-Castile, who at that time was heavily committed to the siege of Muslim Seville, forwarded an angry communiqué to Rome, accusing Count Afonso of merely exacerbating the kingdom's problems. Pope Innocent replied with a repeat of the charges he had levelled against Sancho and a promise to remonstrate with the count of Boulogne. This response did little to assuage Leonese-castilian unease and Fernando's son, Prince Alfonso, led an army into Portugal to support the beleaguered king. The archbishop of Braga immediately excommunicated the prince and his soldiers. Despite Leonese aid, the campaign gradually went against Sancho. By 1247 he was forced to retire from Portugal and enter exile in Toledo, where he died the following year.¹⁰⁷

After the death of his brother Afonso dropped the euphemistic titles he had previously used and adopted the trappings of royalty.¹⁰⁸ Yet the kingdom he had usurped remained in a highly unstable state. Although local clergymen and Roman canonists might hail the wisdom and indeed the legitimacy of Pope Innocent's intervention, local secular attitudes seemed quite different. Leading members of Afonso's own family had opposed Sancho's deposition, as had the king of León-Castile. This sense of disenchantment also percolated through the arms-bearing class. One poignant example came during Count Afonso's long siege of Coimbra. The loyalty of the royal governor, Martim de Freitas, won the admiration even of his enemies. Yet when Afonso offered to retain Martim in his office, the governor refused and cursed

honoris sibus usurpit dignitatem, curas vestras et animos excitet.' Quoted in Peters, 'Rex Inutilis: Sancho II of Portugal', p. 303.

¹⁰⁷ Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 135-7. For the correspondence between León-Castile and Rome see *Les Régistres d'Innocent IV*, 1932, 8027; and *Regesta pontificum*, 12177, 12512, 12513.

¹⁰⁸ Following the promulgation of the papal act of deposition, Afonso used such neutral titles as *procurator* or *defensor*. After March 1248 he assumed royal status in all future correspondence. Herculano, *História de Portugal*, 3, pp. 15-6.

any of his descendants who would serve the new government.¹⁰⁹ Nor was Martim de Frietas alone in these feelings. In the *Livros de Linhagens* there are clear expressions of disapproval for those knights who joined with Afonso for profit against the rightful king.¹¹⁰ Another secular source, the *cantigas de escarnho* (songs of scorn) performed by troubadours in noble courts, was also heavily critical of Afonso's actions.¹¹¹

In 1245 the frequent threats made by the papacy to depose a recalcitrant king became a reality. Yet to remove King Sancho required a special set of circumstances: it was initiated locally and relied on the willingness and ability of Afonso to topple his brother. The high level of resistance to the usurper, even when he was backed by the full force of Latin Christendom, was indicative of the resilience of local feeling. While the deposition might be seen as a triumph for Latin Christian cultural mores over local custom, the price for victory was a disenchantment in Portugal toward those very ideals. When Afonso III assumed his brother's throne he took leadership of a deeply divided and suspicious people.

A race to the finish: the Portuguese occupation of the Algarve

The years after 1230 saw a remarkable upsurge in militancy along the whole Iberian frontier. Despite the trauma of the civil war, King Afonso III of Portugal moved almost immediately to emulate the efforts of his fellow monarchs in launching major campaigns against the Muslims. While both Aragonese and Leon-Castilian monarchs were careful to promote their victories as crusading or reconquest triumphs, such language is completely absent from Portuguese campaigns. In fact the Portuguese occupation of the Algarve demonstrated a certain paradoxical character: the speed with which Afonso took up the burden of border warfare seems at odds with the restraint of the resulting campaign. Although brief and poorly recorded, the final engagements between Moors and Christians on the Portuguese mainland reveal a great deal about the attitudes and motivations of Afonso III and his war-weary subjects.

¹⁰⁹ Peters, 'Rex Inutilis: Sancho II of Portugal', pp. 304-5.

¹¹⁰ Mem Cravo, who held Lanhoso Castle, and Soeiro Bezerra and his sons, who held castles in Beira were accused of treason for surrendering to Count Afonso. The inference in both cases was that they acted from self-interest alone. *Livro de Linhagens do Conde D. Pedro*, 47C4 (Mem Cravo) and 66G1 (Soeiro Bezerra).

¹¹¹ Peters, 'Rex Inutilis: Sancho II of Portugal', pp. 266-7.

The mid-thirteenth century was a period of intense military activity on the Iberian frontier. The spectacular advances of Aragonese and Leon-Castilian troops were carefully recorded by court historians, who placed upon these triumphs the gloss of religious sanction. King Jaime I of Aragon (1213-1276) earned the epithet 'the Conqueror' through a series of successful campaigns against the Muslims. Between 1228 and 1235 King Jaime's forces captured the Balearic Islands, Majorca, and Minorca. A still greater enterprise was the conquest of Valencia, which Pope Gregory IX proclaimed a crusade in 1232. The long campaign finally ended with complete Christian victory in 1245.¹¹² In contrast to the scant documentary records from Portugal during this period, the kingdom of Aragon produced extensive histories of these campaigns. Most famous of these accounts is an autobiography by the king, entitled *Llibre del feyts*, in which Jaime portrays himself as a crusading king to the virtual exclusion of his many administrative and social advances.¹¹³

Similarly, in León-Castile the period after 1230 was one of almost constant military triumph. The reunification of the two kingdoms under Fernando III quickly bore fruit. In 1236 the city of Cordova fell to Christian arms. Jaen was taken in 1246 and, after a long and difficult siege, Seville also capitulated to Fernando in November 1248.¹¹⁴ These events were dutifully woven into an overall framework of triumphant reconquest by Lucas of Túy and Rodrigo of Toledo. Their work was continued by the court historians engaged in writing official histories for the Leonese-castilian king Alfonso X (1252-84).¹¹⁵ Thus, in both Aragon and León-Castile, the military efforts of kings were matched by the remarkable historiographical work undertaken at their behest.

Afonso joined his fellow monarchs in frontier warfare soon after coming to the throne. Yet Portuguese historians were centuries slower in attributing crusading or reconquest attitudes to these campaigns. From strictly contemporary documents it is possible to glean an impression of the course of events. The royal army consisted of a few nobles and several town militias, but the backbone of the force was the military orders, particularly the knights of Santiago. There was no attempt to obtain any form of

¹¹² Bishko, 'The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest, 1095-1492', in K. M. Setton, (ed.), *A History of the Crusade*, 5 vols (Madison- London: Wisconsin University Press, 1975), 3, pp. 430-1.

¹¹³ John Victor Tolan, *Saracens. Western Christian Responses to Islam* (New York: Columbia UP, 2002), pp. 175-80.

¹¹⁴ Bishko, 'The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest', pp. 426-9.

¹¹⁵ Tolan, *Saracens*, pp. 180-93; Linehan, *History and the Historians*, ch. 13.

outside assistance, either practical or moral: the papacy made no offer of crusading indulgences. The campaign began in the spring of 1249 with the conquest of Santa Maria de Faro, the following year Estêvão Pires de Tavares was named governor. In March 1250 the castle of Albufeira was placed under the care of the military order of Avis. The castles of Porches, Loulé Aljezur and other smaller towns also fell to the Portuguese by the end of the year.¹¹⁶

To the threadbare facts provided by charter documents can be added the more detailed but also more controversial information in the *Chronica da Conquista do Algarve*.¹¹⁷ While questions have been raised over the factual accuracy of much of this chronicle, the businesslike, low-key campaign it describes accords well with the lack of other material. A characteristic example is the description of the capture of Faro, the final event mentioned in the chronicle. After a long siege the defenders were brought to terms in a negotiation completely lacking religious antipathy. The Moors were offered the choice of leaving under safe conduct with their goods, or remaining in the city. Those who chose to stay were guaranteed their houses and lands, for which they would be obliged to pay the same taxes as they had under Almohad rule. Most remarkably, the Moorish knights agreed to swear allegiance to the king as his vassals.¹¹⁸ The mild tone of this exchange seems anachronistic, especially when contrasted with the expressions of pious militancy by the other Spanish monarchs during the same period.

Is it then possible to interpret the speed with which Afonso took up the cause of reconquest as indicative of a rise in religious militancy in Portugal? Certainly Afonso ruled a deeply divided kingdom and finding common cause against an ancient enemy may have seemed an attractive means to unify the troubled realm. Perhaps too the new king felt indebted to the Church for the assistance he had received during his rise to the throne.¹¹⁹ Yet the pragmatic approach the Portuguese adopted during the campaign, as well as the complete absence of celebratory literature dedicated to it, argues against such motives. In fact Afonso's hurried entrance into the reconquest would seem to be above all a reaction to the successes enjoyed by the king of León-Castile.

¹¹⁶ Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 1, p. 138; Herculano, *História de Portugal*, 3, pp. 20-1; Brandão, *Crônicas de D. Sancho II e D. Afonso III*, pp. 147-54.

¹¹⁷ *Chronica da Conquista do Algarve*, PMH SS, pp. 415-20. For the challenges in using this source see J. Mattoso's comments in Herculano, *História de Portugal*, 3, pp. 198, and G. Lanciani and G. Tavani (eds), *Dicionário da Literatura Medieval Galega e Portuguesa*, (Lisbon: Caminho, 1993), p. 176.

¹¹⁸ 'os cavalleiros moros ficam por seus vaçallos, e que andaçem com EllRey quando lhe cumprice...' *Chronica da Conquista do Algarve*, p. 419b.

King Fernando had supported Sancho during the civil war and so could be expected to show scant goodwill toward Afonso. Moreover Fernando's capture of Seville opened Moorish Algarve to further Leonese-castilian attack; these rich lands were as attractive an acquisition for him as for the Portuguese king. In addition, the situation was complicated by the leading role taken by the knights of Santiago in earlier Portuguese advances. Because of the supra-national nature of the military order, the legitimate political orientation of the lands they captured could be unclear, particularly when those lands lay in disputed border territory.¹²⁰ Afonso's eagerness to take up the burden of the southward expansion seems not to have been motivated by religious sentiments or antipathy toward the Moors, but rather his desire to prevent his Christian rival occupying the land before he could himself.

These inherently realistic attitudes can explain the speed with which Afonso embarked on a campaign in the south, and indeed the tolerance he adopted in dealing with the Moors. Yet the complete lack of laudatory chronicles seems odd, particularly in contrast to historiographical work supported in the other Iberian kingdoms. The absence of strong statements of a belief in the reconquest are perhaps the easier to account for. The ideal of reconquest had always held the strongest attraction for the kings of León-Castile, emphasising as it did their hegemony as the heirs to the Visigothic throne. A return to the Visigothic past was less attractive to neighbouring kingdoms, particularly when there was contention over disputed land claims. If Afonso of Portugal championed the right of reconquest he also gave tacit acknowledgement to the primacy of Leonese-castilian claims over the Algarve. For this reason the Portuguese monarchy had since the middle of the twelfth century preferred to use crusading ideology to sanction the southern expansion. Why then did Afonso not attempt to link this final campaign with the crusade? The events of the civil war, particularly Pope Innocent's questionable use of crusading ideology on Afonso's behalf, may have led to a degree of disillusionment toward holy war among the Portuguese people. This would explain Afonso's desire to distance himself from the institution. In any event, the final

¹¹⁹ This is certainly Herculano's view: 'Contraíra uma dívida de sangue perante Roma e perante a Europa: era necessário paga-la.' *História de Portugal*, 3, p. 17.

¹²⁰ 'ho mestre dom payo correa ouve ganhadas estas villas e lugares no Algarve que erão da conquista de El Rey de Castella.' *Chronica da Conquista do Algarve*, p. 419. In the wake of the conquest the question of rights to the land soured relations between the two kingdoms and was only settled by treaty in 1253. Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 37-9.

campaign of the reconquest was fought for purely secular ends, and in the aftermath Afonso saw no benefit in attempting to make it appear otherwise.

During the thirteenth century, even as the reconquest drew to a close, the position of the Portuguese monarchy deteriorated. Royal authority was heavily reliant on the unique relationship an effective monarch could establish with the institutions of Latin Christendom. Afonso II was sensitive to the advantages foreign influences could bring to the crown, both through alliances with overseas magnates and the importation of useful legal concepts. While his lack of military aptitude led him to rely less on frontier defence as a pillar of royal policy, he was nonetheless able to make the most of his indifferent record as a crusader to secure important concessions from the Church. In the end, however, ill-fortune and poor management combined to bring his efforts to nothing. As a result Sancho inherited a still more difficult task. In attempting to establish royal authority on slender means, he was forced to rely on the support his martial prowess might bring. Yet the dwindling importance of the frontier made this an increasingly untenable proposition. In an environment of rising social unrest, Latin Christian intervention increasingly worked against the interests of the crown. This inability of the monarchy to effectively control Latin Christian influence in the kingdom was starkly demonstrated in 1245 with the Church-sponsored deposition of Sancho II. The relationship between the Portuguese king and the institutions of Latin Christendom had overbalanced. The social and political significance of the frontier was gone. For this reason the final campaign of the centuries-long Portuguese reconquest ended quietly, virtually unnoticed outside the borders of the kingdom.

Conclusion

The Neglected Reconquest

The Portuguese experience during the reconquest period has often been subsumed into the history of neighbouring Spain. Yet there were significant differences between the two regions. Eleventh-century Portuguese society was characteristically Iberian, with local horizons and an identity based on regional loyalty; but by the thirteenth century this situation had changed dramatically. Portugal became affiliated into Latin Christendom, although the process of integration was a sporadic one. Tensions between local custom and Latin Christian expectation were only slowly and partially resolved. During these centuries Portuguese leaders won independence from Spanish control, an achievement usually represented as marking the origin of modern Portugal. A focus on Iberian political developments has allowed the significance of Latin Christian influence to be largely overlooked. Nevertheless, the origins of modern Portugal were in fact determined by the local response to Latin Christian expansion, even as this expansion was laying the foundations of Europe itself.

Royal independence and national formation

During the twelfth century Portuguese leaders were able to secure acknowledgement of their political independence, first from the kings of León-Castile and later by the papacy. Modern Portuguese historians have not always acknowledged the significance of Latin Christian influence in the achievement of regional independence. A concentration on political developments has also obscured the more fundamental shift in local identity that truly marked the origins of the Portuguese nation. Afonso Henriques has been lauded as the founding father of modern Portugal, but there are problems in attributing patriotic ambitions to the first Portuguese king. Patriotism can only be felt when individuals and communities within a society begin to perceive an identity wider than narrow kin-groups or local institutions. The achievement of royal status might encourage such attitudes, but it was not in itself a manifestation of them. In fact such widening identities began to emerge in the thirteenth century, as an unintended corollary of royal engagement with Latin Christian culture.

The Portuguese royal family owed its very presence in Iberia to the Latin Christian expansion. The progenitor of the royal dynasty, Henry the Burgundian (1095-1112), was an immigrant knight drawn by the opportunities the frontier offered to a skilled military commander. Henry assimilated quickly into local society, and the early success of the Burgundian dynasty was primarily due to a manipulation of regional circumstances. Afonso Henriques (1128-1185) carried this policy to its furthest possible extent, achieving the pinnacle of local advancement by declaring himself king. Yet a title claimed locally could only be acknowledged locally, and to advance further Henriques turned to his father's legacy of international links. By taking advantage of an aggressively expanding Latin Christendom, Henriques soon gave substance to his royal claims. With the help of northern crusaders the Portuguese king pushed the frontier southward to the Tagus River, effectively doubling his territory and decisively consolidating royal authority within the kingdom. After a long campaign of self-promotion Henriques received papal acknowledgement of his crown through the bull *Manifestis probatum* in 1179. Thus, by placing himself at the forefront of the Latin Christian cultural expansion into Iberia, Afonso Henriques was able to confirm royal authority within his own borders and at the same time secure the independence of the kingdom from external threat.

Were these actions motivated by a proto-nationalist spirit? The promulgation of *Manifestis probatum* resulted from a tireless propaganda campaign by Afonso Henriques, combined with the resistance mounted by Archbishop João Peculiar of Braga (1138-1175) to Toledan ecclesiastical dominance. Together king and archbishop were able to fuel papal doubts over the future of imperial authority in Iberia. Yet the ambitions of the two Portuguese leaders should not be misconstrued, for both men sought aggrandisement: the king for his dynasty, the clergyman for his see. Neither was motivated by patriotic desires. The final actions of King Sancho I (1185-1211) demonstrate the distinction between the independence of the monarchy and the establishment of the nation. In subdividing his estate without consideration for the future coherency of the kingdom, Sancho acted on his assumption that the realm was simply a possession of the king. He accepted no responsibility wider than his own family, thus throwing the kingdom into chaos and fundamentally undermining the monarchy itself.

Yet while Sancho's division of the kingdom reveals the limits of his ambition, the efforts of his successors to restore royal fortunes provide the first indication of something approaching proto-nationalist sentiment. The reign of Afonso II (1211-1223) was decisive in this respect. The *cortes* of 1211 brought different sections of society – nobility, clergy, and merchants – together in common cause to restrict royal authority. Afonso's efforts to re-establish his position actually consolidated these social trends. By appealing to Latin Christian legal precept, Afonso distinguished the royal patrimony from other noble estates. This action allowed the king to reclaim control of crown lands, but in return, Afonso acknowledged limitations on future royal authority, as well as accepting by implication his responsibility for the future stability of the realm. The changing relationship between monarch and kingdom was dramatically demonstrated in the reign of Sancho II (1223-1248). During the crisis of 1245 the deposition of Sancho was justified by papal accusations of incompetence. Sancho's fate demonstrated that a king could be considered as much servant as ruler of the people; and that the interests of the kingdom could be separate and superior to those of any individual monarch.

These political and legal developments were the most visible aspect of a more general shift in attitude. Although early Portuguese kings displayed little nascent patriotic sentiment, royal policies aimed at political centralisation did have important implications for the evolution of a national consciousness. In an effort to garner wealth and military support Portuguese leaders fostered regional urban development. Royal policy actively encouraged travel and cooperation between towns, while citizens themselves became aware of the need for corporate action in defence of the frontier. This local urban trend toward a common identity was greatly encouraged by the growing number of foreign visitors reaching Portugal. Whether as crusaders, clergymen or merchants, increasing contacts between Latin Christians and Portuguese had the effect of consolidating a sense of local identity even as it facilitated an awareness of a wider Christian community.

The two reconquests

Early political and cultural developments in Portugal were decisively influenced by growing links with Latin Christendom. Portuguese secular leaders encouraged the transfer of European institutions in order to strengthen their own efforts toward

centralisation and regional independence. Success required a skilled use of the ethos of the frontier to mediate Latin Christian influence, along with an ability to monopolise the benefits of greater engagement with Europe. Twelfth-century Portuguese leaders were able to establish these conditions, but during the thirteenth century the delicate balance was lost. As royal authority itself came under threat, the pursuit of the reconquest, once so central to the success of the kings, dwindled in significance before the greater challenge Latin Christian cultural permeation of Portugal posed to the very future of the monarchy.

Until the end of the eleventh century, Portuguese society was almost exclusively shaped within an Iberian context; predominant identities and attitudes were locally derived. The coming to power of the Burgundian dynasty marked the beginning of a dramatic social reorientation. The policies developed by Portuguese leaders combined an attention to local factors with an awareness of wider Latin Christian opportunities. The territorial reconquest became a central pillar of secular governance, particularly during the reign of Afonso Henriques. Victory against the Muslims brought a consolidation of local authority; equally it allowed Henriques to extract important concessions from the papacy by portraying himself as an effective defender of a threatened frontier. Meanwhile, the Portuguese king also established wider links with Latin Christendom, by supporting religious reforms, entering into marriage alliances, and fostering international commerce. By the end of the twelfth century these policies had brought dramatic changes to the kingdom. The monarchy had entered into a special relationship with the papacy, submitting to Roman authority in return for guarantees of support and protection. Portuguese society retained many characteristically Iberian traits, but also received cultural influences from continental Europe and, increasingly, from the Atlantic maritime states.

While the twelfth century brought fundamental change to Portuguese society, such change also generated significant tensions. These proved extremely difficult to resolve. Closer engagement with Europe created a complex, culturally confident Portuguese society; this in turn encouraged secular leaders to question the constraints imposed by a distant papacy. The growing friction between royal and ecclesiastical authority was exacerbated by changing attitudes to the frontier. Even as theologians sought to equate the reconquest with the crusade in the popular mind, the concept of holy war itself was changing. Increasingly churchmen saw obedience to ecclesiastical

laws, rather than simple military initiative and prowess, as the means to ensure success. As a result Iberian kings found their most reliable bargaining chip in negotiations with the papacy suddenly, and to them unaccountably, devalued. Furthermore, the Iberian kings were to find that their own success could be held against them. In 1217 the reconquest reached a climax at the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa. With Christian victory the Muslim threat – from a Roman vantage point at least – appeared to have receded. In the wake of this triumph Iberian monarchs found that requests for ecclesiastical leniency based on the needs of frontier defence were received with less sympathy.

Against this background of ideological change the struggle between the Portuguese monarchy and the papacy intensified. Sancho's final years were dominated by a bitter contest with the Church. The royal capitulation in 1211, far from bringing resolution, simply exacerbated tensions. With royal prerogatives undermined, both Afonso II and Sancho II pursued policies designed to take advantage of Latin Christian influence in the kingdom. Afonso chose legalistic measures; Sancho adopted the more traditional guise of frontier defender. In the twelfth century similar policies had enabled Afonso Henriques to secure the kingship; a century later his successors were unable even to maintain their inherited royal authority. By 1248 the Portuguese monarchy reached its nadir in the Church-sponsored deposition of King Sancho II in favour of his brother, Alfonso III (1249-1279). In the wake of this crisis the fall of the last Muslim strongholds had limited political significance; the long campaign ended without fanfare and went virtually unobserved in contemporary chronicles.

The history of Portugal as a frontier between Christendom and the Islamic world is not the story of one reconquest but rather of two. The Portuguese may have waged a territorial reconquest against Iberian Muslims, but the society that emerged from this military contest was itself under a form of cultural incursion from the Latin Christian world. During the twelfth century Portugal's kings were able to use their success as military leaders in the territorial reconquest of Muslim lands to mediate for their own benefit the progress of the Latin Christian cultural reconquest. In the thirteenth century, faced with a more complicated world, the monarchy proved unable to maintain the fine control required to take full advantage of Latin Christian influence. The result was disaster for the royalist cause. This confrontation between local custom and Latin

Christian culture truly was the neglected reconquest; and it was the decisive factor in the political and social formation of early Portugal.

Appendix 1

Portuguese interpretations of the medieval period: continuity in the midst of change

An often quoted Portuguese maxim, *a história é filha do seu tempo* (history is the daughter of its own time), warns that historical interpretations are the product of contemporary political, intellectual, and social trends.¹ Thus, while Portuguese interest in the medieval period has seldom flagged, changing circumstances in Portugal have encouraged a wide variety of interpretation. Although the focus of this thesis has been the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Portuguese historical writing is exotic territory to many medievalists, so an outline of the general phases of Portuguese historiography should be established. An enduring theme of this historiography has been the desire to explain and thereby justify the existence of Portugal as distinct from Spain. One repercussion of this focus on national origins has been the marginalising of foreign influences in the early years of the kingdom, a situation only reinforced by progressive developments in Portuguese historiography.

Until the end of the seventeenth century the writing of Portuguese history was the purview of a small cadre of predominantly ecclesiastical court authors. Their work was characterised by a confident certainty of their facts and a desire to eulogise the deeds of the past. During the eighteenth century the dominance of court historians was successfully challenged by the emerging liberal school. In the wake of this change, academic discourse became polarised. Portuguese historians worked against a background of rising political uncertainty. Through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries republicans vied with monarchists and ecclesiastical apologists; political partisanship reduced scholarly debate into polemic confrontations over the process of

¹ Extended works on Portuguese historiography include A. H. de Oliveira Marques, *Antologia da Historiografia Portuguesa*, 2 vols (Lisbon: Publicações Europa-América, 1974-5) and by the same author *Ensaio de Historiografia Portuguesa* (Lisbon: Palas Editores, 1988); Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, *A Historiografia Portuguesa. Doutrina e Crítica*, 3 vols (Lisbon: Editora Verbo, 1972-4); Luís R. Torgal, José A. Mendez, and Fernando Catroga, *História da História em Portugal. Séculos XIX-XX*, 2nd ed., 2 vols (Lisbon: Temas e Debates, 1998); and Pedro Cardim, *A História: entre Memória e Invenção* (Lisbon: Publicações Europa-América, 1998). For a brief, readily accessible overview see, L. R. Torgal, 'Portuguese Historiography', in D. R. Woolf (ed.), *A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing*, 2 vols (New York: Garland, 1998), 2, pp. 728-31.

national formation. The collapse of republican government in 1926 and the subsequent rise of the authoritarian Salazar regime sharply curtailed academic discussion for almost half a century. The re-establishment of democracy in 1975 reinvigorated the academy; ironically, however, given rapid Portuguese acceptance of the European Union, there has still been little attempt to reconsider the role of Latin Christian influence during the formation of the kingdom.

A struggle for certainty: the court historians and the rise of liberalism

Court historians exercised a virtual monopoly over Portuguese historiography until the eighteenth century. These historians avoided having to grapple with issues of national origins through recourse to the distant past or to pious fable. History was written to appeal to the tastes of wealthy ecclesiastical and aristocratic patrons. Although these works display a rising level of historical knowledge, there was little attempt to revise their essential structure or purpose. The foundation of the Academia Real de História in 1720 marked the zenith of court influence over Portuguese historiography. Yet this institution also provided a focus for opposition, and liberal historians soon began to propose contrary theories of the national past. The confrontation between the two academic schools had significant political overtones. The French Revolution, Napoleonic Wars, and fall of the Portuguese monarchy produced a growing sense of crisis in Portugal, and the tenor of historical debate became increasingly acrimonious.

The court historians avoided many of the questions that were to trouble their successors by accepting without question the continuity between antiquity and their own times. In this way early Portuguese authors were able to exploit a rich vein of explanatory myth. The popular, unsubstantiated legend that Lisbon was founded by Ulysses was presented as fact; authors traced national antecedents back to pre-Roman Lusitanian tribes.² While cultural identity might be sought in the distant past, political independence could be justified by divine injunction. The monks of Alcobaça preserved a document purporting to record a description by Afonso Henriques (1128-1185) of a vision he witnessed on the eve of the battle of Ourique in 1139. In this vision God commanded the Portuguese leader to create an independent kingdom, with his victory

² See for example Bernardo Brito, *Monarquia Lusitania*, ed. A. da Silva Rego, 5 vols (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, 1973-6), 1, chs. 22-3, pp. 305-22.

over the Moors to be interpreted as confirmation of this mandate. The miracle was faithfully recorded by later historians without question.³ The importance of the Ourique myth to the Portuguese monarchy is demonstrated by the prominence in their coat of arms of five small heraldic shields representing the five Moorish kings defeated by Henriques.⁴

These beliefs in the classical origins and divine mandate of the kingdom did not prevent Portuguese court historians from making significant advances in method and knowledge. These advances did not, however, lead to a questioning of basic assumptions, nor did they encourage a revision of the role played by international forces in the foundation of Portugal. The strengths and interpretative weaknesses of the court historians can be highlighted by comparing two accounts of the most direct example of foreign involvement in Portuguese affairs, the capture of Lisbon in 1147. The earlier of these works, the anonymous *Crónica de Portugal de 1419* was, as the title suggests, penned in the fifteenth century. The second work, the seventeenth-century *Monarquia Lusitania*, is a monumental historiographical effort produced by several authors.⁵

The *Crónica de Portugal de 1419* contains an extensive description of the combined operation launched by King Afonso Henriques and the force of Anglo-Norman maritime crusaders. The account can be paraphrased as follows:

At the time Henriques was contemplating an attack on Lisbon a large fleet of Crusaders from northern Europe arrived off the coast; their aim was to fight against the Spanish Moors in the service of God (*que partirom de suas terras e vinhom às Espanhas pera guerear com os mouros por fazer serviço a Deos*).

³ This document was first published by Pedro de Mariz in the second edition of *Dialogos da Varia História* (1599). Its veracity was accepted until the nineteenth century. See A. de Magalhães Basto's introduction to António Brandão, *Crónica de D. Afonso Henriques* (Lisbon: Biblioteca Historica, 1944), pp. xlii-xlviii.

⁴ Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, *A História de Portugal*, 3 vols (Lisbon: Editora Verbo, 1977), 1, pp. 84-5.

⁵ *Crónica de Portugal de 1419*, ed. A. Almeida Calado (Coimbra: University de Aveiro, 1998). This chronicle has previously been published as *Crónica de Cinco Reis de Portugal* in 1943 and a decade later as *Crónicas dos Sete Primeiros Reis de Portugal*. The *Monarquia Lusitania* has had a similarly complex publication history. The compilation of the work actually lasted from 1597 until 1720. The authors were Bernardo de Brito (parts 1 and 2), António Brandão (parts 3 and 4), Francisco Brandão (parts 5 and 6), Rafael de Jesus (part 7) and Manuel dos Santos (part 8). The first five sections have been re-edited as *Monarquia Lusitania*, ed. A. da Silva Rego (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, 1973-6). A. de Magalhães Basto has published António Brandão's component as *Crónicas de Conde D. Henrique, D. Teresa e Infante D. Afonso* (Lisbon: Biblioteca Historica, 1944), *Crónica de D. Afonso Henriques* (Lisbon: Biblioteca Historica, 1944), *Crónicas de D. Sancho I e D. Afonso II* (Lisbon: Biblioteca Historica, 1945), and *Crónicas de D. Sancho II e D. Afonso III* (Lisbon: Biblioteca Historica, n/d). For a

The fleet was commanded by counts and nobles (*muytos condes e outros senhores grãodes*), four of whom were mentioned: William Longsword, Chill de Roolim, D. Leberche, and D. Ligeli. The king persuaded them to aid in the attack on the city. There ensued a discussion of tactics during which Henriques' suggestions were adopted. After the capture of the city many of the visitors decided to stay and were rewarded with large estates by the grateful king. Those who died were buried as martyrs, their tombs subsequently became a site for miraculous healing and visions (*morerum alguns cavaleyros como martires e depois faziam muytos milagres*).⁶

This account borrows heavily from the twelfth-century foundation chronicle of the monastery of São Vicente de Fora in Lisbon.⁷ Significant elaboration is made, however, seemingly on the basis of the author's own imagination and desire to portray Henriques in an heroic light. The role of the visiting soldiery is a peripheral one, as little more than a noble chorus emphasising the king's leadership.

In 1632 António Brandão completed the section of the *Monarquia Lusitania* dealing with the same incident. In the two intervening centuries there had been considerable advance in historical knowledge, yet the essential consistency of the accounts remained.⁸ Although Brandão's description adds little detail to the account of the siege itself, he demonstrates a far greater knowledge of the wider twelfth-century world. He knew the crusading fleet was actually en route to the Holy Land when inveigled into the attack on Lisbon. Furthermore, he was aware that English sources claimed the crusaders were of humble origin, but he quickly rejected the possibility. Instead Brandão confirmed the presence of the many nobles, even adding information on William Longsword's parentage. In common with his anonymous predecessor, Brandão provided a catalogue of foreign knights who remained in Portugal, but his roll-call included several Portuguese nobles he claimed also took part in the siege. An entire chapter is devoted to the creation of a largely spurious list of local noble participants and their descendants.⁹

further discussion of Brandão's work and influence see Oliveira Marques, *Antologia da Historiografia Portuguesa*, pp. 170-7.

⁶ *Crónica de Portugal de 1419*, pp. 46-7.

⁷ *Indiculum foundationis monasterii S. Vincentii*, in PMH SS, pp. 90-3.

⁸ Brandão, *Afonso Henriques*, pp. 118-35.

⁹ Brandão, *Afonso Henriques*, pp. 125-9.

Portuguese historians wrote to please noble patrons; but they also worked against a background of major social change. The capture of Ceuta in 1415 launched Portugal on the great adventure of exploration, the discovery of new lands, and the foundation of a maritime empire. These experiences were reflected in Portuguese interpretations of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The reconquest came to be portrayed as the first phase of a glorious religious and cultural mission of expansion; the bull *Manifestis probatum*, issued by Pope Alexander III (1159-1181) in 1179, was seen not simply as a papal acknowledgement of the monarchy, but more importantly as an early sanction for the empire itself.¹⁰ This teleological approach to the past did not encourage a reappraisal of the essential facts on which interpretations were based. The high point of the influence of court historians came in 1720 with the establishment of the Academia Real de História. The charter and membership of this body reveals much about the motives for its foundation. Its mandate was: 'the preservation of the memory of Portugal and of the prestige of its kings and nobles' by examining 'everything pertinent in all their history and their conquests.'¹¹ The Academia retained a distinctly ecclesiastical character, with the majority of its members, including the first director, D. Manuel Caetano de Sousa (1658-1734), being clergymen. In 1721 King João V (1706-1750), extended the Academia's role to encompass the collection and preservation of all historical documents within the country.¹²

The foundation of the Academia Real de História focused the efforts of those willing to eulogise kings and nobles, but a small group of revisionist scholars gradually began to work outside the restraints it imposed. Drawing inspiration from the liberal movements developing in Europe, they attempted a reassessment of both the centrality of the king and the role of the Church throughout Portuguese history. These first stirrings of liberal scholarship received little official support until a political leader with similar sympathies, Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo (1699-1782), the Marquês de Pombal, rose to power.¹³ The devastating 1755 earthquake left Pombal in virtual control

¹⁰ Luís Ribeiro Soares, 'A bula <manifestis probatum> e a legitimidade portuguesa', in J. V. Serrão (ed.), *8.º Centenário do Reconhecimento de Portugal pela Santa Sé* (Lisbon: Academia Portuguesa da História, 1979), p. 151.

¹¹ 'a preservação da memória de Portugal e do prestígio dos seus reis e senhores... tudo o que pertence a toda a História deles e de suas Conquistas', quoted in L. R. Torgal, 'Antes de Herculano', in Torgal, *História da História em Portugal*, 1, p. 26.

¹² Torgal, 'Antes de Herculano', pp. 25-6.

¹³ Indicative of Pombal's character are two of his lesser reforms. He forbade under law the use of pejorative terms when speaking of the Brazilian native peoples, and justified this by recourse to classical Roman tradition. Charles R. Boxer, *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire* (London: Hutchinson, 1969), pp.

of the country and he instituted a grand plan of reform and restoration. After a bitter struggle with the Jesuits, Pombal forced organisational changes in the university at Coimbra, established several royal schools, and encouraged the study of science.

Under Pombal's rule the first works of Portuguese scholarship openly critical of the Church were produced. Notable among them was the *Dedução Cronológica e Analítica*, an anonymous work attributed to José Seabra da Silva (1732-1813), presenting historical arguments for the expulsion of the Jesuit order and the subordination of Church to State.¹⁴ Portuguese historiography during the Pombal period quickly became polarised between traditionalist scholars intent on defending ecclesiastical and aristocratic privilege, and the liberal historians who were attracted to the intellectual developments of the Enlightenment. Pombal's fall from power in 1777 did not halt the intellectual currents he had loosed. Instead this contrariety between liberal and traditional scholars grew even deeper in the nineteenth century as further turbulence enveloped the country.

The French revolution sparked excitement among Portuguese liberals; but the excesses of the Terror soon disillusioned most commentators. The rise of Napoleon deepened Portuguese unease, and tension reached breaking point when in an effort to blockade Britain the French demanded Portuguese ports be closed to English ships. Refusal provoked an invasion under General Junot in 1807. The Portuguese royal family promptly fled to Brazil, leaving the defence of the kingdom to a combined English-Portuguese army under Sir Arthur Wellesley, (later the Duke of Wellington). In 1808 the French were driven back across the border, but a British force remained to administer the country on behalf of the absent king. Disillusionment with the monarchy deepened as the Empire began to show clear signs of decay. In 1820 disgruntled army officers staged a coup in which they sought to impose a liberal constitution. Conservatives resisted, and the situation quickly degenerated into a civil war. The liberals were ultimately victorious, but their hold on power remained uncertain.

These years of international humiliation and endemic political uncertainty shaped the writing of several of the most influential works of Portuguese history. Yet the tumultuous events had altered forever the way scholars could view the nation's past.

23-4. Pombal was also credited with introducing the fork to Portuguese tables. J. B. Trend, *Portugal* (London: Ernest Benn, 1957), p. 173. For this period of Portuguese history see also D. Francis, *Portugal 1715-1808* (London: Tamesis, 1985).

Civil war had created an irreparable division between the conservatives and liberals, while the actions of foreign powers had disillusioned intellectuals of all political persuasions. Histories with an unashamedly partisan intent were hotly debated as both liberals and conservatives sought support for their own political agendas. The tone of these debates is evident in a 1830 publication by José Liberato Freire de Carvalho (1772-1855). The title can be translated as: *Historico-Political essays concerning the Constitution and Government of the Kingdom of Portugal; in which the kingdom is shown to have been from its origin a Representative monarchy, and that Absolutism, superstition [i.e. the Church], and the influence of England are the reasons for its present state of decay.*¹⁵

Carvalho's work epitomised sentiments within the Portuguese liberal school in the wake of the turbulence of the first decades of the nineteenth century. They blamed their conservative opponents for a long period of national decay; their historical method was to bring into prominence any elements from the past which might be used to support their theoretical position. Wherever possible they sought precedent to limit royal privilege or undermine the influence of the clergy. Conservative writers responded with similarly selective histories intended to bolster aristocratic and Church authority. One overall effect of such antagonistic debate was to prevent interpretations of the reconquest period rising above sterile confrontation over specific, often isolated incidents. Ironically, because one of the few points of agreement between the schools was a wariness of foreign influence in Portugal, examinations of foreign participation in the early kingdom became even further marginalised in the works of both.¹⁶

Alexandre Herculano and the reorientation of Portuguese history

The next phase of Portuguese historical writing was initiated outside the halls of the universities by an author who is even today widely regarded as Portugal's premier historian: Alexandre Herculano (1810-1877). Eschewing the polemicist approaches of his contemporaries, Herculano sought his inspiration further afield. By taking advantage

¹⁴ José Seabra da Silva (?), *Dedução chronologica e analytica*, 5 vols (Lisbon: De Miguel Meneschal da Silva, 1768).

¹⁵ José Liberato Freire de Carvalho, *Ensaio historico-politico sobre a Constituição e Governo do Reino de Portugal; onde se mostra ser aquelle reino, desde sua origem, uma Monarquia Representativa, e que o Absolutismo, a superstição, e a influencia da Inglaterra são as causas da sua actual decadencia* (Paris: Casa de Hector Bossage, 1830).

of newly developed European historical methodologies he was able to formulate a strikingly original interpretation of Portuguese nationality. His work inaugurated a new and extremely influential direction of Portuguese historiography, provoking both critics and supporters even to the present day. Ironically, although Herculano and his followers were open to European ideas, one result of their use was to further marginalise the comparable phenomenon of Latin Christian influence in medieval Portugal.

Most sizeable towns in Portugal have a street or public building named in Herculano's honour, his writings are frequently republished, and subsequent historians take his work as a touch-stone for both evidence and method.¹⁷ Herculano rose to public attention as an author of fiction, as the editor of the popular liberalist journal *O Panorama*, and later as the chief librarian of the Biblioteca Nacional. His reputation as an historian rests most heavily on his major works, *História de Portugal* and *História da origem e estabelecimento da Inquisição em Portugal*, along with his editorship of the major collection of sources *Portugaliae Monumenta Historica*.¹⁸ Herculano supplemented these major works with a plethora of articles covering historical and political themes, as well as with several historical novels.¹⁹ What is it that has made these works of such central importance to both Portuguese historians and general public?

Herculano shared the conviction of his fellows that the past held answers for the nation's many problems. When the political turmoil of the 1820s drove him into exile in England and France, the historian acquainted himself with developing trends of liberal nationalism and new techniques in source criticism.²⁰ On returning to his homeland Herculano used these techniques to reinterpret Portuguese history. His aim was to unify

¹⁶ Cf. Serrão, *A História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 31-3.

¹⁷ Recent assessments of Herculano's importance include: Harry Bernstein, *Alexandre Herculano (1810-1877), Portugal's Prime Historian and Historical Novelist* (Paris: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1983); Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, *Herculano e a consciência do Liberalismo Português*, (Lisbon: Bertrand, 1977); Fernando Catroga, 'Alexandre Herculano e o Historicismo Romântico', in Torgal, *História da História em Portugal*, 1, pp. 46-98.

¹⁸ Alexandre Herculano, *História de Portugal desde o começo da monarquia até o fim do reinado de Afonso III*, ed. J. Mattoso, 4 vols (Lisbon: Bertrand, 1980-1) [original date 1846-1853]; *História da origem e estabelecimento da Inquisição em Portugal* (Lisbon: Bertrand, 1975); trans. by J. C. Banner as *History of the Origin and Establishment of the Inquisition in Portugal* (Stanford University Press, 1962); *Portugaliae Monumenta Historica, Scriptores* (Lisbon: Academia das Ciências, 1856-61); *Leges et consuetudines* (Lisbon: Academia das Ciências, 1856-68); *Diplomata et chartae* (Lisbon: Academia das Ciências, 1868-73); *Inquisitiones* (Lisbon: Academia das Ciências, 1888-97).

¹⁹ The majority of these writings have been collected in A. Herculano, *Opúsculos*, with notes by J. Custódio and J. M. Garcia, 6 vols (Lisbon: Presença, 1982-1987). This collection includes a full bibliography of Herculano's work.

the disparate factions of society behind a new concept of nation, while concurrently justifying the liberal revolution and legitimising the form of government it had produced. For Herculano, history was neither a paean to great men and their deeds, nor an armory for political ammunition, but an account of the formation of a unique, independent people.

Herculano adopted a more rigorous approach to his sources than was the custom of the time. He refused to accept the reality of the 'Miracle of Ourique'. The document so often referred to by court historians he dismissed as a seventeenth-century forgery. Yet he was even-handed in his approach to documents. One of the liberal historians' fondest conceits was the so-called 'Council of Lamego', a gathering of clergymen, nobles and popular representatives which supposedly met in 1143 to publicly acclaim Henriques as their king. This granting of authority to the monarch by an assembly of representatives was frequently cited by the liberals in their struggle against absolutism. Herculano was scathing in his rejection of this idea as an obvious fantasy.²¹ The distinctiveness of Herculano's presentation of Portuguese history is exemplified in his description of the siege of Lisbon in 1147.²²

Herculano's treatment of the siege is radically different from those of his predecessors. This novelty rested on his acceptance of an until then little-known source he titled the *Crusignati Anglici Epistolae* but which has come to be known as *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*.²³ This eyewitness account of the siege confirmed that the expedition was not led by a committee of counts and aristocrats. The only titled noble mentioned, Arnold of Aershot, was clearly not in overall command. Herculano followed *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi* closely, adding to it or elaborating small points with reference to other documents only occasionally. The lists of nobles, both Portuguese and foreign, were removed, along with tales of miracles performed by martyred crusaders. The major divergence Herculano made from the account provided in *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi* concerned the initial meeting between the Portuguese and the northerners. Herculano portrayed Henriques taking the lead role in persuading the

²⁰ The international influences in Herculano's work are discussed by J. Barradas de Carvalho, *As ideias políticas e sociais de Alexandre Herculano* (Lisbon: Seara Nova, 1971), pp. 137ff.

²¹ 'O pobre inventor dessa ridícula farsa teve quase sempre a desgraça de estar em contradição com as intuições e com os factos do tempo a que a atribuiu.' Herculano, *História de Portugal*, 3, pp. 51, n. 54. For a discussion of the controversy surrounding both the Miracle of Ourique and the Council of Lamego see Cartroga, 'Alexandre Herculano', pp. 83-7.

²² Herculano, *Historia de Portugal*, 1, pp. 486-526.

crusaders to assist in his plans; but the eyewitness account gave this honour to the Portuguese clergymen, particularly the Bishop Pedro of Porto (1146-1152).²⁴ This inconsistency is not a eulogistic liberty, but rather underlines a point in Herculano's wider conception of the relationship between clergy, crown and people.

Herculano's view of Portuguese history was as a process of political development in which the critical agency was the relationship between authority and individualism. Rather than looking to the distant past, to Homeric heroes or the prolonged resistance of the Lusitanian tribes to the Roman empire, Herculano maintained that there was no significant link between the classical inhabitants of the western Iberian peninsula and their modern successors. Instead, national independence was founded on the energy of the Portuguese people and the excellence and ambition of their kings. Herculano imagined history in cyclical terms, with long periods of growth being countered by periods of decadence. The dynamic era which saw the foundation and establishment of the kingdom was a result of the balance between individual aspiration and social order. The subsequent overseas discoveries upset this equilibrium by allowing the Church and the aristocracy to create the stagnating force of absolutism. This situation paralysed the country until liberalism brought about the re-establishment of the vital parity between individual and state.

While Herculano did not share the deep anticlericalism of many liberal scholars, neither did he hold the Church above reproach. He freely acknowledged the influence of the Catholic faith as a central factor in the Portuguese character, yet also remained highly critical of any interference from Rome in the political development of the state. Papal influence, translated through the religious orders, led in Herculano's view to the dominion of the Jesuits and the evils of the Inquisition. For Herculano, the ideal role of the Church was to support the patriotic aspirations of wider secular society; it should not initiate change or seek political control.

What role could Herculano assign to non-Portuguese in this epic tale of national formation and regeneration? A caveat at the beginning of the *História de Portugal* gives some indication of his own feelings.

²³ *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi: The Conquest of Lisbon*, ed. and trans. C. W. David (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936).

²⁴ Herculano, *História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 494-5; *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 87-8.

I have faith that neither ill-will toward foreigners nor partiality to native land blinded me. Yet for a man to sacrifice to long and dry investigations, frequently without result, all the faculties of spirit, almost all the hours of life, with the intention of giving to one's country a history, if not good, at least sincere, some love of homeland is, I believe, necessary.²⁵

Herculano remained true to this claim in that he refrained from any overt expressions of xenophobia, yet his overriding patriotic agenda encouraged the exclusion of international forces from the centre stage of debate. In his description of the siege of Lisbon, for example, Herculano described the king's appeal to the crusades, yet the disunity this provoked among the northerners, and the reasons for it, remain unexplored. Such an omission is a result of Herculano's focus on the development of the Portuguese character and government. Activities of international groups were treated as largely unnecessary complications in the thread of this overall story. Nevertheless, due to its novelty, controversiality and popularity, Herculano's work quickly became the focus of Portuguese historical commentary and criticism. Moreover the ongoing turbulence of national politics gave subsequent historians no less a sense of mission in the conduct of their work

By the end of the nineteenth century the liberal monarchist government was foundering in the face of a growing realisation that Portuguese technological and economic development lagged far behind the rest of Europe. To the accompaniment of a rising murmur of urban discontent the government suffered a deep humiliation in 1890 with the so-called 'English Ultimatum'. Portuguese attempts to merge Angola and Mozambique were frustrated by British threats of armed intervention. An increasingly vocal republican movement drew large numbers of supporters from a disillusioned populace. General unrest culminated in a botched coup in 1908. A month later both King Carlos I (1889-1908) and Crown Prince Luís were assassinated in a Lisbon street. The surviving heir, Manuel II (1908-1910), made belated attempts to appease the republican movement, but was forestalled by a successful uprising on 5 October 1910.

²⁵ 'Tenho fé, que não me cegou malevolência para com os estranhos, nem parcialidade pela terra natal. Para o homem sacrificar a longas e áridas investigações, frequentes vezes sem resultado, todas as faculdades do espírito, quase todas as horas da vida, com o intuito de dar ao seu país uma história, se não boa, ao menos sincera, é necessário, creio eu, algum amor da pátria.' Herculano, *História de Portugal*, 1, p. 16.

A republic was declared, the monarchy was abolished, and Manuel 'the Unfortunate' sailed into English exile, where he died in 1932.²⁶

Spurred on by this endemic turbulence, historians responded vigorously to Herculano's theories. While traditional scholars raised objections to both his theory and method, of more significance for later historiographical development was the response of Herculano's fellow progressives, who maintained that he had failed to carry the scientific approach to its logical conclusions.²⁷ These historians could accept the framework of formation, growth, and subsequent decline of the nation. Generally too, they agreed on the baneful influence of absolutism, the Church, and economic domination by foreign interests. What many liberals found objectionable was Herculano's representation of the early medieval period as the Portuguese golden age, instead they insisted that the discoveries and the creation of empire provided the highest expression of Portuguese nationality.²⁸

This shift of attention discouraged a detailed revision of Herculano's interpretation of the early medieval period. Younger liberal historians quickly became polarised by two opposing schools of thought, with the ensuing debate between them absorbing the majority of scholarly effort. These contrasting views of history and nationality have become known to Portuguese historiography as *objectivismo* and *subjectivismo*. They can be represented by two authors who maintained throughout this period a career-long, unremitting opposition: the objectivist Teófilo Braga (1843-1924) and subjectivist Joaquim Pedro de Oliveira Martins (1845-1894).

Teófilo Braga was an author of history, fiction, and social commentary, who ultimately became the inaugural president of the First Republic in 1910. The staunchly republican Braga was deeply influenced by French positivism, and attempted to transform Portuguese history from a self-justifying national epic into an empirical

²⁶ Important discussions of this period include: Fernando Catroga, *O Republicanismo em Portugal – Da Formação ao 5 de Outubro de 1910*, 2 vols (Coimbra: Faculdade de Letras, 1991); and Tom Gallagher, *Portugal: A Twentieth-Century Interpretation* (Manchester: UP, 1983).

²⁷ S. C. Matos, 'Portugal: the Nineteenth-Century Debate on the Formation of the Nation', *Portuguese Studies*, 13 (1997), 66-94.

²⁸ Abdoolkarim A. Vakil, 'Nationalising Cultural Politics: Representations of the Portuguese 'Discoveries' and the Rhetoric of Identitarianism, 1880-1926', in C. Mar-Molinero and A. Smith (eds), *Nationalism and Nation in the Iberian Peninsula* (Oxford: Berg, 1996), 33-53; A. Freeland, 'The People and the Poet: Portuguese National Identity and the Camões Tercentenary, (1880)', in Mar-Molinero, *Nationalism and Nation in the Iberian Peninsula*, 54-69. See also Luís Ribeiro Soares, 'O Condeito de Idade Média na Historiografia Portuguesa Posterior a Herculano – a Polémica sobre a Idade Média entre Oliveira Martins e Antero e a Génese de o Helenismo e a Civilização Cristã', in *A Historiografia Portuguesa de Herculano a 1950* (Lisbon: Academia Portuguesa da História, 1978), 31-52.

process which individuals might come to understand, but could never hope to defy. Braga rejected Herculano's belief in the ambitious valour of the kings as the motive force behind Portuguese nationhood, advocating instead the primary importance of 'scientific' factors, such as environmental influences and racial determination. Such a formulation attacked the basis not only of absolutist monarchy but also of the liberal monarchy of the day, for the positivists concluded that the only truly justifiable form of government was republicanism.²⁹ Indeed, many of the positivist historians succumbed to a form of secular millenarianism in which the dawning of a world-wide republic would signal a golden age of peace and prosperity. In 1878 this spirit led Braga and Júlio de Matos (1856-1922) to found the journal *O Positivismo* 'to promote the mental and moral renovation necessary for socio-political transformation.'³⁰

Although Braga's theories focused on Portugal, the ideas infusing them can be traced to their sources in French, and to a lesser extent German intellectual currents.³¹ French republican historians used similar concepts to make radical reinterpretations of their own nation's history. Their Portuguese colleagues read these works with interest. Augustin Thierry and Henri Martin created controversy by drawing a division in French history between the Frankish aristocracy and Gaulish popular nationalism. They insisted that the latter was the repository of the true French spirit.³² Braga borrowed heavily from these scholars to draw a distinction between the Romanised Goths, who became entrenched in positions of authority as a result of their reconquest success, and the Mozarabic Christians, who had not been displaced by the eighth-century Arab expansion. The creation of absolutist monarchies supported by a powerful Church was depicted as an attempt to obstruct the desire of the 'true' citizens for equality, liberty and, ultimately, republicanism. Thus, in a stroke, Braga had removed any justification for monarchy, established a republican mandate, and placed the source of legitimacy squarely on the shoulders of the Portuguese people themselves. This history of the struggle between the two sections of Portuguese society effectively removed external agency from the formation and development of the Portuguese nation.

²⁹ Fernando Catroga, 'Positivistas e Republicanos', in Torgal, *História da História*, pp. 101-24.

³⁰ 'a renovação mental e moral necessária às transformações políticas sociais,' T. Braga, 'Introdução', *O Positivismo*, 4 (1880), p. 5. See also A. C. Homem, *A Ideia Republicana em Portugal. O contributo de Teófilo Braga* (Coimbra: Minerva, 1989).

³¹ Matos, 'The Debate on the Formation of the Nation', pp. 77-82.

³² G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*, 2nd ed. (London: Longmans, 1958), pp. 162-8; more recently Woolf, *A Global Encyclopedia*, 2, p. 883.

Braga's work drew a storm of criticism from several quarters, most notably from Oliveira Martins, the leading writer of the subjectivist school. What is striking about the subsequent debate is the clear parallel that can be traced throughout between Portuguese and French schools of history. In the series of essays with which he opened his attack on the theory of racial determination advocated by Braga, Oliveira Martins borrowed heavily from the very arguments Jules Michelet raised in his rebuttal of the French scholars Thierry and Martin.³³ Both subjectivist and objectivist scholars were very aware of international intellectual developments, using them wherever possible. In fact much of the animosity between the two leading Portuguese historians seems to have come from their similarities of character rather than their differences of interpretation. In his general approach to historical writing Oliveira Martins had much in common with his opponent. His work possessed a similar protean quality, blending history, literary criticism, sociology, anthropology and ethnography into a conglomerate richly studded with both inconsistency and insightful observation. Although Oliveira Martins's work was frequently linked with that of Alexandre Herculano, the grand old man of Portuguese historical writing was ultimately to distance himself from those aspects of his protégé's work that he deemed overly synthetic.³⁴ Certainly from initial areas of agreement the theories of the two historians diverged sharply.

In his magnum opus, *História de Portugal*, Oliveira Martins accepted Herculano's interpretation of the origin of the kingdom, including the central role played by the kings in the achievement of independence from León-Castile. Their opinions differed when apportioning relative significance to this early period. Oliveira Martins drew a distinction between the 'nation' which was simply a territory, and 'nationality' which was an aspect of identity. While the early kings were unquestionably the founders of the nation, the formation of national identity was a process more gradual and less easy to pinpoint. The French and German contributions to this line of thinking are clearly discernible.³⁵ For Oliveira Martins, the territorial realities bequeathed by the ambitions of earlier kings instilled in the Portuguese people

³³ J. P. de Oliveira Martins, 'Teófilo Braga e o Cancioneiro e Romanceiro Geral Português', in J. P. Oliveira, *Literatura e filosofia* (Lisbon: Guimarães, 1955), pp. 93-4, 121-2.

³⁴ Fernando Catroga, 'História e Ciências Sociais em Oliveira Martins', in Torgal, *História da História em Portugal*, p. 165. Woolf, *A Global Encyclopedia*, 2, p. 614-5.

³⁵ Oliveira Martins expressed his indebtedness to Michelet's *Histoire de France* several times. J. P. de Oliveira Martins, *Política e história*, 2 vols (Lisbon: Guimarães, 1957), 1, pp. 177-9. Although he is less candid about other influences, they are readily detectable. Matos, 'The Debate on the Formation of the Nation', pp. 82-94; Catroga, 'História e Ciências em Oliveira Martins', pp. 139-41.

a sense of collective identity based on the continual threat posed by surrounding kingdoms, both Muslim and Christian, but patriotism was a process that developed over a long period of time. In Oliveira Martins' schema, as with that of his objectivist opponents, the epitome of national development was the period of discovery and empire. Leaders and artist could be judged on their success in bolstering national strength and autonomy in the face of external pressure, for in doing so they were seen to be representing the collective will of the Portuguese people.³⁶

Despite his avowed distaste for the deterministic theories of his opponents, Oliveira Martins also adopted a distinctive form of race-oriented history. He accepted a racial distinction between Portuguese and Spanish on the basis of the Celtic elements to be found in northern Portugal, but accorded this second place to collective experience in the development of national self-definition. But it was when attempting to analyse the place of Portugal in the world as a whole that Oliveira Martins indulged in his wildest speculation. The historian propounded theories linking Portuguese destiny with that of a supposed Aryan race, theories which have a distinctly sinister cast to a modern audience. By equating Portugal with the Aryan myth Oliveira Martins was able to reinforce the crowning glory of Portuguese endeavour as being the attempt to impose Indo-European civilisation on the world, through their nautical and imperial adventures. The significance of this theory goes beyond its breathtakingly Eurocentric attitude to the supposed causes for the failure of the vision. Although internal Portuguese instability was accorded some measure of blame, the 'Anglo-Saxon' global presence was considered decisive. Oliveira Martins portrayed the Aryan/Indo-European destiny as being thwarted by the presence of opposing Anglo-Saxon powers in Africa, America and Australia.³⁷ To allow the forces that had ultimately thwarted Portugal of its historical destiny any fundamental role in the establishment of the nation itself was not a proposition Oliveira Martins happily entertained.

The theories of history that sprang from Alexandre Herculano's pioneering work did little to encourage a serious revision of his interpretation of the process by which the Portuguese kingdom was formed. In the wake of Herculano's *História de Portugal* scholars and leaders became more aware of the potential use of history as a weapon in

³⁶ Of J. P. de Oliveira Martins' extensive corpus of particular interest in this context are: *História de Portugal. Obras Completas*, 16th ed., 2 vols (Lisbon: Guimarães Editores, 1972) [first published 1879], 2, pp. 81ff and *Camões, Os Lusíadas e a Renascença* (Lisbon: Guimarães Editores, 1986).

³⁷ Catroga, 'História e Ciências em Oliveira Martins', pp. 151-60.

the political arena. The result was an increasing focus on theoretical models and a growing historical introversion. Ironically, international intellectual developments provided the impetus for these historiographical shifts, but rather than encouraging Portuguese authors to consider the impact of similar influences in earlier times, they led to a further insulation of the debate over national origins and direction.

Tumultuous tides: the First Republic, the Estado Novo, and the re-engagement with Europe

The collapse of the monarchy and the declaration of the First Portuguese Republic in 1910 was greeted with enthusiasm, particularly from the educated middle classes; this optimism soon flagged in the face of endemic political uncertainty. Initially the republic fostered scholarly debate, but as the political situation deteriorated so too did toleration of opposing view-points. By 1926 the first Portuguese experiment with republicanism ended in a military coup. Power soon devolved on to António Salazar, and the new government, known as the *Estado Novo* (New State), became increasingly authoritarian. For almost half a century the Estado Nova pursued a policy of political and cultural isolation. In 1974 the ineffective and deeply unpopular government was again toppled in a military coup; after a period of confusion, democratic reforms were instituted and Portugal reopened relations with the outside world. In recent decades Portuguese integration into the European Community has accelerated, yet scholarly interest in the earliest relations between Portugal and Europe has not kept pace.

With the proclamation of the First Republic in October 1910 Portugal became Europe's third republican regime after France and Switzerland.³⁸ Popular opinion eagerly anticipated the rapid onset of a period of prosperous tranquility, but the reality was to be frustration. The idealistic theories of a Europeanised intellectual elite quickly collided with the intractable realities of entrenched conservatism and backwardness throughout the county. Lacking strong organisational structures of debate and resolution, the new government was consistently embroiled in unproductive wrangling, frequently it reached deadlock. The Republican regime quickly gained a reputation for extreme instability, between 1910 and 1926 there were nine presidents, forty-four

³⁸ For a general discussion of Portugal's first Republican experience see Douglas Wheeler, *Republican Portugal. A Political History 1910-1926* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978) and Gallagher, *Portugal: A Twentieth-Century Interpretation*, ch. 2.

governments, twenty-five uprisings and three counter-revolutionary dictatorships.³⁹ The virulent anticlericalism adopted by many republicans combined with their financial mismanagement to fuel a growing popular disenchantment. In 1926 a conspiracy of military officers took matters into their own hands by carrying out a virtually bloodless coup. The majority of the overburdened citizens reacted with relief to this quiet revolution; the republican deputies who were led from the parliamentary building shouting 'Long live the Republic!' attracted only derision from the Lisbon crowd.⁴⁰

What was the effect of the turbulent fourteen years of the First Republic on the development of Portuguese historical writing? In much the same way as the solidarity of liberal and republican politicians fragmented when it became evident that their royalist opponents had been ousted from power, so too the unity of their intellectual supporters quickly broke down. Of the many groups that formed and dissolved during this period, one of the earliest and most productive was *Renascença Portuguesa*, which included the leading republican intellectuals Raul Proença (1884-1941), Teixeira de Pascoaes (1877-1952), and Jaime Cortesão (1884-1960). Cortesão was also the author of the important and controversial work, *Os Factores Democráticos na Formação de Portugal*.⁴¹ Yet the divisive policies of the republican government alienated many intellectuals, resulting in the formation of smaller, more volatile groups. While these organisations generally had a vocal but short-lived existence, a notable exception was a group formed in 1921, the *Seara Nova* (New Harvest). Among the more famous of its members were Raul Proença and António Sérgio (1883-1969); the writings they produced tended to be increasingly critical of the excesses of the regime.⁴² *Seara Nova* was ultimately to survive the downfall of the republican regime, becoming a major voice for liberal scholarship during the subsequent conservative backlash.

Although republican historians were unsettled by many of the actions of the government, they were nonetheless able to take advantage of the political climate to strengthen international academic links. A characteristic of the intellectuals who advocated the republican cause prior to the revolution of 1910 was an enthusiasm for ideas from wider Europe. This interest was maintained during the period of republican government. One of the more visible aspects of this internationalism was the creation of

³⁹ T. C. Bruneau, *Politics and Nationhood. Post-Revolutionary Portugal* (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 16-7.

⁴⁰ Wheeler, *Republican Portugal*, pp. 116-9, 172-92.

⁴¹ J. Cortesão, *Os Factores Democráticos na Formação de Portugal* (Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, 1974).

the Sociedade Portuguesa de Estudos Históricos in 1914. The constitution of this group made clear the aim of fostering the study of the relations between Portugal and other countries through publications and the organisation of conferences.⁴³ The new society attracted the input of international scholars such as the German Gerhard Moldenhauer, the Frenchman Robert Ricard, and the Englishmen Charles Boxer, Aubrey Bell, and Edgar Prestage. Under the auspices of the Society Prestage edited the collection *Chapters in Anglo-Portuguese Relations*, which remains one of very few accounts of the early relations between the two countries.⁴⁴

While the republican intellectuals strove to create an enduring basis for their chosen form of government, the contentious and divisive policies adopted by the politicians, not to mention their on-going failure to bring stability to the country, encouraged the reappearance of groups openly supporting the absent king. An early pro-monarchist was the historian António Sardinha (1887-1925), who became the guiding spirit of the *Integralismo Lusitano* movement. This movement, popularly known as 'the integrationalists', advocated a return to the 'traditional Portuguese values' of hierarchical authority provided by king and clergy. They blamed the problems besetting the nation on the excessive influence of European ideas. The journal of the integrationalist movement, *Nação Portuguesa*, reveals a quasi-mystical approach to history heavily influenced by Sebastianism and dominated by the activities of the 'great men' of Portuguese history.⁴⁵ Contemporaneously with the rise of the integrationalists, the continuing repression of the Church encouraged the formation of groups dedicated to its defence. Several of the most eminent historians of the period were linked to these movements, notably Fortunato de Almeida (1869-1933), whose major works *História de Portugal* and *História da Igreja em Portugal* remain the standard references on Portuguese ecclesiastical history. Both these works betray the contemporary atmosphere of political siege.⁴⁶

The reformation of a more vocal opposition in conjunction with the turbulent political environment led the republican government to attempt to control dissident

⁴² L. R. Torgal, 'Sob o signo da <<reconstrução nacional>>', in Torgal, *História da História*, pp. 251-2.

⁴³ Torgal, 'Sob o signo', pp. 258-9.

⁴⁴ Edgar Prestage (ed.), *Chapters in Anglo-Portuguese Relations* (London: Voss and Michael, 1935).

⁴⁵ Torgal, 'Sob o signo', p. 252; Wheeler, *Republican Portugal*, pp. 11-2. 'Sebastianism' is a unique form of Portuguese messianic patriotism in which the miraculous return of King Sebastian (1557-1558), the last monarch of the Avis dynasty, is anticipated.

voices; rather than stifling debate, this simply gave it a keener edge.⁴⁷ Initially the authorities relied on judicious use of funding and university appointments, but as the situation worsened the more active dissuasions of censorship and detention were employed. In 1919 a Coimbra lecturer was forced to defend himself against charges of influencing his students with monarchist propaganda. He reminded the court:

No one can point to any known occurrence which could justify them forming an opinion about my political convictions. I have never been condemned, judged, pronounced on, investigated or jailed. Not even jailed – and this is indeed remarkable when, in the course of a few years, half the population of Portugal – Monarchists, Catholics, Democrats, Evolutionists, Camachists, Syndicalists, Socialists, Sidonists, and those with no views at all – have entered the prisons and fortresses of the Republic, sometimes successively, sometimes alternatively, and sometimes simultaneously.⁴⁸

The judges acquitted him of all charges. Ironically, the lecturer in question was António Salazar (1890-1970), who would cast a shadow of his own over the political and intellectual life of Portugal for the following five decades, and arguably until the present day.

The fall of the First Republic in 1924 ushered in a period of chaos, from which Salazar emerged as Premier. It was a position he retained until incapacitated by a stroke in 1968.⁴⁹ Salazar's programme of reform was labelled the *Estado Novo* (New State), a name not without irony, since in many ways the regime consciously modelled itself on an image of the past. Under the *Estado Novo* a form of national corporatism was established in which various groups were organised in guild-like structures. The heads of these guilds met in council, and the regime's most frequently used catch-cry, '*Deus, Patria, Família*', underlined the hierarchical nature of the state. The Salazar regime

⁴⁶ Fortunato de Almeida, *História da Igreja em Portugal*, 2nd ed., 4 vols (Porto: Portucalense Editora, 1967-1972). [First edition 1910-28]. *História de Portugal*, 6 vols. (Coimbra: Editor Fortunato de Almeida, 1922-1929).

⁴⁷ An illuminating incident was the public debate held in the final year of the Republic between the Traditionalist study group *Cruzada Nacional* and members of *Seara Nova*, including Jaime Cortesão, at which high words resulted in a fistfight. Wheeler, *Republican Portugal*, pp. 208-9.

⁴⁸ Quoted in H. Kay, *Salazar and Modern Portugal* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1970), p. 31.

⁴⁹ The office of Premier in Portugal equates in function to the Prime Minister in the Westminster System. While much executive power is vested in the Premier, the official head of the Portuguese State was (and is) the President.

attempted to remain isolated from the outside world. This insular policy was encapsulated in another of the regime's favourite slogans: '*Estamos orgulhosamente sós*' (We are proudly alone).⁵⁰

It is difficult to overestimate the effect of the long period of the Estado Novo on Portuguese historiography. Because of the regime's focus on the past the teaching and writing of history was of central importance.⁵¹ Many of the ideas of the integrationalist Sardinha were received favourably by the regime, but his work was soon eclipsed by that of the younger João Ameal, (1902-1982), whose *História de Portugal* was reprinted seven times during the Salazar period.⁵² Both these authors portrayed Portuguese history as a series of noble episodes which presaged and yet were improved upon by the Estado Novo. As Luis Torgal writes:

History was, for Salazar, made up above all of manifestations of nationalism, of heroic sacrifices of 'Ouriques' and 'Aljubarrotas', of 'Discoveries' and 'Restorations', which prolonged the past, but which he turned toward the future, toward the 'new world'.⁵³

For those historians who could accommodate this view there were significant rewards. Both Sardinha and Ameal accepted the newly instituted Alexandre Herculano Prize for History awarded by the Secretariado de Propaganda Nacional and both were able to secure lucrative teaching and administrative jobs under the new regime. In 1936 the importance of historical studies was recognised with the formation of the Academia Portuguesa da História. Ameal was a founding member, along with the polemicist Alfredo Pimenta and the influential Coimbra professor Damião Peres (1889-1976).

Not all intellectuals were willing to adhere to the Salazarist portrayal of the past, but opposition to the party line was neither easy nor safe. The darker side of the Salazar period was the suppression of dissident voices through heavy censorship and the

⁵⁰ L. R. Torgal, 'A História em Tempo de <ditadura>', in Torgal, *História de História*, pp. 307-10. Gallagher, *Portugal: A Twentieth-Century Interpretation*, p. 69, observes: 'The only external influence readily acknowledged by Salazar was that of the papacy.'

⁵¹ Charles R. Boxer, 'Some notes on Portuguese Historiography, 1930-1950', *History*, 39 (1954), 1-13.

⁵² José Ameal, *História de Portugal* (Porto: Tavares Martins, 1940). The seventh edition was published in 1974.

⁵³ 'A história é, para Salazar, feita sobretudo de manifestações de nacionalismo, sacrifícios heróicos, de <<Ouriques>>, de <<Aljubarrotas>>, de <<Descobrimientos>> e de <<Restaurações>>, que prolongam o passado mas que se viram para o futuro, para o <<mundo novo>>', Torgal, 'A História em tempo de <<ditadura>>', p. 274.

intervention of the secret police (PIDE), who covertly investigated and frequently imprisoned politically active citizens. Many dissident intellectuals fell foul of the PIDE; António Sérgio and João Cortesão were only two of the many authors who suffered arrest, imprisonment and exile during the dictatorship.⁵⁴

A third option existed between profitable support and costly resistance to the regime. The majority of scholars during the Estado Novo, particularly those whose formative years fell after Salazar came to power, learned to walk the fine line between intellectual honesty and dangerous dissent. A low level of opposition was permitted by the government, republican organisations such as *Seara Nova* continued to meet and publish their work. Although the Academia Portuguesa da História encouraged the nationalistic line, some independent and enduring work was carried out under its auspices. To celebrate the eight-hundredth anniversary of the 'founding of the nation' in 1140, Damião Peres directed a new, official history, enlisting over two dozen authors as contributors. Although this *História de Portugal*, which came to be known as the 'Barcelos History' was predominantly a traditional presentation, some contributors were able to forward slightly divergent views.⁵⁵ Revisionist authors were also occasionally able to reach the pages of the Academy's two journals, *Anais* and *Boletim*, but only within the framework of what the censors considered 'decent' or 'decorous' and what the PIDE considered 'non-political.'⁵⁶

Historiography during this period was inward looking; there was little official interest in, or encouragement for, research into the early relations between Portugal and Europe. During the Estado Novo the origins of the nation were once again firmly placed in the medieval period. Damião Peres' most well known work, *Como Nasceu Portugal*, provides a succinct statement of the orthodox position.⁵⁷ Afonso Henriques was reinstated as founder of the country. The decisive moment came in 1140 when Henriques proclaimed himself king, an act which marked 'the definitive independence of Portugal'⁵⁸. This portrayal of strictly autonomous national formation was in

⁵⁴ Discussions of the oppression carried out during the Salazar period are many and contrary. For example H. Kay, *Salazar and Modern Portugal*, pp. 329-97 minimises the role and actions of the PIDE. An alternative view can be found in D. P. Machado, *The Structure of Portuguese Society: The Failure of Fascism* (New York: Praeger, 1991), pp. 43-123.

⁵⁵ Damião Peres (ed.), *A História de Portugal*. 7 vols (Porto-Barcelos: Portugalense Editora, 1928-1937).

⁵⁶ These two journals are still in publication and remain at the forefront of Portuguese historiography.

⁵⁷ Damião Peres, *Como Nasceu Portugal* 7th ed. (Porto: Portugalense Editora, 1970) [First published 1938].

⁵⁸ Peres, *Como Nasceu Portugal*, p. 124. 'proclamando com esse acto [the assumption of royalty], tão atrevidamente significativo, a definitiva independência de Portugal!'

accordance with the conservative, nationalistic sentiments of the Salazar regime. Moreover this view proved influential, and the relative unimportance of early relations between Portugal and Europe was widely accepted by Peres' contemporaries. When Oliveira Marques examined relations between Portugal and the Low Countries, the military, economic and cultural links that formed between the two regions prior to the fourteenth century were covered in ten short pages.⁵⁹ In his study of Portuguese international relations, Pedro Martínez makes a similarly cursory passage over the medieval period.⁶⁰ Though these authors did not write on behalf of the Estado Novo, their work was nevertheless influenced by the assumptions of those who did.

The stability of the Estado Novo was heavily reliant on one man, and by the late 1960s Salazar's grip was beginning to weaken. Maintaining Portuguese isolation from the rest of the world was becoming difficult. More ominously for the regime, colonial independence movements were growing stronger and more militant, generally with the support of large sections of the international community. In 1968 Salazar suffered a stroke, forcing him into retirement; he died three years later. His successor, Marcello Caetano, promised reforms both at home and in the colonies, along with a relaxation of the isolationist policy. Yet he was unable to counteract the inertia of the existing bureaucracy. In 1973 units of the army revolted and the unwieldy machinery of the Estado Novo quickly collapsed. On the 25 April 1974 the military was returned to power once again.⁶¹

During the revolt officers had advocated democratic reforms and decolonization: in 1975 the colonies were granted independence and the following year free elections were held. The socialist Mário Soares came to power and wider relations were initiated with the outside world. During the Salazar period Portugal had maintained strategic links with other countries, particularly England, and had been a founding member of NATO in 1949. Yet by renouncing empire Portugal had effectively pledged its future to Europe, and after 1975 these ties grew far closer. In 1989 Portugal confirmed this reorientation by joining the European Union. Membership has brought gradual, but undeniable, economic benefits to the country. In 1997 Lisbon

⁵⁹ A. H. de Oliveira Marques, *Hansa e Portugal na Idade Média*, 2nd ed. (Lisbon: Editorial Presença, 1993) pp. 25-37. [First edition 1959].

⁶⁰ Pedro Soares Martínez, *História Diplomática de Portugal* (Lisbon: Editorial Verbo, 1970).

⁶¹ For the fall of the Estado Novo and the democratic revolution see D. P. Machado, *The Structure of Portuguese Society*, pp. 143-99; Gallagher, *Portugal, A Twentieth-Century Interpretation*, pp. 165-252; Kenneth Maxwell, *The Making of Portuguese Democracy* (Cambridge: UP, 1995).

hosted the World Expo, an event seen by many commentators as Portugal's statement of full re-engagement with Europe and with the world.

The collapse of the Estado Novo accelerated trends already occurring in Portuguese historiography. Several revisionist scholars in Portugal, notably António Sérgio, had long sought to engage with foreign historiographical trends and utilise them in their own research. Moreover some Portuguese scholars were able to work in universities outside their homeland, and so gain open access to wider intellectual currents.⁶² After 1974 these efforts became more widespread. Initially French historiography dominated Portuguese revisionism, but Germanic and later English influences were soon incorporated. This embrace of foreign intellectual developments prompted a rapid increase in historical publications. In the two decades after the fall of the Estado Novo no less than five major national histories were published.⁶³ Several important works on Portuguese historiography also appeared.⁶⁴ Numerous journals were founded, such as the *Revista de História das Ideias* (1977), the *Revista de História Económica e Social* (1978), *Cultura – Histórica e Filosofia*, (1982), *Ler História* (1983), and *Penélope – Fazer e Desfazer a História* (1988). In this way Portuguese historians have embarked on an exciting new phase of activity as they seek to integrate outside influences with their own, unique historical tradition.⁶⁵

Although greater exposure to European historiographical developments was a major impetus for much of this revisionist effort, the impact of Latin Christian cultural influences in Portugal during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries has continued to be overlooked. In part this has been a reaction to the predominance of medieval history in the historical corpus of the Estado Novo, and an understandable desire to research areas actively discouraged by the Salazar regime. At the same time many medievalists in

⁶² For example, during the early 1970s Oliveira Marques taught at Columbia University. He developed courses incorporating new historiographical trends. These lectures formed the basis of his *A História de Portugal* which also appeared in English as *A History of Portugal*, 4 vols (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975).

⁶³ Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 3 vols (Lisbon: Editora Verbo, 1977); José Hernando Saraiva (ed.), *História de Portugal*, 7 vols (Lisbon: Editora Alfa, 1983-5); Joel Serrão and A. H. de Oliveira Marques (eds), *Nova História de Portugal*, 6 vols (Lisbon: Editora Presença, 1986-96); José Mattoso (ed.), *História de Portugal*, 8 vols (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 1992-3); João Medina (ed.), *História de Portugal*, 15 vols (Amadora: Ediclube, 1994).

⁶⁴ See above, n. 1.

⁶⁵ Of particular interest in this respect are the recent comments by Luís Adão de Fonseca, Jean-Frédéric Schaub, and Diogo Ramada Curto on the topic 'The Internationalization of Portuguese Historiography' in the 'Surveys and Debates' section of the recently inaugurated *e-Journal of Portuguese History* 1:1 2003. http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Portuguese_Brazilian_Studies/ejph/left.html (date accessed 1/12/03).

Portugal, taking their lead from José Mattoso, have directed their attention inwards, by undertaking an exhaustive study of local documents to recreate the structure of early Portuguese culture with an emphasis on the kinship links binding society together.⁶⁶ Meanwhile, those historians whose interests have led them into a study of past relations between Portugal and other states have gravitated toward the discovery and empire periods, where such relations are both striking, and comprehensively documented. Consequently, even as Portugal looks to a European future, present day historians have been no more inclined than their predecessors to re-examine the significance of European influence during the foundation of the kingdom.

The changing phases in Portuguese historiography are a reflection of the tumultuous history of the country itself, and while the influences at work on historians have changed, some characteristics of Portuguese history writing have remained oddly consistent. One of these is the tendency to underestimate the importance of foreign influence in Portugal during the medieval period. Until the eighteenth century court historians sought to create a laudatory, epic history in which the actions of kings, aristocrats, and clergymen defined the kingdom; foreign influences were at best tangential to this aim. The political uncertainty that overtook Portugal from the end of the eighteenth century encouraged alternative interpretations to be considered. Revisionist authors, themselves sensitive to intellectual developments in the wider world, sought to re-define the nature of the state and the processes of national formation, but this agenda tended to further marginalise the role of foreign influences in early Portugal. The establishment of the Estado Novo, with its conservative focus on the autochthonous formation of the nation, simply consolidated these assumptions. Although the collapse of authoritarian government has brought a rapid Portuguese re-engagement with the outside world, the implications of earlier European influences in Portugal have still to be adequately addressed by modern historians. Yet as the process of Portuguese integration into Europe continues, earlier links between Portugal and the wider world may at last be given the recognition their significance deserves.

⁶⁶ Among José Mattoso's many publications of particular importance are *Identificação de um País*, 2 vols (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1985); *Ricos-Homens, Infâncias, e Cavaleiros. A Nobreza Medieval Portuguesa nos Séculos XI e XII* (Lisbon: Guimarães Editores, 1985); and the collections *Fragments de uma Composição Medieval* (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1993); and *A Nobreza Medieval Portuguesa. A Família e o Poder* (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1994).

Appendix 2

Portuguese churchmen and their rivals¹

Portuguese Sees

Braga

Pedro (1070-1091)
Gerald (1096-1108)
Maurice Bourdin (1109-1118)
Paio Mendes (1118-1137)
João Peculiar (1138-1175)
Godinho (1175-1188)
Martinho Pires (1189-1209)
Pedro Mendes (elected) (1209-1212)
Estêvão Soares da Silva (1212-1228)
Silvestre Godinho (1229-1244)
João Egas (1245-1255)

Coimbra

Paterno (1080-1088)
Cresconio (1092-1098)
Maurice Bourdin (1099-1109)
Gonçalo Pais (1109-1128)
Bernard (1128-1146)
João de Anaia (1147-1155)
Miguel Salomão (1159, 1162-1176)
Bermudo (1177-1182)
Martim Gonçalves (1183-1191)
Pedro Soares (1192-1233)
Tibúrcio (1234-1246)
Domingos (1246)
Egas Fafes (1246-1267)

Évora

Soeiro I (1166-1180)
Paio (1180-1204)
Soeiro II (1205-1229)
Fernando (1235-1246)
Martinho (1248-1266)

Lisbon

Gilbert of Hastings (1148-1164?)
Álvaro (1164-1184)
Soeiro I (1185-1209)
Soeiro II Viegas (1210-1232)
João I (1238?-1241)
Aires Vasques (1244-1258)

Lamego

Mendo (1147-1176)
Godinho Afonso (1176-1189)
João I (1190-1196)
Pedro Mendes (1197-1211)
Paio (or Pelayo) Furtado (1211-1246)
Martinho (1248)
Egas Pais (1249-1275)

Guarda

Martinho Pais (1203-1228)
Vicente (1229-1248)
Rodrigo Fernandes (1250-1267)

Silves

Nicolas (1189-1191)
Robert (1253-1256)

¹ Sources: Miguel de Oliveira, *História Eclesiástica de Portugal* (Lisbon: Publicações Europa-América, 1994); Richard Fletcher, *The Episcopate in the Kingdom of León in the Twelfth Century* (Oxford: UP, 1978), and by the same author, *St James's Catapult. The Life and Times of Diego Gelmírez of Santiago de Compostela* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); and Peter Linehan, *History and the Historians of Medieval Spain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).

Oporto

Hugo (1121-1136)
 João Peculiar (1136-1138)
 Pedro Rabáldis (1138-1145)
 Pedro Pitões (1146-1152)
 Pedro Sénior (1154-1174)
 Fernando Martins (1176-1185)
 Martinho Pires (1186-1189)
 Martinho Rodrigues (1191-1235)
 Pedro Salvadores (1235-1247)
 Julião Fernandes (1247-1260)

Viseu

Odorius (1147-1166)
 Gonçalo (1166?-1169)
 Marcos (1170)
 Godinho (1171-1179)]
 João Pires (1179-1192)
 Nicolau (1193-1213)
 Fernando Raimundo (1213-1214)
 Bartholemew (1214-1222)
 Gil (or Egido) Hugo (1224-1248?)
 Pedro Gonçales (1250-1254)

Rival Metropolitans**Santiago de Compostela**

Diego Gelmíres (1100-1140)
 Berengar (elected) (1141-2)
 Pedro Helias (1143-1149)
 Berengar (1150-1151)
 Bernard (1151-1152)
 Pelayo (1153-1155)
 Martim (1156-1167)
 Pedro Gudestéiz (1167-1173)
 Pedro Suárez de Deza (1173-1206)
 Pedro Muñoz (1206-1224)

Toledo

Bernard (1085-1125)
 Raymond (1125-1153)
 Juan de Castellmorum (1153-1166)
 Cerebruno (1166-1180)
 Pere de Cardoña (1180-1192)
 Martim Lopez (1192-1208)
 Rodrigo Jiminez de Rada (1208-1247)

Bragan suffragans or contested by Braga**Astorga**

Pelayo (1097?-1121)
 Alo (1123-1131)
 Robert (1131-1138)
 Jimeno Eriz (1138-1141)
 Amadeo (1141-1143)
 Arnaldo I (1144-1152-3)
 Pedro Cristiano (1153-1156)
 Fernando I (1156-1172)
 Arnaldo II (1173-1177)
 Fernando II (1177-1190)
 Lope (1190-1205)
 Pedro Andrés (1205-1226)

Túy

Alfonso (1097-1131)
 Pelayo Menéndez (1131-1155-6)
 Isidoro (1156-1166-7)
 Juan (1168-1172)
 Beltrán (1173-1187)
 Pedro (1188-1205)
 Suero (1206-1215)

Orense


Diego (1097/1100-1132)
Martín (1133-1155-7)
Pedro Seguin (1157-1169)
Adán (1169-1173-4)
Alfonso (1174-1213)
Fernando Méñez (1213-1218)

Zamora


Jerónimo (1102-1120)
Bernard (1121-1149)
Esteban (1150-1175)
Guillermo (1175-1193)
Martín (1193-1217)

Appendix 3: Royal Genealogies

A) Eleventh/Twelfth Century



B) Thirteenth Century



Appendix 4

Documents

Introductory Note

This appendix contains three important historical documents, selected for slightly different reasons. The first, *De expugnatione Scalabis*, is a fascinating, supposedly first-hand account by Afonso Henriques. Regardless of the truth of this claim, it remains the most valuable source for the Portuguese capture of Santarém in 1147. Herculano edited the manuscript at the end of the nineteenth century, but unlike most other similar chronicles there has been no more recent edition. The version produced here is based on the single extant manuscript.¹ The second source in this appendix, the papal bull *Manifestis probatum*, is arguably the most important single document in Portuguese history. Despite this, no complete version of the bull has been published in a readily accessible form. The final document, the Santarém foral, while important in its own right, has also been selected as representative of the many similar settlement charters.

i) *De expugnatione Scalabis: the Conquest of Santarem*

Mss: Mosteiro de Alcobaça, cod. 207/Hills 416, f. 147a – 148vb

Publ. txt: PMH SS, pp. 93-5; Brandão, *Crónica de D. Afonso Henriques*, pp. 341-5.

Quomodo sit capta Sanctaren civitas a rege Alfonso comitus Henrici filio

Cantemus Domino fratres karissimi, cantemus domino in tympano et choro, et iubilemus in cordis et organo,² exultationis voce, magnificatus est enim gloriose subiciendo gentes Mahometh adorantes sub pedibus nostris³, elegit nobis hereditatem speciosissimam quam dilexit. Et vos, qui propria voluntate obtulistis animas vestras periculoso discrimini, benedicite, Deo summo regi, qui pedibus nudis innitentes hastis, et clipeis, accincti gladiis, et scalas lineas portantes humeris, viriliter per montis

¹ I would like to express my thanks to the staff at the Hill Monastic Manuscript Library for their assistance in obtaining a copy of the original manuscript.

² Cf. Ps. 150: 4.

crepidinem properastis ad murum, ad laudem christi convocate omnem populum. Plaudite manibus, bene psallite ei in vociferatione, ac dicite: Audite reges auribus percipite principes universe terre, quam Dominus elegit nova bella⁴ in diebus nostris, non in trecentis decem et VIII. vernaculis, ut quondam Abraham, qui quinque reges devicit. vel Gedeon qui in trecentis æquam manibus lambentibus Sisaram principem milicie Iabin prostavit, sed in XX. V. aut parum supra, rex noster, immo Deus per regem nostrum, omnium Ispanie civitatum munitissimam cepit Sanctaren.⁵ Elua ergo et tu, o rex noster Alfonse, eleua in iubilo vocem, et confitere quia non tuis meritis ascribis, vel viribus hoc magnam prodigium, sed Christo regi vero, cuius est omnis terra, et merito cui curuatur omne genu, qui est in secula benedictus Deus, et edissere nobis geste rei prodigiose exordium, ordinem et exitum.

Ab hinc rex

Testor Deum celi, oculis cuius nuda et aperta sunt omnia, quia nec muros Iericho subrutos, nec solis stationem prece Iosue at Gabaon in comparisonem huius in me pietatis et misericordie facti pro miraculis duco,⁶ sed nomen Christi magnifico cuius profunde sunt cogitationes, et magnifica opera, et pro se suaque pietate pia in novissimis temporibus novis mirabilibus non renovat, sed supergreditur antiqua mirabilia. Omnes enim qui audierint duceat pro re incredibili Sanctaren civitatem munitissimam omni multitudine hominum, omnique genere machinarum inexpugnabilem a tam paucissimis viris invasam.

Siquidem avus meus Alfonsus Yspanie imperator non potuit eam debellare nisi famis deditioe. Moabitarum etiam rex Cyrus similiter. Sed necdum Abzechri, qui ferme per XXX. et IIII. annos eiusdem tenuit regimen. Erexerat muros, ante murale, et turre a parte occidentali, que vocatur Alplan, eo quod ad comparisonem precipicii tocus circuitus planum videbatur, quia antiquos repleverat terra usque ad sumum in promuntorii modum captivorum humeris asportata. A parte vero orientali adeo locus ruit in preceps, ut lingua arabica vocetur Alhafa, idem timor, quia inde precipitabantur qui

³ vestris PMH.

⁴ Cf. Judges 5: 8.

⁵ Gen. 14: 15. Abram (later Abraham) overthrew the four kings. Is the author thinking, perhaps, of Joshua and the five kings (Joshua 10: 5-22)? For Gideon and the three hundred warriors, Judges 7-8.

⁶ For phrasing cf. Hebrews, 4: 13; for the biblical allusion see Joshua 6: 20, 10: 12-4. This passage also bears strong similarities to the dedicatory section of *Vita Tellonis Archidiaconi*, PMH SS, p. 86b.

capitalem subierant sententiam, ut fractis cervicibus, ex toto corpore ad ripam usque proruerent Tagi aureas, ut ferunt, arenas habentis. A parte vero australi propter precipitium quod fit ex natura terre quasi hyantis, et in abyssum cuntis, vocatur Alhanse, idem coluber, eo quod nullo possit adiri modo, nisi per anfractus, et quosdam meandros. Ex parte vero aquilonis munivit eam ipsa montis natura petrosa, et aspera, et velut inter nubes porrigens ipsam civitatem. In sua sumitate planam, non magnam ne ad tenendum sit difficilis, nec modicum ne furetur a paucis. Quomodo igitur huius speciositatem describere queam, cum nec hominum sacietur nisus cernentium ad orientalem plagam plana, et omni generi frugum fertilissima arua ferme⁷ per C. LX. stadia? Ad occidentalem, et austrum deficit omnino acies oculorum. Ad aquilonem versus montuosa vinearum, et olearum sunt loca. Quid de fertelitate dicam, cum nec sit inferior Apulia, sed superhabundet, vel piscium multitudine, vel salubritate aque? Est equidem dei paradus, id est deliciarum ortus, ut quondam Egyptus venientibus Segor.⁸

Sed ad rem gestam veniamus, et qualiter capta sit aperiamus. Capta est idus martii illucescente die sabbati in era M. centesima LXXX. V. quo anno mauri, qui arabice mozamida vocantur, ingressi Yspaniam destruxerunt yspalim civitatem, me tunc a gente tricesimum ferme ac septimum etatis annum, et regni X. VIII, anno nondum evoluto quo duxeram uxorem Mahaldam nomine comitis Amedeu filiam, ex qua primogenitus est natus Henricus filius meus iii. nonas eiusdem mensis, quo civitas capta est hoc ordine.

Fuit hec civitas quia fortissima, et fecundissima semper bellicosa insidians Colimbrie, et meum regnum pene pessumdans ex multo tempore. Quam non poteram debellare, quia, ut predixi, erat inexpugnabilis, nec depredare propter impedimentum aque. Cum enim tetenderam insidias ex parte dextera fluvii, confugiebant ad sinistram, vel e converso cum peccoribus, et iumentis. Preterea planicies ipsa est paludibus plena et insulis, et ob hoc nemini pervia, nisi navibus temporibus congruis.

Cogitavi itaque mecum sepiissime si quomodo eam invaderem, vel vi, vel aliqua deceptione. Sed quibus profitebar, infirmitatis pretendebant excusationem mortis percussi timore. Tandem pactita cum eis pace, Menendum Ramiridem mei consilii conscium premisi totius scrutatorem negotii, qua semita vel parte muri securius possemus nocte ingredi. Qui prout erat vir providus, et acri ingenio, et ad omnia

⁷ OM PMH

⁸ Cf. Gen. 13: 10.

audenda que mihi placere cognoverat avidus. prospectans omnia solito diligentius animavit me, secreto se iturum in prima fronte, promittento et erecturum meum vexillum supra murum, serasque portarum confracturum, quod et fecit sicut rei geste eventus probavit, quia omnia sibi videbantur facilia, omnique periculo segura.

Itaque statuto die preparatis cibariis cum colimbrianis, et Fernando Pertide cum aliis de meis paucis, egressi Colymbria feria II. castra metati sumus in Alfafhar, et hec fuit nostra mansio prima. Sequenti die mansimus in Chornudelos, unde misimus Martinum Mohab et alios duos, qui renuntiarent habitatoribus Sanctaren solutam fore ~~paucis~~ usque in tertium diem. Qui iussa perficientes venerunt ad nos feria III. in Abdegas. Inde proficiscentes castra metati sumus in Alvardos, mansimusque ibique totam quintam feriam usque ad noctem. Indeque promoventes nocte illa ambulavimus usque Ebrahaz in sumitate Pernez feria vi. illuscente. Tunc existimans fore idoneum omnibus meum aperire desiderium, convocavi ad me omnes a minimo usque ad maximum, et hoc ordine sum eos adlocutus.

Oratio regis ad milites

Nostis comilitones mei, nostis, et bene nostis, quia et mecum et sine me multos labores sustinuistis ex hac urbe in cuius confinio estis. Nostis quanta mala fecerit civitati vestre, et vobis, omnique me regno, qualiter sit in laqueum, et in stuporem dentium multis temporibus. Et nunc si convocarem omne robur totius mei exercitus, ferrent auxilium unusquisque pro viribus, sed nolui. Vos solos elegi quos assidue in meis angustiis expertos habui, et vobis meum comitto consilium, de quibus bene certus sum pro me dolore dolorem meum. Credite mihi milites mei, quoniam videtur adeo perfacile, et oportunum quod vobiscum inire paro, quod per gaudio animi mei, et mora venturi dici, crescunt mihi dies medii quos velum transire subito. Sed et cum vos video magis hoc obtare quam ego, et ipsam in faciendo oportunitatem attendo, quasi iam sim in civitatis medio, sic exulto.

Sed hoc est quod prius facere debemus. Eligantur centum XX. e numero vestro, qui decem fabricent scalas divisi per duodenas, ut cum unusquisque ascenderit per suam, non sit unus, sed decem supra civitatis murum, et ita facilis erit ascensus, et ascendentium multiplicabitur numerus. Quo cum fuerit perventum, meum erigite vexillum prius, ut et a nobis ad robur, et ab eis forte excitatis ad detrimentum possit

conspici eminus. Postea portarum confringite seras. ut impetus simul introeuntium perturbet inermes, et somnolentos. Cuiusmodi erit difficultas interficiendi, dicite mihi pro amore dei, nudos et male sopitos? Sed hoc erit quod observabitis attentius, nulli etati vel sexui parcatis: moriatur infans ad ubera pendens, et senex plenus dierum, adolescentula, et anus decrepita. Confortentur vestre manus, Dominus est enim nobiscum, nam unus e vobis poterit ex eis percutere C. Hodie, sicut credo, fit pro nobis communis oratio et a canonicis sancte crucis, quibus predixi hoc nostrum negotium, et in quibus confido, et a cetero clero simul cum omni populo. Preterea quidam de vigiliis sunt nos recepturi. Parcat mihi Deus huius crimen mendacii, quia ideo scienter sum mentitus, ut eorum animi consolidarentur fortius. Pugnate ergo pro filiis vestris ac nepotibus, ego enim ipse ero unus e vobis, et primus, nec est qui a vestro me possit seiungi consortio, vel in morte vel in vita ullo modo.

Huc usque me audierunt auribus arrectis, ut videbatur mihi, et ad audenda que precabar parato animo. Sed cum de mei periculo cum eis fieret sermo, obstupuerunt nec se coibere patuerunt. Ut quondam Ioab, et ceteri principes milicie David, dicentes: Non ibis nobiscum. Si enim fugerimus, non magnopere ad eos pertinebit de nobis, Sive media pars vel omnes ceciderimus non satis erit ulla cura, quia tu unus computaris pro decem milibus.⁹ Nec inficietur familia nostra sempiterno elogio ut filii proditorum, si te permiserimus commisceri tam aperto periculo. Ad quos ego benignissime iuxta karitativam eorum rationem respondi hec pauca. Velit deus oro ut si in hoc anno excessurus sum vita, nisi civitas sit capta non egrediar ab hac pugna.

Qui cum me obstinato viderent animo pronum ad subeunda discrimina, paraverunt omnia que negotio erant necessaria, et dimissis ibidem sarcinis properavimus ad urbem ascensis equis iam subeunte nocte, vidimusque miraculum quod maxime nostros erexit animos. Siquidem quedam stella magna ardens ut facula, discurrens per celi plana a parte dextera, prolapsa est in mare, maxime illuminans superficiem terre, diximusque continuo: tradidit dominus civitatem in manibus nostris. Similiter et ipsis eo die quo pax est soluta orrendum apparuit prodigium, portendens eorum in tercia nocte futurum excidium: Namque viderunt media die quasi quendam colubrum ferri per celi medium comis ignitum a cauda usque ad caput, et prophetaverunt inter eos sapientes nouum regem habere Sanctaren.

⁹ Cf. Sam. II, 18: 3.

Cum iam ergo non longe essemus ab urbe pedites, et velut cursarii preparati omnes, tenuimus semitam inter montem Iraz, et fontem qui propter amaras aquas arabice appellatur Athumarmal per medium vallem, preeunte Menendo Ramiride in prima fronte, qui transitus et exitus noverat bene, et ego in posteriori parte. Hinc libet attendere quam mirabilis clarescat Deus in suis operibus. Qui ne videretur aliquid nostro fieri arbitrio, mutavit consulta, tamen in melius, sua propria virtute. Quo enim loco nullam formidabamus fore custodiam, ibi enim videbatur facilis ascensus, erant due mutuo sese ad vigilandum ortantes. Unde quicuimus parum in erba tritici quiescentes, donec consopirentur sompno a domino utreque.

Statimque promouens Menendus ascendit cum suis per Alchudiam, et figuli, domum viriliter ad murum, tetenditque scalam in summitate haste, que non potuit herere sursum, sed repens usque deorsum dedit magnum sonitum. Condoluit itaque Menendus ne vigilie excitarentur strepitu, et incuruatus parumper super se fecit ascendere iuvenem nomine Mogueyme. Qui erectus sursum ascendit ilico supra murum, et innectens scalam propugnaculis, ascendit alius cum vexillo regis, erexitque illud. Interim ascendit Menendus, deinde ceteri, prout poterant melius. Sed cum tres tantum adhuc essent supra, excitantur subito male dormientes vigilie. Respicientesque vexillum iuxta mirantesque clamaverunt rauca voce: Manhu? id est, qui estis? Cumque cognouissent frustra christianos fore, clamaverunt voce sublimi, et confusa: annachara, id est, christianorum insidie. Post terciam itaque vigiliarum vocem, exclamat Menendus invitans ad auxilium sanctum Iacobum Yspanie patronum, et regem Alfonsum. Conclamavi et ego clamore magno: sancte Iacobe, et beatissima Maria virgo succurrite, hic est rex Alfonsus, cedite eos, nec sit unus qui evadat gladium. Tanta deinde secuta est confusio vocum utrarumque partium, ut nulla possit notari discretio. Aio ergo meis: feramus auxilium sociis, teneamus dexteram, si poterimus ascendere per Alpan, et Gundisaluus Gundisalui cum suis sinistram ut preocupet callem, qui venit de seserigo, ne porte aditus ab illis preocupetur, nosque frustrati pereant nostri qui intus sunt ab obprobrium nostrum, quod et factum est non nostra, sed voluntate Domini sola.

Qui enim proposueramus per scalas conscendere murum, ingressi sumus per portam civitatis multo securius. Et qui decem fabricaveramus due sole erecte compleverunt totum officium, per quas ascenderunt, ut aiunt, qui interfuerunt ad XX. V. tantum. Laudetur ergo Deus in suis operibus. Tunc hii qui erant intus ad portum concurrens precipuus nitebantur frangere valvas lapidibus. Sed malleus ferreus de foris

porrectus confregit seras, et vectes fortius, et ita cum magno gaudio, et meis intus sum receptus. In medio ergo porte fixis genibus, que oraverim, vel ex quanta profunditate animi scit Deus, nec nunc refferam, quia exciderunt iam a memoria. Quas congressiones, vel impetus fecerint, dicant amodo qui interfuerunt, quia non est meum. Itaque ista sufficiant pro magnitudine gaudii cordis mei et leticie.

ii) Manifestis probatum (1179)

Publ. txt: PL 200: 1237-8; J. V. Serrão (ed.), *8.º Centenário do reconhecimento de Portugal pela Santa Sé* (Lisbon: Academia Portuguesa da História, 1979), pp. 231-2

Alexander episcopus servus servorum Dei, karissimo in Christo filio Alfono illustri Portugalensium regi, eiusque heredibus, in perpetuum.

Manifestis probatum¹⁰ est argumentis, quod per sudores bellicos et certamina militaria inimicorum Christiani nominis intrepidus extirpator et propagator diligens fidei Christiane sicut bonus filius et princeps catholicus multimoda obsequia matri tue sacrosancte Ecclesie impendisti, dignum memoria nomen et exemplum imitabile posteris derelinquens. Equum est autem ut quod ad regimen et salutem populi ab alto dispensatio celestis elegit, Apostolica sedes affectione sincera diligit, et in justis postulationibus studeat efficaciter exaudire. Proinde nos attendentes personam tuam prudentia ornatam, iusticia peditam atque ad populi regimen idoneam, eam sub beati Petri et nostra protectione suscipimus et regnum Portugalense eum integritate honoris regni¹¹ et dignitate que ad reges pertinet nec non et omnia loca que cum auxilio celestis gratie de Sarracenorum manibus eripueris, in quibus jus sibi non possunt Christiani principes circumpositi vindicare, excellentie tue concedimus et auctoritate apostolica confirmamus. Ut autem ad devotionem¹² et obsequium beati Petri apostolorum principis et sacrosancte Romane ecclesie vehementis accendaris, hec ipsa prefatis heredibus tuis duximus concedenda, eosque super his que concessa sunt, Deo propitio, pro injuncti nobis apostolatus officio defendemus. Tua itaque intererit, fili karissime, ita circa

¹⁰ comprobatum PL

¹¹ OM PL

¹² OM PL

honorem et obsequium matris tue sacrosancte Romane Ecclesie humilem et devotum existere, et sic te ipsum ejus oportunitatibus et dilatandis Christiane fidei finibus exercere, ut de tam devoto et glorioso filio sedes apostolica gratuletur, et in ejus amore quiescat. Ad indicium autem quod prescriptum regnum beati Petri juris existat, pro amplioris reverentie argumento statuisti duas marcas auri annis singulis nobis nostrisque successoribus persolvendas. Quem utique censum ad utilitatem nostram et successorum nostrorum Bracharensi archiepiscopo, qui pro tempore fuerit, tu et successores tui curabitis assignare.

Decernimus ergo ut nulli omnino hominum liceat personam tuam aut heredum tuorum vel etiam prefatum regnum temere perturbare, aut ejus possessiones auferre, vel ablatas retinere, minuere aut aliquibus vexationibus fatigare. Si qua igitur in futurum¹³ ecclesiastica secularisve persona hanc nostre constitutionis paginam sciens contra eam temere venire temptaverit, secundo tertiove commonita, nisi reatum suam digna satisfactione correxerit, potestatis honorisque sui dignitate careat reamque se divino iudicio existere de perpetrata¹⁴ iniquitate cognoscat et a sacratissimo corpore ac sanguine Dei et Domini Redemptoris Nostri Jhesu Christi aliena fiat atque in extremo examine districte ultione subjaceat. Cunctis autem eidem regno et regi sua jura servantibus sit pax Domini Nostri Jhesu Christi quatinus et hic fructum bone actionis percipiant et apud districtum iudicem premia eterne pacis inveniant. Amen. Amen.

Ego Alexander Catholice ecclesie episcopus. SS. Bene valete.

Ego Johanes presbyter cardinalis sanctorum Johannis et Pauli tituli Pamachii. Ego Johanes presbyter cardinalis tituli Sancte Anastasie. Ego Johanes presbyter cardinalis tituli Sancte Marci. Ego Petrus presbyter tituli Sancte Suzanne. Ego Vivianus presbyter cardinalis tituli Sancti Stephani in Celiomonte. Ego Cinthius presbyter cardinalis tituli Sancte Cecilie. Ego Hugo presbyter cardinalis tituli Sancti Clementis. Ego Arduinus presbyter cardinalis tituli sancte crucis in Jerusalem. Ego Matheus presbyter cardinalis tituli Sancti Marcelli.

¹³ PL version ends here.

¹⁴ Following line omitted from Serrão. Source is the reissue of *Manifestis probatum* (1212) from *Bulário Português Inocência III (1198-1216)*, eds A. de Jesus da Costa and M. Alegria F. Marques (Coimbra: Casa da Moeda, 1989), p. 326.

Ego Hubaldus Hostiensis episcopus. Ego Theodinus Portuensis et Sancte Rufine episcopus. Ego Petrus Tusculanensis episcopus. Ego Henricus Albanensis episcopus. Ego Bernerus Prenestinus episcopus.

Ego Jacintus diaconus cardinalis Sancte Marie in Cosmydin. Ego Ardecio diaconus cardinalis Sancti Theodori. Ego Laborans diaconus cardinalis Sancte Marie in Porticu. Ego Rainerius diaconus cardinalis Sancti Georgii ad velum aureum. Ego Gratianus diaconus cardinalis sanctorum Cosme et Damiani. Ego Johanes diaconus cardinalis Sancti Angeli. Ego Rainerius diaconus cardinalis Sancti Adriani. Ego Matheus Sancte Marie Nove diaconus cardinalis. Ego Bernardus Sancti Nicholai in carcere Tulliano diaconus cardinalis.

Dat. Lateran per manum Alberti sancte Romane ecclesie presbyteri Cardinalis et Cancellarii X Kalendas Junii Indictione XI Incarnationis dominice anno M.C.LXXVIII. Pontificatus vero domini Alexandri Pape. III anno XX.

iii) The Santarem Foral (1179)

Publ. txt: PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 405-11; CMP-A, pp. 366-8 (incomplete).

In nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti amen. Quoniam gratia dei cooperante qui dat omnibus affluenter et non inproperat¹⁵: ego Alfonsus divino nutu Portugalensis rex corporali labore et pervigili astucia mei et meorum hominum opidum de Sanctarem Sarracenis abstuli et eam Dei cultui restitui et vobis meis hominibus atque vassalis et alumnis ad habitandum iure hereditario tribui. Idcirco placuit mihi libenti animo et spontanea voluntate dare et concedere vobis forum bonum tam presentibus quam futuris perpetuo ibidem permansuris: per quod forum regalia iura inferius plenarie scripta mihi et generi meo a vobis et a successoribus vestris persolvantur.

De homicidio.

¹⁵ Cf. James, 1:5.

Do itaque uobis pro foro ut qui publice coram bonis hominibus casam violenter cum aramis ruperit pectet D solidos et hoc sit sine uozeiro. Et si infra domum ruptor occisus fuerit occisor vel dominus domus pectet I morabatinum: et si ibi uulneratus fuerit pectent pro eo medium morabatinum. Similiter pro homicidio et rausso publice facto pectet D solidos.

De stercore in buca.

Pro merda in bucca LX solidos pectet testimonio bonorum hominum.

De furto cognito.

Futum cogitum testimonio bonorum hominum novies componatur.

De relego regis.

Qui relegum vini regis ruperit et in relego suum vinum vendiderit et inventum fuerit testimonio bonorum hominum primo pectet V solidos et secundo V solidos. Et si in tercio iterum inuentum fuerit testimonio bonorum hominum uinum totum effundatur et arcus cuparum incidantur. De vino de fora dent unaquaque carrega I almude et vendatur aliud in relegum.

De iugata.

De iugata vero hoc mando ut usque ad natalem domini trahatur. Et de unoquoque iugo boum dent I modium milii uel tritici qualis laborauerint. Et si de utroque laborauerint de utroque dent per alqueire directum uille, et sit quartarius de quatuordecim alqueriis et meciatur sine brachio curuato et tabula supraposita. Et parceiro de caualeiro qui boues non habuerit non det iugatam.

De tendis.

Et habitatores de Sanctaren habeant libere tendas, fornos panis, scilicet et ollarum.

De fornos telia.

Et de fornos de telia dent decimam.

De homici.

Qui hominem extra cautum occiderit pectet LX solidos. Et qui vulnerauerit hominem extra cautum pectet XXX solidos. Qui in platea aliquem armis vulnerauerit pectet medietatem homicidii. Qui arma per iram denudaverit uel a domo ea extraxerit per iram et non percusserit pectet LX solidos.

De hereditatibus populatas.

Et homines de Sanctaren habeant hereditates suas populatas: et illi qui in eis habitaverint pectent pro homicidio et rausso noto et merda in bucca LX solidos medietatem scilicet regi et medietatem domno hereditatis, et eant in appetitum regis, et nullum aliud forum faciant regi.

De almozaria.

Et almozaria sit de concilio et mittatur almozace per alcaidem et per concilium ville, et dent de foro de vacca I denarium et de zeuro I denarium et de cervo I denarium et de bestia de pescato I denarium et de barca de pescato I denarium et de iudicato similiter et de alcavala III denarios: de cervo et de zeuro et de vacca et de porco I denarium et de carneiro I denarium. Piscatores dent decimam. De equo vel de mula vel de mulo quem vendiderint vel emerint homines de fora a decem morabitanis et supra dent I morabitanum et a decem morabitanis et infra dent medium morabitanum. De equa vendita uel comprata dent II solidos: et de bove II solidos et de vacca I solidum et de asino et de asina I solidum. De mauro et de maura medium morabitanum. De porco vel de carneiro II denarios: de caprone vel de capra I denarium. De carrega de azeite vel de coriis boum vel zeurorum vel ceruorum dent medium morabitanum. De carrega de cera medium morabitanum. De carrega de anil vel de pannis vel de pellibus coniliorum vel de coriis vermeliis vel albis vel de pipere vel de grana I morabitanum: de braceale II denarios. De vestitu de pellibus III denarios: de lino vel de aliis vel cepis decimam. De pescato de fora decimam. De concas vel vasis ligneis decimam. Et pro omnibus his carregis quas vendiderint homines de fora et portagium dederint si alias proprias emerint non dent portagium ex eis. De carrega panis vel salis quam uendiderint vel emerint homines de fora, de bestia caualari vel mulari dent III denarios, de asinari III medalias.

De mercatoribus.

Mercatores naturales ville qui soldatam dare voluerint recipatur ab eis. Si autem soldatam dare noluerint dent portagium. De carrega de piscato quam inde levaverint homines de fora dent VI denarios.

De peditibus.

Cauon si laboraverit triticum det I talegam, et si laboraverit milium similiter: *et* de geiras de bobus I quartarium de tritico vel milio unde laboraverit. Pedites dent octavam vini et lini.

De balestariis.

Balistarii habeant forum militum.

De mulieribus.

Mulier militis que viduaverit habeat honorem militis usque nubat: et si nupserit pediti faciat forum peditis.

De sene milite.

Miles qui senuerit vel ita debilitauerit quod exercitum facere non possit stet in honore suo. Si autem mulier militis viduata talem filium habuerit qui cum ea in domo contineatur et cavalariam facere potuerit eam pro matre.

De almoqueuaria.

Almoqueuer qui per almoquauariam vixerit faciat forum suum semel in anno. Miles vero qui equum suum aut bestias suas ad almoqueuariam miserit nullum forum de almoquauaria faciat.

De conillariis.

Conillarius qui fuerit ad sogeiram et illuc manserit det follem unum conilii. Et qui illuc moratus fuerit octo diebus vel amplius det unum conilium cum pelle sua. Et conilarius de fora det decimam quociens venerit.

De habitatoribus.

Moratores de Sanctaren qui panem suum vel vinum vel ficus vel oleum in Ulixbona habuerint vel in aliis locis et ad Sanctaren illud ad opus sui duxerint et non ad revendendum non dent inde portagium.

De rixa.

Qui cum aliquo rixaverit et post rixam domum suam intraverit et ibi inito concilio acceperit fustem vel porrinam et eum percusserit pectet XXX solidos. Si autem in consulte et casu accidente percusserit nichil pectet.

De inimicis de fora.

Inimicus de fora non intret in villam super inimicum suum nisi per treugas aut pro directo illi dare.

De homine occiso equo.

Si equa alicuius aliquem occiderit dominus equi pectet aut equum aut homicidium quod horum domino equi placuerit.

De clericis.

Et clericus habeat forum militis per totum et si cum muliere inventus turpiter fuerit maiordomus non mittant manum in eum nec aliquo modo eum capiat, sed mulierem capiat si voluerit.

De madeira.

De madeira que venerit per flumen unde dabant octavam dent decimam.

De atalaia.

De atalaia de villa debet rex tenere medietatem et milites medietatem suis corporibus.

De militibus.

Militem de Sanctaren cui meus diues homo benefecerit de terra sua vel de habere suo per quod eum habeat ego eum recipiam meo diviti homini in numerum suorum militum.

De sagionius

Maiordomus vel sagio eius non eant ad domum militis sine portario pretoris.

De nobilis homo

Et meus nobilis homo qui in (sic) Sanctaren de me tenuerit non mittat ibi alium alchaidem nisi de Sanctaren. De casis quas mei nobiles homines aut fleires aut hospitalarii aut monasteria in Sanctaren habuerint faciant forum uille sicut ceteri milities de Santaren.

De ganato per [perditio]¹⁶

Ganatum perditicium quod maiordomus inuenerit teneat illud usque tres manese, et per singulos menses faciat de eo preconem dari, ut si domnus eius uenerit detur ei. Si autem domnus eius preconem dato usque tres menses non uenerit tunc maiordomus faciat de eo commodum suum.

De cavalgada de [alcaide]

De cavalgada de alcaide nichil accipiat alcaide per vim nisi quod ei milites amore suo dare voluerint. De cavalgada LX militum et supra dividant mecum in campo.

De fabris et zapatariis.

Faber aut zapatarius aut pellitarius qui in Sanctaren casam habuerit et in ea laboraverit non det de ea ullum forum. Et qui maurum fabrum vel zapatarium habuerit et in domo sua laboraverit non det pro eo forum. Qui autem ministriales ferrarii vel zapatarii fuerint et per officium istud vixerint et casas non habuerint veniant ad tendas meas et faciant mihi meum forum.

De venditione equorum

Qui equum vendiderit aut comparaverit vel maurum extra Sanctarem, ubi eum comparaverit vel vendiderit ibi det portagium. Et pedites quibus suum habere dare debuerint dent inde decimam maiordomo, et maiordomus det eis directum pro decima: et si pro decima eis dare directum noluerit tunc pretor faciat eis directum dari per portarium suum.

¹⁶ Titles obscured in Santarém foral can be reconstructed from the virtually identical Lisbon foro PMH, *Leges and consuetudines*, p. 414.

De furto.

Et homines qui habitaverint in hereditatibus sanctaranensis si furtum fecerint ut supradictum est componatur medietatem regi et medietatem domno hereditatis.

De luctuosa

Moratores de Sanctaren non dent luctuosam.

De adaliles

Adaliles de Sanctaren non dent quinatam de quiniones suorum corporum.

De delantiera milit[itum exercitu regis]

Milites de Sanctaren non teneant zagam et teneant delanteira in exercitu regis.

De paneta[riis]

Panetarie dent pro foro de XXX panibus unum.

De portagio.

Portagia vero et forum et quinte Sarracenorum et aliorum ita persolvantur sicut consuetudo est, exceptis his que superius scripta sunt et nobis relinquo.

De alcaidaria

Et pro alchaidaria de una bestia que venerit de fora cum piscato dent II denarios. Et de barca de piscato minuto II denarios. Et de toto alio piscato dent suum forum.

De concedendo regis

Hec itaque omnia prescripta uobis pro foro do et concedo: et ad hec eat maiordomus testimonio bonorum hominum, et non ad alia.

De testimonio

Milites de Sanctaren testificentur cum infantionibus de Portugali. Siquis igitur hoc meum factum vobis firmiter seruauerit benedictionibus Dei et mei repleatur. Qui vero illud frangere voluerit maledictionem Dei et mei consequatur. Facta karta apud Colimbria mense maio era MCCXVII. Ego predictus Rex Alfonsus domnus hanc kartam quam fieri iussi roboro et confirmo. Qui etiam aliquem calcaribus percusserit et testimonio bonorum hominum convictus fuerit pectet D solidos.

De navigio

De navigio vero mando ut alchaide et duo spadelarii et duo pronarii et unus petintal habeant forum militum.

Ego S. Dei gratia Portugalensis Rex una cum uxore mea Regina domna D. et cum filiabus meis hanc karta roboro et confirmo. Preterea Ego S. Dei gratia Portugalensis Rex una cum filiis et filliabus meis do vobis et concedo ut vestram almotazariam habeatis et eam pro voluntate vestram disponatis. Mando etiam ut nec meus pretor ville nec maiordomus nec alvaziles nec aliquis alius audeat afforciare nullum hominem de Sanctaren vel de fora de suo vino neque de suo pane neque de suo piscato neque de suis carnibus neque de aliis rebus suis. Adhuc mando ut mei maiordomo non vadant extra villam apprehendere homines neque roubare neque afforciare: sed si fecerint calumpnias faciant eos vocari per portarium pretoris coram pretore et alvazilibus, et sanent eis quod fecerint sicut mandaverint pretor et alvaziles. Et concilium cambiet suos alvaziles annuatim. Preterea mando ut pater non pectet calumpniam pro filio suo, sed filius pectet eam si illam fecerit. Et si non habuerit per quod sanet illam, per corpus suum sanet eam. Mando etiam de mauris et de iudeis percussis ut veniant se conqueri pretori et alvazilibus sicut fuit consuetudo tempore patris mei. Adhuc mando ut maiordomi non pignorent ullum hominem se Santaren donec uocent eum ad concilium coram pretore et alvazilibus. Addo adhuc amore vestro ut si aliquis pignoraverit sine meo maiordomo aut sine sagione suo aut sine portario pretoris pectet tantum pro quanto pignoraverit et non plus.

Qui presentes fuerunt Domnus Velascus Fernandi curie maiordomus conf. – Domnus Suerius Ariei conf. Domnus Petrus Fernandi conf. – Domnus Gunsaluus Egea tenens Ulixbonum conf. Julianus notarius domni regis – Domnus Suerius Didaci conf. Domnus

Fernandus Arieie conf. – Domnus Johannes Fernadiz conf. – Domnus Martin Fernandus conf. Domnus Reimundus Pelagii conf. Domnus Gunsaluus Roderici conf. – Petro Nuniz test. – Fernandus Nuniz test. Johannes Reimundi test. – Petrus Gomez test.

Bracharensis archiepiscopus domnus Godinus conf. – Portugalensis episcopus domnus Fernandi conf. – Colimbriensis episcopus Vermudus conf. – Ulixbonensis episcopus domnus Alvarus conf. – Petrus regis cancellarius conf. Domnus Johannes Fernandi conf. – Domnus Menendus Gusalui conf. Domnus S. Ulixbonensis electus conf. – Petrus Menendiz test. – Michael Menendiz test.

Rex domnus Sancius – Rex domnus Alfonsus – Regina domina Dulcia – Regina domina Tarasia – Regina domina Sancia.

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