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For Those Who Can Climb? A Critique of the Instrumental Rationalisation of

Mass Education and its Relationship to Democratic Citizenship

By

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Abstract

This thesis is an examination of the relationship between mass education and liberal democracy in Australia. Changes to conventional practises of mass education across institutional and informal contexts during the last twenty-five years are analysed in terms of their effects on processes of social integration, cultural reproduction and the constitution of subjectivity. The conclusion of the thesis is that education is increasingly oriented towards self-disciplinary practises shaped by a narrow instrumental rationality. While these individuating practises are currently enacted to the detriment of effective democracy, there is also a potential for revitalising democratic values using a variety of approaches to education reform. Therefore, a model of democratic education is proposed and critically analysed.

Statement

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution.

I affirm that to my knowledge, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Glossary of terms

Civic Education involves the acquisition of knowledge and skills through active political participation. Unlike *civics education*, which is pedagogically instructed through institutions of public education, *civic education* encompasses educative practises of learning and action across general formal and informal contexts. *(See: Civics Education; Education.)*

Civics Education concerns the instruction, study and learning of citizenship and associated rights and duties. Traditionally, civics education provides information about the historical development of national identity, civic life, politics and government. *(See: Civic Education; Education.)*

Cultural Capital emerged as a self-conscious practice of the acquisition of status during modernity. Knowledge, which constitutes culture, is the precondition for the generation of cultural capital. (Gouldner 1979) The habitus is made up of cultural capital in the form of knowledge and skills. The education system enables the accumulation of cultural capital. (Lash, in Calhoun, Lipuma and Postone 1993) *(See: Habitus.)*

Cultural Production involves any agency, institution or individual actively involved in the deliberate generation, dissemination and reproduction of knowledge. Thus, teachers, the state and the motion picture industry are cultural producers. *(See: Cultural Capital; Education; Habitus.)*

Democratic Education as understood throughout this thesis from the critical pedagogy of Stanley Aronowitz and Henry A. Giroux, in which education is broadly defined as "a collectively produced set of experiences organized around issues and concerns that allow for a critical understanding of everyday oppression as well as the dynamics involved in constructing alternative political cultures. As the embodiment of an ideal, it refers to forms of learning and action based on a commitment to the elimination of class, racial and gender oppression." This definition includes the knowledge and skills required for the active participation of every citizen of a democratic polity. (Aronowitz 1985: 132)

Disciplinary Power During the development of modernity, disciplinary power has been increasingly used by democratic states in lieu of brute force to instigate new forms of social training. This social training is concerned with productive processes of normalisation ordering every grain of individuality. Governmentality since the Enlightenment shifted its object of concern from the regulating subjects through physical punishment to an economy of suspended rights, and an expansion of the disciplinary net over the moral character of the individual through processes such as the use of isolation and rehabilitation. (Foucault 1977) In late-modernity, disciplinary power is increasingly manifested through technologies of self-discipline. *(See: Technologies of self-discipline; Governmentality.)*

Disembodied Visual Media includes all cultural producers oriented towards the provision of cultural representations through disembodied visual media (eg cinema, television and Internet). The term *New Media* is used in relation to convergent disembodied media within the loosely grouped under the title. *(See: Cultural Producers; Education.)*

Distance Learning includes formal education that does not require the student to physically attend a central institution. Distance learning occurs through disembodied media such as telecommunications and Internet.

Education Encompassing processes of training and developing of knowledge, skill and character, *education* is used throughout the thesis to mean the mass, systemic application of these processes in three spheres: (i) formal public education, where processes of learning occur within an institutionalised system; (ii) civic education, in which democratic citizenship is developed through active political participation; and (iii) mass political socialisation, whereby social integration and governance is predominantly facilitated by state institutions and industry. Contemporary mass education takes place on three levels: (i) pre-technological levels include the provision of lay-knowledge *'face-to-face'*; (ii) institutional levels, such as the conventional classroom regulated by a teacher(s); and (iii) disembodied levels, through mass electronic communications media. *(See: Social Integration; Civic Education.)*

Governmentality concerns the development of expert systems by the modern state, which are designed to efficiently shape and regulate the public and private conduct of citizens. The primary object of modern regimes is the continuous regulation and management of the body, "its disciplining, the optimisation of its capabilities, the exertion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls..." (Foucault 1980: 139) In late-modernity, these expert systems draw heavily upon technologies of self-discipline. *(See: Technologies of Self-Discipline, Reflexive Processes.)*

Habitus Cultural values and ethos form part of a cultural logic, which is systematically structured according to is called the *habitus*. The *habitus* functions as a feedback loop between social structures and rational, purposeful human agents. It is generated through the structures of everyday experience, including class and education, consisting of embodied and unconscious mechanisms that regulate social structure and human agency. These mechanisms include cultural capital geared towards improving, securing and guaranteeing status in the labour market such as academic qualifications. (Bourdieu 1977) Unlike Bourdieu, I argue that there is a reflexively active role for human agency in shaping the habitus. *(See: Cultural Capital, Theory of Structuration.)*

Instrumental Reason aims to achieve the most technically efficient means to a given end. Where rationalisation is the process in which a form of social action becomes more reasonable, *instrumental rationality* is understood as a means of deriving order from one's perception of the world using the criteria of utilitarianism and positivism. Different types of rationality are embedded in historical social institutions and practices, which "change and develop in historical time." (Bernstein 1985: 20) In late-modernity, *instrumental rationality* is increasingly reliant on economic criteria as the means of evaluating the consequences of a given action or policy. *(See: Utilitarianism.)*

Lifeworld refers to communicatively (culturally) shared background of meaning that makes ordinary symbolic interaction between people possible. Through communicative action and processes of cultural reproduction, subjects repair, elaborate, change and integrate their symbolic worlds. (Bernstein 1985: 20)

Pedagogy refers to the methodology of instruction. As such, the term connotes a *science* of teaching that is differentiated from lay knowledge because it lays claim to expert systems of teaching and learning that are *objectively* applicable across individuals and cultures.

Performance Ideology In modernity, citizens are motivated to be loyal to the state and its ongoing development according to a system of beliefs oriented towards the accumulation of cultural capital. This pursuit is motivated by a *performance ideology* based on instrumental reason. *(See: Cultural Capital; Habitus; Instrumental Reason; Possessive Individualism.)*

Possessive Individualism Liberal Democracy is based on the conception of possessive individualism. Private wealth, as the ultimate measure of a person, is the ontological essence of this doctrine. The liberal definition of freedom in possessive individualist terms is the basis of a performance ideology evoked by government and citizen alike as a means of marshalling stable social integration into the liberal democratic polity. *(See: Performance Ideology, Modes of Social Integration.)*

Reflexive Processes Modernity contains reflexive processes of cultural reproduction that continually re-modernise modern structures. Modern structures modernise themselves on individual and societal levels, replacing taken-for-granted practises, such as the pre-technological communication of lay knowledge. *(See: Technologies of Self-Discipline; Modes of Social Integration.)*

Self-discipline, Technologies of Social integration in late-modernity is increasingly oriented towards technologies of self-discipline in which greater responsibility is placed upon the individual to define the political, social and economic conditions of their well-being. The term "technology" refers to the systematic application of a body of knowledge. These applications are referred to as *techniques*, that is, technologies of self-discipline consist of techniques, which the self applies upon the self in reflexive ways. These techniques may be manifested in restrictive and oppressive forms of *self-regimentation*, or they may provide knowledge and skills for *self-empowerment*. *(See: Modes of Social Integration; Reflexive Processes.)*

Social Integration, Modes of involve the techniques by which citizens are guided into the cohesive membership of a given polity. These techniques are increasingly oriented towards self-maintenance. *(See: Technologies of Self-discipline; Habitus and Cultural Capital.)*

Structuration, Theory of is an ontological framework for the study of human social activities. Giddens' theory of structuration avoids the limitations of simplistic agency-structure binaries by understanding political processes as the dynamic combination of interactions between the agency of subjects (both individuals and groups), and structures and institutions in which agency is engaged in a dialectical relationship. (Giddens, in Bryant and Jary 1991)

Utilitarianism is a normative ethical theory that places the locus of right and wrong solely on the outcomes and consequences of choosing one action or policy over other actions or policies. It moves beyond the limits of one's own interests and accounts for the interests of others. (Cavalier 1997) Bentham's Principle of Utility asserts that pleasure and pain are capable of quantification/measurement. This conception of utility forms the foundation of instrumental reason. *(See: Instrumental Reason.)*

Welfare State is a major policy achievement of the modern democratic state. Measured by state expenditures, welfare states developed into three broad types: (i) the limited welfare state, where the ability to claim benefits are strictly kept to a minimum, (ii) the conservative welfare state, where benefits are linked to job salaries, and (iii) the social democratic welfare state based on equal flat rate benefits for all citizens. (Hague *et al.* 1993)

Introduction

In this thesis, I offer a critique of instrumental reason as a "meta-ideological" phenomenon by considering how the closely related emergence of economic liberalism as a dominant rationale for policy formation, educational practice and institutional change affects the education of future citizens. Education, understood in its broadest sense, is inturn evaluated as a potential site/cultural practise for democratising a wide range of institutions. An attempt is made to offer a significant contribution to the subject of mass education and democratic citizenship by moving beyond established research literature in education and politics. Though much of the relevant education literature bears testimony to, and criticism of, several central themes of this thesis, I have chosen to move through these specific debates in the education literature rather than engage with them in detailed exposition and critique. The emphasis of the thesis in on developing an interdisciplinary approach draws on conceptual debates and contemporary issues of social and political theory. In attempting to mount a systematic examination of the relationship between modern education, democracy and the constitution of subjectivity autobiographical anecdotes are dispersed throughout discussion to maintain an analytic link between personal reflection and social polemic and to underscore local and global dimensions of contemporary education reform.

This thesis argues as its central contention that a combination of recent changes in mass education has lead to a shift in constitutive processes of subjectivity. These changes range from pedagogical reforms to the growing influence of disembodied media, such as the Internet, to movements in the conception and experience of democratic citizenship. While diverse, these changes share certain commonalities when analysed in terms of emergent patterns of rationalisation throughout contemporary Australian society. In particular, patterns become evident when this shift is analysed in the context of those changes to mass education of Australians guided by instrumental reasoning. During my analysis of this educational context, I will explore of the impact of changing technologies of public and civic education reform in Australia since the late 1960s. The term "technology" is used here not only in its conventional meaning as the study of the industrial and practical arts, but also in the sense of its original Greek translation meaning the systematic application of a body of knowledge. In exploring this latter notion of technology, I hope to identify emergent patterns of rationalisation throughout the processes and experiences of mass education. Shifts in certain technologies of mass education are indicative of broad, sweeping alterations to patterns of power, authority and processes of social integration in late-modern democratic societies of the West. Therefore, a central objective of this thesis is to examine various forms of mass education to illustrate the changing ways in which subjectivity is constituted in the late-twentieth century. While Australia is the immediate focus of analysis, it is set in the wider context of similar changes in the United States, Europe and New Zealand.

Widespread alterations to the education system coincide with the decline of the welfare state since the 1970s. A variety of reforms have been instituted at all levels of public education in Australia. Most of these reforms have been rationalised within an intensified ideology of instrumentality. This ideology of

instrumentality is so broad and pervasive that it virtually assumes the form of a *meta-ideology*, which is a revised form of instrumental reasoning that has become the predominate rationality of both government education-reform strategies, and various non-government market actors that are increasingly involved in Australian public education. This mutation of the modern state's relationship to the education system has given rise to an increasing reliance of public education on disembodied electronic and visual communications technology, such as cinema, television and the Internet, as the new media of this instrumental reasoning. Given the consequent changes to the social integration of students, teachers and state, the recent development of this institutional shaping of Australian cultures and subjectivities is a major new political concern.

The pragmatic ideology of instrumental reason has been successfully adopted by both state and market actors to re-structure the education system, resulting in the decline of the visible authority of the classroom teacher, the rise of technologies of self-regimentation amongst students and a growing dependency upon disembodied media for mass education. The increasing reliance by state regimes, market actors and education reformers upon a revised notion of instrumental reasoning in the organisation of public education offers some beneficial approaches to the easing of financial burdens on the welfare state. However, the hegemony of this ideology of instrumentality over other forms of reasoning poses serious threats to the principles of pluralism and democratic citizenship vital to effective democracy. For example, the increasing dependence of the state upon economic indicators to measure social and democratic well-being—combined with the diversion of traditionally state-based responsibilities to the private sector—has restricted political freedoms, avenues of mass political participation and certain favourable education technologies. Increasingly defined by narrow parameters of the market and New Right ideology, these negative changes to processes of mass education are linked to patterns of declining active political participation by the general populace and the expansion of private agencies of mass cultural reproduction (i.e. Internet, television and cinema). These culture industries undermine and sometimes attempt to replace spontaneous and traditional processes of cultural formations. Consequently, the patterns of education reforms signify a major threat to the quality of contemporary democratic life and its ongoing development.

The Historical Context of Discussion

This thesis seeks to analyse transformations of the institutional shaping of mass cultures and subjectivities in the late-modern liberal democratic state by focussing upon public education reform during the last three decades of the twentieth century. Certain political, economic and cultural shifts since the late 1960s indicate the nadir of established frameworks of the modern liberal democratic state. The term 'late-modernity' designates this period. Particular emphasis is placed on illustrating the pacification and clientalisation of the citizen's relationship to the state in the experience of teachers and students under market-driven reforms to the Australian public education during the 1980s.

Integral to my analysis of late-modern reforms to public and civic education are five related themes:

(i) The development of the modern education system is intrinsically linked to the emergence of the modern liberal democratic state;

(ii) Instrumental reasoning developed as a central logic of the organisation and expansion of the state during the Enlightenment. Instrumentality has shaped the emergence of legitimate, authoritative technologies of mass public education through techniques of governmentality employed in the management of education systems (e.g. curriculum design), the visible authority of teachers and the privileging of oral and textual modes of communication above other means of learning intercourse;

(iii) Instrumentality developed in the West as a mode of rationalisation amongst, within and in conflict with other modalities of organisation, logics of governance and normative frameworks liberal democratic principles such as pluralism and the participation of the general populace in self-government. These principles of the liberal democratic state are continually challenged by processes such as the following: (i) social, political and economic demands created by the emergence of mass industrialised societies; (ii) rapid technological innovation; and (iii) globalisation manifest in a growth in migration, the expansion of industrialisation and international trade and the growth of global disembodied information media;

(iv) Consequently, there has been a restructuring of the institutional order of the education system into arrangements that, on one level, are increasingly regimented and secularised, while on other levels, are fragmented and dysfunctional. The revision of the individualistic ethos of modern liberalism has been used to justify and facilitate the widespread dissemination of technologies of self-discipline. Within these technologies, certain techniques of self-maintenance are systematically encouraged by both state and non-state agencies in a variety of spheres of life, such as health-care, civic participation and public education. These techniques operate as a form of disciplinary power that encourages both autonomy through self-empowerment and oppressive forms of political self-regimentation. Framed by instrumental reason, these two contemporary facets of disciplinary power often operate alongside each other and in a condition of tension; and

(v) Oppressive new forms of instrumentalisation threaten to exile the citizen and student from democratic membership, the realisation of plural forms of life and equality of opportunity and learning outcomes in public education. Therefore, I wish to propose ways of overcoming the anti-democratic consequences of this hegemony of instrumental rationality over the discourses of education in its three spheres during recent decades.

I wish to illustrate that the limited experience of democratic citizenship and civics education in modernity is primarily due to fundamental tensions arising between the ideological influence of liberalism and the practical realisation of democracy. Tensions inherent in the organisation of contemporary mass society are exacerbated by the state's efforts to implement draconian education reform during the late twentieth century mobilise bias of mass loyalty and political obligation to the New Right's evocation of possessive individualism as a legitimate claim to democratic reform. I argue that the educative role of mass political participation is diminished under the New Right's limited conception of democracy.

Emphasis is placed on the links between democratic citizenship and public schooling. The implications of the problems shared by these two spheres of education are understood using Habermas' notion of the "colonisation of the lifeworld." Instrumental reason is located as the driving rationality behind processes of colonisation generated by corporate and state agencies. Instrumental reason aims to achieve the most technically efficient means to a given end. (Connerton 1976: 27, Taylor 1993: 5)

Changing fields of power in the school and state are indicative of broader tensions in the modern liberal democracy. The complex historical changes to this dialectic of power have, in recent decades, led to a growing clientalisation of the citizen's relationship to the state. The relationship of the citizen to the state has been recast in terms of a "user-pays" mentality, which aggrandises the state as a service provider in lieu of its traditional role as patron of perpetual, intrinsic democratic freedoms. Freedoms are economically rationalised under this neo-liberal rationality, in which the health of democracy is measured by the degree of market power available to individuals. Neo-liberalism defines freedom in purely economic terms at the expense of active political participation vital to the maintenance of democratic states. I wish to assert that the role of education in a liberal democracy must include the mass participation of its citizens. Education is a key form of social integration not only in the classroom, but also in the way citizenship is defined in the modern liberal democracy. Furthermore, mass political socialisation is increasingly shaped by commercially provided visual mass media.

The Conceptual Framework of the Thesis

Education is defined as processes facilitating the development and training of knowledge, skills and character. Furthermore, this notion of education is used throughout the thesis to mean the mass, systemic application of these processes—both within and outside of established institutions and spheres. Because of the ways in which instrumental reasoning has nearly monopolised the technologies of mass social integration and coordination within the Australian education system and across broader, interrelated processes of mass cultural reproduction, I am expanding the definition of education to include three distinct, yet overlapping categories of education processes within the late-modern liberal democratic state:

(i) Formal public education: where technologies of learning occur within a formal institutionalised system of education. In principle, the education system is universally available to all citizens of the Australian state within certain democratic standards;

(ii) Civic education: in which mass active political participation is a key learning process that is essential to ongoing democratic development; and

(iii) Political socialisation: involving socialisation into broad political cultures through both state institutions and privately owned, non-state organisations (such as the visual media of television and cinema). As a direct consequence of the declining welfare state, market-based cultural producers have assumed a greater role in the daily formal and informal education of citizens.

In light of changes to the third category of mass education above, the politics of cultural reproduction and representation is investigated as a key influence of subjectivity. In particular, disembodied technologies of cultural reproduction

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have become a central force in the formation of subjectivities and cultures, providing integrative techniques utilised by both the state and agencies in competition with the state. Hence, my conception of political culture encompasses cultures that operate as fields of power, shaping subjectivity and defining the political rights and obligations of the citizen in the late-modern state. Here it should be noted that the designation 'late-modern' is a short-hand description of a society that I take to be constituted in layers of traditionalism, modernism and postmodernism.

Changes to the ways in which citizens are formally, politically and culturally educated across all three of the above categories occur at three levels:

(i) Pre-technological levels—in which the learning of expert systems of knowledge and lay-knowledge occur within local, face-to-face communities but not necessarily on a mass-systemic scale;

(ii) Institutional levels—in which skills and knowledge are directly acquired from both state and non-state actors via technologies like pedagogy; and

(iii) Disembodied levels—at which education occurs through electronic communications media. Disembodied media originate in local and foreign state territories and have significantly extended their spheres of influence over processes of cultural reproduction in the latter twentieth century. For example, the saturation of Northern American popular culture throughout all dimensions of Australian mass media contains many enduring cultural representations, constituting a systematic influence over the development of subjectivities on a global scale. The concepts of 'pre-technological', 'institutional' and 'disembodied' levels of engagement are used throughout the thesis both to refer specifically to modes of pedagogy as well as more broadly to modes of social integration.

The structure of my argument is as follows: Chapter 1 presents a thumbnail sketch of the thesis, outlining the key problems identified for examination and defining the author's argument for an effective and healthy education system in contemporary democratic life.

Chapter 2 situates the thesis principally in political and social theory by exploring the reproduction of power and its modes of practise through educational contexts. This chapter outlines a methodology for the thesis, with particular attention to the influential works of Michel Foucault and Jürgen Habermas. While my analysis adopts concepts from different traditions, Habermas is used as the theoretical framework underlying this approach to provide the theoretical system upon which other concepts are used with a Habermasian inflection. The Foucaultian approach, for example, is used to only to the extent that it sensitises this discussion of educational change to historical changes at a micro-levels of power.

In Chapter 3, this exploration of power is inturn contextualised within the discourse of several broad debates in public policy by exploring relationships between the development modern schooling, instrumental reason and the modern liberal democratic state. I wish to identify the role of instrumental reason in the expansion of public education.

The thesis then discusses the relationship between culture, political class-divisions and education reform since the 1980s. Chapter 3 compares recent reform to the education systems of Australia, New Zealand and the United

States of America (USA). The rise of disembodied technology as a significant new dimension of social organisation is briefly described in Chapter 4 as a global phenomenon affecting power, rule and authority on multiple levels. The growing reliance upon disembodied electronic communications media is partially symptomatic of a pervasive governmentality dominated by instrumental reason that is reshaping the political landscape of Australian democracy. Within this emergent discourse, non-state (mainly commercial) providers of these visual media, such as the motion picture industry, are rapidly eclipsing the influence of traditional modes of teaching and learning.

In Chapter 5, the declining visible authority of the teacher is linked to the curtailment of welfare state activity, which has as its corollary a shift towards technologies of self-discipline in the social mobilisation of student and citizen. As many Australian schools struggle to meet changing demands made upon their resources and expertise, the democratic goal of universal access to public education is challenged. Inequality between schools facilities, learning opportunities and outcomes is exacerbated by the state, which consistently defers responsibility for this goal onto individual teachers, students, parents and local community. A broad political shift in the dialectic of power defining the relationship of citizen to elected (and non-elected) representative is currently underway, which may be seen in the declining visible authority of teachers, indicating a redefinition of state sovereignty and social order across local, national and global domains.

Chapter 6 provides a more detailed examination of these shifts in power, rule and authority in relation to the development of political subjectivity. Certain postmodern conditions affecting the development of cultural identity are identified, which demarcate contemporary practices of teaching, learning and administration from conventional forms of education. In particular, I link certain practices of self-discipline to related processes of de-traditionalisation and colonisation of the lifeworld. These practises have a propensity to stifle the development of creative learning, civic virtue and participatory democracy.

Chapter 7 reopens discussion of the instrumental rationalisation of mass education by examining its impact on the quality and effectiveness of Australian democracy. A concept of the "exile" is evoked as an analytical entry into this complex task. This notion has two interrelated meanings: firstly, it describes those dissenting individuals and social movements who, as a consequence of resisting colonisation, face unjust marginalisation from meaningful involvement in democratic decision-making. Increasing numbers of individuals and groups face exile from many basic democratic entitlements associated with formal citizenship (e.g. universal access, education welfare). Secondly, the term refers to processes of self-regimentation that atomise political communities, effectively *exiling* people by encouraging them to adopt a notion of political identity based competitive self-interest and self-responsibility that, ultimately, places them as individuals at odds with the collective responsibilities, such participation in consensus formation and sharing the political obligations, duties and rewards of necessary for effective social democracy.

Chapter 8 explores ways by which democratic values may be enriched and salvaged within and beyond instrumental rationality. Using Habermas' argument for communicative action, a richer conception of reason is proposed upon

which education may be re-conceptualised as a core component of healthy democratic practise.

The penultimate chapter outlines a model for democratic education. This model explores several possibilities for improving education beyond the established structural and ideological limitations of established practices of schooling. It is suggested that rights, normative standards and indicators of democratic citizenship need to be publicly discussed, debated and implemented before meaningful democratic reform is possible at the level of mass education.

As a student, teacher and citizen, I myself have become increasingly concerned by the restrictive and dubious ways that educators and students are constituted within the ever-narrowing parameters of an instrumental policy agenda. I have therefore chosen to present parts of this discussion in the form of autobiographical reflections, which seek to make explicit my own subject-position within the educational contexts discussed.[1] In drawing upon my own experiences of educational change since the late 1960s, no special evidentiary claim is made other than to concretise the generalities of the social developments described. This reflective approach augments the central critical methodology, drawing from the works of Alvin Gouldner and Henry A. Giroux in Chapters' 5 and 6.

The determination of this thesis is that Australian education requires urgent re-evaluation in light of the instrumental rationalisation of school reform over the past three decades. This far-reaching ideology of reform threatens to marginalise increasing numbers of people from the opportunities and responsibilities necessary to maintain effective, meaningful democracy.

Drawing on the powerful metaphorical imagery of Albert Camus' story, *L'Hôte*, the conclusion retraces the main themes of the thesis, indicating ways of thinking beyond conventional modes of social inquiry, moribund educational practices and other conceptual prisons that may inhibit the capacity to imagine social transformation through education. A politics of resistance is recommended to engage the dominant instrumental discourses of educational governance and provide positive alternatives for social reconstruction. This approach features a vigorous reflexive ethos of democratic education emphasising critical thinking and political participation. This politics of resistance is proposed in conjunction with the extension of entrenched legal safeguards and social benchmarks that collectively can respond effectively to colonisation by instrumental reason and protect any consequent erosion of functionally related areas of democracy, such as cultural pluralism, civic awareness and community.

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[1] Please note that all personal accounts concern actual events and people. With the exception of blood-relatives, other names have been changed. All individuals referred to in my autobiographical accounts have been consulted and granted consent to references made to them throughout this thesis.

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Chapter 1: Educating Citizenship in an Era of Economic Rationalism{PRIVATE }

Advocates of citizenship democracy have seen education as a vital step in the political socialisation of the subject to citizen.[2] "Education for democracy," Bobbio writes, "takes place as an integral part of the operation of democracy in practise." (Bobbio 1987: 35) However, the Australian education system is perennially besieged by contentious debates over everything from literacy levels to issues of access and inequity, who should be responsible for education, how it ought to be funded and so on. The latter half of the twentieth century is no exception. The expansion of comprehensive schooling following the *Wyndham Report* in 1957 was met with hostility and suspicion.[3] Ten years later, Philip Coombs (1968) warned of no less than a global educational crisis. A Senate inquiry into Education for Active Citizenship at the end of the 1980s advised of a "crisis which Australians cannot afford to ignore," (SCEET 1989: vi) while the West Review Committee on Higher Education Financing and Policy found a critical sense of "unease" among academics who felt as though education had become "rudderless in a sea of change." (West, Banks *et al.* 1997: 1)

It would therefore be trite for me to write of a "new crisis" in education, per se. Nevertheless, mounting problems in our education system are exacerbated by policy in ways that are far-reaching. I refer to the growing corpus of education policy favouring market competition, student-centred learning and the devolution of responsibility for education from the state to its users and commercial interests. Constructed according to conservative tenets of neo-liberalism, this ideology has, for well over a decade now, guided a vector of educational reform that intersects with domains of institutional governance, political socialisation and identity formation. Recent market-based reforms constitute a kind of axis of ideological change in education policy extending across management, curriculum planning and pedagogy. Given its extensive articulation throughout state and federal policy, the discourse of neo-liberalism is now capable of bringing about a radical political relocation of the student by shaping his/her transition from subject to citizen.

The scope of neo-liberalism's influence along this axis of reform is as profoundly far-reaching as it is pernicious. In shirking responsibility for access and equity, the state evokes a seductive but illusory rhetoric espousing liberatory virtues of self-determination, competitive advantage, flexibility and freedom of choice as the benefits of marketisation. While many school communities and students have benefited from self-management and flexible learning, for those who start from positions of inequity arising, for example, from racial difference or poverty, then these reforms reflect a myth of democracy that conceals new modalities of exclusion.

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2. This socialising process sees the political identity of the individual undergo a transition from being under the power of a sovereign authority (e.g. teacher, nation-state, Queen, etc.) to a member of a polity in which every citizen has free and equal input into determining the conditions of his/her association with fellow citizens (i.e. democratic citizenship).

3. The Wyndham Report's recommendation to further expand comprehensive schooling was described by The Bulletin as "a landmark in the history of the decay of education in Australia." The Report's proposal for greater access to secondary schooling for groups such as girls and migrants, was seen as a threat to existing standards, inviting nothing less than a "collapse [of] the whole of education." (Bulletin 1961: 11; Wyndham 1962)

This chapter has three parts: I begin by describing the historical link between the development of liberalism, public education and democratic citizenship in Australia. My understanding of this relationship is predicated on a broad notion of civics and citizenship education. Inasmuch as current definitions of citizenship tend to be limited to a formal status associated with legal entitlements, civics and citizenship education tends to be taught within a confined framework or relegated to the periphery of curricula as an add-on. Furthermore, when taught in conventional didactic ways, the subject matter is bled of its dynamic, practical and personal significance. Effective civics and citizenship education emphasises the social dimension of citizenship—especially the educative value of participation in collective decision-making processes. I shall then illustrate some of the ways by which neo-liberal ideology has influenced education policy to the detriment of CCE. Examples of this emergent discourse are taken from recent policy statements, such as *Literacy for All* (DEETYA 1998) and the West Committee's findings in *Learning for Life: Review of Higher Education Financing and Policy*. (West *et al.* 1998) These statements give insight into the changing relationship between citizen and state—of central concern is the growing disjunction of public education from democratic citizenship. Finally, I explore some directions in which civics and citizenship education could be improved to encourage higher levels of politically literacy and participation.

Liberalism, Education and the Modern State

Liberalism emerged as "the attempt to uphold the values of choice, reason and toleration in the face of tyranny and the absolutist system." (Held 1991: 41) Liberalism provides the ideological justification for a movement of political power away from the despotic authority of monarchy by claiming that individual men [*sic*] had a private sphere of freedom beyond legitimate monarchic intervention. Liberalism advocates the notion of a constitutional state, private property and the competitive market economy as central mechanisms for coordinating the free and equal pursuit of 'the good life' by its citizens. Essentially, liberal theory is concerned with Rousseau's dilemma of finding a balance between might and right, duties and rights. The pursuit of this balance has taken a pernicious turn in recent decades. The axis of reform described in Chapter 1 represents an extensive penetration of Neoliberal values and strategies across educational policy, management and participation. Marketisation, competition, flexibility and freedom of choice and self-management form the vocabulary of a liberal rhetoric that conceals new modalities of inequity and social exclusion. A shift in the relationship of Australian citizens to the liberal democratic state has been generated by the rise of instrumental reason in the regulation and civic education of democratic citizenship. To some extent, the origins of this shift become apparent in tensions within the liberal conception of democracy in modern society.

Democracy in the Modern State

Sixteenth century Europe was a period of tremendous historical release that generated new forms of authority, self-government and political subjectivity. The Protestant Reformation dismantled the sovereign power of the Catholic Church, capturing the European imagination with its invitation to consider plural interpretations of the nature of political life. (Held 1991: 36-41) Martin Luther

effectively challenged Papal authority by relocating the interpretation, enactment and accountability of God's will away from the clergy to the secular and to the *individual*.

The first absolutist states formed during this period of transition. Drawing authority from the established feudal nobility of the manorial lord, these states maintained the first permanent standing armies funded through taxation and instituted complex administrative, legal and regulatory structures to organise the increasingly complex needs of society. (Anderson, in Held 1983: 149) Before its demise at the hands of bourgeois revolution, the feudal class system established the political foundation for the formation of civil society and the public sphere. (Bendix 1977: 385-457; Habermas 1989) A practical shift in feudal authority towards 'policing' the populace enabled the formation of public authority, whose addresses effectively formed the public sphere. Habermas suggests that civil society developed as a corollary of this emergent, depersonalised state authority. This shift in authority established the conditions necessary for "the objectification of personal relations of domination." (Habermas 1989: 17-19) He explains that "[o]nly after national and territorial power states had arisen on the basis of the early capitalist commercial economy and shattered the feudal foundations of power could this court nobility develop the framework of a sociability... into that peculiarly free-floating/but clearly demarcated sphere of 'good society' in the eighteenth century." (Habermas 1989: 10-11)

The ebb of papal influence not only unsettled the dynamics of political authority across Europe, but also enabled discussion of new ideas and possibilities for social change. Luther, for example, pioneered the development of a public education system during the mid-1500s.[4] He felt that education should be available to all children irrespective of social privilege and status. While Luther's schools were significant precursors to modern popular schooling, they did not seek to enhance the political efficacy or expand representation in any deliberate, democratic way. Democracy remerged in the English language during the sixteenth century; taking its name from the Greek words *demos* and *kratos*, meaning *rule by the people*. (Held 1991: 2) In the wake of the *true believer* (the Christian), a growing class of merchants, manufacturers and commercial traders ushered in the era of capitalism. Their status defined by property, the credo of this emergent, socially mobile class was liberalism. (Emy and Hughes 1988: 190)

Giddens provides a useful paradigm of contemporary democratic citizenship in which he argues that modern citizenship has developed within a dialectic of power. He contends that the development of citizenship has occurred in a two-way expansion of state sovereignty from the late-sixteenth century. The build up of administrative power included: (i) the development of technologies to survey citizens (e.g. prisons and schools); while (ii) relying on co-operative forms of social relations between citizens and the state. According to Giddens, the expansion of state sovereignty helped foster the identity of subjects as citizens. The growth of democracy and citizenship since the Enlightenment

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4 Financed in part from the dissolved monasteries. Luther argued that a new cultivated class of men was necessary to replace the dispossessed monks and priests from those monasteries.

meant that the state gradually could no longer rely on force alone to regulate its populace. (Held 1989: 196-197)

Classical Liberalism and Popular Education

Liberalism originated in the political philosophical thought of the seventeenth century. The central principle of Liberalism is that citizens enjoy political equality so that they are free to rule and be ruled. Sovereignty is embodied in an assembly of citizens bound by no distinction of privilege differentiating ordinary citizens and public officials. (Held 1991: 34) While certain types of direct participation in judicial and legislative functions were encouraged, the practical scope for citizen involvement in general political decision-making was limited. John Locke (1632-1704) placed increasing importance on securing the rights of individuals and maintaining popular sovereignty; but viewed political activity in very instrumental terms (i.e. to secure individual freedom for the protection of private ends in a civil society ordered by majority rule). (Held 1991: 48-55)

The formative period of development in liberalism occurred between 1760 and 1860, roughly coinciding with the first European colonisation of Australia. Classical liberals were wary of extending democratic entitlements to the general populace (e.g. universal suffrage) for fear of how 'the masses' might respond/adjust to their new political status. The ability to vote in general elections, for example, was reluctantly extended was regarded as a privilege rather than a right. As Held suggests, "There is much significant history in the attempt to restrict the meaning of 'the people' to certain groups: among others, owners of property, white men, educated men, men, those with particular skills," and so on. (Held 1991: 3)

Similarities between the debate over the introduction of a public education in Great Britain and Australia affirm this ideological desire to extend political entitlement in education. Viewpoints differed as to whether or not a state-backed general education system should be established. Some opposed the introduction of universal education because of possible class-resentment arising from "the lower orders" learning about the world beyond their social station.[5] Alternatively, some advocates of a national system saw it is a means of social control. Another view offered by the Church dismissively held that the lower classes were better off remaining "in the state of ignorance in which nature has originally placed them." (Austin 1964: 2) A typical liberal view at the time, as Austin points out, was simply distrustful of increasing state influence or any other centralised power for that matter. (Austin 1964: 3) Despite their differences, the perspectives presented above feature a low regard for the capacity of human agency and cooperation to develop betters ways of life.

Because classical liberalism assumes that people are essentially motivated by self-interest, the rule of law is paramount to securing of the privacy of individuals to pursue their chosen interests. James Mill (1773-1836) advocated "recognition of certain immunities, called political liberties or rights, which it was to be regarded as a breach of duty in the ruler to infringe" as constitutional

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5 One speech to the House of Commons warned that educating the labouring classes of the poor risked exposing them to "seditious" literature that would "be prejudicial to their morals and happiness; it would teach them to despise their lot in life," render them "factious" and "insolent to their superiors" until "the legislature would find it necessary to direct the strong arm of power towards them." Many of those in favour of popular education, did so out of feared of "incipient rebellion". (Austin 1964: 2)

safeguards against possible tyranny by self-interested rulers. (Mill 1975: 5-6) As Berlin observes, classical liberals like Locke and Mill recommended a "minimum area of personal freedom which must on no account be violated; for if it is over-stepped, the individual will find himself in an area too narrow for even that minimum development of his natural faculties which alone makes it possible to pursue, and even conceive, the various ends which men hold good or right or sacred." (Berlin 1975: 124) Classical liberals therefore propose that rational individuals are by nature entitled to certain rights. These rights pre-date government and therefore do not require government approval. (Emy and Hughes 1988: 205) Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) rejected the suggestion by fellow liberals that natural rights could provide a sufficient basis for protecting individuals. His famous theory of utility attempted to provide a framework for the rational calculation of sovereign interest by the majority secured through representation, legislation and public administration. Grounded in a corollary of rationalism and legalism, Bentham favoured private interest above all else. Collins describes him as "a theorist of law and government rather than of liberty and opposition. The politics he expounds is the operation of interests rather than the functioning of consent." (Collins 1985: 148-149)

Bentham's utilitarian conception of democracy continues to have a significant impact on a broad cross-section of Australian society, including both the institutional education and civic education of its citizens. Collins overzealously claims that "so completely has this philosophy captured Australia's public mind that the sporadic appearance of different political ideas, whether of the left or of the right, is better understood as a reaction against this hegemony than as the motion of independent forces." (Collins 1985: 152) While Collins' claim is exaggerated, Australian liberal democracy exhibits many of the characteristics of Bentham's principles of utilitarianism, legalism and positivism.[6] The bearers of Bentham's ideas prevailed in the formation of public education during Australia's colonial political struggles during the mid-1800s. Moreover, the establishment of a general education system in colonies such as Victoria and New South Wales was invariably justified in democratic terms. In 1851, the Denominational Schools Board responsible for school funding in Victoria pursued an agenda of reform according to which "the extension of democracy to the colony as a good opportunity introduce a general education system..." (Hessels 1999a) Described as the *secular alternative*, the liberal idea of a unified public education system posed a direct to surrounding threat to the traditional administration by the clergy. Religious groups[7] fought throughout the 1850s to retain their traditional control of education (particularly in New South Wales); however, the Education Acts signified the abolition of State aid to religion and consolidated the institutional presence of the liberal reforming State in Australia's democratic formation: "the introduction of a secular system of public education were pieces of liberal reform... inspired by... a determination to make the State, in action and in law, the symbol of a common citizenship." (Gregory, cited in Austin 1964: 108)

C. H. Pearson's influential Royal Commission report on *The State of Education in Victoria* (1877) exemplifies the profound influence of Benthamite philosophy

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6 These characteristics will be discussed and analysed in more detail below.

7 Roman Catholic and Church of England groups opposed virtually all non-denominational proposals for educational change.

on Australian political culture during the latter half of the nineteenth century.[8] His understanding of democracy as "self-government by men educated up to a common low level, and trained by the habit of self-government under institutions which secure power to the majority" is unmistakably utilitarian. (Collins 1985: 151) In developing a state school system, the activities of the church were not regarded as politically significant because liberalism views religious beliefs and practices as private rather than public matters. (Austin 1964: 186-187) Austin contends that "the State which we see opposing the Church in the nineteenth century is... simply committed to the liberal belief that progress and perfectibility are to be achieved by human endeavour acting under the sanction of legal and parliamentary institutions." (Austin 1964: 108-109) The *Free, Compulsory and Secular Acts* between 1872 and 1895, represented a commitment from the six Australian colonies to establish a national system of education under Ministerial control. The 1872 Victorian Education Act ordered compulsory schooling for all Victorian children aged six to fifteen and set out a limited course of free instruction in areas such as reading, writing arithmetic and needlework. (Hessels 1999b) The Act restricted State education to elementary schools on the assumption that "a little education is good for all children but much education is good for only a few." Consequently, the *Three R's* dominated curriculum of the 1890s as the system aspired only produce literate citizens: "in most of the Australian colonies in the last quarter of the nineteenth century teachers were engaged under a system of "payment by results" whereby their livelihood was made dependent upon their success in beating the three R's into their unfortunate charges." Any further education was the responsibility of individual.[9] (Austin 1964: 237; Hessels 1999a) In light of gross inefficiency within the functioning of the Education Department, the Fink Royal Commission Reports (1899) revitalised Pearson's recommendations twenty years earlier for a complete system of education (*The State of Public Education Report in Victoria,* 1878). The Fink Commission saw education as "an instrument of national uplifting for raising of the standard of humanity apart from mere consideration of money returns to individuals... The Nation as a whole must be trained." (Hessels 1999a) From its formation in the late nineteenth century, expectations of public education in Australia have been high; as Austin points out: "The State had triumphed. Now it had to justify its victory, for it had secured the allegiance of some, and the neutrality of others, by promising that, if it triumphed, it would transform the nature of society. Somehow it now had to get the nation's children into the school-room, it had to educate them without direct expense to their parents, and it had to prove that the secular education it intended to give would promote social harmony, raise industrial efficiency, increase political competence and foster national cohesion. The vanquished sought consolation in marking down each unfulfilled promise." (Austin 1964: 226)

The first decade of the twentieth century was a period of major development in public education across Australia. A leading reformer of the day was Frank

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8 Pearson made the self-observation that he had changed from "a liberal of the English type to a democratic liberal." It has been argued that Bentham's ideas took root in Australia more successfully than in Britain (e.g. Collins 1985: 151).

9 The Common Schools Act (1862) attempted institute a uniform approach to all education receiving State aid in Victoria. (Hessels 1999b) Teachers objected, however, to the government's suggestion that consideration to supplement that school incomes by requiring local contributions to match the funding and that that government would limit payment to instruction of *the Three R's.*

Tate, who also served as Victoria's first and longest, serving Director of Education. (Selleck 1982) A former teacher's college lecturer, Tate was appointed to the position in 1902, when he immediately set about promoting the role of schools and improving the training and professional status of teachers. (Selleck 1983; Anchen *et al.* 1956) Though central to the formation of Victorian secondary education, Tate's vision of educational change was by no means revolutionary; his agenda for reform was commensurate with the Fink Commission's recommendations on primary schools and existing technical courses. Tate argued for an expansion of strong secondary schooling based on a clear functional division between high school learning and technical training.[10] His push for the expansion and diversification of was motivated by a firm belief that education should be relevant to the working lives of students as a critical function of Australia's industrial growth and future economic prosperity. Rather than throw "a few ropes from the upper storey to accommodate a few selected scholars," Tate argued that Victorian schools should provide "broad stairways for all who can climb." Stairways are powerful symbols of self-actualisation, which Tate evokes in an unmistakable way. Ladders, steps and stairways are powerful metaphors because they evoke a sense of impending disclosure or destiny. To ascend these structures conjures a rational process of development—a movement towards becoming something *more* than what is immediately at hand. Tate's vision appeals to this symbolism in an unmistakable way. For Tate, the extension of the school system was entwined with the Australian state. Public schooling was intrinsic to nation building; polity and education shared a common destiny. The metaphor of public education as stairway of personal growth is readily generalised to social development: the stairs signify the pathway to self-realisation and productive membership of society. Tate's stairway alludes to the purpose of schooling as an institutionalised form of social engineering; a technology of social integration enacted upon individuals to harness the necessary capacities for a 'productive' society. Tate adopted this imagery in the spirit of his predecessors C. H. Pearson, and T. H. Huxley. It was Pearson's inspiration that the state provide "a ladder reaching from the gutter to the university along which every child... shall have the chance of climbing as far as he is fit to go." (Pearson, cited in Ely 1978: 48) After observing the cultures of educational change in Europe and North America in 1908, Tate was struck by a paradox in "Australia, which in some areas of politic activity is so daringly progressive and democratic, should in education remain the most conservative and reactionary of people." (Tate 1908: 3)

Expansion of secondary schooling after the turn of the century involved a significant shift in state policy, from the language of "meritocracy" was transposed from social mobility to *national* prosperity. Adopting the symbolism, of predecessors Pearson and Huxley, Tate vigorously pursued this idea of an educational ladder for those "fit to climb" for mainly economic reasons because he believed that Australia needed to prepare itself for international competition in which a variety of markets would demand a more technically skilled workforce. He therefore promoted a distinction between liberal and vocational education. (Tate 1908: 26) His strategy was important: technical education has

10 This distinction began to erode following the establishment of multi-purpose schools offering technical and high school courses in the 1940s. (Education Victoria 1997b)

Nevertheless, enrolments in training and vocational courses continued to be dominated by full-time tradespeople until the 1970s. (ANTA 1998)

always been promoted for its immediate industrial relevance, but Tate capitalised on increasingly strong associations between education, industrial development and national destiny. (Ely 1978: 50-53) In some ways, this identification of technical education with economic development in this way was, in political terms, a *step backwards* from the late 1800s, when technical education was popular amongst labourers, manufacturers, traders and others as "a means of liberating the potential of democratic man, and thus a plank in the liberal platform." (Ely 1978: 53) However, in the economic mindset of the twentieth century, the scope for individual improvement was overshadowed by arbitrary goals of workforce productivity, quality training and national efficiency. After 1900, technical education was increasingly identified with the idea of a 'national destiny' and was conceive, not as a vehicle for individual or social change but as an instrument of industrial development.[11]

By the 1950s, economic prosperity facilitated an expansion of state-provided services in the public education sector. Subsequently, there was an explosive growth in the administrative arm of the state: the public service. Australia's civil servants adopted the sweeping influence of Keynesian economics to facilitate the expansion of public education. The economic growth of the long boom and the eagerness of the state to expand its spheres of influence produced the welfare state as a major policy achievement of the twentieth-century. (Hague *et al.* 1993: 409) Measured by state expenditures, welfare became the primary activity of most liberal democratic states. Welfare states developed into three broad types: (i) the liberal/limited welfare state, where the ability to claim benefits are strictly kept to a minimum, such as in the USA; (ii) the conservative welfare state, where benefits are linked via the government to jobs and distributed according to salary, which exist in Continental Europe; and the social democratic welfare state, based on equal flat-rate benefits for all citizens based around full employment as the key policy objective, such as in Britain and Australia. (Hague *et al.* 1993: 412)

The connection of schools as institutions capable of developing useful human resources for industry continues to predominate: "The industrial society is linked to classrooms in the same way as it is linked to factories. So strong is the association that organisations such as the World Bank have invested billions of dollars building classrooms in the belief that factories will follow, that educational systems lead to industrial societies, and that this is progress." (Tiffin and Rajasingham 1995: 48-49) The coupling of industrial demands to Australian public education strengthened significantly in the 1990s as a result. For example, Australian Commonwealth growth funding for the vocational education and training sector aimed at injecting $720 million between 1993 and 1996, provided each State maintained their level of commitment to the TAFE sector. (Schumpeter 1993: 2) The Dawkins Era of the late 1980s instituted vast reforms tailoring the education to the perceived economic interests of the nation. The Federal Government announced a new education policy approach emphasising the role of schools in restructuring the national economy and the need to prepare students for "a more highly skilled, adaptive and productive workforce." The Mayer, Finn and Carmichael reports "explored ways in which the education system might be changed so that its products—people—have skills directly relevant to those needed by employers." (Schumpeter 1993: 2) As Sofo

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11 As Ely observes, Frank Tate "was prepared to employ the 'education for democracy' argument, but only as an appendage to his national efficiency argument." (Ely 1978: 72)

noted in 1992: "The Government is bent on the education and training systems playing an active role in Australia's economic judgement..." (Sofo 1992: 33) In the early 1990s, approximately 100,000 young people were finishing secondary school each year, receiving no further substantial vocational education. (Sofo 1992: 35) To achieve these purposes, there was an attempt to increase participation in education in relation to training while raising the profile and importance of training in the education system and industry's commitment to it.

{PRIVATE }Education for democratic citizenship

In this section, I will outline key aspects of civics and citizenship education in relation to entitlements and responsibilities conferred by citizenship, the workings of government, its objectives and how civics and citizenship education assists citizens in collectively determining the conditions and therefore quality of their association. In particular, I wish to highlight the emphasis placed on the educative value of political participation in democratic life. I then examine the "marketisation" of education arising from a pervasive ideological shift in policy towards neo-liberal tenets of governance. I wish to contrast the educative value of civics and citizenship education against neoliberal doctrine as it has been applied to education policy in Australia during the last fifteen years.

John Stuart Mill invoked a doctrine of democracy based on a conception of liberty whose basic guiding principle is "that the sole end for which man kind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self protection." Force should only be used over an individual to prevent that individual from harming others. (Mill 1975: 15) However, Mill rightly argues that human nature is not as uniformly motivated as utilitarians claim. For Mill, democracy is more than determining boundaries for the pursuit of individual satisfaction. While he agreed that man [sic] is pleasure seeking, how he seeks pleasure varies from individual to individual. For example, "Free and open discussion, the consideration and pursuit of experience and opinion in all their variety, are prerequisites if the individual is decide how his own unique nature is to be fulfilled." (Mill 1975: viii-xiv) While Mill argued that representative government "is the best form of government for a population mature in its faculties in that it is most likely to advance its interests...an ancillary case for representative democracy rests on its capacity to encourage and sustain maturity of faculty." Mill asserts that even though representative democracy favours those who help themselves, it is necessary that the knowledge and skills necessary for its maintenance are cultivated. (Mill 1975: xvi-xvii) He claims that the state should foster freedom to broaden personal, individual development. Education was critical to this cultivation of political subjectivity: "Every extension of education promotes [democracy], because education brings people under common influences, and gives them access to the general stock of facts and sentiments." (Mill 1975: 90-91) Political participation is an important feature of democracy. Direct involvement in voting, local administration and jury service presents an opportunity for citizens to acquire a closer interest in governance. (Held 1991: 86) Democratic participation is critical to moral development. Mill presents an expanded definition of citizenship, whose democratic well-being included "all that portion of a person's life and conduct that affects himself, or if it affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation." (Mill 1975: 17) He was

one of the earliest liberals to acknowledge the important role of civic education in the maintenance of effective democracy, although he never developed a framework for this cultivation of "maturity of faculty" in much detail.[12]

One of the most influential definitions of modern citizenship is provided of T. H. Marshall. Marshall contends that societies create an ideal image of citizenship that forms "a goal towards which aspirations can be directed." (Held 1989{xe "Held 1989"}: 190) In this century, citizenship has come to mean full membership of a distinct political community. Marshall writes that *membership* is determined by the type and degree of political participation undertaken by citizens in forming the conditions of their association.[13] (Marshall 1950: 10-11, 77) Citizenship, for Marshall, is a status bestowing upon individuals equal rights and duties, liberties and constraints, powers and responsibilities. But citizenship is more than a status; it is an active *expression* of one's membership of a political community. (Kymlicka and Norman 1994: 352) For this to take place, all citizens must have equal opportunity to participate in the exercise of their rights and responsibilities. Collective solidarity is therefore central to democratic citizenship, from which every citizen derives a civic ethic in a developmental process that is vital to the education of active, politically literate citizens. The ideal citizen "not only believes in the concept of democratic society but... is willing and able to translate that belief into action." (Civics Expert Group 1994: 68)

The need to re-examine civics and citizenship education is compelling in light of evidence that levels of "civic deficit" amongst young people—ignorance, lack of confidence in Australian politics, feelings of personal alienation and powerlessness—have dramatically increased in recent years. (Civics Expert Group 1994: 3, 19; SLCRC 1995: 6-20) The centenary of Federation, the question of republican reform and greater recognition of the status of Aboriginal peoples have renewed government interest in raising public awareness and stimulate discussion of citizenship. The government has responded with initiatives such as the *Discovering Democracy* civics and citizenship education program, which seeks to help students to "understand the relevance of political and legal systems to everyday life, and develop capacities to participate as informed, reflective and active citizens in their civic community." (Curriculum Corporation 1998)

Professional literature and government policy on civics and citizenship education during the 1990s tended to adopt a more sophisticated definition of civics and citizenship; one which encompasses more than the traditional view of citizenship as a status defined by the acquisition of legal entitlements (e.g. a passport) and responsibilities (e.g. compulsory voting). Civics education is seen as different from citizenship education. Where civics education is usually school-based and attached to a formal course, citizenship education concentrates on a broader cultivation of political identity and community values. (Civics Expert Group 1994: 16, 68) The sum knowledge of civics and citizenship education amounts to an

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12 Mill, however, was distrustful of any public institutional model of education, arguing that A general State education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another: and as the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant power in the government, whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the existing generation, in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body. (Mill 1869)

13 This definition of democratic citizenship is rooted in the classical democracy of Ancient Greece. The ancient Greeks believed that man [sic] is by nature a political animal, therefore, democratic citizenship meant the participation of certain people in public affairs through public meetings and direct voting by giving judgement and holding office. (Held 1987{xe "Held 1987"}: 1-3)

awareness of citizens of their entitlements and responsibilities, the workings of government and how it can serve them. Most importantly, this knowledge includes an appreciation of these dimensions of democracy that stimulates a general willingness to participate in decisions affecting their association and collective well-being. I think of this as the socio-political function of education.

The most important aspect of this extended notion of civics and citizenship education is its emphasis on the *educative value of participation itself*. This participatory model of civics and citizenship education encourages students to become actively aware of how they shape their social environment and how their environment shapes them. This may involve attending historical events (e.g. Anzac Day), creating a mock parliament at school or getting involved in a local community activity, which in this digital era extends from the local neighbourhood to the MUDs and MOOs of cyberspace, from Meals on Wheels to the Internet-based Collaborative Project. This holistic approach to civics and citizenship education draws attention to the learning environments in which it is taught, so that students become aware of how the environments themselves are imbued with a sense of political possibility. The reflexive nature of participation contributes to students' awareness of and engagement with their environment. This, it is hoped, leads to a desire to maintain, improve or change one's living conditions.

A holistic perspective of civics and citizenship education highlights an enduring link between citizenship and education in Australia. Education has the capacity to facilitate the cohesive social integration of students (as political subjects) into a harmonious civic culture (of productive, "good" citizens). Education contains *implied* political functions. The state has affirmed the strategic role of education in securing "an essential base" for "a productive work-force" within a just and cohesive social system. (Hughes 1995; McGaw 1996) However, in seeking to cultivate a productive workforce, education policy is now compromising the equity and social fabric of Australian democracy.

Neo-liberalism: Education Through Competition

One of the most articulate advocates of neo-liberal ideas was F. A. von Hayek. Hayek's most significant work was published during the 1940s, at a turning point in Western governance towards greater financial management by the state, systemic administration of social planning and the pursuit of full employment policy. The seeds of the welfare state had been planted by Keynes, whose profoundly influential economic model was offered with a seemingly unassuming caveat that "moderate planning will be safe if those carrying it out are rightly oriented in their own minds and hearts to the moral issue..." (Keynes, cited in Hayek 1994: 7) Hayek supported representative democracy in principle, however, he argues that the dynamics of mass democracies becomes problematic insofar as the majority can become oppressive and that the rule of the majority ends up being replaced by the rule of its representatives. According to Hayek, any discretionary power is dangerous and that it is constantly at risk of abuse. (Hayek 1994: 5, 148-167) Drawing on the liberal tradition of J. S. Mill, Hayek claims that democracy requires *fixed-rules* as opposed to *rule-fixers* because political outcomes depend much more on the rules of the game than on the players participating in

it. (Hayek 1994: 124) His conception of democracy emphasises procedural or *thin* modes (i.e. "fixed-rules") of reform. (Hayek 1994: 63-96)

Hayek equates the necessary conditions of effective democracy with competition in the market place. The ongoing functioning of democracy is likened to the belief of classical economic theory that, because the economy is never in perfect equilibrium, there are always gaps to be filled by alert, profit-seeking entrepreneurs. Hayek assumes that people start from a position of relative ignorance and that they can only hope to discover available opportunities and coordinate activities through the market process. Hayek argues that competition in the free market is a discovery procedure. Open, uninhibited competition between self-interested individuals is an educative process that is vital to the maintenance of healthy democracy. (Hayek 1994: 55-57)

Hayek claims that the very foundations of modern democratic freedoms owe their creation to the development of modern industrial freedom. The industrial revolution, writes Hayek, established the conditions for the advancement of science and progress. Industrial freedom opened the path to the free use of knowledge, in which everything could be tried and tested. He links progress with the pluralisation of values amongst democratic citizens, arguing that generally speaking, the higher the education and intelligence of the individuals becomes, the more the views and tastes are differentiated. Less likely are they to agree on a potentially oppressive hierarchy of values in this conception of competitive society. Hayek's view of established democratic institutions is pessimistic. (Hayek 1994: 152-166) Hayek assumes that those who intervene on behalf of government are likely to be docile and gullible, with 'no strong convictions of their own'. (Hayek 1994: 166) He warns that the 'simple creed' of these interveners would likely yield an oppressive cultural uniformity based on political dictatorship. (Hayek 1994: 152-154) This is why Hayek emphasises the need to provide clear and fixed "rules of the game" in the form of legal mechanisms: to ensure that competition amongst individuals is encouraged to minimise the potential abuses of his conception of democracy. (Hayek 1994: 63-96) Hayek eschews the belief that any centralised authority invariably brings the worst to the top "like scum." In short, he argues that while the modern planning movement of the state may set out with good intentions, it "invariably ends up controlling the minds of men." (Hayek 1994: 148-167) Hayek's view illustrates a radical recasting of liberalism, whose extreme advocates have been called the New Right. New Right philosophy is committed to minimal intervention by the state, arguing that political and economic life is a matter of individual freedom and initiative. The state should primarily exist as a strong force to maintain law and order. The New Right is savagely critical of the welfare state, providing a strong ideological argument for the Thatcher and Reagan cuts to welfare expenditure and services during the 1970s. (Held 1991: 244)

Simon Marginson provides some of the most comprehensive and persuasive evidence of the educational and social problems emerging from New Right thinking in Australian education policy. (Marginson 1997: 131-132) Marginson observes that the "New Right developed a synthesised narrative in which the conservatively defined 'problems' of standards and discipline were resolved by the liberal 'solution' of marketisation. These heterogeneous elements were bound together by the notion of competition, in its dual role as a system of economic production and distribution, and a system of pedagogical control."

(Marginson 1997: 140) Marginson gives examples of how this ideological approach to policy was derived from "a clever blend of liberal and conservative ideas, equating market competition with scholastic competition and joining cultural standards, student discipline and social order to the national interest." (Marginson 1997: 141) The Karmel report of 1973, for example, represents a careful amalgam of "two models of choice in schooling: 'freedom of choice' based on individuation, negative freedom and markets, supported by the New Right; and choice as collective self-determination within the framework of site based planning, supported in some government systems." (Marginson 1997: 141) Policy of the latter 1980s, as Marginson illustrates, used an open ended choice as an ideological device to "deconstruct government education from outside, but inside that sector, even if reformed along market lines, the ambit of choice was to be severely constrained. All strands of the New Right agreed on the need to strengthen system wide examinations and introduce standardised testing in government schooling, to facilitate competition, accountability and control; to measure standards, and to create pressures for their improvement." (Marginson 1997: 143) Ultimately, Marginson argues market reform is oriented towards "the conservation of the existing social elite; and education's role in producing and reproducing social hierarchy would increasingly overshadow its role in the constitution of universal citizenship." (Marginson 1997: 144) These profound changes in educational policy have subordinated objectives of equality in education to economic imperatives, which deemed educational competition to be "fair as well as efficient. Selectivity and privilege were no longer seen as antagonistic to the growth of participation in education, but were combined with it. Equity as universal participation in education supplied one of the key norms of government, extending beyond education itself to policies on employment and the labour market programs. Equity as participation connected to the solidaristic and egalitarian aspect of the old equality of opportunity policies, and even the radical campaigns for equality of respect, which had emphasised the need for broader access. It also connected to the notion of education as a right of all citizens, one that was necessary for functioning at work and in all other social sites (Finn 1991). It was congruent with the goals of economic policy in education, of vocational modernisation and universal skilling, and eliminating youth unemployment." (Marginson 1997: 202)

{PRIVATE }Devolving Democracy: Marketisation, Internationalisation, Individuation

Issues of financing, access and equity have intensified with the tremendous growth of mass education over the last fifty years. The democratic function of education encounters persistent dilemmas of access and equity arising from the question of how educational governance ought to negotiate the diverse needs and imperatives of individuals, groups, bureaucracy and economy in responsible efficient and effective way?

By the mid-1990s, the Commonwealth government's prioritisation of expansion in higher education enrolments affirmed its strategic effort to align outcomes of education with national economic imperatives.[14] The government has overtly

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14 Between 1983 and 1995, Australian universities experienced the highest rate of increase (70 per cent) in student enrolments compared to any other OECD country, even though government expenditure on education was comparatively low. (OECD 1997)

sought to deregulate institutional management and devolve responsibility for educational governance to individual institutions, teachers and parents.

Devolution of school management is intended to create "greater autonomy [and] freedom for schools to improve their teaching and learning that they do not have under centralised systems." (DEETYA 1998) In theory, public schools are "able to develop their own distinctive identity and expertise" so that "programs, methods of teaching and school organisation will vary to suit students' needs." (DEETYA 1998) Under the Victorian Government's *Schools of the Third Millennium* initiative, "self-managing schools" were encouraged to "build closer links with local industry" and the local community. At the tertiary level, each university also "has the freedom to specify its own mission and purpose, modes of teaching and research, constitution of the student body and the range of educational programs." (AV-CC 1997)

Emphasising the need for responsiveness to international markets, neo-liberalism advocates minimal state intervention, preferring market competition in the name of efficiency, innovation and flexibility. New media enhance transnational flows in information, values and ideology, redefining education as a service and cultural commodity in the process. (Cunningham 1998: 7; IMF 1997) Education policy explicitly links global change, new media and democratic citizenship in the burgeoning area of internationalisation. *The Hobart Declaration of Australia's Common and Agreed National Goals for Schooling in the Twenty-First Century*, for example, aspires "to develop knowledge, skills and values which enable students to participate as active and informed citizens in our democratic Australian society within an international context." (MCEETYA 1998) In seeking to integrate an international/intercultural dimension into the teaching, research and service of an institution, internationalisation of higher education has most visibly responded to "new knowledge markets" in fee-paying international students. (Knight, cited in Back, Davis and Olsen 1996)

Since introducing fees for overseas students at the beginning of the 1980s, higher education has become as "a major national enterprise." International education alone is worth $3 billion per year. (Patrick 1997: 2-3) Internationalisation has shifted from targeting cross-cultural exchange programs to the lucrative knowledge industry of international education. Redirection of educational purpose "from aid to trade" in international education is echoed throughout the domestic system. At the end of the millennium, the user-pays principle is now entrenched in extended fee-based courses for domestic and international students in postgraduate and undergraduate courses.

Devolution, deregulation and privatisation have been important instruments of neo-liberal reform; however, the practical implementation of education policy negotiates a complex dialectic of tradition, power and cultural differences. Teachers must adapt pedagogy to new technology; corporations such as McDonald's Family Restaurants are now involved in the business of school funding; geopolitical change has given rise to diasporas of international students—these influence policy implementation in overt and covert ways. Consequently, tensions arise emanating from shifts in the "locus of control" over school planning. Some aspects planning are devolved from the national level to the institutional level (e.g. staff appointments), while many areas formerly left to schools are now determined by national and international agendas (e.g.

curriculum). Attempts to centralise sectorial governance, nationalise curricula and implement universal standards of accreditation are coupled with efforts to devolve educational administration and responsibility to individual institutions, teachers and students.

The central problem confronting educational planners is the question of *how to balance the developmental needs of the individual against the interests of an increasingly diverse society?* A dialectical interplay of government regulation and autonomy is defining spaces and interfaces of formal learning (i.e. schools, websites, distance providers, etc.). This dialectic of control is central to modern democratic citizenship.[15] Where the state traditionally negotiated issues of "might versus right" with solidaristic groups, current student-centred approaches relocate political responsibility in the domain of a reprivatised realm.

{PRIVATE }Relocating the citizen: Student-centred learning

> *It is clear... that the University is working towards a model where flexible student-centred learning is the essential philosophy underpinning the practice and values of teaching, and permeating the institutional culture.*

> (West *et al.* 1998)

In order to ensure that schools and graduates are competitive in the international education market, education policy is addressing the need to adopt flexible and dynamic approaches. The pre-eminent target of neo-liberal reform is the student. While this is a welcome change from teacher-centred approaches to learning, these policy responses represent a political reconstitution of citizenship away from conventional state regulation. *Commonwealth Literacy Policy*, for example, aspires to the following:

- All students should be given an equal opportunity to learn;
- Students and parents should have a choice of schools;
- Schools should have less regulation and greater autonomy;
- Educational accountability should be increased through assessment and reporting; and
- Schools should focus on students needs individually in preparation for work and lifelong learning. (DEETYA 1998)

Concepts such as "choice," "less regulation," "autonomy," "equal opportunity" and "accountability" reflect the neo-liberal interpretation of citizenship and civic culture within the context of education. However, student-centred approaches foster a very negative, divisive form of self-governance. In closely aligning personal liberty with choice and market power, neo-liberal reform presupposes that all students enter the system on equal terms. Many, of course, do not. Problems of access and equity are exacerbated as the values, practices and environments of education are economically rationalised into education commodities, teaching services, virtual campuses and knowledge industries. The *Finn, Carmichael* and *Mayer* reports of the early 'nineties prefigured this process of individuation in their orientation towards competition policy.

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15. See Held's discussion of Giddens (Held 1989: 190-197).

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(Australian Education Council Review Committee 1991; Employment and Skills Formation Council 1992; Mayer Committee 1992) Competition policy encourages a form of citizenship that forgoes a genuine commitment to collective responsibility.

Education is now defined in relation to the economy, in particular, according to vocational criteria and marketability, rather than democracy. Devolution of responsibility to levels of institutional management, private provision and local community is justified by neo-liberal doctrine in neoclassical economic terms. (Marginson 199) Individual freedom, competition and entrepreneurialism are the centre of pol. al and economic life. (Carey 1995: 244) Education is a private good for which individuals should pay, while its institutions are encouraged to compete for funding as a way of increasing efficiency and productivity. This is the context in which the policy described above must be understood. It is worth unpacking these terms a little further.

A flexible learning framework posits the learning needs students at the centre of educational practice, enabling them to exercise greater choice, mobility and involvement in teaching and learning. (Murphy 1998: 14) Information and communications technology is central to flexible learning because it offers an interactive and cost-effective means of delivering education beyond traditional classroom settings to geographically and culturally diverse locations. In addition, it provides "new ways for everyone involved in education to be openly accountable to parents, to communities, and to students." (Ellmore, Olson et al. 1993) Online learning is widely seen as a fast-track and socially progressive means to the global educational market. It also offers students a more direct role in determining content, pace and environment. (OLTC 1996)

Under the neo-liberal rubric of institutional self-management, "full staffing flexibility" has been implemented to enable individual schools a greater say in the appointment of staff. "Flexible work arrangements" constitute the latest wave of casualisation, undermining job security at the expense of quality teaching and research. New learning technology is further recasting the status of teacher to knowledge worker, whose role is act as a kind of shopping guide in a global supermarket of ideas.

The neo-liberal appeal to "flexibility" as a democratic quality has as its corollary a notion of "choice" as a form of empowerment. As the *Wyndham Report* pointed over forty years ago, choice is important because it is linked to "both the freedom and responsibility involved in living in a democracy." (Wyndham 1962: 129-132) However, notions of choice invoked in initiatives, such as Commonwealth Literacy Policy, often mask disturbing implications because the freedom to choose is as illusory as it is conditional.

The current *re-privatisation* of education is undermining any semblance of democratic process from public decision-making in favour of naked consumerism underlying emergent knowledge industries. As John Ralston Saul demonstrates, this corporatist approach of contemporary governance undermines the legitimacy of the individual as democratic citizen and education as a public good, producing instead an adoration of self-interest and denial of the public good. (Saul 1995: 2) Devolution of educational governance forces schools to confront additional pressures of competitive individualism and consumerism, which cause pathological side effects in social relations, such as gross class-inequality. (Pusey

1987: 108) As the *T***·**· *row Schools* program in New Zealand has shown, devolution only exacr **···** ·s problems of access, quality and racial difference. (Bruce 1993) Providing choice in the context of market competition is undemocratic because it disadvantages those without access to cultural capital, money or networks to make informed, deliberate judgement without serious constraint. In this sense, the current push for self-regulation as a keystone of "lifelong learning" produces is a pernicious type of knowledge based on an instrumental, pragmatic and therefore limited c**·**·**·**·**·**·** perspective of society. (Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994)

Economics of fatalism

Economic imperatives assumed an unnerving pre-eminence in the discourse of education policy during the Dawkins reforms of the later 1980s. This period was a kind of watershed of neo-liberalist reform, during which time the Federal Government targeted education as a key institutional base upon which to restructure the national economy. (Dawkins 1988; West *et al.* 1998; SCEET 1989) John Dawkins argued at the time that a reorientation of education towards a more flexible, technically proficient and industrially innovative workforce was nothing less than a matter of economic survival. (Dawkins 1992: 7-11) The West Review continues in this vein to propose market driven solutions, arguing that "in a globally competitive environment, Australia will need to get the best possible value from its educational dollar ("more scholar for the dollar," as one Review member expressed it)." (West *et al.* 1997: 69) Governments are using economic conditions to justify their education policies. In this manner, economic conditions appear to be objective social facts—sometimes beyond political influence (and therefore the political accountability of responsible government). This enables the state to minimise its responsibility to provide appropriate and educational facilities and to be accountable for learning outcomes.

What makes this strategy so insidious is the manner by which it deflects responsibility for social well-being away from the stakes of state and corporate power, onto individuals, communities and groups. In allowing institutions to level fees for tertiary study, for example, the government delimits access to those of financial means, which effectively denies some citizens their democratic entitlement to pursue lifelong learning. The state has a responsibility to prevent this kind of discrimination rather than foster its implementation; however, now that access to post-compulsory study is seen to be a matter of competition and wealth, the *obligation* to successfully gain entrance falls directly upon the students themselves (as well as their parents, guardians, sponsors, etc.) In a society increasingly divided between information rich and information poor, the source of marginalisation appears to emanate not from government or responsible agency, but from the marginalised themselves.

This distressing social pathology is caused from an autonomisation of the citizen. Neo-liberal policy fosters popular acceptance of governance by self-discipline as an acceptable and appropriate form of democratic citizenship. Social theorist Zygmunt Bauman connects this alienating conception of market-based autonomy to new forms of human domination. Following Bauman's thesis, it becomes clear that democratic entitlements are eroding as individuals come to expect that issues of access, equity, teaching and learning are *purely* a matter of self-

discipline, (Bauman 1988; 1993: 11) This notion of individuation will be explored later in the thesis.

According to Castles{xe "Castles"} (1985), Australian citizenship evolved as function of the wage-earners' welfare state in which the full benefits and status of citizenship are only available to male (mostly white) wage earners. He argues that this narrow conception excludes or marginalises other citizens with legitimate interests and civic claims in their own right, such as women and the unemployed, as well as helping to sustain racist and *exclusionary* policies.[16] Australians have come to increasingly rely on economic indicators to measure social well-being: "Older images (of national identity)... have been replaced by the more abstract idea of 'the economy'." (Horne, in SLCRC 1995: 26) Democratic standards of freedom are increasingly determined within the narrow discourse of economic rationalism. As mentioned above, the relationship of the citizen to the state has been recast in terms of a user-pays mentality, which aggrandises the state as a service provider and a clientalisation of the citizen. (Turner{xe "Turner"}, in SLCRC 1995; Habermas 1992b: 11) Consequently, argues the SLCRC, "these circumstances suggest the need for some reappraisal of citizenship, national identity and community goals." (SLCRC 1995: 6) Under this confined economic liberal view of citizenship, the average citizen is treated more like a client of the state rather than an active participating member in the democratic life of the nation. Loyalties between citizen and state are increasingly forged within the arena of the competitive market at the expense of effective democratic development, equality and freedom. The intense pressures of competitive individualism and consumerism utilitarianise social values to the point where they produce pathological side effects in social relations such as gross class-inequality.[17] (Pusey{xe "Pusey"} 1987: 108)

According to Bourdieu, our social world is defined by overt norms and social convention. Whilst overt norms are open to question, social convention is regarded as social reality and therefore remains unquestioned. (Bourdieu 1977: 78, 94, 168-69) Education is a key site in which social convention is articulated and reproduced. State and corporate actors "are able to use the power conferred on them, especially in periods of crisis, by their capacity to put forward a critical definition of the social world, to mobilise the potential strength of the dominated classes." (Bourdieu 1993: 44) Government uses jargon such as "*acceptable* levels of unemployment," "the recession we *had* to have" and "the level playing field" to persuade citizens to accept draconian reform. In devolving responsibility f· . : :ation to local communities, schools and individuals, the government ,. :Ṿ on subsequent decisions and actions made by those citizens to become accepted over time to form a culture of competitive self-preservation and civic deficit. Citizens are reoriented away from values of reciprocity and community towards an atomised form of personal autonomy. This relocation reduces citizenship to an economic and legal status based on self-regimentation and isolation. Neo-liberal reforms have undermined solidarity, community and celebration of diversity.

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16 The origins of this formal exclusion extend back to the Constitution which, in 1901, provided that Aboriginal people were not to be counted in reckoning the population of the Commonwealth or states.

17 These side effects will be explored in further detail throughout the latter half of this thesis.

Educating Citizenship

Modern liberal theorists are divided on whether a viable democratic community can be maintained in the long run if individuals are to be viewed as purely self-interested. Dating back to the nineteenth century, this debate highlights the fact that the 'liberal' and 'democratic' components of liberal democracy do not fit so neatly together. (Emy and Hughes 1988: 188-189) Tensions between liberalism as a doctrine of democracy and the practical realisation of democracy in modernity have a critical impact on the civic education of democratic citizens. It is also important to remember that the central institutions of modern liberal democracy (including bureaucracy, a continuous legislative program, an enduring military and fiscal system) are only the product of the last seventy years. Thus, as Emy and Hughes point out, in the context of Australian democracy, "we are dealing with a type of government and society which is still taking shape." (Emy and Hughes 1988: 187) In falling short of expectations, education continues to be described as one of the "unfulfilled promises of democracy." Political theorist Norberto Bobbio contends that the educative value of political participation remains undervalued and undeveloped as a form of ongoing citizenship education that broadens political awareness, tolerance and sense of community. (Bobbio 1987: 26-27)

Effective pedagogy should embrace more dynamic perspectives than traditional, didactic, teacher-centred methods of instruction. (Print 1996) Vught suggests that team-based rather than individual learning provides a way of addressing crises of cost and access. The integration of information and communications technology into secondary and higher education is transforming educational institutions: for example, by 1997, 11 mega-universities in China, France, India, Indonesia, Iran, Korea, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, Turkey and the UK enrolled nearly 3 million students by distance mode. (Vught 1997)

Civics and citizenship education must encompass the lived experience of democratic citizenship. Political literacy is vital to the active experience of democratic citizenship. (Walsh and Salvaris 1998: 30) *Political literacy* concerns the knowledge, engagement and attitudes towards the workings of government and democratic institutions. (Baker and Baker 1997) The participating democratic citizen ought to have a well-developed sense of civic duty that values community and is mindful of cultural differences. For this to take place in Australia, our current institutional model of democracy must be transformed into a model for social democracy. Thus, the opportunities and environments in which citizens can participate in determining the conditions of their association must be increased. For a healthy social democracy to exist, the socio-political function of education must be to nurture, challenge and develop social citizenship in open but inclusive ways. Ideally, regular learning environments, such as the school, should be practical examples of an effective democratic civic community.

The failure in 1999 of the referendum to establish an Australian republic highlighted the need for more civics education in Australia. It is difficult, however, to make people think of themselves as citizens when their lived experience is that their rights are based only on their power within economic markets. This is increasingly the experience of people in our schools and universities. Any new civics campaigns must be widened beyond providing information about constitutional matters; they should instead encourage citizens to understand the

full political and social dimensions of citizenship. If civics campaigns in our schools and universities are to succeed, they must be based upon more than curriculum alone. Our schools and universities themselves must operate in ways that encourage people to think of themselves as more than mere clients, but as participating citizens. This requires a more dynamic theoretical conception of subjectivity and the ways in which power shapes its contemporary formation in the education of students as citizens. I will now begin to unpack such a model as the basis of an historically informed critique of educational change in the latter twentieth century.{PRIVATE }{tc \l 3 ""}

Chapter 2: The Formation of Student as Citizen: A Background to a Critique

Introduction

Throughout this thesis, concepts are adopted drawn from quite different traditions. The work of Jürgen Habermas is used as a theoretical framework underlying this approach. In effect Habermas provides the theoretical system upon which useful concepts, such as those of Foucault, Bourdieu and Giddens, are taken out of their original theoretical contexts and used with a Habermasian inflection. This chapter provides a critical overview of Habermas' work relates to this thesis in which his concept of the colonisation of the lifeworld is evaluated and modified using Australian institutional and civic education reform as a case study.

Dewey, Education and Democracy

There is a rich body of literature seeking to connect popular education with democratic development from which key thinkers, such as Ivan Illich and Henry Giroux, whose work will be drawn upon throughout the thesis. Seminal to this body of literature are the ideas of John Dewey (1859-1952).

Dewey's work on education and democracy favours a model of teaching and learning focussed on the interests and broader well-being of the child in all aspects of its being. (Dewey 1956; 1990) Critical of the prevailing view of learning as a mechanistic and passive process, Dewey argues that this model underestimated the value of experience as a dynamic social activity. Dewey's philosophy of education reorients the focus of education away from subject-centred approaches towards the needs of the student. According to this approach, the teacher is a guide who collaborates with pupils in the cultivation of the self in the broadest sense. By encouraging active inquiry, Dewey (1957) provides a convincing framework for education to be transformative on both an individual and social scale. Seeing democracy as more than a framework of governance, for Dewey conceives it is a mode of association enabling the possibility for valuable experimentation and personal growth of its citizens. He equates social life with communication and argues that because all communication is educative, all social life is therefore educative. The ideal society, for Dewey, provides the conditions for expanding the experience of all its members.

Dewey's progressive approach has attracted criticism for its lack of emphasis on school discipline, the liberal arts and teaching "the basics" such as maths and science. In the current period of "back to basics" politics, his ideas are marginalised for similar reasons; but in a significantly different political environment. While Dewey is acutely aware that the "demands of an industrialised and technological society cannot be ignored," his work does not provide for the scope of practical and ideological influence exerted by global capital and new media during the latter twentieth century. (Dewey 1958: 89) Moreover, Dewey's conception of society does not provide for the immense political and socio-economic shift in practice and governance of education towards self-administration that is driven by social and economic imperatives rather than the pursuit of an ideal nexus of pedagogy and democracy.

Nevertheless, Dewey's understanding of education as cultural practice still has validity and importance but within a radically altered context. His work offers a possibility for a dynamic theoretical framework based upon a conception of subjectivity that provides for the often-ambiguous ways by which its formation is tempered by new techniques of governance shaping the education of students as citizens.

Power and Governance: a Foucaultian Approach

Foucault's model of power understands the sovereignty of the state and the rule the law as terminal forms that power takes. Power is regarded as a multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization. States of power are always local, unstable and exercised from innumerable points. Foucault analyses the mechanisms of power in the sphere of force relations. (Foucault 1980) His discussion of the history of sexuality and disciplinary practises seeks to highlight a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies. Discourse, for Foucault, is both an instrument and an effect of power. In *Discipline and Punish* (1979), for example, Foucault demonstrates that discourses are constitutive of the specific actions of the social world and have material consequences within historical contexts.

Foucault's contemporaries have developed this concept of power within contemporary contexts of educational development and governance. Ian Hunter's analysis of the rise of state education in the United Kingdom adopts a Foucaultian approach to illustrate an emergent technology of statistical surveillance and administrative techniques, which targeted the "moral training" of the student and the cultivation of civic conduct. (Hunter 1994: 138) He traces the historical formation of a pastoral pedagogy seeking to enhance the moral and economic capacities of its citizens by instilling a "self-governing rational principle" to promote the optimal development of the state. (Hunter 1994: 13, 34) Following Foucault's lead, Hunter sees the historical evolution of the school as inextricably tied to technologies of subject formation in the form of small forms of normative gradation in consisting of "a tiny operational schema" whose invisible function have historically served to consolidate a "'formalisation' of the individual within power relations." (Foucault 1979: 185-190) Hunter's approach is flawed because it adopts the Foucaultian premise that all power is relative and from which education as a means of governance is driven by pragmatic rather than any higher principles of human development. (Hunter 1994: 3) Hunter presents an incomplete example of educational development in the modern Western state. In a similar vein, contemporary Foucaultian Nikolas Rose suggests that techniques of governance form a grid of visibilities for the conduct of organisations and those who inhabit them. (Rose 1996b: 55) But where he argues that this "grid" is monitored through mechanisms not bound to the state or to explicit ideological directives, I wish to show explicit ideological influences in the contemporary governance of education in Australia.

The Foucaultian approach is useful to this thesis only to the extent that it sensitises the discussion to historical changes at a micro-level. By drawing attention to shifting micro-practices within broader structural changes, Foucault provides a critical model through which the ideology of this change can be better understood, and how this ideology reframes discourses of power, rule

and authority. (Examples of this are explored in more detail in Chapter 5) This thesis does not, however, attempt to enter the theoretical debates concerning the works of Habermas and Foucault; rather, the latter's work is employed as a useful deconstructive tool describing changes in power through micro-practises of surveillance.

A Critical Framework of Analysis: a Habermasian Approach

The practise of governance intrinsically involves the regulation of behaviours through rule making and its application. The key to effective governance is to make those rules binding or obligatory in a generalised way. The modern state relies upon individualistic motivational ideologies to regulate behaviours and foster loyalty within the private domain. Appealing to a narrowly derivative liberal notion of individual autonomy, civil and vocational privatism facilitates an instrumentalisation of society at deeper levels than ever before.

Vocational privatism involves formal public education and careers structured for status competition. The meritocracy of formal education assessment is vital to this performance ideology as it is equated with labour power. Motivational syndromes drive the citizen to compete for particular types of work in the pursuit of social status. Collective goals, such as economic growth and welfare, attempt to draw upon individual contribution while requiring the smooth integration of individuals. These motivational syndromes engage the system in a social framework that becomes naturalised in the manner described above. Habermas rightly contends that "[f]or the individual, the institutional framework of established society is an immovable reality. Wishes that are not compatible with this reality cannot be realised." (Habermas, in Macridis and Brown 1986: 280-374) The pursuit of academic qualifications to secure adequate conditions of labour, for example, is driven by this cultural logic, which is reproduced in social hierarchies of education.[18]

Civil privatism facilitates the expansion of what Habermas calls the "direct administrative processing of cultural tradition" within redefined spheres of legitimate state intervention. (Habermas, in Macridis and Brown 1986: 374) In educational terms, civil privatism "corresponds to the structures of educational and occupational systems regulated by competitive performance" and has become "vital to the political and economic system." (Habermas, in Macridis and Brown 1986: 374) It provides the state with a means of motivating of subtly diverting the interest of most citizens from the apparently 'expert' activities of government. The ideological basis for this extends back to the early liberal prudential belief that mass participation is potentially dangerous and is best left to the moral guidance of educated representatives. Civil privatism requires a bare minimum of political involvement and participation from citizens in return for freedom in the private sphere (in which citizens may retain an interest in the outcome of the state's economic management in terms of their occupation and consumption). (Pateman 1985) Habermas notes that while encouraging minor participation in broad political decision-making processes, "civil privatism means strong interests in the administrative system's output," which in recent decades has included the economic imperatives of the state as it cuts-back welfare service provisions while it expands its influence in other areas. It has been rightly argued

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18 For example Bourdieu and Passeron (1990). The nature and implications of this logic is discussed in Chapters' 3, 6 and 8.

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that consumption and achievement motivations are breaking down because schooling no longer necessarily leads to a job commensurate with qualifications.[19] (Habermas 1975; Haraway 1983; Pateman 1985)

Habermas' notion of civil privatism, however, places too much emphasis on a conception authority of the liberal state that is driven by the 'prudential motivations' of bourgeois culture. As Pateman points out, legitimate authority in any democratic polity is also held on political obligation involving the voluntary moral commitment of citizens. Voluntarism, she argues, is a practical source of cohesion and any state intervention is still mediated through formal political mechanisms such as democratic citizenship. (Pateman 1985: 167) However, it is arguable that given the ways in which schooling, for example, indoctrinates an ideology of moral commitment to the imperatives of state and economy, a degree of this 'voluntarism' is illusory. Nevertheless, a tension exists between the degree of government intervention in contemporary society and the voluntary moral commitment to that intervention by the electorate.

Habermas argues that despite mass education, increasing social mobility and modernisation, a growing irrationality seems to be emerging. Public opinion is increasingly manipulated by mass media. Social needs are forcibly articulated through a process of management of politics by narrow systemic imperatives. Citizens of contemporary liberal democracy have become more of an object of political decision-making processes than subjects of democratic representation. This process of reification is embedded in a technocratic conscious; an ideology that serves to hide the fact that partial rather than common interests are being served by the sovereign power of the state. Habermas writes that the "slick domination of technology and science as ideology... has already compelled the reorganisation of social institutions and sectors, and necessitates it on an even larger scale than heretofore." (Habermas 1970: 118) According to Habermas' model, "different types of action and rationality are embedded in historical social institutions and practices" that change in historical time. (Bernstein 1985: 20) The underlying rationality of contemporary governance is a technocratic consciousness guided by media of corporate and state power.

Steering mechanisms of state and private agencies have become reified or objectified, appearing nature-like and recognised as "social facts" that exist as part of nature beyond ordinary social interaction. (Habermas 1975: 143) Habermas argues that once citizens become 'good practitioners' of economic rationalism, "the unplanned, nature-like development of economic processes can re-establish itself, at least in secondary form, in the political system." (Habermas 1975: 68-75) This re-establishment in the political system has two consequences: (i) this diverts a degree of responsibility for economic hardships away from the state as these problems become seen to be beyond the capable influence of responsible government; and (ii) the state can use the nature-like qualities of economic processes as a means to justify radical policy platforms, such as the privatisation of public facilities and severe cuts to welfare and education. Enframing this overall process is what Habermas refers to as a "colonisation of the lifeworld."

19 For example, a paper presented by Motive Market Research to the Finn Review into young people's participation in education and training in Australia found that young people see educational qualifications now almost exclusively as a prerequisite for finding work. (Collins 1992: 32)

The lifeworld is a communicatively shared background of meaning that makes ordinary symbolic interaction and social reproduction possible. The lifeworld is reproduced through communicative action; that is, the general comprehensibility of everyday communicative practice. The lifeworld "is a reservoir for simple interactions; specialized systems of action and knowledge that are differentiated within the lifeworld remain tied to these interactions." Habermas categorises these systems in two ways. Systems like science, morality and art, on the one hand, take up different validity aspects of everyday communicative action concerning truth and rightness. Systems like education, on the other hand, become associated with general reproductive functions of the lifeworld, such as cultural reproduction, social integration or socialization. (Habermas 1998: 360) Habermas notes that "the social context in which schooling takes place is extremely important" to this process because the school establishes norms that mediate behaviour, providing justification of different life-styles and interpretive systems guaranteeing identity. (Habermas 1986: 374)

As both bearers of the political public sphere and as *members of society*, citizens occupy two positions at once. As members of society, they occupy the roles of employees and consumers, insured persons and patients, taxpayers and clients of bureaucracies, as well as the roles of students, tourists, commuters, and the like; in such complementary roles, they are especially exposed to the specific requirements and failures of the corresponding service systems. Such experiences are first assimilated "privately," that is, are interpreted within the horizon of a life history intermeshed with other life histories in the contexts of shared lifeworlds. The communication channels of the public sphere are linked to private spheres to the thick networks of interaction found in families and circles of friends as well as to the looser contacts with neighbours, work..." (Habermas 1992: 365) Through communicative action, individuals repair, elaborate, change and integrate this symbolic world in ways that are not always according to a purely technical interest aimed at the successful and efficient achievement of ends.

Habermas contrasts the social reproduction of the lifeworld with the 'systemic' demands of the state resulting from large-scale modern democratic societies. The system consists of "vast tracts" of society that are uncoupled from ordinary communicative shared experience. Instead, these tracts are co-ordinated through the steering mechanisms of money and power. Money concerns those areas of the lifeworld that have been "mediatised," dissolved and reconstituted as imperatives of an economic sub-system. (Pusey 1987: 107) Media of money and power subjugate dimensions of the lifeworld within dual processes of expanding the technocratic influence of the state in some areas social integration, while transferring other traditional state roles over to the private sector, in this process of colonisation of the lifeworld.

Colonisation of the lifeworld involves "a selective process of rationalisation which encroaches upon and deforms the life-world of everyday life." (Bernstein 1985: 23) Social relations in the lifeworld become monetised and bureaucratised by steering media to meet functional requirements of the system. Habermas' concern is with the disjunction between system and lifeworld, and the degree to which political and economic relations become justified and embedded outside of the ordinary lifeworld of citizens. (Brand 1990: 138) For example, upkeep of the economy is depicted as a self-justifying goal that is best handled by 'experts' in trade, finance and resource

management. The type of instrumentality dominating this colonisation is a functional reason characterised by the primacy of goal rationality over communicative rationality.

Central to this reorganisation of state intervention is what Habermas calls a process of juridification. Juridification involves a proliferation of legal process as an intrinsic part of the development of the modern state, from the bourgeois state, to the constitutional state, the democratic constitutional state and the welfare state, whereby "Even though new freedoms are granted, such as universal suffrage and the right to organise political parties in the democratic constitutional state, juridification erodes lifeworld structures to which it assumes a parasitic position. This is particularly true of the welfare state, where the state has the good intention of promoting social integration through juridification." (Rasmussen 1990: 81) While law is anchored in the lifeworld, in that it draws its legitimation from the lifeworld through structures of communication, the state attempts to mask this relationship under the imperatives of the system. The law assumes the role of a steering mechanism itself, beyond the lifeworld and democratic access of the public sphere. (Rasmussen 1990: 82) The appearance of state expertise in the administration and regulation of social integration draws upon science and technology that are not viewed as servants of political will and economic development, but rather as an independent force. (Habermas 1975: 143) The methods of modern science, economy and state have become infused, steered and motivated by instrumental reason that is found in the "technical control of nature," leading to the domination of one human over another. (Connerton 1976: 27) According to Taylor, instrumental reason is "the kind of rationality we draw on when we calculate the most economical application of a means to a given end. Maximum efficiency, the best cost-output ratio, is its measure of success." (Taylor 1993: 5)

Pateman rightly points out that while "liberal theorists have claimed that the relationship between citizens and the liberal state rests upon the voluntary creation of, or agreement to, political obligation," it is actually utilitarianism—and not voluntarism—that has defined the relationship between citizens and the liberal state. Under utilitarianism, it is in the citizen's interests to obey: "It is possible to move directly from the liberal conception of free and equal individuals, competing with each other in the market to protect and further their interests, to the argument that there are good and prudential or instrumental reasons for obedience to the state that protects them in this enterprise." The state attempts to exercise a reasonable and external constraint upon its citizen's actions, "operating as an impartial procedure or political method to regulate their possessive interactions." (Pateman 1985: 164) Pusey writes that the political development of democracy and its citizens has consequently become "a notion that is now narrowed to mean only economic development facilitated by the State with no other purpose." (Pusey 1987: 90-91) The clientalisation of the citizen's role is part of social integration into the abstract community of the *economy*.

This shift in authority corresponds to the intensification of economically rationalised performance ideology. The domination of economic imperatives and state intervention is occurring at the expense of cultural practices that should coexist alongside instrumental reason. According to Habermas,

If one studies the paradoxical structure of juridification in such areas

as the family, the schools, social welfare policy and the like, the meaning of the demands that regularly result from these analyses is easy to decipher. The point is to protect areas of life that are functionally dependent on social integration through values, norms and consensus formation, to preserve them from falling prey to the systematic imperatives of economic and administrative subsystems growing with dynamics of their own, and to defend them from becoming converted over, through the steering medium of the law, to a principle of association which is, for them, dysfunctional.

(Habermas 1989: 82)

Beyond the Panopticon

Critics of Foucault, such as Nancy Fraser, have rightly argued that his understanding of knowledge and power is "both theoretically paradoxical and politically suspect" because its rejection of humanism fails to provide an explanation of how or even why we should oppose the fully panopticised society described so bleakly in his work. (Fraser 1989: 35) The critical theory of Habermas provides a means of

"integrating the normative aspects of philosophical reflection with the explanatory achievements of the social sciences. The ultimate goal of its program is to link theory and practice, to provide insight, and to empower subjects to change their oppressive circumstance and achieve human emancipation, a rational society that satisfies human needs and powers... Habermas' analysis of communication seeks to provide norms for non-dominating relations to others and a broader notion of reason."

(Pusey 1987: 14)

Habermas' reconstruction of Marx proposes a theory of society that cannot be reduced to economic processes alone. In seeking out other positive standards for critique, Habermas explores culture as a site of action, connecting Max Weber's conceptions of social action, rationality and rationalization, emphasising the importance of processes of knowing are based in the patterns of ordinary language used in everyday communicative interaction. (Habermas 1984) This normative approach provides a basis for critically identifying and normatively evaluating those social conditions in which "autonomy is defined by reason, alienation minimised through the consensual harmony of interests and rational administration of justice free of coercion." (Braaten 1991: 111)

Despite the enormous breadth of his work, Habermas suffers two major weaknesses that I wish to avoid in this thesis. The first is the centrality of linguistic interaction to his concept of inter-subjectivity. Reflecting the historical emphasis of contemporary European philosophy on "the linguistic turn," Habermas' framework lacks a sufficient account of the richness of human interaction in various forms of expression, knowing and interaction. While open to the "plurality of voices" of reason, Habermas' communicative model requires further elaboration to be theoretically robust while remaining contextually relevant. A grounding of the possibilities for human emancipation in the capacity to reason is not enough. As a corollary of this limitation is what McCarthy (1978: 386) rightly refers to as the "anonymous character" of

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Habermas' critique. This too, beckons a more contextually defined approach featuring a robust methodology coupled with a vision of hope.

Seeking Utopian Surplus in the Popular

There is much about the work of Ernst Bloch that enhances the Habermasian approach. In contrast to the detached, "anonymous character" of latter social theorist, Bloch's critique is imbued with a lively, historical tone that speaks enthusiastically of social development and its diverse modes of expression. Perhaps the most significant way that Bloch lends a sense of possibility to "reason cannot flourish without hope, hope cannot speak without reason." (Bloch, cited in McCarthy 1978: 386) Bloch (1986) provides a critical history of utopian expressions of hope throughout society. Bloch systematically encounters signs of utopian potential in the daily lived experienced of daydreams and popular culture, to cultural artefacts of literature and theatre. 'Hope' permeates everyday consciousness and its articulation in various cultural forms and practices, from the fairy tale to political utopia.

Rejecting the Marxian idea of false consciousness, Bloch's approaches ideology as more than a negative totality. He controversially returns to the "anticipatory" dimension of ideology, in which associated artefacts, figures, discourses and representations depict utopian images of a better life. (Bloch 1986: 177; Kellner 1994) Bloch broaches the problem of ideology "from the side of the problem of cultural inheritance, of the problem as to how works of the superstructure progressively reproduce themselves in cultural consciousness even after disappearance of their social bases." (Bloch 1986: 154) Such notions contain a cultural surplus that lives on and provides a utopian function whereby the ideal can still be translated into a reality and thus be fully realized for the first time. Residues of hope can be found throughout artefacts of popular culture. He employs a political hermeneutic directed at understanding and celebrating those cultural instances and traditions that continue to have meaning and influence. (Bloch 1990; 1995) Cultural surplus, Bloch contends, is potentially productive of utopian surplus. Though wary of commercial exploitation in popular culture (Bloch is scathingly critical of the "incomparable falsification" of Hollywood film), he concedes that popular narratives chronicling struggles between good and evil, for example, are an "immature, but honest substitute for revolution" nonetheless. (Bloch 1995: 368) The positional of mass media to generate hope and "redeem concrete reality." (Bloch 1995: 376, 408-410)

Bloch's approach informs my references to personal anecdotes, mass media and popular culture throughout this thesis. Mainstream social criticism tends to dismiss or underestimate the social significance of cultural artefacts, such as Hollywood film and television soap operas by treating them as raw materials of mass society. As popular cultural artefacts become increasingly influential (even if undesirable) in the formation of everyday life, they need to be recognised as significant and potentially positive sites of human recognition and development.[20] (Giroux et al. 2000)

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[20] Giroux goes one step further, proposing, "if we grant students an active role in the process of cultural formation, they can become agents in the production of social practices. To accomplish this we should become involved in fostering forms of resistance; a critical pedagogy is required which will promote the identification and analysis of the underlying ideological interests at stake in the text and its readings. We are then engaged together as resisting intellectuals in a social practice that allows both parties to construe themselves as agents in the process of their own cultural formation." (Giroux et al. 2000)

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Conclusion

During the 1970s, the stresses of contemporary governmental development like these lead theorists like Habermas to prematurely argue that a crisis of democracy may be immanent.[21] Rather than rupturing the legitimacy of the modern state, what has instead happened is that the motivational syndromes of civil privatism, possessive individualism and vocational privatism have been recast through various practices of self-discipline and regulation that facilitate a profound economic rationalisation of state and polity. The shift towards economic rationalism has involved a reorientation of the public sphere, state authority and the basis of its legitimation. This reorientation uses technology, law and techniques of social integration with dangerous repercussions for the cultural reproduction of the lifeworld. Due to this complex relationship between the lifeworld, state and economic actors, capitalist society cannot be dealt with as an undifferentiated social totality, because social integration occurs at many different levels, ranging from the level of interpersonal relationships to the non-linguistic disembodied media of money and power that impersonally steer and integrate society through functional cybernetic feedback.

This instrumentalisation of lifeworlds needs to be counterbalanced by social practices that entrench differing ways of life. Basic human values at the level of the lifeworld are being encroached and need defence. Habermas rightly identifies that the 'scope for manipulation' by the media of money and power (in the form of state administration and legislation) is delimited by elements of the cultural system that "remains peculiarly resistant to administrative control." (Habermas, in Macridis and Brown 1986: 371) Culture, as it is reproduced in institutions like the school, is a vital point of re-entry into the system to curb processes of colonisation. Culture is a point of resistance to the immense manipulative forces of contemporary governance and economic regulation. Following Giddens' approach, I base my thesis on a "conception of human Praxis, emphasising that human beings are neither to be treated as passive objects nor as wholly free subjects," from which I seek to identify concrete social practices that exist in tension and from which there is a possibility for positive social development. (Giddens 1983: 150-51)

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21 For example, see Habermas (1975) or Theophanous (1980).

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Chapter 3: Culture, Class and Education

"Why gaze into a crystal ball when you can read the book?"

(Bevan, cited in Walker 1994: 14)

Introduction

In the early nineteenth century, the French historian and politician, Alexis de Tocqueville, observed that schools were an important democratic institution in which men [*sic*] had the opportunity to rise above narrow, self-interested world views to pursue activities for the public good. (Lively 1990: 140) Seen as a means for expanding social mobility, modern schooling has attracted widespread criticism, ranging from Illich's claim that "[i]n the shadow of each national school-pyramid, an international caste system is wedded to an international class structure," (Illich 1976a{xe "Illich 1976a"}: 154) to Haraway's conclusion that education since the 1980s has perpetuated "mass ignorance and repression in technocratic and militarized culture..." (Haraway{xe "Haraway"} 1991: 171)

This chapter will analyse the exacerbation by the instrumental rationalisation of education of *modern* problems of class inequality. Analysis will focus on formal public education. I wish to show empirical connections between recent reforms to public education and class inequality and the modalities of social reproduction discussed in the previous chapter. Following the discussion of Habermas' observations of the 'peculiar' relationship of culture to colonisation described above, I shall continue this examination of processes of cultural reproduction through an investigation of the ideological colonisation of the education systems of the USA, New Zealand and Australia. I use these case studies to illustrate the global dimension of instrumental reason, and the role of processes of cultural reproduction in these examples.

America

In 1993, an American citizen could attend a 'Burger King Academy' in at least fourteen cities of the United States. These are fully accredited quasi-private high schools—real schools attended by real students. These high schools provide extensive resources (such as satellite disks), but at a price: every day, over 90 per cent of the eight million students must sit through at least 90 per cent of a news programme provided by an advertising company, Whittle Communications. (Kozol 1993: 9, Berman 1992: 10-11) The programme includes advertising by such corporate-giants as Snickers and Burger King, earning founder Chris Whittle $630, 000 a day at the time. (Kozol 1993) This advertising is, by contract, *required* viewing for those schools' students. Whittle Communications has invested over $300 million in 40 per cent of the American Education System and was planning to open more in the United Kingdom. (Cole-Adams 1993: 52) "It's open season on marketing" said the corporation's president. According to Kozol, should the schools prove to be profitably viable, IBM and Apple may also pursue sponsorship. (Kozol 1993: 8-10)

There is a long history in the USA of non-profit, tax-free organisations aiding the administration of schools without overtly interfering with nation-wide policy. However, it appears that this responsibility for mass education is shifting to the

secular interests of the private sector. Berman indicates that while corporate attempts to shape public education are not new, only since the Reagan-Bush regimes has there been systematised attempts by private corporations to influence public education. Berman writes that during the 1980s, "the tone of political discourse... increasingly denigrated the role of governmental agency while sanctifying that of the marketplace and private initiative..." He warns of a "marked tendency to re-introduce old ideas newly repackaged. Would-be panaceas from earlier reform areas are in evidence today. The most salient of these is the almost unqualified belief in the power of technology to positively transform the schooling endeavour. This conviction draws upon a deep-seated confidence in the principles of scientific-technical rationality... and the adherence to the idea of unlimited progress and growth." (Berman 1992: 10-11)

The economic rationalisation of public schools in the USA does not entail a complete withdrawal of state regulation of public education. In some ways, the depth of government regulation has increased. To a limited extent, the type of techniques of disciplinary power used by the state since the early 1980s has been a function of economic recession. American governmentality has shifted towards methods of surveillance and intervention within an economic framework, for example, through the evaluation of education quality according to economic criteria and advice of private industry. This shift in governmentality is characterised by the attempted fusion of economic rationality with the conventional "technocratic mindset" of the American government. Berman argues: "This technocratic mindset helps to explain the widespread American addiction to quantification measures and the school-based manifestation of this, the heavy reliance on standardised testing and assessment instruments to measure school 'learning'." (Berman 1992: 11) For example, as the corporate influence of formal education has increased, the state has maintained responsibility for the determination, legitimation and standardisation of education outcomes. That is, through curricula and standardised assessment, the state continues to regulate the cultural capital of public education. Furthermore, the Clinton government established the National Alliance of Restructuring Education, which attempted to consolidate the link of education to training with the aim of meeting the economic demands of the state, within the broad directives of Clinton's social policy. (Painter 1993: 39)

Another method through which the media of state power has attempted to shape the social system is through the imposition of certain duties and legal fines onto the students and their families. In Arkansas, parents can be fined if they do not meet a set level of involvement in their child's education. (Painter 1993: 39) This technique of provoking the private family-realm to take more responsibility for the education system is typical of instrumentalised attempts by the state to regulate its citizens in a non-coercive way. The emphasis of these techniques of disciplinary power is on the self-discipline of citizen, while the state designates legitimate behaviours in the interests of political order and economic growth.

According to Giroux, the 'savaging' of funding for public schools during the 1980s was a part of an appeal for cultural uniformity by the Right Wing under a veil of "patriotism and nationalism... in an authoritarian populist discourse that is powerfully refiguring the relationship between identity and culture..." (Giroux 1993: 4-5) This refiguring of citizenship identity and culture involves the

complex interaction of the social system and lifeworld, which can be understood in terms of Habermas' colonisation thesis. These education reforms reflect a significant change in the relationship between social system and lifeworld, deeply affecting the reproduction of socialised individuals and the continuation of coherent cultural traditions. The reliance on private corporations to finance public education signifies the colonisation of the lifeworld by the media of money during critical periods of personal development. The influence of private interests over schooling, such as Whittle Corp, indicates colonisation at a profound technological level. Through the disembodied visual media of television and computer modem, advertising in the classroom entrenches a consumer culture, placing emphasis on defining the status of students as clients of the state and consumers of the economy. As for the teacher, a principal of a school in Chicago remarked that a teacher merely becomes a part of the business of developing minds to meet a market demand. (Kozol 1993: 10)

Driven by market imperatives, the logic of practice underlying USA-education reform establishes conditions for the cultural reproduction of economic rationality as the predominant ethos of late-modernity. The habitus of formal education is characterised by instrumentalised mechanisms aimed at developing good consumers who equate knowledge with market power. The valorisation of certain forms of cultural capital according to this instrumental logic reproduces the domination of economic rationality. Kozol rightly asks: what is more dangerous: the products advertised on Channel 1 or the brand of attitude that is espoused? Mindful of the profound influence of schools in shaping the "soul and style of the future adult population," Kozol is justifiably wary of corporatism, which is inclined to sell "predicability instead of critical capacities. It sells a circumscribed, job-specific utility." (Kozol 1993: 10) This type of reform predominating the rationalisation of public education is not confined to the USA. A closer geographical and cultural example to Australia's recent experience is that of New Zealand.

New Zealand

When British Labor Statesman Aneurin Bevan and his colleagues were establishing the foundations of the British welfare state in the 1940s, there were few existing frameworks of reference for such a comparatively radical policy. One state, however, had already begun to incorporate welfare policy and institutionalisation into its national agenda. Aware of this pioneering welfare state and its history of radical democratic reform, Bevan is quoted as saying "Why gaze into a crystal ball when you can read the book?" The metaphoric book to which he referred is New Zealand. (Walker 1994: 14) Having pioneered universal suffrage, New Zealand initiated welfare state policy reform years before industrialised nation-states like Britain. This tradition of democratic innovation has recently declined. Plagued by problems of unemployment, declining education standards, social unrest and poverty, recent New Zealand governments have initiated extensive changes to the public education system. In a turn towards economic rationalism and draconian welfare state funding cutbacks, New Zealand's reputation of innovative democratic reform is now disputable.

A significant turning point for public education in New Zealand was the national budget of 30 July 1991. The budget announced significant cuts to social welfare, most notably health, education, housing and pensions affecting nearly half of New Zealand's population and ending what prior to 1991, had been one of the most comprehensive welfare systems in the world. The government planned to reduce spending by just under 15 per cent by 1993. To achieve this, the national Government ceased providing universal benefits. (Walker 1994: 14) By February 1992, sixty years of free hospital care in New Zealand had ended.

Funding cuts in all areas of education indict the traumatic impact of instrumental reasoning across New Zealand's public system. Between 1989 and 1993, the state attempted to integrate 2700 primary and secondary schools into a system of school-based management under the *Tomorrow's Schools* programme. (Bruce 1993e: 13) Initiated by the Lange Government, the programme encouraged schools to be 'self-managing'. Schools were given a grant by the government, which the schools could spend as they wished, provided they followed government policy guidelines (e.g. teacher union awards and national curriculum frameworks). Each school via a board of trustees consisting of the principal, parents and a staff representative administered the grants. Teacher wages, which account for about 75 per cent of total running costs, were initially handled centrally by the state. Since 1992, at least seventy-one schools began a program of bulk funding, whereby the school can individually determine administrative issues such as staff sizes, class sizes and teaching hours. The schools were encouraged to seek further funding from the private sector. Schools turned to the local community and commerce for sponsorship, asking for voluntary contributions ranging from twenty dollars to several hundred dollars. According to Bruce, "Principals, teachers, parents and the local community work as a team for what they think is the best for their school and the bureaucracy stays at an acceptable distance..." (Bruce 1993e: 13)

Since this wave of reforms began in 1990, the New Zealand government has enacted minimal change to the size of operating grants, while school costs have significantly increased. This has placed considerable pressure on principals and teachers in managing what one principal calls the "small businesses." She remarked at the time that "Most of us have never faced this sort of thing before." (Bruce 1993e: 13) Her school had a management consultant on the trustees' board who, like her, were surprised at the lengths they had to go to raise funds, including casino and ubiquitous housie nights. The Principal of Mahurangi College asserted that New Zealand reforms are primarily a "cost cutting exercise. I am not sure that the quality of education will improve as a result of it." He is equally suspicious of the consequences of becoming a 'manager' over educator. (Bruce 1993e: 13)

Bruce asserts that recent reforms to New Zealand's public education system are a part of the broader government strategy in which "unwieldy bureaucracies should be replaced by a more efficient system consisting of a small core and an empowered fringe." (Bruce 1993e: 13) He illustrates the complex ideological issues underlying the move towards school 'self-management'. Social democratic welcomed the moves to devolution in the name of participatory democracy. Advocates of the free-market, such as the New Right, "seized the ideology as a logical tool for the financially stricken 90s." (Bruce 1993e: 13)

Regardless of ideological motivations, the rationalisation of public schooling has been causally connected to a number of social problems, many of which are related to class inequality. Bruce illustrates some of these problems by contrasting the recent experience of two 'typical' secondary schools.

Westlake Girls High School is a secondary school located in a relatively affluent area of Auckland. It is an example of a school that has managed to maintain a high status amongst New Zealand schools. Westlake Girls High School responded quickly to the funding cutbacks since 1990, initiating a voluntary levy that yielded over $127,000 in 1993 (averaging eight-five dollars per child over 1500 students plus $1500 per month in interest on the bulk grant). The school established a board of trustees, consisting mainly of parents involved in business and professional vocations. The school's success is linked to its management strategies and to people conversant in the discourse of resource management in the competitive market. Its principal sees herself as a general manager, asserting that any school could maintain a high status using bulk funding "and a bit of imagination." (Bruce 1993e: 13)

Bruce contrasts the experience of Westlake to schools like Tamaki. Tamaki is located in a lower-class area plagued by poverty, learning abilities, behavioural problems and racial conflict. Consequently, a sizeable proportion of Tamaki's resources were dedicated to managing these difficulties. For example, the school appropriates a large proportion of its bulk-grant to hire counsellors and conduct remedial classes. Plagued by the same problems of inequality, the local community is not able to offer the kind of resources and expertise as those of Westlake. Tamaki faces ongoing shortages of resources, behavioural problems and stress amongst its staff. A principal of the school, John Grant, felt that "Education used to try to alleviate inequalities. Now it exacerbates them. It treats people as if they were all equal." (Bruce 1993e: 13) The instrumental reasoning guiding this reform is not aware of the implications of the vagaries of differing lifeworlds.

The dramatic differences in the social and economic conditions of Tamaki and Westlake appear to have been exacerbated by the *Tomorrow Schools* programme. Where the welfare state attempted to cater for social inequalities by enabling all citizens the opportunity to seek formal education, the policies of devolution have neglected differences between and within school communities such as divisions in income, gender, race and physical capability. Those New Zealand schools most affected by economic hardship must simultaneously (i) address the consequences of this hardship, (ii) raise funds for the improvement of school facilities and (iii) maintain a minimum standard of education. The inevitable difficulties resulting from lack of resources entrenches cycles of poverty in the habitus of those New Zealanders who, in particular, should have the opportunity to seek formal education and training. For the state to expect schools to generate fiscal and cultural capital in communities characterised by a distinct lacking in either of them, is *un*reasonable and invites inequality.

Patterns of inequality in class and ethnicity appear to have become more entrenched since 1980. According to Gold (1985: 4), "racial divisions are very evident and class differences are more significant than is often recognised." He asserts that Maoris and Pacific Islanders, who comprise less than one-fifth of the entire population, are disadvantaged by related conditions of unemployment, lack of education and low income. (Gold 1985: 2) In 1990, 68

per cent of Pakeha (European) students reached sixth form, compared to 38 per cent of Maori students. Over 20 per cent of the Maori population were unemployed in the early 1990s. (Cadby 1996: 5) The adoption by recent governments of the neo-liberal rationality of the free market has had no discernible positive impact on New Zealand's social well-being.[22]

New Zealand governments largely deny or underplay the existence of problems of inequality. For example, the group manager of policy implementation in the Ministry of Education stated in 1993 that differences have emerged because of lack of strong leadership by principals and school boards. Based on the assumption that bulk-funding encourages competition will ultimately improve the quality of public education, she argues that

> Now, the highest levels of teacher funds goes to the affluent schools because they can attract the best teachers... Bulk-funding forces schools to balance their staff and with that there is fairer distribution of resources to all schools. That will lead to kids getting a better education." (Bruce 1993e: 13) Contrary to this kind of government rhetoric, the president of the primary teachers union, Neville Lambert, asserts that "What has actually happened, coupled with New Zealand's economic difficulties, is the reforms now are an instrument to distance the Government from its responsibilities for adequately funding education and of distancing the Government from its responsibilities for outcomes.

> (Bruce 1993e: 13)

Australia

Adopting an instrumental strategy during my final year of secondary school studies facilitated my entry into the next level of public education. By 1988, I was enrolled to study for my Bachelor of Arts (BA) at a Victorian university. However, in some ways, finding the motivation to study the arts was difficult. Most of my friends from secondary school had opted to study degrees oriented towards professional vocations in economics, medicine and law, whereas the BA is not directly linked to any specific vocation. I was amazed at the high number of students who chose to study medicine, law or commerce solely because these courses were popularly associated with a secure status with high incomes. As I intimated earlier, status competition is a powerful motivation for tertiary study.

Because my secondary school was located in an affluent area dominated by professionals, many of my colleagues from secondary school assumed that tertiary education was an inevitable feature of their paths to a profession in adulthood, provided they achieved a high standard of assessment. Having climbed the same ladder of meritocracy to university, I was concerned that by studying the arts, I was not playing the game in which a high VCE score is expected to be used to profitable (and instrumentally rational) ends. For me, the question underlying tertiary study was the following: having secured a high degree of cultural capital at school, had I invested it wisely? My parents

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22 A study at the University of Waikato in 1992 claimed that the increase in crime is the sleeping partner of the free-market doctrine. By 1993, New Zealand was alleged to have the highest crime rate in the industrialised world. (Cadby 1996: 9, 14)

encouraged me to choose to study areas of personal interest without necessarily relying on vocational criteria. However, at school, the pressure to orient my studies toward vocational ends was overwhelming. University study was seen as a critical step in life. I was unwittingly emersed in a cultural milieu in which vocational structures of meritocracy deeply influenced my choice of life-style in ways that defied critical reflection at the time. The educational ladder of formal schooling structured my choices of study. My admission to university was based as much on my narrow perception of post-secondary school options, as my desire to study the arts. My 'decision' to study at university effectively reconstituted a dominant culture of meritocracy. And yet by not enrolling to study a course with immediate vocational outcomes, I displayed a degree of resistance to the instrumental rationality predominating the cultures of formal education.

Under its *Schools of the Future* programme, the Australian state of Victoria has been developing a broad-based self-management education system by attempting to reinforce the role of schools' councils. These *Schools of the Future* are based on the *Tomorrow Schools* of New Zealand. Both encouraged devolution of power over budgets, staffing issues and curriculum within centrally administered guidelines. As cuts in central bureaucracy and a bigger role for parents and other non-state (funded) actors. Respective governments appealed to democratic of increasing community and individual participation in public education policy.[23] Similarly, the Greiner government in New South Wales (NSW) borrowed ideas from English and American reform models from the 1980s, applying market rationality to public education through deregulation, rationalisation and giving schools more responsibility for their budgets. By the mid 'nineties, policy reform throughout Australian public education involved two interrelated strategies directed at:

(i) Rationalising secondary schools into aggregated super-structures; while

(ii) Encouraging individual, community-based and professional participation within those super-school formations.

The second process attempts to be seen to uphold the values of autonomy and possessive individualism in the face of increasing colonisation of the lifeworld. By international comparison, this style of education administration has a familiar logic to the systemic reform in England and Wales under the Thatcher and Major regimes, as well as the self-management projects developed in Canada during the 1970s.

The widespread adoption of instrumental rationality in the regulation and reform of public schooling has become firmly entrenched in the Australian education system—especially since 1988, when Federal Government policy began to focus on directly linking the role of schools to its attempts at restructuring the national economy. As indicated in Chapter 1, this shift in focus was largely in response to the prolonged economic recession. The discourse of public education began to confine its term of reference to *education as training*.[24] The Mayer, Finn and Carmichael reports "explored ways in which the education system might be changed so that its products—people—have skills directly relevant to those needed by employers." (Muller 1993: 3) Another report by the Economic Planning

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23 For example, under the Schools of the Future program, schools were in theory given more autonomy by being able to develop specialist subjects. (Johnson 1992b: 8)

24 A good example of this discourse is the government report: "Skills For Australia and Education and National Needs." (1987)

and Advisory Council (EPAC) came to the conclusion that it is at primary and secondary levels "that patterns of inequality in opportunity and outcomes begin to develop..." (EPAC 1993) The EPAC report of 1993 concluded that high levels of illiteracy (especially amongst children of blue-collar Australians) are best addressed through technologies of surveillance such as the Profiles System, introduced earlier. By imposing standards of measuring, quantifying and evaluating student performance, the state continues to increase its surveillance in the primary school sector. The Profiles System used in Victorian Primary Schools requires teachers to rate each student's level of achievement against indicators in nine bands or levels in reading, writing, spoken language and maths. The Profile is like a map of a sphere of curricula that illustrates more importantly how the media of power colonises the educational context via techniques of surveillance and normalisation. (Ironically, the Profiles system was being phased out at that point.) The EPAC report proposed a further decentralisation of schools to facility greater autonomy. It also identified a need for more information on national achievements in schooling, advocating a national testing in schools. (Slattery 1993: 15) It was also found that 100,000 young Australians leave school each year without ever receiving any further substantial vocational education. (Sofo 1992: 35) Consequently, education reform has targeted primary and secondary sectors. The state unambiguously treated education as instrumen al to economic growth.

Emphasising the need to prepare students for "a highly skilled and flexible work force," the Dawkins Era of the 1990s re-oriented formal education to national economic imperatives through the development "technically proficient and industrially innovative" citizens. Dawkins argued at the time that these imperatives were best met through the standardisation of assessment at a national level. (Dawkins 1992: 7, 9) Education reform during the 1990s is characterised by the same technocratic mindset held by the US government described above. Attempts to revitalise "back to basics" approaches to education reform reflect numerous[25], but largely unsuccessful attempts by the state to standardise assessment.[26] (MacLean 1994: 13)

The instrumental rationalisation of public education was justified according to the government's assertion that it was necessary for "economic survival" that education be structured towards securing "effective participation in the workforce." (Dawkins 1992: 10-11) According to Sofo, "The government is bent on the education and training systems playing an active role in Australia's economic judgement..." (Sofo 1992: 33) Between 1993 and 1996, the Commonwealth Government offered $720 million to Australian states for the development and expansion of vocational education and training, provided each state maintained their level of commitment to the TAFE sector. (Hawes 1993a: 1)

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25 Citing the so-called standards debate of the 1970s as an example, Marginson points out that the 'debate' was fabricated by key institutional heads, university experts, industry leaders and politicians, who used the media to legitimate their position. Referencing each other's statements to the media, this group evoked common arguments and slogans, such as "back to the basic", connected to "genuine educational issues, albeit filtered (and often distorted) by public debate. It responded to a multitude of social changes, simplifying and reducing those changes with powerful slogans. It had a broad populist appeal, and touched the interests of every student, parent and employer. It was about national values. But it was also orchestrated by the media, and scripted by the New Right, which had its own answers to the 'problem' of standards even before the questions were raised." (Marginson 1997: 131)

26 There is evidence to suggest that standards of literacy and numeracy have not declined significantly since the 1970s. (MacLean argues that the same cannot be said for the US, whose rates have declined.) In 1994, the Victorian government began to urge schools to participate in programs of standardised testing. (MacLean 1994: 13) The government has met resistance from educators concerned that standardised testing is not appropriate across differing cultures and communities, and merely creates social divisions by meritocracy.

The TAFE sector of Victorian tertiary education provides vocational education and training programs and services within the state, national and international training market, and offers courses from apprenticeships and certificate courses through to associate diplomas. TAFE courses attempt to provide a preparation for employment and/or further education through professional and paraprofessional training, entry-level courses and custom-made courses for industry and business. TAFE is Victoria's largest training provider of tertiary institution. The vocational streaming of public education saw experimentation with new formal links between universities and secondary schools in the areas of science, commerce and languages in Victoria. (Johnson 1992a: 7) Initiatives seeking to integrate schools with the labour market, such as vocational education and training in schools and *dual recognition* represented explicit attempts to align universities, TAFE institutes and schools with each other and labour market imperatives. (Education Victoria 1997)

The same process is occurring across the tertiary sector. Slattery is critical of government reform to universities, including amalgamations, an overhaul of academic research and the expansion of new places. He argues that the link between higher education and economic efficiency is a "tenuous one," citing the North American experience as an example of failed attempts to structure education "to serve the economy more efficiently." (Slattery 1993: 15)

While funding was boosted to courses deemed to have intrinsic vocational in Australian industry, aggregate funding cuts to public education were substantial. Despite Commonwealth injections to vocational education, 270,000 Victorian students enrolled in TAFE courses during 1993 faced increases in fees of up to a third over the previous year. Concessions and exemptions from tertiary education fees decreased, affecting between 30 and 50 per cent of students disadvantaged by physical and social handicaps or on welfare. These figures undermined the Department of Employment, Education and Training's objective to preserve "an equitable opportunity for access to higher education." (Hawes 1993a: 1)

Since the late 1980s, Australian governments have investigated and implemented new forms of revenue rising and modes of regulation in all levels of schooling. In a fusion of approaches reminiscent of the USA governmentality illustrated above, reforms are often constructed which attempt to balance issues of fiscal viability with the deferral of responsibility onto the citizen or private sector. Such an attempt was proposed by the 1993 EPAC paper cited above, which suggested that parents take more responsibility for the education of their children by reporting to the government on how they were assisting them. It raised the possibility of linking government assistance to evidence of their involvement, not unlike the case in Arkansas. The report consolidated its own authoritarian perspective of education by suggesting that parents failing to provide evidence of their support could be denied entitlement to Family Allowance. EPAC proposed that the money saved by denying entitlements could then be diverted to the schools. (EPAC 1993) Proposals like these are indicative of the potential capacities for the media of the state to colonise lifeworlds through the juridification of school and family life.[27] They reflect a strategic move by the state

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27 Advice from reports like EPAC (1993) encouraged the expansion of processes of juridification through education reform on early stages of children's development. By the end of 1993, the Federal Government had developed accreditation principles for childcare centres that met considerable criticism from childcare professionals and parliamentarians. Fifty-two standards were developed for childcare centres to satisfy in order to qualify for Government Childcare Assistance. Tabled in the Quality Improvement and Accreditation System Handbook, the principles ranged from staff management of conflict, to the ways in which they used the words "no," "naughty" and

to shift the onus of securing conditions of democratic citizenship onto the citizens while maintaining a firm hold of their regulation and integration within the social system. The other dimension of this process of colonisation is the opening up of capacities for corporate intervention. As in the USA and New Zealand, the Australian government has also increasingly encouraged industry sponsorship of public education.

Between 1993 and 1996, McDonald's Family Restaurant sponsored sports activities in schools of NSW, earning the Government $800,000. McDonald's displays its logos at sports events and the schools were encouraged by the Department of Education to establish 'personal relations' with local store representatives, inviting them to speech nights and fairs. Students, teachers, administrative staff and parents were encouraged to eat at certain McDonald's outlets in Sydney during "McHappy hours," because 10 per cent of the earnings were returned to the school.[28] (Cole-Adams 1993: 53) In 1992, over 400,000 primary school children participated in a reading program offering pizza vouchers as a reading incentive. In an identical program to New Zealand, certain Australian primary schools were sponsored by a supermarket chain offering computers to schools in return for proven patronage by the families of students. (Cole-Adams 1993: 53) This type of sponsorship discriminates against remote and lower class regions, where this type of sponsorship is logistically impossible because demographic and geographic make these communities unprofitable ventures.

Similarly, Australian universities have faced increasing pressure to acquire funding from the private sector and the clientalisation of students. The Hawke-Keating Labor governments of the early 1990s compelled universities to become more self-sufficient by dropping public subsidies. In 1988, a third of the Australian government's total spending on education (equalling just under 2 per cent of national output) was devoted to tertiary education. By 1991, the total public subsidies to universities dropped to 67 per cent of the $5.5 billion set aside for higher education. (Maslen 1993a: 48) Consequently, within two years, most universities were raising about 12 per cent of their annual budgets from fees and contracts with industry. Fees and charges set by tertiary institutions were worth over $500 million. (EPAC 1993) Ironically, the Hawke regime boasted an increase in state funding to higher education, however, this increase was offset by government revenue accrued since HECS was introduced in 1989 (which required students to pay for more than one fifth of their tuition fees). Furthermore, since 1990, university earnings from fees-paying foreign students have increased over threefold.

Despite innovations to tertiary sector funding, the Australian Vice-Chancellor's Committee indicated that overall, fewer applicants were getting a place at university in the longer run. This is due, in part, to the fact that the number of students finishing high school has dramatically increased. For example, between 1989 and 1991, the number of Australian students finishing high school

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the extent to which Christmas albums are played during the festive season. The standards were predominantly directed towards regulating those teacherly behaviours affecting the social integration of children under their care. According to Grose, the principles are rigid and impose behaviours on children that enforce values of pluralism (e.g. representations of gender equality) for their own sake without sufficient attention to the method, mode and quality of childcare workers. (Grose 1993: 15)

28 A hoax letter reported in Time magazine, was allegedly sent around New South Wales schools advising principals that all school names would have the prefix "Mc" and teachers would henceforth be referred to as "crew members." (Cole-Adams 1993:53)

increased by 11 per cent.[29] (Catalano 1992: 12) Another possible reason for this decline in the early 1990s was the increased diversion of "unmet demand" to the TAFE system. (Schumpeter 1993: 2) Beneath issues of demand and supply are problems caused by the colonisation of the school as a significant site of cultural reproduction.

Contrary to the rhetorical claims of recent governments, the logic of practice governing education reform is one dependency. The scarcity of state funding appears to only increase the value placed on its funding, while the necessity for schools to rely on the corporate sector encourages an ethos, experience, and outcome of public education that is "dependent upon government or corporate support and hence constrained to varying degrees by given definitions, imperatives, and economic structures." (Slaughter 1988: 17)

The significant influence of neo-liberal ideology in the dissemination of instrumental reason is evident in the discourse of recent reform. American educationalist Myron Lieberman espouses a view that is indicative of the neo-liberal conception of freedom and its relationship for formal public schooling. He argues that "market systems here [in Australia] generally have done more than political systems to equalise the human condition. Centuries ago not even the wealthiest monarch could buy the range and quality of food found in every supermarket in Australia. Not even the wealthiest citizens could communicate with family members as quickly and efficiently as the poorest strata of society are able to today." (Lieberman 1993: 14) He argues that there is a correlation between compulsory education and juvenile crime, because students are forces to remain at school against their wishes and abilities. They should enter the labour forces earlier. Lieberman forgets that work available in manual labour has declined, while vocational options available to students are severely delimited without the skills and accreditation. His argument becomes seductive when he rightly points out that lower strata of society pay for the university education of the middle class "who attend college for no better reason than everyone else is doing it." He asks: why should the lower class pay for something that they don't need?" (Lieberman 1993: 14) His view reduces public education to consumer choices (from a supermarket shelf), and appears to value the accumulation of income over democratic entitlements to education and other freedoms.

The ethical role of the state as arbiter of appropriate behaviours in public education becomes particularly questionable as the state defers responsibility for public education to local communities and pragmatic, self-interested organisations of the private market. From a Habermasian perspective, "the 'juridification' of client and citizen roles through the welfare state turns acting subjects and rightful claimants into dependent objects of bureaucratic regulation in a way that impairs autonomy, psychological health, and symbolically structured affiliations and memberships." (Pusey 1987: 108)

Furthermore, the state's highly reactive attempts to reform education in response to the perceived pressures of economic recession have allowed the

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29 Evidence and explanations vary as to the rate of student enrolment in secondary and tertiary education. For example, the Victorian Secondary Teachers Association and Federated Teachers Union of Victoria reported an increased number of withdrawals by students from Year's 11 and 12 students from secondary school in 1994 (of up to eleven per cent). The union argued that the decline in enrolments, combined with decreasing teacher positions were causally linked to education cutbacks. (Pargan 1994: 4) On the other hand, Heaney reported that the recession and unemployment forced many students to remain in school, causing behavioural problems of integration and social cohesion within the classroom. (Heaney 1994: 4)

implementation of policy measures that are not sufficiently thought out. Rejecting allegations that industry sponsorship was a little more than cost cutting exercise by the state, a NSW Education Minister contrasted the $10 million earned by sponsorship to the $3.4 million budget for that state. According to the OECD "policies and practices based on narrowly circumscribed definitions of further education and training could be counter-productive... there are dangers in stressing industry training if it is at the expense of general, non-vocationally oriented education. It looks increasingly as if the two should exist as healthy compliments to one another." (Warzburg 1992: 8)

The orientation of recent education policy towards the neo-liberal free-market doctrine has induced intense pressures of competitive individualism and consumerism, which in their relentless pursuit of achievement, utilitarianise social values to the point where they produce pathological side effects in social relations such as class inequality and social conflict. The social impact of this pressure may explain the increase in violence in Australian schools for example, aggravated assault in schools nearly doubled between 1990 and 1993. (Ryle 1993: 8) Increasing rates of violence against students and teachers became a major concern of the state around the mid-1990s. The government sought legal reform as a means of "deterring people from loitering in and around schools." It was proposed that school councils be empowered to issue notices to people they considered to be "undesirable." According to the Victorian Education Minister at the time, the problem was finding a balance between individual's civil liberties to be in and around schools and providing a safe environment for students and staff. (Heaney 1994: 2) Funding cutbacks have also affected teacher morale and performance. (Jones 1994: 4; Pinkney 1992: 1) John Hughes, spokesperson for the New South Wales Teachers Federation, links this decline in social cohesion to the lack of individual attention paid to students because of increasing class sizes. "I think," he adds, "the answer lies in society and not just with schools." (Ryle 1993: 8)

Within these broad processes of colonisation, instrumentalisation pervades the habitus of public schooling. The impact of colonisation through education reforms affects the cultural fabric of the public sphere. Habermas argues that the public sphere has become more of an arena for advertising than a setting for rational debate. The 'transformation' of the public sphere has involved a 'literal disintegration' whereby a loss of general interest leads to a loss of common ground. (Calhoun 1993:25) Shifts in modes of cultural reproduction evident in the instrumentalisation of institutional education have been uneven. Increases in student violence, drug abuse and teacher stress may confirm Habermas' observation that dimensions of culture 'remain peculiarly resistant to administrative control.' The role of culture in the resistance of colonisation has a number of negative implications.

Despite recent attempts by the governments of Australia, New Zealand and the USA to consolidate links between public schooling and education, levels of unemployment have continued to increase in these states. By diverting responsibility for educational outcomes to the private sector, these late-modern states have managed to avoid the resultant social and economic problems. Donna Haraway argues that factors such as rising unemployment have strained the popular belief that education qualifications are commensurate with job opportunities, causing a "crash in public education." (Haraway 1983) The subsequent devaluation of cultural capital in the form of education qualifications

places pressure on the legitimacy of neo-liberal reform by obstructing processes of social integration (e.g. from school to gainful employment). .

Conclusion

By the time I was enrolling in second-year political science subjects at university in 1989, I was paying more than one-fifth of my university tuition fees under the newly introduced HECS scheme. The era of state protection of education opportunities had reached its nadir during the 1970s at the twilight of the long boom. Provisions for tenured (long-term) teaching positions at my university were dramatically reduced during the following five years. Universities were compelled to hire teachers and administrative staff on either a casual or short-term contract basis. Teacher-per-student quotas were increased while the provision of support resources and staff (such as tutors) decreased. The casualisation of teaching positions led to greater competition for short-term positions, consequently undermining any long-term coherence in teaching. Teachers at all levels of the education system were pressured to teach more classes containing more students without a sufficient increase in financial compensation and resources.

In his analysis of teachers in Australia, educationalist G. F. Berkeley observes that "the demands of a technologically based democracy" have indeed made life more complex. (Berkeley 1991: 1) This increased burden throughout the education system compelled academics to learn the way of the entrepreneur using less support services and staff, while forced into more teaching and research. As a result, institutions of education turned toward corporate sponsorship.

State and educational reformers increasingly rely on corporate sponsored technological alternatives as panaceas to these problems. As a result, universities such as Deakin University must sell enrolments and provide consultancy to the private sector. Since the mid-1990s, governments have been openly developing plans for the construction of private universities dedicated exclusively to the foreign (Asian) student market. With the introduction of course-based fees in the latter 1990s, the student has become situated as customer in the competitive market place of tertiary education. Instrumentality guides reform by clientalising the student. (At the time of writing, fees were staggered in such a way that it was cheaper in the short term to become a philosopher than to practice law.)

If there is any validity to EPAC's conclusion that patterns of inequality in opportunity and outcomes begin at primary and secondary schooling, then the full impact of state withdrawal since the 1980s is not fully realised. (EPAC 1993) The effects of these reforms vary across education sectors and geographic communities; however, underlying the entire approach is a governmentality that on one level claims to be salvaging the basics of numeracy and literacy, while at a deeper level is getting back to a culturally circumscribed utility. It is rapidly becoming apparent that these reforms are not addressing economic inequality.[30] Reforms aimed at diverting responsibility onto parents and local communities create enormous problems to communities that lack educational resources.

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[30] One government advisory report on Education and Training in the 1990s warned that poor standards of adult literacy were "often due to inefficiency in school curriculums... a lot of higher education expansion has been done very cheaply..." (Hawes 1993a: 1)

Reforms like those in Arkansas and New Zealand reveal a deficiency in attention by the government to the fact that lower-class children face different pressures to those in higher social classes. A single parent may face enough financial hardship without the financial manipulation of the state in the raising of their children.

Once a model of democratic innovation, New Zealand now finds itself at the cutting-edge of economic rationalisation at the expense of a half-century of democratic development. According to Walker, "For 40 years, New Zealand tried to build a civil society in which all of its people were free from fear or want. That project has now lapsed. In its place is only a vague exhortation for individuals to go and get rich." (Walker 1994: 14) Given the recent opening of 'markets' in public education in years, the president of network affairs at Whittle Communications, is quoted in *Time Magazine* that the company that brought Channel 1 to America would seriously consider cooperative ventures with the Australian government. (Cole-Adams 1993: 53)

Education reform in the three democracies described above not only indicates the means by which their respective states have instrumentally rationalised public education, they also illustrate the immense economic, political and social pressures resulting from draconian reform. Furthermore, the rapid penetration of corporate interests into the mechanisms of the habitus of public education (such as Whittle Communications) suggests the potential depth at which the colonisation of lifeworlds may occur. Finally, the shift in responsibility for mass public education away from the state onto students, their parents, teachers and corporations is indicative of a transformation in disciplinary power and authority in late-modernity. Underlying all of this is the move from a pedagogical context where the teacher is seen as a visible authority, to a situation where responsibility for the funding, management, assessment of schools and students is placed on the families and students themselves. Responsibility is transferred to the student in a process of self-regimentation. This technology of power reorientates the political field to the individual as client and autonoma. This situation echoes back to the fears of the philosopher Martin Heidegger, who wondered if the movements of technology would facilitate a new type of social organisation to replace democracy. (Heidegger, in Wolin 1993: 104) The following discussion will explore some important implications of this shift in power, rule and authority; namely, the role of disembodied visual media in the colonisation of lifeworlds by evaluating them as informal instruments of mass education in late-modernity. Mass communications media have played a critical role in the entrenchment of economic rationalism as the most viable approach to reforming the modern liberal democratic state. Because of an increase in the variety and penetration of disembodied media throughout contemporary Australian society, Chapter 4 will focus on the rise and impact of disembodied visual media on broad processes of education, both within the school and across extensive spheres of social life.

Chapter 4: Romance and Truth in Motion pictures: The Ascent of Visual Media in Mass Socialisation

Thou seeist we are not all alone unhappy:
This wide and universal theatre
Presents more woeful pageants than the scene
Wherein we play in.

William Shakespeare (1989b: 140)

Hollywood is writing our lives!

Arnold Schwarzenegger (in Mc Tiernan 1993) [31]

Introduction

So far, discussion has focussed on two areas of mass education: (i) institutional systems of formal education; and (ii) civic education, in which behaviours of political participation are generated, acquired and reproduced in the public sphere. This chapter explores the modern convergence technologies of political socialisation, guide social integration in specific ways. Over the course of last century, these technologies have played an increasing role in the social integration and mass political socialisation in ways that begun educational institutions and from state and privately owned visual media, such as television and cinema. I wish to argue that these institutions of mass communication, entertainment and informal modes of learning have assumed a greater role in the overall education of citizens in the context of the economic rationalisation of the welfare state. Disembodied technologies of cultural reproduction increasingly have a major influence on the formation of subjectivities and cultural reproduction, operating as fields of power shaping nation identity and expectations of citizen rights and obligations in the late-modern state. I will integrate these informal sites and modes of mass political socialisation into a broader notion of education that will be utilised throughout the remainder of the thesis.

Disembodied visual media are a major force in late-modern political socialisation. Visual modes of mass media such as film, television and the Internet, have eclipsed the dominance of the traditional textual and the oral technologies of cultural reproduction in Western society. These media operate at institutional levels, in which technologies of education are disseminated from state and non-state actors via technologically mediated systems, and at disembodied levels through mass communications media. Often originating in foreign state territories, these disembodied media have significantly extended their spheres of influence over processes of cultural reproduction in the latter twentieth century. For example, the saturation of Northern American popular culture throughout all domains of Australian mass media has involved the integration of many enduring cultural representations, constituting a systematic influence of the development of subjectivities on a mass-scale. Privately initiated visual media have undercut the impact and value of formal public

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31 This quote is taken from the words of fictional character Jack Slater, played by Arnold Schwarzenegger in the Hollywood film: The Last Action Hero. (Mc Tiernan 1993)

education and democratic participation, possibly even surpassing these modes of education in the near future.

The rise and influence of cinema in Australia this century will be analysed as an example of the colonising power of modern visual media within capitalist-based democracies. The structures of the cinema experience and their historical development exhibit many characteristics that are consistent with Foucault's appropriation of the panopticon. The same organisational panoptic logics of the modern state are evident in the structurating processes of audience and theatre in the cinema experience. The same organisational principles of the first cinemas (e.g. scientific and capitalist) influenced the organising principles of the audience and film. The processes of normalisation occurring in the cinema experience parallel those of the early modernist classroom. The growth of the cinema in Australian society is examined as an example of an informal educational institution that has eroded the influence of state-initiated public education and active face-to-face or pre-technological modes of education.

The cinema experience provides an important educative function beyond popular conceptions of mainstream film as pure "entertainment." Through its representation of culture on a massive scale, the cinema occupies a significant historical phase that parallels the transition of education to visually based modes of learning. The architecture of the cinema itself reflects similar organisational characteristics of the classroom and films aimed at popular culture rely on conventions of narrative similar to the traditional text. Aside from the fact that the cinema has always relied on disembodied technologies, the main difference between the social integrative functions of the school and cinema has been that the expansion of cinema has, from the beginning, mainly been motivated by private economic interests (with sporadic bursts of state subsidisation and censorship).

The dynamic between the structure of the cinema experience and audience is explainable through a revised conception of Giddens' dialectic of power. Simply put, films disseminated in Australia reflect a North American cultural bias due to the effective colonisation of Australia by Hollywood-based cultural representations. These representations permeate all dimensions of the Australian film industry even as it develops national differences shaped by local conditions. The consequences of this American cultural bias can be expressed using Habermas' thesis of the colonisation of the lifeworld. Processes of colonisation are evident in both the Hollywood dominance of film distribution and in the predictable conventions of film form and style employed by Hollywood filmmakers. Hollywood's influence upon Australian culture is indicative of the power of global, disembodied technologies over the processes of the cultural reproduction of 'local' (e.g. national) identities.

Beyond this straightforward description, we can take the analysis further using the language of levels of integration developed earlier in the thesis. The tremendous scope and rapidity of the reproduction of cultural representations and subjectivities via these disembodied technologies results in a folding of the filmic-form onto itself in a mixture of genres and traditions. Television, like cinema, is a "simulation machine" in which images and significations of cultural references become reproduced at such speed and variation, that the authority of the image becomes questionable and unstable in a process of de-traditionalisation. Traditions that were once spontaneously generated through

embodied, pre-technological modes of education, are increasingly destabilised, rearticulated and sometimes exterminated by these emergent disembodied vision-based media. These processes form part of a larger cultural malaise that faces the West: increasingly abstract and disembodied visual media produce simulacra of cultural reproduction that undermines traditional textual and oral claims to legitimacy.

Through contemporary educative processes of political socialisation, unstable and monological patterns of cultural reproduction are becoming more common in late-modernity. Consequently, because cultural representations no longer provide an enduring reference point for the articulation of lifeworlds, a cultural anomie may result in which stable lifeworlds can no longer be successfully reproduced. Guided by a pragmatic rationality of capitalism, the state facilitates this process of de-traditionalisation, employing technologies of self-discipline to maintain political order and the semblance of a legitimate and stable democratic collective identity. The outcome is the social atomisation of individuals who are integrated predominantly through disembodied electronic technologies by the media of money and power. The motion picture industry, as it operates in cinemas and living-room televisions, vicariously reinforces processes of individuation indicative of the colonisation of popular culture by instrumentality in late-modern society.

The objective of this chapter is to illustrate the causal link of the relationship between modern mainstream cinema and the audience, to both the student's relationship to the text, and the citizen's relationship to the state. An underlying instrumental logic of cultural reproduction is identified in the narratives of governmentality, text and popular motion picture. I shall investigate these narratives with reference to some of my family life history and personal experiences.

A True Story

Just after the turn of the twentieth century, my great grandfather Joe Cleaver earned his living in two ways: firstly, he travelled with the self-titled Cleaver Family, *which was a musical troupe consisting mostly of musicians and actors who were not, ironically, from the Cleaver family. He was the leader and violinist of the troupe, which travelled around Australia's east coast. Joe's second source of income was unique—he travelled around the country with one of the first projectors and reels of film to be used exclusively to entertain paying audiences in Australia. At this stage, Hollywood—as we know it today—was the glimmer in the eye of a few disgruntled American actors. Film was seen as having limited scientific value or, as inventor Thomas Edison thought, was just a sideshow gimmick; a fad that would pass in time.*

My great grandfather would journey from town to town, setting up the portable projection system for a few nights at a time. Having arrived in the town of Albury one Saturday to show his footage of trains and boxers, he met formidable competition: a travelling theatre group was putting on a play that had already soaked up most of the local audience. So my great grandfather decided to leave the film equipment in his car and see the show. At that performance of a well-known melodrama of the day, my grandfather became mesmerised by the leading actor's beauty and stage presence—so much so, that he went back-stage during intermission to meet her. He was unsuccessful, but caught her

attention by playing violin during her most important and heart-breaking soliloquy. Beneath her theatrical lament of unrequited love, he performed the tragic intermezzo from Pietro Mascagni's "Cavalleria Rusticana." Rather than be distracted by this uninvited recital, the actor was instead inspired to create one of her most vivid performances on stage. They fell in love and were married shortly after.

My great grandfather's vocation in film exhibition was interrupted by World War I, in which he became an army bandleader stationed in Paris. He conducted a military band, climbing over corpses stacked high in the muddy trenches between performances. The war altered his career path forever. He spent the bulk of his post-war life working in my enterprising great grandmother's clothes-factory in Brunswick. Meanwhile, the emergence of film as popular entertainment during the war began a shift in public life away from embodied media of social intercourse like the live theatre in which my great grandparents met.

Speculating on the role of the cinematograph in education, Frank Tate suggested in 1923 that: "as British folk they ought to view with very great concern indeed the fact that millions of people throughout the Empire, who attended picture shows, were daily watching programmes which were prepared in America. The cinematograph, by reason of the fact that it was such a potent instrument for conveying instruction in an easy and fascinating way, might be made the means of the most insidious propaganda." Nevertheless, Tate conceded that "a use could be made of the cinema in education for giving a great deal of desirable information, in a very popular way, and it might be regarded as a kind of educational recreation." (Tate, cited in Boston 1999) Boston writes: "Anticipating contemporary debates about Australian content in multimedia, Tate spoke in a context where the Australian film industry, which had led the world at the beginning of the century, was virtually defunct, laid low by the triumph of the American studios, where it would remain until its revival in the 1970s." (Boston 1999) The silent era in Australian cinema developed as a medium of popular entertainment, heavily influenced by a burst of patriotism generated by the Australian contribution to the Western Alliance in World War II. Despite this nationalism from 1918 onwards, there was a poignant external influence of the rapidly growing Hollywood film-industry over film production, exhibition and distribution in Australia. In its assertion of American cultural values on Australian popular culture, Hollywood's influence over the form, content and distribution of films in Australia was deliberate and systematic. (Bordwell, Staiger and Thompson 1985: xiv) To illustrate the role of Hollywood cinema in the education of many Australians during the twentieth century, I will now investigate the dynamic of changing modes of film production and style, cinema structures, publicity, social class, aesthetic tradition and ideology in socialising the Australian audience.

Modern Technologies of Socialisation: The Return of the Visual

The origins of the motion picture extend back to the shadow puppet shows of China, India and Java. These shows formed the basis of a broad, generalising education through their depiction of moral fables and mythologies. Beneath the surface imbroglio of these public spectacles were important processes of cultural reproduction in which types of behaviour were valorised or denigrated.

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Shadow shows did not enjoy favour across Europe until the Enlightenment in the late-eighteenth century at the hands of Ambrogio and Goethe. The technology of lanterns surpassed the shadow-shadows, leading to the invention of the Zoetrope and more importantly, the *Praxinoscope* in 1876. Invented by Emile Reynaud, the Praxinoscope was a polygonal drum with mirrors at the centre that reflected rotating illustrations in such a way as to appear in motion. The next major gestalt occurred when this kind of visual medium was combined with photography. (Parkinson 1995: 8-15)

The early development of photography and film occurred during the release of enormous historical energies in the West. While the idea of photography has its origins in the works of Aristotle and ancient Arabic mathematics, it was practically realised in 1839 when Nicephore and Daguerre displayed the *Daguerreotype* in Paris. An Englishman named William Fox discovered how to produce negative and positive photographic images on paper. Modifications by the Langenheim brothers of Philadelphia paved the way for glass plates in 1849. (Parkinson 1995: 13) The ability to physically capture the perception of movement was developed in the 1880s to study animal locomotion using faster exposures and multiple cameras. (Parkinson 1995: 14) It was argued that the ability to make these still pictures achieve the semblance of movement depended on a concept known as "persistence of vision." In 1824, Peter Mark Roget defined the concept "as the ability of the retina to retain and image of an object for 1/20 to 1/5 of a second after its removal from the field of vision." (Parkinson 1995: 7) It has since been argued that persistence of vision occurs because the brain cannot separate images flashing before the eye at high speeds. The first motion cameras were designed during the nineteenth century because of the desire of scientists to capture this perception of movement. (Parkinson 1995: 7)

The nineteenth century was characterised by an obsession with machinery, optical illusion and public entertainment. Cinema was born of these factors: "The modern of all the arts, cinema is fittingly the most dependent on technology... Cinema is, therefore, the first art form to rely solely on psycho-perceptual illusions generated by machine." (Parkinson 1995: 7) The motion picture was conceived of originally as a scientific aid. Following the Enlightenment, a growing interest in Europe with science and capitalism motivated the development of mass-production technologies like film. During this intense period of industrialisation, huge populations migrated into the city eras in search of work in the newly industrialising towns. The nature of work for Europeans and Northern Americans dramatically changed, while the establishment of democracy transformed civic life, public education altered patterns of social integration and science became the measure of truth. Western thinkers of all intellectual disciplines no longer looked to the heavens to find self-mastery, but to the objective analysis of natural phenomena as a means of harnessing nature's energies and master nature itself. The desire to capture and study animal locomotion on film is an example of this enlightened will to master forces of nature. The motion picture industry was born of this mindset. It is what makes cinema is quintessentially modern.

In 1891 Edison and Dickson produced a rudimentary camera and viewer called, respectively, the *Kinetograph* and *Kinetoscope*. Within three years,

Kinetoscope parlours were popular throughout America, screening brief footage of boxing matches, vaudeville acts and other visual curiosities.[32] The birth of cinema occurred in the basement of a Parisian Café on December 28, 1895. Brothers Auguste and Louis Lumière, who before a paying audience demonstrated a workable method for combining the Kinetoscope with a lantern. (Parkinson 1995: 16) Previously on a sleepless night, Louis devised a hand-cranked camera that recorded, developed and projected films in a single mechanism. According to Parkinson, the production of feature-length films was made possible through inventions like Latham's Panoptikon, which prevented the perforated celluloid strip from snapping as it passed before the lens. (Parkinson 1995: 17)

Feature-film production ushered in a new era of mass socialisation in the West. Through the disembodied technologies of celluloid film, the camera and the projector, the ascension of popular cinema was a catalyst for the televisual revolution in the later twentieth century. The rise of the cinema is indicative of a gradual shift in the normalisation processes of modernity toward mechanical and electronically mediated technologies of social integration and education. The coupling of cinema with commerce signalled a new era of mass education with significant political implications for the social integration of modern citizens.

From Panoptikon to Panopticon

Over half-a-century after my great grandfather was romancing in the theatres of Victoria, I was courting in the cinemas of Melbourne. There was one particular girl named Kim,[33] whom I had met at University. We were at that clumsy and tense early stage of friendship when we were establishing commonalities; it was within this awkward context that I acquiesced to attend a screening of The Bodyguard (1992) with Kevin Costner and singer Whitney Houston. Despite the fact that I loathed films featuring Costner, we attended one of the first screenings of the Hollywood action film on her request.

During that particular evening, I was struck by the physicality of the cinema experience. We arrived at the local multi-cinema complex early to confirm the times of screening that blinkered across the fluorescent timetable above the ticket office. We purchased our tickets and were subsequently hustled into parallel lines leading into the two cinemas that simultaneously screened The Bodyguard. In the foyer, amidst the television screens, large billboards advertising new films, the bar, arcade machines and cacophony of colour emanating from the refreshments counter, I was overwhelmed with the amount of information saturating the lobby of the cinema. Even my ticket contained a wealth of information, including the time of the film, my eligibility for student-concession prices, seating allocation, the name of the film and cinema. We stood in a sombre and orderly queue, waiting in a pool of dazzling light and sound for the cinema doors to open. Kim and I chatted about forthcoming films and movies we had seen recently.

We entered a medium-sized theatre boasting state-of-the-art sound technology for maximum viewing pleasure. The theatre was coloured in muted blue-grey

tones and adorned with long flowing curtains, giving a curious and paradoxical impression of minimalist design, while at the same time accentuating the enormity of the space. The cinema was packed with people. The seats were arranged to maximise audience size (and profit). A middle-aged woman sat to my right, while Kim sat to my left. I opened my potato chips during the previews to avoid irritating surrounding customers with the sound of its plastic wrap being unsealed. When the house lights were dimmed, a collective hush subdued the noise creating a brief social vacuum.

The Bodyguard's narrative was filled with the usual highs, lows, character separations and tearful reunions one expects from a Hollywood film of the action-drama genre. Obeying certain tacit social conventions, such as placing my arm on the very edge of our shared armrest, I kept any conversation with Kim to a minimum. During the film, I was careful not to cross the invisible line of personal body space between my seat and the female audience-member to my right. Ushers ensured that cinema patrons respected these social conventions. Seated tightly amongst these hundreds of strangers, the experience of watching the film detracted from any possible social discomfort I may have felt. The functional design of the theatre was partly responsible for this.

That particular theatre contrasted from earlier cinema designs, like those of the so-called "Golden Era" of Hollywood in the 1920s. In contrast to the stark functionalism of mainstream cinemas built since the 1970s, the cinemas of the 1920s were exotically fashioned after Romanesque and Renaissance-style classical palaces and the excessively Moorish, Spanish-style cinemas. Erected to attract both Hollywood distributors and Australian audiences alike, the pastiche of garish newness and fake-regalia of those early theatres reflected a burgeoning Hollywood aesthetic, the vulgarity of which beguiles its tremendous global capacity to shape cultural formation under a deceptively harmless guise of mass entertainment. Cinema theatres of the late twentieth century continue to be driven by commercial gain and instrumentality that seeks to maximise bottoms-on-seats and profits-in-pocket. The architecture of the modern cinema complex continues bear the marks of this structural logic early Hollywood sensibilities impact of. Beneath this harmless function as an informal social space of leisure, the generic cinema space appears to be influenced by a panoptic sensibility directed at producing "docile bodies"; but in different ways to the formal technologies of disciplinary power utilised in established institutional places directed at mobilising social and political order, such as the school or prison. In the movie-theatre, disembodied technologies of cultural representation modes of governance.

Technologies of disciplinary power operate in the cinema in a similar way to the panoptic prison and classroom, inscribing upon the body signatures of the political fields of modernity. Disciplinary technologies are inscribed in the walls of the cinema, marking its very functional design, its use of technology, its employment of ushers, and the content of the films displayed within. These technologies are enmeshed in a broader dynamic matrix through which intersubjectivity is shaped by the power of visual media to influence a mass audience on an unprecedented scale, shaping individual perception, social behaviour and collective identity in new and abstract ways. The cinema experience is productive of personhood illustrated by Foucault. Where the modern state has consolidated its sovereign power through institutionalised

processes of normalisation (e.g. criminal rehabilitation and public education), modern cinema is largely driven by market competition with limited state subsidisation and regulation through censorship, health and safety codes and so on. The nature of the medium influences social formation in abstract and disembodied ways the power of cinema informal pragmatic rationality operates and

The Cinema Experience as Structuration

The film The Body Guard *seemed to appeal to the woman on my right. She chuckled during moments of levity and gently sobbed during an emotional turning point in action-romance vehicle. I sat approximately eight centimetres from this woman for nearly two hours, experiencing a variety of feelings without ever sharing, speaking or consciously exchanging a gesture with her. Many of the hundreds of other people in that screening probably had a similar experience of shared isolation, whether by personal choice or by social custom. There we all sat in the semi-darkness facing the screen in an orderly fashion, row upon row, the projector casting light over our shoulders, the projectionist unseen behind the veil of the projection booth, the ushers quietly surveying the theatre. There we sat alone, together ordered as a group and yet segregated into couples and individuals. The interaction with the stage that my great grandfather enjoyed that night at the theatre over five decades earlier is impossible at the cinema. The aim of the cinema is that its patrons remain (hopefully) blissfully unaware of each other and the source of the images. To cradle the viewer into a sense of security, inconvenience is kept to a minimum so that the escape from reality to fiction is as smooth as possible. Yet while this is occurring, each of us is altered in some way, be it our behaviours, our memories, our perception, our experience of life itself.*

I wondered during The Bodyguard *about this collective isolation and modernity. The cinema that night was a collection of individuals joined by a culture and institutionally separated in the theatre. At the core of the modern Western individual is the identification of possessive individualism, where by an individual is shaped and defined by his or her ownership or property. The logic of the cinema embodied this identity. My ticket specified what kind of client I was (student concession) and what my entitlement (a seat to view one session of* The Bodyguard*). The cinema in this sense embodies an intensification of this Western notion of individualism in strange and potentially alienating ways. Whether we liked the film or not, in that Hollywood cradle our very personhood was being altered in ways barely realisable at a conscious level.*

This production of personhood can be found in many social institutions. Consider the structure of the classroom: rows of bodies facing the teacher, all easily visible so that the teacher can exercise surveillance as easily and efficiently as possible as a means to control. All students have fairly detailed reports kept about them, their progress and family background. A rigorous timetable is maintained. The cinema operates under a similar logic—the blinking schedules, the queues, the tightly ordered bodies in the theatre, the presence of ushers and informal rules of conduct and the actual film narrative are productive of this modern form of personhood. Foucault argues that in modernity, a fundamental change in practices of social integration like this indicate a qualitative change in logic from using bodily punishment to a more focused infliction of norms upon the soul. The

ordering of the body in the classroom and prison in the form of reports, for example, is evidence of the reduction of the individual from an autonomous subject to an object of knowledge with a scientific status.

The school and the state share similar regulatory technologies of disciplinary power. These technologies are applied according to the ongoing development of modern logics, which shift in emphasis over time. Modern logics have predominantly been shaped by a mixture of the epistemological concerns of positivism, the ethical framework of utilitarianism, the ontological values of the Protestant work ethic and the political agendas of liberal conceptions of democracy. Modern logics also continue to be tempered by those pre-modern cultural traditions that persist and/or change in the modern period. At the heart of this mixture are the values and goals of reason, which also changes over time since its emergence during the Enlightenment period. During the historical development of modernity in the twentieth century, the social integration of individuals and communities has increasingly been rationalised according to instrumental criteria. The logic of instrumental reason has come to dominate the rationalisation of liberal democracy through a variety of media utilising various technologies of disciplinary power.

These technologies operate alongside and/or against enduring traditions and other modern logics in a dialectic of power. Within this dialectic of power, the modern state has increased its administrative and regulatory influence over its members, producing and transforming the modern welfare state in the process. It is argued that "democratic government feels most keenly the demands of the people constantly to extend its services and benefits to them, thus creating ever larger administrative and distributional networks and constantly categorising and evaluating individuals." (Kukathas *et al.*1990: 4) German critical theorist, Max Horkheimer, claims that the explosive development of state interventionist systems within contemporary liberal democratic societies has been guided by an instrumentally rationalised attempt at the human domination of nature, including the social integration of individuals and communities. This development has facilitated the rise of fascism, the decline of the individual under a "technological veil" and a decline in the confidence of democratic citizens in the emancipatory potential of enlightened reason. (Horkheimer, in Arato and Gebhardt 1993: 26)

There is a strong correlation between the instrumentalised education reform advocated by the New Right since the 1970s and declines in the broader educative processes of Australian liberal democracy. The fields of disciplinary power evident in the school are indicative of broad patterns of power, rule and authority in modern processes of social integration. Education is a critical site of social integration, both within the classroom and in the manner by which democratic citizenship is popularly understood in the Australian political culture.

The camera attempts to master its subject in a similar way, from its early scientific usage to capture the movement of horses, to its portrayal of heroic mythologies like Kevin Costner's character in *The Bodyguard*.

The power of the whole cinema-experience is tremendous. It is more appropriate to think of 'power influences x' rather than 'subject influences x'. At best, power may be seen as acting *through* relationships in dynamic and polymorphous ways. For Foucault, history is a process without any particular subject. No one is external to power as there is no 'power over'. There are not

binary opposites between rulers and ruled. History is about transforming strategic relational fields of resistance at many loci. It is architecture, culture and inter-subjectivity. It is the cinema experience. It is life itself.

Much can be understood by looking at the processes through which a subject—be it prisoner, student or cinephile—is ordered. The cinema not only embodies these modernist institutional forms, it also emerged because of them. Walter Benjamin explains: "Our taverns and metropolitan streets, our offices and furnished rooms, our railroad stations and our factories appeared to have locked us up hopelessly. Then came the film and burst this prison-world asunder by the dynamite of the tenth of a second, so that now, in the midst of its far flung ruins and debris, we calmly and adventurously go travelling." (Benjamin 1969: 236)

At one point when Kim and I were watching The Bodyguard, someone in the audience broke the conventional sound curfew with a loud and somewhat crude remark about Whitney Houston that broke the fantastic spell of the cinema. The person's attempted joke slashed like a knife through the social fabric created by the film and theatre for a moment before the audience returned its mesmerised gaze back upon the screen. The suspension of disbelief that fantasies like The Bodyguard attempt to induce in the audience is as dependent upon the discourse in which the film is screened as the content of its narrative in securing the audience's attention.

To ensure that the gaze of the audience falls upon the screen, the design of theatre aims to maximise the illusion of adventure using sound technology, seating arrangements, overt rules of social conduct enforced by the cinema staff and tacit consensual norms acknowledged by its patrons. This dynamic between the storytellers, cinema architecture and spectators is crucial to the cinema experience. The point is that any analysis of how the individual is *educated* by this must be conceptually located within a dialectic of power, which on the one hand, necessitates the ordering of individual in differing political ways, while at the same time, recognises the autonomy and independence of each individual.

Modern Representations: The Golden Era of Hollywood Colonisation

Before the rise of cinema as big business, the motion picture as popular entertainment was treated as a sideshow and gimmick, primarily because of the initial physical limitations of the medium. Through his company Star Films, Georges Meliés expanded the technical capabilities of film, utilising a variety of revolutionary techniques from dissolves, time-lapse photography, art direction, artificial lighting and special effects in a more sophisticated way. He augmented the vocabulary of film by recognising "the difference between screen and real time and conceived a bewildering array of optical effects to expand the parameters of the fictional film story." (Parkinson 1995: 18) The pioneers of popular film from Chaplin to Griffith expressed their debt to him as the father of narrative film. Another tremendous extension of film vocabulary occurred in Porter's *The Great Train Robbery* (1903), which uses cross-cutting techniques to build pace as well as pans, tilts and overlapping shots to establish the basic principles of continuity editing central to the construction of narrative film. (Parkinson 1995: 18-20) These new techniques altered the capacity of film to portray time, space and reality itself. As Benjamin observes: "With the close up,

space expands; with slow motion, movement is extended." (Benjamin 1969: 236) With the development of these principles of narrative cinema, the Australian film industry expanded in ways that affected the socialisation of Australians on a number of levels.

Production of silent film making in Australia began in 1896. Under the guidance of a competent group of technicians, including directors like Smith, Ordell and Longford, and actors like Lyle and Torchette, Australia entered its 'Golden Era'. Over fifty-two films were made between 1911 and 1913. By the time that sound-technology was available during the 1920s, the film industry provided over twenty thousand people with jobs related to film production. However, this expansion of local industry began to decrease in the late-1920s with the increased monopolisation of film distribution by Hollywood. The influx of films made in the USA and the domination of Hollywood over local Australian distribution restricted the development of film innovation in Australia. The combination of economic depression and the invention of sound-films from Hollywood destroyed major Australian film production houses, such as the Frank Thring Studios (which moved to Hollywood.) A new Hollywood-style production system was instituted, involving less location work, less expenditure and a more hierarchical organisation of production. This mass production system, oriented towards big business profits, replaced the existing small "cottage-style" production houses. (Moran and O'Regan 1985: 24-26) The American Rank Company owned a large proportion of Australian film production. (Shirley and Adams 1989: 173)

While many of the more prominent Australian films of the Golden Era were imbued with patriotism, many influential Australian filmmakers like Ken Hall were heavily influenced by the Hollywood style of filmmaking. (Brisbane 1991: 220-221; Shirley and Adams 1989: 116-119) Hall's films, such as _The Squatter's Daughter_ (1933) and _The Hayseeds_ (1938) were made directly for mass entertainment and profit. He adopted the Hollywood style in the way his films included titles that were easy to remember and narratives with strong climaxes at the end of the movie for impact. As was the case with most major Hollywood films, publicity for Hall's works began weeks in advance. These films accrued phenomenal profits.[34] Hollywood's colonisation of the Australian film industry assisted the near total collapse of local production by 1939. (Shirley and Adams 1989: 174) For decades, the extensive foreign ownership of film exhibition in Australia meant that profits and investments went directly to American studios. It was only under the financing of the wealthy USA producers, such as Columbia, that allowed the production of films with Australian content like Ken Hall's _Smithy_ (1946) to take place. (Brisbane 1991: 220-221; see also Shirley and Adams 1989: 170) By the 1950s, the production of feature films in Australia was forced into co-production with the USA. The romantic Golden Era had ended, and local film product was virtually dead. The colonisation of the lifeworld was in full swing.

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34 For example, in 1932 Hall's remake of _On Our Selection_ cost $1,000 to produce but generated $50,000 in profit—this record profit wasn't out-grossed in Australia until 1977.

Australian Culture, Virtual Romance and Death

During 1992, I decided to take a break from mainstream cinema and see a film entitled Swoon *(1992) with a girl named Lea.[35] The film was a sexual-political dramatisation of the notorious sex crimes of gay lovers, Leopold and Loeb, in 1924. We saw the film at a small art-house cinema in Melbourne. Lea and I lost interest in the film's tedious technique and began to distract each other in a 'reciprocally tactile' way. While kissing Lea, I noticed that in the back row behind us, two young women were gesturing in our direction, grimacing and expressing moral discontent at our petting. I found this moralising ironic, as at that particular moment, the two main characters on screen were brutally killing and disposing the corpse of a young boy. This incident made me wonder about the effect of cinema on the relationship between the audience and film, particularly in the way cultural values are transmitted and reproduced.*

As stated above, the relationship between audience and cinema is a dynamic one involving the structure of the theatre, the audience and the content of the film itself. At first, the cultures depicted on early Australian films began to be colonised by the Hollywood system in a very overt and physical way. Invariably, "the huge film-going audience saw mainly United States films, frequently about the United States" from the 1920s onwards. [36] (Moran 1985: 31) A conglomeration of independent Australian distributors particularly affected distribution of movies in Australia after 1918. By the 1920s, Australia became a dumping ground for American films, especially since the War had diminished the UK and French markets. (Moran and O' Regan 1985: 28) Australia became the second market (and still is) for American film. (Dermody and Jacka 1988: 11-13) Hence, at any rate, Australian distributors preferred Hollywood films as this "dumping" rendered the films cheap by comparison to increasing costs in Australian production. Furthermore, these American prints could be screened over longer periods as there were multiple prints distributed after the American market was saturated. While it is argued that many British makers were interested in preserving Australian cultural values in films, like Henry Watt's *Overlanders* (1946), American productions such as *On The Beach* (1956) viewed Australia as nothing but an exotic background. The 1950s saw "a continuing drain of Australian creative talent" with actors and writers leaving in droves for England and America. While the president of the Motion picture Association of America, in his annual report of 1952/53, viewed Australia as "a good stable market for American pictures," the local industry looked forward to production at "subsistence level" with regular production of feature films, "a dead issue by the mid-1950s," and a non-event by 1964. (Shirley and Adams 1989: 185-186) The Hollywood 'star system' had consolidated the character of Hollywood filmmaking, which asserted its presence all over the Western world. This process of cultural imperialism occurred across Western society. While

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35 Not her real name.

36 All of this was compounded when, according to Dermody and Jacka, despite the post-war social climate that placed emphasis on national growth and international prominence, financial conservatism became the accepted thinking. Community support for a local film industry was to dwindle more than at any other time previously. (Dermody and Jacka 1988) Furthermore, Shirley and Adams point out that the purchase by British owned Rank of half the shares in Cinesound's parent company, Greater Union (exhibitor/distributor) "ultimately proved to be as threatening to local production as the Fox purchase of Hoyts had been in 1930." (Shirley and Adams 1989: 173) The Australian film industry suffered as a result. Compared to the tens of thousands involved in Australian film making during 1930s, by the late 'eighties that number diminished to between 1200-1500.

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embraced by mass society for its capacity to deliver pure entertainment, others took a more critical but by no means negative view of Hollywood film.

The Persistence of Hollywood

A friend of mine named Denise[37] had returned from a study-related trip to the USA. Terminally romantic, she had fallen for a young man in New York who wooed her with an old-fashioned barrage of roses, chocolates and candle-lit dinners. Eventually, he proposed to her from the observatory of the Empire State Building. Denise was swept away from the gesture, stating, "it was just like Tom Hanks and Meg Ryan in Sleepless In Seattle..."

Hollywood icons are threaded throughout the fabric of Western memory, providing shifting reference points for people of diverse cultures. In spite of her being Australian, Denise equated her experience upon the fictional icons of Northern American film as one such reference point. Some argue that the simulations of cinema and television diminished people's ability to retain the past, de-temporalising points of reference around which the identities of individuals are constituted.[38]

Hollywood is an inescapable part of Australian popular culture. This influence can be traced back to the earliest days of Australian cinema. From the late-1950s onwards, television, video and electronic media technologies transformed the movie market, amounting to an intensification of the kinds of processes of normalisation described by Foucault.[39] They permit a wider and deeper penetration of technologies of disciplinary power into the private and public lives of people across society and the world. They also enable private agents (e.g. individual and corporate actors) to employ these technologies on a mass-scale. Television occupies the central place as furniture in the average house; the computer resides in the most accessible regions of work and home, while the laptop remains permanently mobile, travelling with the individual wherever they may go.[40]

Denise's wedding proposal would have made the author J. G. Ballard cringe; Ballard argues that television particularly has created generations who have never experienced an *original* life. Instead, Ballard argues, they live it vicariously through electronic media. (Dery 1995: 11) Studies analysing declining political participation in the USA concluded that the most significant cause was the large amount of time Americans devoted to television viewing. According to Putnam, time spent watching television is time not spent pursuing the democratic education of political participation. (Putnam 1993)

Disembodied visual media of television, computer software and film, enable the experience of life, virtual death and romance from any number of localities. The originality surrounding Denise's experience of being proposed to on the Empire State Building is bled of its novelty because it is informed by a previous 'lived' event of seeing the proposal on film or on video. The barriers between lived experience and the moving image become blurred in an entanglement of lived

37 Not her real name.

38 This process of de-traditionalisation will be examined in more detail below.

39 See Chapter 2 above.

40 Computer-based learning through the Internet is included under the category of disembodied visual media, even though it still conveys and mediates mostly textual modes of communication. I wish to make the distinction between the "written-text" of the book and the "image-text" of the computer.

experience and clichés of popular culture. Baudrillard describes the American city itself as having "stepped right out of the movies. To grasp its secret, you should not then begin with the city and move towards the screen; you should begin with the screen and move outwards toward the city." (Baudrillard 1988: 56) Depicting a larger-than-life protagonist in *The Last Action Hero* (1993), the *actor* Arnold Schwarzenegger is magically transplanted from the fictional cinema screen within the narrative to confront his *true-life self in the real world,* proclaiming: "Hollywood is writing our lives!"

Everyday experiences of the cinephile's life become blurred amidst polymorphic processes of cultural reproduction. However, residues of truth reside in the complexities of cinema experience, as much as it resides in the progress of modernity and everyday life.

Strictly Virtual? Postmodern Ruptures in the Living-room and School

Coupled with the pragmatic logic of capitalism, technological development has increased home-based entertainment systems. The home as a place of work, education and play is increasingly viable in light of the home computer, distance education and the home-cinema system. Meanwhile, video distribution becomes increasingly concentrated in huge outlets that parallel the development of the hyper-mart shopping centres that form the social epicentre of many suburbs. Cinema technology integrates engaging movie experiences through automated seating and attempted virtual reality.

One of the most appealing aspects of computer-networked learning is home simulation machine, is becoming a significant part of the educational landscape in areas such as the air force and in schools. This represents the next development of the simulation-machine, as it assumes a number of differing social functions simultaneously. For example, educationalists Tiffin and Rajasingham propose that early next century, it is possible that virtual reality education could become a central feature of the home. (Tiffin and Rajasingham 1995: 14-15)

A key force mediating the further development of the motion picture industry is the ability of technology to constantly outpace the market. The development of giant entertainment complexes that combine theme-park rides with cinema screens represents the next stage in mass cinema entertainment. According to Friedberg, these aim to increase the simulation of the cinema experience by maximising the movie theatre "as a "simulation machine" that induces a desired "artificial psychosis"—"a mechanically reproducible representation of an elsewhere and an elsewhen..." (Friedberg 1993: 131) Friedberg refers to the viewing of the movie as one involving a "virtual gaze": "The virtual gaze is not a direct perception but a received perception mediated through representation." (Friedberg 1993: 2) The 'present' and the 'real' achieve new meanings in the post-cinematic era that differ from other modes of entertainment and mass communication that have a more physical sense of history (such as museums, department stores and exhibition halls).[41] (Friedberg 1993: 4) The motion

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41 The capitalist logic driving film has lead to a demise of much of its physical history because of factors such as the early use of film that corroded in storage. The efforts of directors like Martin Scorsese to publicise the importance of celluloid preservation attempt to reclaim as much of this physical history. As relatively brief the history of cinema is, time has claimed other casualties. For example, Georges Méliès, despite his innovation and influence, virtually disappeared during the war years only to be "re-discovered" decades later selling cigarettes at a tobacconist's stand.

picture experience involves the projection of representations that are not bound by time and space, and which shuffle and distort histories and other narratives, further obfuscating the dynamic confluence of the cinephile's gaze and cinematic structure. If conventional subjective and objective categories break down in this engagement of the real and the simulated, what are the possible consequences?

A Postmodern Proposal?

Shortly after Denise told me of her proposal (which she declined to accept), I was watching the American talk show Ricki Lake. *The episode was focussed on 'real' individuals who wished to surprise their lovers by proposing to them on 'live' television. One such fellow had been hesitant to propose to his lover because he was shy, so he chose the* Ricki Lake Show *to suggest marriage. Beneath the irony of a shy man proposing before millions of viewers is the role that nostalgia and fame play in the use of motion pictures in popular culture. Within the live televisual context of* Ricki Lake, *this man found a discourse in which he could communicate what was previously incommunicable in his everyday life. His proposal revealed a fascinating interplay between the secure escapism of the television programme, the merging of the personal relationship of these two people with mass culture and the instant production of nostalgia.*

The power of the disembodied visual media to influence constitutive processes of subjectivity and cultural reproduction was consolidated once cinema receded from its initial role as scientific instrument, and became motivated by capitalism. Driven by the utilitarian ethic of providing a kind of happiness to the greatest number whatever the means, Hollywood film slices through moral taboos and invokes all manner of images that defy time and space. In its early years, Hollywood cinema explored different ways of life. in reasonably distinct categories, from the Western to science fiction. Hollywood films today often contain overlapping film genres with a dizzying display of narrative twists and aesthetic touches. Zemeckis' *Back to the Future* (1985) and its sequels (1989, 1990) infuse science fiction, slapstick comedy, Western and romantic genres within a narrative longing for the past. Jameson sees cinema spectatorship as developing from nostalgia for endless 'secondariness'. Sequels like *Back To The Future, Parts II* and *III* embody this nostalgia for nostalgia in an endless return to selective but secondary representations. Jameson identifies this with a *postmodern* malaise that is characteristic of a transformation of modernist society. (Jameson 1983)

Jameson's description of postmodernism highlights emergent features of Western consumer culture featuring an eclectic mix of cultural reference points within a spatial reorganisation. Jameson suggests that in postmodernism one can recognise new patterns of dominance. (Jameson 1983) I agree with Jameson's characterisation of the current period to the extent that there certainly seems to be an air of 'secondariness' in the flavour of Australian cinema and popular culture generally. Australian popular culture of the 1990s seems locked in a loop of retro-fashion evident in film, music and fashionable clothing. In cinema, one can identify a broader trend evident in all Western life that involves introspection, a sifting through of the history of Enlightenment and beyond for cultural reference points and inspiration for new ideas. Baudrillard

argues that the enlightened subject is enveloped by information technologies that operate on increasingly abstract levels. (Baudrillard 1983)

Friedberg suggests that there has been a gradual and indistinct epistemological tear along the fabric of modernity, a change produced by the increasing cultural centrality of both cinematic and televisual apparatuses: *a mobilised "virtual gaze."* (Friedberg 1993: 2) This, she argues, is what makes this tear a mark of the transition to postmodernism and the end of the Enlightenment project of modern Western civilisation. For example, architectural historian Charles Jencks points to a precise moment when the modern ended and the postmodern began. Postmodern style in architecture is marked by its departure from the aesthetic purity and streamlined functionalism of modernists such as Le Corbusier and Gropius. Half-modern, half-conventional designs have emerged in the postmodern era. (Jencks 1991: 6) While these trends are definitely a distinctive characteristic our times, his claim to postmodernity is premature. This epistemological tear, while undermining traditional modernist categories in the same way as film genres have become jumbled, signals an intensification of elements of modernity, a casting off of some of the utopian remnants of its childhood.[42] The by-products of these social developments often yield distinctly *postmodern* phenomena, but within the continuing enframing of the *modern* intensification and abstraction of social life.

The cinema, more than any other art form represents this intensification. The institution of the cinema has become more instrumentalised in the modern multiplex shopping centres, and has found its way into the lounge and bedroom through the television and personal computer. The great twentieth century philosopher—Ludwig Wittgenstein—liked to go to the cinema. Early in his career, he argued that while the limitations of our language define the limits of our world, technology has expounded ontological boundaries of our current language in such a way that a new lexicon is needed to describe the nature and frontiers of being. (Wittgenstein 1961) Ironically, much contemporary continental philosophy emanating from Wittgenstein's linguistic approach remains captive of *the word*. The cinema experience is indicative of the need for a new lexicon of understanding that accounts for emotions, phenomena and sensory knowledge beyond the interplay of words and symbols that is only a dimension of that experience. The dialectic of power that is evident in the motion picture experience challenges the traditional Enlightenment categories of objectivity and subjectivity. Within the processes of structuration, a new vocabulary is required to encompass this conceptual blur if one is to attempt to 'know' the significance of this process.

The simulated way of life embodied in film, television and personal computer encourage learning within a discourse of abstract worlds and overlapping genres that alter institutional formations from the school, to places of leisure. The home movie theatre and the computer can bring work, play and education into the home, changing work patterns and subsequently whole ways of life. Lifeworlds are increasingly bound up in abstract worlds bound by optic fibre and technology. Human life is transformed into new structures and political ordering that leaves its mark upon the soul in a more pernicious way. Western culture

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42 Benjamin argues that the aura of original art-work has been transplanted by mass-produced images. The so-called aura cast by original works of art has simply been cast away by the intrinsic logic of modernity. (Benjamin 1969)

may have explored all possible domains of expression.[43] For Baudrillard, during the forthcoming the exploration of the increasingly abstract modern Western world of information and simulation, "it is the map which precedes the territory." (Baudrillard 1983: 2) A devastating consequence of this 'abstraction' occurred in 1990 during the international conflict in the Persian Gulf.

Into the Living Room: The Education of Television

Between August 1990 and February 1991, coverage of the Gulf War replaced children's TV. (Wark 1994: 73) An audience of unprecedented magnitude gazed at the conflict in Kuwait and Iraq through the media of global television. The USA-led alliance reflected a new global sensibility—its reply to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and seizure of oil consisted of most Western nation-states in addition to eighteen other countries. In the post cold-war world, former enemies fought side by side in a market-driven massacre. Much of the war was depicted in simulations that assisted in the minimisation of causalities perceived by audiences. The televised images of the war projected by CNN were sterile and centred on the surgical precision of modern technological warfare. The language of death and destruction was shrouded and sanitised in the jargon of terms like *collateral damage* and *friendly fire*. The combined effect successfully distorted the comparative losses of a war that was described by a USA fighter pilot as "a turkey shoot." An estimated 50,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed compared to 146 soldiers from the allied opposition. (One in four USA soldiers were killed by *friendly fire*.) Technology serviced the military and the media on a worldwide scale in both destroying and mythologising the real-life experience of individuals, cultures and nation-states.

Initially designed as the tool of scientific tool of objective inquiry, popular film has been objectified in the way that projected and televised motion pictures became commodified for mass consumption. The projector and operator in the cinema remain discreetly out of view as an objective tool of the storyteller. During the Gulf war, mass society became the theatre of televised war and destruction. The coverage was sold as entertainment to an audience of millions seated comfortably in their homes. Control of coverage by CNN was visible but discreet. Eclipsing the geographical barriers separating distinct political and cultural entities, the televised coverage of the war made "events that connect the most disparate sites of public action appear simultaneously as a private drama filled with familiar characters and moving stories." Media technologies transgress "borders between public and private spheres both on the home front and on the front line." (Wark 1994: 71) Both the panopticon and panoptikon are re-invented for late-modernity.

Forty years before the Gulf war, Adorno remarked that

> *"The total obliteration of the war by information, propaganda, commentaries, with cameramen in the first tanks and war reporters dying heroic deaths, the mishmash of an enlightened manipulation of public opinion and oblivious activity: all this is another expression for the withering of experience, the vacuum between men and their real fate lies. It is as if the reified, hardened plaster cast of events takes*

43 For example, Fukuyama argues that Western society is approaching the "end of history" is based on the belief that Enlightenment thinking has extended as far as it can. (Fukuyama 1992) Fukuyama implies that liberal democracy is the ultimate political framework for the peaceful coexistence.

the place of events themselves. Men are reduced to walk-on parts in a monster documentary-film."

<div align="right">(Adorno 1974: 55)</div>

Since Adorno wrote this, the speed and scope of influence of visual media has only increased alongside the power of global capital. As Wark writes, during the Gulf war coverage, powers of all descriptions were "learning the new language of force and terror that is the media..." (Wark 1994: 78) The relationship of television to audience oscillated from being one based either on a mass consumption to public education. Wark observes that during the Gulf war coverage, television no longer existed "in a relation to an audience assumed to be a mass of consumers or a public to be educated. The event turns television into part of a feedback loop connecting the spectator to the action via the vagaries of 'opinion' and the pressures of the popular on political elites." (Wark 1994: 71) The docility of viewers and mobilisation of media technology by corporation and nation-states alike meshed in loop between of a simulated war and a simulated consensus by a public believing itself to be 'informed'. While Wark's postmodern appraisal of media technology is exaggerated in its conclusions, his analysis is relevant to the current discussion to the extent that he highlights that within this loop, the television spectator "becomes vague and quixotic" in its relation to the abstract worlds of disembodied visual media. (Wark 1994: 71) The information provided by CNN was to educate the public in consumption of coverage as a TV product, while its content was intended by the USA-dominated alliance to mobilise bias on a global scale against a minor threat to the oil market. By "mobilise bias," I mean that for the audience to remain seated in their living rooms was sufficient for the Western alliance to undertake the task of protecting their commercial interests in Kuwait using brute force beneath a technological veil.[44]

Truth, Rationality and Death

The tragedy of the Gulf war and its portrayal on TV amounted to an annihilation of truth and people; however, this facet of the destruction of war was buried beneath the techno-babble of political 'experts' and military authorities. The use of technology to 'educate' the public in the contemporary language of domination and mass destruction is not confined to television. Ellmore, Olson and Smith point out that during the Gulf War, "students in the United States communicated regularly over the Internet with students in Israel, discussing such subjects as what it feels like to be under attack by Scud missiles." (Ellmore 1993) Contemporary modes of rationalisation in this context of electronic mediation occur in increasingly complex and abstract ways that shape the character and processes of rationalisation. Packaged "as a private drama filled with familiar characters and moving stories," the Gulf war was dubiously displayed to viewers in a worldwide theatre of learning in which conventional demarcations of fact and fiction, real and imagined, and entertainment and education crumbled beneath the weight, power and immediacy of television and the new media.

At the core of the rising influence of visual media over mass education is an epistemological question of the (im)possibility of any education of 'reliable'

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44 See my reference to Adorno above.

knowledge in late-modernity. Jacques Derrida once intimated that life is the stories we tell ourselves, implying that people attempt to make sense of their lives by imposing meaning on the often disjointed, unrelated and fragmented things they do from day to day. (Derrida 1987: 37-91) Fragments, memories and experiences become infused into a quixotic narrative of life in a kind of ontological persistence of vision.

This is what it means to rationalise: *to make order of the world*. Therefore, should one conclude that processes of rationalisation belong to shifting narratives whose subjective nature relegates them to the moribund obscurity of relativism? Is this doctoral thesis a *story* that I am writing to myself? It might be inferred from this conclusion that in writing this critique of education in late-modernity, I am attempting to draw meaning from my experiences in the cinema and the (hi)stories of my grandmother by rationalising them within some sort of meaningful autobiography. Foucault argues that people are bound up in shifting discourses defined by factors beyond their determination. By the end of his life in the 1980s, Foucault seemed to argue that the physical body is the only actual site of self-comprehension. With subjectivity swept away in tides of shifting discourses, Foucault retreated to the care and pleasure of the self as the only way of *knowing* the self. For Foucault, pushing the frontiers of knowledge may be seen as involving a pushing of the body towards a particular space, or experience, which an individual uniquely experiences for him/herself: death. However, whether this in fact *was* his attitude remains as obscure as Foucault himself. Biographers like Miller only speculate Foucault's motives because his stories died with him. His ascetic practices provide only an obscure insight into the affirmation of life. The body and historical constitution are certainly important to this discussion of mass education—its location and ordering in the classrooms of modernity provide an understanding of disciplinary power and its historical development. Furthermore, the body's disengagement from the traditional intercourse of face-to-face relations towards the 'quixotic' discourse of mass education through disembodied media reveals new formations of subjectivity, power and authority. However, Foucault's politics of the body fails to address the importance of embodied social relations in the meaningful reproduction of lifeworlds. The need to reassert the importance of social relations as integral to the inter-subjective generation, affirmation and maintenance of meaningful cultural norms, requires a notion of the self that is neither simply an individualistic aesthetic, as Foucault implies, nor an absolute in itself, as neo-liberal ideology implies.

Post-structural theory is insightful but epistemologically and ontologically limited in explaining the constitution of subjectivity. As Bennett observes: "if narratives are all that we can have and if all narratives are, in principle, of equal value—as it seems there must be if there is no touchstone of 'reality' to which they can be referred for the adjudication of truth-claims—then rational debate would seem to be pointless." (Bennett, cited in Norris 1992: 52) Similarly, there may be postmodern conditions; however, *postmodernism as a theory* often dwells too much on language games and too on critical social inquiry.

Modern rationalities, cultures and patterns of domination remain beneath the technological fireworks and language games of the information age. Science still resides as the epistemological touchstone of Western reality and the key methodological tool for the objective mastering of nature. Technology is the key instrument of natural and human mastery. Capitalism still relentlessly drives the

commodification of anything and everything. Patriarchy continues to dominate gender relations. Divisions of class separate groups in societies and between societies themselves. Within modern Western societies, these divisions are firmly entrenched, making the cinema, video and PC inaccessible to most citizens on a regular basis.[45]

The Enlightenment vision continues to be a romantic one, nevertheless, the processes of structuration are partly in a state of perpetual change. Like the distance between spectator and silver screen, an ineffable space or moment divides individuals, while at the same time enveloping them into a simulated, polymorphous discourse of intersubjectivity. Denise's wedding proposal atop the Empire State Building was only akin to romantic representation presented in *Sleepless in Seattle*—a semblance not to be confused with reality itself. What is most significant about this distance is, to use Jameson's approach, the way in which it reveals new patterns of dominance. However, where Jameson depicts the popular culture of the current period as featuring a random pastiche of references, I wish to emphasise that the cultural discourse underlying these apparently random phenomena features its own logic, that is, a distinctive *regularity*, integrity and potential sites of resistance. I will examine these sites of resistance later in the thesis.

Conclusion

While disembodied visual technology emerged in modernity, the spirit of Enlightenment motivated its inventors. The motion picture developed as a scientific instrument for understanding Enlightenment curiosities and then also as a medium of mass entertainment. Its development occurred as a function of the technological progress of modernity. As a result, mass media shifted the emphasis from the oral (classrooms and radio) to the visual (film, television and computers).

As the motion picture industry surpassed many pre-technological modes of education and live-entertainment (e.g. theatre), its explosive growth across society has come to rival and possibly exceed the impact of formal institutional education. The development of offspring media like television has expanded the scope of disembodied visual media into the private sphere as well as education institutions such as school. The ascension of disembodied visual media this century has, I would argue, the most far-reaching implications for the education of members of the Australian liberal democracy if only because disembodied visual media have been increasingly influential across all three categories of education. The use of television, film and computer-based visual modes of instruction have been in extensive use in the education system since the 1960s. The fusion of work, entertainment and education into a single technological medium has significant implications that will not be examined here, except that the research situation above reminds me of the story of how a group of North Brazil in a televised class were convinced that a triangle had three curved sides because of a bad television picture tube. The one student who disagreed eventually relented in agreement with the others. (Tiffin and Rajasingham 1995: 95)

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45 For example, see the Australian Bureau of Statistics report entitled: *Household Use of IT* (1996).

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In the private realms of the cinema and living room, the use of visual media has eroded and replaced pre-technological modes of education, which may partially account for a decline in political participation and civic education. But perhaps the most profound influence of disembodied visual media has been its effect on mass political socialisation as a key cite of cultural reproduction. According to Adorno and Horkheimer, the rise of cinematic media is directly connected to the decay of liberal capitalism and the development of state interventionist systems. The culture industry symbolises and propagates the dark underbelly of Enlightenment reason that extinguishes and oppresses the very plural forms of life that its advocates aimed to nurture. (Adorno and Horkheimer 1972) Because of Enlightened reason's intimate historical connection with Western notions of truth, it has the potential to be maltreated by self-interested individuals and groups.

The mutation of enlightened reason into a predominantly instrumental rationality prompts Adorno to question the very heart of truth since the Enlightenment of the Europe. Echoing Nietzsche's axiom that the simple truth is a compound lie, Adorno intimates that modern notion of truth is located only in the absolute lie. Truth remains obscure for Adorno, who, like Nietzsche, is sceptical of any claims to truth. (Adorno 1974, Nietzsche 1968: 23) Thus Adorno's statement may be taken to mean that only by pointing out what isn't truthful, can any semblance of truth be attained. This idea of truth points the way to a critical method for investigating reality in the myriad of forces that shape personhood in modernity as exemplified by the cinema experience.

In 1859, the poet Baudelaire expressed a loathing of photography. He felt that the photographic image would change the very fabric of history and memory. (Friedberg 1993: 1) His prognostication is certainly correct, in that disembodied visual media emanating from photography have transformed the cultural reproduction and social integration of people throughout the world in the latter part of the twentieth century. This makes their process central to this discussion. The influence of visual technology on informal and formal processes of education is profound, affecting the constitution of subjectivities. According to Benjamin, "The enlargement of a snapshot does not render more precise what in any case was visible, though unclear: it reveals entirely new formations of the subject." (Benjamin 1969: 236) A snapshot of Hollywood's colonisation of the Australian film industry reveals that beneath complex shifts in processes of social integration, power, rule and authority are profound implications for the constitution of subjectivities across all contexts of education.

Chapter 5: The Decline of Visible Authority and the Rise of Self-regimentation

"Yesterday's solutions to the problems of distance are today's pollution problems... It is no longer sufficient for people to become literate and numerate. The growth of the knowledge industry has brought a demand for new skills and literacies."

(Tiffin and Rajasingham 1995: 66-72)

Introduction

The reorientation of the citizen's relationship to the state is echoed in the experience of teachers and students under reforms to Australian public education since the 1980s. Technological and political reform of Australian schools has a direct effect on the subjectivity of students and teachers. From primary to tertiary levels, the role of the teacher is changing from being the agent of visible authority to a background figure, supervising the self-discipline of students. The teacher is becoming less of an educator than a facilitator of self-discipline. The responsibility of the state for public education is being redirected onto students and their families with detrimental results. This shift towards techniques of self-discipline and self-regulation amounts to a re-configuration of the way by which citizens are politically ordered beyond the power relations theorised by Foucault.

The diffusion of the visible authority of the teacher parallels the redefinition of state sovereignty during the decline of the welfare state. Within an altered dialectic of power, the decline of the visible authority of the teacher is linked to a redefinition of state sovereignty through the increased use by the state of technologies of self-discipline and self-regimentation in the social integration of students and citizens alike. Furthermore, the growing equation of consumer freedom with democracy through disembodied technologies is usurping the educative function of political participation. Withering political participation is consolidated by the pacification of most citizens in light of the economic rationalisation of democratic citizenship.

Education in late-modernity is characterised by a shift in the ways that frame personal and national goals within instrumentally rationalised general principles. This chapter examines the movement in the care and protection of citizens of the Australian polity beyond the panoptic state. Once a key concern of the democratic state, the care and protection of its citizens is increasingly transferred to the individual-self and the private sector. In Chapter 3, I provided examples of how this shift is legitimated through government rhetoric, which claims that the economic rationalisation of public institutions are in the interests of political autonomy at the local level and economic growth. Examples of formal education reform in New Zealand indicate a consequential entrenchment of divisions in class and a secularisation of politics. The entrenchment of inequality is evident in the ways by which, for example, the corporatisation of education has lead to schools in economically depressed areas becoming reliant on dubious pedagogical and fund-raising practices, or left for dead.

New forms of pedagogy are layered over previous panoptic practices (discussed in Chapter 4 through concepts taken from Foucault) do not entail a decline in the

uses of disciplinary technologies of surveillance and political order. Rather, they entail a change in the nature of that surveillance with the development of internalised reflexive practices of self-regulation. While the state employs these technologies and techniques within a tempering framework of micro-regulation, market actors increasingly employ them by attempting to push beyond that framework. The conduit of many of these techniques of self-discipline are the kind of technological changes prevalent in public education reform and public communication—namely in the field of electronic mediation. The disembodied visual media of non-state institutions, such as the motion picture industry, are eclipsing traditional modes of institutional and participatory education. As discussed in Chapter 4, the technology of visual media now plays a central role in processes of social integration, cultural reproduction and the constitution of subjectivity. This then becomes a core argument of the chapter. The meta-ideology of instrumental rationalism is, I suggest, taken a step further as governments and educators draw upon the mediating possibilities and efficiency-gains of a three inter-related processes: the introduction of new electronic technologies mediating 'teacher' and student; the institution of new regimes of self-discipline normalising the student as a consuming-learning individual; and the legislating of schools as self-managing entities competing for existence in a public sphere turned market-place.

One of the most significant dimensions of public educational reform in recent years is the institution of self-managing schools. The development of a more de-centred public education system has involved cuts in central bureaucracy, devolution of state-power over budgets, staff- and curriculum-design and a bigger role for parents and schools' councils. At the same time, recent Australian governments have maintained, altered and expanded techniques of surveillance by imposing standards of measuring, quantifying and evaluating student and school performance. The institution of such regulatory technologies as the Profiles System illustrates the attempt of recent governments to cut costs by off-loading responsibility for student evaluation and regulation on to individual teachers. The state maintains legitimacy and authority by justifying these instrumental practices under the rhetorical veil of 'making schools more independent' and 'increasing community involvement'. The pragmatic rationality of market and state strategically informs social integration in mass education. This has positive and negative dimensions because they it can either empower some students to 'perform' while regimenting others.

Alongside these techniques of governmentality is the growing presence of corporations throughout the educational landscape of late-modernity. As government funding is cut back in Australia, schools of all types are turning to corporations like Mitsubishi, Coles and McDonald's for sponsorship. Consequently, a burgeoning formal education market is becoming very profitable. Reidar Roll, Secretary General of the International Council for Distance Public education in New Zealand, speculated that "Maybe this market [of tomorrow] will see a rapprochement of parts of the public education system and the corporate world of telecommunications and producers of hardware and software for the public education market, leaving politicians behind for a while?" (Tiffin and Rajasingham 1995: xii) notions of democratic representation may well be left behind, as well.

In 1995, an EU Parliamentary Report noted an increasing awareness of the immediate affect of new communications technologies on the political process

throughout the world. (Rodotà 1995: 1-6) The influence of predominantly visually oriented communications technologies permeates processes of education at all levels across a large portion of the world. New media facilitate the dissemination of self-disciplinary technologies and increase the scope and intensity of the colonisation of the lifeworld. They became more visibly entrenched in formal institutional practices of education during the 1980s.

Self-management in the Invisible State

When I was ten-years old, I regularly tuned in to a local community radio station called 3CR. The non-profit station broadcast a 'nostalgia' show featuring Swing and Broadway music from the 1940s. The show's recreation of 'the golden years of radio' and jazz music appealed to me in an inexplicable way—as a child, I had little past for which to be nostalgic, nevertheless, I thrived on the intimacy of radio. Tucked away with me at night, the nostalgia show transported me to an abstract space in which I imagined families gathered around their wireless at night for information and entertainment. Replays of popular radio programmes during the war years were especially enjoyable because the medium encouraged me to fill the lack of tactile and visual information with my own mental doodling. The absence of personal experience and historical knowledge enriched the palette of imagery available to my mind's eye. It influenced my taste in music beyond what was mostly offered in popular culture. The medium of radio itself influenced me in a distinctly different way to the printed and televisual media that would be the central source of education during my remaining waking hours. Radio land became one of those cherished places where I lived as a child, eliciting a sense of security and providing a soundtrack to my childhood along side my parent's lullabies. Over the years, my mind's eye turned its gaze upon the new media, my radio superseded by television, cinema and PC as the technological interfaces through which I informally acquired my education. While television and Hollywood film were an inescapable part of my entire childhood, it was not until the 1980s that a musty English classroom at my school was converted into a 'computer lab'. From that point on, the new media became entrenched in my formal and informal education, mediating my normalisation into adulthood from classroom to places of work.

Foucault's analysis of the effects of institutional conditions on subjectivity illustrates how disciplinary power was reinvested in the classroom. Productive processes of normalisation occur within a positive field of relations constituting every grain of subjectivity. However, against Foucault argument that the movements of power are unstructured and decentred, it is important to recognise the signatures of disciplinary power that mark students and teachers affected by Australian education reform. These signatures indicate modern problems of class inequality described in Chapter 3, but more importantly, they reveal new processes of normalisation and fields of power extending beyond the panoptic order. Predominantly, the media of these new processes is in the form of electronic communications and information technology. In recent years, the application of this technology to education in the form of television and modem-computers is having a tremendous impact throughout the industrialised world. The response to the rise of these so-called "new media" has been mixed. (Rodotà 1995) The new media offers the potential for citizens to either empower themselves or become the target of disciplinary power, which

regiments them in abstract and alienating ways. Regardless of these possibilities, the increasing use of the new media is productive of a powerful disembodied order.

The New Media, Self-empowerment and All That Jazz

When I tuned in to the nostalgia radio show as a child, I connected a tape deck to my small clock radio to record some of the jazz music aired. One night, I recorded a piece that to this day is one of the most beautiful sounds I have ever heard. For a long time, I never knew who the musicians were or what the title was, I only knew that it was a live recording of a jazz quartet led by a tenor sax. The sound of that improvised sax solo was a revelation to me. Aside from my Dad's Dave Bruebeck album, jazz was neither in the family musical discourse nor was it in any else's that I knew. Yet such was the power of the sound—it alluded to a way of playing, thinking and living that was a stark contrast to my daily life. The mysterious composition provided the impetus for me to become a musician over a decade later.

I acquired a love of music from my family. My parents possessed a moderately large record collection ranging from Tchaikovsky to The Beatles; however, their taste did not include the more contemporary "rock-licks" of AC/DC booming from my brother's vinyl record player. My brother provided me with a detailed deconstruction of every facet of popular musical performance, its personnel and recording techniques. He would shut his door and class would begin. Aside from both loving music, a distrust of school was something else we shared. He left school in his mid-teens to join the 'dole' queue of a local welfare agency. My brother spent much of his time at pool-halls and pinball arcades where he received much of his education. School was easier for me as I was more amenable to conduct litmus tests, attend military cadet camp and write about nineteenth-century poetry without too much questioning. School was such an inflexibly entrenched part of life that I never really reflected upon it as self-consciously as I did my brother's instructions on the finer points of a Rock 'n' Roll drum solo. Aside from my brother's informal oral tutelage, I was also learning classical piano at school, which I came to resent as much as the education institution itself.

My elderly piano teacher persisted with the well-worn canons of Western traditional tuition (which I suspect was because she was alive when most of the classical pieces were composed). She nearly snuffed out any musical flame burning within, however, my parents urged me to continue.[46] In a compromise with my mother and father, I switched teachers and battled on with fumbling fingers, playing music with which I did not share sufficient affinity to play well. However, my new teacher was flexible enough to see that the way I was playing Bach was indicative of musical potential, but not in the classical style. One day, she presented a Duke Ellington jazz standard for me to play and from then on, the piano assumed new significance. I suspect that those years in bed beside the muted radio light had left their mark on me.[47] I learned to prefer the free-form

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46 In my moments of frustration, my father would look over the top of his newspaper and say "When are you going to get a job playing in a bar?" My father asked this question repeatedly from my very first lessons and as with my metamorphosis into a bookworm, his anticipations were fulfilled. I cannot decide if his are the powers of prophesy or of motivation.

47 See Chapter 5: Self-management and the invisible state.

fluidity of jazz music, especially in contrast to the limited sterile and rigid method of academic discourse, teaching and learning.

I got my first job as a jazz pianist at a bar while at university. For a few years, I played with a couple of jazz bands, which was immensely rewarding. The musical, non-linguistic communication between the members of those jazz groups created a platform for collective expression that was unmatched elsewhere in my life. The unique discourse of a musical ensemble enlivened the pleasurable spontaneity of jazz; however, the pleasure emanating from this discourse was short-lived because of the financial compulsion to play widely recognisable jazz standards to satisfy our conditions of employment. The required repetition of the daily musical grind drained the experience of much of its joy and spontaneity. After a few years, I had managed to save enough money to purchase a portable synthesiser that enabled me to perform where pianos weren't provided. I was also able to interface the keyboard with my PC, thus expanding its technical capabilities. Eventually, the synthesiser's main function was to satisfy my need for musical modes of expression in solitude—just synthesiser, PC and me. These technological platforms were a mixed blessing: they liberated me from the restraints of playing with an ensemble at the expense of the spontaneity of group performance, impairing my musical technique in the process. Economic imperatives undermined the value of collective action through music performance. Technology facilitated my isolation in both empowering and alienating ways.

This experience parallels certain individuating processes of late-modern life. Delivered through the media of state and corporations, self-disciplinary techniques enable a degree of autonomy at the expense of valuable collective possibilities for expression, participation and self-determination. The slick domination of technocratic conscious through technology, law and coercion has ushered in an era of economic rationalism that threatens the foundations of Australian democracy.

An increased dependency on computers as disembodied instruments of normalisation profoundly affects the constitution of subjectivity. The computer is a remarkable tool of learning. It may be used as an efficient instrument for creative and functional tasks in a potentially cost-effective and 'environmentally friendly' way.[48] It allows the user access to a variety of means for communication, access to information and self-expression. The personal computer is a useful device to cultivate skills for self-empowerment. This is not only applicable to pedagogical contexts; it also offers potential for new forms of political participation.

Rodotà notes a growing awareness across the world of the direct influence of new communications technologies on the political process. For example, Brazilian President Fernando Collor de Mello heavily relied on the *Rede Globo* television network for publicity during one election campaign. Similarly, in the USA, Ross Perot used TV publicity, videoconferences and large-scale telephone communication during the 1992 election. He also encouraged the development of the Electronic Town Hall, in which people could use email to discuss matters of civic importance. (Rodotà 1995: 1) The influence of the information media over political affairs in Australia has been a contentious issue

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[48] I refer specifically to the possible ways by which modern and network communication can save paper and the associated industrial waste created by the paper industry.

for some time; however, there has been growing speculation over the possible uses of new media in facilitating civic education in recent years. Rodotà argues that the new media can allow for active choice at any time as needs arise, moving the emphasis away from "passive reception to autonomous choice." (Rodotà 1995: 6) While speculation over the democratic application of new media has largely been confined to academic discourses in Australia,[49] applied experiments in 'electronic democracy' have taken place in Europe and the USA for over a decade.

In the 1980s, interactive television experiments were conducted in the USA. For example, the "Qube" experiment in Columbus, Ohio, involved the installation of devices into a group of homes that enabled viewers to choose their preferences to questions that appeared on their television. A recent report on *Europe and the Global Information Society* to the European Union (EU) urged the establishment of experimental networks to provide homes with a network access system and with facilities for the on-line use of multimedia and entertainment services on a local, regional, national and international basis. The objective of the report was for the EU to install and manage the link between 40,000 homes in five European towns by 1997. (Rodotà 1995: 5) Political movements such as "Charter 88" in Britain have drawn on the World Wide Web as a resource and mechanism for expanding political awareness and activity. (Charter 88: 1996)

The use of disembodied visual technologies to mediate formal education achieved a new significance in the late 1960s. Televised classes were used to educate impoverished people in certain isolated communities of Mexico, Columbia, El Salvador and Africa. At the time, television was the sole source of formal mass education in Niger. Its usage in similar programs in the USA, Europe and Japan was reduced after studies in the 1970s concluded that it was not having a serious positive effect on learning.[50] (Tiffin and Rajasingham 1995: 91-95) Nevertheless, the abstract realm of 'television-land' established itself as means of formal learning across the world. At the turn of the millennium, the use of modems in the homes and schools of students is increasingly prevalent. While in the 1990s, PC modems were available to less than one-third of Australians at home[51]; the corporate-driven instalment of cable access across Australia increases the possibility for widespread access to electronic mail (email) and the Internet.[52] Despite the confinement of private Internet usage to wealthier Australians, there is scarcely a single school that does not use computers for administration, teaching or learning in some way. A number of universities are providing on-line courses. Despite the potentially revolutionary potential for the new media to facilitate civic education and self-empowerment, a number of problems emerge in the context of disciplinary power.

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49 In 1994, Deakin University Australia began the initial stage of a "democratic audit" of Australian political institutions to provide a comparative study of democratisation. One dimension of the audit focused on the access to, and regulation of information amongst citizenry as a function of the quality and effectiveness of democratic practices and citizenship in Australia. (Marmo 1994)

50 Negative aspects on the formation of subjectivity of learning via televisual media are potentially profound. During one teleclass in a school, a group of Brazilian students was convinced that a triangle had three curved sides because of a bad television receiver. One student who queried the consensus relented under peer pressure. (Tiffin and Rajasingham 1995: 91-95)

51 See the Australian Bureau of Statistics survey of Household Use of IT, Australia, Feb 1996. (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1996)

52 Cable access also facilitates the high-speed distribution of larger amounts of data, expanding the ability for real-time interaction between PC users. The expansion of these cable networks in the last decade has been staggering. For example, the early 1990s saw the completion of a 13, 000 kilometre-long submarine cable of optical fibre now links Marseille to Singapore through the Suez Canal. (Rodotà 1995: 5)

Beyond the Panopticon: Technology and Disembodied Order

Rodotà rightly cautions that while the new media can enable active, autonomous choice at any time, "the initiative still lies with those who have the power to frame the questions." (Rodotà 1995: 6) The new media are successfully used to "educate" the public on the "appropriate behaviour" of citizens as voters, workers and good consumers. Disembodied communications media provide a great deal of information : citizens on what it means to be a productive and valued member of society. I, nically, "productive" citizen is often equated in the mass media with consumption—be it the consumption of fashionable goods, lifestyles or government policies. As shown in Chapter 5, disembodied visual media penetrate into most spheres of daily life on a massive scale, from home to work, childhood to death. As the new media seemed to gain autonomy, it penetrates the public and private lives of authority with little discrimination, from the holiday resorts of British Royalty, to the illegally intercepted phone calls of Australian Members of Parliament.[53] The semblance of autonomy by the media hides the intentions of the agents manipulating them. At one extreme is the Internet, upon which anyone with a PC and modem connection can contribute. Consequently, the World Wide Web is saturated with information on various topics that reflect diverse moralities and claims to authenticity. Access is limited only by access to resources, proficiency with computers and personal inclination. (Although, by the latter 1990s, most Western governments have initiated attempts to regulate and censor content such as pornography. Furthermore, corporations and advertisers have implemented ways of restricting access by charging fees to visit their websites and manipulated content by sponsoring webpage.) At the other extreme, the technological veil of new media hides the interests of their corporate owners, sponsors and influential politicians. To use the words of Rodotà, it is "their initiative" and "power to frame the questions" which determines much of the form and function of new media. Their interests do not necessarily coincide with those of democratic citizenship; therefore, civic education generally exists at the periphery of their initiatives.[54]

The use of new media in educating electorates on their choice of candidates is extensive. During the Italian election of 1994, Silvio Berlusconi strategically linked the use of advertising and directing techniques to forms of political communication, using market surveys, opinion polls and most importantly, television, which he owned and controlled at the time. French theorist Paul Virilio calls it the first "media coup d'état." (Virilio, cited in Rodotà 1995: 4) Around that time, President Mitterrand warned that mass media may "seriously interfere with democracy... Beware!" In response to the influence of new media over political affairs, two recent documents of the EU—the *White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment* and *Europe and the Global Information Society*—raised issues connecting democratic development with

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[53] I am thinking here of a notorious case in the 1980s when a voyeur illegally intercepted and recorded an unsavoury analogue mobile phone-call between the Victorian leader of the Liberal Party, Jeff Kennett and his federal counterpart, former Liberal Party leader Andrew Peacock. The profane call received coverage on all major television networks.

[54] It is interesting to note the growing interest of corporations in limited forms of civic education. The promotion of "corporate citizenship," whereby private organisations seek greater accountability for the social consequences of their activities, has been a perennial topic of discussion throughout some areas of industry and news media since the 1980s. Based on a belief that healthy business promotes healthy society, this approach to citizenship has failed to arouse serious discussion or action. Developing such an ethos would presumably strike difficulty given that varying any given definition of social wellbeing would have as its corollary, a conception of "healthy business" that is contingent on the vagaries of market survival and profit. (Tomas 1997: 8)

"the protection of the freedoms of citizens or government, access to telecomputing networks and the ownership of mass media..." (Rodotà 1995: 4)

Henry Kissinger once commented that television shaped political conscious·ess as profoundly as the press did during the Renaissance, but only in the short term. (Rodotà 1995: 1) Kissinger's remark is less applicable in Australia because of the short-term cycles of elections (which occur well under every three years on average) and the pragmatic approaches of recent Australia governments. Whether in the short or long term, the new media's influence over the public sphere significantly shapes the fabric of authority in contemporary politics. Despite its tremendous influence over the development of democracy, much of the new media remains unaccountable for its profound influence over civic education and the agendas of governments in late-modernity. As an instrument of publicity in mass society, it locates politics in the same contexts and narratives as popular entertainment, shaping political consciousness in the kinds of ambiguous ways discussed in Chapter 4. It is pertinent to briefly return to Wark's analysis of the Gulf War coverage here. Wark argues that during CNN's portrayal of the Gulf War, television no longer existed "in a relation to an audience assumed to be a mass of consumers or a public to be educated. The event turns television into part of a feedback loop connecting the spectator to the action via the vagaries of 'opinion' and the pressures of the popular on political elites " (Wark 1994: 71) Within this loop, the television spectator "becomes vague and quixotic" in its relation to the abstract worlds of disembodied visual media. (Wark 1994: 71) The virtual gaze of the citizen is no longer a direct perception but instead is "received perception mediated through representation." (Friedberg 1993: 2)

At the level of society, this loop blurs conventional categories of public and private domains and distinctions between news coverage and entertainment. In Habermasian terms, a growing irrationality emerges from the degradation of the public sphere caused by the manipulation of public opinion by capitalist-driven media. The "slick domination" of a technocratic consciousness conceals the fact that partial rather than common interests are being served, compelling the reorganisation of social institutions and sectors on a larger scale than ever before.[55] (Habermas 1970: 118) Using "standardised and appealing messages," the media can be used to pacify citizens. Rodotà writes that the corporate control of mass media produces a "commodification of the public sphere," in which direct political communication of election candidates is cut down to sound bytes. Consequently, the "public sphere has lost its separate identity and autonomy." (Rodotà 1995: 2-4) It is rapidly becoming absorbed by a powerful new disembodied order which overlays and replaces elements of the panoptic formations identified by Foucault.

To some extent, Jameson's description of postmodernism is applicable to this degradation of the public sphere. (Jameson 1983) Disembodied visual media entrench new patterns of Western consumer culture. Within this reorganisation of public/private space, the bombardment of representations of politics through the new media feature an eclectic mix of cultural reference points, in which information about politics, entertainment and trivia converge in the feedback loop of the virtual gaze. The breakdown in the distinction between public and

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55 See my discussion of Habermas' concepts in Chapter 2.

private spheres caused by the reorganisation of social institutions coincides with changes to the educational priorities and structures of authority in the public school.

Self-discipline and the Decline of the Visible Authority of the Teacher

By 1993, I had graduated from university, acquiring enough cultural capital to instruct others in its accumulation at a Melbourne university. One hot summer's day in 1995, I was talking to a colleague who was teaching at a university in Queensland. He was remarking at how technologically developed the facilities were at that Queensland university. At the forefront of this technological development was the possible introduction of course requirements on CD-Rom. The CD-Rom would contain reading guides, exercises and exams. The student could be left to his or her own pedagogical devices, provided he or she had a computer and diskette. For example, according to my colleague, these exams on CD-Rom could only be activated once so that students could take them home, instead of crowding exam halls. Tiffin and Rajasingham (1995) validly argue that this kind of individuated learning has valuable pedagogical implications, however, I am more concerned with the location of these technological innovations within the broader political landscape of the 1990s; a landscape marked by economic rationalism and the decline of the welfare state; a landscape whose atmosphere is permutated by a change in power relations between citizens, teachers, students and the state at all levels of education in this country.

The shift in public education towards a powerful disembodied order has two facets: one facet is a significant deferral of the management public education and responsibility for education outcomes to students, families, school staff and corporate sponsorship. The other facet is the development of disembodied education-technologies such as televised classes and remote-access learning through personal computers. Both of these facets form a significant part of formal public education in a complex dialectic of empowerment, colonisation and alienation.

The conventional role of the teacher i⋯ ⋯g undermined by a combination of factors ranging from the perceived crises in education outlined in Chapter 1, to the availability of new media. The explosive growth in industrial society this century seems to have outpaced the ability of institutionalised education to keep up. Teachers in certain communities have faced increasing responsibilities in the social integration of students from diverse ethnic and class backgrounds. Enabling the successful integration of students into the world of work is made difficult under conditions of hard-core unemployment and rapid changes to the nature of the work force. Deprived of adequate resources, further welfare cuts have exacerbated this condition in which the status of teacher as expert is compromised. The decline of the conventional teacher is occurring in conditions of institutional de-centralisation.

Ironically, the teacher as a professional emerged in modern Western Europe with the secularisation and the de-centralisation of pre-modern authority and the growth of a global market economy. But what is most important to this discussion is the role of positivist thinking in the formation of this teaching class, which Gouldner suggests informed the technical rationalisation of modern teaching as a specialised practise grounded in the rigorous objective

methodology of empirical science. As a specialist in knowledge, the particular status of modern teacher is derived from a notion of the autonomous, detached and educated individual that owes allegiance to no one, except for the pursuit of knowledge. The differentiation of education spurred the development of an educated intelligentsia that is increasingly at odds with the conditions and rationality that consolidated its formation in the first place. (Gouldner 1979: 43-47)

The development of the teacher also coincided with the reinvestment of disciplinary power in the modern school. The teacher occupied a critical function in the deployment of technologies of disciplinary power in the classroom. These technologies were concerned with productive processes of normalisation. By virtue of his/her expertise in certain vernacular technical languages and pedagogy, the teacher came to be located a positive field of relations constituting the subjectivity of all those contained in the field. Central to this location of the teacher is the use of discipline. According to the definition provided by Stenhouse, discipline involves "an acceptance of certain goals and hence of the order and organisation necessary to achieve them." (Stenhouse 1967: 43) Reflecting on discipline in schools, Stenhouse cites industry management and the military as examples of contexts in which discipline regulates "expected behaviour" within "a common core of general principles." (Stenhouse 1967: 43) As an educator, the teacher facilitates processes of training and developing of knowledge, skill and character, within a defined core of general principles. The teacher's role is bound up with the state's necessity for students to accept the goals required for its cohesive social, economic and political development.

Stenhouse observes that discipline is important to life outside school as well as within. (Stenhouse 1967: 43) Part of the teacher's role in the production of subjectivity is to provide students with the cultural capital to meet the goals and expected behaviour of society. In a way, the teacher's disciplinary function is a mechanism of a habitus in which a given political order of society is reproduced in an extensive cultural feedback loop. Extrapolating from Bourdieu's argument that necessity creates a taste for necessity in lower-class cultures, I suggest that discipline creates a taste for discipline. This process has a reflexive quality.[56] The cultural feedback loop is by no means a fixed process: it also gradually transforms over time. Alongside the historical development of modernity this process has been increasingly rationalised instrumentally as attempts have been made to maximise the efficiency of the application of disciplinary technologies. This instrumentalisation of disciplinary strategies has played a significant role in the decline of the visible authority of the teacher. However, the use of technologies of disciplinary power within the instrumental rationalisation of education is by no means totalising. As Habermas argues, there are cultures that remain resistant to administrative control.[57] Emphasising here the role of agency is akin to Marx's adage that "man [sic] makes history, but not the history of his own making."

Social integration in late-modernity is increasingly oriented towards technologies of self-discipline in which greater responsibility is placed upon the

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[56] This reflexive characteristic will be explored in more detail in the following chapter.

[57] See Chapter 2.

individual to define the political, social and economic conditions of their well-being. These technologies consist of techniques that are applied by the self to the self in reflexive ways. These techniques may be manifested in restrictive and oppressive forms of *self-regimentation* or they may provide knowledge and skills for *self-empowerment*. These forms of self-regulation are not mutually exclusive; differing techniques may be simultaneously applied in different contexts. It is the increasing application of both of these techniques in late-modernity that has contributed to the decline of teacher authority. As the role of the teacher expanded with the rise of the welfare state, the teacher's status diminished with its shift in orientation. The role of the teacher is intrinsically bound up with movements of disciplinary power.

The emergence of the teacher as a unique status is linked to broader contextual movements in power and authority. While the teacher assumed visible authority in the classroom, that status is very much a condition of circumstance. The constitution of the modern teacher is heavily defined by the panoptic condition of the modern state. For example, the function of the teacher developed from a need by the state to survey, modify and regulate the behaviour of citizens from an early age. Reflecting the sensibilities of Giddens' dialectic of power,[58] the teacher initially occupied a position of authority based on a combination of non-coercive instruction, the use of physical and mental punishment and the monopoly of the use of knowledge. The development of the democratic state in the twentieth century entailed a decrease in the use of force to alter behaviours, a rise in technocratic consciousness and an intensification of instrumental rationality. Accordingly, the teacher's role shifted to a more instrumental function to the extent that technocratic consciousness emphasised the teacher as functionary of the state, rather than detached inquirer of truth. Towards the latter twentieth century, the teacher is expected to regulate, counsel and manage a broader range of student-behaviours, such as personal problems, while the teacher him/herself is confined to the assessment, curricula and pedagogical standards of the education system. Like the student, the visible authority of the teacher is enmeshed in a disciplinary net that changes over time. Furthermore, the teacher in recent decades has suffered a decline in status. As students have faced the possibility that formal education will not lead to a suitable vocation, the high expectations of the teacher has not been commensurate with the financial and personal rewards of the vocation. At this vast level, the teacher's status and power is unstructured and decentred. As disciplinary power becomes increasingly invested in new ways, the visible authority of the teacher declines.

For example, the personal computer has become a central means through which students can be subject to processes of normalisation without the need for panoptic surveillance. CD-Rom based learning containing reading guides, exercises and even exams are gaining widespread currency in Australian universities. The student, left to his or her own pedagogical devices with a computer and diskette, is increasingly the subject of self-regimenting processes that exceed any visions of possessive individualism envisaged by liberal and Marxist alike. To a large extent, technology is being utilised to fill the void created by the decline of the welfare state, reorientating the political field in which the subjectivities of student and teacher are formed. Underlying this

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58 See Chapter 1.

reorientation is a gradual shift from a pedagogical context in which the teacher is a visible authority to a situation in which processes of formal public education are increasingly de-centred.

An example of this movement to a disembodied order can be seen in the Victorian Government reforms of the last decade discussed above in Chapter 3. These reforms have involved the rationalisation of secondary schools into aggregated super-structures while using the rhetoric of local participation within these super-structures. To maintain legitimacy, there is an attempt by the state to preserve a semblance of citizen autonomy to retain the electoral support. The rationality of these reforms has resulted in the changing nature of student and citizen: they have moved from having a universal entitlement to public education to becoming a client of the state and a consumer of education services. Furthermore, the teacher's relationship to the student as a figure of authority is being re-configured. Disembodied modes of instruction have become more important in the provision of flexible learning (e.g. distance learning via CD-Rom, the Internet or one of Whittle Communications' sponsored programmes). With this shift, the role of the teacher is increasingly orientated towards that of *facilitator*. This shift represents an important change in the education environment, reconfiguring the kinds of visible power hierarchies identified by Paul Willis.

This shift is not purely a matter of economics. Consistent with Habermas' colonisation thesis, the state plays an integral role in mediating the implementation of processes of self-regimentation. For example, at the beginning of 1993, the then Victorian Minister for Employment, Public education and Training, Don Hayward, said that in the name of "quality public education" and the "painful" but necessary process of "rejuvenation," teacher unions would be bypassed to enable government to "communicate direct with teachers individually." The state government argued that this would provide teachers with "wider freedom to exercise their own professional judgment in the schools and classrooms." (Schumpeter 1993: 2) The Victorian State Government attempted to maintain the legitimacy of its actions in the name of preservation of individual autonomy, which in this case, is the teacher.[59]

The personal autonomy of the student and teacher is ostensibly a possible benefit of the processes of self-discipline that appear to be accelerating in liberal democracies such as Australia. However, the danger lies principally within the emerging dialectic of control that exists between the public and state, whereby democratic safeguards that supposedly exist to preserve autonomy and encourage difference are insidiously eroded and transformed. This process is not limited to education reform, and may be witnessed in the move in other public institutions such as public health (where there is a growing transference of care of the population to self-help and alternative medicines).

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[59] Thus the mode of self-discipline moves upon the teacher in a similar logic to that of students and parents who are expected (within broad guidelines) to move within an illusory autonomous power field. This maintenance of performance ideology is necessary for the government's sake so that it could destabilize the union movement to push through radical reform, including massive staff cutbacks. Given that at that time all cleaning staff (3760) in Victoria was sacked to make way for private cleaners, many teachers were forced by school budget restraints to assume responsibility for the cleaning of their class rooms.

Seeing the World through Rose-coloured Optic Fibre

The years dividing my introduction to computers in a musty old English room at my secondary school in 1985 to my first years of teaching in the 1990s were nothing short of a gestalt in the use of electronic communications technologies in formal public education. From staff administration to the writing of essays, the computer now has a pivotal role in most Victorian schools. The integration of the disembodied world of the Internet into the pedagogical discourse of the Victorian education system is well under way. The systematic use of disembodied visual media in public education is a distinctly contemporary phenomenon.

Self-disciplinary technologies are increasingly appropriating the new media because they offer cost-effective ways and promise the possibility for self-empowerment. However, it is important to note that often this promise of autonomy is illusory, as disembodied technologies often subtly facilitate the imposition of abstract structures of self-regimentation. For example, within the Internet, hypertext offers the seductive possibility of realising Barthes' vision of a writing liberated from the author. Landow notes that hypertext offers each reader the capacity "to add to, alter, or simply edit a hypertext opens possibilities of collective authorship that breaks down the idea of writing as originating from a single fixed source. Similarly, the ability to plot out unique patterns of reading, to move through a text in an aleatory, non-linear fashion, serves to highlight the importance of the reader in the "writing" of a text—each reading, even if it does not physically change the words—writes the text anew simply by re-arranging it, by placing different emphases that might subtly inflect its meanings." (Landow 1992)

On the other hand, the vision of hypertext as "writerly" text neglects the gratification that comes from surrendering to the discursive seductions of a masterful author. Max Whitby asserts that "[s]torytelling and narrative lie at the heart of all successful communication. Crude, explicit, button-pushing interaction breaks the spell of engagement and makes it hard to present complex information that unfolds in careful sequence." (Landow 1992: 41) Through fixed links and narrow choices, the Internet offers new ways of directing and controlling the user. As Landow sardonically notes "The Author may be dead, but his ghosts maybe even more eloquent." I should add that these ghosts would most likely write within instrumentalised discourses of self-regimentation via optic cables and high-speed modems. They would not be eloquent so much as concise.

In recent years, problems of space, storage, time and teacher-to-learner ratios have provided the impetus for educationalists to seek new technological solutions to these problems of mass-education. Tiffin and Rajasingham propose distance learning as a viable technological alternative. Distance learning has, for a long time, relied on information technologies to provide public education in a relatively low-cost way. They delve into Western society's Christian past, evoking the evangelist St Paul. St Paul sent his Epistles with the word of god to distant lands, supposedly making him the first teacher by correspondence. (Tiffin and Rajasingham 1995: 74-88) Tiffin and Rajasingham argue that distance learning 'liberates' public education from the limitations of time and space because students are no longer dependent on institutions being open at fixed times. There are no physical restrictions on the size and number

of students. They assert that the use of disembodied media in distance learning means that public education no longer needs to be a matter of topology and rugged terrain. The personal computer can overcome the weakness of distance education through face-to-monitor interaction, which can be applied in a cost-efficient way. (Tiffin and Rajasingham 1995: 15-16)

A more unnerving example of this instrumentalised discourse is as follows: in a research situation conducted by a company to test instructional software it was found that:

> *"At times after an intense one-to-one session with the computer they would reach out and hold hands to form a human circle and declare how good it felt to be linked to humans instead of machines... They also said that after a while they became less tolerant of the silliness that sometimes developed in discussion, the subjective nature of many comments, and the undertones of personal feelings that clouded clear thinking. Then they found it a relief to return to impersonal, unambiguous interaction with a computer."*
>
> (Tiffin and Rajasingham 1995: 5)

This test group reveals the possible movement of education and social integration towards the sterile discourse of disembodied media. Seen to be inefficient and "silly", face-to-face discussion is instrumentalised by eliminating personal human interaction from the learning process. This type of rationalisation of the learning process is potentially the most dangerous aspect of technological reform. In an individuated world informed by disembodied media, autonomy is replaced by pure atomism, abstract community replaces civic virtue and political participation is fetishised or diminished by efficient processes of decision-making.

A foreseeable technological step in educational practice is virtual reality (VR) based public education. Tiffin and Rajasingham propose a curious hypothetical scenario in which a fictitious student named Shirly goes to a virtual school. Wearing a skin-tight ski-suit and VR helmet, she sits on a VR device in her house and is educated while her dad tele-works in a virtual city. VR School provides thousands of curricula and extra-curricula activities, including a virtual field trip to a glacier as part of a school assignment on global warming. According to Tiffin and Rajasingham, "A child born in the 1990s could be educated in this way." (Tiffin and Rajasingham 1995: 14-15) Virtual Reality education represents the possibility for a completely disembodied mediation of the self and the social.

Tiffin and Rajasingham argue for a new paradigm of instruction: "The growth of the knowledge industry has brought a demand for new skills and literacies." (Tiffin and Rajasingham 1995: 72) The computer is presented as a panacea to costly infrastructure changes that already are overburdening institutions of learning. They argue that millions of paying students will bring about the best research and facilities. As Whittle Communications has shown in the USA, the use of disembodied information media can indeed make public education profitable, but the social cost may be much greater than expected. Late-modern evangelists could assume the form of just-in-time teachers, working in the abstract classrooms of virtual reality. Where the lifetime of a teacher's learning is normally lost at retirement (or retrenchment), the knowledge is lost, however, according to the technological utopians with the ongoing use of computer-

based education, "The feedback from one cycle of instruction can be built into the design for the next, and the design can be held in a computer memory and endlessly improved…" (Tiffin and Rajasingham 1995: 154-166)

The 'new knowledge' of disembodied mass public education is indicative of a cultural move beyond the panoptic condition examined by Foucault. Tacitly, if not intentionally, existing corporate intervention in education is increasingly becoming part of the learning process, informing the grammar of these "new literacies." In this process, market-performance ideology becomes entrenched in habitus of the classroom, producing not only an ordering of the body in the panoptic sense, but also transforming the school (virtual and actual) into an effective factory for the production of good consumers. Tiffin and Rajasingham argue that this is a necessary part of education reform: "Public education needs to be tailored to fit the needs of individuals. In business, the customer is always right and if the customer wants a certain size, colour and texture in a product then something is done to make this possible." (Tiffin and Rajasingham 1995: 85) Computer-based education offers a plethora of seductive possibilities for an education system in trouble. It provides new abstract spaces to occupy in a modern world of limited space and time. The computer terminal as a mode of communication has interesting implications.

Traditional, embodied processes of cultural identification and collective memory have been ruptured by the development of mass telecommunications in the 1980s. New media like the Internet fill more of the senses than radio and have the capacity to overshadow television through its potential for interaction between distant users. Classrooms, cinemas, sound-systems, theatres and museums may be becoming displaced by the virtual worlds as places of learning. But these abstract worlds require resources. The market is filling part of that financial void. Tiffin and Rajasingham ask:

> "Is this to do to learning what McDonald's did to eating? Are we talking about 'hambergerising' how we teach and franchising the facilitation of education? Where skills and knowledge are not embedded in a cultural matrix, as for example in mathematics and science, why not develop instruction as a product that is easy to deliver and digest and appeals to the taste of learners around the world?"

(Tiffin and Rajasingham 1995: 166-167)

While they rightly are concerned that this commercialisation needs to be in moderation (Tiffin and Rajasingham 1995: 85), the rapid progress of commercially driven technological education-reform cannot be underestimated. I am reminded of a quote posted on the Internet in June of 1994:

> "In 1884 Samual [sic] Morse sent a message from Washington to Baltimore asking 'What hath God wrought?' The question remains unanswered."

(Gehl and Douglas 1994)

The answer to Morses' question over a century ago lies not with God, but with a radical revision of Enlightenment reason. The expression of instrumentality through economic rationalised state reforms has resulted in a commodification of education. Achieved through techniques of self-discipline, increasing usage of televisual and computer-based modes of instruction risk being

inappropriately used by state, quango and corporate organisations as a convenient panacea to problems of welfare and instability.

Conclusion

Where the panopticon is a useful metaphor for understanding conventional processes of normalisation, recent education reforms and proposals indicate a movement beyond this kind of state surveillance and ordering of the body to modes of self-empowerment and self-regimentation by students, families and local communities. New processes of normalisation are emerging through which the state maintains legitimacy as visible authority in determining the policy of public education, while at the same time, transferring responsibility for the disciplinary net on to the student and family. These disembodied techniques of self-discipline are still concerned with ordering the body, however, the state is decreasingly a locus of disciplinary power. To some extent, the processes of normalisation identified by Willis and Foucault remain salient to the current condition of Australia's public education system, however, they fail to account for the new processes and structures of inter-subjectivity and the ways in which increased utilisation of these technologies affect the discourses of mass education and political socialisation.

The emergence of new techniques of state surveillance and corporate intervention in public education affects the social organisation of the school, undermining visible staff hierarchies that previously monopolised expert knowledge. The ordering of bodies in the classroom utilising reports such as the Profiles System at one level reduces the individual to an object of knowledge with a scientific status. Corporate influence further commodifies the subject. At another level, the combination of these not only constitutes a kind of political technology for efficiently ordering citizens, it also encourages a "sense of freedom" defined in market terms. (Bauman 1988) This limited neo-liberal conception of democratic freedom is evident in recent education reform proposals and policies. For example, education theorists Tiffin and Rajasingham argue that "Education needs to be tailored to fit the needs of individuals. In business, the customer is always right and if the customer wants a certain size, colour and texture in a product then something is done to make this possible." (Tiffin and Rajasingham 1995: 85)

The implications of this growing dependence on technological panaceas are ambiguous in that differing technologies may be employed to expand the variety of tools available for participation in formal learning and political decision-making. On the other hand, these disembodied technologies assist in the uprooting of longstanding lifeworld traditions and undermine pre-technological modes of learning. For example, the disembodied technological reforms to institutional education (e.g. distance education and computer-based instruction) dislocate the student from social interaction. This dislocation of active face-to-face participation is indicative of broader processes of self-discipline.

A consequence is an entrenchment of class differences and further secularisation of political activity in an anti-democratic fashion. The corporatisation of education has lead to schools in depressed areas being left without pedagogical and

financial support to rely on dubious pedagogical practices.[60] Movements away from the panoptic condition illustrated by Foucault do not entail a decline in the processes of surveillance and disciplinary power as much as a change in the *nature* of that surveillance to more internalised subjective forms and corporate influences. The conduit of these processes of self-discipline is the kind of technological change already in motion. Technology no doubt has a valuable part to play in the future well-being of Australian liberal democracy, however, the way in which it reshapes the political discourse of society in the near future (for example through distance education) is crucial here. It is precisely these processes that will shape the change in knowledge and competencies urged by Tiffin and Rajasingham and structure the ways in which democratic systems develop in the coming decades. Processes of self-discipline do not necessarily lead to greater self-determination, but can foster a discourse of illusory autonomy, veiled by a rhetoric of self-management with little regard for the long-term societal consequences of what may amount to break-down of what spirit of democracy ever existed.

After Word: This Dream's On Me

By the mid-1990s, my musical experience was confined to my home multi-media set up. Lacking the spontaneity of musical interaction with real musicians, my resolution to return to live public performance in a group was consolidated when I watched a video entitled Dingo (1991). *The Rolf De Heer film depicts an Australian jazz trumpeter who dreams of playing the 'big-time' jazz circuit in Paris. Upon arriving in Paris, he encounters his estranged jazz idol (played by renowned 'real-life' trumpeter Miles Davis). When the Australian asks his hero why he is disillusioned with playing live music, the character played by Davis intimates that there is little need for well-crafted musicianship, when the trumpeter is so easily replaced by the electronically surrogated synthesiser. De Heer ends the film in a bittersweet tension as both musicians face an uncertain future in which they must compromise their dreams and passions of free musical exploration with the financial and technological limitations imposed by the practicalities of modern and postmodern life.*

Before watching Dingo, *I watched another film called* Bird (1988). *It dealt with the life of the great jazz saxophonist, Charlie Parker. It was during the film that I heard the unmistakable and beautiful melody that I heard on my clock radio all those years ago when I was a child. It was a composition by Parker entitled "This Dream's On Me." I immediately purchased the compact disk recording of the film. Curiously, the songs all featured Parker playing sax, however, many had been digitally modified for the film. For example, extra instruments had been added and live audiences were overlayed for effect. One of the musicians included in the posthumous re-recording of Parker's music was only a child when Parker died, but was honoured to have performed on a recording with the legendary "Bird." I was briefly unsettled by the technological revision of musical history I heard. But I wasn't terribly concerned, for while I prefer the authenticity of an original, the jazz still sounded very, very good. My point is that the value of any technology is determined by the rationality guiding its use and abuse. Technology is not the*

60 Ironically, there is evidence to suggest that attempts by the Victorian Kennett Government to save money through the dismantling of Victorian public schools and the consequent payment of teacher redundancies actually increased the state budget in 1995. (Burrow 1995: 5)

problem in Australian education as much as the rationality guiding its use and abuse. The forces of technology, globalisation and limited influence of American music are not inherently problematic, provided a framework is in place to ensure that they benefit human development of differing cultures and values held by individuals and collectives, as well as the means for their spontaneous expression and communication. I will now critically examine several different conceptions as a means of articulating such a framework for mass education with an inclusive, meaningful and effective model of democracy.

Chapter 6: Postmodern Student, Postmodern Citizen, Postmodern Self?

Introduction

In the spirit of democratic pluralism, the public education system of my youth during the 1970s and 1980s did not compel me to adopt any particular religious belief system. Aside from pledging allegiance to the British Monarchy once a week when we sang "God Save The Queen," the Christian god from which the sovereign throne's power emanated did not feature prominently elsewhere in my education. My education was informed by the more earth-bound ideology of liberalism.

The liberal tenet of possessive individualism was a key motivational ideology for learning during my secondary and tertiary studies, which I was subtly compelled to follow without any explicit pledge of allegiance. As such, my perception of self-determination was profoundly shaped by the neo-liberal ideology spreading throughout Australian society. The habitus of school and family provided an education in 'normal' codes of conduct. In combination, they provided an education in self-regulation and self-discipline.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, Giroux links the "savaging" of government funding for North American public schools during the Reagan/Bush years to a call for cultural uniformity by the authoritarian populist discourse of the Right Wing under the veil of patriotism and nationalism. (Giroux 1993: 4-5) However, since the early 1980s, the reconfiguration of identity and culture by Australian governments has been aligned more overtly with broad economic imperatives than with appeals to nationalism.[61] The colonisation of instrumental rationality throughout public education since the 1980s is most apparent in the ways by which education standards have been refigured according to economic imperatives. This chapter identifies some important implications of colonisation on the formation of self-identity.

This inquiry into the modern and postmodern problems confronting the student, citizen and self in late-modernity is divided into three sections. Each subtitle is prefixed with the adjective "postmodern" to emphasise those political conditions affecting mass education that distinguish the current educational environment from those prevalent prior to the 1970s. Certain cultural shifts underlying recent changes to mass education are complex and difficult to evaluate reliably, especially when one's own lifeworld is thoroughly enmeshed within them. Yet beneath the hegemonic spectre of instrumentality, there seems to be a prevailing sense of social fragmentation and cultural upheaval that challenge the very foundations of education and identity-formation. Nevertheless, these postmodern conditions affect educative practices within discernible, enduring *modern* political and economic institutions. Amidst the claims by postmodernist intellectuals of cultural heterogeneity and difference are distinctive patterns of social behaviour that are indicative of the neo-liberal push for economic liberalisation and consumer sovereignty on a global scale. I wish to argue, in the vein of Jurgen Habermas that it is amidst these tensions that a strategy may

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61 One major justification for these reforms was to consolidate the economic presence of the Australian nation-state in the Asian-Pacific region.

be developed to counter the patterns of domination emerging in mass education. I wish to locate the distinctive signatures and patterns of instrumental reason in the social, political and economic phenomena prevailing late-modern education.

As I have drawn fundamental connections between the student, citizen, state and subjectivity throughout the thesis, I will continue in this vein to evaluate the broader social impact of instrumental reason in light of the kinds of contemporary polemic criticism by the Foucaultian theorists of governmentality such as Nicholas Rose and educationalists Ivan Illich and Henry A. Giroux. In particular, I wish to determine the potential for mass public education to enrich democratic life by examining more closely the roles of students, teachers, citizens, governments and political institutions within the three different spheres of education discussed in the previous chapters. Within this evaluation is the anecdotal experience of my family and my mother's entry into university as a mature-age student during the 1990s.

Lessons My Mother Taught Me

My Protestant Anglo-Saxon parents met at secondary school and married whilst aged in their early twenties. My brother was born within two years of wedlock and I four years later. My father is a university-trained professional with his own small business. He is the breadwinner of the family. When I was growing up, he was both the placid voice of reason and the unquestioned dispenser of discipline. He was the liberal patriarch of the family; his benevolent authority both visible and covert. He is a kind and gentle man whose first and unwavering priority has always been his family. In a house of three males, my mother provided an emollient of femininity.

Two qualities my mother shares with my father include a liberal open-mindedness and a Protestant devotion to family well-being. She came from a middle-class background and like many female baby-boomers, left secondary school prematurely to undertake unskilled employment. Her father was partially responsible for this when he decided that she should leave school, seek employment and marry. His judgement, like my father's, was virtually never questioned. Further, my mother did not see the relevance of formal education, nor the vocational opportunities it could bring in the not too distant future. (Vocational privatism was still firmly rooted in patriarchy in those days.) She worked in advertising, retail and radio before assuming the unpaid domestic work of the housewife. Her first years of wedlock involved following her husband around the country while he completed his tertiary qualifications and commenced his professional career.

One of my mother's strengths is her innate artistic creativity. She was awarded the school prize for artistic ability; however, her parents apparently ignored the merit of this achievement, despite the encouragement of her art teacher. (The visible authority of the teacher seldom extends beyond the confines of the school.) My own father was unaware of her creative flair until many years into their marriage. Despite the lack of overt encouragement, she was able to become a successful silversmith, although this was secondary to her family duties. Shaped by a combination of rationalities based on Protestant ethics, local custom and the unrehearsed invention of intuition, my mother's intellectual development profoundly influenced my extra-curricula education.

From my mother's example, I learned at least three things: firstly, she taught me the value of intuition as an alternative to my father's rigid rationalism; secondly, she showed the value of tolerance through her own struggle to maintain her identity in a house dominated by males; and most importantly, she demonstrated the power of creativity as a spontaneous means of expression and self-constitution.[62] *She effectively drew upon this power to resist the oppressive dimensions of social custom within dominant male discourses, and as a means of creating paths of communication. In doing so, she widened her scope for personal development.*

The Postmodern Student?

Once my brother had found a vocation in retail and I had gained financial independence through jazz piano and teaching, we both moved out of home. Consequently, my mother was confronted with the all-too common problem faced by many women of her generation of occupying her time with some form of meaningful and productive activity. Approaching middle age, financially dependent on her husband and without a secondary school qualification, her opportunities for self-development were limited. Having devoted the better part of twenty-five years of her life to raising a family, she was rewarded with suburban isolation and a disinterested labour market. Like too many women, her remuneration for respecting the mainstream values of her generation was exile from meritocracy. She continued to make jewellery, however, she had exhausted all known creative avenues of expression. In what was the boldest decision of her life, she attempted to gain admission to university as a mature-age student. Her technical proficiency and commercial success enabled her to pursue formal study at the tertiary level.

By her own account, the benefits to her of university learning are immeasurable. Tertiary education boosted her self-esteem, invigorated her creative energies, broadened her vocational horizons and provided a stimulating social environment containing a variety of sub-cultures. She acquired new technical skills and literacies in computers, metal work, humanities, professional and interpersonal communication. These skills and cultural literacies have a reflexive quality, in that they could be applied to a variety of situations and contexts. On one level, they are techniques of self-empowerment, however, there are those who argue that the empowering qualities learned through institutions like the public school are illusory. I shall now explore some of these contesting perspectives in the context of formal public education in late-modernity.

A major difficulty with modern public education has been the inability of education systems to maintain pace with continual increases in the size and complexity of society in general. With exceptions, teacher-to-student ratios have steadily increased at all levels, while the sensibility of school curricula has been unable to adjust to the diverse and changing needs of citizens in the latter twentieth century. At the most basic level, schools have failed to provide adequate opportunities (i.e. cultural capital) to minority groups, such as the disabled and Australians facing language and cultural barriers. Furthermore, until recently, secondary school students unable to satisfy assessment

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62 I shall explore those means in Chapters' 8 and 9.

requirements to move 'up the education ladder' were generally absorbed by unskilled and/or labour intensive industries. However, the Australian labour market has been profoundly changed by technological developments such as increased industrial automation, international competition and the rise of 'white-collar' vocations accompanying the widespread implementation of electronic media. Socio-economic developments such as the massive influx of women and migrants into the work-force coupled with the more competitive and strategic trade relations with New Zealand, Europe and Asia, have radically changed the orientation of the Australian economy away from primary production towards the provision of information technologies and formal education. Changes to the Australian labour market have necessitated the need for public education to develop new literacies. Consequently, the growth in tertiary sector of Australia's economy and service provision to domestic and global markets has not been matched by the provision of adequate resources and relevant curricula within the public education system. Deficiencies in cultural and technical literacies amongst Australian students in areas ranging from awareness of foreign cultures to basic computer skills have compounded the traditional problems of literacy and numeracy. In the age of the pocket calculator and personal computer, certain skills are arguably obsolete; however, the development of basic skills in their operation alongside more relevant social and vocational competencies has been insufficient.

In Chapter 3, I described how New Zealand and Australian governments diverted responsibility for funding to local school-based management. While purporting to be in the interests "school autonomy" and "freedom of choice," this direction in policy reform was misleading given that the capacity to choose is determined by a combination of material resources, access to education facilities and degree of cultural capital/literacy possessed by the chooser. Communities availed by these reforms tend to have an established base in one or more of these areas and can thus cope better with added responsibilities (at least in the short term). Others, such as Tamaki in New Zealand, enjoy neither a freedom of choose, nor the same quality of education. Governments—regardless of objectives—have forsaken political accountability for equality of educational outcomes.

For example, claims that personal computers can empower citizens by providing them with a vast array of information on the Internet presupposes the following: (i) that most citizens are financially capable of buying the basic hardware required; (ii) that they have the time and capacity to learn to use the software required; and (iii) that information on the Internet is credible and provided in the interests of those individuals and the communities to which they belong. On another level, the demobilisation of union protection for teachers in Victoria was justified on the basis that teachers would have greater autonomy and choice in dealing with their administrators in the determination of their conditions of employment. It has partly stripped teachers of the resources and political support that the collective representation of a union can offer. The decline in the quality of teachers has affected the quality of formal public education. The freedom of choice available to citizens under this neo-liberal doctrine is uneven and undemocratic. While there is nothing new about these inequalities, they are more pronounced because democratic freedom is so narrowly defined by the pervasive ideology of neo-liberalism beneath the veil of this ideology's illusory claims to equity and democracy.

Understandably, many schools addressed these new social and material pressures by focussing on the instruction of basic life-skills in areas like communication and job-seeking. However, as unemployment continued to rise and new economic targets were set, Australian federal and state governments in the 1980s responded with poorly developed education reform reflecting a reactionary, cost-cutting mentality. The Victorian Certification of Education (VCE), for example, superseded the Higher School Certificate (HSC) in Victoria before adequate curricula design and assessment standards had been determined. Subsequent confusion, suspicion and dissatisfaction amongst VCE students, their families and teachers continued well into the 1990s.

Governments also appealed to traditional canons in an effort to appease public dissatisfaction with outcomes. By the mid-1990s, state governments began to shift the tone of education policy towards the perennial "three R's." In Victoria, the state government evoked "back to basics" rhetoric as a tactical response to public criticism of the VCE.

When the VCE was introduced, the neo-liberal education policies of the Dawkins era justified the decentralisation of funding and assessment of secondary education on the premises that schools would have greater administrative autonomy, teachers would have increased independence in bargaining for working conditions and the students would have a wider degree of input and choice in selecting preferred areas of study. Where the HSC was based upon a highly centralised structure of curriculum and assessment, the VCE shifted an enormous amount of responsibility onto secondary school students and teachers. The Common Assessment Tasks (CATS) component required teachers to handle a vastly increased quantity of marking and student consultation time without matching the new work load with sufficient remuneration. Within a few years of the introduction of the VCE, many teachers were concerned about student plagiarism, because there were fewer ways of knowing whether the student's CATS assignments were their own. For example, a VCE graduate purporting to be an A+ student posted his CATS on the Internet as an act of revenge against students who rely on tutors to complete their requirements. The web author even included a lengthy legal disclaimer. (Soma King 1996) Another site openly advertised the following "research":

"WHY WASTE YOUR VALUABLE TIME AT THE LIBRARY???

WE SUPPLY RESEARCH FOLDERS FOR YOUR VCE CATS.

RESEARCH FOLDERS AVAILABLE FROM $12.50 PER CAT"

(Polly Watt 1996)

Furthermore, the diversity and subjective nature of CATS assignments made it more difficult for teachers to determine a universal system of evaluation. The objective credibility of the VCE was questioned to the extent that several major universities considered introducing entrance exams on top of VCE assessment. Where the state government had traditionally been responsible under the HSC system for matching its centralised curriculum with resources (such as text books), the greater flexibility of individual student choice under the CATS system provided the government with a means of saving money by encouraging students to use their local public libraries. There are many obvious benefits to

advocating this exploration, however, public libraries were not upgraded to match the sudden swell in student patronage. Protesting the lack of government funding, many public libraries became overcrowded. The quality of student research was no doubt affected by the subsequent deficit in educational resources. Ironically, it is probable that the decentralisation of the Victorian education system has contributed to trends in declining proficiency in the fundamental canons of liberal education. Beneath trends towards declining proficiency are patterns of domination that are reinforced at the level of ontology through the way that types of cultural reproduction are affected by these public education reforms.

In a sociological study of the relationship between culture and divisions of class in modern France, Bourdieu concluded that the habitus of the dominated classes has a self-perpetuating component in which "necessity imposes a taste for necessity." That is, the environment in which dominated classes are deprived of time and non-essential material acquisitions, informs the limited types of cultural capital available to them. The habitus is shaped in such a totalising way that dominated groups believe that their social predicament is acceptable and even celebrated. This adaptation to elite cultural regimes "implies a form of acceptance of domination" whereby matters of choice are reduced to utilitarian terms. (Bourdieu 1984: 372, 386; 1977: 72-9) The logic of practice guiding the agency of the dominated classes is primarily an instrumental one; the major concerns of students and teachers alike in these forsaken communities revolve around practical issues of survival. To use Illich's turn of phrase, these communities and individuals are 'slotted' into 'castes' demarcated by poverty, resignation and the covert veil of oppression disguised as democratic freedom. Once slotted, education, class and agency become entwined in the cultural feedback loop of the habitus. Instrumental rationality becomes an ethos of the oppressed. The habitus imbues the citizen with the necessary cultural capital for self-regulation, self-discipline and self-regimentation. Those unable to play the game of meritocracy are pacified, while the successful players become absorbed in the games of elite culture.

The process of appropriating economic value or opportunity cost to academic qualifications reproduces conditions of meritocracy within the cultural practise formal education. The standardisation of formal assessment enables a widely accepted currency of education qualifications. Pedagogical technique, curriculum design and school administration have conventionally bolstered the perception of this currency as necessary to the acquisition of social and economic status. Alvin Gouldner suggests that this expertise is the hallmark of a New Class, whose emergent authority is derived from the secular discourse of modern schooling. (Gouldner 1979: 43-47) The emphasis of formal education on competition for and accumulation of cultural capital is indicative of the instrumentalisation of education in modernity. According to Gouldner, cultural capital emerged as a function of several phenomena in modernity. Gouldner asserts that knowledge, which constitutes culture, is the precondition for the generation of capital. He writes that "the emerging concepts of "culture" and "capital" are Siamese twins, joined at the back: culture was capital generalised, capital was culture privatised..." (Gouldner 1979: 25) Understanding formal schooling as a site of cultural reproduction recasts the problem of education reform in provocative and useful ways. The economic rationalisation of the Australian education system since the 1980s involved an

emphasis on the development of cultural capital by treating schools, teachers, students and knowledge itself as consumer products. The logic of reform is one in which students are clients of the public education system, while teachers and academics are primarily managers of education resources.

The Utility of Literacy

The most overt manifestations of disciplinary power in my formal education were visible during my final year at secondary school. At the time, the Victorian Certificate of Education (VCE) superseded the Higher School Certificate (HSC). The HSC was a state-wide indicator based mostly upon the standardised evaluation of Victorian secondary students by examination. Subject options allowed for a limited degree of individual research, expression and criticism, however, the emphasis of assessment for the year was on final exams. The VCE was implemented in name only during my twelfth year of study, so I was still required to sit the HSC style exam.

My teachers almost universally adopted a purely instrumental approach to learning in my final VCE year. The goal of achieving the highest possible score was a given, therefore, the approach of teachers was to instruct students to hone and develop the methodological approaches desired by state examiners. Emphasis was placed on the techniques of providing the expected responses to exam questions. Having realised this, I set about mastering the self-disciplinary strategies of, for example, essay style in English. Of the five texts that we were required to review, I read the shortest one only (both in the name of expediency and lack of interest) and merely sampled the relevant passages of the remaining texts mentioned during classes. The works were mostly classical texts. My teachers emphasised the relevance of these texts to the 'reality' of my life at the time, which was cold comfort given my inability to perceive such immediate connections (other than the fact that the literary works were written by some people about some other people). I set about identifying the key themes of the five texts and prepared 'stock' answers anticipating the standard questions asked. The pragmatic ethic propagated by my teachers to satisfy the requirements of the education system placed creativity and genuine critique at the lower end of pedagogical priorities. The study of literary narratives was reduced to relatively simple formula. The five required readings posed no challenge to the formula as they employed traditional, predictable linear narratives, uncomplicated characterisations and fairly straightforward metaphors. My essays were exercises in language games of an institutional design. Any claim to authorship on my part was, with the exception of a few of my own idiosyncratic inflections, a dubious claim given that the essay content was instrumentally constructed from a variety of influences (from my teachers to the state education curriculum designers). Motivated by a need to achieve status in the highest quartile of assessment, my role as the author slipped into a broader stream of cultural and functional social values.[63] *This, in a sense, is ironic given the status usually appropriated to the author as authority in modern Western civilisation.*

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[63] This is not to say that I did not eventually develop a love of reading. Despite my overt aversion to reading for leisure during my secondary schooling, my father espoused a belief that I would become a 'bookworm' in adulthood. Whether this belief was based on divine knowledge, hope or was a child-rearing technique is unclear, however, his belief was to prove valid in later years.

My essays imitated the systematised strategies of scholarship. As an author, I was inadvertently demonstrating processes of self-identification as an individual student and as a socially and historically constituted subject. Roland Barthes' landmark essay, *The Death of the Author*, illustrates how "[T]he writer can only imitate a gesture that is always anterior, never original. His [or her] only power is to mix writings... in such a way as never to rest on any one of them." (Barthes 1982: 146) Barthes argues that an author cannot claim any absolute authority over his or her text because, to a significant extent, he or she did not write it. Furthermore, Barthes emphasises that authorship exists neither before, nor beyond language. An author is not, as such, *creator* of text, as the process of writing shapes authorship. This view challenges the liberal, atomistic emphasis on individualism as a key tenet of enlightened subjectivity is destabilised by the complex ways in which subjectivity is constituted.

Although the post-structuralist inflexions of his work go beyond what I want to argue, Barthes' conception of the writer serves to challenge the modern conception of the all-knowing, unified, intending subject as the site of production in an attempt to liberate writing from the despotism of what he calls "the work" (such as an essay). He asserts that

> *To give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing,"* however, *"by refusing to assign a 'secret,' an ultimate meaning, to the text (and the world as text), liberates what may be called an anti-theological activity, an activity that is truly revolutionary since to refuse to fix meaning is, in the end, to refuse God and his hypostases–reason, science, law.*

(Barthes 1975: 147)

Barthes would have classified the kinds of traditional literature that I studied as "readerly texts" because they do not locate the reader as a site of the production of meaning, but only as the receiver of a pre-determined meaning. The text becomes a product or commodity to be consumed. The reader is nothing more than a consumer. The utility of most textbooks purchased for my secondary education evaporated once exams were completed and were resold many to some of a legion of students that would occupy my locker and classroom seats in subsequent years. (Fortunately for them, I underlined all 'relevant' passages to save time, effort and thought.) The readerly text is part of a discourse that stabilises and pacifies; it meets the expectations of the reader. (Barthes 1975) Barthes prefers text that violates literary convention by forcing the reader to produce meaning, which is not predetermined, fixed or "authorised":

> *"the 'writerly' text is ourselves writing, before the infinite play of the world (the world as function) is traversed, intersected, stopped, plasticised by some singular system (Ideology, Genus, Criticism) which reduces the plurality of entrances, the opening of networks, the infinity of languages."*

(Barthes 1975: 5)

That is the point of critique that I want to take from Barthes without necessarily agreeing to his subsequent move to say that the writerly text creates a subject position for the reader that is outside of the mores or cultural base of the reader. The critique nevertheless draws attention to the way that the readerly text presents itself as a transparent window onto reality, effectively obscuring its

status as a fiction and literary product. The kinds of literature selected for study during my secondary education were more like products rather than *productions* forming the dominant mode of literature. A liberal education aimed at producing productive, critical, active citizens on a mass scale faces the ongoing problem of having to impose structural constraints upon the processes of learning from the culturally shaped epistemological level to the physical level of discipline to the societal level of resources available to sustain a mass education system. The limited resources available each individual is confined at the most basic level; therefore, the ability of my examiners to encourage and assess productive responses to 'writerly' texts was heavily restricted. The emancipatory potential of mass education to empower individuals is intrinsically limited by cultural bias, ideology and resources scarcity.

When those dreaded exams fell upon me, my teachers at my school had strategically armed me with the cultural capital (in the sense that Gouldner (1979) uses the concept) to efficiently meet the requirements of the education system. Using very little intellectual innovation, I successfully achieved results that placed my in the top 25 per cent of the state, making me eligible for study at what was perceived at the time to be one of the most exclusive tertiary institutions in Victoria. Upon receiving my results, I was relieved rather than proud. I had been accepted into the next stage of the education system, which was more a source of basic ontological security than a feeling of meaningful personal development. In retrospect, my memories of that year amount to a feeling of achievement akin to the laboratory monkey that has successfully earned his banana having placed the peg in the appropriately shaped hole. While my wholesale adoption of the utilitarian ethic satisfied my need for integration into the broader industrially based social system, it ultimately failed to gratify any broader sense of personal development. Yet, the ethic utility is so intrinsically enmeshed in the cultural logic of modern Western society that it seems to be unavoidable, particularly given the rise of disembodied electronic media.

Educating Self-discipline: Empowerment or Regimentation?

For the bulk of the Australian population, institutional education governs the bulk of their waking hours in an intensive burst within between ten to fifteen critical years of development. After spending the better part of childhood in public schools, Australia's youth are expected to make crucial life-choices with insufficient experience to make any kind of informed, balanced and critical decision. As a student, I recall my own naivety and inability to imagine a suitable vocation and/or course of study at university during my final year at secondary school. At the time, I could not have imagined how much my perception of the world would change in the following months. This parallels my mother's initial experience at university to the extent that by her own admission, she did not foresee the degree of pleasure and dignity that the learning institution would foster. One significant difference is that my mother was at a level of maturity and readiness upon which she was self-consciously able to 'suck the marrow' from her studies in ways that would have made the author Henry David Thoreau proud. Tertiary education provided my mother with a range of self-disciplinary techniques and cultural literacies that enhanced her experience of the world, and empowered her ability to engage a variety of extra-curricula social discourses. However, she was in a financially secure

situation and had the implicit (though not always explicit) support of her immediate family. She had also accumulated cultural capital during her full-time vocation as jeweller. She was by no means self-assured; nevertheless, her commercial viable permitted access to the next rung on the ladder of meritocracy. Self-disciplinary techniques have both positive and negative implications for the development of individuals and communities.

Whilst potentially empowering, these techniques have the capacity to instrumentalise the relationship of government and governed. Driven by economic criteria and imperatives, there has been a significant transfer in responsibility for day-to-day education from the state onto students as competitive 'users' of the education system and school staff as 'service providers'. This transfer in responsibility is justified by the state on the basis that modes of individual development are being localised in such a way as to increase the degree of empowerment available to the student in the decision-making processes governing his/her formal education. While there is a potential in these reforms to expand the capacity for empowerment, I am more inclined to support the view that this re-definition of the student (and teacher's) role has occurred in light of the 'crash of public education' where, in Donna Haraway's words, "any relation between skills learned at school and job future becomes unbelievable", and schools are characterised by increasing "involvement of managerial classes in educational reform and refunding at the cost of any remaining progressive educational democratic structures for children and teachers, education for mass ignorance." This results in the "growing industrial direction of education (especially higher education) by science-based multinationals (particularly in electronics and biotechnology dependent companies), highly educated elites in a progressively bimodal society." (Haraway 1991: 171) Despite having the democratic principle of universal education as its foundation, the development of institutionalised public education throughout modernity to the present has assisted the entrenchment of patterns of inequality, particularly class inequality.

The question of recent institutional education reforms and its effects upon the quality of Australian democracy needs to be addressed on a number of levels. The most important involves addressing what kind of effect contemporary technologies of education are having on the social integration and political efficacy of democratic citizens? A satisfactory explanation of these complex processes is necessary in order to evaluate the potential for a formal institutional education system to empower every Australian citizen to effectively enjoy membership of a democratic society.

Foucault's work on the rise of disciplinary power provides an insightful (though hostile way to begin analysing the modern processes of social integration through technologies of education. As noted above, Foucault delineates between the roles of pre-modern sovereign power and modern disciplinary power in the regulation and social integration of citizens. In pre-democratic authoritarian states, sovereign power had operated through the physical restriction of public behaviour through the threat and use of force. The sovereign power's interest in the shaping of subjectivity extended only insofar as subjects obeyed the authority of the sovereign (such as the King or Queen) and the rules of the state. On the other hand, *disciplinary* power, as it emerged in modernity, is *productive* of subjectivities rather than purely restrictive of behaviour. The *governmentality* of disciplinary power has its own distinctive

logics of regulation, influence and control directed at the constitution of subjectivity at all levels. According to Foucault, the primary object of modern regimes is the continuous regulation and management of the body: "its disciplining, the optimisation of its capabilities, the exertion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls..." (Foucault 1980: 139)

As discussed earlier, Foucault uses Bentham's model of the panopticon to emphasise the ways by which behavioural norms are internalised via technologies of regulation. The modern public school employs these disciplinary technologies. In the classroom, students are overtly compelled to behave in certain ways under the gaze of the teacher, whose visible authority defines the parameters of acceptable, *normal* conduct. Students gradually incorporate these codes of conduct into their own moral framework so that the normalised self maintains self-surveillance in order to avoid punishment for 'inappropriate' behaviour. This panoptic process underlies the maturing of children from a pre-conventional to a conventional stage of moral development. For these techniques of normalisation to be effective, the student must be motivated to assume complicity in the process. In the case of public education, these techniques have been employed with the aim of both empowering and regimenting the student within a political order, establishing "in the body the constricting link between an increased aptitude and an increased domination." (Foucault 1977: 137-8) The development of these techniques has shifted the nature of authority in both the school and society.

Rose argues that modernity is characterised by the development of the "authorization of authority," involving the development of new *expert systems* of human conduct. These expert systems are professional and bureaucratic technologies of social and individual regulation produced by various authorities, such as school administrators and teachers. These technologies form "a grid of regulatory ideals," employing abstract 'modalities for folding authority into the self'. The constitutive power of these abstract techniques is rendered transparent by an ideology of autonomy and freedom of choice that emphasises the liberating potential of these techniques, encouraging "autonomy, freedom, choice, authenticity, enterprise, lifestyle." (Rose 1996a: 320-321) I believe that the development of these expert systems is causally linked to the proliferation of new forms of juridification underlying the processes of self-discipline illustrated in Chapter 3. Below, I will briefly outline the main implications of the development of expert systems of behaviour and juridification in relation to the certain motivational ideologies and the cultural reproduction (and colonisation) of traditional educative practices.

Education and De-traditionalisation

Returning to the discussion earlier concerning social integration, it is possible now to identify the means by which certain motivational syndromes utilised by state and market actors have managed to mobilise the populace in favour of their secular interests in the face of contemporary political and economic change. In the early 1970s, Habermas had already identified a shift in performance ideology, in which "social rewards should be distributed on the basis of individual achievement." He believed at the time that the market was losing credibility as a mechanism for the distribution of rewards based on

performance, asserting that market success was being replaced by the professional success mediated by formal schooling.[64] (Habermas, in Macridis and Brown 1986: 374) Habermas linked this emergent performance ideology to increases in "school justice" that was attempting to provide equal opportunity of access to higher schools within non-discriminatory evaluation standards for school performance. He argued that threatening the credibility of this performance ideology was a counter-trend, in which the expansion of the education system was becoming more independent of the occupational system, loosening the connection between schooling and professional success in the process. Furthermore, the ability to evaluate individual performance at both work and school was seen to becoming increasingly difficult. (Habermas, in Macridis and Brown 1986: 373-375)

Habermas felt that crisis may be immanent, however, a further adaptation of performance ideology through reforms to both school and workplace during the 1980s and 1990s disarmed further tension (at least temporarily). For example, the Dawkins reforms outlined earlier attempted to foster closer ties between schooling and occupation. Furthermore, the decentralisation of school administration and assessment via the *Schools of the Future* program in Victoria gave the impression that evaluation of individual performances was being maintained. The implementation of collective enterprise bargaining in the workplace occurred under a mask of similar government rhetoric.[65] What eventuated after the mid-1970s was a return of the market as an integrative mechanism, only it became infused with the performance ideology identified by Habermas. The media of money and administrative power utilised neo-liberal ideologies to economic rationalise the welfare state under a revised conception of democracy.

Nevertheless, some of Habermas' observations were quite astute and continue to have some relevance to the current period. For example, Habermas argued at the time that civil privatism and the depoliticised public were closely related; as indicated earlier in the thesis, the economic rationalisation of the state has been a function of declining mass participation since the 1960s. Furthermore, Habermas observed that during the early 1970s, "[t]he most important motivation contributed by the sociocultural system in late-capitalist societies consists in syndromes of civil and family/vocational privatism... Family and vocational privatism complement civil privatism. It consists of a family orientation with consumer and leisure interests, and a career orientation consistent with status competition." (Habermas, in Macridis and Brown 1986: 374)

This link between family/vocational and civil privatism became one of the key features of administrative planning of education in the 1990s, as governments in the USA, New Zealand and Australia shifted responsibility for formal education over to families, individual students and teachers, while simultaneously attempting to integrate the education system with status competition. From the 1980s onwards, the relationship between these motivational syndromes was transformed and consolidated in a radical rationalisation of the late-modern democratic state.

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64 This observations echo those of Illich, who during the same period asserted that institutional schooling formed an international caste-system of meritocracy. (Illich 1976: 154)

65 See Chapter 3.

Habermas envisaged the enormous growth in the planning area of administration into previously taken for granted areas (e.g. family) and cultural traditions in a process that "thematises traditions which were previously not part of public programming..." (Habermas, in Macridis and Brown 1986: 373) The educational planning of the curriculum is identified as a significant example of such direct administrative processing of cultural tradition, in that where "the school administration merely had to codify a given naturally evolved canon...now planning of the curriculum is based on the premise that the tradition [sic] models can also be different." (Habermas, in Macridis and Brown 1986: 374) Foreshadowing his forthcoming theory of communicative action, Habermas identified the character and scope of the colonisation of the lifeworld that would pervade the reform of mass education in subsequent decades. In particular, his observation directly above marks the processes of de-traditionalisation that characterise the instrumentalisation of mass education in late-modernity. Juridification undermines tradition, resulting in the widespread colonisation of lifeworlds. Beneath the veil of neo-liberal ideology, the technologisation of the student involves the breakdown of traditional life-styles through the increasing juridification of daily political life. The routinisation of expert systems of contemporary public education involves a colonisation of lifeworlds that extends beyond both pre-modern processes of integration and de-traditionalised panoptic modes of integration inherent in the development of modernity.

In the context of education, traditional ways of living include those modes by which learning occurs within local communities at pre-technological levels, unmediated by media other than language, imagery and bodily gestures. The application of pedagogics within traditional modes of education is limited to the locally developed and applied teaching methods of lay knowledge. Traditions are generated, reproduced and altered over time through rituals, oral communication and mimesis. Through the informal and embodied media of learning, these modes affect the intellectual development of individuals within communities of varying sizes but not on a systemic scale.

During modernity, there has been a shift away from traditional practices to the widespread application of an organised body of knowledge to specific tasks (such as reading, arithmetic and computer operation). Once the central domain of social and cultural reproduction, the pre-technological practice of exchanging knowledge through verbal and illustrative demonstration became formalised and scientised by pedagogical systems during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. By definition, pedagogy means the *science* of teaching. It is differentiated from lay-knowledge because it lays claim to expert systems of knowledge that are supposedly *objectively* applicable across individuals and cultures. The replacement of traditional-embodied practices of formal education began during the Enlightenment period, when the book emerged as a widely accepted mode of information-exchange. It was the first medium of mass disembodied education to predominate the dissemination of knowledge in the modern West. Oral practices have persisted throughout modernity in public schools, however, the *technologisation* of these practices occurred as part of the state's attempts to universalise these modes via modern expert systems of learning. Traditional practices of learning through oral story telling have become systematically organised into pedagogical technologies applied by the state through education system curricula and teaching techniques.

As indicated in Chapter's 5 and 6, the target of administrative planning was the regulation of the self. According to Connolly: "The emergence of modern practices of bureaucratic control, market discipline, therapeutic help, democratic virtue, and sexual liberation, though each often defines itself in opposition to others, meshes with the global tendency of modern orders to organize the self into an agent of self-containment." (Connolly 1992: 150) Traditional modes of cultural reproduction and socialisation have increasingly been replaced with technologies disseminated by the disembodied electronic media supplied by private corporate actors. The increasing use of disembodied communications media such as the Internet in classrooms is altering the pace of change and consequently, the scope of influence by these technologies.

What happens to traditional modes of cultural production once they have been colonised? Giddens argues that modernity contains reflexive processes of cultural reproduction that involve not the modernisation of traditional structures; instead, these reflexive processes continually re-modernise *modern* structures. (Giddens, in Beck *et al.* 1994) They are reflexive because modern structures modernise themselves, operating on individual, societal and politico-systemic levels. For example, the pre-technological practice of story telling has been largely replaced by teacher-centred pedagogy, which inturn is becoming the virtual teacher of educational computer software. These reflexive processes replace taken-for-granted practices, such as the pre-technological communication of lay-knowledge, with reflexive practices in which the subject apparently feels more aware of his/her own maintenance and regulation. (Giddens, in Beck *et al.* 1994)

Giddens' analysis of reflexive processes in relation to modern therapeutic practices is relevant to the context of institutional education to the extent that modern reflexive processes have the propensity to problematise what is previously not consciously known. (Giddens, in Beck *et al.* 1994) According to Giddens, the reflexivity of expert systems have the capacity to de-naturalise traditions, so that the cultural logics of the past become emotional inertia to those living in the present. The authority of many new expert systems challenges that which was previously intuitively understood by an individual as taken-for-granted or common sense. For example, the deity-centred authority of Biblical teachings has been challenged throughout modernity by the human-centred "objective" authority of positivism through pedagogical systems of inquiry. In the context of mass public education, instrumentalised pedagogics challenge pre-technological learning at the face-to-face levels (such as at home). Consequently, these expert systems destabilise the ontology of the individual by contesting the core of his/her lifeworld. For example, a child of a non-mainstream ethnic background may enter the public education system to find that the traditional grounding of his/her lifeworld is challenged by the institutionalised pedagogy imposed 'from above' in school. In Habermas' terms, the tremendous authority and influence of these institutional expert systems create a situation in which many lifeworlds are marginalised or colonised. In the schools of Australia's predominantly ethnic communities, students, teachers and their families often deal with tensions between the demands of the public education system and the demands of differentiated local cultures. Australian multiculturalism as an ethic of social integration is characterised by the often-uneasy association of tradition and modern belief systems. Ethnic students growing up in public schools must integrate the values of their home life with

the plurality of values prevalent at school. Once de-traditionalised, tradition that was once a taken-for-granted belief is transformed into discursive knowledge, meaning that *one wants to believe* as opposed to simply believing. (Giddens, in Beck *et al.* 1994) At the societal level, public education pedagogy since the 1980s has been increasingly based upon student-centred learning.

Within the self-disciplinary regimes of late-modernity, the Australian public education system has adopted instrumental technologies to strategically shape the subjectivities of students and teachers. As indicated above, these expert systems occur in the form of reflexive pedagogic reforms like the VCE, which replaced the HSC in the state of Victoria during the late 1980s. The VCE incorporated the standardised curriculum and evaluation of the former Higher School Certificate into a new expert system through which students were given more responsibility in the determination and completion of secondary school requirements. These student-centred technologies have developed according to abstract systems of expertise, which fold back onto society, transforming it in the process. These expert systems produce a type of knowledge and cultural literacy about society that transforms society through the ways that these systems inform individuals. (Giddens, in Beck *et al.* 1994)

The use of the personal computer in the classroom has been a central medium through which these expert systems have been disseminated. In the case of interactive educational software, the subject is encouraged to manipulate the program, rather than be purely instructed by the program. For example, the computer spell-check application that I am using to write these words replaces the traditional basic canon of literacy with a technologically standardised mode of self-assessment and regulation. However, as this automated spell-check function de-traditionalises the taken-for-granted belief in a canon of literacy, it also *creates* a new taken-for-granted mode of practice. This example illustrates how a modern educational practice of writing is reflexively reconstituted via the technological mediation of the word-processor. This once consciously practiced skill of literacy, central to my early education, has been replaced by a new taken-for-granted practice of writing. Why do I use the computer-generated spell-check function? Because it is a technically efficient means of finishing this thesis.[66] I seldom have to consult memory or dictionary to verify grammar and spelling. In this context, the traditional utility of literacy declines in favour of computing technology. The logic of utility inevitably yields obsolescence—in ideas, rationalities, traditions and people. To an extent, this illustrates the pernicious way in which technology has provided a powerful means of instrumentalising discourses of learning. It is symbolic of the seductive ways by which instrumental reason becomes entrenched as an everyday process shaping cultural reproduction.

The School, Subjectivity...and the Postmodern Cyborg?

Tiffin and Rajasingham (1995) rightly identify the growing influence of disembodied, abstract technologically mediated processes of mass education in recent decades. However, such educational reformists fail to identify the depth and scope of the effect of disembodied electronic modes of education on

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66 Reliance on technological applications such as word processing software to automate human processes is not without certain perils. The uncritical nature of this sort of technology may be functionally expedient; however, they are a poor substitute for the professional editorial methodology employed by *human* proof readers.

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the constitution of subjectivities and social integration. The process of individuation underlying the growing intimacy of relations between students and personal computers is linked to a profound shift in the historical constitution of the body during the last twenty years. The integration of technological media and lifeworld is increasingly unmitigated; according to Haraway: "By the late-twentieth century... we are all chimeras, mythic hybrids of machine and organism, in short, cyborgs." (Haraway 1991: 150) Haraway's proclamation here of the arrival of the cyborg is overstated, however, she rightly has observed that the difference between machine and organism in the historical constitution of subjectivity is blurred by these postmodern constitutive processes of subjectivity in which the body, mind and electronic apparatus are increasingly intrinsic.[67] (Haraway 1991: 148-181) An example of the 'hybrid of machine and organism' is chillingly illustrated in the software research situation described in Chapter 6, wherein participants of the survey "became less tolerant of the silliness that sometimes developed in discussion" with other humans, preferring the "impersonal, unambiguous interaction with a computer." The instrumentality of this hybrid of human and computer is evident in the belief of those research participants that "the undertones of personal feelings" of unmediated oral intercourse "clouded clear thinking." (Tiffin and Rajasingham 1995: 5)

The relationship of pedagogy and other expert systems of learning to these 'extraordinary new structures of domination' is one of colonisation and domination. The growth in the complexity and size of late-modern society necessitates technically efficient technologies of formal education that are as unspecific as possible. However, the requisite instrumentality to achieve any practical measure of mass institutional education delimits the ability of the education system to encourage, protect and recognise the plurality of lifeworlds within the late-modern welfare state. Beneath postmodern conditions of contradiction and fragmentation in the development of the lifeworld, exist reflexive educational practices that involve organised, strategic, *instrumental* modes of cultural reproduction. Reflexive practices of self-regimentation override both the localised character of face-to-face forms of education and conventional institutional arrangements typical to modern public education. The increasing reliance upon modem-based distance education as a panacea to perceived economic deficits, points the way beyond traditional, embodied and panoptic practices of public education. The use of the Internet in the classroom offers the potential for greater autonomy for the student to explore the vast array of data on the information super-highway, however, students enjoy fewer benefits of face-to-face learning whilst unaware of the ways in which the disembodied medium of computer-technology structures distorts and filters the education process. The contemporary manifestations of disciplinary power shape society at a more abstract level of social integration, colonising, marginalising and overlaying the pre-technological level of face-to-face level of social integration.

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67 Haraway derives from this observation a politics of the body in which the blur between human and machine is celebrated at its fluidity. Whilst I agree that the growing connection of human to machine has some exciting possibilities, I believe that Haraway's politics are based on insufficient ontological criteria, meaning that the awe of technological progress evident in thinkers like Haraway does not sufficiently account for the importance of embodied social relations in conjunction with disembodied media of human discourse. While her arguments validly respond to contemporary manifestations of patterns of domination, her interest in the historical constitution of the body provides little from which to understand the constitution of subjectivity and develop frameworks for improving its development in the latter twentieth century. (My criticisms of Haraway are similar to those addressing Foucault above.)

In other words, the panoptic structure of the modern classroom still plays a significant role in shaping face-to-face relations between subjects and authorities, but is beginning to be framed differently. Despite all of this change we need to remember the powerful continuities of the level of the modern. The conventional modern classroom facilitates a social integration that bears complicity with the particular imperatives of governmental, corporate regimes and social classes. Illich credibly argues that Western schooling[68] by its very nature establishes, entrenches and reproduces class inequalities both within nation-states and between nation-states at the global level. Institutionalised education entrenches class inequality by diverting vast sums of national revenue to the education of elite social strata. Illich illustrates how the privileged discourse of schooling marginalises those whose interests and abilities are not compatible with the system. Public education effectively loses its democratic character when the bulk of the population is marginalised into the exile of alienation from its empowering benefits. Illich illustrates the problems of formal public education through examples of how nations have attempted to use schooling as a means to economic development: "Schools affect individuals and characterize nations...nations are irreversibly degraded when they build schools to help their citizens play at international competition." (Illich 1976: 150) He shows how economically poorer nations have futilely attempted to use institutional schooling as a means to industrial development and economic growth.[69] Institutionalised compulsory schooling encourages 'the production of inferiority' in both poor and rich countries alike. Illich points out that by the late 1960s, "the 10 per cent in the United States with the highest incomes can provide most of the education for their children through private institutions. Yet they also succeed in obtaining ten times more of the public resources devoted to education than the poorest 10 per cent of the population." (Illich 1976: 154) Institutionalised formal education encourages class-based social hierarchies within nation-states that are enmeshed in an "international caste system." These castes delineate the degree of 'educational dignity' of citizens within the state according to the average years of schooling of its citizens: "Individual citizens of all countries achieve a symbolic mobility through a class system which makes each man accept the place he [sic] believes to have merited." (Illich 1976: 154) It is beyond the scope of this thesis to develop a position on the reconstitution of class relations and the rise of the intellectually trained as a class-in-itself, but it is central to my argument that, despite continuities, the changes in education are linked to an emergent layer of postmodern subjectivity.

New processes shaping the constitution of subjectivities are becoming prominent in countries like Australia, New Zealand and the USA. Mediated by pedagogical and electronic technologies of education, these processes are indicative of a radical shift towards a class-based meritocracy based on new neo-liberal techniques of individuation. Movements to more abstract structures and processes of education are occurring in light of the prevailing (mis)recognition that school-based learning is where education occurs while

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68 Illich defines schooling as *obligatory* education, whereby full-time attendance of age-specific groups within a graded curriculum is a prerequisite. (Illich 1976: 150)

69 For example, Illich illustrates that in Latin American countries, "Fundamental education is either redefined as the foundation for schooling, and therefore placed beyond the reach of the unschooled and the early dropout, or is defined as a remedy for the unschooled, which will only frustrate him into accepting inferiority. Even the poorest countries continue to spend disproportionate sums on graduate schools-gardens which ornament the penthouses of skyscrapers built in a slum." (Illich 1976: 152)

informal contexts like cinema and home television viewing is for leisure. Illich rightly argues that the widely held belief that most learning is a result of teaching is an illusion.[70] (Illich 1976: 154) Learning, like democracy, is something that occurs across a wide range of spheres of life. The 'illusion' of public education as a means to learning and empowerment is perpetuated through pernicious processes of structuration at abstract levels. These processes entrench hierarchies of social relations including stratified differences in class, gender and ethnicity. For example, on the one hand, students are more aware of the resources available at their schools because of private sponsorship. On the other hand, they are less aware of the more subtle ways in which corporate media influence the content and patterns of learning and social integration beyond the school across political and social life.

The Postmodern Citizen?

Neo-liberal doctrine has successfully been used to justify the reorientation of the state away from its democratic mandate to provide the protection, resources and security of its citizens to the encouragement of self-regulation. Key democratic values have been replaced by entrepreneurship as the basis for freedom and autonomy "consonant with the new regime of the self." (Rose 1992: 160) According to Haraway, the re-organisation of the state occurred in light of the "collapse of the welfare state, decentralizations with increased surveillance and control, citizenship by telematics, satellite communication systems and political integrations, imperialism and political power broad'y in the form of information rich/information poor differentiation, increased hi-tech militarisation increasingly opposed by many social groups, reduction of civil service jobs with the growing capital intensification of office work with implications for occupational mobility for women of color, growing privatization of material and ideological life and culture." (Haraway 1983) As discussed in Chapter 3, the neo-liberal critique of the welfare state is influential for two reasons: firstly, it has provided limited economic justifications for the perceived unsustainability of the welfare state; secondly, it has criticised the welfare state for creating a dependence mentality amongst many of its citizens. Therefore, neo-liberals argue that the state must be actively engaged in encouraging and protecting the free-market as the most viable mechanism of social coordination and prosperity. Consequently, there has been "a re-organization of political rationalities that brings them into a kind of alignment with contemporary technologies of government." (Rose and Miller 1992: 199) State activity has not so much declined, as changed in character.

The economic rationalisation of the state in Australia since the 1980s has been successfully effected by recent political and corporate regimes to encourage a series of interconnected processes, including the increasing privatisation of public schools, and a reorientation of political participation towards the

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70 Using the formal public education system as a backdrop, films like To Sir With Love (1967), Blackboard Jungle (1955), and Dead Poet's Society (1989) illustrate an ongoing romance within mainstream popular culture with the humanist attachment for face to face interaction. One of the central concerns of these films is that the ravages of overly authoritarian identities, the alienation of modern industrialised lifestyles, class inequality and other social differences are engaged and overcome by the reinventing of the authority of the teacher. Given the disembodied processes evident in the cinema experience, the saving graces of humanism are ironically extolled in these films which draw upon direct human discourse and interaction for ontological credibility. The passing on of orally-based wisdom in the classroom in these films is linked with civic self-empowerment. The representations of the values of face to face communication in film contrast the disembodied processes of regimentation occurring within the cinemas exhibiting the films themselves.

economic market. These processes have been made successful through the use of late-modern techniques of domination, in effect producing a thinning out of political participation. Foucault rightly observes that these techniques of normalisation aim to both produce ineffective citizens and extract the highest level of utility from them through the most technically efficient means. These techniques may or may not require the conscious acquiescence and participation from those citizens. (Foucault 1977, Rose 1996a) According to Rose, these techniques of normalisation entrench patterns of domination "to instil and use the self-directing propensities of subjects to bring them into alliance with the aspirations of authorities." (Rose: 1992: 153) These techniques are deeply entrenched through governmental strategies ranging from classroom pedagogics, to the clientalisation of citizenship, which 'autonomize' and 'responsibilize' the subject. According to Rose, the 'autonomization' and 'responsibilization' of the self involves an encouragement of subjectivity in which the individual becomes "an entrepreneur of itself, seeking to maximize its own powers, its own happiness, its own quality of life, through enhancing its autonomy and then instrumentalizing its autonomous choices in the service of its own lifestyle." (Rose 1992: 150-151) Responsibility for empowering the self becomes the concern of the student and citizen, not the state. Neo-liberal strategies represent the dominant set of normative principles by which the individual is expected to cope with late-modern and postmodern social structures. According to Illich, "More and more, men [sic] begin to believe that, in the schooling game, the loser gets only what he deserves. The belief in the ability of schools to label people correctly is already so strong that people accept their vocational... fate with a gambler's resignation." (Illich 1976: 151)

The success of these techniques of domination is evident in the ways in which Australian secondary and tertiary school curricula are vocationally geared towards providing industry with the necessary workers and entrepreneurs required to meet immediate market demands. Students are motivated by the belief that their success in school will determine future career possibilities. However, deeper processes of disciplinary power regulate and normalise behaviour to ensure that as citizens, students develop the necessary utility for state and market to maintain order and domination.[71] Where the modern state could no longer rely on force alone to facilitate what it saw to be 'appropriate' behaviours of its citizens, it has utilised mixtures of self and social disciplinary techniques that are applied at individual and societal levels: "Attempts to manage the enterprise to ensure productivity, competitiveness and innovation, to regulate child rearing to maximize emotional health and intellectual ability... no longer seek to discipline, instruct, moralize or threaten subjects into compliance." (Rose 1992: 153) Contemporary processes of self-formation are characterised by a "technologisation of the self," which demobilises the

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[71] A personal experience of these processes occurred during my secondary schooling in the form of 'Course Scan' evaluations. An 'expert' consultant came to my school and evaluated our career prospects using a computer program. The program attempted to provide 'objective' assessment of my most favourable vocational paths. Both teacher and student treated the results of the assessment as gospel; consequently, those results profoundly affect the choices of study and career taken by students like myself thereafter. Our subjective preferences were objectified in this process of normalisation by which we were 'herded' towards our appropriate, utility-defined, vocational destinies. The success of the Course Scan depended upon our active participation; hence, I had to consciously agree to be involved in the evaluation. More subtle forms of normalisation are evident in the fact that while the results of the Scan did not match my aspirations, I could not imagine any other possible directions of study, work or lifestyle after secondary school. To maintain the illusion/delusion of autonomy, I have been lead to believe that I passed through the three levels of formal education on the merit of my academic performance and personal achievement. However, consistent with Illich's argument outlined above, I am now more inclined to believe that systemic factors beyond my personal influence based on my socio-economic class background, contributed as much to my formal education as my intellectual virtue (if not more).

traditional bases of authority (e.g. the visible authority of the teacher), the conventional bounds of state responsibility in the regulation of citizens and the freedoms to which they are entitled. These disciplinary techniques are successful because these regimes have effectively utilised covert forms of power to exclude non-economically rationalised alternatives of political action from reaching the agendas of popular debate and national decision-making.

Educating Docility

Modern government is, by Foucault's definition, about the calculated and systemic ways in which the behaviour of citizens is shaped. Accordingly, *governmentality* is about the development of expert systems by the state designed to instrumentally regulate and alter the public and private conduct of citizens. Rose argues that these expert systems exist in 'complex and contestatory relations' with other ethical systems maintained by theological, juridical and customary authorities. (Rose 1996a: 317) As mentioned above, new social arrangements are emerging in which political strategies of governance are directed at the regulation of the self-government of the citizen. I agree with Rose that the sense of autonomy encouraged by these new expert systems is largely false. Underpinning governmentality in late-modernity is a neo-liberal ideology of autonomy that is deliberately cultivated by the media of corporate and state agencies to facilitate a penetration of disciplinary power deeper into the person. The recent predominance of this notion of autonomy has been a decisive factor in maintenance of the narrow scope in modern liberal democracies for active political participation. The docile citizen is strategically maintained to facilitate the instrumental governance of money and power as smoothly and efficiently as possible.

The economic rationalisation of freedom is integral to instrumental governance. Within narrow definitions of democratic freedoms, techniques of self-discipline (and regimentation) are structured according to economic criterion, such as consumer power. As indicated previously, 'freedom' in mainstream popular discourse has come to be understood in terms of the amount of choices available to the consumer in the market place. Habermas, Bauman and Jameson have drawn the connections between recent shifts in liberal democracies toward this market-based conception of freedom and the emergence of new patterns of domination. (Habermas 1975, Bauman 1988, Jameson 1984) Earlier, I used this social critique to illustrate how the citizen's relationship to the state is clientalised to such an extent that it is reduced to a market contract in substitute of a binding social contract or status worthy of political and economic entitlements and duties. Broader conceptions of liberty and democracy have been marginalised from popular and governmental discourse by an instrumental rationality based on neo-liberal doctrine to the detriment of effective democratic practice and development.

The reflexive processes of cultural reproduction have two implications for the civic education of the citizen in late-modernity. On the one hand, these new systems of expertise offer the potential for citizens to explore and develop their capacities to protect and expand the conditions of well-being. For example, since the 1970s there has been a tremendous rise in the sale of self-help texts claiming, in various ways, to provide individuals with the cultural capital to enhance their awareness and autonomy. On the other hand, these expert

systems are often reflexively structured according to instrumental criteria that are self-perpetuating and narrow in both content and accessibility. A self-help text on how to succeed in a job interview diverts responsibility, onto the individual who is encouraged to seek empowerment through the acquisition of expert skills to navigate that vocational discourse successfully.

The identity of the citizen is reduced to economically rationalised cultural capital by which their political power is equated solely with labour and consumer power, which in turn, is equated with market power. This practice reflexively reproduces inequalities because those who are successful perpetuate the process, while those who are unsuccessful believe that they only have themselves to blame.

Consequently, attention is diverted from that citizen's access to democratic entitlements and duties on to the will of the individual to seek the development of behaviours that are consistent with corporate interests. Citizens in the workplace are increasingly encouraged through structures like collective enterprise bargaining to become more aware and responsible for their working conditions and rights, encouraging the kind of political efficacy discussed in Chapter 1. For example, Australian primary and secondary school teachers must increasingly submit to these economic arrangements that offer little scope for effective political action and its associated educative benefits as public servants in an undervalued profession.

Under this prevailing ideology, the meanings of democratic power shift from the empowerment of citizens to determine the conditions of existence as a society, onto the empowerment of citizens to successfully gain overt power over each other in the ever-competitive market. However, not all citizens have the ability or inclination to seek empowerment in this way; they become excluded from decision-making and the political efficacy of active participation. For example, citizens in the workplace are increasingly encouraged, through decentralised political structures like collective enterprise bargaining, to become more aware and responsible for their working conditions and rights, encouraging the kind of political efficacy discussed in Chapter 1.

The democratic value of reflexive practices depends upon the way in which reflexivity is defined. For example, Scott Lash defines reflexivity as the mediation of experience through conceptual or mimetic imitation. (Lash, in Beck et al. 1994) This definition implies a limited capacity for reflexive practices in that these practices are little more than mimicry and impersonation.

I wish to emphasise Pateman's argument that there is a much deeper educative value in political participation than simply the acquisition of instrumental ends through mimicry. (Pateman 1970) Political participation encourages a political efficacy that feeds back upon both the participants and structures in a dynamic and cumulative way that enriches self-identity and the values of co-operation.

Lash naively claims that 'a genuine individualisation' occurs that increases the liberties of individuals as traditional structures erode. Rose argues, with some validity, that the belief that a heightened sense of plurality, autonomy and reflexivity is emerging is unfounded. He writes that "the whole analytic of individualization in misplaced" where it assumes that the shifts toward reflexive

processes of integration change the constitution of subjectivity at an ontological level. He believes that practices of social integration have only shifted on the spatial level concerning the way *people are known*. According to Rose, while there has been a change in integrative mechanisms, disciplinary power continues to operate. (Rose 1996a: 307-312) Like Foucault and Haraway, Rose is interested in the ways in which the body is historically constituted rather than the ways in which the *nature* of being may change over time. His argument implies that the ontological constitution of people has not essentially changed. However, I can't help but think that the rapidity and depth of the processes by which people are educated affects their identity on an ontological level. These processes of socialisation and civic education affect the ways they are known, the ways they see themselves and their reasons for being. Theorists like Rose underestimate the effects of disembodied media on the constitution of subjectivity and consequently, the profound ways in which subjects are individuated in late-modernity. While elements of the traditional, pre-technological face-to-face level of integration exist in various forms in late-modernity, the effects of the mass penetration of institutional and disembodied processes of education in recent decades must not be underestimated. For example, the impact of globalisation has initiated not only spatial shifts in social integration, as Rose argues, it has also challenged the constitution of subjectivity at the level of ontology. Through influences such as television, radio, the Internet, the cinema, the school, tourism or immigration, it is difficult *not* to have one's belief system affected by the broadening of cultural milieus. However, I agree with Rose's claim that the allegedly more autonomous self-identity is created to some extent by various elites to legitimate the governmental technologies. Australian government and corporate regimes since the 1980s have strategically evoked the neo-liberal conception of autonomy to legitimate their education policy reforms to considerable success.

A sense of critical awareness and enthusiasm for active participation can occur if the spheres of political participation are extended in association with the other educational and democratic strategies, which I will outline in Chapters' 8 and 9. The scope of democratic discourse needs to be greatly widened if any semblance of effective democratic practice is to take place. The meanings, mechanisms and values attached to education in Australia must be seriously reconsidered and expanded to account for changes in both everyday political life and the patterns of domination that pervade them.

The Postmodern Self?

Tertiary studies enriched my mother's experience of the world. They opened new discourses, offering new influences and ways of thinking. As a result, her attitudes to art, politics and relationships have changed. The PC and modem are now an integrated part of my mother's daily life. Her metal work is no longer specifically geared solely for commercial viability. It is decidedly more idiosyncratic, more distinctive and yet constantly changing. Her metal sculptures and ornaments reflect multiple identities of artist, woman, mother, wife, student and self. While she is still my father's wife and her father's daughter, her subjectivity is now constituted within and across heterogenous discourses. She is no longer the woman my father married. Her name is Jenny.

Within historically defined processes of subjective constitution, Haraway observes that identities have become 'fluid' in the sense that they are no longer ground in tradition atomistic conceptions of the self. (Haraway 1991: 157) According to Haraway, the symbolic organisation of the production and reproduction of culture shaped by electronic communications technologies undermines conceptual boundaries delineating conventional political spheres such as base and superstructure and public and private domains. (Haraway 1983) The social reformations of the late-twentieth century result in identities that "seem contradictory, partial, and strategic." Conventional categories of class, race and gender have become 'frayed' in contemporary science-mediated social systems. Nevertheless, the material bases of this growing fluidity "are intimately related to the grounds for extraordinary new structures of domination in the state, military, industrial, sexual, and imperialist orders." (Haraway 1991: 149-181) The technologically reformed public school is one such 'material' base. The neo-liberal environment of recent education reform has generated a 'user-pays' mentality in which people are more aware of market-defined freedoms of choice in the consumption of educational commodities, such as state educational facilities but less aware of abstract structures of social integration and other democratic freedoms that many of these structures inhibit. Freedom of choice within this market of empowerment fetishises democracy as just another supermarket of values. According to Bauman (1988), the freedom of choice based on market power and consumption is so pervasive because the desire upon which that freedom is based seems so real. Nowhere is this fetishism of democracy more evident than in the beliefs of Myron Lieberman described above in Chapter 3. (See Lieberman 1993: 14) While pre-technological modes of learning have the ontological benefit of relevance and the practical benefit of accessibility within a local context, reflexive processes of engagement are overlaying face-to-face relations with more abstract layers of instrumental-modern integration and pseudo-liberatory postmodern differentiation.

This is part of a general destabilising of the lifeworld. The permeation of neo-liberal values into the grammars of late-modern forms of life is linked to the widespread sense of ontological insecurity, particularly amongst those without the material and cultural capital to participate in the meritocracy of these values. Perhaps this explains the recent feelings of alienation indicated by Horne in Chapter 1. In the late-modern cultures of Australia, where science has 'proven' the improbability of the existence of supreme deities, where traditional barriers of race, gender and ethnicity have eroded and where the mass information media has exposed the ordinariness of the British Queen, many individuals become insecure in the atomistic, shifting and ontologically barren habitus of the economy which has come to replace traditional belief-systems.[72] This may also explain the shifts in discursive knowledge towards counter-cultural belief systems such as Western appropriations of Buddhism and the New Age, signifying a conscious search by many individuals for ontological

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72 In Chapter 7, I argue that widespread support for republican reform in Australia was due to the desire for many people to want to believe in a common good, where scientism and liberalism has atomised and alienated people from feeling a sense of community. Ironically, it could be this combination of liberalism and scientism which, through reflexive processes, that been responsible for the desire to break ties with the British Monarchy and establish full political autonomy for the Australian state.

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alternatives to the mainstream Western values of materialism, utilitarianism and pragmatism.[73]

There are many possible explanations for this appropriation of non-mainstream belief systems. I have already mentioned the destabilisation of the sovereign authority of the Church throughout the thesis, whose repercussions have since affected political life from the global distribution of overt power to the ontology of believers and non-believers alike. Since the rise of civil rights movements in the USA during the 1950s, various intellectuals and political movements have challenged the cultural imperialism of modern liberal democratic values and institutions across the West by analytically and practically breaking down the mainstream binaries of 'self' and 'other' as they are based on race, gender, ethnicity, class and physically ability. Since the late 1960s, various feminist movements, for example, have disputed traditional gender stereotypes. Consequently, the popularly recognised ideas of some of these movements have radically altered the widespread perceptions and structures of the workplace, family, sexuality and their representations in popular culture.[74] While these movements have widened the spheres of tolerance and freedom enjoyed by previously marginalised groups and individuals, it is possible that the subsequent recasting of identities have destabilised the traditional ontological bases of many individuals.

Another possible cause for ontological insecurity is the widespread perception of impending economic and democratic crises after several global economic 'shocks' during the 'seventies as the long economic boom ended.[75] Processes of globalisation such as the migrations of belief systems (such as Buddhism) and populations (such as migrant workers and students), the threat of 'ecocide' (such as global warming) and international trade have threatened both national identities and the post-Cold War international order of nation-states. Processes of de-traditionalisation have facilitated the reification of economic phenomena like economic recession, the naturalisation of which may be an attempt to fill an ontological vacuum. These factors may have all, in some way, contributed to a possible destabilisation of ontological securities and de-naturalisation of traditions that once provided stable, taken-for-granted foundations of lifeworlds, sewing the seeds for the widespread adoption of neo-liberal values and the domination of instrumental reason through expert systems of behavioural regulation.

The Question of Agency

There has been an intensification of the use of expert systems to guide and adjust human behaviours within and beyond the classroom. Throughout the thesis, I have attempted to draw links between formal public education and the constitution of citizenship in the late-modern democratic state, in which technologies of education are directly acquired from both state and non-state

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73 Chris Zaguras provides a bizarre insight into an example of one such stuff in the shape Brother Charles, an American "high-tech guru" who has appropriated his experience with Vedic rituals to develop a "weird fusion of New Age spirituality and therapeutic practices with a euphoric cyberculture..." (Zaguras 1994: 22-23) Zaguras quotes Brother Charles as saying "we are Americans. We have created McDonald's. If we can create fast foods, can we not create fast enlightenment?" (Zaguras 1994: 22)

74 Haraway admits to taking pleasure in watching male intellectuals adjust or try to conventionally explain the breakdown in nature-artifice distinctions evident in the integration of electronic, robotics and biological technologies into the every day lives of late-modern citizens! (Haraway 1983)

75 See Chapter 1.

actors via technologically mediated, systemic processes.[76] Techniques of social integration create a sense of individuality and autonomy, as the citizen is constituted by disciplinary regimes of social integration. As such, Foucaultian theory implies that student and teacher, prisoner and warden, and worker and employer, are *effects* of power.

In as much as Adorno claims that the truth is annihilated by power, Foucault similarly argues that self-identity is nothing more than an effect of power that exists within and beyond the agency of the self. Where the doctrines above argue for the preservation of *spheres* of freedom held by individuals and groups through *allocations* of overt and covert power, Foucault presents the somewhat nihilistic view that disciplinary power is by nature oppressive and inescapable. The Foucaultian perspective of modern governmentality seriously challenges the validity of claims that education can empower the citizen to critically reflect upon, subvert or escape patterns of domination. If subjects are effects of power, then according to the Foucaultian argument, it is impossible to *escape* power.

For Foucault, the capacities of individuals to resist the constitutive effects of power are fleeting. At the limits of power lies an "untamed exteriority" which, Foucault argues, is a brief a moment in which the self through the care and pleasure of the body. (Miller 1993) While formal public education, civic education and political socialisation would be grouped in Foucault's terms under the category of oppressive disciplinary regimes, Foucault argues that the spontaneous pursuit of irregular bodily pleasure is the only site of resistance. Even then, the resistance of power is no sooner enacted than it is absorbed by power and rendered ineffectual. Foucault's politics of resistance are limited by the binary that he creates between the ways in which the body is socially constructed, on the one hand, and the very narrowly defined way in which it is a site of obstruction, on the other.

Because agency for Foucault exists in the resistance of socialisation, education is instrumental in the oppression of the self. I reject this overly sceptical and limited account of agency. Not only does it underplay the influence of creative individuals and groups in the development of modern democracies, the theory lacks a conception of subjectivity preceding the influence of disciplinary powers. Furthermore, Foucault fails to explain the ways in which cultural traditions containing face-to-face moralities, values and belief-systems remain peculiarly resistant to administrative control, colonisation and processes of disciplinary power.[77]

Finally, as I stated above, Foucault's analysis becomes limited in light of the ways in which individuals, such as students and teachers, are becoming both regimented and empowered in the significant cultural and political shift across the end of the twentieth century. A similar criticism applies to Rose. In Foucault's analysis, like that of Rose, the subject is understood as an effect of

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76 The only exception to this specific example is perhaps the influence of the cinema experience on mass political socialisation described in Chapter 4, in which behaviours are shaped more subtly by broad and shifting cultural representations depicted on the screen. While the saturation of Northern American popular culture throughout all dimensions of Australian mass media contains many enduring cultural representations that systematically influence of the development of subjectivities on a mass-scale, they do not exhibit the degree of organisation and disciplinary techniques as the media of state governance and large corporations. Nevertheless, disembodied media, which often originate in foreign state territories, have significantly extended their spheres of influence over processes of cultural reproduction alongside other processes of globalisation in the latter twentieth century. This is clearly evident in the profound influence of CNN coverage of the Gulf War described in Chapter 4.

77 See Habermas 1975.

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power, caused by a shifting matrices of normalising discourses which generate the illusion of autonomy and voluntary compliance. As with agency, choice within this social constructionist framework is both illusion and delusion. (Hewitt 1991) Foucault's appropriation of the panopticon adequately captures some of these modes, however, it overlooks the empowering processes inherent in the development of the modern democratic state. It misses the way in which panoptic-style descriptions become misleading and outdated by the emergence of postmodern conditions including the abstract mode of integration evident in the rise of disembodied visual media. Rose's critique convincingly takes up many of these issues, however, his like-minded relativist approach provides an incomplete picture of contemporary social relations, and provides little scope for any meaningful practical response. Clearly, a richer conception of human agency is necessary to adequately analyse mass education in relation to social integration, cultural reproduction and the constitution of subjectivity. The social constructionist paradigms of Foucault and his successors underestimates role of autonomous individual and group agency in the constitution of subjectivities and the shaping of institutional structures, hence I favour Giddens' model of structuration because it encompasses those processes of normalisation identified by Foucaultian theories of governmentality but situates them within a more comprehensive analytic setting that accounts for contemporary modes of social integration. I wish to draw on the powerful insights of Rose and Foucault while defending a notion of agency that does justice to the moral, intellectual and political capabilities of students, teachers and citizenry in the determination of the conditions of their association.

The Impact of Globalisation

Global trends, such as the cultural influence of the USA over the Australian film industry described in Chapter 5, represent a significant political, economic and ontological challenge to Western nation-states. For example, the consolidation of Australia's relationship with the Pacific Rim countries since the 1980s has created challenges to both the recognition and integration of different cultural values within Australian culture. One such challenge has been the controversial marketing of Australian public education services to the Asian community.[78] The increasing interdependence of nation-states indicates the need to analyse the education of the Australian citizen from a *global perspective*.

Processes of globalisation increasingly establish themselves as familiar, though not fixed, currents in the international political landscape of the 1990s. Levels of planetary consciousness appear to be at an all time high. In the late-modern West, issues of trade, tourism, migration, diplomacy, environmental degradation and global information media, within which unprecedented levels of social, political and economic integration has taken place in the domain of international politics, have entered the public spotlight as key concerns of this globalisation. While these processes have increased in momentum, their histories are often long.

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78 Links between Asia and Australia became more entrenched in the formal education system as well. For example, In October of 1996, Monash University in Victoria established a user-pays policy for Masters degrees by course work with an explicit emphasis on Asia.

In recent decades, conventional bases of state sovereignty and localised cultural reproduction have been challenged by forces of globalisation, including the increasing spread of global capitalism, the development of super-national structures such as the European Community and the development of multinational information technologies. The significance of global tendencies depends upon one's assumptions concerning the motivations of individuals, groups and nation-states.

Through both the formal institutions of public education and the less overtly structured influences of political socialisation, students of late-modernity are bombarded with a growing array of representations that shape the student's self-identity. These representations emerge from textual, musical, visual and face-to-face modes of communication that inform and structure the student's perception of his/her relationship to various hierarchies of authority in various spheres of life from the classroom to the state, the place of work to the family and the immediate social networks in which the student spends his/her daily life. These representations act as cultural signposts to the student as to his/her perceived intellectual and physical capacities for self-empowerment. Constitutive processes of subject-formation through embodied and disembodied media generate these representations and these processes of normalisation are inturn shaped by these representations. They indicate the limits of appropriate behaviour and in doing so; illustrate the choice of lifestyles available to the student. On one level, disembodied visual media such as television and the Internet have opened up a global array of representations that are heterogeneous and sometimes contradictory. But on a deeper level, instrumentalised processes of individuation capable of eluding conscious reflection appear to increasingly shape subjectivity. I have illustrated these processes in the logic of curriculum and pedagogy as well as the structuration that occurs in public spaces, such as classrooms and cinemas. So, on one level, students must negotiate a complex dynamic of cultural reference points in the development of self-identity, while on another level, are shaped by a monological *meta*-ideology. To employ a mixed linguistic metaphor, the capacity for students to negotiate a path through life may be understood in terms of the cultural capital or literacy that defines the grammars of life available to each student.

The colonisation of lifeworld traditions has given way to more rapid and far-reaching modes of social integration through the more abstract processes of disembodied media. The immense influence of Hollywood film over Australian cinema is evidence of this. The impact of these media on the constitution of subjectivities is profound. Rose observes that the environment of the modern subject is saturated with mediated images of self-conduct and self-formation. These representations are mediated by educational television at school and through news, drama and soap operas at home, portraying a variety of moralities and behaviours. They profoundly influence mass socialisation in new ways. The declaration of love by a shy male guest on *Ricki Lake* described in Chapter 5 is an awry example. He declared his love for a co-worker to her, 'live' on American television before millions of viewers despite being too shy to communicate his feelings in another context. In the language of this thesis, disembodied media broadcast the television show to a wide audience of Australians depicting a face-to-face intercourse of what was traditionally an intimate gesture of emotion. This awry entanglement of ethical issues, disembodied media and face-to-face discursive practices, illuminates the

complexity of these new modes of integration and their effects on inter-subjectivity. The content of these representations is bound up in the structural properties of the modes through which they are communicated. Popular chat shows like Ricki Lake create a spectacle in which postmodern practices of social integration and differentiation can occur. Rose rightly points out that the cultural representations portrayed by the mass media "presuppose certain repertoires of personhood as the *a priori* of the forms of life they display." (Rose 1996a: 321) At the global level, traditional representations of cultural identity such as nationalism are altering within the context of these shifts in modes of social integration. The global media presents the audience with a heterogeneous array of cultural frames of reference which destabilise the integrative capacity of cultural frameworks like nationalism in such a way that claims to expressions of national identity in the romantic, organic sense become increasingly difficult.

According to Said, "The internalisation of norms used in cultural discourse, the rules to follow when statements are made, the 'history' that is made official as opposed to the history that is not: all these of course are ways to regulate public discussion in all societies." (Said 1994: 391) However, Said astutely adds that what differentiates the internalisation of norms in Western society in the current period from other cultures in historical time is the 'epic scale' of influence exerted this century by the global power of the United States. The USA has achieved this unprecedented level of both visible and covert power through the electronic media. The colonisation of the Australian film industry by Hollywood earlier this century is an example of this. The electronic information media is so powerful in shaping cultural discourse, mass obedience and national consensus, that according to Said, "Never has there been a consensus so difficult to oppose nor so easy and logical to capitulate to unconsciously." (Said 1994: 391-392)

The human tragedy of the Gulf War is a definitive example of the distance between the rapid changes befalling Western culture and the inability of social analysis to adequately comprehend global change. Said remarks that "Some of the work done by critical theorists; in particular, Herbert Marcuse's notion of one-dimensional society, Adorno and Enzensberger's consciousness industry—has clarified the nature of the mix of repression and tolerance used as instruments of social pacification in Western societies...Yet before the media go abroad...they are effective in representing strange and threatening foreign cultures for the home audience, rare with more success in creating an appetite for hostility and violence against these cultural 'Others' that during the Gulf crisis and war of 1990-91." (Said 1994: 353) Political scientists explained, with objective detachment, the tragedy with typical sterility and moral complacency. The relativism of postmodern theory remained tongue-tied and indifferent while the conflict took place. At the grassroots, the majority of the Australian population reacted to the Gulf war by either activating or deactivating their television sets. While this is an exaggeration, I wish to emphasise that the lack of popular critical debate over the validity of the Western alliances actions in the Gulf war. The morality of Australia's participation in the war went almost unquestioned, and the bulk of information from that war available to the public can be tracked to one source: CNN. The Australian public's education on war and its newfound artistry of technological destruction were predominantly through the electronic media.

The rise of disembodied visual media has developed as a function of this de-traditionalisation of the cultural fabric of modernity. The growth of cinema, television and computer technologies is directly transforming the nature of formal public education and the processes of mass political socialisation. According to Haraway: "It is not an exaggeration to say that modern states, multinational corporations, strategic alliances, military power, bureaucracies of the welfare state, satellite systems, political processes, fabrication of our imaginations, labour control systems, medical constructions of our bodies, personal mobility, the international division of labour, and religious evangelism depend intimately upon electronics," which breakdown the distinction between image and reality, and represents life in digitised codes of ones and zeros. (Haraway 1983) The coverage of the Gulf War was an education in 'normal political discourse' in which human destruction and televisual war-game simulations are indistinguishable. In the virtual classroom, this restructuring translates "the mind into artificial intelligence and decision procedures" in a permeation of the boundaries between material and symbolic reality; "i.e., between production, reproduction, and interpretation in the political struggle for the constitution of daily life." (Haraway 1983)

Illich rightly illustrates that technology is a problem of modern education because the ways by which it is employed are undertaken without sufficient attention to how this affects the constitution of subjectivities. (Illich 1976: 150) Haraway observes the widespread impact on the social relations of new electronic communications technologies across a variety of spheres of life including the home, market, paid work place, state, school and clinic-hospital. She highlights the potential for these technologies to distort information which inturn affects the ability of intellectuals, governments and citizens to make active, informed observations and develop alternatives: "Information is just that kind of quantifiable element (unit, basis of unity) which allows universal translation, and so unhindered instrumental power (called effective communication)." (Haraway 1983) However, the tremendous recent rise of the influence of communications technologies does not need to be understood in terms of a technological determinism; these media must be understood as being enmeshed in "an historical system depending upon the structured relations among people." The boundaries between artificial technologies such as the electronic communications media have become so entrenched in daily life that the dualisms of nature and science, natural and artificial are no longer useful concepts upon which an alternative strategy might be developed. Electronic technologies challenge these dualisms, wherein "It is not clear who makes and who is made in the relation between human and machine." (Haraway 1983) This blurring of constitutive processes of subjectivity reflects processes of structuration that are always operating within human environments at a variety of physical, epistemological and ontological levels. In late-modernity, the postmodern character of many of these processes has destabilised traditional and conventional boundaries demarcating public and private spheres, legitimate and illegitimate forms of government intervention, economic values from social ones, self-empowerment from self-regimentation and possibly even the natural and artificial.

Conclusion

Analysis of the relationship between education, culture, technology and class inequality highlights a number of widespread implications arising from recent developments in processes of mass education. Characterised by a shift in the individual and collective determination of personal and national goals towards an economically rationalised core of general principles, recent developments are enframed by these general principles of autonomy, market freedom and social integration, legitimated through the rhetorical claims of governments, education reformers and corporate agencies that the economic rationalisation of public institutions is in the name of political autonomy and economic growth. During this shift, the care and protection of public education is being transferred to the self and other localised private sectors of society via new techniques of individuation.

Though potentially empowering, techniques of self-discipline have the capacity to reconfigure the relationship of government and governed in a way that enables conditions of domination, such as class-based meritocracy. Within the growing educational discourse of self-regulation, the habitus of formal and informal contexts of learning imbues the citizen with the necessary cultural capital for self-regulation, self-discipline and self-regimentation. Those unable to play the game of meritocracy are pacified, while the successful players become absorbed in the games of elite culture.

The rules of the game are to be found in a discourse of economic rationalism that has the propensity to marginalise those interests and abilities incompatible with the systemic demands of market-driven status competition. As large portions of the population are marginalised into an exile of social alienation and political disempowerment, public and civic education is consequently losing any existing democratic virtue.

Problems of class inequality become particularly pernicious at the level of cultural reproduction. Once slotted into hierarchies of influence (and lack thereof), mass education, class division and individual agency become entwined within the cultural feedback loop of the habitus. The environment in which dominated classes are deprived of educational opportunities and resources informs the limited types of cultural capital available to them, the environment becoming reproduced as social fact in consequence. The narrow rationality guiding the process of slotting citizens in both school and community becomes the ethos of the oppressed. The logic of practise emerging from this ethos is predominantly an *instrumental* one, for example, as the major concerns of students and teachers alike in these marginalised communities increasingly revolve around utilitarianised issues of practical survival. In an environment deprived of government and commercial support, those schools unable to prove their profitability seem to be doomed. Communities and individuals are 'slotted' into 'castes' demarcated by poverty and resignation beneath a covert veil of oppression disguised as democratic freedom. Certain *Tomorrow Schools* of New Zealand already show signs of decay under the recent neo-liberal regimes of reform.

It has been my argument that while, at one level, public education is increasingly mediated by self-disciplinary and electronic technologies of mass education, at another level the traditional panoptic structure of the modern

classroom continues to play a significant role in shaping face-to-face relations between subjects and authorities. This multilayered process facilitates contradictory patterns of social integration bearing complicity with the secular imperatives of governments, corporate regimes and educated social classes. With the growth of technologies of self-discipline in the social mobilisation of student and citizen, the dissolution of the visible authority of the teacher parallels the declining welfare state. Similarly, the pacification and clientalisation of contemporary citizenship corresponds to the experience of teachers and students under the market-driven reforms pervading the polities of the USA, New Zealand and Australia since the 1980s.

Drawing on a dangerous ideology of political and economic autonomy, the motivational syndromes underpinning these reforms fetishise democratic citizenship by equating political autonomy and empowerment with market-power and consumer choice. It is evident in the effects of recent public education reforms in New Zealand and the USA that the growing equation of consumer choice with democracy is usurping the educative function of political participation and public education. Barriers to learning, social mobility and civic engagement are covertly erected by processes of self-regimentation.

A feature prevalent throughout the commercialisation of education is the increasing use of computers and television to unburden the bureaucratised welfare state of its duty to provide accessible public and civic education and the resources necessary to maintain them. The implications of this growing dependence on technological panaceas to resolve fiscal difficulties are still ambiguous, however, common to the uses of new media arising from the commercialisation of education is the application of new techniques of self-regimentation. These techniques have a number of possible effects. For example, the use of distance education and computer-based instruction has the potential to dislocate the student from traditional modes of face-to-face participation in social intercourse. It already appears to be the case that the influence of traditional modes of institutional and participatory education are being eclipsed by corporate-administered disembodied visual media, whereby mass education is occurring on increasingly abstract levels. The growing presence of disembodied technology throughout processes of social organisation is a global phenomenon tied directly to the consolidation of a world economy.

In the twilight of the twentieth century, it might be more appropriate to pledge allegiance to the free market, than to the Queen and country as I had done in school. Yet it is difficult to feel a sense of allegiance, or belonging to increasing abstract cultures of the economy. Nevertheless, these abstract cultures appear to have become solid social realities because a form of cultural imperialism permeates processes of mass education. The logic of this imperialism is instrumental reason, which through "established, and domesticated dynamics of culture," colonises lifeworlds and exiles citizens from involvement in democratic development. It is during the colonisation of lifeworlds that certain practises of self-discipline stifle the development of learning, civic virtue and democracy, while facilitating the de-traditionalisation of lifeworlds amidst certain ontologically shallow processes of reflexivity.

While these expressions of instrumentality have distinctly cultural manifestations, they are by no means embedded in immutable and irreducible historical constructions. According to Edward Said,

> *liberation is an intellectual mission, born in the resistance and opposition to the confinements and ravages of imperialism, has now shifted from the settled, established, and domesticated dynamics of culture to its unhoused, decentred, and exilic energies…*

(Said 1994: 403)

I agree with Said because there are instances when instrumental reason encounters cultural resistance that provide an analytical point of entry into the investigation of democratic strategies for social change through mass education. I will explore some of these instances below. However, liberation from the hegemony of instrumentality is more than a purely *intellectual* mission; it is a practical activity drawing upon various rationalities, creativities, intuitive and emotional expressions of human needs and interests through differing democratic institutions and modes of communication. I shall focus discussion on these possibilities in the final part of this thesis that follows. The instrumentalisation of education has significant repercussions affecting the ongoing development and experience of democracy in Australia. The fundamental issue here is how the colonisation of instrumental reason in late-modernity can be prevented (or at least minimised) in the interests of preserving the capacities of individuals and groups to enjoy and celebrate diverse ways of life.

My mother taught me that the capacity to reason is hollow without intuition and the ability to rationalise is empty without creativity.

Chapter 7: Education and the Exiles

There are no more deserts, there are no more islands. Yet the need for them makes itself felt. If we are to understand the world, we must turn aside from it; if we are to serve men better we must briefly hold them at a distance. But where can we find the solitude necessary to strength, the long breathing-space in which the mind can gather itself together and courage take stock of itself? We still have large towns. But these must fulfil certain conditions.

The cities that Europe can offer are too full of rumours from the past. A practised ear can still detect the rustling of wings, the quivering of souls. We feel the dizziness of centuries, of glory and of revolutions. There, we remember the clamour in which Europe was forged. There is not enough silence.

Albert Camus (1995: 1)

Introduction

The nature of mass education in Australia is changing. A degree of change is inevitable, however, if the shifts in public education, political participation and mass-socialisation in the twentieth century depicted in the previous chapters are any indication, then what is significant about recent change is the emergent form, intensity and scope of the *processes* of mass education and the *rationalities* behind their execution. So far, I have attempted to show the *depth* and *pace* with which this overall change in education is taking place. By *depth*, I mean the ways by which changes to public education appear to be connected to mutations in other spheres of life across Australian society that alter the character of Australian liberal democracy. The movement of some of these changes defy traditional boundaries dividing public and private life, work and leisure, class and the equal distribution of wealth and resources, gender equality and patriarchy and the territorial perimeters separating nation-states. The fast *pace* of this movement is evident in the rapid rise of disembodied visual media illustrated in Chapter 4. Underlying these changes and rationalities are shifting modes of instrumental reason, which has come to predominate Western thinking during the twentieth century.

In the first part of this thesis, I argued that these changes amount to re-configurations of *power* and *authority*. At a basic structural level, Australian government reform to the public education system since the 1980s has involved a reorientation of the citizen's relationship to the state. Given that nearly every Australian citizen passes through the education system at some point in their lives, and given that the education system is a central institution of the democratic state, then most major changes to the formal education its citizens have significant repercussions affecting the constitutive processes of subjectivity. The capacity for the realisation of diverse forms of livelihood in contemporary society has been stifled by a domination of the instrumentality over the rationalisation of the liberal democratic state. Understanding changes to education, therefore, means coming to grips with altering ontological

conditions of identity-formation within different spheres of life from the classroom to the cinema, to the overlaying modes of disciplinary power employed by the late-modern democratic state. Concepts of democracy, authority and the state are pivotal to my analysis of the contemporary dominance of instrumentality.

My objective in this part of the thesis is to propose a model of democracy that can adequately facilitate the difficult task of constructing a theory of practise beyond the ideological hegemony of instrumental reason. As I argued in Chapter 1, a democratic society's expectations of its citizens reflect its self-image and goals. While there have been many positive advances through institutional and civic education in the furtherance of the well-being of many Australians, certain negative consequences of instrumentally rationalised changes to education are causally linked to the involuntary marginalisation of ideas, valuesand freedoms necessary for citizens to experience meaningful and active membership of the Australian polity. These processes of marginalisation amount to an undemocratic exile of ideas, democratic values, liberties and human beings from participating in the ongoing shaping of a democracy.

A major part of the pursuit of a good and just existence for all in a democratic society is related to quality of the education of all of its members. In the Australian political system, the quality of democracy is a function of the education of its citizens. To what democratic qualities ought one aspire? For all his neo-liberal assumptions Hayek astutely remarks in his 1944 work, *The Road To Serfdom* that "It may well be true that our generation talks and thinks too much of democracy and too little of the values it serves." (Hayek 1994: 78) This chapter concerns the roles of formal public schooling and civic education in maintaining and enriching Australian democracy. I have chosen to discuss these roles in terms of an *exile* of ideas, values, liberties and citizens of Australian democracy. To emphasise the link between education and democracy, I will provide parallel examples of four dimensions of exile in the education context: (i) the exile of methodologies; (ii) the exile of political values; (iii) the classroom exile; and (iv) the 'lounge-room' exile.

I wish to firstly provide an appropriate and cohesive analytical paradigm for examining the dynamic relationships between subjects and political and economic structures in late-modern liberal democracy. The concept of 'late-modernity' is used here, as through the whole of the thesis as a short-hand designation of the current period, characterised by layers of traditionalism, modernism and postmodernism, or, to be more specific, by the dominance of a certain kind of instrumental modernism overlaid by new postmodern sensibilities and practices. Postmodern 'ruptures' and 'conditions' arising since the 1970s indicate a cultural shift in contemporary society. Characterised by a mix of new patterns of power, rule, social integration and authority, these emergent patterns have taken place at the expense or *exile* of certain notions of human reasoning behind key principles and values of democracy. This exile of ideas is connected to the ways by which the popular discourse of political and social method has developed this century within an overly narrow, limited epistemological, ethical and ontological framework. Structured within the meta-narrative of instrumental reason, this 'mainstream' Western belief-system has endured despite the challenges of counter-cultures. The pragmatic dimension of instrumental reason absorbs and reifies some of these challenges. Those dimensions not incorporated into the mainstream are marginalised; and those

that are absorbed, integrated and colonised undergo a process of cultural sterilisation. The integration of differing beliefs is not entirely a negative process, as contemporary feminist movements have proved with some success.

The exile of democratic values has created a political discourse in which the reduction and denial of certain basic democratic liberties has taken place without any serious public reflection, debate or provision of alternatives. My evocation of the 'classroom exile' concerns the limitations to the recognition and experience of democratic liberties by ordinary citizens. As students increasingly become products and clients of a market-based education system, the student is becoming exiled from his/her right to universal education.

The exile of ideas, democratic values and freedoms has resulted in the marginalisation of many Australian citizens from a community in which, in principle, they should be equal and active members. The image of the 'living room exile' is employed to illustrate how the dominance of instrumental reason vicariously exiles citizens from the educative potential of meaningful democratic participation in the making of political decisions. Processes of self-regimentation neglect the provision of critical and reflexive strategies to the student and citizen.

Identifying the categories of exile from education has two important and interrelated implications:

(i) The lifeworlds of those movements and individuals resisting colonisation are marginalised. They are progressively denied democratic benefits that they in principle still have the right to enjoy (such as universal access to education); and

(ii) Processes of self-regimentation atomise members of political communities into exile from active political participation. They become increasingly excluded from active involvement of the democratic process and the democratic education associated with participation.

The corrosion of democratic structures and values has escalated since the early 1970s. This corrosion is evident in the changes to education illustrated throughout this thesis. The decline of the welfare state in recent decades has had a traumatic effect on nearly all of Australia's public institutions, not the least of which is the public school. In 1985, Coombs felt that the public educational crisis identified in his 1960 report had only deepened.[79] (Tiffin and Rajasingham 1995: 9) During the 1980s and 1990s, numerous Australian public educational reviews such as the Finn, EPAC and Carmichael reports also indicated varying problems confronting Australian public education during the latter twentieth century. As illustrated in Chapter 1, a commonality among all of these public educational reviews has been a subsequent outcry for 'back to basics' to revitalise the basic canons of literacy and numeracy. The following discussion argues that we need to go beyond these often-rhetorical outcries to a discussion of the *democratic basics* of public education that need protection and entrenchment. There is the need for in some form of democratic guarantee or benchmark if the detrimental effects of recent reforms are to be curbed. These 'basics' of mass education are grounded in democratic principles. In light of comments like Hayek's above, the second section of this chapter employs a

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[79] See Chapter 1.

more pertinent analytic model to highlight those *democratic values,* which I argue are essential to the ongoing realisation of democracy. Not only must public education in Australia be protected against encroachment from particularistic interests, such as those of certain private corporations and undemocratic state regulation, a standard of what is expected of the general education of all Australians needs to also be defined. These measures of quality education are intimately tied to democratic citizenship.

A revitalisation of the meanings and functions Australian citizenship occurred in the early 1990s. Three interrelated dimensions of possible citizenship reform emerged during this period: (i) the need for an identification of goals and values of Australian citizenship that could be entrenched in the form of benchmarks and indicators; (ii) the need for a more firmly entrenched legal protection of different spheres of life in the form of universal rights (e.g. a right to education); and (iii) a need to invigorate and expand the role of democratic participation in the daily life of every citizen. There is a long liberal tradition that has a high regard for the educative value of democratic participation in a broad sense, however, in this chapter I wish to draw out the more direct links between citizenship, rights and democratic participation as a means to invigorating active political education and protecting the Australian education system itself as a valuable site of democracy.

Each section of this chapter will conclude with a section providing a theoretical framework by which the values, ideas, liberties and people can be justifiably returned from exile to fulfil an essential part of democratic practise and development. The starting point for the salvation of democracy through education is Habermas' defence of the 'the unity of reason in the diversity of its voices'. (Habermas 1992: 115-148) Habermas provides a conceptual way into exposing both the limitations of the hegemony of instrumental reason as a viable logic of collective action in late-modern states and arguing for the potential of Western culture to develop a richer, more democratically sympathetic conception of reason. Starting from this richer sense of reason, I respond to the ideological exile of people from a positive form of modern liberal democracy by outlining a more comprehensive and inclusive conception of democracy.

My proposal for an enrichment of democracy through education in Australia sets out to negate the hegemony of instrumental reason, arguably the greatest barrier to meaningful democratic practise in Australia in the latter part of the twentieth century. Because European traditions of democracy 'are too full of rumours from the past' and are in serious need of re-evaluation, the model of effective democracy I propose is designed to be flexible to the changing needs and values of Australian people over time and space. The model proposed is intended to: (i) promote important existing characteristics, values and structures of Australian democracy; (ii) salvage valuable components of democracy that have been unduly forsaken or transformed in the development of the modern democratic state, and; (iii) employ democratic structures that are applicable to the contemporary Australian context in which local and global postmodern phenomena are increasingly evident.

The Exile of Ideas

Having commenced this thesis in 1993, I was able to procure academic work as a tutor of politics at one university and as a philosophy lecturer at another. I needed the extra income because jazz piano alone was financially insufficient. While teaching was an enjoyable and challenging vocation, my initial enthusiasm was subdued by the high priority that most students seemed to place on achieving high grades.

Many students concentrated more on the acquisition of the most technically efficient means of achieving high academic scores at the expense of other learning benefits. The idea of spontaneous and politically charged debate or research independent of curricula requirements was often antithetical to the expectations of those students. I was quickly reminded that my own experience of high-school was characterised by the development of instrumental techniques calculated at minimising effort and maximising marks, however, my more valued education at university originated from spontaneous discussion and the haunting of second-hand book stores.

Furthermore, in my experience, university opened up the possibility of exploring diverse discourses ranging from jazz performance to Super 8 filmmaking. These intellectual, emotional and sensory experiences significantly contributed to my university education. However, I could not sufficiently impart the virtues of my education in a meaningful way to my students within the instrumentalised pedagogy expected by my students. Attempts to do so were restricted by restraints of time, resources, the cramped space of the classroom and lack of experience as a teacher. (I am still amazed that I did not need to have any teaching experience to become a university teacher in Australia. An education qualification of 'expert knowledge' sufficed.)

The popular equation of public education with the meritocracy of economic status creates a culture in which the necessity to achieve high grades is locked in a feedback loop through which schooling is sterilised of its broader educative value. This culture of necessity for status-competition creates a taste for necessity in public education that frames the function and appreciation of learning instrumentally. Ironically, the promise of money motivated most of my students while a lack of university funding restricted my ability to teach them. Dominating my vocations as teacher and musician, and the motivations of my students, was the ideology of economic rationalism.

So widely spoken is the language of economic rationalism in Australian political discourse that it seems to have cast aside many core principles of education, effectively marginalising fundamental ideas and experiences. This ideology represents the most significant and potentially dangerous manifestation of instrumental reason in the West this century. In a way, economic rationalism has become like the theology of pre-modern authoritarian structures that I described above. The epistemological and ontological hegemony of this narrow rationality has presented a tremendous barrier to critical thinking. Consequently, attempts to stimulate popular critical debate are demobilised by the ideological straight-jacket of instrumental reason. The cultural imperialism of instrumentality feeds back into the loop of the habitus at the expense of democratic pluralism. This cultural imperialism is veiled by technology and complex processes of social integration emanating from the state, local and

global economic agents and the self according to self-disciplinary practises. The cultural imperialism of instrumental reason appeals to revised traditional liberal notions of political autonomy and pedagogical standards of technical proficiency (e.g. literacy and numeracy).

Said's approach to understanding the cultural imperialism of Western rationality borrows Jameson's description of postmodernism to illustrate 'new patterns of dominance'. These patterns are set amidst contemporary culture's "new relationship with the past based on pastiche and nostalgia, a new and eclectic randomness in the cultural artefact, a reorganisation of space, and characteristics of multinational capital." [80] (Jameson 1983: 123-125) Drawing upon Jameson's description the 'phenomenally incorporative capacity' of contemporary culture, Said argues that contemporary culture "makes it possible for anyone in fact to say anything at all, but everything is processed either towards the dominant mainstream or out to the margins." (Said 1994: 392) He rightly observes that in American culture, anything that is "not major, not central, not powerful" becomes euphemistically labelled as 'alternative' and is relegated to the margins of the mainstream culture and the public sphere. Through the new disembodied media, "new images of centrality... supplant the slower, reflective, less immediate and rapid processes of print culture, with its encoding of the attendant and recalcitrant categories of historical class, inherited property, and traditional privilege." American presidents, television commentators, celebrities and corporate officials have become the representatives of this centrality, signifying power, authority and national identity. By maintaining "ideas with the balances of moderation, rationality, pragmatism" they prevent counter-narratives from emerging from alternative modes and agents, such as "alternative states, peoples, cultures, alternative theatres, presses, newspapers, artists, scholars and styles, which may later become central or at least fashionable." (Said 1994: 392-393)

Said's critique of cultural imperialism is applicable in Australian culture. Here a Benthamite tradition has provided a fertile seedbed for the economic rationalisation of education. Australia's Benthamite tradition is one of several facets of instrumental reason that frames and delimits the popular conception, development and experience of contemporary democracy.

The Exile of Methodologies

Australian education reform stem from the ways democratic politics is perceived within mainstream political discourse. Collins argues that popular understandings of Australian politics tend to be confined to electoral and ministerial activity. Collins locates an historical link between this narrow but widely held perspective of democracy and the profound influence of Benthamite thinking on the formation of Australian government. He illustrates a Benthamite influence in the way that political success is measured by "twin utilitarian standards" of efficacy (*will it work?*) and plurality (*have you got the numbers?*) Utilitarian standards were rearticulated during the 1980s, guiding education reform towards meeting the needs of industry. According to Collins,

The universities, which have codified and certified useful knowledge,
have been mostly post-Darwinian creations: the particular scientific

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[80] See my discussion of Fredric Jameson in Chapter 4.

paradigm they have enshrined has reinforced the tendances of utilitarianism. Empiricism has been a natural enemy of speculative thought; positivism has reigned, almost without challenge, in science, law, philosophy, history, economics, and the social sciences.

(Collins 1985: 156)

Collins adds that the "secular, 'engineering' character of Australian tertiary education is nowhere more evident than in the professional separation from humanities and social sciences achieved by law and economics. The autonomy of law and economics faculties has been to the detriment of each and at the cost of all, since they supply the graduates who chiefly govern the nation..." (Collins 1985: 156)

As noted earlier, Habermas argues that the type of state intervention into the economies of late-modern Western democracies, combined with growing corporate influence and juridification, has undermined the critical potential of the public sphere and its democratic functioning as the forum for civic education. The technocratic consciousness of the state has directed political action away from direct public transformation to modes of state and corporate intervention. The media of economic agents and government appear to be "nature-like" features of contemporary culture. Subsequently, certain economic and political phenomena become rationalised by state and information media as objective forces beyond critical reflection. (Habermas 1975: 143) The use of positivist methods to measure political, social and economic forces this century has yielded distorted and misconceived standards of social and political well-being. An example of this distortion is evident in the use of pseudo-objective models to evaluate the functioning and effectiveness of democratic institutions (e.g. the literacy testing of public schools). Another example is the way economic phenomena, such as economic recession, are reified and treated like forces of nature, acquiring the semblance of existence beyond the direct control of state and citizen alike. Economic phenomena become popularly recognised as "social facts." The functioning of democracy has become a sacred domain of legal, government and corporate "specialists," placing the understanding of democratic processes at a far distance from most citizens. This reductionist, objectivistic approach to understand economic and political life fails to address the cultural and inter-subjective dimensions of modern political life. As a result, dimensions of democracy concerned with citizen-rule, differing normative conceptions of liberty and the voluntary preservation of diverse lifestyles are epistemologically marginalised from the public agenda into an exile of ideas and values.

The Exile of Democratic Values

Kukathas, Lovell and Maley note that their attempt to evaluate political institutions by measuring them against the standards of liberalism and democracy encountered one major barrier—the values of liberalism and democracy conflict at the most basic levels. For example, it may be democratic to kill a minority group under a majority decision, as was the case once in Ancient Greek democracy, but it would not be sanctioned within a liberal democratic framework. (Kukathas *et al.* 1990: 3) The development of liberal democracy in Australia during the twentieth century has experienced significant material problems due to a variety of domestic and global phenomena. Some of these problems arise from tensions inherent in liberal democracies, reminding

advocates of democracy in Australia that certain theoretical dilemmas in the liberal conception of democratic practice need to be understood and, where possible, resolved.

Based on a doctrine of individualism, classical liberal philosophers acknowledged that because people place different values on goals such as equality, justice, culture or happiness, they must to curtail a degree of freedom in the interests of other values to create desirable conditions of association. To ensure that "plain men ruled wisely," the philosophical solution of liberalism was to place both ruler and ruled under the authority of law. Bentham believed that the sanctity of individual freedom be tempered by law. The liberal principle of liberty from interference is drawn via legal concepts such as natural law, natural rights, utility and the social contract, which I outlined in Chapter 1.[81] In practise, institutions had to be devised to prevent the rulers from turning the law in to an instrument serving particular ends or interests. Therefore, liberalism emphasises a rule of law that legitimates the authority of "government not as an instrumentality with the authority to rule in accordance with popular mandate, but as one among several political institutions which enable a society to deal with its common concerns under the guidance of law." (Kukathas *et al.* 1990: 10-12)

The modern manifestation of this principle has been distorted within the legally sanctified yet *undemocratic* colonisation of lifeworlds in modern liberal democracies like Australia. Undermining certain liberties necessary for the maintenance of democracy, the development of modern liberalism in the Australian context has neglected certain types of freedoms and lifestyles not accounted for in its doctrine. Consequently, these freedoms reside in exile from the discourse of modern political life at the expense of meaningful democratic citizenship. Despite the liberal tradition of rights, Australia lacks any formal right to a minimum standard of education. Such rights could have protected, or at least raised public awareness of, the ways by which economically rationalised education reforms have impaired the effectiveness of many public schools that are legally powerless to counteract the appalling and alienating effects of the school reforms identified in Chapter 3.

This inconsistency becomes comprehensible in light of Bentham's influence on the formation of Australian education and democracy. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Collins claims that Australia is a "Benthamite society" in which the dominant ideology conforms to the utilitarianism, legalism and positivism of Bentham's political philosophy. In his examination political ideology in Australia, Collins argues that because "the mental universe of Australian politics is essentially Benthamite," the "tensions and tendencies within Bentham's philosophy became the dilemmas and directions of Australian politics."[82] (Collins 1985: 148) Collins' argument is valid to some extent. Australian popular culture features a strong utilitarian ethic of efficiency. Also consistent with Bentham's is the absence of formal rights in Australia's constitutional framework. The idea of

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81 Also see Berlin 1975: 123-127.

82 Collins argues that those who prevailed in Australia's colonial political struggles such as the Chartist movement during the mid-1800s were the bearers of Bentham's ideas, unwittingly and otherwise. Bentham's philosophy succeeded in Australia by the latter 1800s where it had generally failed in Britain, marking a point of departure of Australian political culture from Britain's. One colonial liberal, C. H. Pearson, said that he had changed from "a liberal of the English type to a democratic liberal." Pearson's definition of democracy contained tenets of utilitarian liberalism including "self-government by men educated up to a common low level, and trained by the habit of self-government under institutions which secure power to the majority." (Collins 1985: 151)

entrenched and enduring spheres of freedom through rights is antithetical to the utilitarianism, in which the rules of political organisation are secondary to the goal of greatest happiness for the greatest number. The basic freedoms of minorities and the marginalised are secondary to this end. As far as legal rules of conduct are concerned, the utilitarian is primarily interested in them as technically efficient instruments of the political ends of the majority.

Besides containing this strong utilitarian tradition, Australian liberal democracy is also the product of a mixture of other different democratic traditions and institutions. This mixture includes elements of classical liberalism, democratic socialism, republicanism, participatory democracy and contemporary liberalism. Each of these doctrines has its own distinctive conception of democracy and the means necessary for its realisation. I will now briefly examine six of these perspectives and the democratic values they espouse.

Democracy According to the Left

> *"Democracy has, if anything, to be retrieved from the clutches of liberalism."*
>
> (Macpherson, in Kukathas *et al.* 1990: 9)

Despite being labelled a "liberal democracy," the Australian political system has also been significantly influenced by the values of democratic socialism. (Kukathas *et al.* 1990: 10)

Macpherson highlights two elements of contemporary democratic theory: utility maximisation and the maximisation of *powers*. Utility maximisation is a key liberal democratic value based on the belief that the liberal democratic political system is the essential complement of a free economy. (Kukathas *et al.* 1990: 9) This coupling of economy and polity is based on an unrealistic assumption that the free-market can ensure equality and free choice for all. Macpherson justifiably argues that because access to the market is rarely on a truly equal basis, the workers who must *sell* their labour power have their powers of free choice reduced. According to Barry, the utility maximising model of democracy may be seen as ethically deficient because the exchange process conducted within the capitalist economic system entails an unequal transfer of powers. (Barry 1981: 227) The effects of this deficiency are evident in the privatisation of public education. For example, the type of corporate intervention by private firms like Whittle Communications in the North American formal education system creates an uneven transfer of powers away from the state, school administrators, teachers and students. Neither students nor teachers can exercise any control over the nature of the advertising screened during class each day by Whittle Communications. Similarly, schools most dramatically affected by state-funding cutbacks in Australia and New Zealand increasingly find themselves at the mercy of corporate sponsors.[83] Furthermore, the decline of visible authority examined in Chapter 5 has effectively left individual teachers with no political strength to challenge the state's draconian economic reforms to ensure minimal working conditions in pay, hours or class-sizes. These examples illustrate class oppression beneath the liberal mask of "equality for all." The Marxist critique of liberal democracy is aimed at the utility-maximising approach of liberalism, in which the conception of political man is seen to be

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[83] See Chapter 3.

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"narrow and demeaning." Instead, Marxist approaches emphasise communal values of friendship and cooperation over the liberal doctrine of competitive individualism. Liberal democracies are rightly criticised by Marxists for mainly political-economic reasons, because "they fail to fulfil traditional democratic ideals of political equality, freedom and governmental accountability..." (Barry 1981: 226)

Where the liberal doctrine advocated by Hayek emphasises the need for fixed-rules, contemporary Marxist criticism places little value upon formal rights to address certain inequalities because of their essential link to the rule of law. The Left has argued that rights emanate from the same political (liberal) framework in which effective rule of law ultimately depends on the power of a sovereign authority to enforce them—a power that is rooted in relations of domination with law as the instrument of class oppression. (Putnam, in Campbell 1983: 5-14) Chase suggests that the rule of law is inevitably open to abuse by state and/or corporate actors seeking to legitimate economic coercion and ideological manipulation. (Chase 1984: 1559)

In his analysis of the development of rights in the modern democratic state, Giddens prefers to draw a distinction between the civil rights won by an emergent bourgeoisie and the economic civil rights won by unions. (Giddens, in Held 1989: 207) Civil rights are tied to the modes of surveillance employed in the policing activities of the state. Institutions such as the judicial system control any behaviour deviating from the economic interests of the state. Because the state is seen as an instrument of capitalism, civil rights confirmed the dominance of capital while economic civil rights threatened the functioning of the market where market forces were subordinated to social justice. For Giddens, class and state power are directly linked in modernity. In Giddens' assessment, class conflict in a liberal democracy is intrinsically the medium of the extension of citizenship rights and the foundation of an insulated economy and polyarchy within the modern welfare state. (Held 1989: 195-207) Class power is held on the basis of political power. The law court is the institutionalised setting in which rights are vindicated in the interests of class power. According to Putnam, liberal legalism is a major obstacle to class-consciousness by maintaining conditions of alienation amongst subordinate classes: "Rights are the prized possessions of alienated persons." (Putnam, cited in Campbell 1983: 8) The Left rightly assert that rights are useless if they are not actively enjoyed.

At a deeper ontological level, it is argued that the liberal conception of natural rights as *universal* rights is a myth. For example, critics from the Left have argued that the natural right to property is a historically conditioned expression of bourgeois interests, thus rights are not universal and inalienable. Claims to freedom and justice within liberal rights discourse is seen by these critics as nothing more than the moral rhetoric of bourgeois individualism, producing juridical and coercive associations. Contemporary left-wing critics have claimed that rights, as they exist in modern liberal democracies, are rooted in a legal institution that is destructive of community relations because these rights presuppose that personal autonomy is characterised by economic competition between self-interested individuals with vested property interests: "rights are analytically tied to rule governed relationships in which the propriety of interactions is determined by the conformity or lack of it between the actual behaviour and normative rules of conduct." (Campbell 1983: 14) Furthermore, while liberal rights such as the right to property are defined by a doctrine of

competitive individualism, critics of liberalism argue that institutions, organisations and nations also have rights. (Raz 1986)

However, there are camps of socialism that argue that, in theory, temporary rights may facilitate social change necessary for the achievement of full socialism. They advocate an instrumental model of strategically secured rights, involving participation in mixed party electoral skirmishes and compromises with "popular front" politicians. Marx, for example, defends universal suffrage as a means of making universally accessible the rights of political participation to abolish the dualism of state and civil society by liquidating the private sector and making *civil* existence inessential by contrast to *political* existence. Marx argues that the collective interests of a species would replace the interests of an individual along with the state, law and other forms of alienation. (Walicki, in Chase 1984: 1554) The assumption is that people under socialism will be united by bonds deeper than individual rights in a willing spirit of cooperation unencumbered by restrictive regulations and the motivations of self-interested competition. (Campbell 1983) Nevertheless, Chase argues that this view lacks credibility in that the instrumental employment of rights to facilitate socialism may still be co-opted by authoritarian regimes. (Chase 1984: 1559)

There are also those on the Left who argue that rights are useful not only as instrumental means, but as ends in themselves. (Chase 1984: 1553) Franz Neumann asserts that rights such as civil rights need to be preserved and defended as restraints upon both state and non-state powers to protect freedom and facilitate man's fullest development. Nevertheless, like Habermas, Neumann is cautious of the system of law in liberal democratic theory because it has a precarious semi-autonomy anchored in the status of basic rights and in the dominant qualities of law. The rule of law has the potential to either restrain the abuse of power or be "transformed, rematerialised and ultimately destroyed" by an economic and political monopoly. Neumann argues that during this century, economic and political monopolies have become normatively entrenched and legitimated through statutory jurisprudence and the revival of natural law. The power of the private sphere to permit political power to prevail over individual rights could possibly lead to a totally administered society. (Chase 1984) Like Neumann, Habermas argues that juridification has the potential to facilitate the totally administered society in which lifeworlds are completely colonised by state and corporate imposed regulations.[84]

In summary, the core values of the Left's conception of democracy stand in stark contrast to the individualism of liberalism. For Macpherson, a truly democratic society promotes the human powers of creativity through social cooperation. Macpherson argues that individualism is not even a fundamental democratic value. For example, a common imperative amongst certain Leftist defenders of democracy is the need to relate the idea of rights to human needs rather than to *a priori* conceptions of individual liberty. This needs-based orientation is understood in terms of the communal arrangements of socially motivated persons committed to the cooperative satisfaction of human needs and the fulfilment of every individual's potential within a rule-governed

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84 See Chapter 3.

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framework.[85] (Campbell 1983: 4) This spirit of social cooperation as an ethical component of democracy also has a strong tradition within liberal theory itself. Macpherson traces this conception of man as a *doer* and *creator* (rather than as consumer) back to J. S. Mill. (Barry 1981: 226-227) The democratic significance of social cooperation highlighted by the neo-Marxist theory developed by Macpherson also lies at the heart of communitarian theory.

Communitarian Alternatives

Based upon the assumption of atomistic individualism, liberalism espouses a view of democracy that is geared toward the protection of negative liberty. In contrast to this assumption is a "positive" conception of liberty underlying the communitarian theories of democracy. According to Berlin, positive freedom exists in the source of control or interference that can determine someone to live a certain way. (Berlin 1975: 121) Where the liberal conception democracy confines the role of law to the minimal function of protecting spheres of individual autonomy from unwarranted intervention, the communitarians emphasise the possibility for individuals to use legal structures to actively expand and develop their spheres of autonomy. Pettit argues that promoting positive liberty means "enhancing people's moral and psychological power to exploit legal opportunity." (Pettit 1987: 177) This positive conception of freedom emphasises a democratic society in which one is *free to pursue* self-determination and active participation in the process by which one is governed.

The communitarian approach assumes that society is not merely the sum of self-interested individuals in the liberal sense, arguing that groups are not necessarily the products of the will and interests of individuals. (Unger 1975: 81) Unger replaces the liberal principle of individualism with his principle of totality where "the whole is treated as an indivisible unit..." Society is regarded as an organic entity, within which individuals and groups are fundamentally interdependent. Unger treats social wholes as "real things in the world of fact." (Unger 1975: 125, 129) This conception of society is a prominent component of republicanism.

Modern republican theory advances a conception of democracy in which government seeks to achieve "the common good" through deliberation by political actors who act not in their own interest or the interests of their constituents, but in the interest of the community as a whole. Unlike liberal theorists, who narrowly conceive citizenship in terms of a *legally defined individual status*, advocates of civic republicanism attach a high priority to the *practice* of citizenship. (Oldfield 1990: 177-187) Ease of access to the political process by all citizens and groups is highly valued under the republican principle of the political equality. (Williams 1995: 133) Williams suggests that the resurgence of republicanism in the USA may indicate dissatisfaction with modern liberalism's fixation with courts and rights-centred strategies for the protection of individual liberty. (Williams 1995: 133-134)

The central problem with the holistic assumption of republican and communitarian theories is the potential to overlook the importance of *individuals*

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[85] As illustrated at the start of this chapter, Left wing critics of liberalism disagree as to the nature of this 'rule governed framework.' For example, rights are an intrusion on spontaneous, uncalculating and unreserved mutual service in a genuine community where there is no duty to love, no right to be loved. However, radical socialists reject the value of rights because they are seen to be tied to a coercive state that is the instrument of capitalism. (Campbell 1983)

comprising the *common good*. For example, Raz points out that rights such as free speech may be upheld as a right that is in the public interest, without acknowledging the right-holder's interest *itself*, independent of its contribution to the public interest. (Raz 1986: 179) The aggrandisement of positive freedom inherent in the approaches of both communitarian and republican doctrines risks the possible subversion of democracy by a tyranny of the majority. Liberalism bases its justification of legalism on the belief that majority rule has the potential to systematically exclude the interests of minorities from the public agenda to undemocratic ends. Liberals argue that inherent in mass participation based on majority rule is the potential to turn democratic government into something "no better than a specious disguise for brutal tyranny." (Berlin 1975: 131)

Participatory Democratic Alternatives

Social democrats such as Wolff argue that liberal theory views the role of political participation too instrumentally. He emphasises the role of politics as a "dialogue" or a kind of "public conversation." While conventional political theorists such as Dahl and Polsby emphasise the need to make political participation—such as voting—binding to maintain a pluralist society; for theorists such as Pateman, a much deeper conception of participation is required which is lacking under liberalism. (Kukathas *et al.* 1990: 20-22)

Participatory theories of democracy extending back to Rousseau and J. S. Mill advocate an educative function of democratic participation. Participatory theories argue that beyond democratic structures, such as the legal system, essential to democracy is the quality and attitudes of its citizens. (Kymlicka and Norman 1994: 352-381) Conditions must exist for the promotion of active participation in a just, democratic and mutually supportive political community: "for a democratic polity to exist it is necessary for a participatory society to exist" (Pateman 1970: 43) Democracy is realised more effectively if the people involved feel that they had an active part in the process of decision-making. The key justification for participatory conceptions of democracy rests on the belief that human results that accrue from the participatory process itself. These results include not just policy decisions but also the development of the social and political capacities of each individual. (Pateman 1970)

Barry raises a valid criticism of participatory theory that "if the necessary conditions [for participation] cannot be satisfied and if human nature refuses to be "moralised," there is no protection for the individual who finds himself at odds with collective decisions..." (Barry 1981: 229) Barry asserts that most individuals cannot afford the time and energy required for the level of rational participation advocated by these theorists. Barry's assertion is consistent with that aspect of liberalism extending back to Bentham, which valorises a conception of individuals as utility-maximisers. According to this liberal view, a lack of political participation or desire for participation may reflect a satisfaction with the political system, therefore, individuals may be seen as placing a higher use-value on other dimensions of their lives.[86] This argument is undermined to

some extent by a growing sense of alienation experienced by some Australians from the political system and the growth of widespread interest in republican reforms such as the introduction of a bill of rights in recent years. (Galligan 1995, Horne 1994, Walker 1993, Walker *et al.* 1993) Modern liberal approaches, such as that of John Rawls, have attempted to move beyond the utilitarian trappings of classical liberalism, without relying upon the social assumptions of human nature and societal organicism evident in communitarian and republican theories.

Contemporary Liberal Alternatives

Kukathas, Lovell and Maley suggest that modern liberalism is "a series of attempts to develop a conception of a society ruled by law, with law understood not as an instrument of the ruler but as the product of independent judgements in a free society." (Kukathas *et al.* 1990: 13) They justifiably argue that there are elements of the liberal inheritance of modern liberal democracy that are worthwhile, even in Australia, where its liberal democratic evolution has been (until recently) influenced by the political sensibilities of democratic socialism. (Kukathas *et al.* 1990: 10)

The democratic theory of Rawls is possibly the most significant attempt to recast the valuable components of this liberal inheritance within the context of late-modern democratic life. Rawls wishes to distinguish himself from the traditional utilitarian approach of liberalism, while maintaining other key tenets of the liberal doctrine. For example, he assumes that there will always be conflict of interests between individual citizens, and that because some groups and individuals will always struggle for advantage, "a set of principles is required for choosing among the various social arrangements which determine this division of advantage." (Rawls, quoted in Mouffe 1992: 211) These principles of social justice are based on the thesis that "since no one knows what standing he or she will enjoy in the society whose rules are being drawn up, and since everyone will primarily be concerned to ensure that they are not themselves disadvantaged, we can safely treat as principles of just distribution whatever agreement is reached under such circumstances by "free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests." (Skinner, in Mouffe 1992: 212) Justice is held by Rawls to be the first virtue of democratic institutions, the first principle of which is the respect of absolute autonomy and the separateness of individuals above all else. (Skinner, in Mouffe 1992: 212) Rawls defends the basic liberal tenet that every member of a liberal democracy should possess an equal right to the most comprehensive total system of basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all members. If justice is to be preserved, then a minimum set of individual rights need to be respected. (Skinner, in Mouffe 1992: 213)

To theoretically justify this conception of social justice, Rawls employs "the device of an imagined contract as a means of trying to show us how rational individuals would... arrive at an agreed account of distributive justice, and hence an agreed set of principles for the proper treatment of individuals within society." (Skinner, in Mouffe 1992: 211) The state's role is to protect justice, keeping its demands upon the citizen to a minimum. Liberty is restricted only for the sake of individual liberty. Therefore, notions of the common good central to the communitarian and republican approaches above are at odds with Rawls' understanding of democratic freedom. Skinner rightly questions the deficit in

Rawls' approach to rights in so far as it does not place sufficient emphasis on the role of social duty as a corollary of rights. Rawls dismisses such duties as something of a hindrance to democracy. (Skinner, in Mouffe 1992: 214-215)

At the most elementary level, rights by nature must have community support, reflecting the context and actual experience of citizenship: "rights have as a corollary duties to respect the enjoyment of rights by others." (SLCRC 1995: 14) For example, for social rights to be fully enjoyed, such as universal access to public education, all must contribute to society if public welfare is to be enjoyed by others. However, this depiction of duties as the corollary of rights is not entirely accurate. The relationship between rights, duties and the polities in which they are enmeshed, is complex and uneven. For example, rights can impose a duty to do some things and not others. Raz illustrates that "The right to life may impose a duty not to kill or endanger the life of another without imposing a duty to take whatever action is necessary to keep him alive." (Raz 1986: 183) Not every right has a corresponding duty or set of duties. Raz correctly observes that a right of one individual or group does not necessarily imply a duty on another. Essentially, a right for one person is the basis of a duty held by another—that basis justifies holding that other person (or group) to have a duty *provided the right is not counteracted by conflicting considerations*. A change of circumstances may lead to the generation of a new set of duties based on the old right.

The economic rationalisation of public education has redefined the duties of students, their families and teachers into a consumer-service provider relationship. Within this narrow neo-liberal framework, the corollary of the universal right to education is increasingly a duty of the student to financially provide for his/her education on a clientalised basis. Furthermore, the duty of educators since the 1980s has been to structure public education towards vocational outcomes that meet industry requirements. At the level of civic education, Raz illustrates how even though the right to political participation is not new, it is "only in modern states with their enormously complex bureaucracies does this right justify... a duty on the government to make public its plans and proposals before a decision on them is reached, as well as a duty to publish its reason for a decision once reached..." (Raz 1986: 171)

The mix of democratic values, institutions and processes in the Australian democratic tradition raises serious problems with the collectivist-versus-individualist dichotomy. Skinner argues that there is a false dichotomy between the liberal concept of individual autonomy expressed by Rawls and the republican belief that the common good should prevail. There is a tradition in democratic theory connecting liberalism's conception of individual autonomy and the republican common good. Skinner finds this bridge in pre-modern conceptions of the common good particular to classical republicanism, which claim that to maximise to collective liberty, we must devote ourselves to a life of public service, "placing the ideal of the common good above all considerations of individual advantage." (Skinner, in Mouffe 1992: 217-219) Skinner is correctly wary of liberalism's "danger of sweeping the public arena base of any concepts save those of self-interest and individual rights." (Skinner, in Mouffe 1992: 222) There is a need to re-conceptualise the atomistic individualism of liberalism, which has been a key site of controversy in the liberal democratic state of this century: "Every plea for civil liberties and individual rights, every protest against exploitation and humiliation, against the encroachment of public authority, or

the mass hypnosis of custom, or organised propaganda, springs from this individualistic, and much disputed, conception of man."[87] (Berlin 1975: 128) The liberal definition of rights emphasises the importance of *individual* freedom, identifying legitimate spheres of independent action or inaction. The liberty of individuals can be represented by that bundle of rights that each citizen can enjoy because of their status as free and equal members of society. (Held 1989: 200-201) However, Skinner wishes to avoid reverting to the Aristotelian view that citizenship is essentially a matter of shared moral purposes based on an *objective* notion of the *good*, because its very definition is changing in accordance with the changing needs of a democratic polity. Skinner does not argue for a wholesale rejection of Rawls' individualistic conception of justice and liberty; but seeks instead to develop a richer notion of democracy beneath the false dichotomy in Rawls' approach between individualism and the common good. (Skinner, in Mouffe 1992) A richer conception of holistic individualism will be explored further a little later in the present chapter.

The Exile of Liberties

In an examination of the Benthamite characteristics of Australia's central political institutions, Collins argues that federalism and cabinet government exhibit a utilitarian character. Unlike the federal structures of other liberal democracies such as the United States, which were consciously designed according to normative principles, the constitutional framework chosen for Australia in the 1890s was primarily a practical adjustment to circumstance. For example, at the time, small communities separated by great distance but already endowed with political institutions found the federal scheme expedient where matters of defence, trade and immigration were concerned. A century later, declarations of a "new federalism" continue to focus on streamlining constitutional, fiscal and administrative relations between state governments and Commonwealth governments, rather than as articulations of normative principles. (Collins 1985)

Where these legal structures were intended by Bentham to serve as protective measures against the undemocratic centralisation of powers, Australia has seen a growing concentration of decision-making to the federal centre of government since 1901. (Evans, in Walker *et al.* 1993: 5) The two-party system in Australian politics and growing influence of the executive over legislative process has resulted from a gradual, but significant delegation of legislative power from parliament to the ministry. There has been a massive delegation of legislative power to the ministry from parliament. This situation has been reinforced by the High Court in its interpretation of the Constitution "and the recognition of the power of administrative bodies to make final decisions concerning individual rights, have all helped to put us into the camp of

87 At the core of Australian liberal democracy, not surprisingly, is the liberal value of the freedom of the individual. The ethic of utility inherent in liberalism draws its individualistic sense of liberty from the more narrow conception of negative freedom defined by liberal theorists such as Bentham and James Mill. Berlin accuses Mill of confusing two distinct justifications of utilitarian notion of negative freedom in that:

(i) Mill claims that all coercion that frustrates human desires is bad, although it may have to be applied to prevent greater evils, while non-interference is given the highest priority, under Mill's classical liberalism.

(ii) Mill asserts that men should seek to discover the truth or to develop a critical, imaginative, independent character which can only be found under these conditions of freedom. According to Berlin, history indicates that even in the most severely disciplined communities such as the Puritan Calvinists of Scotland, a love of truth, integrity and individualism have grown. Berlin concludes that those qualities of individualism which liberal theory claims can only be nurtured within a liberal democratic system may flourish within other social arrangements. (Berlin 1975: 129)

ministerial absolutism." (Evans, in Walker *et al.* 1993: 5) The power of the executive over the legislative process is now a regular feature of the political landscape. The average citizen is restricted by the insulation of 'expert' policy making and law making from popular pressure. (Walker 1993) Since the Second World War, there has been a massive expansion of the state and consequently, processes of juridification identified by Habermas above. The concentration of power has occurred without enduring normative standards by which these legislative delegations could have been measured. In theory, the Constitution is supposed to define the limits of power, however, the High Court, in its interpretation of the Constitution, has largely reinforced this delegation in its recognition and legitimation of the power of administrative bodies to make final decisions concerning individual rights. (Walker 1993) This movement towards "ministerial absolutism" is an indication of the practical weaknesses of both the legalism and utilitarianism inherent in Bentham's approach as well as the liberal doctrine generally. To some extent, the need for "fixed-rules rather than rule-fixers" outlined by Hayek is applicable here where fixed rules such as the provision of rights as benchmarks of democratic freedoms may have limited such a concentration of power. However, the institution of rights alone is an insufficient panacea for a number of reasons.

As illustrated in Chapter 3, there was a significant change in the policy approach of Australian governments towards the degree of state and market coordination of social integration in the face of widespread economic recession during the 1980s. In the 1990s, democratic standards of freedom are increasingly determined within the narrow discourse of economic rationalism. Those values that cannot be calculated and fiscally quantified—be they democratic values or the meanings of "quality" public education—have been exiled from the agendas of recent governments. Under the late-modern development of the non-standard liberal conception of the state, the relationship of the citizen to the state has become recast according to a "user-pays" mentality which aggrandises the state as a service provider over its traditional role as patron of perpetual, intrinsic democratic freedoms. Freedoms have been redefined in terms of the economically rationalised choices available to the citizen within the redefined structures of the rule of law.

A Democratic Rule of Law?

The New Right's influence on state policy discourse since the 1970s has encouraged a utilitarian-based economic rationalisation of welfare state reform. As illustrated previously, this neo-liberal rationality measures the health of democracy according to the degree of consumer and labour-market power available to individuals. Under this confined economic liberal view of liberty, the citizen is treated more like a client of the state rather than an active participating member in the formation of the state. Economic recession, inflation and competitive enterprise bargaining are treated like forces of nature that are widely perceived to be beyond the influence and responsibility of the liberal democratic state and its citizenry. For example, if the poverty of an individual or group is due to natural causes (such as a natural disaster), then this poverty is not causally linked to a political incursion of freedom for those adversely affected. But what happens when economic restrictions to freedom imposed by state and/or corporate agencies upon groups or individuals, and which fall

within legally prescribed conditions (such as wage indexations), become "naturalised" so that the consequent restrictions are no longer considered to be a lack of freedom? The objectification of political and economic dimensions of social relations is undermining the ability of critics to make moral claims to freedoms because the phenomena are widely perceived to be beyond the normative spheres of human influence. For example, where individual operating grants to each Victorian primary school has been issued by the state in the name of school autonomy and self-determination, those schools located in communities with high existing problems of social integration (e.g. racial and class-based difficulties) are expected to independently battle the "unfortunate" economic hardships of what former Prime Minister Paul Keating called "the recession we had to have."

Where the actions of individuals, corporations, governments and their bureaucracies become reified and dislodged from their normative origins by the pervasive instrumental ideology of economic rationalism, alternative ethical frameworks have struggled to re-establish the connection between those agents and the moral responsibility for the consequences of their actions. Utilitarian ethics appear to have debased alternative moral frameworks, facilitating a pragmatism that is predominantly framed in terms of economic rationalisations. The rise of pragmatism, which has an ethical indifference to the means by which ends are pursued, has effectively lead to the marginalisation of legitimacy attached to other ethical view points, and the political doctrines based upon them. The resultant exile of alternate democratic values to the margins of popular, mainstream political culture, limits the kinds of freedoms deemed to be "just" in the late-modern Australian democratic state.

Despite the decline in recognition of certain liberties in recent years, spheres of individual freedom have expanded dramatically during the last two centuries from the bourgeois state to the constitutional state, the democratic constitutional state and the welfare state. Pragmatism emerged to dominate the development of democratic institutions of the Australian state because these spheres of freedom have always been largely defined in terms of utilitarianism. Utilitarianism has been the principal ethic guiding successive political regimes since Federation to recognise political freedoms by law. The rapid and complex expansion of the modern democratic state has in turn caused a proliferation of processes of legalisation to cope with the diverse demands of its citizens. As described in Chapter 2, these processes of juridification have the potential to erode basic cultural structures upon which the rule of law assumes a parasitic position, dominating democratic practise rather than being a functional mechanism of democracy. Legally based mechanisms, such as rights, have provided a foundation for new freedoms while simultaneously restricting and even eroding the quality of the lives of citizens. As Habermas asserts, areas such as education (which are functionally dependent on social integration through values, norms and consensus-formation) need to be protected by legislation from falling prey to the interests of particular groups such as corporations, however the law can also restrict the functioning of these areas. (Habermas 1989: 82) The realisations of legal entitlement to freedom have the potential to be either democratised or colonised by state and economic interests. (Rasmussen 1990: 81)

Thompson correctly illustrates that because rights have a "relatively autonomous character," their institution is like a double-edged sword: those

without power can use them to enhance their strategic position in the struggle, whilst those in power can use them to conceal inequality built into a system of radical social and economic division. Chase notes, "In the context of gross class inequalities, the equity of law must always be in some part sham... But even here the rules and rhetoric have imposed some inhibitions upon the imperial power." (Chase 1984: 1560) I agree with Giddens' assertion that each category of rights in the modern liberal democratic state should be understood as an area of contestation or conflict, each linked to a distinctive type of regulatory power or surveillance, where that surveillance is both necessary to the power of subordinate groups and an axis around which subordinate groups can seek to reclaim control over their lives. Within this axis, rights have their own particular locale. (Held 1989: 195) However, I also concur with Held, who asserts that Giddens' appreciation of rights underestimates the complexity of late-modern citizenship: "Citizenship has meant a certain reciprocity of rights against, and duties towards, the community." (Held 1989: 198) [88]

The Classroom Exile

Australia has an impressive record in the area of democracy and social progress in so far as it is one of the earliest countries to abolish property qualifications for voting, give women the right to vote and stand for parliament, introduce a universal franchise and hold secret ballots (otherwise known as "Australian ballots"). Australia is also one of the earliest nations to provide universal public education, introduce industrial arbitration, the principle of fair third-party intervention in wage contracts and the eight-hour day. Furthermore, the 1907 Harvester judgement made Australia one of the first of the modern nations to tie wages to the concept of a decent living standard, rather than what the market would bear. (SLCRC 1995:9) Yet, in the educational context, there is a growing danger of encroachment of public education by the secular interests corporations and the state. Furthermore, the ability of teachers to seek protection against changes in their working conditions is diminishing.[89] The increased workload on teachers at all levels of public education, combined within a decline in resources available, has taken its toll in public education in Australia. (Berkeley 1993, Milburn 1996: 1)

Government pragmatism has not only lead to a disintegration of any substantial difference between centre-left and right-wing parties; it has also permitted corporate intervention, bureaucratic inefficiency and undemocratic government

88 Held argues that "If citizenship involves the struggle for membership and participation in the community, then its analysis involves examining the way in which different groups, classes and movements struggle to gain degrees of autonomy and control over their lives in the face of various forms of stratification, hierarchy and political oppression."(Held 1989: 199) However, the necessary empirical analysis will not be examined within the confines of this primarily theoretical investigation.

89 Early in 1993, the Victorian Minister for Employment, Education and Training, Don Hayward, said in the name of "quality education" and the "painful" but necessary process of "rejuvenation", teacher unions would be bypassed to allow more direct communication with teachers individually and provide teachers with "wider freedom to exercise their own professional judgement in the schools and classrooms." (Schumpeter 1993: 2) But this process has involved the government attempting to destabilise the union movement to enable radical reform such as massive staff cutbacks. At the time, 3760 school cleaners employed by the government in Victoria were sacked to make way for private cleaners. School budget restraints were such that private contractors were beyond the finances of some Victorian primary schools, forcing teachers to clean the classrooms themselves. The capacity of teachers to apply political pressure against draconian reform was undermined by industrial relations reform that effectively destabilised collective representation of the teaching profession In August of 1993, for example, a new procedure for handling complaints against teachers was instigated to facilitate "speedy resolution, remove compulsory unionism and enhance the role of the principal. By 1993, teacher-Union representation dropped from the inquiry panel, which then consisted of a single directorate inquiry officer. Although the teacher could request to be accompanied by anyone, the principal gained a greater say in the process, determining the agenda of the inquiry. Peter Lord of the Federated Teachers Union of Victoria asserted at the time "The new procedures are very much about teachers being an employee, not a professional." (Lord, cited in Bruce 1993d: 2)

reform. It is able to flourish because of the lack of democratic values and standards enshrined in the Constitution. It does not sufficiently outline what the legitimate spheres of action or inaction are as far as market and state intervention in the education system are concerned. What to seems be emerging in Australia is that where some form of rights is not ingrained into the political fibre, an ethically narrow discourse of economic rationalism has emerged in its place. The idea of providing a minimum safeguard against such outcomes has been reinvigorated in recent years in the form of rights-based legal entitlements. (Salvaris, in Davis 1996: 143-170) The Australian Constitution broadly defines the role of citizens, but there is no formal or written recognition of rights. The development of rights in liberal democracies has been one of tensions between the predominant and powerful economic and political regimes of the day and the growing diversity of interests amongst the masses of the developing liberal democracies.

As stated above, Giddens argues that the development of democratic citizenship took its most important form in the class struggle of certain groups to escape feudal then bourgeois domination, facilitating the uncoupling economy from the state. Privately organised economic activity was separated from the public domain. (Giddens, cited in Held 1991: 196-197) Since the 1980s, the conventional distinction between the role of the state and the economy in Australia seems to be eroding. Where government funding to public education has been reduced, schools are increasingly forced to rely on corporate sponsorship.[90] This trend toward the economic rationalisation of schools has been unchecked by any legally based democratic standards due to the lack of rights-based protection in the Australian context. The democratic value of possible legally based measures is dependent upon the democratic institutions of the state responsible for monitoring, regulating and articulating their implementation. The effectiveness of these institutions is in turn dependent on the principles of the public interest upon which they are based. According to Collins,

> *Although the agenda of Bentham's utilitarian state includes issues that are now associated with a collectivist age, such as education, health, and welfare, in Bentham's system these tasks are firmly secured to individualist interests. A collectivism that captures utilitarianism's political instruments would always be in conflict with Bentham's commitment to individualism.*

> (Collins 1985: 148-149)

Jeremy Bentham died in 1832. His work, *Principles of Moral Legislation*, is arguably his greatest legacy to the modern liberal democracy. He wrote that work over two centuries ago. The book itself does not reside as prominently in the living memory of modern democratic society as the utilitarian theory expounded within. Moreover, even if Australia is not the generalised 'Benthamite society' as Collins would have us believe, then the permeation of Bentham's arguments for utilitarianism, legalism and positivism throughout Australian political culture must not be underestimated. Nevertheless, a lot has happened since Bentham's work was published, including the establishment of the Australian form of liberal democracy itself. Now, more than ever, the

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90 See Chapter 3.

realisation of democracy in Australia must proceed on a doctrine that benefits from Bentham's profound thinking, but proceeds beyond Bentham's commitment to individualism.

The Exile of Democratic Citizens

The primary function of rights, according to liberalism, is to preserve negative freedom. Pateman (1970) argues that rights are of little use if they are not actively enjoyed. The ways rights are *exercised* by citizens is often overlooked. Mouffe argues that in "setting out the rights that the individual holds against the state," widely accepted liberal notions of democratic citizenship confine it to a legal status. (Mouffe 1992: 227) Why defined in terms of liberal individualism, this status essentially problematic because is assumes that individual freedom is a primary human need. But what if an individual has rights that are against his or her best interests (or will) to have? For example, a right to own property may be more trouble to the owner than it is worth. (Berlin 1975: 124, Raz 1986: 180) A general right is only prima facie ground for the existence of a *particular* right in those circumstances to which it applies. Some duties may even conflict with rights such as the "necessary conflict between free speech on the one hand and the protection of people's reputation...on the other." (Raz 1986: 184) The implications of a right such as the right to public education and the duties it sets forth depend on additional premises, which in principle cannot ever be wholly determined. Changing circumstances can generate new duties. (Raz 1986: 185-186) It is for this reason that while a developing democracy like Australia's requires a framework of entrenched rules to define the distribution of power over decision-making processes within normatively and consensually prescribed spheres of freedom, this framework must be flexible to the often spontaneous changing demands occurring within this development. This dimension of participatory democracy places emphasis on the need for rules that are contextually relevant and responsive, therefore, their ongoing creation, maintenance and implementation need to be closely tied to the differing capacities, cultures and interests of all groups and individuals within a democratic polity. As Held notes in his criticism of Giddens' analysis of rights, political membership in a liberal democracy includes broader forms of political participation both within and beyond class struggle. (Held 1989: 198)

A danger is that the legal dimension of citizenship may prevail over the other facets of citizenship. The implementation of rights to preserve minimum standards of education needs to be kept in check from the domination of processes of juridification under the rule of law. A possible way to keep juridification in check is by regular citizen participation and scrutiny through regular elections and more importantly, through ongoing active participation. As Barrett points out, the legal notion of citizenship is "purely descriptive," and that beneath the legal criteria specifying the role of the citizen, there is a much richer notion of citizenship—that of "democratic citizenship," which emphasises the desirability of political participation both for individual citizens and for the community. (Barrett 1995) This notion of citizenship requires citizens to be informed about their role and relationship to the government and maintain a critical attitude towards those in power. Therefore, *reflexive democratic mechanisms* constitute a vital dimension of democratic society. (Examples of these mechanisms will be explored in the chapter to follow.)

The Living Room Exile

In Chapter 3, I showed how studies in the USA have revealed that declines in civic virtue and participation may be directly linked to the rise of disembodied visual media like television. Americans, argues Putnam, exercise less political participation and partake in fewer civic activities because they spend more time in front of the TV.

Australian commentators have remarked on the increasing sense of alienation of a large body of the populace from the political system. The technologies of expertise that are popularly attached to government processes marginalise most citizens from feeling capable of—or even wanting—participation in the decision-making processes that determine the political conditions off their association. In 1995, the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee noted that: "There have also been some decline in civic values as evidenced by marked increases in the sense of personal alienation, powerlessness and a diminished sense of community. All of these circumstances suggest the need for some reappraisal of citizenship, national identity and community goals." (SLCRC 1995: 6) Mackay stresses a loss of direction especially in young people in the form of a growing feeling of isolation. As noted in section three above, there has also been an over-use of economic values to measure social values and well-being. (Mackay 1993: 25) Social benchmarks and indicators of citizenship are not well developed and Australians have come to increasingly rely on economic indicators as poor surrogates. Horne expresses concern over the replacement of traditional images of national identity "by the more abstract idea of 'the economy'." (Horne, in SLCRC 1995: 26) The kind of participation envisaged by liberal theory is very narrow and protective. The Australian experience clearly reflects this. To a limited extent, I agree with Collins' claim that given the ways in which the dominant utilitarian ideology of Australia valorises and legitimates the pursuit of individual interests, it "negates the possibility of a genuine battle of ideas." (Collins 1985: 155) If Collins is correct in his observation that Australians "are people proud in their pragmatism, sceptical of speculative and abstract schemes, wedded to "common sense," then this reorientation of values could only take place within a narrow range of possibilities. (Collins 1985: 157)

The realisation of an active democracy is undermined by the direct and vicarious exile of the bulk of its members. Determining the full potential of democracy in Australia begins when political analysts avoid the epistemological limitations of traditional objectivistic methodologies. As quoted at the start of this chapter, Camus writes that "if we are to serve men better we must briefly hold them at a distance"; however, the dangers of this approach necessitate a more socially empathic and dynamic conception of human relations. The holistic individualism proposed by Pettit provides a useful starting point conceptualising a more "workable" assumption upon which to base a model of a revitalised democratic society. Giddens' theory of structuration overcomes the limitations of the conventional binary of agency and structure by understanding political processes as an aggregation of interactions between the agency of individuals and groups, and the structures engaged by this agency. For example, where liberal theory views rights as asocial entities of nature or the rule of law as an objective institution that exists separately from the citizenry it regulates, Giddens' model captures the dynamic ways in which social institutions and

subjects shape each other. It opens the possibility for a theoretical synthesis of the relativist approaches like Skinner's communitarian model and the atomistic individualism of liberalism. The identity of democracy is understood as a kind of social organism in which the agency of both individuals and groups is important. From this approach, it is possible to argue for the implementation of reflexive democratic structures that provide the framework for increased political participation within shaping institutions that are not necessarily incompatible with existing Australian liberal democratic structures and political cultures.

Conclusion

> *The centenary of federation presents Australia with a unique opportunity to strengthen our democracy and to discuss ourselves in terms of our liberal democratic beliefs and institutions. We have an opportunity to emphasise questions of active citizenship in a lively civil society.*

(Horne 1994)

While the Macintyre report indicated a failure of the state to promote active and informed citizenship, the Centenary Advisory Committee (1994) found that Australians wanted a clearer vision and change, including participation by the people themselves (Salvaris, in Davis 1996: 145-147) A 1991 poll of Australians found that 72 per cent of the population favoured a bill of rights. (Galligan 1995: 134) The need for an entrenched notion of effective democratic practise in Australia would ensure that declining standards of public education and the intervention of secular interests be minimised. The value of participation as a means of invigorating democracy has been disputed on the dubious grounds that extensive participation may result in increased social conflict. Apathy on the part of citizens can lead to political stability. (Held 1991: 191) This belief fails to account for the valid justification of participatory theory that effective democracy depends on the educative value of human results that accrue from the participatory process. (Pateman 1970) These results include not just (education) policy outcomes, but also the development of the social and political capacities of each individual. While the act of political participation is educational, the reflexive quality of participatory democracy serves to protect and improve the education system as well.

A reflexive dimension of democracy is a means of ensuring protection of the education system from becoming unable to fulfil its role in the Australian political system. A charter and/or universal social rights may be effective means of ensuring that the state and market do not illegitimately infringe upon the education system. Rights must exist in a dynamic with participation by the citizenry through, for example, political movements, elections or through citizen initiated referenda. Civics education through schools has re-emerged as a way of consolidating the citizen's awareness of his/her membership to the broader political community. Schools and universities provide a potentially vital context for the political socialisation of democratic membership, citizenship and community. However, the desire for using the education system as a mode for encouraging civic virtue is meaningless while the education system continues to be carved up and privatised. The fight for resources in amongst schools and universities is indicative of an anti-pluralistic tendency that is antithetical to democracy. Legally based mechanisms are required to act as protective

safeguards against further damaging of Australia's schools by draconian government reform and/or corporate intervention.

Liberal theory will no doubt continue to be cautious of democratic citizenship based on open communication and active participation because the possibility of majoritarianism tyranny and its particularistic bias remains imminent in the healthiest democracies. I argue that liberal democracy, as it exists in Australia, has perpetuated its own particularistic biases because of its distinctive historical development and the domination of instrumentality in late-modernity. If Berlin is correct, and I am inclined to think he is, then the potential threat of a tyranny of the majority is the least of liberalism's problems:

> *What troubles the consciences of Western liberals is not, I think, the belief that the freedom that men seek differs according to their social or economic conditions,. but that the minority who possess it have gained it by exploiting, or, at least, averting their gaze from, the vast majority who do not.*

(Berlin 1975: 125)

Freedom in the current political climate is largely defined by the liberal ideal conception of 'perfect liberty' identified by Pettit above. Choice and liberty in a free-market one do not necessarily guarantee democratic freedom for all citizens. Pettit ironically suggests "You cannot see such effects as undermining freedom, since the solitary individual who enjoys perfect liberty may well be their victim." (Pettit 1987: 177) They do, however, entrench social ladders of meritocracy that are antithetical to democratic well-being.

I commenced this chapter with a passage from Camus concerning a man who is experiencing the overwhelming environment of the modern city. Increasingly, human beings are confronted by a world in which "There are no more deserts, there are no more islands." (Camus 1995: 1) In an increasingly interdependent world, his opening words to the story '*Minotaur*' can be transposed to the global level. Collins examines how domestic and global changes pose challenges to the dominant ideology of utilitarianism in Australia. Collins rightly observes that while Australia is still a Benthamite society, "Australia's ideology has exhausted its capacity to cope with Australia's serious political predicaments." This ideology is challenged by domestic constraints, such as "a convulsive legalism," in which, "[t]he homogeneity that earlier made a rough-and-ready egalitarianism simply has been replaced by a heterogeneous society in which inequalities have to be justified between cultures rather than within a social set of assumptions." (Collins 1985: 162-163) Australian utilitarianism is further challenged by international pressures, which according to Collins, leave Australia is "without a region" amidst a complex web of global interdependence.

In an increasingly interdependent world, in which differing cultures face choices of cooperation and conflict, the need to establish democratic practises geared to preserve and encourage a plurality of life-styles is essential if the peaceful and voluntary cohabitation of different cultures is to be achieved. Haraway provides a timely warning for such a bold political enterprise: "With the hard-won recognition of their radical social and historical constitution, gender, race, and class cannot provide the basis for belief in essential unity. We have learned that unities are difficult historical achievements fraught with inevitable exclusionary practices." (Haraway 1991: 149-181) I agree with Habermas that "Only democratic citizenship can prepare the way for a condition of world citizenship which does

not close itself off within particularistic biases, and which accepts a world-wide form of political communication." (Habermas 1992: 18) Henry A. Giroux rightly calls for an urgent link of the politics of culture to the practice of substantive democracy, and the reason why the education system has been targeted for this discussion is that I believe in the very classical idea of education being able to empower people with the agency for change.

Determining the full potential of democracy in Australia begins when political analysts avoid the epistemological limitations of traditional objectivistic methodologies. As quoted at the start of this chapter, Camus (1996: 1) writes that "if we are to serve men better we must briefly hold them at a distance," however, the dangers of this approach necessitate a more socially empathic and dynamic conception of human relations. The holistic individualism proposed by Pettit provides a useful starting point conceptualising a more 'workable' assumption upon which to base a model of a revitalised democratic society. It reflects the epistemological sensibilities of Giddens' theory of structuration by conceiving human relations as the aggregation of interactions between the agency of individuals, groups, and social structures. As discussed in the previous chapter, it provides the basis for a movement beyond certain weaknesses of liberal theory by avoiding the liberal presupposition that asocial entities of nature (e.g. rights) or objective institutions (e.g. the rule of law) can exist either conceptually or actually from forms of individual and collective agency.

Similarly, democratic citizenship cannot be understood as something grounded in atomistic conceptions of society. A failing of the Macintyre report was its assumption the values and skills necessary for democratic citizenship could be acquired by individuals like social artefacts. Appreciating one's political history is no doubt valuable; however, *experiencing* of citizenship at a practical level imbues this knowledge with practical relevance and personal/communal significance. Enmeshed in structurating processes of legal, political, cultural and economic institutions, this experience is integral to the dynamic corollary of rights, duties and contemporary citizenship. Democratic citizenship is, by necessity, enmeshed within the collective framework of contemporary society as a social organism in which both individual participation and collective agency is critical to the ongoing realisation of democracy. Reflexive democratic structures enable increased political participation within shaping institutions in ways that are potentially compatible within existing Australian political cultures.

New information and communications technology is not inherently subversive of democratic life. On the contrary, disembodied visual media can enrich learning environments through heightened connectivity, opening up new sites of dialogue and cultural exchange on an unprecedented scale. For the time being, however, advocates of its application to education and democracy must first overcome the fearful stigma perpetuated by its critics. From the digital revolution to the first virtual university, the rise of new media in the latter part of twentieth century has generated an intensely polarised response ranging from the naïvely utopian to bleakly dystopia visions of a brave new world. Grappling the problem of technology begins when it is rightfully understood as a product of human development; as such, it is an intrinsic part of that continuing development in potentially valuable ways to further the democratic values of peaceful and meaningful cohabitation.

The mixture of sub-cultures and political institutions evident in Australian liberal democracy creates a theoretical minefield of problems to anyone attempting to provide a normative justification for both the improvement of the quality of democracy as well as a definition of 'democracy' itself that is compatible with late-modern political conditions. (Collins 1985: 147) Democracy is too often seen in terms of a variety of dichotomies. On the one hand, democracy is taken to mean either the protection of an *asocial* notion of individual autonomy *or* the holistic conception of a *collective* common good. It is taken by some to mean a social arrangement for preserving negative liberty *or* for the maximisation of positive liberty by others. Democratic processes can either be structured according to a utilitarian ethic *or* to a more communal set of values. These processes can be designed to operate under an assumption that the 'public good' is an objective notion *or* that it must be consensually determined to reflect the subjective and cultural orientations of the individuals or groups within a democratic polity at a given time.

The task of contemporary democratic theory is to provide a theoretical framework that overcomes the epistemological and methodological limitations of these dichotomies while maintaining diverse democratic values. There exists certain key threads running through many of the conceptions of democracy identified above that may be used to weave a tapestry of democracy satisfying many of the critics of liberal democracy, while maintaining coherence with the more desirable elements of the current form of Australian liberal democracy. I will argue below, in the vein of the sociological, legal and social theories of Habermas, Giddens and Pettit, that this tapestry is ideally realised through certain reflexive democratic practises.

Chapter 8: Democracy Beyond Instrumental Reason

Let me begin by reminding you of the fact that the possession of true thoughts means everywhere the possession of invaluable instruments of action.

William James (cited in Cool 1993)

Introduction

Conventional modes of self-discipline have the potential to both regiment the student and empower the student to question authority of state, texts and teachers in a dialectic of power. Within the contemporary Australian democracy exists a mixture of potentially empowering techniques of self-discipline enabling critical reflection and action over dominant authoritarian regimes. There is scope within this dialectic for resistance, critical reflection and political engagement. The objective of this chapter is to examine several analytical, legal and institutional means by which the domination of instrumental reason can be overcome. I wish to establish a theoretical framework for the practical education reforms advocated in Chapter 9 below. These reforms promote:

(i) Strategies of resistance against physical and ideological domination;

(ii) Capacities for critical reflection on self-identity and identification of others; and

(iii) Citizen-based mechanisms to develop and protect spheres of freedom.

Earlier, I explored different conceptions of democracy in an attempt to identify their distinctive core democratic values and extract significant commonalities shared by different conceptions. The foundation of effective democratic framework in late-modernity requires the strategies and institutions that:

(i) Recognise, entrench and encourage a variety of democratic values;

(ii) Maximise positive and negative liberties; and

(iii) Ensure that citizens can actively enjoy the widest possible choice of lifestyles in a supportive, tolerant yet critically aware environment.

A widened conception of institutions promoting civic education, which includes spheres of participation ranging from universal suffrage to workplace democracy have the potential to be a valuable component of democratic society. A restructured formal public education system also has the potential to play a vital role in the promotion of democratic, social and economic well-being across Australian society. The continued functioning and relevance to the changing needs of citizens of these educational institutions should be safeguarded by legal mechanisms such as rights combined with the promotion and expression of active political participation across a variety of spheres of life. Because there is no objective notion of rights, participation would also be encouraged to determine, revitalise and adjust rights according to consensually based procedures.

Beyond Instrumentality: Salvaging a Richer Conception of Reason

I was born in a quiet seaside town in Melbourne amidst an era of political turbulence in modern Western history. From the late 1950s to the early 1970s, widespread upheaval against hierarchies of visible authority erupted throughout

the West. In April 1968, violent demonstration swept from Columbia University in New York to France, where student Daniel Cohn-Bendit helped to instigate the infamous May uprising that exploded into a month-long period of economic and civil protest involving as many as 10 million French citizens, and which nearly ended de Gaulle's ten-year regime. (The sentiment of many constituents was, I imagine, made clearer to the President nonetheless.) The achievement of USA civil rights movements during the 1950s was echoed a decade later in the formal acknowledgement of the democratic status of Australian indigenous peoples. Civil unrest in Australia during the 1970s coincided with the end of the long-boom. However, the sound of dissenting voices was quickly dampened by a welfare state losing control. Instability and political uncertainty was perhaps most dramatically manifested in the dismissal of the Whitlam administration in 1975. Australian Parliament was dissolved by the Governor General, who serves by appointment as Representative of the Queen. This shattering blow to Australia's first elected left-wing government was compounded by global economic turbulence heralding a new era of the industrial world dominated by the New Right. By the late 1970s, communes across the USA and Australia, born of 1960s' counterculture, dwindled in number together with other aspirations that had become luxuries of a welfare state in decline.

As a child, however, my most vivid memory was not of social upheaval but the release of the movie, Star Wars (1977). In retrospect, it seems appropriate that this film steeped in a fusion of fantastic technology and classic mythologies of good-versus-evil was so successful amidst the growing cynicism and conservative backlash of the period. While the 1980s was a time of persistent laissez-faire institutional reform, the shifts in political ideologies, national and cultural identities continued, suggesting that the upheaval of Western politics had not stabilised. What links these phenomena was the predominance of instrumental reason.

Earlier in this discussion, I cited Max Horkheimer's evocative criticism of liberal capitalism as the basis for widespread instrumental rationalisation seeking to dominate nature, the individual, furnish fascism and undermine the trust held by citizens in neither the capacity of their representative institutions nor of themselves to secure democratic well-being. Horkheimer's observation of a decline of the individual beneath a technological veil continues to be apparent in the capacity of new media to reorient structure environments of authority. The veil also masks significant negative consequences of major procedural and structural transformations in political socialisation, such as the pernicious rise of disembodied visual media discussed in Chapter 4.

For Horkheimer, the eclipse of democracy by instrumental reason represents a devastating blow to contemporary society and any aspirations to freedom held by its members. (Arato 1993: 26-27) Horkheimer's critique is delimited by two related shortcomings—firstly, his analysis does not sufficiently differentiate important ambiguities of contemporary development. I argue below that technological innovation is often dismissed as instrumental protagonist in itself rather than in the instrumentality of its application. Horkheimer's diagnosis of Western decline is predicated on a narrow conception of reason. It is via the works in German critical theory of his prominent successor—Jürgen Habermas—that a satisfactory critique and reinvigoration of reason in relation to education might be found.

Habermas attempts to provide a kind of salvation for reason by showing the limits of purely "objective" analysis and the necessity for a more comprehensive methodology that takes into serious consideration the normative dimensions of human life. The key way in which he does this is by showing that processes of knowing are not grounded in the transcendental, but in patterns of ordinary language shared in everyday communication. The core of Habermas' reconstruction of reason is a process of reflection that is balanced between empiricism and introspection. Empiricists argue that introspection creates illusion, therefore, a more exact knowing is found through the observation of external Nature. Thus, empiricists are obliged to objectivise themselves, which for Habermas is an inadequate approach because it views subjectivity only in instrumental ways. Rasmussen describes Habermas' critique of the empirical conception of reason in the following way: "Reason, imprisoned in the modern subject, could only express itself instrumentally, resulting in the transition from a positive reading of the powers and capacities of reason in the modern world... to a negative one..." (Rasmussen 1991: 5)

Objective mastery of the understanding of the natural and social world has been the traditional goal of human inquiry in the Western world since the Enlightenment. Based on the epistemological standards of positivism, this belief in the human capacity for objectivity stems from the basic motivations of Enlightenment thinkers whose goal has been to transcend pre-Enlightenment mysticism and theological claims to truth by locating a universal method, criteria, and authority over arbitration of claims to what is *true*, justified belief.[91] The methodological rigours imposed upon such a monumental task have provided the epistemological foundation for the domination of instrumental reason over other forms of rationality (such as those claiming truth in subjectivity).[92]

An example of this objectivistic error relevant to the current discussion is evident in Bourdieu's concept of habitus. Bourdieu claims that his approach resolves the tensions between subjectivist and objectivist poles by providing "the means of escaping crude reduction of ideological products to the interests of the classes they serve... without falling into the idealist illusion of treating ideological productions as self-sufficient and self-generating totalities amenable to pure, purely internal analysis." (Bourdieu, in Garnham and Williams 1986: 117) In developing the 'habitus' concept, Cool writes that Bourdieu's intention is to overcome "the opposition between Subjectivism, with its tendency to overestimate the creative power of social actors... and Objectivism, which tends to reify cultural structures and their logic, reducing human agency to a mechanistic submission to rules." (Cool 1993) Bourdieu states that on the one hand, the habitus structures "practices and representations which can be objectively 'regulated' and 'regular' without in any way being the product of obedience to rules." On the other hand, these practices and representations can be "objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them." (Bourdieu 1977: 72) His approach insufficiently accounts for my claim in

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91 At the time, politics was largely confined to the influence and vested interests of property owning men. It wasn't until the nineteenth century that the interests of women began to figure in Western political concerns. (Brown 1988)

92 In his defence of a subjective claim to truth, nineteenth century sceptic Soren Kierkegaard posed the question: "What is truth but to live for an idea? It is a question of discovering a truth which is truth for me, of finding the idea for which I am willing to live or die." (Solomon 1982: 148)

Chapter 7 that the logics of instrumental rationality permeate popular culture in such a way as to marginalise counter-cultures. According to Bourdieu:

Those who believe in the existence of a 'popular culture', a paradoxical notion which imposes, willy-nilly, the dominant definition of culture, must expect to find--if they were to go and look--only the scattered fragments of an old erudite culture (such as folk medicine), selected and reinterpreted in terms of the fundamental principles of the class habitus and integrated into the unitary world view it engenders, and not the counter-culture they call for, a culture truly raised in opposition to the dominant culture and consciously claimed as a symbol of status or a declaration of separate existence.

(Bourdieu 1984: 395)

The weakness of his approach is that while he correctly observes that "There is no way out of the game of culture," he falsely assumes that "one's only chance of objectifying the true nature of the game is to objectify as fully as possible the very operations one is obliged to use in order to achieve that objectification." (Bourdieu 1984: 12) Bourdieu's methodology is epistemologically flawed in its attempt to objectify his own position and thinking vis-à-vis his subject. As a consequence, Cool rightly points out, Bourdieu provides little insight into the actual processes of cultural struggle: "Moreover, Bourdieu speaks as if it were so much Subjectivist nonsense to seek such a sense in grounded research." (Cool 1993)

Furthermore, Bourdieu concludes that the totality of culture forces a "submission to necessity," which "inclines working-class people to a pragmatic, functionalist 'aesthetic'..." (Bourdieu 1984: 376) He falsely reduces the working-class's criteria for choice to utilitarian terms. Bourdieu's attempt to objectively classify structures of *the game* of cultural reproduction is too superficial.[93] As Cool argues,

He seems to forget that the playing is the most meaningful aspect of any game; and that meaning, in the sense of collective subjectification, also possesses the logic he reserves for structure; and might also be the goal of social inquiry. It is precisely because the structures Bourdieu speaks of are unconscious, or embodied, and lie apart from our sense of ourselves, that they invite human agents to engage them, to produce significance out of them.

(Cool 1993)

Bourdieu's functionalist and determinist approach to cultural reproduction falsely devalues the innovative and transformative power of human agency. (Cool 1993; Garnham and Williams 1986: 129) In summary, Bourdieu's concept of habitus delimits the possibility of genuine, alternate cultural logics.

Habermas argues that subject-centred reason is victimised by its own instrumentalist formulation. Problems resulting from the instrumental bias inherent in mainstream methodology are not purely academic. For example, earlier in Chapter 4, I discussed how the instrumentally rationalised expansion of disembodied visual media has potentially devastating implications for the education of citizens in a democratic state. I used Adorno's illustration of the

[93] For example, see Bourdieu 1984: 12.

causal relationship of the culture industry in the twentieth century to the rise of fascism such as Nazism in the German democratic polity prior to the Second World War. Enlightenment ideals of universal freedom through reason were tragically subverted by the will to power of *Führer ideology*. Consequently, he questions the very heart of reason as a valid path to truth, writing that:

> *Only the absolute lie now has any freedom to speak the truth... The conversion of all questions of truth into questions of power, a process that truth itself cannot escape if it is not annihilated by power, not only suppresses the truth as in earlier despotic regimes, but has attacked the very heart of the distinction between true and false, which the hirelings of logic were in any case diligently working to abolish. So Hitler, of whom no-one can say whether he died or escaped, survives.*

(Adorno 1974)

Reactions by recent social theorists like Baudrillard, Derrida and Foucault to the 'annihilation' of truth by power include a rejection the enlightened concept of reason as a valid premise for inquiry into questions of truth and the nature of human relations. For example, Foucault abandons notions of universal truth in favour of a relativist analysis of the relationship between power and knowledge. Foucault is one of numerous significant contemporary critics of political analyses to reject a premise of objectivity, resorting instead to relativism as an alternative. While often providing significant criticisms of mainstream methodologies, these relativist theories have so far failed to make any significant impact on the development of oppressive patterns of domination because they are highly abstract and inaccessible to popular discourse and fail to provide positive alternative strategies. Nevertheless, certain forms of relativism have entered into popular discourse during the latter half of the twentieth century in the West. Multiculturalism, for example, became a prominent policy-objective of the Australian government during the 1980s in response to the impact of globalisation and the subsequent national confrontation with the economic, political and social values and needs of differing cultures. Nevertheless, the rigours of positivism still pervade the dominant rationalities of the West.

Habermas rightly argues that reason is situated in subject-subject relations rather than in any one particular subject. Contrary to notions of objectivised nature been held in the traditional conceptualisation of reason, Habermas locates reason in the inter-subjectivity of shared understanding. (Brand 1990: 10) However, reason is not recast by Habermas in the relativist philosophy of post-structuralism. For example, Habermas is right in his criticism of Foucault. Habermas notes the theoretically paradoxical rejection of humanism by Foucault, who fails to provide an explanation how or why the fully panoptic society should be opposed. Nancy Fraser concurs with Habermas' critique, arguing that postmodernism's epistemological scepticism provides no basis for resistance. (Fraser 1989:35) Instead, Habermas utilises what Norris refers to as "a full-scale genealogy of its own formative—though unacknowledged—prehistory..." (Norris 1992: 28)

Objectivity is only one dimension of reason. Another dimension is communicative reason. (Pusey 1987: 23, Rasmussen 1991: 5) As Habermas asserts: "The release of the potential of reason embedded in communicative

action is a world historical process... in the increasing prevalence of more abstract and more universal norms, etc." The meaning and role of rationality is central to Habermas' justification of this potential of reason. (Habermas, in Pusey 1987: 39) According to Habermas, rationality must be understood as a balance between scientific, moral and aesthetic dimensions. (Brand 1990: 117 and Roderick 1986: 134) Habermas argues for a "unity of reason in the multiplicity of its voices"—its voices located in the formal world concepts of the objective (referred to by claims for truth), social (referred to by claims to rightness) and subjective (referred to by claims to sincerity and authenticity). His broader definition of rationality has cognitive, normative and expressive facets and includes universal attributes found in the formal properties of discourse.

Bernstein writes that under this "rational reconstruction of the universal conditions of reason, critical reflection in one domain may release repressed traces of reason that lay in others." (Bernstein 1985: 16) Communicative action is a process of rationalisation that occurs in the simple act of interaction be it agreement, discussion and negotiation in ordinary conversation. (Pusey 1987: 106) For Habermas, communicative reasoning becomes more and more important as "The circumstances of life in modernity of late capitalism—of life amidst dislocated cultures, traditions and normative structures and an unrelenting pluralisation and relativisation of value orientations—force individuals to rely increasingly on their own 'communicative accomplishments'." (Pusey 1987: 116) Communicative action is based on conditions for consensus formation that go beyond the spatial and temporal limitations of any particular context (such as solving immediate problems of state deficits via pragmatic policy solutions).

The central problem with Habermas' defence of communicative reason is that his overly structural approach relies too much on linguistic notions of reason while under-rating more experiential and informal approaches to social interaction. The cinema experience exemplifies an inter-subjective interaction that consists of an array of communicated symbols that are limited and encouraged by structures ranging from how the film narrative is constructed to the structure of the film theatre itself. The musical dialogue between musicians is another form of non-linguistic communication. Habermas does not account sufficiently for the range of dialectical interplays of structure and subjectivity, or the diverse arrays of human expression and interaction through image, text and music.

Nevertheless, I think that Habermas successfully identifies the possibility of salvaging a deeper notion of reason in which rationality is understood as a balance between scientific, moral and aesthetic dimensions beyond the instrumental. Habermas' justification of reason as located in inter-subjective human relations offers the potential to expand the vocabulary of political methodology beyond subjective-objective binaries to include wider normative dimension encompassing the emotional, collective and individual perspectives. The process of using this expanded vocabulary to defend endangered spheres of education and democracy from further colonisation by instrumental rationality begins when certain dimensions of reason and ways of looking at the world are returned from epistemological exile. Only then, can the basis for enrichment of Australian democracy and necessary education reform be addressed. A broader conception of rationality must be embodied in the approach of states to

school reform and in the very structuring of the school itself. Increasing the formal public and civic education of citizens is insufficient without a simultaneous restructuring of the mechanisms of surveillance and protective measures provided for each citizen. In the context of the public school, this means increasing the capacities of the student to actively engage the learning process as a well-rounded individual and a participating citizen with the belief and ability to become more involved in public life: "the question is now to defend or reinstate endangered lifestyles, or how to put reformed lifestyles into practice. In short, the new conflicts are not sparked by the *problems of distribution*, but concern *the grammar of forms of life.*" (Habermas 1981: 37) Raymond Williams identified the importance of securing, protecting and developing a more extensive grammar of forms of life:

> *The practical liberty of thought and expression is less a natural right than a common necessity. The growth of understanding is so difficult that none of us can arrogate to himself, or to an institution or class, the right to determine its channels of advance. To deny these practical liberties is to burn the common seed. To tolerate only this or only that, according to some given formula, is to submit to the phantasy of having occupied the future and fenced it into fruitful or unfruitful ground.*

(Williams 1953: 334-5)

Aside from the domination of instrumental reason, a major barrier to the development of the 'practical liberties' of thought and expression to which Williams refers, is that of traditional frameworks of understanding.

Beyond Liberal Democracy—Salvaging Democratic Values

Endangered lifestyles and the capacities to put reformed lifestyles into practice require defence and/or reinstatement against 'reproductions of domination'. Rights have a significant symbolic function in the recognition of legitimate spheres of freedom amongst the Australian public. The Australian Constitution mainly contains civil rights; there is scarcely any formal embodiment of legitimate spheres of freedom. For example, formal recognition of a universal entitlement to a minium standard of public education is lacking in the Australian Constitution. Possible yardsticks for the introduction of rights to education may be found in UN conventions. These conventions seek to ensure: universal access to education; free primary education; equality of availability of secondary and tertiary education to all based on ability and merit; that there should be no differentiation in quality of education on grounds of socio-economic class or income; and that there should be no differential funding for schools according to location except more funding for those with greater need. Other examples of possible social rights to ensure protection of formal mass-education exist in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of the United Nations:

(i)   A right to education;

(ii) A right to work, form unions and strike; and

(iii) A right to the widest possible assistance to the family. (SLCRC 1995: 13)

The need for rights like the ones listed above is evident in the draconian reforms to the education system listed throughout this thesis. Not only would they guarantee education of a certain standard; they would also ensure that teachers and educational administrators are guaranteed protection as professionals— something that is vital in the current climate when teacher protection in the determination of working conditions has been undermined. But simply instituting rights to education and favourable conditions of work is not sufficient.[94]

A possible danger of implementing rights in the current context is that they would be recognised within the liberal conception of the rule of law, which consequently would severely limit their capacity to entrench and protect the liberties of individuals and groups. Significant movements towards legally based entitlements to freedom in Australia were established during the early 1990s by an *unelected* judiciary. While rights scarcely have a formal embodiment in the Australian liberal democracy, the role of *implied* rights has become increasingly important in the 1990s. Changes in the constitutional order Australian High Court interpretations have indicated alterations to the role of implied rights in recognising and protecting spheres of liberty. [95]

A consensually determined system of national benchmarks for effective democratic citizenship is one way of establishing minimum standards of education and the equality of access to educational facilities. A benchmark is a policy standard or target, which may be specific or general, such as a detailed charter of civil and political rights agreed by the United Nations. A citizenship charter may outline Australia's national goals and values. The charter, which could be implemented instead of a United States style Bill Of Rights, could act as a guide to general public policy, outlining rights and duties and perhaps be based on UN human rights covenants, European Community standards or the OECD Social Indicator Program. (SLCRC 1995: 11-14)

Salvaging Political Liberties

The state also has the potential to play an important part in salvaging democratic liberties. Pettit justifiably presupposes that the state has the epistemic and engineering capacity to intervene fruitfully in social life. In light of challenges by "institutional pessimists like F. A. Hayek," Pettit distinguishes between three types of democratic institutions: (i) gearing institutions; (ii) planning institutions; and (iii) shaping institutions. (Pettit 1987: 178-180) These three types of institutions are each applicable to education in Australia in a number of ways:

(i) *Gearing institutions*, such as the neo-classical economic conception of the market, assume that the public good comes of the interactions of self-interested individuals. The basic policy approach taken by Australian governments since the 1980s has been guided by an economically rationalised restructuring of the welfare state through the encouragement of this gearing institution. The state's encouragement of corporate sponsorship of schools and tertiary education-institutions is an example of this. The clientalisation of the citizen's relationship to the state is another example of the rise of gearing institutions in Australia;

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94 Some possible improvements are discussed in Chapter 9 below.

95 For example, the Australian Capital Television (1992) case established "that the Australian people enjoy a right of political communication and discourse that parliaments are powerless to take away from them." (Walker 1993)

(ii) *Planning institutions* monitor and interfere with the effects of what individuals do to promote what is perceived to be the 'public good'. The welfare state is a good example of a planning institution, within which civics education and Australian studies programmes have been employed to promote the 'public good' within the state education system. Despite cutbacks to the Australian welfare state, planning institutions like the education system still exist, although recent trends indicate that increasing corporate intervention into schools in specific regions will result in the orientation of schools towards particular interests rather than a 'public good'. For example, a school sponsored by a local real estate agent, restaurant or supermarket will be oriented towards the sponsor's financial well-being if continued sponsorship is desired. (Examples of these specific types of sponsorship already exist throughout Australia); while

(iii) *Shaping institutions* lie between the institutions above "to engage with individuals at a more intimate level than the gearing kind, putting such motivating factors in place that it is in the private interest of those agents to act in the manner of people whose only concern is the public welfare." (Pettit 1987: 178-180) Parliament and jury-rooms are, in theory, examples of shaping institutions when "the need to persuade others shapes the dispositions of discussants so that they argue and vote in accordance with considerations which all must admit to be relevant..." (Pettit 1987: 178-180) The self-regulating nature of these shaping institutions differs from the planning ones attacked by Hayek as being potentially antithetical to negative freedom. Pettit argues that shaping institutions have democratic properties that enable them to overcome many of the weaknesses evident in planning and gearing institutions. The realisation of freedom within a democratic society based upon shaping institutions must be understood in terms of the complex interaction between political subjects such as citizens, students, teachers and corporations and state agencies, and these shaping institutions.

Having established the possibility to move beyond objective/subjective dichotomies of understanding, the conception of shaping institutions like schools are best understood within Giddens' model of structuration. Throughout this thesis, I have emphasised that recent changes to education can only be sufficiently understood in terms of the interconnectedness of subjects, their capacities for agency and the structures within and through which human relations are enmeshed. These relationships range from the citizen and state to the political system; the student and teacher to the classroom; and the audience to the cinema and film content. Giddens' theory of structuration provides a more appropriate way of analysing the complex patterns of political interrelationships involving education, democracy and instrumental rationality. The theory emerged from a "concern to develop an ontological framework for the study of human social activities." (Giddens, in Bryant and Jary 1991: 201) The model of structuration avoids the limitations of simplistic agency-structure binaries by understanding political processes as the dynamic combination of interactions between the agency of subjects (both individuals and groups), their elected governors and the political and economic structures in which agency is dialectically engaged. Giddens' model captures the ways in which social institutions and subjects shape each other. It opens the possibility for a theoretical synthesis of differing capable of accounting for the different democratic values espoused by the theories above, within the inherent tensions and dynamic development of democracy. The identity of democracy can thus

be understood as a kind of complex social organism, the congruity of which demands a far more sophisticated theoretical methodology than is provided by the scientism underlying classical and modern liberal theory. For example, political institutions like the ones described by Pettit above are not treated just as objective structures, but instead are conceptually intertwined with the subjects engaging them. It is now possible to advance upon Skinner's claim that a richer notion of democracy mediating individualism and the common good exists beneath the false dichotomy of liberal individualism and the communitarian principle of doctrines like republicanism, through Pettit's principle of holistic individualism.[96]

Pettit constructs a theory of democracy based on a principal that traverses the divide between liberal individualism·and the organic, communitarian approach of Unger outlined in Chapter 7. Pettit bases his republican alternative on a principal of 'holistic individualism' according to which the state plays a greater role than is envisaged by liberalism. (Pettit 1987: 174-176, 182) Unlike Unger's organic "anti-liberal philosophy in which groups bulk as large as individuals," Pettit begins with a different understanding of 'individualism' and 'atomism' to construct a post-liberal philosophy that attempts to incorporate and *subsume* these liberal doctrine. This holistic-individualist explication of the demands of negative liberty contends that freedom *emerges under appropriate sociopolitical institutions* rather than pre-existing them. (Pettit 1987: 181) According to this principle, perfect liberty is "available to someone when he enjoys the greatest absence of interpersonal constraints which can be provided by his fellows, given the cultural means—legal, moral, traditional, etc.—whereby he is assured such freedom. (Pettit 1987: 178) Perfect liberty becomes a social status rather than an *asocial* condition. This social status has three implications:

(i) No one can enjoy perfect liberty under a given culture if he or she is subject to more constraints than some others. Perfect liberty is no longer defined on an intrinsic basis as the absence of any coercion, but rather it is defined *comparatively or relationally*. Liberty does not pre-exist social institutions, and is not only limited by coercion, but other asymmetry's of power which lead to disadvantages of position or information (such as relations of class);

(ii) Perfect liberty requires an assurance of the absence of constraint as well as the absence itself; and

(iii) The social status of perfect liberty requires not only an assured absence of constraint, but also a general awareness of that assured absence. (Pettit 1987: 178–179)

The state under Pettit's holistic principle encourages "an ethos of public virtue: an ethos under which each exercises whatever power he has over others as he would do if he were concerned only with the good of all." (Pettit 1987: 180) Republican citizens "will be enthusiasts for the public forum, since publicity is a safeguard against systemic discrimination." (Pettit 1987: 174-182)

I wish to elaborate on Pettit's republicanism as the basis for an *effective democracy* via an explication of the necessary democratic mechanisms for actualising 'an ethos of public virtue'. Democracy in Australia must break from the instrumentalised development of Benthamite, scientistic and outmoded

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96 See my discussion of Skinner's critique of Rawls in Chapter 7: Contemporary Liberal Alternatives.

traditional influences of democracy in modernity while retaining core democratic principles, structures and institutions that remain central to the realisation of democracy in late-modernity. I wish to argue for a theoretical conception of democracy that is characterised by processes of structuration based upon a principle of holistic individualism that is realised through the introduction of democratic mechanisms guided by a notion of reason that is based upon multiple modes of rationalisation.

Education for Democracy

Proposals for reflexive mechanisms to enhance democracy have emerged amongst political and social theorists wishing to establish a political and economic democracy that is compatible with modernity beyond prevailing elite-theoretical views. (Cohen and Arato 1988) The term *reflexive* is employed because it has two important connotations: (i) It emphasises the need for automatic democratic processes; and (ii) connotes the "feedback" of agency upon the self.

The first connotation emphasises the need to establish self-maintaining democratic structures that automatically occur in the day-to-day functioning of a democracy. Certain types of rights, charters and other legal mechanisms need to be entrenched to ensure that certain spheres of freedom are guaranteed for *all* members of a democratic polity. These exist to ensure that negative liberty is protected. The second facet of reflexive democratic practises implies that democratic processes are accessible and responsive to all citizens. Individuals and groups need to be aware of the ways in which they can influence democratic outcomes and feel that their involvement is important to the maintenance of both their own positive freedoms and the greater democratic polity. Therefore, the democratic structures under the second connotation must be reflexively geared to respond to citizen participation.

One value that liberalism shares with almost all other theories of democracy is recognition of the immense importance of political participation. Kukathas observe that inherent in both the liberalism of theorists such as J. S. Mill and democratic theory extending back to Plato is the need to ensure "that social institutions foster and preserve traditions that emphasise the need to look critically at governors and government, which place great importance on the *public* character of political decision-making (however difficult this is to achieve even at the best of times), and which view rulers not as leaders but as servers, who are to be held responsible and accountable for their actions." (Kukathas *et al.* 1990: 25) There is a significant role in *liberal* democracy for popular participation, majority voting and other political practices. These democratic practices "may also perform an educative role, reinforcing the inclination of citizens to look critically... at the actions of rulers. This perspective affirms the importance of the idea of political education..." (Kukathas *et al.* 1990: 26) Hence, the potential for the integration of participatory democracy into the Australian political system already exists. However, to ensure the continued responsiveness and relevance of reflexive democratic structures to democratic citizens, a degree of political participation higher than is currently experienced in the Australian liberal democracy is essential. This not only means a more active and critical engagement with formal modes of participation such as regular elections, popular debate and running for political office, it also means a

wider degree of democratic participation in other spheres of life from one's formal schooling to the workplace. This is necessary to ensure that reflexive democratic structures such as rights reflect political life in all of its contexts and the different types of freedom and duties associated with these contexts. Pateman rightly observes, for example, that political education in the management of collective affairs is difficult to parallel elsewhere, least of which is the casting of a vote every three years. (Pateman 1970: 43) The experience of participation as a valuable form of political education would empower citizens and groups with a greater critical awareness of their own rights and responsibilities as well as those of others. In Pateman's terms: "...for maximum participation by all the people at that level of socialisation, or "social training," for democracy must take place at other spheres in order that the necessary individual attitudes and psychological qualities can be developed." (Pateman 1970: 42) The engagement of individuals and groups with reflexive structures becomes a self-perpetuating process.

Can reflexively be successfully taught, learned and applied, given the saturation of instrumental reason? There is significant scope in existing types of education to develop and enhance the critical capacities of individuals. According to Lash, a critical reflexivity is possible when reflexivity is turned away from the everyday experiences of people onto the systems that regulate, bind and dominate them. (Lash, in Beck et al. 1994: 140) Given that the everyday discourses of individuals through to the policy discourses of governments have become so instrumentalised, the major problem facing this reorientation of reflexivity is to do so without the ideological restrictions imposed by instrumentalised structures. Deborah Lupton proposes a post-structural methodology based upon a discourse analysis orientated towards meeting the epistemological and ontological challenges of postmodern conditions. (Lupton 1992) While Lupton's analysis is largely concerned with contemporary developments in the health sciences, her approach offers possibilities for the identification of strategies of resistance against the hegemony of instrumental reason throughout education and society.

Broadly speaking, discourse analysis aims to identify "cultural hegemony and the manner by which it is reproduced." (Lupton 1992: 149) Lupton's approach examines the ways in which rhetorical, grammatical and other techniques of communication are utilised within particular texts and the ways in which these techniques are related to the broader political frameworks in which the communication is taking place. (Lupton 1992: 145-150) Discourse analysis involves content-based interpretation of text and talking discourses. In the context of education, these discourses include required school readings, curriculum, oral pedagogical practises, popular news and fiction, film form, narrative and style and television commercials celebrating civic virtue and national identity. Through the critical examination of discourses like this, discourse analysis aims to provide a critique of ideology, which attempts to identify the ways in which power operates through the text by exposing the subtle and overt ways in which ideology is reproduced within the meanings of the text.

In typical post-structuralist form, Lupton's approach assumes that the constitution of the subject is fragmented within multiple identities. Discourses such as those shaped by scientism, structural functionalism and liberalism are based upon a unified conception of subjectivity. Lupton argues that these

discourses ultimately impede personal freedoms because of the narrow ways by which they inform identity. Lupton sees the state as a powerful agent of domination through normalising techniques that, in theory, operate within the democratic limits imposed within a liberal democracy. Like Giddens, Lupton acknowledges the modern state's reliance on more subtle forms of ideological manipulation "by way of the persuasion inherent in its truths, the anxieties stimulated by its norms, and the attraction exercised by the images of life and self it offers to us." The state creates desires in its citizens, which it then satisfies as a means of mobilising citizens towards its political imperatives. (Lupton 1995: 10)

Echoing Adorno's politics of resistance, in which obscure communication is central to subvert the dominant logics of mainstream discourse[97], Lupton argues for practises of the self-promoting idiosyncratic behaviour to counter the homogenising effects of normalisation. (Lupton 1994: 1) Disclosing patterns of persuasion, manipulation and domination within a given discourse (such as a classroom or cinema) offers the possibility for positive forms of textual and oral communication. The construction of alternative discourses provides a method of resistance against the domination of instrumental rationality. The resistance of cultural homogenisation offers the potential to repel the processes of colonisation of the life world described by Habermas and the domination of popular discourse by mainstream cultures illustrated by Said.[98] I have attempted to utilise this kind of approach when I analysed the ways by which processes of reproduction of both text and visual representations in schools, televisions and cinemas are dominated by an instrumental reasoning whose ideological reproduction involves the homogenisation of ways of life. (Lupton 1992: 149) As a political strategy, Lupton advocates a reflexive politics, through which individuals are more critically aware of the processes shaping the constitution of subjects. If this strategy is transposed to the public education system, I presume that teachers and the designers of curricula would engage in the critical examination of the ways in which they use knowledge and may share complicity in the perpetuation of patterns of domination. While this kind of strategy is useful for elevating awareness of power and its responsible usage, there are a number of problems with this approach. Norris is scathingly critical of an epistemological assumption made by thinkers such as Foucault and Baudrillard that "every text can be shown to involve some kind of narrative or story telling interest, therefore we can be in no position to distinguish factual, historical or documentary writings on the one hand from fictive, imaginary or simulated episodes on the other."[99] (Norris 1992: 20-21) This criticism applies to Lupton's model of discourse analysis. Its textual focus delimits its capacity to understand ideological reproduction within linguistic and alternative symbolic modes of exchange. Giroux rightly asserts that:

> the challenges raised by feminism, post-modernism and postcolonialism have contributed to a redefinition of cultural politics that addresses representational practices in terms that analyse not

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97 See Adorno 1974: 81.

98 See Chapter 7: The Exile of Ideas.

99 Even the critics of post-structural relativism, such as Jürgen Habermas, limit their critique to the philosophical domain of language and/or text, which often excludes other important processes of self-identity and cultural formation (e.g. music).

only their discursive power to construct common-sense, textual authority, and particular social... formations, but also institutional conditions which regulate different fields of culture.

(Giroux 1993: 2)

At the level of ontology, Lupton characterises freedom as consisting of irreducible heterogeneous discourses that encourage multiple and shifting identities. This conception of freedom implies serious problems from any system of education, which by nature require minimum standards of membership in order to function in the best interests of all members. Lupton's strategy for resistance lacks a significant appreciation for the practicalities of industrialised societies founded on conditions of membership that assume a minimum standard of behaviour to function successfully.

Furthermore, in positing domination against resistance and homogeneity against heterogeneity this approach falls in to conventional logocentric binaries identified above. These binaries limit the ability to adequately identify the complex dynamics inherent in power relations in late-modernity. A simple hypothetical example is that a teacher may identify the ways by which his/her influence over students is linked to an oppressive instrumental ideology, but what action should the teacher take to resist this? Similarly, if the teacher is contemplating strike action to raise public awareness, to what extent would financial, emotional and family matters play in the teacher's decision? Approaches like Lupton's failure to provide adequate alternative strategies. The teacher is enmeshed in processes of structuration that are not reducible to crude binaries of resistance and domination. Furthermore, if postmodern analysts like Lupton applied their own reflexive strategies to themselves, they would see that their denial of essential identities is contradicted by their simultaneous valorisation of heterogeneity founded upon a multiple and fragmented subject. The valorisation of heterogeneity lacks both an ontological and political appreciation of agents, structures and social forces. Lupton's encouragement of idiosyncratic behaviour to resist homogenisation ignores the central role of inter-subjective recognition in identity formation and values of social empathy and cooperation.

The value of discourse analysis lies in its encouragement of critical reflection and the location of problems within a 'bigger-picture'. One of the major reasons why aspects of education are in decline is because of a widespread deficit in the recognition of the interconnectedness of problems in public education, civic education and political socialisation. Discourse analysis also rightly illustrates how the text should be understood not simply as a reified vessel of information, but as an historically constituted medium within which the form of the medium distorts the content and vice versa.

For Haraway, the body is historically constituted, but provides a site of political resistance. Despite the propensity for science and technology (e.g. virtual education and the disembodied mass media of popular entertainment) to objectify and commodify everything, Haraway sees the potential for political resistance through the development of political strategies that approach the problem "not simply in adopting the important but narrow role of scientist, but most crucially in setting comprehensive boundary conditions for production and reproduction." (Haraway 1983) Like Foucault, Haraway is reluctant to pursue grand theories to explain the ways in which the body is historically constituted:

"We can still inscribe our bodies, even if not canonize them." The body is a map of power and identity. (Haraway 1991: 149-181) She argues for "*pleasure* in the confusion of boundaries and for *responsibility* in their construction."(Haraway 1991: 150) Unlike Foucault, she sees a potential in the fluidity of identity for generating new political strategies to empower citizens in a reconstituted world "in which we are placed and place ourselves" which does not argue for a theoretical or practical hierarchy among class, race, or sex and yet accounts for potential empowerment in the social relations produced by and producing science and technology. (Haraway 1991: 149-181)

I agree with Haraway's belief that these deconstructions open the possibility for political change. In Haraway's terms, "There are grounds for hope in the emerging bases for new kinds of unity across race, gender, and class..." (Haraway 1983) Consistent with my argument above, Haraway argues that persistent dualisms in Western traditions such as self/other, mind/body, culture/nature, male/female, civilised/primitive, reality/appearance, whole/part, agent/resource, maker/made, active/passive, truth/illusion, total/partial, God/man "have been systemic to the logics and practices of domination." (Haraway 1983) Her suggestion is that a viable approach to dealing with the problems of late-modernity must keep two things in mind:

(i) The production of universal, totalising theory is a major mistake that misses most of reality; and that

(ii) Taking responsibility for the social relations of science and technology means refusing an anti-science metaphysics, a demonology of technology, and so means embracing the skilful task of reconstructing the boundaries of daily life, in partial connection with others, in ironic communication with all of our parts. (Haraway 1983)

In contrast to the grim prognostications of theorists like Heidegger, Adorno and Horkheimer, Haraway's celebration of the fusion of person and machine in the modern constitution of subjectivities is useful to the extent that her approach to technology encourages a heightened awareness of human connection to technologies such as disembodied communications media: "We can be responsible for machines; they do not dominate or threaten us. We are responsible for boundaries; we are they." (Haraway 1983)

The possibilities for empowerment through democratic education reform become possible only when the capacities of human agency are acknowledged. Giddens' understanding of societal development as enmeshed within this dialectic of power is a more adequate explanation of the dynamic between human agency, societal structures and historical circumstance. His theory of structuration allows an acknowledgment of the ways in which subjectivity is shaped by social constructions, while facilitating a more meaningful comprehensive explanation of the human potential. I wish to combine this conceptualisation of agency with Habermas' approach to reason, which provides potential strategies for human engagement with the development of its social forms of expression.

The successful implementation of democratic reform intrinsically depends upon the expectations of human conduct in which it is grounded. For example, as Campbell observes, rights—as liberalism defines them—are understood as a possession giving the owner certain powers over the actions of others in the name of protection of self-interest. (Campbell 1983: 15) According to liberalism,

rights are founded on the atomistic view of society, whereby competitive individualism is established via the force of the community. As discussed above, an argument of the Left has been that rights based on this assumption of atomistic individualism enable the individual to ignore the moral claim of the common good, therefore, this pre-social type of individual right is "totally at variance with the socialist concept of man as originally and essentially a social being who brings nothing distinctively human into society and whose nature is inseparable from his social relationships." (Campbell 1983: 15) From this dichotomy it is possible to conclude that only members of the same moral community can have rights because their obligations derive from the same type of social contract, be it a contract based on asocial (liberalism) or social premises (socialism, republicanism, communitarianism). Raz correctly identifies an implicit assumption of both the Left and Right critics is that only interests which are considered of *ultimate* value can be the basis of rights. (Raz 1986: 176-180) For example, liberalism places its highest priority on the interests of the individual, while communitarian and republican doctrines place their emphasis 'the common good'. Given Australia's varied cultural and political heritage, it could hardly be considered a homogenous moral community. Its 'curious mixture' of multicultural interests, Benthamite influence and elements of democratic socialism, would—according to Raz—leave no room for rights. This is why the reform of democracy needs to account for both socially grounded rights and rights protecting those interests of instrumental value to individuals and groups. The starting point is to avoid the commonplace discussion of democratic mechanisms like rights as conceptual and empirical entities, by consciously considering their worth within specified historic-political discourses. Hence, I adopt a contingent approach to evaluating mechanisms like rights by locating them in direct relation to the institutions and political cultures required to sustain them. The central normative principles required are:

(i)   That the agency of individuals and groups is equal;

(ii)   That individuals and groups are aware of the means of access to relevant information; and

(iii)   That individuals and groups acquire, and are able to pursue, unrestricted access to popular debate.

The basic structure of any rights-based educational reform requires active, knowledgeable citizens for maintaining true representation of the Australian polity and a check on any possible form of encroachment of the education system. Although quite different in his approach, Berlin echoes Pateman's criticism of liberalism's notion of rights, stating that

> *to offer political rights, or safeguards against intervention by the state, to men who are half-naked, illiterate, underfed, and diseased is to mock their condition; they need medical help or education before they can understand, or make use of, an increase in their freedom. What is freedom to those who cannot make use of it? Without adequate conditions for the use of freedom, what is the value of freedom?*

(Berlin 1975: 124)

Therefore, an education in cultural literacy is needed. The kinds of rights required to ensure minimum standards of public education would simultaneously require focus on the ethical content of citizenship, especially the

idea of civic duty. This civic duty implies that individuals and groups need to participate and take responsibility. This in turn requires a concept of the public interest, a sense of solidarity and belonging.

During the early 1990s, the then Labor government expressed the desire to strengthen civics education through school programs. In June 1994, Prime Minister Paul Keating, set up a committee to consider strategies for national education for citizenship guided by the Civics Expert Group chaired by Professor Macintyre. Later the same year, the Centenary of Federation Advisory Committee, chaired by Joan Kirner, released a report to the Council of Australian Governments recommending a series of measures to develop and strengthen citizenship and democracy in Australia including a national popular debate, peoples' conventions and schools programs.

The Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee (1995) argues that any rational approach to citizenship reform may need to focus on establishing a clear definition of the basic rights and duties of individual citizens; identifying and setting standards in at least those policy areas that are necessary to sustain social participation and social well-being; and a careful consideration of the most effective ways to implement these rights and duties, and policy standards, in government and community, for example, through legislation, charters, rights and duties and national policy standards illustrated above. (SLCRC 1995: 15) Increased awareness of citizenship through civics education and participation are ways of ensuring that the government remains sensitive and responsible to the electorate in its role as guarantor of high education standards. The education system would be an ideal institution in which foster this power of solidarity of different voices over forces, which currently divide society and reducing democracy to pure rhetoric. The *realisation* of democracy depends upon the existence of shaping institutions like public schooling to provide a frame of reference for political participation. (These strategies will be examined in detail below.)

If rights and duties exist in a dynamic relationship with both each other and the ongoing development of society, then the institutions responsible for their creation, implementation and modification should also be reflexive to adjust to this relational dynamic for enduring democratic conditions to prevail. In Giddens' terms, these democratic forms need to be attuned to differing spheres of freedom within the dialectic of power underlying late-modern liberal democracies. Shaping institutions engage with individuals at a more intimate level than the gearing kind that currently prevails in Australian liberal democracy. Rather than exist as minimalist structures geared specifically to the preservation of negative liberties, shaping institutions would also have to be sensitive to positive freedoms; motivating individuals and groups in such a way that it is in the *private* interest of those agents to behave as though their only concern is the *public* welfare. Parliament and jury-rooms are examples of this shaping institution because they encourage political efficacy in that the need to persuade others shapes the dispositions of discussants so that they argue and reach a form of agreement in accordance with considerations which all must admit to be relevant.) However, the recent experience of parliaments and the judiciary in Australia indicates that as shaping institutions, they have been insufficient in the realisation of democracy. Hence, the scope of this kind of democratic practice needs to be widened to include the broader spheres of participation illustrated by Pateman above. Other forms of shaping institutions

need to be recognised and encouraged in all facets of life if an effective democracy is to be effectively realised. The public school and university is potentially a critical shaping institution to realise effective democracy in Australia.

Conclusion

Encouraging and protecting the education system is a precursor to broader political reform and a vital first step in reinvigorating Australian political activity out of its current malaise. I propose a model of democratic reform founded on a rights-based protection that is reflexively linked to an ethic of widespread political participation across a variety of spheres of political, social and economic life. My discussion of democratic reform through education is connected to the public education system in two ways:

(i) Despite the influence of new media, the formal education system is still a key site of political socialisation. It has the potential to stimulate greater awareness of citizenship and identity to enrich democracy, particularly if the new media is utilised in more democratically responsible ways.[100] Civic education in schools is one of the more popular suggestions for encouraging an awareness of this identity. This emphasis on education leads to the second point,

(ii) The education system should, therefore, be protected through formalised rights that guard both staff and students from encroachment by secular political agencies.

Ensuring the legal status of the education system is not sufficient to guarantee democratic citizenship; it must be grounded in a participatory agenda, ensuring that students (and staff) are not only aware of their membership to the liberal democracy of Australia, but that they are able to become actively involved in maintaining and altering the values of Australian democracy. The history of most rights has been that they risk becoming dysfunctional and unrepresentative unless there is some form of active participation by the citizenry to maintain, reform, secure and defend such rights. Proposed reforms to the education system need to be employed in conjunction with the implementation of widespread institutional reform of the democratic type discussed throughout this chapter.

This more dynamic appreciation requires the facilitation of unrestricted discussion free from domination within the context of a re-politicised decision-making process.[101] Part of this re-politicisation must account for the rapid globalisation that has become a predominant concern of Australian democratic education in the late twentieth century. Theories of democracy suffer from focussing too much on the relation of the citizen to the nation-state. (Held 1989: 202) At its core, democracy emphasises the importance of popular participation, majority control of the agenda and decision-making processes. (Kukathas *et al.* 1990: 9) Members of a democratic polity should be governed not by might (be it economic, physical or otherwise) but by knowledge where "Knowledge is the product of a process in which propositions are openly subjected to critical examination. This requires public institutions which facilitate rather than obstruct free criticism of arguments, beliefs, practices, and indeed

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100 The possible uses of the new media for democratic education is discussed in the following chapter.

101 See Habermas 1975: 95-143

of social institutions themselves." (Kukathas *et al.* 1990: 12-13) Education, in all of its forms, is the context in which this critical faculty is best developed and realised, and it is within an *effective democracy* that the free pursuit of this faculty can be secured and nurtured.

Having focussed on political reformation at the societal level, I will now conclude this discussion of possible democratic reform by analysing the particular roles of the student, teacher and citizen in the context of a model of effective democracy. The limitations of Australian liberal democracy indicate that its key institutions and spheres of education need to be re-appraised in light of contemporary developments from juridification to globalisation.

Chapter 9: A Model of Democratic Education

Introduction

Throughout this thesis, I have explored some of the ways by which education influences Australian culture, citizenship and the ongoing development of democracy. As Australia approaches its Centenary of Federation amidst national and global transformation, the definition, scope and experience of Australian citizenship has assumed greater significance in governmental, academic and popular discourses. In this chapter, I wish to analyse the connections between the quality of schooling and the quality of democratic society through the learning and teaching of citizenship. I address the question, "what qualities of democratic citizenship should Australian schools emphasise?"

The task of investigating the ways by which schooling can and should define a desirable form of Australian citizenship involves the identification of the qualities that constitute a 'successful' education in citizenship. This discussion begins by locating a desirable form of citizenship as a concept and an experience in democratic society. The following discussion explores the development of citizenship education in schools to determine a framework for improving citizenship education.

I will identify whether there is, or has been, a distinctive Australian version of citizenship. As implied in my discussion of Australia's liberal heritage in Chapter 7, there are certain problems and ideological tensions surrounding the development of democratic citizenship in Australia. Beyond the traditional notion of citizenship as stolid and dutiful is a potentially revolutionary concept of citizenship informed by a set of critical, democratic, inclusionary skills. A desirable form of democratic citizenship is based upon a knowledge or cultural capital that is empowering to individuals and communities. Crucial to the concrete definition of desirable citizenship for Australian practise is the location and implementation of standards and benchmarks. I argue that the active democratic citizen should have a sense of civic duty emphasising social solidarity within a broader framework of citizenship practises reflecting a global awareness.

I then examine the resources and approaches necessary for schools to teach democratic citizenship. These pedagogical and institutional strategies include the teaching of citizenship as a historically defined set of political institutions, as vocation and the development of the school as a model of a democratic community based on general principles of democratic citizenship. I explore the use of practical models such as the curriculum, teaching method and the conception of the school as a democratic civic community that nurtures every citizen to actively engage democratic processes.

Given that most schooling takes place within state-regulated institutions, there are certain problems located in the structural and pedagogical limitations of the public education system. The current organisation of schools makes them imperfect models for the experience of democratic citizenship. The state's approach to citizenship education in schools is based on a predominantly rhetorical commitment to democracy and citizenship. The state's ambivalence

has resulted in the teaching of weak models of citizenship that will be transmitted in schools. The weak transmission of democratic values and skills arises from the conflicting functions of schools as contexts for acquiring skills for empowerment versus their institutional bias in reproducing the social order, conformity and acceptance of authority.

On the other hand, there is a potential for democratic education through formal schooling to yield a variety of political, social and economic benefits. The nexus of these benefits is the cultural dimension of citizenship that defines and enhances Australian democracy.

The Meanings of Citizenship

In Chapter 1, I traced the development of democracy from the sixteenth century, based upon a notion of citizenship limited to certain groups including owners of property consisting mainly of white educated men. The doctrine of classical liberalism is based on the assumption is that men [*sic*] are essentially self-interested; therefore, democratic citizenship meant the securing of the privacy of individuals to pursue their chosen interests.

This century, citizenship has, in theory, come to mean full membership of a distinct political community based on the *participation* by citizens in the determination of the conditions of their own association. Citizenship is a status bestowing upon individuals equal rights and duties, liberties and constraints, powers and responsibilities. Societies create their own distinctive ideal citizenship towards which aspirations can be directed. (Marshall 1950) In Australia, the development of this ideal has been tempered by a dangerous ideological tension between citizenship as impassive dutiful conformity and citizenship as critical, inclusionary and pro-active.

Australian citizenship is generally associated to the status of nationality and laws governing that status such as voting, land ownership and travel outside of national boundaries. (Barrett{xe "Barrett"} 1995: 17) The conventional notion of citizenship is principally a legal one that has scarcely developed since the nineteenth century. (James{xe "James"} 1994/5: 82) There is a broader notion of the democratic citizen who is devoted to the common good, participating in political processes to guarantee liberty and legitimacy of the democratic state. The state, in turn, is responsible for the cultivation of civic virtue in all members of society. (Mouffe{xe "Mouffe"} 1992: 227-228) Citizenship is more than just a certain status; it is also an expression of one's membership in a political community. (Kymlicka{xe "Kymlicka"} and Norman 1994: 352) To be democratically effective, citizens have to believe that they have an active involvement in political decision-making processes. (Emy{xe "Emy"} and Hughes, in Hague *et al.* 1993: 136) An intrinsic problem with modern education institutions is that their very structure stifles the development of this belief. This structure places too much emphasis on limiting formal education to people of certain demographic and economic groups; in particular, age and class.

The Imprisonment of Formal Schooling

De Bono, in similar metaphorical vein to Foucault's evocation of the panopticon, employs the term 'concept-prison' to connote the ways by which traditional fixed ideas stifle the capacity for new ideas to develop. The dominance of

instrumental reason is a cultural manifestation of the concept-prison. Concept-prisons, in De Bono sense of the term, readily describe the government's unimaginative appeals to the three Rs. Without sufficient reflection on the changing contexts in which 'the basics' are summoned, the government evokes these canons as a rhetorical panacea to all manner of problems in education.[102] The narrow coupling of formal education to the imperatives of the economy is a significant concept-prison.

In Chapter 6, evidence was provided that confirms Illich's argument that obligatory schooling and the market value attached to formal qualifications encourages a false ideology of meritocracy that perpetuates class stratification. (Illich 1976a: 147-148) I attribute this to the instrumentalisation of public education, whereby the education *system* has become synonymous with *education* itself, rather than as an institutional arrangement that *produces* types of cultural knowledge. Consequently, the school system provides limited means to self-empowerment because the means to public education have become ends in themselves. Schooling encourages the domestication of citizens through out-dated didactic teaching strategies and the 'slotting' of students into assessment categories. (Illich 1976a: 156) Despite recent government initiatives to stimulate active participation through civics and citizenship education, "the reality of classroom life in Australian schools is that traditional, didactic teaching strategies predominate." (Print 1996{xe "Print 1996"}) The teaching of essential democratic skills and values such as tolerance, multiculturalism and equality are somewhat paradoxical in the context of the authoritarian structures that predominate modes of learning in public schools. The very structure of the classroom directly and vicariously re-enforces relations of domination through visible hierarchies that monopolise knowledge.

Paul Willis' study of working-class high school boys ("the lads") in an English factory town provides an excellent example of how cultures of domination are reproduced without overt physical coercion. (Willis 1977) Willis explains that these processes of cultural reproduction are not without tension. According to his study, the lads instigate a counter-culture of truancy and rebellion as a rejection of the belief that education is a means to social and economic mobility. This counter-culture is the product of the lads' attempt to meaningfully structure their experience of class domination. Willis argues that as members of an oppressed class, the lads are fully aware that they cannot advance through educational qualification, therefore, their rebellion is indicative of their refusal to climb the ladder of democratic meritocracy via formal schooling. Such participation in meritocracy only serves to legitimise the structures of class inequality. According to Willis,

> the counter-school culture makes a real penetration of what might be called the difference between individual and group logics and the nature of their ideological confusion in modern education. The essence of the cultural penetration concerning the school-made unselfconsciously within the cultural milieu with its own practices and objects but determining all the same an inherently collective perspective-is that the logic of class or group interests is different from the logic of individual interests. To the individual working-class

102 I refer back to my discussion of use and abuse of these canon in Chapter 3.

person mobility means nothing at all. The only true mobility at this level would be the destruction of the whole class society.

(Willis 1977: 128)

Willis illustrates the complex levels of cultural reproduction in which predominant influences of reproduction shift from institutional structures to collective cultural milieus to individual agency.[103]

A major problem with formal institutionalised education is that in order to meet the tremendous demands of large-scale modern society, it has had to develop new expert systems to cope with these demands. In Chapter 5, I drew on Gouldner's study of the modern status of teachers to locate the visible authority of teacher within the 'New Class' of institutionalised education.[104] (Gouldner 1979: 43-47) A high degree of technical efficiency is necessary if the public education system is to fulfil its task of mass education. The historical conditions grounding the development of modern public education in the West have produced an instrumentalised mode of education, with an enormous burden is placed upon teachers and educational administrators. The school is one of the main spheres of social integration, and seen as responsible for addressing social cohesion when, for example, social problems arise amongst youth cultures or unemployment rates among young adults are deemed excessive. Illich rightly asserts that too much emphasis is placed upon the teacher and school as a means to maintaining, enhancing and expanding a polity's democratic and economic progress. (Illich 1976: 154-155)

Another concept-prison is that formal education should be concerned with the young. In Chapter 6, I drew upon my mother's tertiary studies as an example of the potential for education to transform agency by providing both reflexive and non-reflexive skills. Unlike my other women of her age and predisposition, my mother's ontological transformation during tertiary studies indicates the ongoing benefits of formal schooling throughout one's lifetime. In a democratic society, universal formal education would need to reflect, amongst other things, an adequate meaning of 'universal' reflecting the changing stages of everyday life amongst all citizens. Education needs to be recast from its traditional emphasis on the passage of childhood to adulthood. It also needs to change its relationship to the economy. De Bono rightly claims that the popular representation of education undervalues its potential by narrowly associating it with children. Consequently, argues De Bono, "the concept of 'school' is a concept prison because it makes it difficult to think of other ways in which education can happen." (De Bono 1973: 22) Education, he rightly suggests, "should be built into the environment more consciously." (De Bono 1973: 22) Thus, De Bono proposes an alternative model of 'split education'. As the name suggests, 'split education' involves dividing the opportunity to pursue formal education into four segments. Education could take place until the age of fifteen, then another short period of six months could occur at twenty-five, followed by short periods at the ages of forty-five and sixty: "The idea would be to equip people directly for the years ahead of them." (De Bono 1973: 23) Based on the assumption that the needs of a fifteen-year-old differ from those of a man or woman at the age of fifty, staggering education in this way seeks to

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103 Beyond the determinist limitations of Bourdieu's functionalist approach, Willis' study affirms the influential role of human agency over certain levels of cultural reproduction.

104 See Chapter 5.

avoid the onset and reproduction of concept-prisons by re-igniting the learning process as a life-long activity. Offering people "more opportunity to change their lives and jobs instead of having them fixed at an early age when there is nothing on which to base their choice," De Bono's notion of split education opens up possibilities for the integration of non-vocationally based study into workplace environments. (De Bono 1973: 23) The practical realisation of such large-scale reform is, however, unlikely. Aside from requiring a major shift in popular thinking about formal education, this kind of radical measure would depend on long-term state-commitment within a regulated, stable work environment.

The option for voluntary access of all citizens to further education as a legitimate, regular and desirable feature of the democratic polity offers empowerment to both young and older generations. Most importantly, this type of institutional expansion would need to be supported by curricula emphasising techniques of critical thinking and creativity if the possibility for the prevention of ideological domination is to be realised. For citizenship to be meaningful in a democracy, citizens must be active, critical and politically literate, possessing a well-developed sense of civic ethic or duty. The effective of teaching civics and citizenship education requires a clear and popularly recognised sense of what 'legitimate and effective democratic citizenship' means in practise.

Standards and Indicators of Citizenship

A major problem with contemporary approaches to civics education is their reliance on historical and culturally biased conceptions of democratic citizenship. Frameworks for civics and citizenship education reform like those proposed by the Macintyre report (CEG 1994) and the Senate Select Committee on Employment, Education and Training (SSCEET) (1989, 1991) fail to engage the dynamic relationship of citizens, states, groups and institutions like the mass information media, which have such a profound impact on the reproduction of political cultures, values and patterns of equality and domination amongst citizens and their representatives.

Neo-liberal conceptions of citizenship have become widely integrated into everyday political life because they appeal to the philosophical tradition of utilitarianism as a basis for qualifying what they claim to be 'true' democratic principles and institutional arrangements. Practical indicators of social equity have been substituted by economic indicators to measure social well-being. Popular images of national identity have been replaced by the abstract idea of the economy, to which no one can be a member in any practical sense. (Horne, in Stephenson and Turner 1994) As noted earlier in this thesis, surveys have indicated an increasing sense of personal alienation, powerlessness and a declining feeling of community amongst young Australians, implying a decline in civic values. (Mackay 1993: 25) One Senate committee identified the need for some reappraisal of citizenship, national identity and community goals. (SLCRC 1995: 6) However, in appealing to historical values and institutions of democratic polities, proposals for civics reform, such as *Whereas the people...* (CEG 1994), fail to account for changing political cultures and institutions intrinsic to the development of citizenship.

Conservative republican approaches to civics and citizenship education, like that of the Civics Experts Group (1994), inappropriately return to traditional

democratic values that, ultimately, are inadequate in light of social change. The Macintyre Report on Civics Education makes these kinds of appeals to respect the historical development of democracy. It employs a discourse of citizenship education that is limited to certain outdated values, which has the potential to restrict the exploration of new and innovative democratic improvements applicable to changing political, economic and social circumstances. As Davidson asserts, the Civics Experts Group "confused civics education with learning history... which perpetuated the myth of a highly democratic citizenry at the creation of the Constitution and its practical expression." (Davidson 1997: 141-142) Claims to democratic citizenship like these may unintentionally legitimate the antiquated and narrowly defined cultural values and institutions emanating, fostering the ideological justification of patterns of social, political and economic inequality. For example, the 'open republic' in the historical terms advocated by Stuart Macintyre of the Civics Experts Group is better understood as a 'cultural republic' or more dangerously, as a kind of religion in its ideological dogma. (Davidson 1997: 142)

Given the combination of Australia's historical and cultural links with Britain and the USA, and its expanding commercial relationships with Asia, civics education must reflect both local and global community standards of citizenship. The danger of a culturally circumscribed citizenship education is that it risks stifling the development of citizenship education. The emphasis of early curricula on European history and culture at the exclusion of indigenous peoples' history is an example of culturally procedures that reinforce oppressive hierarchies of exclusion, rather than encouraging inclusive and empowering strategies of citizenship awareness.

A major danger facing the education of democratic citizenship in the late-twentieth century is that individuals are increasingly being reduced to cultural, statistical and/or stereotypical historical generalisations. Therefore, standards of effective citizenship need to be developed to provide a unifying theme based on widely accepted values and symbols including tolerance, participation and social solidarity. These standards in government and community could be achieved through legislation, charters, rights, national policy standards and civics education.

If democracy is about the *rule of the people*, then these standards must be established throughout society from both above and below. Government and media control of the discourse of debate and discussion of democracy must cease. Furthermore, the repeated failure to relegate substantive democratic reform from rhetoric to practise insults the intelligence and learning capabilities of Australian citizens. Democratic citizenship is legitimate and meaningful when, at the very least, the overwhelming majority of citizens derive a sense of political efficacy and self-empowerment from the social arrangements in which political, economic and social equality is actively enjoyed. By *actively enjoyed*, every individual must be prepared, without coercion, to participate in the determination of his/her personal conditions of existence peacefully alongside her/his fellow citizens. Civics and citizenship education needs to facilitate the learning of cultural literacies of tolerance and mutual understanding to avoid both the dangers of social cleavage and the false generalisation of individuals from perceived economic, historical and cultural backgrounds. The instruction, learning and practise of citizenship through civics education has the potential to be crucial in the realisation of a more meaningful conception of democratic

citizenship. Civics education needs to be enhanced beyond its traditional function of providing information about national identity, its historical development, civic life, politics and government. At least the Civics Experts Group are right when they argue that civics education "should address the needs of school students and others in the community." (CEG{xe "CEG"} 1994: 1-7)

Unlike the USA, where civics citizenship education often takes the form of clearly identifiable school subjects—subjects such as Civics, Government, Problems of Democracy, or History, Civics and Citizenship—education . in Australia tends to be more discretely interwoven within existing school subjects such as Social Studies. (Print 1996) During the early 1990s, the Keating Government made a largely rhetorical attempt to increase citizenship education in schools, amongst migrants and in the general community to encourage "knowledgeable citizens who are equipped to participate in the exercise of the rights and responsibilities which they, as Australian citizens, share."[105] (Department Of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs 1995{xe "Department Of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs 1995"}: 3) Civics education in Australian schools is confined to the ideology of vocationalism that has predominated in education policy since the Dawkins era of the 1980s. (Maslen 1993a{xe *"The Bulletin 1993"}: 49)

The Mid-continent Regional Educational Laboratory (McREL) in the USA provides a useful basis for effective civics education by providing a comprehensive set of benchmarks for civic and citizenship education. (McREL 1995 and 1996) Drawing from three bodies of work on USA civics education, including the *National Standards for Civics and Government* (1994), the Centre for Civic Education's *Civitas: A Framework for Civic Education* and a series of civics units authored by *Law in a Free Society*, McREL categorises components of civics education into over seventy content standards. Each content standard includes a set of key concepts that students should know and the resources for teachers and curriculum developers to meet the particular standard. Examples of these content requirements include:

* The meaning of citizenship in the United States;

* The sources, purposes, and functions of law, and the importance of the rule of law for the protection of individual rights and the common good;

* The concept and purposes of a constitution,

* Major characteristics of parliamentary systems;

* Important shared values, political beliefs and civic beliefs in an increasingly diverse American society;

* Issues regarding personal, political and economic rights;

* Traits that enhance a citizen's ability to fulfil personal and civic responsibilities; and

* Means by which participation in civic and political life helps citizens attain individual and public goals. (McREL 1996)

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105 In a similar rhetorical move, the then Deputy Prime Minister, announced details of a major government proposal to develop a "Citizen Charter" in 1994. Another failed proposal was made by the Department of Immigration in 1953. (Della-Giacoma 1993: 2)

Within these standards, McREL divides civics education into four tiers of schooling. At level one, civics education in the Primary sector aims to educate students to develop an awareness of authority, for example, by illustrating situations in which individuals are acting on their own (e.g. two friends decide to do something) and situations in which individuals' actions are directed by others (e.g. parents tell their children to do something), the use of power with legitimate authority (e.g. a teacher tells a group of students to do something) and power without authority (e.g. an older, larger student tells a group of younger students to do something) and the problems that might result from lack of effective authority (e.g. inability to settle disputes or accomplish necessary tasks). At the Upper Elementary level, civics education encourages an awareness of those who make, apply and enforce rules and laws for others (e.g. adult family members, teachers, city councils, national governments) and who manage disputes about rules and laws (e.g. courts). The student is expected to know the difference between power (e.g. the capacity to control something or someone) and authority (e.g. power that people have the right to use because of custom, law, or the consent of the governed), as well as the ways in which authority is used (e.g. parents have authority to direct and control their children, governors of states have the authority to carry out and enforce laws) and ways in which power can be used without authority. The student is also expected to have a firm grasp of the basic purposes of government (e.g. to protect the rights of individuals, to promote the common good). At level three (Middle School/Junior High), civics education aims to enable the student to distinguish between private life and civic life and how politics enables people with differing ideas to reach binding agreements (e.g. presenting information and evidence, stating arguments, negotiating, compromising, voting). The student is expected to learn institutions that have the authority to direct or control the behaviour of members of a society (e.g. a school board, state legislature, courts, and so on). At the High School level, civics education is expected to understand how politics enables a group of people with varying opinions and/or interests to reach collective decisions, influence decisions, and accomplish goals that they could not reach as individuals, for example, in managing the distribution of resources, and conflicts. (McREL 1996)

In 1995, the director of the Australian Federal Government's Economic Planning Advisory Commission advocated a democratic audit to establish the basis for the expansion of mass political participation and the alleviation of economic inequalities through mass education and advanced information technology. (Withers{xe "Withers"}, in Fagan 1995: 6) Typical audits attempt to provide a framework based on benchmarks and social indicators to evaluate the quality and effectiveness of democratic values, institutions and citizenship in Australia.[106]

Hattam rightly argues that democratic benchmarks are necessary to curb the erosion of social services like public education. A democratic audit of education could: (i) benchmark social indicators in areas such as education in the public sphere; (ii) actively seek participation from the most silenced and oppressed groups in society in the auditing process; and (iii) enliven debates about Australia's democratic future. Hattam suggests that benchmarking the arena of teacher's work is a manageable way of beginning a broader audit of

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[106] Both Deakin University and Swinburne University began developing audits of Australian democracy in the early 1990s.

democracy. Improving the quality of education begins with the identification of the appropriate role of the teacher, and the resources necessary to maintain that role. (Hattam 1995) More importantly, I agree with Burrow's argument that an attempt to benchmark educational processes must consider "the educational needs of students not systems." (Burrow 1995: 4)

Teaching Democracy

Despite the traditional conception of teachers as agents of visible authority, teacher-centred strategies are not entirely without value. There has been a broad body of research since the 1980s indicating the effectiveness of teacher-centred strategies.[107] Teachers can provide a valuable foundation of knowledge and appropriate teaching resources, without which, student centred strategies of civics and citizenship education "can easily become a pool of directionless, ineffective attempts at learning." (Print 1996) For effective citizenship education, Giroux advocates focussing on "the intersection between cultural politics and the work of public intellectuals within expanded sites of learning as an essential public strategy of engagement." (Giroux 1996) Giroux asserts that the collective knowledge and actions of critical public intellectuals should be pedagogically geared towards educational and political strategies for extending and entrenching the possibilities of democratic public life. It is through "a more expansive notion of education and pedagogy as a form of cultural work" that teachers have the potential to utilise knowledge and power to facilitate the enrichment of democracy across diverse sites of learning. (Giroux 1996)

Osborne{xe "Osborne"} (1991) argues that teachers must possess a clearly articulated vision of education and believe that the material being taught is worth knowing and important. He suggests that the learning material should be organised as a problem or issue to be investigated, with careful, deliberate attention is given to the teaching of thinking within the context of valuable knowledge. As a corollary of Osborne's model of effective teaching strategies, students are required to be active in their own learning and encouraged to share, to build on each other's ideas. Osborne also rightly suggests that in principle, classrooms are characterised by trust and openness so that students find it easy to participate. Teachers must be able to connect the material with student knowledge and experience and the outside world. (Osborne 1991; Print 1996) Similarly, Giroux advocates a consolidation of "the intersection between cultural politics and the work of public intellectuals within expanded sites of learning as an essential public strategy of engagement." (Giroux 1996) Public intellectuals need to move beyond their conventional roles as professional academics acting alone on the margins of popular discourse, to a more active and morally accountable position within the community. Giroux rightly highlights the need for public intellectuals to self-consciously identify themselves as "as citizens whose collective knowledge and actions presuppose specific visions of public life." In a similar vein, Said argues that the public realm needs social critics who are self-critical in their analysis of social phenomena. He invokes the reflexive sociological approach of Gouldner as an example. (Said 1994) Gouldner argues that in any process of social critique, the sociologist should

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107 However, Print (1996) is critical of the lack in research on effective class-based, cognitive strategies in Civics and Citizenship Education in Australia. He rightly urges future development in civics and citizenship education to redress this deficit in research.

"penetrate deeply into his [*sic*] daily life" because the "knowledge of the world cannot be advanced apart from the sociologist's knowledge of himself [*sic*] and his [*sic*] position in the social world, or apart from his [*sic*] efforts to change these." (Gouldner, in Lemert 1993: 466) Even though knowledge is limited by the pathologies of its historical constitution and infused with personal agenda, he believes that it can be appropriated to the task of positive social reconstruction. To this end, Gouldner proposes a reflexive approach by intellectuals in the public sphere through "cultures of critical discourse." (Gouldner 1979: 5, 28-43)

I agree with Giroux's assertion that the collective knowledge and actions of critical public intellectuals should be pedagogically geared towards educational and political strategies for extending and entrenching the possibilities of democratic public life. He proposes that is through "a more expansive notion of education and pedagogy as a form of cultural work" that cultural and educational workers utilise knowledge and power to facilitate the enrichment of democracy across diverse sites of learning, including schools, the workplace, the day-care centre, the local church, youth centres, hospitals, the art world, movie studios, television programs, etc. These locations are intrinsically pedagogical sites in which cultural workers actively engage in the production and circulation of ideas, values, social identities and material conditions of well-being through a range of discourses, formats, and styles. For example, Giroux suggests that educators "need to use the electronic media as a site of learning in which they can combine entertainment with serious commentaries" to "arouse the language and passion of hope through an appeal to the possibilities of what it means to live in a democracy."[108] (Giroux 1996) Similar suggestions have been widely discussed amongst Australian cultural workers, ranging from academics to journalists and documentary filmmakers. (National Centre for Australian Studies 1991)

Learning by Example

According to Print, "By themselves, the catalyst document *Whereas the people...* and subsequent Commonwealth support, will be insufficient to ensure that civics and citizenship education is taught in Australian schools." He rightly claims that the Macintyre report (CEG 1994), and its unsuccessful predecessors from the Senate Select Committee on Employment, Education and Training (1989, 1991), falsely assume "that an active approach to learning by students will be later reflected in an active approach to participative citizenship as adults" because they pay insufficient attention to the pedagogy of civics education. (Print 1996)

The *form* of civics education is as important as its *content* in the learning of democratic citizenship. By *form*, I refer to civics pedagogy and the environments in which learning occurs. As Print observes civics and citizenship education has traditionally relied on class and school-based, passive-cognitive pedagogics, which "are usually presented as teacher-centred strategies where students are perceived as passive learners who cognitively absorb teacher-identified knowledge." Citizenship education needs to be oriented towards

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108 In his critique of popular music Adorno concedes that, under the right circumstances, the products of the culture industry might be put to subversive use, however, he gives the impression that he finds these products utterly mystifying. (Adorno 1941)

"more student-centred strategies and are based on positive views of student learning through participation." (Print 1996)

Citizenship education must begin early in life with role-playing using democratic problem solving to teach citizens how to define and overcome conflicts and problems democratically. For example, these tasks could use contemporary issues of Constitution reform as real-life case-study of how citizens should make their own democratic governance (or perhaps, how they don't get to participate in governance). This includes the transmission of skills such as voting and getting young people to define their idea of their human rights and duties in school. Within the classroom, participatory pedagogics involve group problem-solving exercises during which students work together to identify the issues or resolve the problems. The teacher guides students through activities requiring active student participation. Strategies for effective citizenship education require the development of citizenship education pedagogies that foster critical thinking particularly through group work, simulations, role play, the use of technology as a resource[109] and a variety of other cooperative learning strategies involving group problem-solving exercises. Giroux argues for a critical pedagogy enabling students to become more critically aware of "the various ways in which representations are constructed as a means of comprehending the past through the present in order to legitimate and secure a particular view of the future. This involves exploring how students can come to interrogate the historical, semiotic, and relational dynamics involved in the production of various regimes of representations and their respective politics..." (Giroux 1991: 19) Giroux's critical pedagogy encourages the student to actively reflect on the ontological and material conditions of his or her own existence beyond contemporary pedagogies which are uncritically and instrumentally geared to integrate and normalise the student into a society in a taken for granted way.

Critical pedagogy makes possible a deeper appreciation of the various values and belief systems of different cultures, communities and polities that are increasingly prevalent in late-modern democratic life. Giroux contends that "the challenges raised by feminism, post-modernism and postcolonialism have contributed to a redefinition of cultural politics that addresses representational practices in terms that analyse not only their discursive power to construct common-sense, textual authority, and particular social... formations, but also institutional conditions which regulate different fields of culture." (Giroux 1991: 2) Similarly, Fromm argues that citizens need to be equipped with "the readiness and capacity for critical questioning of all assumptions and institutions which have become idols under the name of common sense, logic, and what is supposed to be 'natural.'" This radicalism does not negate tradition; it aims to critically understand the conditions of its reproduction and/or abolition in modernity. (Fromm 1971)

There is evidence to suggest that cooperative learning strategies are more effective than the individualistic and competitive models of learning currently

109 While print refers specifically to computer technologies such as the CD-Rom, according to Giroux, "it might be argued that the most important sites of learning today encompass both television and radio airwaves... the public is increasingly getting educated about politics from sites of learning, such as talk radio, that offer a combination of entertainment, ideology, and commentary largely ignored by progressives in their analysis of public intellectuals." (Giroux 1996) Consequently, Giroux argues for a redefinition of what is meant by critical education to include a wider spectrum of sites in the public sphere beyond the traditional sphere of schooling. Giroux asserts that educators "need to use the electronic media as a site of learning in which they can combine entertainment with serious commentaries" to "arouse the language and passion of hope through an appeal to the possibilities of what it means to live in a democracy." (Giroux 1996)

predominating throughout Australian schooling. (Print 1996) While cooperative learning strategies are already prevalent in Australian school curricula, their implementation has been minimal. Cooperative learning involves "the instructional use of small groups so that students work together to maximise their own and each other's learning" through classroom discussions of current events, and mini-parliaments. (Johnson, Johnson and Holubec, in Print 1996) Other valuable strategies include the student-run school assembly; school council elections, visits to Parliament House and active involvement with local community programs like "Meals on Wheels." For these activities to be effective, there needs to be a high degree of student involvement. They must be seen as relevant to the student's own experiences of political life. (Print 1996) The focus of conventional citizenship education strategies on highlighting a particular event—during which civic responsibility is deliberately emphasised as a positive good for the community (e.g. Anzac Day)—usually foster a passive role for students. Studies in the USA "suggest that extracurricular activities are far more influential than formal academic classroom activities in nurturing positive values about participation in civic life." (Patrick and Hoge, in Print 1996) An example of these extracurricular strategies is the "public life" model of civics and citizenship education. Designed to re-energise local communities, 'public life' strategies encourage the exploration of democratic citizenship through activities such as public work and involvement in community politics concerning issues like public housing redevelopment and local communities services. (Boyte, in Print 1996) Stronger formal links need to be established between school participation in and partnership with local government.

While establishing clear standards, pedagogical strategies of civics education are crucial to the education of democratic citizenship. A more extensive reform of civics and citizenship education may include the restructuring of schools themselves as key democratic institutions. Public schooling should provide a frame of reference for political participation, the cultivation of civic virtue and democratic citizenship.

The experience of active participation is a valuable form of political education. As I argue above, active political participation has the potential to empower citizens and groups with a greater critical awareness of their own rights and responsibilities as well as those of others. Research suggests that active participation in a school framework in which principles of democracy are operationalised in school decision-making processes; students are more likely to acquire the values and skills of democratic citizenship. (Print 1996) Pateman writes that: "...for maximum participation by all the people... democracy must take place at other spheres in order that the necessary individual attitudes and psychological qualities can be developed." (Pateman 1970: 42) She argues for an extension of participation into the schools and universities themselves as valuable contexts of 'social training'. Increased awareness of citizenship through civics education and participation in school decision-making processes are ways of learning a variety of qualities of democratic citizenship.

During the 1990s, there has been an increasing interest in electronic communications technologies as a valuable classroom resource and as a means for enhancing the means of citizen participation in decision-making processes. Examples of widespread democratic form utilising electronic communications technologies exist in Europe; however, the use of these

techniques of instant mass voting is limited to specific topics of deliberation. (Rodotà 1995) Decisions concerning the day-to-day running of the state and its regions still has to be handled by representative democratic organs because of the complexity and scope of needs and interests among citizens that need to be addressed on a day to day basis. Most existing reforms aiming to enhance direct democracy offer only a thin commitment to extending and enriching democracy because the possibility of citizens making active, informed and critical decisions is confined to issue-based political concerns. (Davidson 1997: 219-221) Furthermore, while electronic democracy is useful for enhancing individual capacities to participate, it requires, however, a well-informed citizenry that must decide issues on an isolated, atomistic basis. This is not overly encouraging of civic virtue. To be able to communicate with fellow 'web-surfers' in a far-away territory is one thing, but actually sharing a culture within a face-to-face community is another. For example, a student may be able to learn the civic values of multiculturalism from a CD-Rom or the Internet via distance learning; however, to actively share the political efficacy inherent in the act of voting with members of her/his physical local community of shared cultures is undermined by the use of disembodied communications technology.

Electronically mediated modes of participation in political affairs do not guarantee the cultivation of civic virtue in which the capacity to participate yields political efficacy for the individual or group concerned. A central reason for this is that decisions based upon specific issues are generally interest-based, appealing to the momentary interests of individuals within a pragmatic mode of rationality. This pragmatism often disregards more enduring, long-term interests that citizens have in common with other members of their community (local, societal and global). Issue-based decision-making techniques are useful to an extent; however, their intrinsically momentary existence does not necessarily enrich the more enduring characteristics of democratic communities.

Educating Democracy, Law and Public Policy

The ground-rules guaranteeing the teaching, learning and experience of democratic citizenship need to be embodied in law and policy. Rights are one of the key ways in which citizenship may be defined because they form and shape the status of membership. (Held 1989: 200-201) A charter may be used in the place of a bill of rights to formally outline Australia's national goals and values, acting as a guide to general policy. (SLCRC 1995; Della-Giacoma{xe "Della-Giacoma"} 1993: 2) As I proposed in Chapter 8, a charter may include national social benchmarks and public policy standards monitored by a set of national indicators, like the European Community's Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers.

The entrenchment of principles of freedom through educational rights is central to Illich's approach to cultural reform. (Illich 1976a and 1976b) He cites the first amendment of the United States Constitution as an example of legal protection. He advocates a radical reform of institutional schooling, beginning with the legal prevention of the establishment of education by the state. Illich argues that while rights are useful guarantees of democratic freedoms, "A bill of rights for modern man [sic] cannot produce cultural revolution. It is merely a manifesto." The value for Illich is that "These principles can be generalized." (Illich 1976a: 156)

Rights have as a corollary a high degree of ongoing citizen involvement and awareness in the influence of issues "concerning social justice and institutions other than those of the central government." (Lively{xe "Lively"} 1990: 140-141) This involvement includes a wider degree of democratic participation in the classroom to establish "confidence in one's ability to participate responsibly and effectively, and to control one's life and environment..." (Pateman 1970: 46) Citizens must be able to actively and knowledgeably participate in determining the conditions of their association and assume collective responsibility for the preservation of those conditions. (Kukathas, Lovell and Maley 1990: 5) Critical to this political ethos is a belief in the legitimacy, capacity and necessity of grassroots participation for democratic wellbeing. (Oldfield{xe "Oldfield"} 1990: 187)

Conclusion

Davidson suggests that the essence of democracy lies in the rejection of history, because historical notions of democratic values have the potential to become mythologised, generating unfair impressions of certain citizens in the present as a result (i.e. unfair in that they create the cultural bases of racism, sexism and other prejudicial generalisations). (Davidson{xe "Davidson"} 1997: 2-11, 141-142) While I disagree with Davidson's claim, I also believe that it is not entirely without foundation. Firstly, I disagree with Davidson because of the important role of the past in shaping the lifeworlds that form the basis of identity for many people and communities. Democratic frameworks must provide the scope for those citizens whose identity-formation is intrinsically connected to historical values for the meaningful reproduction of cultural traditions, if those frameworks to indeed be democratic. As a corollary of this, democratic frameworks must also enable processes of consensus-formation as a check against the possible hegemony of any particular value-system—historical or otherwise. Therefore, Davidson is correct to the extent that democracy is ineffective while individuals and groups are marginalised by a dominant set of values governing the realisation of democratic society. Davidson's use of examples, like Macintyre's narrow republican conception of democracy illustrated earlier, highlights the existence of historically circumscribed conceptions of democracy in positions of influence within the Australian polity.[110] Effective democratic education emphasises civic themes such as tolerance and the celebration of cultural differences within relevant a framework of rights and duties. Like Giroux, I advocate a pedagogical project as a means to extending the principles and practices of democracy, whose principles include the non-violent pursuit of self-determination, solidarity, economic justice, equity and racial tolerance. Education must offer the possibility for diverse groups to imagine new forms of community whose educative dimensions impact directly on the renewal of everyday life. (Giroux 1996)

Within both the classroom and community, the possibilities for improving civics and citizenship education are still in abundance. While the role of the state, teacher, student and pedagogy is in urgent need of re-evaluation, the classroom can provide a valuable forum in which the qualities of democratic

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[110] Aside from chairing the Report on Civics Education, Stuart Macintyre also had a significant influence over Prime Minister's Hawke and Keating during the 1990s. (Davidson 1997: 141-142)

citizenship are discussed, appreciated and learned. These qualities range from the cultivation of a sense of social inclusion and solidarity, to active participation in the local community, to a greater awareness of the rights and duties attached to democratic citizenship. As the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee note: "civic qualities are not just innate: they can be learned and improved." (SLCRC 1995: 15)

The starting point for invigorating democracy through education is to break from the instrumental, outdated and Euro-centric values of liberalism that, to borrow from Camus, "are too full of rumours from the past." While it is useful to "remember the clamour in which Europe was forged," Australia's political destiny must remain mindful of its past, but even more mindful of its future.

Conclusion

Dans ce désert, personne, ni lui ni son hôte n'étaient rien. Et pourtant, hors de ce désert, ni l'un ni l'autre... n'auraient pu vivre vraiment.

Albert Camus (in Davies 1983: 60)

A French Lesson

The quote above is from a short story that I read in my French classes at university. The story is called *L'Hôte*. Written by Camus in 1957, it is included in an anthology entitled *The Exile and the Kingdom*. (Davies 1983: 53-66) *L'Hôte* is primarily the fictional tale of a teacher, Daru, who is single-handedly minding a school in a remote part of the Algerian desert during one cold winter break. The story is set in the historical context of the actual Arabic revolt against the imperial domination of France in Algeria. An Arab murderer, who is fleeing the colonial French authorities, seeks shelter at the school. The Arab prisoner becomes *l'hôte*, meaning "guest," of the Frenchman, Daru. Upon learning that his guest's act of murder was the product of anguished oppression under French colonial rule, the non-Arabic Daru takes sympathy on the distrusting fugitive. Daru's love of this fellow man motivates him to act beyond the rules and institutions of organised society and authority; he gives the Arab a chance at freedom. The wary fugitive, however, misinterprets the teacher's motives and turns on Daru. Within the isolated confinement of the school, the relationship between the two men becomes one of shifting power. Daru becomes the "guest" of the desperate Arab. Camus portrays Daru as a well-intentioned person whose actions are misplaced because of his failure to understand the complexities of the Arab's predicament. In the end, Daru is ironically condemned by the race of people whose member he had attempted to help. The teacher's sincerity is crushed by the malice and violence of a hostile world of alienation and miscommunication. (Camus, in Davies 1983: 53-66)

Introduction

While I do not agree with Camus' depiction of essential solitude of humanity, his observations of modern life *Minotaur* and *L'Hôte* are metaphorically applicable to the current discussion of reason, subjectivity and democratic education.

The relationship of the teacher Daru to the Arab prisoner is symbolic of the ever-shifting dynamic of overt power between authority and citizen. The conflict and misunderstanding between these characters depicts the fragility of social order in a society founded on humanism. The Algerian desert in which the fictional school is situated symbolises the ontological wasteland of modern Western civilisation. In *Minotaur*, the city may be interpreted to be metaphorical of Western civilisation in the twentieth century as a crowded and oppressive place, marked by the echoes of European tradition and history. I wish to conclude this thesis by linking these brief textual representations from *L'Hôte* and *Minotaur* to the ideological domination of instrumental reason in the intellectual and practical development of various processes and institutions of mass education in Australia during the late-twen*' :th century. Drawing on the

evocative metaphors of power, authority and exile in these texts, I wish to justify my claim in this thesis that various forms of democratic education are necessary to avoid and negative the social, political and economic consequences of market-driven, instrumentalised forms of education that are currently developing across Australia.

Authority, Progress and Education in Late-modernity

L'Hôte depicts an ever-shifting corollary of authority and subjectivity, which is insightful to explaining a dynamic of power that shapes the relationships of student and teacher, citizen and state, and self and society. On one level, the Arab prisoner is *l'hôte*, or "guest" of Daru the teacher at the Algerian school. The French word, *l'hôte*, can also be taken to mean "host," which Camus exploits to capture the cultural ambiguity underpinning the dynamic interplay of power between the two protagonists. Although the Arab is initially surprised to find that he is guest, rather prisoner of the teacher, his distrust of Daru compels him to seek domination of his host. Overt power shifts as the roles guest and host are reversed. The status of Daru's visible authority as a teacher and an unwitting French imperialist is portrayed as contextually dependent upon discourses of power defining his spheres of influence and freedoms.

At the ontological level of the face-to-face, the teacher in the modern Australian school is conventionally understood as 'host' to her/his students in a hierarchy of visible authority. "The teacher" exists as a social status by virtue of the student. For the teacher to claim legitimate authority as an educator and dispenser of discipline, a minimum degree of unquestioned submission to the teacher is required of the student. In this sense, the teacher is a kind of guest of the student, because without the notion of "the student," the concept of "the teacher" loses meaning (and subsequently, authority). The notion of guest and host as a conceptual binary is blurred by this inter-subjective dynamic in the same fundamental way as the shifting relationship of the protagonists in the fictional Algerian classroom of Camus' story. The status of the teacher and student is essentially a relational one situated within a dialectic of power. Changes to the role of the teacher have implications for the student, which, at a very basic level, is evident in the compounding effects of increases to the workloads of teachers and students alike in recent years. Late-modern conditions of cultural fragmentation, reflexive processes of self-discipline, the widespread dissemination of expert pedagogical systems and the subsequent decline in the visible authority of the Australian teacher, obscure this relationship on various practical levels.

As illustrated in Chapter 5, a similar transformation of authority is evident in Australia's democratic institutions. In theory, representative democracy is concerned with self-rule; therefore, officials are elected to 'host' the collective decision-making process on behalf of their electorate. At the same time, government is guest of the people by way of political mandate subject to ongoing electoral approval. (Schumpeter 1943: 246) In practise, the Australian government is seen less as "guest" of the people and more as a distant 'host' of national political affairs. The democratic status of elected representatives has become reified and removed from both the perceived influence and understanding of most citizens. (See Galligan 1995: 134, Horne 1994, Walker 1993, Walker *et al.* 1993) This is largely due to the scale and complexity of the

modern state and the late-modern instrumental rationalisation of its democratic functions.

Economically rationalised reforms to education initiated by purveyors of neo-liberal doctrine generally amplify these conditions of domination of social integration (e.g. anomie, alienation and declining civic participation) because they emphasise an individuation of citizens as clients and consumers without sufficient concern for the unequal access of citizens to both political institutions and capacities for self-determination. Established neo-liberal conceptions of individual freedom diminish the democratic role of the government as 'host' by locating responsibility for self-determination in the hands of citizens as consumers in a market-place of limited freedoms.

I agree with Illich's contention that the education system has become synonymous with education as an end in itself. The emphasis by the state on quantifiable institutionally delivery *as substance* is at the expense of human dignity. Ignoring democratic factors such as the financial and intellectual accessibility of education, this dangerous emphasis on "thin" reform confuses improvements to mass-education with *more schooling.* In limiting education reform to issues of resource management, market power and consumer power, *more schooling* inappropriately reduces the qualitative facets of education to economic standards of evaluation. The reduction of democratic education to "consumer value packages" limits both the scope, and accessibility of education content to the pragmatic market forces of demand and supply. (Illich 1976: 147-149) The development of modern education is driven by a myopic consumerism that has ideologically distorted the popular perception of democratic entitlements and duties. Processes of mass education are transforming into the production of standard commodities. In the public education system of Australia, education has come to mean "training." As schools are forced to market themselves as profitable ventures to advertisers through companies like Whittle Communications, students become more accustomed to equating education *solely* with vocation as a means to securing economic power in the labour market. As a commodity, education on one level is becoming standardised according to market imperatives, while on another level, the marketing logic of education will increasingly be one of maximising product differentiation of education commodities. This differentiation may, for example, be according to the types of vocational outcomes offered by corporatised educational organisations, or aimed at a client with special needs such as the handicapped. This differentiation of education generate an illusory sense of plurality and freedom of choice for the consumer that may be confused with substantive democracy, however, it will only generate new social hierarchies. Wealthier groups will continue to enjoy the privilege of education, while a growing number of people of lesser financial means are motivated by the consumption-driven logic that working harder to pay for education is the only means to freedom of choice. Teachers and students alike are becoming competitive in the market place rather than competition to further the self and community in its broader capacities. Democratic entitlements are falling by the wayside as individuals come to expect that accessing education is purely a matter of self-discipline. (Bauman 1988) Those without market power are excluded from access entirely. If Illich is correct, then the outcome of this marketisation and standardisation is violence and oppression, especially when jobs are not forthcoming. (Illich 1976: 148-149)

There is already an indication that Illich's chilling prognosis is correct. A survey of Victorian teachers conducted in 1996 identified a changing attitude of students, who were increasingly disrespectful of the school disciplinary hierarchies. Traditional expectations of loyalty and obedience to the school system appear to be diminishing in some regions of Victoria. (Milburn 1996: 11) Outbursts of violence in Australian schools appear to be increasing in frequency, indicating an erosion of the social order within schools. The decline of the visible authority of the teacher and the responsiblization of the student is occurring within a fragmentation of the traditional disciplinary culture of many public schools. Broadly speaking, the colonisation of life-worlds by the media of money and power is, in a complex relationship, leading to the kinds of social fragmentation evident in the education system of late-modernity. This cultural shift is indicative of a new form of autonomization, regimentation and domination. (Rose 1992) Certain processes of individuation based on expert systems of self-discipline and clientalisation pacify democratic citizens, oppressing them in ways that are not necessarily self-evident to those citizens. (Pettit 1987: 177) At the same time, Illich may be correct in his conclusion that one outcome of this development-mentality may be sporadic violence, both in and out of school grounds.

Camus wrote L'Hôte during a period of violent revolt by Muslim Algerians against the French imperial domination. French colonialism left an indelible imprint on Algeria. Social upheaval continued into the latter 1990s, even after Algeria gained territorial independence in 1962. (SBS 1994: 9) In the Algerian neighbourhood of Belcourt, where Camus grew up, metal frames from old school desks lined the street curbs to deter Islamic terrorist car bombers from parking their explosives near pedestrian thoroughfares during the early months of 1997. (Marlowe 1997: 3) Australians face a different kind of colonisation to that of the Algerians. If the domination of instrumental reason persists, colonising more aspects of daily life, then the most terrifying prospect for Australian democracy is the transformation of economic competition into a (dialectically related) nexus of passivity and recrudescent conflict.

Alienation, Empowerment and the City

The difficulty in establishing satisfactory conditions for the peaceful cohabitation of citizens with differing interests is partially attributable to the scale and complexity of modern Western civilisation. To advocate a large-scale political arrangement in which individuals and groups are able to voluntarily pursue their own interests in peace is a perilous undertaking. The city, one observer said, is a bargain with the devil, because the possibility for the demise of the city is always immanent. Similarly, citizens of the classical democracy of Ancient Greece observed the fragility of order in public life. The democratic polities of modernity face the same possibility. Institutions are essentially rationally defined artefacts that face the perpetual challenges of confrontation by the irrational. Given the growing confinement of institutional rationality to the instrumental, these challenges are intensified. Globalisation only compounds this pressure.

In the passage taken from *Minotaur*, cited at the beginning of Chapter 7, the town is a crowded place in which a citizen is unable to gain a rational perspective of his/her place in it. Camus writes: "there are no more islands. Yet

the need for them makes itself felt." (Camus 1995: 1) The demands of modern life make it difficult to "find the solitude necessary to strength, the long breathing-space in which the mind can gather itself together and courage take stock of itself..." Cities provide a valuable context for human development; however, they also "must fulfil certain conditions." (Camus 1995: 1) I wish to argue that like the city, the development of complex democratic polities necessitates a degree of technical efficiency for the state-management of human affairs to be sustainable. Public institutions, including the education system, require limited levels of instrumental rationalisation to be effective on a mass-scale. Provided it is applied in conjunction with other forms of reasoning, the ethic of utility is a valuable practical framework for rationalising the collective interests of a population. The problem is when this ethic enables the degree of instrumentalisation shown throughout this thesis. Instrumental reason a poor substitute for human reason in its broader capacities.

The quote from Camus' *L'Hôte* at the beginning of this chapter comes from one of Daru's meditations on life in the Algerian desert. Daru is in exile from human contact in the cold seclusion of the desert. In the desert, reflects Daru, one is neither "guest" nor "host." One is in exile and unable to truly *live*. I interpret this to be a metaphor for the widespread alienation of modern (including late-modern) life. The humanism of Daru is displaced in the atomised sterility of a modern society void of coherent ontological meaning and inter-subjective understanding. As a non-indigenous teacher, he symbolises the visible authority of French colonialism that fails to understand the culture and ontological condition of the local people. The Arab prisoner is in exile from active membership and freedom in his society under French imperial domination. He tragically ignores Daru's sympathy and help, unable to reason beyond his contempt for the kind of authority the French teacher personified. Both men are condemned because of lack of understanding.

Camus' portrayal of the difficulty of humanity to communicate is a reminder of the fragility of the open society. As I have illustrated through the critical theory of Habermas, the need to develop and defend the structures of dialogue between rulers and ruled is essential to the ongoing development of democracy. The differentiated interests of groups and individuals need to be communicable to representatives and citizenry if ideological domination is to be prevented. The need for the continual mutual recognition of the differing interests of others by all members of a democratic polity has assumed critical importance in the development of democracy in late-modernity. Formal and informal sites of education are critical to this development.

I agree with Pettit's idea that "freedom, like dignity or authority, is going to be a condition that a person can enjoy only so far as he has a certain standing vis-á-vis others. It is going to be tantamount to freedom in the old sense in which we still speak of someone's getting the freedom of the city." (Pettit 1987: 179) While freedom means different things to different people, its recognition, development and maintenance is intrinsically an inter-subjective process. This process requires the maintenance of civic awareness and community that enable subjects to actively pursue their particular interests, but with an informed civic appreciation of the duties necessary for this pursuit in light of the pursuits of others. Shaping institutions enabling this cultivation are also integral to this process, provided they are regulated by guaranteed but flexible standards, goals and legitimate parameters (such as rights). Citizens must be able to

voluntarily acquire these techniques from the widest possible range of contexts with a minimum of difficulty, from school and home, to the workplace and polling booth. This involves the kinds of widespread democratic participation envisaged by theorists like Pateman. (1970) Vocational, civic and general education must be nurtured by state and society. The objective of this is vital to democratic citizenship; to "emancipate people from the vulnerability of poverty, ill-health and physical handicap; to ensure people's equal access to sources of education and information; and empower people equally in matters of legal and political representation." (Pettit 1987: 179)

In his final volume of *The Principle of Hope*, Bloch offers a curious utopian image of *real democracy*, in which "there arises in the world something which shines into the childhood of all and in which no one has yet been: homeland." (Bloch 1995: 1376) What makes this image so striking is the presentation of democracy as a *place* where people *belong*. Reflecting a society governed through economy, policy and bureaucracy, the language and critique of this thesis is replete with reference to *processes* of educational practice and governance, technological interaction and social development and so on. Bloch's "wishful image of the fulfilled moment" of democracy is a practical reminder that imagining, maintaining and reconstructing education in ways that foster the development, experimentation and extension of new democratic spaces. The possibility for social reconstruction through education depends upon a firm belief in the capacity of human agency to achieve peaceful coexistence. To *proceed* requires the resources, conditions (i.e. physical, legal, economic, etc.) and general environment necessary to sustain democracy and human vitality.

Education, Authority and Democracy

Despite the pessimistic representation of the human condition in *L'Hôte*, Camus was to express an "active faith in the destiny of humanity" in his succeeding works. (Davies 1983: 52) This recognition of agency is indicative of syncretic humanism evident in the works of post-war French intellectuals like Sartre, who espoused a belief in the capacity of individuals to enact social transformation. Foucault savagely criticises this "monstrous alliance" of authors, whose "obsession" with humanism is nothing more than an outdated attempt to resolve problems without fully understanding them. (Foucault, quoted in Miller 1993: 150) In an ironic twist premeditating Foucault's critique, Camus depicts Daru's humanistic attitude as doomed to failure in the moral desert of ignorance in modernity. (Camus, in Davies 1983: 66)

Where learning occurs on a mass scale through civic education, formal educational institutions and in informal contexts, it is about social integration, cultural reproduction and constitutive processes of subjectivity. Sadly, in the Australian liberal democracy of the late-twentieth century, it is also about the denial, oppression and repression of these skills and behaviours of self-development. To ignore the potential of humanity's capacities for bringing about peaceful cohabitation is too often taken for granted. Democracy has, by no means, been fully realised in the modern state. However, the expansion of spheres of freedom through law, technology, economic structures, civic participation, formal education and elementary creativity, has enabled conditions in which the potential for the enriched peaceful cohabitation of

different lifeworlds is more realisable than at any other period in modern history. Various modes of education have the potential capacity to revitalise conditions for countering the exilic tendencies of late-modern conditions of social integration. These modes encourage the acquisition of cultural literacies, grammars of expression and capacities to enrich one's *experience* of life. Invigorating these capacities begins with the widespread dissemination of critical faculties that employ the diverse dimensions of reason.

The Oppression of Tradition

The cultivation of critical faculties begins when mass education moves from under the oppressive shadow of out-dated tradition and ideological hegemony. Democratic education must be oriented towards "the unmasking... of the myth of schooling. It continues with the struggle to liberate other men's [*sic*] minds from the false ideology of schooling—an ideology that makes domestication by schooling inevitable. In its final and positive stage it is the struggle for the right to educational freedom." (Illich 1976: 154-155) Developing strategies to facilitate this 'final and positive stage' require a more complex analytic approach that accounts for various domains of understanding (e.g. scientific, aesthetic and cognitive), and the dynamic interplay between human agency and political structures in the development of both the self and society.

Utilitarian conceptions of 'healthy' democracy have been successfully evoked by neo-liberalism because they idealise democratic values and traditional institutional arrangements as the basis for *true* democracy. Conservative liberal conceptions of democracy often appeal to a return to 'traditional values' in the face of social change. The problem with these appeals is that the modern advocates of utilitarian models of democracy have been defending a maxim of economic satisfaction that is theoretically and practically moribund in the contemporary political context. Schumpeter rightly illustrates that in their models of democracy, the utilitarian fathers of classical liberalism did themselves not account for historical change in the economic and social frameworks of modern democracies and the changing interests of the citizens within them. (Schumpeter 1943: 252)

Instrumentality is guided by the pragmatic ethical tenets of utilitarianism. Utilitarian ethics have provided key justifications for the instrumental rationalisation of the education system, modes of civic participation and other key sites of democracy in Australia. In a similar vein, Berlin argues that,

> *Where ends are agreed, the only questions left are those of means, and these are not political but technical, that is to say, capable of being settled by experts or machines like arguments between engineers and doctors. That is why those who put their faith in some immense, world-transforming phenomenon, like the final triumph of reason... must believe that all political and moral problems can thereby by turned into technological ones.*

(Berlin 1975: 118)

While Berlin adopts an overly restricted conception of reason, his remarks foreshadow the growth of instrumentalised expert systems of human regulation and their causal connection to the domination of groups of people in late-modern democracies.

Appeals to outdated democratic principles are not only confined to modern utilitarianism. Much of the resurgence in republicanism is based on appeals to the historical significance of this doctrine in Western history. In parti.... modern republicanism inappropriately employs the Aristotelian argument that citizenship is essentially a matter of shared moral purposes based on an *objective* notion of the 'common good.' This objectivity is a falsehood, because notions of the 'common good' change over time as a function of the changing needs and substance of democratic society. For example, while appeals to the republican values of the United States' Founding Fathers are a part of attempts to invigorate civic virtue in North America, the material conditions and values of those Founding Fathers are often ignored, including their dubious belief that those who own the land should run the country.

In Australia, the Macintyre report into strategies for national education for citizenship appeals to the historical values of republicanism. (CEG 1994) The discourse of democratic reform prevailing in reports like this is limited to certain values that are either: (i) outdated in the current context; or (ii) have the potential to restrict the exploration of new and innovative democratic improvements applicable to the contemporary context. These appeals evoke the antiquated and culturally defined social arrangements emanating from these republican definitions of democracy, potentially legitimating the patterns of social, political and economic inequality prevalent in those past republics.[111] In light of this, the so-called 'open republic' is more appropriately understood as a '*cultural* republic'. More dangerously, these appeals to republican traditions risk becoming a kind of religion in their ideological dogma, replacing the hegemony of instrumental rationality with an equally pernicious creed.

The problem, as Tiffin and Rajasingham rightly observe, is that much about education does not lend itself to measurement in quantifiable terms. (Tiffin and Rajasingham 1995: 164) Providing justifications for problems and reforms that are seen to be legitimate within the epistemological grip of scientific rationality and ethical hold of utilitarianism inhibits imaginative discussion. Like a "readerly" text, the logic of education governance is locked in a discourse seeking to maximise stability by manipulating the expectations of its "readers," which in this case, is a subject-based political culture that is ontologically estranged from the political system and increasingly disembodied from face-to-face socialisation under a veil of technological reform.

"The cities that Europe can offer are too full of rumours from the past..." writes Camus, where "[w]e feel the dizziness of centuries, of glory and of revolutions. There, we remember the clamour in which Europe was forged." (Camus 1995: 1) Appeals to familiar traditions/canon of teaching and learning may be seductive, but they can also be conceptual prisons. For education to be effective and relevant to contemporary democracy, its heirs must break from the ideological hegemony of instrumental reason. Australia's political destiny must remain mindful of its past, but even more mindful of its future.

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111 While Skinner validly identifies the false dichotomy between the liberal concept of individual autonomy expressed by Rawls and the republican belief that the common good should prevail, he inappropriately argues for the democratic principles of pre-modern conceptions of the common good particular to classical republicanism, which claim that to maximise to collective liberty, citizens must devote themselves to a life of public service, "placing the ideal of the common good above all considerations of individual welfare ... Skinner, in Mouffe 1992: 217, 219) This doctrine is untenable given the reorientation of the constitutive processes of subjectivity in late-modernity.

Postmodern Student, Postmodern Citizen, Postmodern Self

Conventional methodologies for evaluating and understanding political relationships are usually based on the principles of positivism and focus on the institutional arrangements and procedural mechanisms of the state. Generally, these pseudo-scientific methods are applied to democratic problems with the implicit assumption that either: (i) democracy is an attainable object, or (ii) that is already realised to the extent that only procedural or *thin* change is necessary to achieve democratic form. These assumptions are false because democracy is a dynamic framework of political practise whose ongoing functioning is shaped by the subjective and material conditions of its members within a given context. Democracy is not a *moment* that can be ultimately realised. Advocates of 'thin' levels of democratic reform are incorrect in reducing democracy and education to an objective set of institutional arrangements.

The ideological hegemony of positivism has been maintained and justified through the domination of instrumental reason. Described by J. S. Mill (in Collins 1985: 159) as "Cold, mechanical and ungenial," utilitarian ethics have provided key justifications for the instrumental rationalisation of the welfare state, civic participation and other key sites of democracy in Australia. Consequently, the reification of almost all aspects of society has reduced problems of social integration and political inequality to economic variables, "replacing the government of persons by the administration of things." (Saint-Simon, in Berlin 1975: 118) The domination of instrumental reason has the propensity to reify lifeworlds and immobilise the cultural reproduction of differing belief systems. Adorno believes that the greatest threat of instrumental reason is the annihilation of freedom by a totally administered society, "Because anything that is not reified, cannot be counted and measured, ceases to exist." (Adorno 1974: 46-47)

The instrumental valorisation of economic rationalism produces alienation, anomie and social division. As formal education becomes available to fewer people, the value attached to school qualifications, the popularly identified status of public education facilitates class stratification. Modern obligatory schooling encourages a false ideology of universal accessibility, while perpetuating hierarchies of domination. The current school system is responsible for "slotting" people into these oppressive hierarchies; their position within the hierarchy is dependent upon their educational qualifications and their financial means to afford formal education in the first place. Echoing the demonic warnings of an ancient Sumerian, Illich writes that "In cities, this faith in school-slotting is on the way to sprouting a more creditable meritocracy—a state of mind in which each citizen believes that he [*sic*] deserves the place assigned to him by school. A perfect meritocracy, in which there would be no excuses... must be avoided, since a perfect meritocracy would not only be hellish, it would be hell." (Illich 1976: 151) Hell is a condition in which human values are only understood in terms of utility and where education produces domestication. Quoting Marx, Illich warns that advocates of this ethical framework "forget that the production of too many useful things results in too many useless people." (Illich 1976: 156) In short, hell is alienation.

The dignity of the individual is compromised when the collective identification of individuals and their respective interests by their elected representatives are

reduced to statistical, ethical and historical generalisations. Quantitative sampling of the specific interests of a polity can be extremely useful to the democratic functioning of the state, however, the current danger is that the sampling, standardisation and reification of individuals is fast becoming the central *qualitative* gauge of democratic well-being and representation. The interests of a political community can most realistically be recognised within a democratic framework that enables multiple means of expression, not when a population sample is appropriated to represent the interests of the majority of members of that polity. If democratic representation is to have any meaning, t. .; interests of individuals and groups must be comprehended by elected officials within the cultures of most relevance to each individual and/or group. The institutional arrangements of a healthy democracy in late-modernity require a solid foundation in the present material and subjective conditions of citizens with an eye to inevitable change in the future.

For Adorno, freedom is located in the crumbs of liberation found in a form of expression that is intentionally devious and obscure to defy the dominant ideology by enacting its inadequacies. Only through the deliberate defiance of a transparent logic does the enacting of this inadequacy represent an unrestrained one. (Adorno 1974: 81) I agree with Said's criticism that this strategy is too private. (Said 1994: 404) Recognising and resisting the domination of instrumentality also requires strategies at the levels of self *and* society. An educational strategy begins by providing a critical framework for locating the self *within* society.

Author, Auteur, Authority

Through this thesis, I have attempted to explicitly locate myself in the historical contexts that I am attempting to analyse and understand. Growing up on the 1970s, my education has occurred during a period of critical change throughout Australian society. As a citizen of late-modernity, I have attempted to recognise those aspects of my life that shape, and are shaped by, cultures of *modernity* while simultaneously experiencing an emerging layer of *postmodernity*. To this extent, the title of the previous section 'Postmodern Student, Postmodern Citizen, Postmodern Self' is a misnomer, for I believe that I am neither exclusively of modernity or postmodernity. For example, my primary and secondary schooling was founded in traditional pedagogy; however, my tertiary studies and teaching career have taken place in a changing institutional environment. Since the late 1980s, I have witnessed the profound influences of economic rationalism, electronic communications technology and cultural shifts. Similarly, my family upbringing bears the characteristics of typical Protestantism, however, my mother's radical departure from her expected life-style seems to indicate changes to traditional familial structures. (Many of my peers no longer belong to 'nuclear' families due to rising incidents of divorce.) My point is that as I wrote this thesis, it became increasingly evident that my personal experience is as valuable to my analysis as any scholarly research. In becoming aware of this autobiographical motivation for writing on education, it seemed that this thesis would be incomplete without some appraisal of my subject-location in relation to it. I have attempted to minimise the problem in those modes of traditional scholarship that encourage a sterile and reifying approach to analysis which is de-humanising. A degree of objective,

instrumental rationality is useful for certain forms of analysis; however, to allow this facet to dominate without acknowledgment of the author's subject-position empties it of its critical value.

As 'author' of this paper, I am required to be 'host' to a scholarly discussion of contemporary public, civic and informal education in Australia. However, in the spirit of Barthes, I am also a 'guest' of the writing-process, because of my intimate relationship to the subject matter and language as student, citizen and teacher. The words and ideas are not entirely my own, and yet they would not exist without my initiative. In this context, I am *l'hôte* of this discussion in both senses of the word. It seems appropriate that this critical discussion of education is more effective when I overtly recognise my personal stake in the problems analysed. This is why I agree with the cultural politics of Habermas, Giroux and Illich. It seems that academy and state alike overlook the fact that the current problems of education and democracy affect the personal lives of so many people. A critical analysis of human affairs is morally, epistemologically and ontologically empty without this personal dimension. Widespread changes to education and its institutions are not only concerned with the education of the 'masses'; they also affect *my education* and the education of *those of interest to me*. In a similar vein, democracy is ultimately about *self*-rule, and as Pettit argues, self-rule derives its relevance and actualisation in relation to those of interest to the self.

To an extent, this thesis is a literary exercise in demonstrating some of the political trends and principles expounded within. For example, the thesis concerns the constitution of subjectivity in late-modernity—I have briefly attempted to illustrate my own subject-position in the spirit of Gouldner's reflexive sociological notion of a culture of critical discourse. (Gouldner 1979: 28-43 and 83-85) Camus writes "If we are to understand the world, we must turn aside from it; if we are to serve men better we must briefly hold them at a distance." My analysis has drawn upon a variety of cultural representations from both the analytic distance of conventional scholarship and the biographical intimacy of personal experience. My ambiguous relationship to this text is, to a limited extent, indicative of the ambiguity of human relationships in general, beyond the crude binary of conventional analytic frameworks. Visual metaphors have been employed because they capture the complex and dynamic character of certain phenomena more adequately than conventional scholarly discourse. Images, like sounds and gestures, can carry greater meaning than purely textual and linguistic modes of communication. As reason has a "plurality of voices," humanity, too, has the capacity for different forms of expression. Education is about the cultivation of these diverse voices and experiences.

Arguing that "there is nothing unprecedented about an intense problematisation of the conduct of the self," Rose suggests that social commentators have a propensity to exaggerate the conditions of the present. (Rose, in Heelas, Lash and Morris 1996: 307) Rose comes from a Foucaultian analytic tradition of social constructivism, which suggests that shifting, immeasurable discourses shape subjectivity in ways that negate any possibility for such self-awareness. Yet, the self is the only site from which one can understand the world. Rose himself is asserting a view of subjectivity from his scholarly vantage point as a professor of sociology. Foucault also theorises about modernity, having undergone a conventional French education. One can only utter such criticism from a subject-position in which the self, though it may unaware of the

exactitude of its constitution, is able to express a distinctive view in the first place.

Between the self and society, there is a capacity for agency to critically reflect upon the world as an intrinsic part of that world. In a society experiencing globalisation and technological transformation, Australian citizens will increasingly rely upon various modes of education to stimulate, expand and enhance their awareness, participation and empowerment to consolidate peaceful coexistence to the benefit of all. New cultural literacies and other forms of cultural capital must be developed if the domination of rationalities, ideologies, individuals and groups is to be avoided. Societal change begins with the actions of individuals. Action begins with understanding. Understanding begins with education.

Conclusion

I began writing this conclusion on Monday November 4, 1996. Occasionally when I write, I listen to a nostalgia radio station on the clock radio located next to my PC. I still listen to radio in a nostalgic attempt to recapture those moments in childhood when my mind's eye was wide open to dream. Just after 10 a.m., the radio station reported the results of a recent study conducted by Deakin University of 110 Victorian schools. The study found that an increasing administrative role for teachers combined with increasing class sizes and decreasing resources, had lead to high levels of teacher stress and mounting pressures on the functioning of Victorian schools. (Magic 693 AM News and Weather 4/11/96) The Age newspaper of the same day confirmed this radio-report. The Deakin study found that teachers were spending more time on administration and less time on teaching. New methods of student surveillance and assessment such as Learning Assessment Profiles tests were found to exacerbate this problem of time-management. Class sizes were getting bigger, especially in primary schools, as Victoria moved from having the lowest teacher-to-student ratio in Australia to the second highest. Schools were being forced to raise funds for basic equipment while principals devoted more time to promoting their schools to private sponsors and seeking larger enrolments. Growing expectations of curricula, combined with staff cuts, were causing a staff shortage. The front page of The Age also reported that: "Combined with the prospect of league tables for VCE results and literacy tables, they were likely to lead to a two-tiered public education system. Poor-performing schools would suffer, with falling enrolments, and many students with language and learning difficulties." The changes were seen to be part of an erosion of the tradition of Australia's equitable public school system. (Milburn 1996: 1) A similar study by Flinders University in the mid-1990s found that the state was forcing more responsibility for school fund-raising onto parents. Deemed by the study to be an unconstitutional, this shift was rightly identified as an illegitimate denial of the state's intrinsic responsibility to be the primary provider of public education. (Milburn 1996: 1) The relocation of standards of legitimation of authority and responsibility onto individual students, teachers and the private sector is increasingly mediated by electronic communications technologies. This relocation is not entirely unregulated. For example, a news item on Channel 10 reported that in New South Wales, an independent foundation was

set up in 1996 to regulate the private funding of public school sports through advertising in a number of schools. (Channel Ten News 1997)

Recently, I was watching an episode of the cartoon, The Simpsons, on the same channel. In a satirical commentary of funding cut-backs to American public schools, the principal of local primary school was reassuring his district supervisor that the school was maintaining the canons of traditional pedagogy.[112] Upon proudly announcing the school's emphasis on teaching the three 'R's, the supervisor informed the principal that reductions in funding allowed for only two 'R's to be taught. In another episode, a future scenario is portrayed in which classes were televised under the sponsorship of Pepsi Cola and hosted by a local TV celebrity. Despite the dangers of corporate-driven expansion of new media in education, I cannot help but be overwhelmed by a sense of a new frontier in which there are possibilities that are currently only vaguely understood. The path to this new frontier is a politically ambiguous one.

Just over two hundred years ago, Venus obscured the face of the sun. While physically unable to view the phenomena through naked eyes, scientists of the day observed it using newly invented instruments and *enlightened* rational methods of classification and quantification. Stafford symbolically links the eclipse of the sun by Venus as a sign of the continuing presence of all that Venus represents as a "concupiscent goddess of illusory appearances and promiscuous pleasures." Venus cast a shadow of doubt over all that sterile male *enlightened* rationality signified. Stafford evokes the eclipse of the sun by Venus as a metaphor for the reality that as necessary as technically efficient mass education is, "there is no learning without desire, no education without enjoyment." (Stafford 1994: xxvii) This was also a lesson my mother, Jenny, taught me.

An instrumentalised, pragmatic revision of reason now permeates education policy. A reconstituted form of possessive individualism is being invoked by the shrinking state as it struggles to maintain authority in the face of corporatisation and social transformation across Australian society and the world. As Australia approaches a new millennium, televised classes, the Internet and the influence of mass media from video games to cinema, indicate a transition to predominantly visual, postmodern modes of cultural reproduction.

The domination of instrumental reason lies beneath a veil of progress and autonomy. Its expression through the pragmatic ethic of utility and economic rationalism is assuming a fundamentalism that underlies the processes of cultural fragmentation and social transformation in late-modernity. This rationality is particularly pernicious in the ways that it shapes the education. It permeates so many facets of life that the whole basis for socio-political analysis and the meanings of democracy and education urgently needs re-evaluation. As Raymond Williams astutely observes:

> *the ladder is a perfect symbol of the bourgeois idea of society, because, while undoubtedly it offers the opportunity to climb, it is a device which can only be used individually: you go up the ladder alone.*

(Williams 1953: 331)

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112 The three central staff members of the suburban school are depicted as socially dysfunctional and the object of student ridicule.

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