Changing the political climate:
the role of imagery, narrative and political theatre in the work of the Australian climate movement

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Monash University in 2019
School of Social and Political Sciences
Cover images:

*Antarctica–Neko Harbour* (Rita Willaert, 2007).
*Sydney Divesment Day* (350, 2015g).

Shine a light for the reef rally in Melbourne: Climate Guardians with #ReefNotCoal message of light (Takver, 2016a).

Mika Maiava of Tokelau and supporters “Canoes vs Coal” *Pacific Warriors Flotilla* (Tan, 2014g).
Abstract

Narrating climate change, picturing it and dramatising it are central to the ways in which we understand it. Yet taken together, these forms of ‘symbolic politics’ lack a central place in prevailing approaches to political communication and movement mobilisation. Historically, social movements have consistently relied on symbolic power, however this form of power is not emphasised in rational models of political cognition, or in ‘realist’ accounts of climate politics like those that reduce it to a clash between ‘organised money’ and ‘organised people’.

Drawing on interviews with Australian climate campaigners and theory from cultural sociology, this research investigates how symbolic politics figures in the work of the Australian climate movement and how it is important for achieving political change. The thesis argues that power exercised in the ‘cultural-symbolic domain of politics’ is significant in two key ways: it shapes how climate change is understood and ‘imagined’, and it generates momentum and energy for the climate movement. Symbolic politics thus influences the ‘climate of opinion’ and the overall ‘political climate’, creating conditions that are often essential for achieving political change.

This thesis analyses climate politics during the Rudd–Gillard–Abbott era, identifying a consistent pattern where conservative forces used symbolic power more effectively than their opponents, creating the conditions for abolishing Australia’s price on carbon. It then focuses on the 2014 Pacific Warriors’ blockade of Newcastle coal port, where Pacific Islanders used canoes, to confront coal ships and challenge Australia’s plans to expand coal exports. This image-rich, theatrical action became a node around which ongoing political action was organised, and provided a basis for engaging key audiences and creating a new sense of what was politically possible—a pattern evident across other cases examined in this thesis.

This research found that narrative is prominent in the climate movement’s thinking; however, at times ‘narrative’ was interchangeable with ‘message’: a truncated sense of narrative exposes the climate movement to the risk of conveying a message without a plot, a plot without depth, and a ‘moral’ without a rich story.

The way that climate change is pictured also matters. The climate movement uses imagery to make climate change visible, focused, tangible and emotionally compelling, and to convey a vision of the future. (The thesis highlights the political consequences if climate
change is invisible, unfocused, intangible and emotionally unengaging).

Imagery is important for building political will, engaging in 'battles of images', exercising iconic power, generating emotional identification, and engaging and capturing the ‘public imagination’—themes that are addressed at length in this study’s analysis of campaigns including divestment, Lock The Gate and Stop Adani.

The research findings provide a basis for (1) analysing political communication in terms of the way we ‘think in images’ and the importance of emotion, imagination and identification; (2) emphasising cultural power alongside ‘people power’ in approaches to climate movement mobilisation; and (3) an expanded sense of realism: one that includes the real power of imagery, narrative and political theatre in shaping the ‘climate of opinion’ and the ‘political climate’.
Ethics Approval

This thesis was conducted with the approval of Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee: Project Number CF14/4 – 2013002010.

Research Training Program

This research was supported by an Australian Government Research Training Program (RTP) Scholarship.

Declaration

This thesis is an original work of my research and contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at any university or equivalent institution and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Donald (‘Don’) McArthur

Twitter: @Don_M_

10 December, 2019.
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Next, to the people who participated in interviews for this project and volunteered your time and insights—

in a project like this, your contributions are central. The interviews featured rich statements about the political use of imagery, narrative and social drama and why it matters, and provided context for thinking about the work of the climate movement in the period after Tony Abbott became Prime Minister and abolished Australia’s price on carbon. Sometimes, you also challenged my thinking or offered views which differ in one way or another from the approach that this thesis takes, however all of you have added to the outcome in important ways. So, many thanks! In the following pages, I hope that you’ll find some valuable, inspiring and useful ways of seeing—and also addressing—the challenges we all face.
Thanks also to the scholars and writers whose work has informed this thesis. Sometimes researching the literature involved reading the biography of an activist or the history of a campaign. Sometimes it has been sociological and political theory, and even the results of neuropsychology. It has always been great to find work that speaks to the issues in new ways, puts things in perspective, points to an issue that needs to be included in the analysis, supports a hunch and places it in a framework, challenges and sheds light on the issues, or provides ways to put a whole array of ideas together. I would be pleased if there are readers out there who find that this thesis is valuable in these ways.

*****

Finally, personal thanks to the people around me, the many friends and family members whose support and interest across this project has been invaluable. You have provided important background support for this project, whether this has involved discussing ideas, sharing food, helping to create a pdf of this thesis, asking, ‘How it’s going?’, challenging my thinking, ‘being there’ and helping me be a better person as well as a researcher.

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### Abbreviations

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAP</td>
<td>Australian Associated Press</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Australian Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>ABS</td>
<td>Australian Bureau of Statistics</td>
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<td>ACF</td>
<td>Australian Conservation Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACTU</td>
<td>Australian Council of Trade Unions</td>
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<td>ALP</td>
<td>Australian Labor Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>ABC AM, morning current affairs program</td>
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<td>AMCS</td>
<td>Australian Marine Conservation Society</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>ANU</td>
<td>Australian National University</td>
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<td>ANZAC</td>
<td>Australian and New Zealand Army Corps</td>
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<td>ARRCC</td>
<td>Australian Religious Response to Climate Change</td>
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<td>AYCC</td>
<td>Australian Youth Climate Coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>CORE</td>
<td>Congress of Racial Equality</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPRS</td>
<td>Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme</td>
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<td>ETS</td>
<td>Emissions Trading Scheme</td>
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<td>IPCC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organisation</td>
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<td>NSW</td>
<td>New South Wales</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>ABC PM, evening current affairs program</td>
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<td>SNCC</td>
<td>Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCLC</td>
<td>Southern Christian Leadership Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSW</td>
<td>University of New South Wales</td>
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Chapter 1

Introduction

‘The picture is much more important to the message than the words—people are sold on the picture’. Interviewed for this thesis, AL is reflecting on the challenges of building public support for urgent action on climate change. She describes the power of images to ‘reach’ people, arguing: ‘climate change information is coming to the public devoid of emotion—that’s the problem… We are very affected by what we see and feel and hear.’ When campaigners—or politicians and journalists—talk about politics, they frequently convey a sense that imagery and narrative are important. EF describes the climate movement’s task as to ‘change the narrative’. SW describes how the story of the 2014 Pacific Climate Warriors blockade of Newcastle coal port became an important part of climate campaigners’ ‘narrative [about] why they care about taking action on climate change, what they see as their motivation’. Veteran journalist Laurie Oakes (2017) reflects on how former Prime Minister Paul Keating’s use of imagery made his message ‘accessible’, ‘colourful’ and ‘memorable’ (p. 7). Keating himself observes, ‘It’s all about telling the stories. You gotta be able to tell the stories’ (Sales, 2011). While the political importance of imagery and narrative is widely acknowledged, and while ‘political theatre’ is sometimes added (Oakes, 2017; Alexander, 2010), the lines between their use and political outcomes are not always clearly drawn. There is a gap here, between how politics is understood intuitively and formally, and how it is conceptualised. This thesis seeks to address this gap in relation to the work of the Australian climate movement. The following chapters analyse the movement’s use of imagery, narrative and political theatre as elements of symbolic politics, arguing that this form of politics is central for mobilising the climate movement, building political will and influencing the ‘climate of opinion’, thus creating conditions for larger political changes. This chapter introduces symbolic power as a key ‘domain’ of political power, locates it in relation to other ‘domains’ where power is exerted, illustrates how symbolic politics can be omitted from the picture and the value of including it, and provides an overview of the thesis.

1 Interviewees for this research are referred to using a pair of initials. Note: to maintain the confidentiality that was agreed on when the interviews were arranged, these are not the actual initials of the interviewees.
‘The symbolic side of politics calls for attention’, writes political scientist Murray Edelman in his classic *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* ([1964] 1985: p. 1). In an analysis that could be applied to IPCC reports or government policies on climate change, Edelman writes that ‘the mass public does not study and analyse details data about [policy issues]… Mass publics respond to… political symbols… not to direct knowledge of the facts’ (p. 172). Edelman writes that politics is not just ‘instrumental’: there is more to it than the distribution of ‘goods, services and power’ (p. 2). Politics also hinges on what matters to the electorate. Edelman argues that political analysis must ‘proceed on two levels simultaneously’. It needs to examine ‘how political actions get some groups the tangible things they want from government’, and it also needs to analyse what these actions mean to the public. Edelman describes how symbols ‘bring out in concentrated form… particular meanings and emotions which the members of a group create and reinforce in each other’ (p. 11). They can ‘condense into one symbolic event, sign or act patriotic pride, anxieties, remembrances of past glories or humiliations, [and] promises of future greatness’ (p. 6).² He characterises ‘conventional’ political science as focusing on the

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² Edelman makes this statement to describe what he calls ‘condensation symbols’, while ‘referential’ symbols
instrumental dimension of politics, whereas his focus is on symbolic power and how it ‘influences what [people] want, what they fear, what they regard as possible, and even who they are’ (p. 20).

Alexander (2003, 2006a, 2010) shares some common ground with Edelman, but takes arguments like these further. For Alexander (2006a), ‘the public has never been a dry… place composed of abstract arguments about reason. It has always been filled up by expressive images, by narratives, traditions, and symbolic codes’ (L5003). He writes that ‘every action, no matter how instrumental… is embedded to some extent in a horizon of affect and meaning’ (2003: L157). He argues that culture is an ‘independent variable’ that shapes actions and institutions, with an influence ‘every bit as vital as more material or instrumental forces’ (L161). The consequence is that causal explanations in politics and sociology need to include an account of cultural power: material and instrumental forces matter, and so does culture. For example, Alexander (2010) writes that Obama’s 2008 presidential victory could be explained in terms of financial advantage, changing demographics and Obama’s success at community organising, as well as alliances and conflicts between class, racial, and gender interests—all of these factors matter. Yet Alexander argues that persuasion is central in democratic contests for power, and for this, the use of imagery, narrative and political theatre is central. These forms of cultural power matter for gaining legitimacy and ‘defining the difference between one’s own side and the other’s’ (L337). In Alexander’s account, Obama succeeded through offering and enacting a compelling story, and becoming identified in the public mind with the values and future that voters identified with. The ‘people power’ of Obama’s grassroots campaign was central to his success, yet even it relied significantly on images and narratives for its focus and energy (see Chapter 3). Alexander’s work is broader than Edelman’s, who focused on how elites use symbolic politics to exert control.

simply provide ‘economical ways’ to refer to objects or situations.

Throughout the thesis, ‘L….’ refers to the location in the Kindle Edition of this work.

Obama’s views on how organising relies on cultural power to be effective are presented in Chapter 3.

For Alexander, the ‘theatrical’ or ‘performative’ dimension of politics is central. In comments that are relevant to many recent political contests where the victor was better at the theatre of politics (see also Oakes, 2017), Alexander writes that McCain offered a ‘thin’ performance, where he could seem ‘wooden and detached’ (L721), or ‘fake and artificial’ (L5503). The ‘performative contrast’ (L5375) with Obama was marked. Obama’s campaign was delivered with theatrical skill, projecting symbolic power through ‘electrifying’ speeches (L940), visiting the Middle East and enacting a ‘drama that will allow him to walk on a military stage and perform the role of foreign policy leader’ (L3377) and effectively presenting himself as a ‘civil hero riding to rescue America’s economy’ in response to the Global Financial Crisis (L5343).
Alexander’s work also encompasses cases including the civil rights movement, the feminist movement, and the movement for democracy in Egypt (Alexander, 2006a, 2011). In Edelman’s terms, the fossil fuel lobby’s use of symbolic politics is a significant political obstacle facing the climate movement (see Chapter 4); however, in line with Alexander’s focus on social movements, this research addresses the climate movement’s own use of symbolic power. Alexander’s work provides the main theoretical standpoint for this thesis.

There is a rich tradition of social movements using imagery, narratives and political theatre to create the conditions for achieving political change. The anti-apartheid movement used images of Nelson Mandela and of life under apartheid to generate support for change in South Africa (Lodge, 2006; Olesen, 2015, 2016; Gassner, 2009; Thörn, 2006). In the US in the 1960s, the Freedom Rides and lunch counter sit-ins dramatised racial segregation and injustice (Lewis, 2015; Carson, 1981; Arsenault, 2011; Halberstam, 1998; Alexander, 2006a). The British antislavery movement used images of a slave ship and a medallion portraying a slave in chains to make slavery visible and galvanise a public outcry (d’Anjou, 1996; Oldfield, 1995).

Greenpeace has consistently used visual images and dramatic events to reach its audiences, from early anti-nuclear campaigns in the Pacific to the anti-whaling work of the Rainbow Warrior (Hunter, 1979; Zelko, 2013; Doyle 2007). At a time of crisis in India’s movement for independence, Gandhi led the Salt March. A British monopoly made it illegal for Indian people to collect salt—a basic necessity—and Gandhi led a march to publicly defy the law and gather salt by the sea. These actions brought the injustices of British rule into focus, inspired millions to follow suit, and drew global media coverage. Through nonviolent protests like this, Gandhi made symbolic power central to achieving Indian self-rule, also using tactics such as wearing Indian khadi (handwoven local cloth) to protest against foreign economic power; burning foreign cloth; and fasting to prevent Hindu-Muslim violence (Dalton, 1993; Kaushik, 2001; Ackerman and Duvall, 2001; Weber, 2009; Gonsalvez, 2012). In 1972, the Aboriginal Tent Embassy was pitched beneath Aboriginal flags outside Parliament House, Canberra. It dramatised the sovereignty of Aboriginal nations, highlighting that Aboriginal people were aliens without formal representation in their own land,

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Cases like the antislavery movement are significant for climate politics, because they show how symbolically-charged efforts to change political culture were important in achieving political changes that ran against prevailing economic interests: see d’Anjou (1996); Drescher (2010).
but that they had established a presence in Australia’s political and diplomatic capital. Police came to tear down the Embassy, and the protest made headlines worldwide (Foley et al., 2013). These forms of ‘action-that-communicates’ have energised and given new direction to social movements, and have been central to achieving these movements’ goals.

The use of symbolic power is a familiar feature of everyday politics, including climate politics. Australia’s 2019 election provides an example. When the Liberal Party of Australia (2019a) ran an election campaign leading with the image of Bill Shorten as ‘the Bill Australia can’t afford’, it was appealing at one level to immediate financial concerns. At another level, however, it was relying on imagery of Shorten and Labor, and connecting this imagery to a whole ‘mythology’ about Labor’s capacity to manage the economy (see Appendix 1). Efforts by the climate movement to make this election ‘the climate election’ (Australian Conservation Foundation, 2019) did not prevail. When Tony Abbott mounted a scare campaign evoking the image of a monstrous Great Big New Tax on Everything and the Gillard government failed to respond by establishing strong counter-images and narratives in the public mind (see Chapter 4), some of the key conditions for abolishing Australia’s carbon tax were created. When the ‘Pacific Warriors’ confronted coal ships in the port of Newcastle in their canoes (see Chapter 6), they dramatised the link between Australia’s coal exports and climate change, gaining international media coverage, galvanising the climate movement, and building momentum within the movement for a new focus on ending Australia’s coal industry. When people and institutions divest from the fossil fuel industry, they are not only exerting financial pressure, but also sending a message about the legitimacy and social license of fossil fuels. For many campaigners, the stigmatisation of the industry is the primary goal of divestment campaigning (see Chapter 9).

Issues like climate change often only become politically salient when they become symbolically-charged. Images and narratives condense the significance of climate change and bring it into focus. Symbolic power can be important for energising the climate movement, building public support, influencing public perceptions, establishing or withdrawing legitimacy and building or undermining political will. In the ‘symbolic power’ dimension of political power, the public imagination is fired or ‘captured’, constituencies for change are built, and issues that might otherwise
seem remote and complex can become immediate and pressing for the public. As Chapter 8 argues, symbolic politics is important for making an issue visible, tangible focused and emotionally compelling, as well as conveying a vision of the future. The political consequences when an issue is invisible, intangible, unfocused and emotionally flat, and when a vision of the future is vague or unappealing are significant. Symbolic politics thus links to Lukes’ second and third ‘dimensions of power’: agenda setting, and the shaping of perceptions, wishes and cognitions (Lukes, 2005 [1974]).

In analysing symbolic politics, this thesis takes up concerns that have been addressed in social movement theory for some time. The ‘culturalist’ approaches to social movements that developed during the 1980s have been concerned with ‘the struggle over the production of mobilizing and countermobilizing ideas and meanings’ (Benford and Snow, 2000: p. 613) and how movements have used ‘symbols, language, discourse, identity, and other dimensions of culture to recruit, retain, mobilize, and motivate members’ (Williams, 2004). Research done in this tradition added greatly to academic understanding of social movements. The approach taken in this thesis addresses gaps in culturalist perspectives that rely on cognitive psychology, exemplified by the framing approach (Benford and Snow, 2000; Snow et al., 1986), as well as approaches that centre their analysis on language, such as discourse analysis (Glynos et al., 2009). The emphasis in this thesis on imagery and political theatre takes the focus in a different direction. Chapters 2, 3, 6 address these themes in detail; however, in brief, what is different about the approach taken here is way that this thesis combines a focus on

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7 Lukes’ summary statement of his argument about a third dimension of power uses language that points to themes taken up in the thesis, with his references to ‘seeing’ and ‘imagining’. He writes,

is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial? (Lukes 2005 [1974]: p. 28, emphasis added)

The approach taken in this research diverges from that of Lukes, in that his analysis—like Edelman’s—is stated in terms of the exertion of power by ‘the powerful’ rather than the work of social movements that work to challenge elite power. In Lukes’ approach, the focus is on ‘power as domination’—how ‘the powerful secure the compliance of those they dominate—and, more specifically, how… they secure their willing compliance’ (2005: p. 12). Yet movements also work to ‘shape perceptions, cognitions and preferences’ and the ways in which people ‘imagine’ and ‘see’ the world. This dimension of climate politics is the focus of this thesis.
(1) the ways that imagery, narrative and political theatre matter for politics;
(2) imagery, narrative and political theatre as forms of meaning-making that are distinct from abstract, rational, logical ‘cognitions’;
(3) the ways that symbolic power engages the subjective factors that ‘propel’ or block political action (e.g. emotion, identification and ‘the imagination’ and their importance for political will (see Chapter 8) and generating ‘political energy’ and momentum); and
(4) cultural-symbolic power as a distinct, autonomous form of power that is not reducible to other allegedly ‘more fundamental’ social forces (see Alexander and Smith, 2001 on the ‘strong program’ in cultural sociology).

Locating symbolic politics in relation to other forms of politics: models of politics and ‘theories of change’

The place of symbolic politics in the strategic thinking of the climate movement can be thought of in terms of theories of change, a concept widely-used in NGO circles. A ‘theory of change’ involves a particular vision of what causes ‘the problem’ and of the pathways to a ‘solution’. The concept originates in the field of NGO evaluation, and refers to a process of mapping all the building blocks required to achieve a long-term goal, then describing the assumptions that are made about the links between each building block (Weiss, 1995). Whelan (2012) observes that ‘Climate activists are hungry for change and choose tactics they believe will bring it about. At a conscious or subconscious level, they adopt theories of change that guide these choices’ (p. 7). The theories of change that drive approaches to climate politics and the dimensions of politics that they either include or omit have direct consequences for efforts to influence climate politics. This thesis argues that symbolic politics deserves a prominent place in any theory of change, both at the level of analysing ‘the problem’ and in mapping out possible solutions.

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8 Writing about emotions in social movements, Jasper observes that we can understand issues ‘cognitively, as if we were walking dictionaries’ (2018: p. 166). He calls for a broader approach that gives a central place to emotion. Achen and Bartels, whose work is cited later in the thesis, argue that political identities are fundamental to politics and that they are ‘emotional attachments that transcend thinking’ (2016: p. 228).

9 Weiss (1995) argues for grounding evaluation in theories of change on the basis that social programs are based on explicit or implicit theories about how and why they will work. A theory of change approach can be used to bring these theories to the surface, identifying all the assumptions and sub-assumptions built into the program (p. 67). Without making assumptions explicit, it is likely that programs are being run according to different tacit theories that need examination.
The following tables have been created to provide a basis for locating symbolic politics in relation to other forms of politics, and to provide a basis for thinking about its role in climate movement theories of change. Table 1.1 provides an overview of the place of ‘cultural-symbolic power’ (Alexander, 2006b) among other domains where power is exercised, including the ‘people power’ of organised movements, media, institutional and even military power, as well as the power of political parties and government. Here, cultural-symbolic power is not an adjunct to other forms of power, but is a distinct factor, with its own place amongst the array of forces which shape political outcomes.

Table 1.1 ‘Domains’ of political power: summary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domains of power</th>
<th>Aspects of each domain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘People power’</td>
<td>Social movements and organised communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information politics</td>
<td>The use of facts, knowledge and public awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discursive power</td>
<td>Systems of meaning grounded in language.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural-symbolic power</td>
<td>The use of imagery, narrative and political theatre to:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• define the way in which people ‘see’ climate change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• make the issues visible, vivid, and emotionally-compelling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• influence how people ‘imagine’ the issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• ‘win hearts and minds’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>This form of power is important for</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• energising the climate movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• placing new issues and perspectives on the political agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• ‘capturing’ the public imagination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• creating ‘defining moments’ and exercising ‘iconic power’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• building political will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• building public support and influencing the ‘climate of opinion’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective factors</td>
<td>The role of identity, motivation, emotion and group belonging: how political power is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>grounded in people’s identifications, worldviews, values, needs, desires, wishes and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ways of perceiving or ‘imagining’ social reality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subjective factors are relevant when, for example, people who support progressive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>policy positions vote for conservative candidates (see Chapters 4 and 9), or when</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>politicians stir up fear and prejudice and voters identify with their message. They</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>are present whenever people feel strongly about an issue, feel enthusiasm or apathy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>about politics, identify with a political</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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10 Military power has not figured noticeably in climate politics in the West, though an unknown level of behind-the-scenes influence is exerted through concerns such as those expressed by the US military that climate change ‘will affect the Department of Defense’s ability to defend the Nation and poses immediate risks to U.S. national security’ (Department of Defense, 2014). As one person with links to the Maldives who was interviewed for this study noted, the situation is different there. The democratically-elected president, Mohamed Nasheed, a leader for action on climate change at international level, was deposed in a 2012 coup.
group or leader, take a political stance, or join, support (or oppose) a social movement. They are central to what moves people to act (Davis, 2012) and ‘what makes social movements move’ (Eyerman, 2006). Subjective factors are a ‘horizon’ for this thesis without being its main focus.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military and law enforcement power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties and government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.2 below maps these domains in relation to (i) the role of the climate movement; (ii) the contributions of a variety of forms of social movement power; and (iii) examples of the contributions that symbolic politics can make. Given the focus of this research, the tables particularly emphasise social movement politics. They draw on the work of scholars who apply a ‘theory of change’ framework, or related concepts. Table 1.2 below maps these domains in relation to (i) the role of the climate movement; (ii) the contributions of a variety of forms of social movement power; and (iii) examples of the contributions that symbolic politics can make. Given the focus of this research, the tables particularly emphasise social movement politics. They draw on the work of scholars who apply a ‘theory of change’ framework, or related concepts.11 Categories for different ways social movements exercise power are derived from a framework developed by Keck and Sikkink (1998), who delineate:

- **accountability politics** (‘A’ in the table): holding actors to their previously stated policies or principles, e.g. by taking legal action or monitoring compliance
- **information politics** (‘I’): using information to inform and influence political debate
- **symbolic politics**
- **leverage politics** (‘L’): using money, trade, prestige or shame to exert power.12

Community organising (‘O’) is added to Keck and Sikkink’s framework as another important form of social movement politics.13 Factors such as information politics,

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12 Note: Keck and Sikkink locate prestige and shame as part of leverage politics; however, in this thesis, they belong to symbolic politics, because they rely on public image, and are often communicated through visual images and narratives.

13 Organising does not feature in Keck and Sikkink’s framework since their focus is on transnational strategies applied by social movements.
leverage politics, and government accountability, as well as community organising and mobilization, are well-canvassed in existing climate politics literature (e.g. Crow and Boykoff, 2014; Alexander et al., 2014; Corell and Betsill, 2001; Newell, 2008; Staples, 2014; Brulle, 2010); however, as Chapter 3 demonstrates, additional work on symbolic politics and climate politics fills a research gap.
Table 1.2 ‘Domains’ of political power and the contribution of symbolic politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Domains’ of political power</th>
<th>Role of the climate movement</th>
<th>Examples of contributions made by community organising (O), leverage politics (L) information politics (I), and accountability politics (A).</th>
<th>Examples of contributions made by symbolic politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| ‘People power’: social movements & organised communities | • movement-building (Staples, 2014; Alinsky, 1972; Walls, 2015; Whelan, 2012; Tattersall, 2015)  
• strengthening the base of support (Klugman, 2011; Reisman et al., 2007; Hestres, 2015; Lofland, 1993). | (O) • building a community base for campaigning  
• building a public constituency for change  
• local campaigns  
• one-to-one dialogue / conversations  
(I) educating the public | • symbolic politics conveys community experiences and concerns in a compelling way (e.g. imagery from the School Strike 4 Climate, 2018), building momentum for change and generating moral and emotional energy  
• images and narratives give alliances a focus around which they cohere, and generate momentum and a vision that sustains them |
| | • strengthening alliances (Klugman, 2011; Reisman et al., 2007) | (O) building alliances with community groups; endorsements from significant organisations | |
| | • strengthening organisational capacity (Klugman, 2011; Reisman et al., 2007) | (O) • support structures for campaigns  
• strengthened local community networks | Using imagery and narrative to convey organisational history and a vision for the future  
• imagery communicates the issue, catches public attention and motivates people to participate  
• influencing the public image of governments and corporations |
| | • nonviolent protest (Lofland, 1993) | (O, L) pressure generated by protest/boycotts/visible public presence  
(I) drawing public attention to an issue  
(L) delaying or preventing projects | |
| | • economic pressure (Lofland, 1993; Hestres, 2015)  
• use of market mechanisms (Dryzek, 2013)  
• development of strategies for zero emissions (Wright and Hearps, 2010) | (O/ L) lobbying banks to refuse to fund projects; boycotts, strikes and pickets; divestment campaigns  
(I) distinguishing a project from a social issue  
(L) renewable energy becomes economically competitive; insurance companies refuse to insure coastal property; renewable energy industry alliances | • campaigning based on social license and reputation  
• making corporate actions controversial  
• The cultural-symbolic foundation of economic power (Tognato, 2012a, 2012b; Spillman, 2012). |
| | • informing and educating (Lofland, 1993)  
• communicating facts and reasoning (IPCC, 2014) | (A) Building support for holding government and corporate actors to account  
(I) • informing the public about an issue  
• Media advocacy, publishing research and applying scientific expertise | • Images and narrative support the process of persuasion, enabling social movements to be profiled in the media; often the images and narratives more than ‘the facts’ make the strongest impression |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media power</th>
<th>Discursive power: systems of meaning grounded in language.</th>
<th>Cultural-symbolic power</th>
<th>Subjective factors: individual and group psychology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• media advocacy (Brulle et al., 2012; Luxon, 2019)</td>
<td>• using imagery, narrative and political theatre to build an energised and motivated climate movement</td>
<td>• winning hearts and minds’</td>
<td>• evoking emotion and motivation to respond (Jasper, 2011; Alexander, 2006a; 2010; Ferree and Merrill, 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(I) Using the media to influence how issues are defined - shaping perceptions, setting agendas</td>
<td>(L) Using symbols as a focus for exercising leverage (e.g. when symbolic power wielded by divestment campaigning results in the loss of social license)</td>
<td>‘capturing’ the public imagination</td>
<td>Shaping the ‘public imagination’ and ‘re-imagining’ the issues (Hall, 1987; Lederach, 2005; Eaton, 2011; Ghosh, 2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• promoting alternative discourses, ‘subverting’ existing discourses (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Glynos et al., 2009)</td>
<td>(I) 'Problematisation' - influencing and challenging discourses as 'shared way[s] of apprehending the world' (Dryzek 2013: p. 9)</td>
<td>shifting social norms</td>
<td>• Shifts in consciousness (Lofland, 1993) Green consciousness (Dryzek, 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(I) Stories, images and political theatre become a central focus of media coverage.</td>
<td>• Linguistically-based critique</td>
<td>(O) Organising around powerful images and narratives that energise social movements and provide focus and visibility for their work</td>
<td>(O) Building optimism, confidence and a sense of belonging within social movement groups; applying intergroup conflict resolution processes to bring together opposing groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplementing a focus on language with imagery and political theatre and using them to represent 'the problem', possible solutions, and pathways there.</td>
<td>• using imagery, narrative and political theatre to build an energised and motivated climate movement</td>
<td>• using imagery, narrative and political theatre to build an energised and motivated climate movement</td>
<td>(I) Framing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• influencing discourses, ‘subverting’ existing discourses (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Glynos et al., 2009)</td>
<td>(I) Influencing how the public imagines an issue; shaping perceptions of what is politically realistic and politically necessary</td>
<td>• generate political will</td>
<td>• Using imagery and narrative to engage identity, build identification, address feelings of powerlessness and climate denial, and to motivate public responses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 'Problematisation' - influencing and challenging discourses as 'shared way[s] of apprehending the world' (Dryzek 2013: p. 9)</td>
<td>(O) Organising around powerful images and narratives that energise social movements and provide focus and visibility for their work</td>
<td>• generate moral energy</td>
<td>• turning policy debates into debates about values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Linguistically-based critique</td>
<td>• using imagery, narrative and political theatre to build an energised and motivated climate movement</td>
<td>• generate political momentum</td>
<td>• When people might identify with a pro-coal message, promoting the story of (e.g.) school strikers and Greta Thunberg instead (Bourke, 2019).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• influencing discourses, ‘subverting’ existing discourses (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Glynos et al., 2009)</td>
<td>• using imagery, narrative and political theatre to build an energised and motivated climate movement</td>
<td>• influence the politics of reputation, legitimacy and social license</td>
<td>• Using satire and social drama to question and undermine the claims of politicians and other power-holders, making flaws in their arguments visible and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• promoting alternative discourses, ‘subverting’ existing discourses (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Glynos et al., 2009)</td>
<td>• ‘Problematisation’ - influencing and challenging discourses as ‘shared way[s] of apprehending the world’ (Dryzek 2013: p. 9)</td>
<td>• influence shifts in values</td>
<td>• normalise new approaches</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14 For references, see throughout this thesis; however, to provide a sample: • Symbolic politics: the political use of imagery, narrative and social drama (Brysik, 1995; Alexander, 2006a, 2010, 2011; Smith and Howe, 2015) • Influencing perceptions, political identities, and the way we imagine the issues (Westen 2008, 2011; Achen and Bartels, 2016; Hall, 1987; Lederach, 2005; Taylor, 2004; Eaton, 2011; Bottici, 2014) • Energising a movement (Alexander, 2006a, 2010) • Shifts in social norms (Klugman, 2011; Reisman et al., 2007) and shifts in consciousness (Lofland, 1993; Dryzek, 2013) • Moral regeneration (Lofland, 1993) • Building public support to create the conditions for ‘policy sustainability’ (Pierson, 2005).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Moral power and engaging with values</strong> <em>(Lofland, 1993; Lederach, 2005; Horgan, 2014; Crompton, 2008)</em></th>
<th>• Countering powerful images (e.g. images of terrorist attacks used to bolster the case for draconian national security laws) with powerful images in response (e.g. images of Abu Ghraib <em>(Mitchell, 2011; Binder, 2012).</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal power</strong></td>
<td><strong>Military and law enforcement power</strong> e.g. working with retired military figures to highlight the security threats posed by climate change For military power, see Mann (1986). <strong>Institutional power:</strong> e.g. banks, the bureaucracy <strong>Structural power</strong> Power structures organised around social divisions involving (e.g.) class, race, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, the Global South and the Global North (e.g. Crenshaw, 1989; Giddens, 1986)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using legal processes to challenge governments and institutions <em>(Hansen, 2016)</em></td>
<td>(L, A) Campaigning for changes to legislation; claims for damages (L) Delaying projects through legal action (A) Legal challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parties and government</strong> • Lobbying and electoral politics: using mainstream political processes and lobbying for policy enactment <em>(Lofland, 1993; Hestres, 2015; Riesman et al., 2007)</em></td>
<td>(L) High level lobbying; building alliances with supportive MPs (A) Using formal policy processes; applying legal, scientific, and economic expertise (I) Research and policy advice; informing the public about the issues (O) organising to exert electoral power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(L) Financial institutions face regulatory action from the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority over how they deal with climate risk <em>(Summerhayes, 2017)</em>; engagement with elites Elite supporters of climate action send public signals that influence debate - not because of the content of their message but who it comes from Symbolic politics is used to make unjust structures visible, provide a focus for reinterpreting experience in the context of structural power, portray a picture of a different future, communicate the history of structural inequality, and galvanise movements for change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(L) Campaigning for changes to legislation; claims for damages (L) Delaying projects through legal action (A) Legal challenges</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(O) marginalised groups organise to challenge existing structures (A) legal and administrative action taken to create formal and equality and undermine structural inequality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic politics generates political and public will, defines issues, supports persuasion processes, and creates nodes around which debate and political action takes place.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These tables provide a way of thinking across multiple dimensions when analysing climate politics. The distinctions they make between different domains and forms of politics make it possible to conceptualise a range of avenues for achieving the climate movement’s goals. Theories of change applied by the climate movement are likely to be composed of some kind of combination of the domains and factors outlined here. Theories of change may locate the ‘real’ source of the problem in the power of the Australian fossil fuel lobby (Pearse et al., 2013; ABC Four Corners, 2006; Hamilton, 2007), the power of the fossil fuel industry (McKibben, 2012, 2013a), the role of money in politics (Hansen, 2009a), the conservative media (Hamilton, 2007), the governance and institutional challenges of dealing with the ‘wicked’ problem of climate change (Biermann, 2011), or the strength of organised and other forms of climate denial (Manne, 2012; Oreskes and Conway, 2010; Norgaard, 2011a). Solutions may include approaches such as community organising, parliamentary lobbying, building alliances, and developing countervailing economic power within the renewable energy industry. No form of politics effects change by itself, and the analytically-distinct areas listed in the tables overlap in real life. For example, economic, institutional and legal power are intertwined. Symbolic politics may rely on the media and on leverage politics for its effect. In turn, parliamentary or ‘people’ power may only become effective through changes in political conditions created by symbolic power. However, separating out each of these forms of politics makes it possible to think about their distinct contribution.
This research: overview

This thesis investigates ways in which the Australian climate movement uses symbolic politics in its efforts to achieve political change. It analyses the use of imagery, narrative and political theatre as forms of symbolic politics, drawing principally on the insights of movement participants. The research can be understood in terms of Table 1.2 above: the findings fill out and analyse the climate movement’s work in the ‘symbolic power’ row and column.

The central research question is:

How does symbolic politics figure in the work of the Australian climate movement, and in what ways is it important for achieving political change?

Secondary questions include:

What is the range and variety of ways in which symbolic politics is evident in the work of the climate movement?

How can links between symbolic power and political change be understood? How do symbolic forms of political action create conditions for achieving political goals—and what would be missing from climate politics without symbolic politics?

How do climate movement campaigners themselves see the political significance of the climate movement’s use of imagery, narrative and political theatre? (Findings from this question would inform answers to the second part of the central question on how symbolic politics is important for political change).

How can climate politics be understood as being ‘contested’ in the cultural-symbolic ‘domain’ of politics? How does the use of symbolic power by the climate movement’s parliamentary and corporate opponents affect the movement’s ability to achieve its goals?
What makes symbolic politics effective? What makes for powerful political narratives, and what makes images iconic?

How can the research findings be understood in relation to (1) the historical use of symbolic politics by other social movements, and (2) scholarly perspectives which emphasise the importance of symbolic power?

Definitions and context: For the purposes of this thesis, symbolic politics is the political use of images, narrative and political theatre. Its importance for public persuasion and movement-building are described in the following chapter. In this thesis, imagery is understood in a broad sense, encompassing visual images as well as verbal images and metaphors (see Chapter 9). As Chapter 2 argues, images provide an important way of knowing and engaging with the world, and in their various forms, they shape the ‘public imagination’ and the ways in which climate change is ‘imagined’ (see Chapters 2 and 9). There is an important overlap between imagery, narrative and political theatre, since theatre enacts narratives that we can see.

Imagery, narrative and political theatre: some perspectives on why they matter

The importance of imagery in shaping political outlooks is not surprising: our visual sense of the world exists prior to our ability to put words to what we see. While the old adage claims that a picture is worth a thousand words, Davidson (1978) challenges this perspective in an article on metaphor, writing: ‘a picture is not worth a thousand words, or any other number. Words are the wrong currency to exchange for a picture.’ While propositions can be used to describe what we see, he adds that ‘there is no clear end [to what a] metaphor makes us notice… what we notice or see is not, in general, propositional in character’ (p. 47). In relation to narrative, Davis (2012) argues, ‘Through stories, [social movement] participants, actual and potential, are called not so much to reflect on the merits of coherent arguments or self-consciously adopt an interpretive schema—but to identify and empathise with real protagonists, to be repelled by antagonists, to enter into and feel morally involved in configurations of events that specify injustice and prefigure change’ (p. 24). The power of theatre is described by Boulton (2013 [1960]) as ‘literature that walks and talks before our eyes.’ Seeing a play is ‘more exciting and memorable’ than reading a novel, she argues: ‘the concentration and intensity of emotion is caused by our actually seeing and hearing the events represented’ (pp. 3-4). For social movements, using theatre involves enacting and ‘choreographing’ the story of political events, ‘bringing them to life’.
Symbolic politics is distinct from information politics in that images, narrative and political theatre play a different role to facts and rationally-stated propositions. Of course, facts and rational arguments are essential; however, ‘information politics’ without symbolic politics cannot be relied upon to be emotionally compelling and to move people to act. The contrast between Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports and images of melting icebergs or bushfires—or the story of striking school students—illustrates the point. Conversely, images do not interpret themselves, and they need to be accompanied by information of some kind. Sometimes there are references to symbolic power—in this thesis, this simply refers to the power exerted through the use of symbolic politics.

The thesis could have chosen cultural power as its focus, and it shares a great deal in common with works where culture is the central category (see Alexander, 2003). The focus of this thesis does not extend, however, to the ‘internal symbolic structure’ of cultural codes (Alexander 2006a, L703), modern-day binary divisions between ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ (Alexander, 2006a; Alexander 2010) or the reconstruction of cultural systems which make sense-making possible (Smith, 2005). Instead, symbolic politics has been chosen in order to narrow the focus, and foreground particular instances of the use of imagery, narrative and political theatre,15 which might be

15 Alexander (2006a) highlights the range of levels at which cultural power can be analysed when he compares ‘the symbolic medium of politics’ to a language that includes ‘not only situationally motivated speech, but deep symbolic structure’ (L652). This thesis is addressed to instances of the use of symbolic power rather than foregrounding the way these deep symbolic structures work, although processes such as emotional identification with icons and with characters in the climate movement’s narratives are discussed in the thesis. Further, societies’ ‘shared patterns of representations’ and ‘preexisting discursive traditions’ (Alexander, 2006a: L2731) are not the only horizon against which cultural power can be understood as an independent variable that shapes social and political life (Alexander, 2003). Political symbols may exist in relation to these shared patterns and discourses; however, there are analytically distinct (or ‘independent’) pathways through which they can have their effect. When analysing some aspects of politics, the most relevant patterns and discourses may be shared by particular communities or groups rather than the whole of society. It is possible to place the analytic focus here when examining particular aspects of social life while simultaneously sharing Alexander’s (2006a) vision of a ‘civil sphere’—a world of values and institutions that provides a basis for democratic integration and ‘relies on solidarity, on feelings for others whom we do not know but whom we respect out of principle… because of our… commitment to a common secular faith’ (L149). This solidarity can extend beyond any divisions of class, race, gender, sexuality or group identity.

Further, it is valuable to think about how some things connect to discourse but stand outside it as well. The example of the human experience of fire illustrates the point. ‘Fire burns, and causes pain’ is a lesson we often learn well before we have words to put to fire, burning, causation or pain. Thus, long before any cultural system shapes out understanding, images of fire are associated with its consequences. This subjective experience of a linkage between an experience and an image is clearly enriched when it comes to be informed by culture; a sense of what fire means is powerfully reinforced and enlarged by what we see on the news, in film, in
intended, for example, to make coal mining appear somewhere between ‘hazardous to health’ and ‘dangerous to us and our grandchildren’. These instances of symbolic politics then make their impact in the ‘cultural-symbolic’ (Alexander, 2006b) domain of politics that is identified in the tables above. In this domain, particular instances of symbolic power shape actions, institutions and political outcomes as they combine and interact with larger cultural currents and dynamics (e.g. the place of the Great Barrier Reef or water in the national imagination, larger narratives about what matters politically, and the way that narration of character influences political perceptions: see Smith and Howe (2015) and Appendix 1).

This thesis is concerned with how symbolic politics is used to achieve political change. Political change may be effected in any of the domains outlined in the tables above, and it is ‘political’ as soon as it involves exerting power, thereby changing existing political conditions and configurations of power. This is a broad and encompassing definition, but it makes room for some significant political dynamics which influence formal policy outcomes, such as the development of political will, movement mobilisation and shifts in public opinion. As the experience with Australia’s carbon tax shows, political change should not be confused with policy enactment. The fact that Australia’s carbon tax was abolished after being assailed by the fossil fuel lobby and Liberal-National MPs (see Chapter 5) is a sharp reminder that the political work of building the conditions where policy enactment becomes both possible and sustainable needs to be included in the analysis (see a related argument in Pierson, 2005). The political task of influencing the ‘climate of opinion’ and the ‘public imagination’ is particularly important in this context (see Chapters 2 and 8).

The focus of this thesis spans the use of power within and outside the parliamentary and policy arenas. For example, it includes a focus on how symbolic politics is used to influence corporate actors, analysing campaigns involving divestment, the closure of coal-fired power stations, and the politics of Adani. When protests lead to fossil fuel divestment, or when banks rule out financing coal projects, power has been

conversation, or in real life. However, in its earliest forms, it is experienced through relationships and through action before any language about it is understood. Once language is understood, it informs but does not subsume experiential and relational ‘ways of knowing’. Images of bushfire used by the climate movement thus evoke cultural patterns, but they may also evoke subjective associations that have a basis that are more fundamental than discourse.
exercised, and often symbolic power has played a significant role. Building and mobilising the climate movement and widening its base of public support are political changes in that they involve changes in political conditions, which can enhance the prospect of achieving specific policy changes. Larger policy changes will often come about only as a result of these changes.

The empirical material analysed in this project is drawn from the work of the Australian climate movement and Australian climate politics. At times, the thesis cites international commentators to provide a global context or illuminate a point. Like any contemporary movement, the Australian climate movement features some transnational influences: there are strong global networks within the movement, and some parts of the movement are the Australian branch of international organisations. The Australian movement includes large and small NGOs, local environmental and climate action groups, religious groups, and single issue groups such as Stop Adani (see Chapter 5). For the purposes of this research, Lock The Gate is included as part of the climate movement: some but not all of its members are centrally concerned with climate change; however, its goals of preventing coal mining and coal seam gas exploration make it part of the same broad movement.

**Forms of symbolic politics analysed:** Across the thesis, the strongest emphasis is on imagery. One chapter is dedicated to narrative, and the main case study selected for the thesis—the work of the Pacific Warriors who blockaded Newcastle coal port in canoes in 2014—exemplifies political theatre. The importance of political theatre is evident across the thesis: in fact, most of the narratives that are analysed were enacted as a form of public drama—the ‘theatre’ created by political action.

**Structure of the thesis:** Following this chapter, a chapter on why symbolic politics matters provides a rationale for this thesis. A literature review then locates symbolic politics within broader literature from sociology, political communication and climate politics, describing how symbolic power is omitted or overlooked, and making the case for this research. Next, a chapter on the Rudd-Gillard-Abbott era then provides a context for the thesis. An overview of the design and method applied in this research follows. Conventionally, discussion of design and method appear earlier in a thesis. The approach taken here is that some solid work is needed to establish a rationale and context for analysing the role of symbolic power in the
work of the climate movement: an emphasis on symbolic power as a domain of power in its own right is not conventional, and it is important to establish its place against the background of social movement history (Chapter 2) and theoretical contexts (Chapters 2 and 3), and in the context of mainstream politics as well—in the form of Chapter 4’s analysis of its role in creating conditions where Australia’s carbon price could be dismantled.

The thesis then examines the 2014 blockade of Newcastle coal port by the Pacific Climate Warriors and their supporters. Following this case study, the focus shifts to narrative as a form of symbolic politics, and a series of chapters on the climate movement’s use of imagery, addressing themes including political will, the public imagination and iconic power. Case studies for these chapters include Lock The Gate, and the Stop Adani and fossil fuel divestment campaigns. The Conclusion then provides an overall view of the place of symbolic politics in the work of the climate movement.

It is worth providing a rationale for the chapter on the Rudd-Gillard-Abbott era, since it concentrates on parliamentary politics rather than the work of the climate movement. This chapter provides a context for the thesis: the first interviews for the project began as Abbott moved to abolish Australia’s carbon tax. It was a period when the climate movement was re-assessing its strategies to take account of the reality that one of the Western world’s most comprehensive responses to climate change was being dismantled by an incoming conservative government which had made opposition to climate policies central to its electoral message. Importantly, this chapter aims to demonstrate how symbolic politics is a significant component of ‘mainstream’ politics, and is integral to understanding the political outcomes of this period. Symbolic politics is sometimes seen as belonging to the realm of attention-getting political ‘stunts’, whereas this thesis sees it as evident across the full spectrum of politics. For the climate movement, the point that arises is that symbolic politics is a key dimension of the political environment, and exercising symbolic power is a key political task.

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Symbolic politics, ‘organised people’ and ‘organised money’

An example of the way some climate campaigners apply a ‘theory of change’ highlights some of the issues described above. While climate campaigners routinely use symbolic power in their work, it lacks a consistent, established place in the movement’s theories of change. Creative campaigning may be seen as a ‘resource’ for achieving change however cultural-symbolic power tends not to be seen as one of the ‘domains’ where political conflict is won or lost. The discussion below illustrates how symbolic politics can be side-lined from the analysis, and the value of including it. In doing so, it exemplifies how the approach introduced in this chapter is applied in this thesis, introducing themes which the following chapters will frequently address.

Table 1.3: ‘Organised people vs organised money’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Domains’ of power</th>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Solution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social movement</td>
<td></td>
<td>Organised people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>politics/‘people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic power</td>
<td>Organised money</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In recent years, a new focus on ‘people power’ and community organising has been revitalising the work of the climate movement. Union organiser Kate Lee illustrates one approach to organising. In 2010, she told a National Climate Action Summit, ‘The climate movement needs to ‘build its power… to have any real meaningful impact… Power only comes from 1. Organised people 2. Organised money’ (Bridgfoot, 2010). This concept of power has become influential in many sections of the climate movement, both in Australia and internationally. Disillusioned with formal political channels, many in the movement have embraced community organising as the answer to the ‘organised money’ of the fossil fuel industry. In Lee’s terms, the underlying factors that shape climate politics can be ‘boiled down’ to the elements outlined in Table 1.3. At least as stated in this framework, the climate movement’s power exists only in one dimension—the strength of its organising work. In reality, activists’ work is more
complex, involving creative communication, powerful visual actions and (for example) organising events with the symbolic power of the #SchoolStrike4Climate. Many activists will share the views about the importance of imagery and narrative from the interviewees quoted at the beginning of this chapter, while treating symbolic politics as part of a ‘toolkit’ (see Swidler, 1986) which ‘organised people’ can deploy to achieve change. However, in this framework, the purpose is to strengthen the movement’s ‘people power’ rather than to exert cultural-symbolic power as a form of power in its own right. Thus, the movement’s use of images, narratives and social drama holds a secondary place: the ‘real’ task involves exerting the power of organised people. Campaigning toolkits may highlight the importance of capturing visual images (e.g. Stop Adani, 2017a), and ‘changing the narrative’ can figure in at least some of the movement’s strategic statements (see Chapter 7); however, this is not the same as treating cultural-symbolic power as a key terrain or ‘dimension’ of climate politics.

16 The ‘organised money vs organised people’ theory of change where the movement’s power exists in just one dimension has some critics within the climate movement. Ben Fink, a community organiser and a cultural studies academic, suggests the need for ‘a third term in the power equation: “organized ideas”’ (2014: p. 76). Ideas, he argues, ‘no less than people and money, must be organized if they are to be powerful’ (p. vi). The term ‘organised ideas’, however, does not really convey a sense of the political work that images and narratives do. Ideas on their own can be ineffectual in political debate. Better ideas did not enable Clinton to triumph over Trump, Gillard over Abbott, Shorten over Morrison, or Australia’s carbon tax over the sceptre of the ‘giant new tax on everything’ (Chapter 4 below). Fink’s critique is helpful; however, the view taken in this thesis is that ‘ideas’ also need the focus and ‘political energy’ that symbolic politics can provide. Symbols make ideas visible, tangible, vivid, and charged with moral and emotional energy. Ideas without imagery, narrative and political theatre often lack power: they can be intelligible without being compelling; relevant without moving anyone to act.
Both ‘people power’ and symbolic power can be included in the analysis, without diminishing the role of either. Figure 1.2 above treats turnout on the streets as a particular form that ‘people power’ takes. It shows how it is possible to exert a high level of ‘people power’ with limited symbolic power, a high level of symbolic power with limited ‘people power’, and a high level of both. A large turnout on the streets does not necessarily lead to an enduring cultural or political impact; however, symbolic power makes it possible to create defining moments, iconic images and sometimes political crises. For example, the ‘People’s Climate Marches’ held ahead of the 2014 Paris climate talks drew large crowds worldwide (BBC, 2014a), as did the 2003 marches against the Iraq war (*The Age*, 2003). A large turnout certainly sends a symbolic signal: the 2003 marches, for example, contributed to delegitimising the war. However, their symbolic power, while significant, was limited. These marches lacked a dramatic sequence of actions involving symbolically-significant locations or iconic objects comparable, for example, to the 1965 Selma-to-Montgomery marches in the US (see Chapter 2), Gandhi’s 1930 Salt March, or the 1972 Aboriginal Tent Embassy. The Climate Elephant of 2010 (see Chapter 8) attracted significant media attention and featured the powerful symbolism of climate change as the ‘elephant in the room’: it gained commercial TV coverage, without involving a great deal of people power. By contrast, the school strikes that erupted in Australia, beginning in 2018 (School Strike 4 Climate, 2018) had a smaller turnout than the Peoples Climate Marches and the anti-war marches, but held significant symbolic power: young people were standing up for their future, calling on adults to take responsibility for the consequences of climate change on future generations, including their own

17 Importantly, as well as large demonstrations, ‘people power’ or ‘organised people’ also involves building local community networks, lobbying local politicians, and the face-to-face engagement that brings new people into the movement. Symbolic strength has a role at this level as well. For example, movements like Stop Adani and Lock the Gate use films featuring vivid images and powerful stories that provide energy and a focus for local involvement. Symbolic power also figures in the mix of information, narrative, theatre and symbolism that is used when engaging with MPs. It is important when local campaigning events are designed to be visually powerful, with coverage in local newspapers and on social media in mind. This means that a graph like Figure 1.2 can be created for these activities as well, indicating levels of symbolic strength in one dimension, with the other showing factors such as the quality of internal group processes, the turnout at major events, the numbers of people involved in a core organising group and the number of new people who are contacted and become involved.

18 Significantly, while the Aboriginal Tent Embassy involved a small number of protesters in Canberra, it was backed by a high level of ‘people power’ within the Aboriginal Black Power movement in Redfern (Foley et al., 2013).
Organising the same number of adults on the streets without a strong symbolic message would have had nothing like the same impact: a low level of symbolic power can diminish the political power that organised people could exert. Thus, social movement power needs to be understood in multiple dimensions. Including symbolic power in the analysis provides a basis for recognising the different kinds of power exerted by the Peoples Climate Marches and the Selma-to-Montgomery marches, and understanding how the marches against the Iraq war and Gandhi’s Salt March engaged audiences and influenced politics in different ways. These examples highlight how symbolic strength can be important for political strength.

Conclusion

The historical cases cited above, the need to ‘win hearts and minds’ and the need for a strong movement all point to the value of investigating how symbolic politics figures in the climate movement’s work. An emphasis on symbolic power complements approaches that explain politics in terms of institutions, structural factors, political parties and economic forces. Obviously, these factors influence climate politics in powerful ways; however, climate politics is also about what leads people to care about the issue, what they feel strongly about, their political identities and identifications, and what moves them to act. It is about the factors that shape public opinion and that shape the political judgments made by voters and policymakers. Images, narrative and political theatre give content to identities and identifications, and provide a focus for political involvement. They energise political support, and define the issues in the public mind. These are subjective dimensions of politics (Alexander, 2003; Jasper, 2011; Hamilton, 2013; Klein, 2012; Achen and Bartels, 2016). Yet when ‘subjective’ factors are translated into shifts in the ‘climate of opinion’, and when they build political will, generate political momentum and shift the political agenda, they become objectively important.

Symbolic politics is pervasive: it is inevitably present in any political situation in some way, because it is impossible to separate out the role of images and narratives,

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19 The school strikes emerged on the scene too late in the development of this project to be discussed in detail in the following chapters; however, they are well-worth analysing in terms of their role in visualising, narrating and dramatising climate change.
the way we perceive or ‘imagine’ the issues, and the way we act politically. Thus, the question is not whether symbolic politics is present, but how it figures in the climate movement’s work and strategies. Understanding this can provide a basis for considering how effectively and strategically it is used, and for assessing how cultural-symbolic power is shaping climate politics. If symbolic power is missing from campaigners’ theories of change and strategic frameworks, it is more difficult to apply it with effect. Because it is pervasive, however, it can be expected to figure significantly in the climate movement’s work regardless. A focus on symbolic politics takes nothing away from the importance of other forms of power. Further, arguing that symbolic power is a distinct form of power does not involve claiming that it works alone: like all other forms of power, it becomes effective in tandem with other factors. In the historical cases cited above, for example, symbolic politics has worked in conjunction with leverage politics (e.g. divestment from South Africa under apartheid), as well as community organising and parliamentary politics (e.g. the UK antislavery movement and Obama’s 2008 presidential victory). In these and other instances, symbolic politics has been integral to achieving social movement goals. The role of symbolic power is also evident in recent electoral contests that have been immensely consequential for climate politics, such as those between Abbott, Gillard and Rudd; Trump and Clinton; and Morrison and Shorten (see Chapter 4 and Appendix 1 and 3).

Shedding light on the role of symbolic politics in the work of the climate movement will address the gap identified above between how politics is often understood intuitively and informally and how it is conceptualised. It should also illuminate ways of bridging the gaps between public perception and climate science (Hansen, 2009), between apathy and action, and between the scale of the movement that has developed so far, and the movement that is needed. In 2016, US climate campaigner Bill McKibben told a conference at the University of the South Pacific, ‘We require a huge political change. We need to find some source of power other than money to fight against [the fossil fuel industry] and the only other source is to build the movement’ (Dhabuwala, 2016). This thesis extends McKibben’s argument. It makes the case that symbolic politics

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20 They are also evident when fears about issues like immigration become a vortex which consumes political energy and diverts attention from other issues—including climate change.

21 McKibben may in fact readily agree with the points made here. He founded 350.org, which, more than many other sections of the climate movement, has had a strong emphasis on creative, visual and often theatrical campaigning. To a significant extent, 350.org was built on symbolic action (Endres et al., 2009). The chapters that follow frequently cite instances of 350’s campaigns. Further, the points made in this thesis about the role of
is another, related source of power, and that it is important both for building this movement, and for the movement’s capacity to change the ‘climate of opinion’ and to recast the ‘political climate’—all of which are important political tasks for addressing the climate crisis.

narrative are in line with the work that McKibben does as an author and storyteller. Thus, when he states, ‘the only other source is to build the movement’, the kind of movement he has in mind actively uses symbolic power. However, in its own terms, his statement about sources of power does not capture the range of ways in which social movements—including his own—exert power. As a statement of a ‘theory of change’, this formulation returns the focus to a single dimension in which power can be exerted to challenge the fossil fuel industry. This becomes a problem when symbolic power is a significant obstacle (or opportunity) for the climate movement, but is rendered invisible in the analysis of what is really happening. Symbolic politics, leverage politics, accountability politics, information politics, and ‘people power’ all matter (and there is a thesis to be written about each of them). This thesis has chosen to focus on symbolic politics as a pervasive but under-recognised and under-researched aspect of the climate movement’s work.
Chapter 2

Why symbolic politics matters

Narrating, visualising and dramatising climate change matters. Winning hearts and minds, influencing public opinion, capturing the public imagination and energising supporters are among the key tasks for any social movement, and in each instance, there is a significant role for symbolic politics. Climate politics can be thought of in relation to linkages between political outcomes, the ‘climate of opinion’, and the overall ‘political climate’—the array of forces that are shaping political change, of which the ‘climate of opinion’ is a part. This chapter argues that symbolic politics needs to be added to this picture: it is important for influencing both the ‘climate of opinion’ and the political climate. To make this case, the chapter begins with a discussion of public attitudes and the role of persuasion, which is then related to the work of two key thinkers who have analysed symbolic and cultural power, Brysk (1995) and Alexander (2003, 2006a, 2010). Their insights are then grounded in arguments from history and in understandings of persuasion derived from sociology, neuroscience and psychology. These fields provide a rich basis for understanding what is needed to influence public opinion in order to gain political support. A case from the US Civil Rights movement, the 1965 Selma campaign, is featured to illustrate how imagery and the ‘enacted narratives’ of political theatre can dramatically influence political outcomes. The importance of imagery and narrative in human cognition strengthens the case for the importance of symbolic power: empirical evidence indicates that to a significant degree we ‘think in’ images and narratives, and they enable us to engage with issues at the level of affect as well as rationality. Their importance has not always been recognised by social movements, which at times rely on policy arguments in public debate while their opponents deploy powerful imagery and narratives, and win public support (see Chapter 4 and Appendix 3). Against this background, symbolic politics matters because of the central importance of persuasion—of ‘winning hearts’ as well as minds, emotional engagement, and ‘capturing’ the activist and public imagination—and how these matter for influencing the ‘climate of opinion’, the political climate and, in turn, political outcomes.

Shifts in public attitudes are a condition for achieving the political changes that are
needed to address the climate crisis (Bliuc et al., 2015). While there is no direct relationship between shifts in opinion and changes in policy (or levels of movement mobilisation), stronger public support is necessary for attaining the climate movement’s goals. Writing that human-made climate change is the greatest threat faced by humanity, climate scientist James Hansen (2009a) observes that that ‘the gap between public perception and scientific reality is now enormous’, adding, ‘If the world does not make a dramatic shift in energy policies over the next few years, we may well pass the point of no return’ (L3092). Dilling and Moser (2007) describe how climate change is perceived as neither immediate nor urgent. They argue that traditional approaches to communicating about the issue fail to motivate people: ‘the public is aware of the term “global warming,” but not energized by it to act’ (L358). Moser and Berzonsky (2015) note how ‘the issue has long been presented as scientific, uncertain, and complex’ and it can be found ‘difficult, depressing or overwhelming to contemplate’ (p. 293), while for many the necessary responses are unclear. The problem is compounded by the widespread trend towards a ‘hardening of opposing positions on climate change, accompanied by considerable cynicism, distrust, blame and negative sentiment’ (p. 287).²²

Robert Cox (2010), an environmental communication scholar, an advisor to US environmental organisations and a former president of the Sierra Club, argues that existing efforts to educate the public have failed ‘miserably’ to translate knowledge about climate change into a constituency capable of demanding changes ‘on the scale and timetable that climate and other system crises require’ (p. 125). In a later work, Cox (2012) states that the art of rhetoric is not just about skillful delivery, but depends on ‘the ability to discover the resources for persuasion… available in a specific situation’ (L1608). Thinking of symbolic politics as a ‘resource’ for persuasion can sometimes reflect a more narrow vision of cultural power (see a critique of Swidler’s (1986) view of culture as a ‘toolkit’ by Mast, 2012). When climate campaigners work to persuade audiences, they are exerting influence within ‘domains of power’ (Chapter 1) as well as utilising ‘resources’. Yet, choices about what ‘resources’ are used for persuasion are central to the strategic and everyday work of the climate movement.

²² For indications of shifting levels of public concern about climate change, polls conducted by the Lowy Institute (Oliver, 2013, 2015, 2018 and Kassam, 2019) are a valuable source.
LH sums up the issue, asking: ‘what is... going to be the story and the image that connects with people?’ It is a question that applies both to the challenge of persuading the public and to the task of energising and giving direction to the climate movement’s work. In both cases, the conditions for political change are unlikely to materialise if the main themes people think of when they think of climate change are ‘parts per million of CO2’, threats to coal industry jobs, or climate scientists as secretive figures who deliberately distort data for their own advantage. Alternatively, if ‘climate change’ evokes themes that are close to what people care about, there is a much stronger basis for achieving the climate movement’s goals. LH states,

I think images of the Great Barrier Reef are incredibly powerful in engaging people... The Great Barrier Reef is a natural icon. Obviously what's happening in the Arctic is really serious but if the primary image that people think of when they think of climate change is a polar bear, maybe they are less likely to get motivated.

If the primary image they think of when they think of climate change is a bushfire or the Great Barrier Reef or what is happening to the Pacific Islands or renewable energy—these stories and images... Hell, no-one wants bushfires, no-one wants to see the cultures of the Pacific Islands destroyed. What is it that's going to be the story and the image that connects with people? It does need to be more than polar bears.

Public attitudes about climate change do not result from reading IPCC reports: instead, they result from the way in which the concept of climate change is condensed—often by images and narratives—into a meaningful form. Smith and Howe (2015) argue that ‘humans, individually and collectively, act on the basis of the meanings through which they interpret and define what is real’ (L272). Here, ‘meanings’ are not abstractions, but are linked to charged images and narratives that evoke responses like ‘now I can see that we have a real problem here...’, ‘this means something to me (or to ‘us’), ‘I am concerned: I want to respond’, ‘We feel passionately about

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23 For a discussion of ‘Climategate’, see Smith and Howe (2015). Their analysis focuses on how perceptions of climate change have been mediated by a social drama shaped by the way climate scientists figure as ‘characters’ in a plot, as well as shifts in the genre in which the story is told.
This is a defining moment: we need to elevate this on the agenda and take action to address it’. The presence or absence of responses like these matters politically—both in terms of generating public support and for mobilising a movement. Some of these statements express affect as well as rational judgment—hence this chapter’s emphasis on emotion.

Smith and Howe elaborate: climate change is translated and made intelligible ‘via binary codes, deeply grounded myths, parables, images, characters [and] performances. Together they add up to the social drama of climate change in which legitimacy is contested, moral authority gained, and public opinion formed’ (L1230). They add,

Our starting point was to realize that climate change is not just a natural process... it is also something distinctly nonmaterial. It is a signifier within a discursive field that is made up of codes and narratives, characters and plots, performances and settings whose totality is captured in the concept of the social drama.... It is... through aesthetic and generic forms, as well as through... narrative actions... that the environment becomes culturally relevant or “known” in the public sphere. (L4433)

Addressing similar themes, Westerhoff and Robinson (2014) observe that public discussion of climate change has ‘focused on the “facts”… with relatively little discussion of how these facts are actually imbued with meaning that may or may not resonate across communities and societies’ (p. 2). They argue that climate change ‘has failed to acquire any significance or meaning for the majority of those of us living in the western world, such that an insufficient number of citizens have either supported the requisite policy changes or made significant changes in their own daily lives’ (p. 2). The legitimacy, moral authority, and public opinion that Smith and Howe write about count for a great deal, as does Westerhoff and Robinson’s linkage between the significance of climate change and policy change.

The literature of symbolic politics

At an early stage in this research, interest in the intersection between social movement mobilisation, symbolic power, public persuasion and emotional
engagement prompted a search for thinkers who shared these concerns. Two stood out: political scientist Alison Brysk, and pioneer of cultural sociology Jeffrey Alexander. Both make important claims about symbolic and cultural power. In her article ‘Hearts and Minds’: Bringing Symbolic Politics Back In’, Brysk (1995) calls for a renewed focus on the ways in which symbolic politics contributes to social change. She states that symbolic politics is concerned with how meaning shapes social movement mobilisation and societal transformation—‘how semantic collective action produces social change’ (p. 570). For Brysk, meaning plays a central role in shaping the identity of political actors and creating the conditions for achieving political outcomes. Meaning, she says, is a dimension ‘long recognized by theorists but only recently rediscovered by scholars of political behavior’ (pp. 564-5). Citing examples ranging from the US Civil Rights movement and the anti-nuclear movement to Chinese demonstrators in Tiananmen Square, and from Argentina’s Mothers of the Disappeared and protests at Greenham Common to Gandhi’s challenge to British rule, Brysk argues that symbolic politics can lead to social change through ‘shifting priorities, building collective identities, shaping social agendas, or challenging state legitimacy’ (p. 562). Symbolic politics can be effective by creating an alternative sense of reality and giving new political meaning to daily experience. It can tie issues and events to widely-accepted values, or show up the hollowness of a regime’s legitimacy claims.

Asking ‘What makes a new story about politics persuasive?’, Brysk argues, ‘First, symbolic politics must speak to the heart: successful symbols must be culturally appropriate, have historical precedent, be reinforced by other symbols, and signal a call for action’ (p. 576). She states, ‘We think about politics in stories, and our consciousness is changed when new stories persuade us to adopt a new paradigm’ (p. 561). For Brysk, the consequence is that symbols not only mediate political reality; they also help to constitute it. Analysing political change in relation to persuasion, she argues, the influence of symbolic collective action can be traced through ‘changes in the transformation of collective identities, collective mobilization, new public agendas, changes in public policy, establishment of new institutions, and challenges to authority’ (p. 582). Brysk sets her argument against materialist, positivist and rational actor models of collective action, describing instead a ‘meaning-seeking, frame-producing actor’ (p. 570). She argues that because materialist and rationalist approaches overlook normative and affective dimensions
of political behaviour, they often fail to explain political outcomes.

Cultural sociology (Alexander: 2003, 2006a, 2010), the main theoretical framework applied in this thesis, provides rich resources for understanding the importance of symbolic politics. According to Alexander, images, narratives and social drama (or ‘performance’) are at the centre of politics, whether they are wielded by politicians or social movements. They shape perceptions, generate emotional energy, provide a focus for political identifications, and evoke political loyalties and commitments. Cultural power defines policy issues and establishes the basis on which political judgments are made, and political contests can be won or lost as a result. From the perspective of cultural sociology, it is important to study the role of symbolic power in any political issue. Understanding events, movements and political processes such as the election of Obama, the Arab Spring, changing concepts of ‘women’s place’ in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, perceptions of the Holocaust, or the Civil Rights movement (Alexander: 2010, 2011, 2003, 2006a), requires a grasp of what the issues involved mean to the public. People come to care about these issues, and respond politically, because of how the issues are made significant.

For Alexander, meaning stands alongside economic and institutional factors as a determining force in political and social life. He makes this case against the background of a theoretical landscape that, he maintains, has neglected the role of meaning: ‘Traditional approaches to meaning in sociology treat culture as a dependent variable; only social power, social structures, and material interests are treated as independent variables that have a causal status’ (2010, L6037). Alexander challenges the view that meaning is ‘a product of some supposedly more “real” social force’ (2003, p. 15). Instead, he argues, meaning is an independent variable ‘that possesses a relative autonomy in shaping actions and institutions, influencing society as vitally as more material or instrumental forces’ (2003, p. 12). The structures of culture, Alexander argues, can be ‘as forceful, organized, and independent as social structures of a more material kind’ (2010: L6027). While social conditions and material forces matter for political outcomes, so do the symbols, images and narratives through which politicians connect with audiences, establish or lose legitimacy, define themselves in relation to community values, and persuade the public.24 From the perspective of cultural sociology, neglecting the political impact of

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24 In an Australian context, these might involve the story of ANZAC, images of the trustworthiness of political leaders, narratives about Labor as a party that ‘cannot manage the economy’, or the imagined alignment
such images and narratives means failing to understand empirical democratic processes, which rely on persuasion.

If symbolic power matters because ‘we think about politics in stories’; if images and narratives are persuasive and make issues like climate change intelligible, and if the affective role of symbols matters, with symbolic politics ‘speak[ing] to the heart’ (Brysk, 1995: p. 576), and generating emotional energy (Alexander, 2010: L101, 945, 1007), a number of questions arise: How are these claims about symbolic power evident in practice, based on a particular historical case? How does symbolic politics add to ‘information politics’? Why claim a link between images and narratives and emotional engagement? Why claim a link between images and narratives and ‘political cognition’? The following sections address these questions, beginning with a case study from the US Civil Rights movement. The Selma-to-Montgomery marches of 1965 bring some key aspects of symbolic power into focus. They also provide a good example of the ‘theatre’ of politics, where imagery and narrative are fused, since theatre involves ‘enacting’ narratives in a way that we can see.

**Symbolic power in action: the case of the Selma-to-Montgomery marches**

‘Everyone felt that we had to do something, but what?’ John Lewis, a leader of the 1960s US Civil Rights movement, was recalling a meeting between members of two key civil rights organisations, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), which Lewis then chaired, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) (2015: p. 231). It was September 1963, and the group that gathered that night was discussing how to respond to the bombing of a church in Birmingham, Alabama. Four young girls attending its annual Youth Day had been killed, and twenty-two others were injured. Those at the meeting included Martin Luther King, who had just addressed the funeral of three of the murdered girls; Diane Nash, a central leader in the early years of SNCC and by then a member of the SCLC staff; and James Bevel, also a former SNCC figure and then SCLC’s Director of

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between ‘stopping the boats’ and fitness to govern the country. In the climate debate, they include the Reef, politicians wearing hi-vis vests at mining sites and electricity prices. (The debate about electricity prices provides a good example of an issue that straddles material and cultural-symbolic dimensions. In Australia, electricity prices have taken on a meaning that extends far beyond their material impact. Opponents of renewable energy have made them an issue, when if financial impact was the real driving force, housing affordability or lack of wages growth would figure at least as prominently as a political issue.)
Direct Action. At the meeting, Nash presented a plan to King for a ‘nonviolent attack on Montgomery [Alabama’s capital]—the kind of siege many... had had in mind for the March on Washington’, which had occurred just two weeks before (Lewis, 2015: p. 231).

Alabama was a bastion of racism. At the beginning of 1963, George Wallace, Alabama’s recently-elected governor, had declared ‘Segregation now... Segregation tomorrow... Segregation forever!’ (Alabama Department of Archives & History, 2015; Wallace, 1963). Yet he faced opposition from local civil rights campaigners and initiatives organised by SNCC and SCLC (Williams, 2013; Boynton in Carson et al., 1991). In April 1963, campaigners in Birmingham, Alabama’s largest city, had organised economic boycotts, picketing and sit-ins, and in May they had confronted police chief ‘Bull’ Connor’s dogs and firehoses. Then, on 15 September, Ku Klux Klan members murdered four girls at a church which had been a centre of this campaigning, located just ‘across the street [from] Kelly Ingram Park, where ‘Connor’s dogs and hoses had torn into’ marchers only four months earlier (Lewis, 2015: p. 228). When Nash and her husband Bevel heard the news, they decided ‘that an adult man and woman could not allow four little girls to be murdered and do nothing about it’ and that they would campaign for ‘the right to vote for blacks in Alabama, and in that way, they could better protect their children’ (Nash in Ellis, 2017: p. 4). Nash explained: ‘That afternoon, he and I drafted the original strategy for what became the Selma right to vote movement... It became my job to present the draft of the strategy that we had written to Doctor King’ (Ellis, 2017: p. 5) During the following year, as SCLC weighed its options, Nash and Bevel developed various proposals for an Alabama campaign. Late in 1964, SCLC adopted the proposal of local activist Amelia Boynton that Selma be chosen as the campaign’s target (Garrow, 2015; Hartford, 2014). Accounts of the events that followed can readily be interpreted in terms of the role of community organising, media power, or the lobbying of politicians. The following account particularly highlights the role of symbolic power.

King writes,

25 Lewis, Nash and Bevel had led the Nashville sit-ins of 1960 that led to the formation of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, and in 1961 they had been among the original Freedom Riders (Arsenault, 2011; Halberstam, 1998; Greenberg, 1997).
The goal of the demonstrations in Selma, as elsewhere, was to dramatize the existence of injustice and to bring about the presence of justice by methods of nonviolence. Long years of experience indicated to us that Negroes could achieve this goal when four things occurred: nonviolent demonstrators go into the streets to exercise their constitutional rights; racists resist by unleashing violence against them; Americans of good conscience in the name of decency demand federal intervention and legislation; the administration, under mass pressure, initiates measures of immediate intervention and supports remedial legislation… In Selma, thousands of Negroes were courageously providing dramatic witness to the evil forces that bar our way to the… ballot box. They were laying bare for all the nation to see, for all the world to know, the nature of segregationist resistance. The ugly pattern of denial flourished [in states like] Alabama… By jailing hundreds of Negroes, the city of Selma, Alabama, had revealed the persisting ugliness of segregation to the nation and the world. (In Carson, 2001: L4844, L4648, L4542, 4577)

Lewis adds, ‘People live there with a great deal of fear—[Selma] had a mean vicious sheriff in the person of… Sheriff Clark. And people had worked very hard to organize… We had had sit-ins at restaurants and lunch counters’ (Blackside, 1985a).

The SCLC’s Selma campaign began with protest marches, which were met with police violence and mass arrests. Stories of police brutality made front page news (Williams, 2013). Following the murder of activist Jimmy Lee Jackson, who was trying to protect his mother and 82-year-old grandfather from attacking troopers, movement leaders resolved to march in protest from Selma to Montgomery, the state capital. ‘We wanted to make it to Montgomery, to dramatize the right to vote’, stated Lewis (Blackside, 1985a). Wallace was adamant: ‘There will be no march between Selma and Montgomery,’ he declared, and he instructed state troopers to ‘‘take whatever steps necessary’ to prevent it’ (Branch, 2007: L733). However, the march proceeded. Lewis describes what happened when marchers reached the Alabama River at Selma:

When we arrived at the apex of the Edmund Pettus Bridge, we saw… a sea of blue, Alabama state troopers. About six hundred of us [were] walking in twos. It was a very peaceful, orderly protest… we heard one state trooper identify
himself as Major John Cloud, and he said, …“this is an unlawful march, it will not be allowed to continue. I’ll give you three minutes to disperse and go back to your church.” And I would say in about a minute and, and a half he said, “Troopers, advance”… The troopers came toward us with billy clubs, tear gas, bull whips, trampling us… with horses. I felt… like I was going to take my last breath… I saw people rolling, heard people screaming… we were beaten back… downtown... I don’t know to this day, how I made it back … I said something to the effect that I don’t understand how President Johnson can send troops to Vietnam… and cannot send troops to Selma, Alabama to protect black people who want the right to register to vote. (Blackside, 1985a)

It became known as ‘Bloody Sunday’. Lewis, hit by a club, was hospitalised for three days. Images of Amelia Boynton, gassed, assaulted and left for dead, circulated worldwide (Marostica, 2011). Television coverage interrupted regular programming to cover the scenes (Torres, 2018). Lewis reflects,

The American public had already seen so much of this sort of thing, countless images of beatings and dogs… But something about that day in Selma touched a nerve deeper than anything that had come before. Maybe it was the concentrated focus of the scene, the mass movement of those troopers on foot and riders on horseback rolling into and over two long lines of stoic, silent, unarmed people. This was a face-off in the most vivid terms between a dignified, composed, completely nonviolent multitude of silent protestors and the truly malevolent force of a heavily armed, hateful battalion of troopers… People just couldn’t believe this was happening, not in America. (2015: p. 331)

A second march, facing similar violence, did not proceed, in the hope that Washington would respond. Ahead of a third march, the President got involved. Johnson (1966 [1965]) announced legislation that would ‘strike down all restrictions used to deny the people the right to vote’ (p. 275). He then sent in the military to protect the third march from violence. People from across the nation travelled to Selma to participate. Lewis describes what happened:

Ministers, nuns, labor leaders, factory workers, schoolteachers, firemen—people from all walks of life, from all parts of the country, black and white and Asian
and Native American, walked with us as we approached the same bridge where we’d been beaten two weeks before. The same troopers were there again, but this time National Guardsmen were there as well, and we passed over the river without incident, trailed by two truckloads of soldiers and a convoy of Army jeeps... The people who came out of their homes to watch as we passed by—rural people, almost all of them black, almost all of them dirt poor—waved and cheered, ran into their kitchens and brought us out food, brought us something to drink. More than a few of them put down what they were doing and joined us. (2015: p. 343-5).

King recalls,

We had people coming in from all over the country... We hoped to see... the greatest witness for freedom that had ever taken place on the steps of the capitol of any state in the South. And [the] march added drama to this total thrust. I think it will go down in American history on the same level as the March to the Sea did in Indian history. (Carson, 2001: L4755)

Lewis echoes these comments: ‘I think we all walked that day... with a sense of pride and with a sense of dignity... It was one of the most moving and really exciting moments, really, the drama of it all... It was... like Gandhi’s march to the sea’ (Blackside, 1985a). Their reference is to Gandhi’s 1930 ‘Salt March’ (Weber, 2009).

Further reflections on movement strategy from King provide insight into his understanding of the importance of symbolic power. He writes about how civil rights campaigns like Birmingham in 1963 and Selma ‘produced situations that symbolized the evil everywhere and inflamed public opinion against it. Where the spotlight illuminated the evil, a legislative remedy was soon obtained that applied everywhere’ (King (2010 [1967]: L2322). He speaks of the symbolic as well as practical importance of campaign actions (King, 2000 [1964]), and of pursuing ‘specific symbolic objectives’ (in Carson, 2001: L2858). He adds:

Nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and foster such a tension that a community which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue. It seeks so to dramatize the issue that it can no longer be
The purpose of our direct action program is to create a situation so crisis packed that it will inevitably open the door to negotiation… [W]e who engage in nonviolent direct action are not the creators of tension. We merely bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive. We bring it out in the open, where it can be seen and dealt with. Like a boil that can never be cured so long as it is covered up but must be opened with all its ugliness to the natural medicines of air and light, injustice must be exposed, with all the tension its exposure creates, to the light of human conscience and the air of national opinion before it can be cured. (in Carson, 2001: L3218, 3221, 3306, emphasis added)

The passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act was not a foregone conclusion. King recalls his earlier discussion with Johnson about the issue:

[Johnson said] “I’m going to do it eventually, but I can’t get a voting rights bill through in this session of Congress… I can’t get it through, because I need the votes of the Southern bloc to get these other things through. And if I present a voting rights bill, they will block the whole program. So it’s just not the wise and the politically expedient thing to do”… Three months later, the same President who told me in his office that it was impossible to get a voting rights bill was on television [saying], “We Shall Overcome,” and calling for the passage of a voting rights bill in Congress. And it did pass two months later. The President said nothing could be done. But we started a movement. (In Carson, 2001: L4520)

Earlier, this chapter argued that there are important linkages between symbolic power, a shift in the ‘climate of opinion’, the overall ‘political climate’ and political change. The story of the Selma campaign bears this out. Originally, the conditions for the 1965 Voting Rights Act did not exist (see also Blackside, 1985a). Symbolic power is one among a number of factors that made this outcome possible; however, without imagery and political theatre, the legislation would not have eventuated. Johnson would not back it, and it faced entrenched opposition from Wallace and his supporters. The movement created the conditions for change, not just through protest, but protest which created vivid images and dramatised the issues in the public mind—and in the minds of movement supporters who lobbied Congress or participated

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26 Here, Johnson was referring to legislation to support his ‘Great Society’ program.
in the march. Lewis observes that something about the images of Bloody Sunday ‘touched a nerve’, noting ‘the concentrated focus of the scene’. References to drama appear repeatedly in the accounts by Lewis and King, and it is useful to analyse what happened in these terms. King’s account of the four elements that were required to achieve change almost reads like a theatrical or film script: nonviolent protesters, as the ‘protagonists’, claimed rights that the law did not recognise (‘acting’ as though they were real). Racist ‘antagonists’ resisted. The audience, moved by the drama, got involved. King recalled, ‘the sheriff had directed his men in teargassing and beating the marchers to the ground. The nation had seen and heard, and exploded in indignation’ (2010 [1967]: p. 1). Symbolic power—in tandem with ‘people power’—had shifted the climate of opinion. Facing the resulting pressure, the government acted. Omitting imagery and drama from campaigns like this would render them empty of much of their power. Thus, cultural-symbolic power is worth understanding as a distinct force: the case of Selma illustrates Alexander’s argument that meaning is an independent variable that shapes ‘actions and institutions, influencing society as vitally as more material or instrumental forces’ (2003, p. 12).

Alexander (2006a) notes that the Selma campaign was planned with the ingredients of drama in mind: ‘the Selma organizers wanted to trigger Sheriff Clark’s temper and to put it publicly on display’ (L4659), contrasting it with the nonviolent stance of the protesters. From the perspective of cultural sociology, political action sends signals, and what was communicated by mobilization was crucially important in this movement. For Alexander, communication and regulation formed a ‘spiral’ (L4746). Analysing the Civil Rights movement more broadly, Alexander argues that it engaged not only in instrumental but in symbolic action, creating a compelling, arresting, existentially and politically encompassing narrative, a social drama with which the audience, the members of northern civil society, could identify and through which they could vicariously participate (2006, p. 305).

He observes that King

was able to translate what could have been viewed simply as a social, political, and racial conflict over the distribution of resources, centering on aggression and struggles over structural position, into a moral confrontation in which the excluded and denigrated minority won legitimate authority (L3779).
He adds,

It is a fascinating and highly revealing fact of the academic literature on the movement that even those most interested in portraying civil rights leaders and masses as strategic, purposive, practical, and hard-headed continually employ the term ‘dramatic’ to identify the movement’s major events and activities (2006a, p. 305).

For all the differences in context between the contemporary climate movement and the Civil Rights movement in the US in the 1960s, there are important parallels. Both movements have shared the task of making the problem a public issue. In both cases, the problem—climate change or denial of voting rights—has existed, regardless of whether it occupies the headlines or becomes the focus of public discussion. It has been necessary to find ways of placing it in the public eye, or in King’s terms, bringing what is ‘hidden’ to the ‘surface’, and generating a public outcry and political will in response. Lewis describes Bloody Sunday as ‘a face-off in the most vivid terms’. Delegitimising one’s opponents is also part of the process: King writes about ‘laying [the nature of segregationist resistance] bare for all the nation to see, for all the world to know’, and ensuring that the ‘ugliness of segregation’ would be ‘reveal[ed] to the nation and the world’. As well as becoming visible, the issue may need to become a crisis along the lines described by King if the necessary changes are to come about. A ‘crisis’ does not have to mean tear gas and police violence; however, it does mean dramatic intensity, a powerful ‘script’ and compelling ‘actors’, combining to create a sense that ‘this can’t go on’, and that ‘a choice needs to be made’.27

Further, both movements have faced the related task of influencing public opinion. Events at Selma generated a public outcry: thousands marched around the country in support of voting rights (Branch, 2007), and voters deluged Congress with angry letters (Alexander, 2006). To achieve shifts in opinion, both the Civil Rights

27 The fall of the iconic Berlin Wall (see Chapter 10) is a good example of a dramatic and nonviolent moment of crisis, the culmination of a series of smaller crises that had been developing over time. The 2014 Newcastle blockade, where Pacific Islanders confronted coal ships on Newcastle harbour in their canoes, belongs in a sense to the same ‘genre’ of nonviolent drama as Selma—see Chapter 6. Yet while it was a dramatic moment, it did not become a national political crisis. This raises the question of what range of avenues exist for the climate movement to bring climate change into sharp, dramatic focus, and how symbolic power and ‘people power’ can interact to make this happen.
movement and the climate movement have needed to challenge established views of ‘the way things are’. Fear campaigns, lies and distortions, and political loyalties associated with entrenched identities and emotional outlooks figure significantly in both cases. Here, ‘information politics’ by itself is not enough: it can succeed only with those who are already open to persuasion. Another parallel between the two movements is that both involve an interaction between symbolic power and the ‘people power’ of community organising. The tasks of organising, persuading the public and energising a movement are interdependent, yet they are also distinct. Alongside orchestrating highly-visible dramatic events (or ‘moments of energy’: SW), social movements do the hard, ongoing work of building local groups, alliances and networks. To cite another example from the Civil Rights movement, Ransby (2003) writes about Ella Baker, a key figure in both SNCC and SCLC. Her approach ‘placed more emphasis on process than on singular, dramatic events… she understood that follow-up activities would be even more important than the kick-off itself’ (p. 182).

Without an organised movement, none of what happened at Selma—or Birmingham in 1963, or Nashville in 1960, or Montgomery in 1955 (or Newcastle in 2014: see Chapter 6 on the Pacific Warriors’ blockade) would have been possible. ‘People power’ and the ‘symbolic power’ of imagery and political theatre are two distinct and related threads running through the work of both movements.

Making climate change compelling: ‘political cognition’ and the need for more than ‘information politics’

In contrast to the Civil Rights movement, with its emphasis on creating emotionally compelling images and dramas that could move audiences, advocates for action on climate change have often fallen back on asserting ‘the facts’. Accurate information is essential for addressing the climate crisis, yet, as Norgaard (2011b) notes, for

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A number of instances from climate politics highlight the point. LT, interviewed for this project, described how Abbott used the lie of the great big tax... It was the Abbott government’s lie, [combined with the influence of] the Murdoch press... that created fear in the general community’. In 2019, the Liberal Party (2019b; Senator Jane Hume, 2019) circulated videos on social media associating Gillard’s carbon tax with an alleged plan by Bill Shorten to introduce a death tax (see also Frydenberg, 2019). AG observed ‘fear is really powerful, politicians use fear a lot’. For more on the role of factors like these in climate politics, see the chapter in this thesis on the Rudd-Gillard-Abbott era and Norgaard (2011a, 2011b); Kahan (2010) and Weintrobe (2013a). Achen and Bartels (2016) offer an important account of the determining role of political identities and group loyalties in politics more generally, and their work is discussed below.
decades, most research on climate change ‘presumed information was the limiting factor in public non-response’. Many believed that ‘if people only knew the facts about climate change’, they would think differently’ (p. 400: see also Moser and Dilling, 2011; Kahan, 2010). Describing this approach as the *information deficit model*, Moser and Dilling write of ‘the flawed belief… that information and understanding are necessary and sufficient conditions for behavioural or political engagement’ (2011: p. 163). They observe that many scientists and NGO advocates have continued to allow this model to guide their approach, regardless of its persistent lack of success: ‘Surely, if people aren’t getting the message, we must give it more loudly!’ (2007: L952). Hamilton (2013) argues that ‘facts quail before beliefs, and there is something poignant about scientists who continue to adhere to the idea that people repudiate climate science because they suffer from inadequacy of information’ (L852). Slovic (2005) writes that

we are sufficiently aware. We, as members of an industrialised, information-oriented society are already saturated with environmental consciousness… The processes we deplore—the usual litany of planetary degradations—have continued virtually unchecked, despite our accrual of awareness. (p. vii)

Empirical evidence that we ‘think in’ images, stories and metaphors as well as propositions provides one rationale for looking to symbolic politics in order to make ‘the facts’ compelling. During the 1970s and early 1980s, the ‘imagery debate’ involved a clash between those who believed that the mind encodes imagery in the form of propositions (Pylyshyn, 1981) or that ‘cognition relies on multiple representational systems’ (Kosslyn et al., 2006: p. 20)—including depictions of imagery as ‘a distinct type of internal representation, different from that which underlies language’ (Kosslyn 1999: p. 7). Over the last two decades, experimental findings based on the techniques of contemporary neuroscience using Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and Positron Emission Tomography (PET) have supported the latter approach (Reisberg, 2013; Ganis and Schendan, 2010; Kosslyn: 1999, 2006). While maintaining that imagery is central to cognition, Reisberg argues, ‘images are organized depictions, not neutral depictions… This seems to demand some degree of propositional encoding as part of the mental image’ (p. 380). Golding (2016) synthesises recent research findings to argue that ‘there are feedforward and feedback connections between conception and perception
such that thought consists not only in concepts, but in vision (imagery), movement and emotions’ (p. 127). Kosslyn concludes that imagery is ‘a basic form of cognition… [It] plays a critical role in many types of reasoning’ (1999: pp. 1, 404). In this context, findings by Graber (1996) that the brain is ‘far more adept at extracting information from audiovisual stimuli than from purely verbal information’ (p. 86) make sense, and it is not surprising that Szasz (1994) finds that political communication relies heavily on images rather than words. Alongside evidence for the role of imagery, there is also a solid empirical base to support the position that narrative is fundamental to the way we understand the world (László, 2008; Green, Strange and Brock, 2003; Gerrig and Egidi, 2003). In Policy Paradox, Stone (2002) argues that the way policy problems are defined usually has a narrative structure. Jones and McBeth (2010) cite substantial empirical evidence supporting the primacy of narrative in the organizing, processing, and communication of information, and they describe a scholarly consensus that ‘the social act of assigning meaning… is of signal importance when analyzing public policy’ (p. 334). In a study of almost 1500 participants who were exposed to three policy narratives about climate change and a control list of facts, Jones (2010) found that narrative structure was central to shaping opinion about climate change, and the most important factor was the hero of the narrative.

Writing about the Australian climate movement, Rosewarne et al. (2013) observe that ‘there has been a strong tendency to configure climate action as first and foremost grounded in science, rather than in values or political ideologies’ and that ‘this rationalist bent runs the risk of missing the generative potential of affect, values, norms and political vision’ (p. 153). The ‘generative potential’ of symbolic politics could be added to this list. When the ‘resources for persuasion’ are sought primarily in information politics, the result can be a rationalist and emotionally ‘flat’ account of climate change. When part of the task is to motivate people, and when debates about renewable energy, coal or carbon pricing are often emotionally charged, something more than ‘information’ is needed. Bruner’s (1984, 1986) distinction between ‘narrative and paradigmatic ways of knowing’ points to two distinct and complementary forms of cognition, and both matter for addressing climate change. Complementing the ‘paradigmatic’ approaches typified by the work of the IPCC, symbolic politics at its most powerful offers engaging narratives, compelling drama and iconic imagery—a powerful combination when political engagement and
Addressing these themes, psychology professor Dacher Keltner told a forum on ‘Climate on the Brain’ (Climate One, 2014) that ‘It is the passions that drive social change. And that raises [a] challenge for the climate change movement… what passions are really going to move people?’ Taking a different perspective, cultural ecologist Gene Anderson (1996) argues that people are creatures of emotion rather than of reason, and that reason is largely ‘an aid to planning how to reach goals set by instincts and emotions’ (p. 12). Anderson discusses a range of environmental problems where ‘rational considerations break down’ and where ‘emotionality is the block which prevents… solving the problem’ (p. 8). Perhaps Anderson swings the emotion-reason pendulum too far; however, it is important to take account of the challenges he identifies when assessing why it has proven so difficult to generate a public outcry over climate change, despite all the available scientific evidence. Noting the ‘symbolically evocative’ power of stories, Davis (2012) argues that social movement participants

must do more than agree with a particular formulation of grievances or a rationale for engaging in ameliorative action, they must be moved to act, to take risks, to get involved. Participants’ involvement is perhaps never simply logical and instrumental, but… also imaginative, intuitive, and emotional. (p. 24)

Neuroscientist, psychology professor and political commentator Drew Westen (2008) offers comments on political communication that illuminate these points. He reflects on divergent approaches applied by Republicans and Democrats in the US:

The vision of mind that has captured the imagination of philosophers, cognitive scientists, economists, and political scientists since the eighteenth century—a dispassionate mind that makes decisions by weighing the evidence and reasoning to the most valid conclusions—bears no relation to how the mind and brain actually work. When campaign strategists start from this vision of mind, their candidates typically lose. (L150)

In his view, Democrats ‘typically bombard voters with laundry lists of issues, facts, figures, and policy positions, while Republicans offer them emotionally compelling
appeals, whether to their values, principles, or prejudices’ (2011: n.p.). Lakoff (2014) makes similar points:

The brain and cognitive sciences have radically changed our understanding of what reason is and what it means to be rational. Unfortunately, all too many progressives have been taught a false and outdated theory of reason itself, one in which framing, metaphorical thought, and emotion play no role in rationality. This has led many progressives to the view that the facts—alone—will set you free… Facts matter enormously, but to be meaningful they must be framed in terms of their moral importance. (L175)

The ‘laundry lists of issues, facts, figures, and policy positions’ that characterise information politics may be essential when the task is to argue a case within a bureaucracy and inform debate; however, cases like the Selma campaign point to the value of the ‘emotionally compelling appeals’ that Westen highlights.

Approaches to symbolic politics that are applied in this thesis reflect an understanding of the affective resonance of symbols (Sears, 2001; Brysk, 1995; Alexander, 2010; Neuman et al., 2007). Sears (2001), for example, argues that the interaction between political symbols and emotions is a determining factor in politics. He describes how political symbols rivet our attention, and argues that affect often dominates cognition (see Zajonc, 1984). He provides historical and empirical evidence that affectively-loaded symbols (e.g. images of ‘communists’, ‘welfare’ and ‘blacks’) account for differences in political attitudes, and shape political outcomes. Leege and Wald (2007) note the role of ‘powerful emotional symbols,’ and the way that ‘emotions run deep in politics’ (pp. 298, 292). Analysing thirteen presidential elections, they find that most of the variations between voter groups could be accounted for in terms of the imagery that was used to evoke strong feelings about racial groups, equality of opportunity, and social welfare policies. Libby and Eibach (2013) review an array of empirical findings which point to an important role for visual imagery in relation to emotion, persuasion, communication, and judgment and decision-making. Brader (2005) presents evidence that images used in campaign advertising evoke emotions, and in turn influence voters’ electoral responses: imagery can ‘significantly alter the motivational and persuasive power of ads’ (p. 388).
‘Dual processing’ theories (Evans, 2008), which argue that we use two parallel but distinct ‘processing’ systems for engaging with the world, place these findings about imagery and emotion into a broader model. Epstein (2014, 1994) argues that alongside a rational system stands an ‘emotionally-driven experiential system’. The experiential system encodes reality in ‘concrete images, metaphors and narratives’, which are connected through networks of associations (1994: pp. 709, 711). He maintains that ‘experientially derived knowledge is often more compelling and more likely to influence behavior than is abstract knowledge’ (p. 711). Anthony Leiserowitz (2006), Director of the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication, applies a dual processing approach, noting that most theorists ‘assume that decision making about risk is essentially a cognitive activity’ (p. 47). Thus, they disregard the experiential system where images, metaphors and narratives are a basis for cognition. In a study analysing the influence of affect, imagery, values, and sociodemographics on attitudes to climate change, Leiserowitz finds that affective factors play an important role in shaping perceptions about risk. He argues that ‘public risk assessments are strongly influenced by experiential processes, contrary to most rational choice models’ (p. 63). Campaigners at Selma—and in countless other social movements—did not rely on the ‘rational system’ alone. The evidence cited above points to the value of factoring in the role of images and narratives in engaging the ‘emotionally-driven experiential system’.

The discussion above dovetails with literature on emotions and social movements (Goodwin et al., 2007; Jasper, 2011, 2018; Flam and King, 2007) that has developed as part of the ‘affective turn’ in the humanities and social sciences (Clough and Halley, 2007). Emotion had been disregarded in the burgeoning literature about social movements that developed between the 1970s and the 1990s; however in recent

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29 ‘Dual processing’ is a contemporary name for an idea with a long and rich history. Imagery has long been recognised as a component of cognition in Western thought (Frankish and Evans, 2009; Cocking and Murray, 2005). Speaking over two thousand years ago, Aristotle addressed the relationship between imagery and thinking, arguing that ‘the soul never thinks without an image’ (De Anima, III.7). Without using the language of ‘soul’, contemporary cognitive science offers similar insights (Lakoff and Johnson, 2008). For a range of approaches to ‘dual processing’ see Kahneman (2011), Spezio and Adolphs (2007), and Paivio (2014). Not all models emphasise an imagery-emotion link—some for example counterpose reason and emotion without a focus on imagery. In some models, however, the link is strong. Paivio, for example, writes about the ‘emotional-motivational function of imagery’ (p. 377).
decades, emotion has gained new attention as scholars considered its role in accounting for why people join or support movements, reasons for the emergence of movements, the wellsprings of public concern for the issues that movements address, and ‘how emotions connect… macro-politics to the micro-politics of social movements’ (Flam and King, 2007: p. 3). Jasper (2011) writes about how emotions ‘motivate individuals, are generated in crowds, are expressed rhetorically, and shape stated and un-stated goals of social movements’ (p. 286). Emotions are seen as important for understanding what propels political action, and for identifying linkages between emotional energy, a sense of confidence within social movements, and strategic action. Jasper discusses the affective loyalties that shape people’s commitments and outlooks, and offers the concept of ‘moral batteries’: ‘the combination of positive and negative emotions that, through their contrast, help energize action’ through highlighting the ‘contrast between the way things are now and the way things might be’ (p. 291). Goodwin et al. (2007) discuss how literature on emotions and social movements has addressed themes including the processes that lead bystanders to become engaged, the ‘emotional repertories’ activists rely on to communicate, the ‘macrostructural shifts responsible for making certain emotions legitimate motivations for protest’, and how some campaigners work strategically to influence the emotional state of large publics (L7058).

Jasper (2018) argues that ‘we still know almost nothing about what actually helps a symbol or other carrier of meaning resonate with its audiences; almost nothing about the concept at the center of culture: meaning… The time has come to tackle meaning, and I think that emotions offer the key’ (p. 166). He argues that existing cultural approaches ‘too often reduce human meaning to dry cognitive schemas, narratives, ideologies, and frames (p. 13), and in response, he makes the case that emotions are ‘the causal mechanisms beneath many familiar cultural processes’ (p. 166). He adds, ‘If you believe that culture matters, you must recognize that emotions matter’ (p159). However, if emotions matter, then the factors that that can fire and focus them matter as well, and these factors need to be recognised as part of the ‘causal mechanisms’ that Jasper refers to. This brings us back to culture and meaning (and a way of understanding them that takes points like those made by Jasper

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30 This critique applies particularly to limitations of the ‘framing’ approach to social movements which leading thinkers in the field themselves acknowledge (see Chapter 3). Approaches to meaning within cultural sociology, by contrast, recognise the importance of emotion (see, e.g. Alexander, 2003, 2006a, 2010).
Philosopher Martha Nussbaum writes ‘Emotions...are about something: they have an object’ (2003: p. 27).

One reason why symbolic politics matters is that symbols mediate the relationship between emotions and their objects—they can make both familiar and more remote issues ‘mean something’ emotionally. ‘Dry narratives’—or narratives that are understood in a dry way—can be put to one side. The focus here is on narratives, images and social drama that can ‘capture’ the imagination. Addressing this point, Nussbaum adds:

> Emotions typically have a connection to imagination, and to the concrete picturing of events in imagination, that differentiates them from other more abstract judgmental states... Even if [the] propositional content is, “my wonderful mother is dead,” the experience itself involves a storm of memories and concrete perceptions that swarm around that content but add more than is present in it. The experience of emotion is, then, cognitively laden or dense, in a way that a propositional-attitude view would not capture (p.65).

The points above convey something of the relationship between the concerns of the ‘cultural turn’ and the ‘affective turn’. In some ways this research stands at the intersection of the two, however its *particular* focus is much more on ‘culture’, while being alert to the way that symbols engage emotion—and more broadly, how symbols engage the ‘subjective domain of politics’, where emotion, identity, identification, imagination and perception intersect (see Tables 1.1 and 1.2 above). This ‘domain’ is where public opinion and public concern, emotional energy, the public response to fear campaigns, group identification and political will are ‘located’. The ‘subjective domain’ is a horizon against which the thesis is written, and emotion is a recurring theme of the research, both in the interview data and in the data analysis.
Symbolic politics and ‘the public imagination’

The political importance of the way climate change is imagined (Ghosh, 2016; Wright et al., 2013) provides a further perspective on why symbolic politics matters. ‘Capturing the public imagination’, ‘winning hearts and minds’ and ‘shifting the climate of opinion’ are closely related. ‘The imagination’ can be seen as removed from ‘real’ politics; however, some quotes from Civil Rights movement leaders suggest otherwise. In February 1961, eight months after the formation of SNCC, and months ahead of that year’s Freedom Rides, the editor of its Student Voice newsletter wrote, ‘if we are to have a continuation of the great mass movement, then we must again grab hold of a mighty imagination and vision that catapulted us into [the previous year]’ (Carson, 1990). Martin Luther King spoke about the Montgomery Bus Boycott as ‘a movement that would stagger and astound the imagination of the oppressor’ (in Carson, 2001: L1112). He later wrote that the ‘Birmingham and Selma confrontations’ were precipitated by ‘Negro initiative, courage and imagination’ (2010 [1967]: p. 52). Former SNCC Field Secretary Jack Chatfield wrote that ‘civil rights activists and the dedicated journalists covering the South were conducting us along a new frontier of understanding and moral imagination’ (in Greenberg, 1997: x-xi). Key movement strategist Bayard Rustin (2003) observed how ‘poverty in [people’s] imaginations’ stood in the way of thinking more broadly about how to address economic injustice as part of the Civil Rights movement’s work (p. 145). Here, ‘imagination’ is a shared ‘vision’ that energises (even ‘catapults’) a movement and gives direction to its work. In a large and encompassing sense, it refers to a ‘view’ of the world, as well as a creative force that makes it possible to ‘see’ things differently.

Writer Amitav Ghosh (2016) argues that climate change involves ‘a crisis… of the imagination’—an ‘imaginative and cultural failure’ lies at its heart (pp. 9, 8). Visual and other forms of imagery are central to the political imagination—as ‘vision’, ‘viewing’ and ‘seeing’ suggest. Imagery evokes themes such as damage to the Reef, what the future could ‘look’ like, the trustworthiness of political leaders, or restoring a country to ‘greatness’. Political narratives arrange these images into scenes and plots, conveying causation and turning political actors into characters. Establishing an alignment between the coal industry, jobs and economic wellbeing in the public imagination has been central to how the fossil fuel industry has sought to exert
persuasive power through advertising and public relations (Minerals Council of Australia, 2015; Adani Australia, 2017). Imagery and narratives evoked by the Coalition during debate on the carbon tax shaped the outcome of this debate (Dmitrov, 2014; Chapter 4 below). Analysing climate politics in terms of symbolic power is important for understanding how these debates are won and lost.

Literature about ‘social imaginaries’, pioneered by Taylor (2004) and Anderson (1983), illuminates the ways in which imagination, the images and narratives that inform it, and power intersect. Taylor (2004) describes social imaginaries as ‘the ways in which people imagine their social existence’. A social imaginary is ‘that common understanding which makes possible common practices, and a widely shared sense of legitimacy’ (p. 23). Significantly for this thesis, he writes that the way people ‘imagine’ their social surroundings ‘is often not expressed in theoretical terms, but is carried in images, stories and legends’ (2004: p. 23). The images and stories (and even ‘legends’: see Chandler, 2015 and United Nations, 2015) that Taylor refers to are powerfully evident in the example of the Selma-to-Montgomery marches. Building on Taylor’s work, Eaton (2013) offers the concept of an ecological imaginary, commenting that

Perhaps there is less need for assessing causes and calamity and more need for something upon which to base hope… Decisive moments in social transformation require the development of a counter-imaginary… Success as an ecological society will depend, at least in part, on the generation of a powerful ecological imaginary to challenge the governing… social imaginary’. (pp. 109-110)

Stephenson (2011) reflects that imaginaries may be changed, ‘but only if those espousing them are given reason to bring them to consciousness, reflect afresh on their foundations, and embrace an alternate conception’ (n.p.). He argues for the ‘aesthetic imagination’ as a primary way of understanding and challenging existing imaginaries, in combination with cognitive, affective and moral forms of the imagination.

Thus, symbolic power matters because engaging the imagination matters—including ‘capturing’ the public imagination, developing a ‘counter-imaginary’ and firing the
imagination of movement supporters (see Chapter 9). Because political attitudes, judgments and behaviour are mediated by the way we imagine the world, every political situation is shaped by the way in which political actors ‘imagine’ it. We imagine ‘the problem’, its history, possible solutions, the pathways from problem to solution, the goals and motivations of people involved, and our own location within the whole picture. In the case of Selma above, symbolic power was central in creating important shifts in the way the issues were imagined. The Voting Rights Act was imagined as ‘a long term goal that was, for now, impractical and politically impossible’. It became ‘urgent, and politically necessary’. Segregation was a problem that many non-African Americans could disregard. It came to be imagined as ‘a problem that the nation needs to address decisively now’.

Similar shifts are needed in climate politics. It matters politically whether reducing carbon emissions is imagined as a threat to prosperity (Cater, 2018) or a way of averting ‘consequences that would haunt humanity until the end of time’ (Garnaut, 2008a: p. 597). Fossil fuel companies can be imagined as ‘rogue’ actors (La Rocca, 2014; Cubby and Hannam, 2013) or ‘the enemy’ can be seen as ‘everyone’ (Marshall, 2013). Climate change can be imagined as distant and remote, lacking immediacy and urgency (Dilling and Moser, 2007), and as ‘politically motivated… a hoax… spouted by leftist celebrities who do not practice what they preach’ (Thompson, 2017). It can also be imagined as an emergency (Morton, 2018), a threat to national security (Department of Defense, 2014), a danger to global food security (Wheeler and von Braun, 2013), a threat to food production, water and agriculture in Australia (Lawrence et al., 2013), and a risk to financial stability (Carney, 2015, 2016). Some of the ways of ‘imagining’ climate change cited here take academic form; however, if they are to be ‘imbued with meaning’ for the public along the lines suggested above by Westerhoff and Robinson, encoding them symbolically matters. Re-imagining climate change offers a pathway to shifting the politics of the issue, and imagery, narrative and political theatre have much to offer the process.

**Conclusion**

On March 18, 1965, the day after Johnson introduced the Voting Rights Act into the US Congress, and just days before the third march from Selma, Emmanuel Celler, Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, spoke about a change in the ‘climate of
Recent events in Alabama, involving murder, savage brutality, and violence by local police, State troopers, and posses have so aroused the Nation as make action by this Congress necessary and speedy. Freedom to vote must be made meaningful. The legalisms, stratagems, trickery, and coercion that now stand in the path of the Southern Negro when he seeks to vote must be smashed and banished. Swift enactment of the bipartisan voting bill before us is indispensable. The climate of public opinion throughout the Nation has so changed because of the Alabama outrages, as to make assured passage of this solid bill—a bill that would have been inconceivable a year ago (Library of Congress, 1965, emphasis added).

Visualising, narrating and dramatising these events was integral to the political outcome that resulted. This reflects a pattern that is consistently evident in historical cases where social movements have effected shifts in the climate of opinion. These shifts can be dramatic, as in the case of Selma, or they can involve the gradual erosion of legitimacy and the slow building of a sense that change is needed. At its strongest, symbolic politics makes its impact through iconic images, defining moments, and the persuasive impact of powerful stories enacted in dramatic scenes. In Cox’s terms, it offers powerful ‘resources for persuasion’. Alexander (2006b) argues that ‘cultural-symbolic’ processes of ‘communicative mobilisation’ that influenced the outcomes of the civil rights movement have remained ‘virtually unstudied’ (p. 6). Greater understanding of the symbolic ‘resources for persuasion’ can only be valuable in a context where global emissions either flat-line or continue to rise (International Energy Agency, 2019), and where the ‘gap between public perception and scientific reality’ described by Hansen (2009a) persists. Symbolic politics is particularly significant for climate politics, given the need to ‘win hearts and minds’, capture the public imagination, and energise the climate movement. It also matters because of the limitations of information politics, the need for a ‘counter-imaginary’ (Eaton, 2013) in the face of climate denial (Norgaard, 2011a, Hamilton, 2012, 2013; Weintrobe, 2013a), the need for political energy and political will, and the need to open up room for policy change that does not yet exist. The Stop Adani campaign, Lock the Gate’s work against coal seam gas, and the fossil fuel divestment movement all provide important examples of symbolic power in action,
though in each case the symbolic gains made by these movements—and the strength of their ‘people power’—stand in tension with institutional, economic, parliamentary and symbolic forms of power that push in the opposite direction.

As a form of politics with its own causal role (Alexander: 2003, 2010; Smith, 2005), and as a powerful and pervasive but under-recognised and under-analysed means of achieving change (Alexander, 2006a; 2006b), symbolic politics matters. Taking symbolic politics seriously means aligning approaches to political communication and political change with the evidence for the role of images and stories in human cognition. Emphasising symbolic politics is also consistent with social movement history: the Selma campaign is one of many examples where it has influenced political outcomes by creating conditions where broader political change can come about (see the examples in this chapter and the Introduction). Insights from the scholars discussed above—as well as from John Lewis and Martin Luther King—all point to the political importance of symbolic power and the need to factor it in to the analysis of climate politics. Climate politics hinges not just on powerful economic interests and their influence on institutions and the media, or on networks of organised communities exerting pressure on politicians, or on policy-making at national and international forums, but also on how climate change is ‘imagined’, and the linkages between symbolic power, the climate of opinion, the political climate and political outcomes.

The chapters that follow will extend the arguments for why symbolic politics matters that are made here, with a focus on the role of symbolic politics in influencing other aspects of the ‘political climate’, including political will, and the creation of nodes around which political activity occurs. The following chapter makes a case for this research, based on how symbolic politics is disregarded or under-emphasised in existing literature.
Chapter 3

Symbolic politics: a survey of research

In investigating the role of symbolic politics in the work of the Australian climate movement, this thesis is informed by scholarship in fields including the politics of social movements, political communication, climate change communication, climate politics, and studies of cultural power. While some existing studies unite two or more of these fields, this thesis seeks to bring all of them together in a single project. The research question—How does symbolic politics figure in the work of the Australian climate movement, and in what ways is it important for achieving political change?—itself raises a series of further questions, beginning with ‘Why does symbolic politics matter?’, addressed in the previous chapter. A series of further questions arise, beginning with the main focus of this chapter: ‘How is symbolic politics disregarded or sidelined in existing scholarship?’ Symbolic power can be disregarded when narrowly ‘realist’ or instrumentalist views of power are applied. Studies of the ‘people power’ of organised communities can acknowledge symbolic politics without emphasising it, or without treating it as a distinct form of power. Studies of discursive power can make room for some of the issues raised in this thesis, while restricting their analysis to the use of language. Social movement research has not always emphasised the way movements define or ‘frame’ issues; however, even framing approaches, with their emphasis on rational cognitive processes, provide too limited a basis for conceptualising symbolic power. Fields like climate change communication and political communication address issues that are significant for this project; however, there is plenty of room for new work that relates their existing concerns to the climate movement’s use of imagery, narrative and political theatre. Beyond these issues, this literature review addresses the questions of ‘Why focus on perspectives from the climate movement?’ and ‘Why focus on Australia?’ This chapter begins by focusing on how symbolic politics can be neglected or ignored in the name of ‘political realism.’

Symbolic power and political ‘realism’

‘The symbolic’ is often seen as standing in tension with ‘the real’, as if a focus on what is ‘really’ shaping political outcomes means shifting the focus away from images
and narrative. Yet is ‘real’ power driven solely by economic, institutional, military and governmental forces, countered only by the impact of ‘people power’? A significant ‘realist’ tradition treats politics in terms like these, relegating symbolic power to a secondary role at best (Alexander, 2006a), and often disregarding it entirely. ‘Realism’ focuses on the most tangible and overt forms of power, and so-called ‘soft power’ (Nye, 2004) can count for little. In analyses of climate politics, a ‘realist’ perspective emphasises the ‘hard’ power of the fossil fuel industry, with its economic and institutional leverage (Oreskes and Conway, 2011; Manne, 2012; Hansen, 2009a). Hamilton (2007), for example, investigates the influence of the self-described ‘greenhouse mafia’ of fossil fuel lobbyists over Australian government policy. He provides extensive evidence that the Howard government pretended to be even-handed, but in fact acted for the fossil fuel industries and against their low-emissions competitors, allowing policy to be determined by the corporate interests that have the most to lose financially and institutionally. Former Liberal leader John Hewson (2015) describes the ‘real villains’ of Australian renewable energy policy as ‘Australia’s three biggest energy companies: AGL, Energy Australia and Origin.’ The former US Secretary of State John Kerry (2014) made similar points in a speech on climate change in Jakarta: ‘We just don’t have time to let a few loud interest groups hijack the climate conversation. And when I say that, you know what I’m talking about? I’m talking about big companies that like it the way it is, that don’t want to change, and spend a lot of money to keep you and me and everybody from doing what we know we need to do.’ Accurate as these perspectives are in their own terms, they do not provide a basis for thinking about the role of symbolic power.

Some accounts that emphasise ‘hard’ power make reference to cultural-symbolic power in their analysis, without giving it the kind of weight that is called for in this thesis. ‘Big Coal: Australia’s Dirtiest Habit’ (Pearse et al., 2013) provides an example. The authors place the power of the coal industry centre-stage. They analyse how the industry and its allies ‘have had the upper hand on just about all the key elements of Australian government climate policy’ (L2257). They highlight the power of lobby groups, the high-level access of former political insiders now working for the fossil fuel industry, the influence exerted through board memberships, the use of legal threats to silence critics, and influence over the media. Thus, in terms of the framework outlined in the Introduction, this analysis spans economic power, information politics, media power, legal and institutional power, and direct
influence on politicians and government. Pearse et al. also devote a chapter to how the industry seeks to gain community support through its ‘charm offensive.’ They begin with a focus on aspects of symbolic power, discussing industry advertising campaigns and their role in building ‘myths’ about the community and the coal industry being ‘on the same team’ (L1725). They note the way in which industry advertising is ‘designed to positively shape the way we perceive mining’s place in the Australian way of life’ (L1746). Advertisements are used to inflate the public’s estimation of coal’s actual importance to the economy by instilling fear of job losses and leading the public to ‘imagine’ the benefits of coal production trickling down to everyone (L1696). At a time when the industry plans massive expansion in Australia, Pearse et al. argue, the public is presented with the ‘comforting illusion that coal is benign’ (L254). They quote business journalist Ian Verrender: ‘The idea that an industry can hoodwink an entire nation by spending some small change on glitzy television advertisements never ceases to amaze’ (L2226). Points like these share common themes with this thesis. Yet their ‘Charm Offensive’ chapter quickly shifts to a range of other forms of influence and financial inducement, such as industry funding for local community festivals and sporting groups. Pearse et al.’s chapter informs an understanding of symbolic power; however, it is not about symbolic power. They recognise that symbolic power figures as part of the picture of what is happening in climate politics; however, their analysis falls far short of treating cultural-symbolic power as a ‘domain’ of power in its own right, or presenting it as one among a number of key terrains where climate politics is contested.

Oreskes and Conway (2011) place similar emphasis on corporate power. They trace the role of ideologically motivated and corporately funded policy activists who have ‘deliberately distorted public debate, running effective campaigns to mislead the public and deny well-established scientific knowledge’ (p. 241). Oreskes and Conway’s work has been prominent and widely-cited, and it does much to clarify the nexus between corporate, institutional, government and media power; however, it does not set out to clarify how the symbolic power of imagery and narrative matter in the process—or how it may be used to challenge established constellations of power. In a later paper, Oreskes (2014) focuses again on corporate power in environmental politics; however, when exploring ways forward, she points towards what this thesis terms the ‘cultural-symbolic domain’ of power. She urges that we ‘scale up our vision’ and our ‘imagination’ (p. 391), enlarging the way that we see
ecology, humanity, the ocean and the planet. The problem of corporate power is thus met with a response that involves shifts in our imagination: seeing what she calls a ‘larger picture’ and telling a ‘larger story’ (p. 391, emphasis added). These are moves in the direction of recognising symbolic politics as at least part of ‘the solution’ to the power of the fossil fuel industry. Yet as with Pearse et al., there is a great difference between noting the role of symbolic power, and making it the centre of analysis, as this thesis seeks to do.

The role of symbolic power can also be omitted in the name of ‘realism’ in the literature of social movements. A paper by Morris (2007), a historian of the US civil rights movement, provides an illuminating instance. Responding to Alexander’s account of the role of cultural power in the civil rights movement (see Chapter 2), Morris offers a critique based on a particular understanding of what he terms ‘real power.’ Morris’s paper is important for the substantive challenges to Alexander’s account that it offers. In terms of the current argument, however, it is also significant because it illustrates a false and unnecessary opposition between ‘real power’ and cultural power. There is much to agree with in Morris’s perspective; however, if his argument is accepted in full, symbolic power gets side lined—and the analysis of this and other social movements is correspondingly narrowed, in ways that it need not be.

Morris argues for ‘keep[ing] instrumental power at center stage (where it belongs)’ (p. 616). Rightly, he maintains that ‘in the final analysis, overthrowing Jim Crow required a black movement capable of generating real power.’ Explaining his own approach to ‘real’ power, he adds:

Following Weber, by power I mean the movement had to create the leverage to realize its own will despite fierce resistance from the South’s powerful racist regime. It had to create the leverage to force the national government to pass federal legislation prohibiting Jim Crow despite the government’s concerns for law and order and offending the southern white power structure. The strategy to achieve this end was nonviolent direct action, designed to cause a

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31 Notably, Oreskes and Conway (2014) have also turned to science fiction to convey their concerns about climate change, writing *The Collapse of Western Civilization: A View from the Future*. The book is set in 2393, marking 300 years since the collapse of Western culture in 2093.
breakdown in social order, a breakdown in the functioning of the economic and political institutions in the South. But to achieve such power, thousands of people had to be mobilized to face violence, jail, beatings, and even death. For scholars of movements, it is crucial to analyze such mobilization, because it is extremely difficult to achieve and sustain.\textsuperscript{32} (p. 623)

‘The movement had to create… leverage.’ For Morris, the vehicle for leverage is nonviolent direct action, and the consequent breakdowns in social order and institutions that result from it. While Morris draws a contrast between ‘leverage’ and ‘cultural power’, the two need not be placed in opposition. ‘Leverage’ is a term used by Alexander as well: he writes of the leverage over social power created by transforming public opinion (2006a: L3611); the leveraging of ‘King’s prestige to exercise… dramatic power over the flow of events’ (L4308); the way discourse can ‘provide leverage for actual emancipation’ (L7090); and the leverage exercised by social movements through their use of ‘idioms, codes, and narratives’ (L2837) in order to represent themselves in relation to their opponents, and to project an image of future goals. From the perspective adopted in this thesis, cultural power exerts its own leverage and makes a distinct contribution to creating the conditions where other forms of leverage can be exercised. For example, as Morris notes above, ‘mobilization… is extremely difficult to achieve and sustain’ and one of the tasks of this thesis is to investigate how symbolic power can be understood as a source of this mobilisation.

Morris’s ‘realist’ critique can be considered separately from other points on which he challenges Alexander’s account. He criticises Alexander for arguing that change occurred only after the black movement convinced sympathetic northern white liberals to identify psychologically with blacks, who then influenced politicians to legislate. For Morris, the media coverage gained by the civil rights movement ‘would have meant nothing if blacks had not been able to mobilize and sustain a national movement that disrupted the political, economic, and social functioning of the society, thus creating the primary leverage for change’ (p. 626, emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{32} Morris’ critique of Alexander is nuanced: he acknowledges that shared symbolic identifications are important. His critique of Alexander closes with a call that echoes concerns that are raised—though only partially addressed—in this thesis: ‘What we need now are analyses that integrate insights about how symbols and psychological states rooted in various spheres combine with strategic power dynamics of movements to produce change’ (p. 626).
Morris takes Alexander to task for placing ‘the primary agency of change in the hands of whites’, whereas Morris affirms that ‘the black masses generated real economic and political leverage, and that power served as the primary direct force of social change’ (p. 617). Here, the central actors ‘are southern and northern black people, their institutions, creative culture, and their capacity to mobilize for change.’ The focus, Morris argues, should be on ‘the strategies and tactics they devised to overthrow a regime of racial apartheid, rather than merely about an effort to communicate to outside audiences who could do it for them’ (p. 623).

Questions of leadership and agency, however, are distinct from the question of whether and how cultural power matters. This thesis shares Morris’s position that black leadership and black agency belong at the centre of the analysis. This position, however, can be held together with Alexander’s focus on cultural power, including the influence of cultural power on shifting white public opinion as well as its role in energising and focusing the black movement’s own work. Cultural power consistently figured in the Civil Rights Movement, working in tandem with grassroots organising. This is evident, for example, in the symbolic action of Rosa Parks and the organising involved in the Montgomery Bus Boycott (Theoharis, 2015). Martin Luther King’s work involved a series of highly theatrical symbolic actions, not all of which were solidly backed up by community organising (Ransby, 2003); however, his work in Selma, Montgomery, Birmingham and at the Lincoln Memorial all fused symbolic power with ‘people power.’ The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and James Lawson organised the Nashville lunch counter sit-ins (Siracusa, 2009; McDuffie, 2007), which sent symbolic signals as well as providing an avenue for direct action: in the words of civil rights organiser Ella Baker (1960), they were ‘concerned with something much bigger than a hamburger.’ SNCC went on to play a leading role in organising the Freedom Rides and Freedom Summer. Community organising was central to both; however, the Freedom Rides held immense symbolic power, and Freedom Summer (less well-known as a symbolic event) exposed racist violence and led to the formation of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, which powerfully dramatised the exclusion of blacks.

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33 Here, the distinction between grassroots or community organising and mobilisation is important. Both involve ‘people power’ however mobilisation does not necessarily involve enduring networks and the building of relationships within communities - calling people out on the streets is enough. King was more known for mobilisation than the kind of grassroots organising done by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee.
from the Democratic Party in Mississippi at the 1964 Democratic National Convention (Arsenault, 2011; Greenberg, 1997; McAdam, 1988). McAdam writes that ‘in a very real sense, the entire country had visited Mississippi courtesy of the national news media’ (p. 118). The stories that gained this media attention were symbolically powerful. Removing the cultural-symbolic work of the civil rights movement from the analysis would make the history of this era unintelligible, and without the political use of images, narratives and social drama, it would be a movement shorn of much of its ‘real’ (if intangible) power. Cultural sociology could take most of Morris’ critique on board, without losing any of the weight it gives to claims about the political importance of imagery, narrative, social drama, communicative institutions or legitimacy. Whether the focus is on the civil rights movement or the climate movement, integrating the perspectives of Morris and Alexander is a much better approach than choosing one over the other. Before this kind of integration can be realised, however, particular work on the cultural-symbolic dimension of politics is needed, given the ways in which existing scholarship has not focused sufficiently on it.

In a different way, the role of symbolic and cultural power can be side lined or under-recognised within the climate movement itself—not because imagery, narrative and political theatre are absent from the movement’s work, but because they can lack a place at the centre of the movement’s analysis of climate politics and in its formal strategic thinking. By focusing on symbolic power, this thesis seeks to enlarge the existing focus on ‘people power’ and community organising that is prevalent in many analyses of social movements, including the climate movement (e.g. Staples, 2014; Rosewarne et al., 2013; Whelan, 2012, 2015). While there is no shortage of image-rich and theatrical climate campaigning, characterisations of climate politics as a clash between ‘organised people and organised money’ (e.g. Boeve, 2015; Australian Greens, 2015; Ormerod, 2014; Bridgfoot, 2010) reduce politics to a binary conflict. ‘Reading’ politics in these terms does not offer a language for analysing and assessing the role of symbolic power, or of other domains of politics.

Community organising (Alinsky, 1972; Walls, 2015; Stop Adani, 2018a, 2018b; Whelan, 2012; Tattersall, 2015) is prominent in social movements’ strategic thinking, and is sometimes presented as the essential ingredient for achieving change. Jay Naidoo, a veteran trade union leader, anti-apartheid campaigner and former member of Nelson Mandela’s cabinet, writes: ‘The failure of political will at the top
is the result of our failure to organise at the bottom’ (2017: L2919). When asked what can be done to stop global warming, founder of 350.org Bill McKibben responds, ‘Often when I’m on TV, they’ll ask what are the three most important things for people to do… I say the number one thing is to organize politically; number two, do some political organizing; number three, get together with your neighbors and organize’ (Silver, 2009). It is striking that the call to ‘organise, organise organise’ comes from a movement leader whose organisation has relied extensively on symbolic politics for its impact—a point that is illustrated by multiple instances in this thesis—as well as his own emphasis on creative action (McKibben: 2007, 2013a). Symbolic politics and effective organising often go hand-in-hand; however, investigating symbolic politics separately makes it possible to think about its particular contribution.

Further, as Alexander (2010) points out in his analysis of Obama’s first presidential campaign—which provided impetus for organising in civil society groups worldwide—‘Organizing, too, depends on emotional energy and image projection’ (L99). When organisers campaigned for Obama, the ‘energy and solidarity that inspired volunteers [to engage with] their neighbors… and the people in the street’ (L102) can be understood in part as a response to powerful images and narratives that moved and motivated these activists. Alexander quotes Obama himself: ‘We tend to think of organizing as a mechanical, instrumental thing’. However, organizing is really about ‘building a culture… building up stories and getting people to reflect on what their lives mean and how people in the neighborhood can be heroes, and how they are part of a larger force’ (L1025). Although effective organising relies on door knocking, street canvassing and phone banking, for Alexander it also depends on how symbolic power shapes identity and generates motivation and momentum: organising relies on ‘symbolic connection, building energy, creating emotional identification, and extending moral commitment’ (p. 47). Statements Naidoo makes in his book *Change: Organising Tomorrow, Today* (2017) correspond to Alexander’s arguments. Naidoo writes about the need for a ‘spark’, and for vision. He recalls the role of Steve Biko who ‘lit up our minds and rewired our synapses’ (L389-390) and the image of Hector Pieterson, killed by police during the Soweto uprising, which became ‘a powerful symbol of our resistance’ (L562). He notes the symbolic power of Nelson Mandela and the need to both preserve Mandela’s memory and to act on it. In this account, the strength and significance of
imagery and symbolism and effective community organising work in tandem. The role of symbolic power is also evident in a popular approach used in training for organisers. Marshall Ganz’s (2007) ‘Story of Self, Story of Us, Story of Now’ framework has featured both in Obama’s 2008 ‘ground game’ campaigners and in training programs and materials for organisers in Australia (Fluence, 2016; EF, interviewed for this project). Ganz argues that story-telling is important for movements because it can ‘develop agency, reformulate identity, and afford access to the motivational resources to form a leadership group, found a new organization, and launch a new social movement’ (2001: p. 10).

When symbolic power contributes in these and other ways, should it be seen as a ‘tool’ or a ‘resource’ for community organising, thus placing it in a secondary position in relation to a larger goal? This can be a valid approach; however, seeing politics in this way does not identify the distinct role of symbolic power. It is possible for an organised network to be symbolically weaker than its opponents, and it is possible to pour efforts into door knocking and phone canvassing while losing track of the role of the symbolic power that complements (and energises) on-the-streets ‘people power.’ This research analyses symbolic politics separately, while seeing it in practice as strongly bound up with organising, leverage and other forms of politics. The distinct role of symbolic politics is important to identify, since its significance can be lost when it is collapsed or absorbed into other forms of politics. When the particular contribution of symbolic power is obscured, it can be more difficult to recognise how it contributes to determining whether political conflicts are won or lost.

**Political communication, social movement theory and climate change communication**

Symbolic politics involves political communication, a task which is essential for achieving the climate movement’s objectives. In this thesis, the emphasis on communication derives from factors including the importance of changing attitudes as a condition for political change, the importance of communication and symbolism in ‘making social movements move’ (Eyerman, 2006), and the view shared with cultural sociology that symbolic significance is both neglected in academic scholarship and a central, driving force in political life. Climate communication scholar Susanne Moser (2016) calls for research on
the stubborn superficiality of climate change understanding in the general public, on how to move publics from mere awareness, concern and understanding to active engagement, on how to communicate effectively in a deeply politicized and polarized environment, and on how to deal with the growing sense of hopelessness observed among many audiences. (p. 10)

Symbolic power relates directly to the task of addressing each of these challenges—yet current approaches to political communication within social movement theory and more broadly do not provide a framework for analysing it that matches its importance. As is discussed below, the same applies to the literature of climate change communication. In different ways, literature in each of these fields provides further illustrations of how symbolic power is absent from the analysis, and of the value of researching it.

Firstly, it is worth dwelling on the place of political communication within social movement theory and its relationship to analysing the role of symbolic power. Theoretical frameworks that have prevailed in the study of social movements have not always been alert to the role of symbolic power, and often, they have not been interested in it at all. Prevailing approaches to analysing social movements before the ‘cultural turn’ of the 1980s focused on social movement organisations and organisational resources, social structural conditions, and movements’ relationship to the expanding or contracting political opportunities that these conditions provided. Theorists emphasised the rationality of movement actors, in reaction to earlier approaches which had analysed collective action in terms of irrational forces that overtook crowds (Le Bon, [1895] 1960). In emphasising rationality, these theorists disregarded other significant factors that propel collective action. In this way, they allowed for ‘information politics,’ without a focus on symbolic politics. Further, strategic questions of ‘how’ were foregrounded, with a realist and instrumentalist vision of how these ‘how’ questions could be addressed. Motivational questions of ‘why’, which are more readily linked to the narratives and images that ‘move’ people, tended to be disregarded (Goodwin & Jasper 2007; Chesters and Welsh, 2010). This project has been conducted within a context where cultural sociology is offering new perspectives from which social movements’ use of symbolic power can be theorised; however, it takes place against a background
where social movement theory has been disengaged from questions of symbolic power, or where its theoretical resources offer only limited ways of conceptualising it.

The ‘resource mobilisation’ approach to social movements that developed in the 1970s (McCarthy and Zald, 1977) claimed the mantle of ‘realism’ (1229) and applied ‘economic models’ (p. 1213) to collective behaviour and the study of social movement organisations. McCarthy and Zald focused on ‘the resources that must be mobilized, the linkages of social movements to other groups, the dependence of movements upon external support for success, and the tactics used by authorities to control or incorporate movements (p. 1213). They called for a shift away from social psychology so that ‘social movement analysis [could be] more easily integrated with structural theories of social process’ (p. 1212). In a later summary of their approach, they explained that their analysis emphasized ‘how social movement organisations (SMOs) and cadre combine money, materials, people and technology into strategic and tactical action’ (McCarthy and Zald 1987: p. 45). For Tilly (1978), another influential thinker in the field, analysing social movements meant ‘mapping the interests of the participants, estimating the current state of opportunity and threat with respect to those interests, checking their mobilization levels, gauging their power positions, then seeing to what extent these variables accounted for the intensity and character of their collective action.’ His analysis was augmented by assessing a ‘prevailing pattern of repression and facilitation, the impact of the various groups’ organization on their mobilization and on their interests [and] the effect of coalitions with other contenders on their current power positions’ (p. 227). McAdam et al. (1997) look back on research during this era: ‘Analysis of social movements focused on ‘changes in institutional rules, political alignments or alliance structures’, allowing movements greater leverage. The resulting expansion in political opportunities derived its ‘causal force by changing the cost-benefit calculus of insurgents and antagonists alike’ (p. 153). Even works that sought to bring culture into the analysis relegated it to a secondary and derivative place. In his later work, Tilly (1999, 2003, 2008) sought to make more room for culture in his theory; however, for him it largely remained an effect of structural forces. For example, while arguing that repertoires of contention are ‘ineradicably cultural’, he argued that they originate, survive and change not in individual consciousness or in something abstract we might call “the Culture” but within concrete social relations
among political actors’ (1999: p. 419).

Here, then, were key themes in the analysis of social movements during this era: interests, tactics, social structural conditions, mobilisation of resources, economic models, external political opportunities, alliances, leverage, as well as a vision of movement participants as ‘rational actors coolly calculating the costs and benefits of participation, and people mobilized by incentives rather than by passionate anger or righteous indignation’ (Goodwin and Jasper, 2007: 615). Calhoun (2001) reflects that a ‘more or less instrumental approach to questions of collective action’ prevailed (p. 49). Power was understood in terms of political structures and the rational pursuit of interests. In these models, ‘interests motivate action [and] political structures open and close to encourage or discourage this action’ (Young, 2001: p. 103). In a work on comparative politics, Lichbach and Zuckerman (1997) describe the field as being dominated by rationalist, culturalist and structuralist approaches. In social movement theory, empiricism and realism reigned, and the rationalist and structuralist worldviews that prevailed in social movement research left little room for the role of culture.

The culturalist approaches to the study of social movements that developed during the 1980s (Williams, 2004) have taken up themes of meaning, and of how social and political phenomena are defined in the public mind. Tarrow (2011) notes how, in recent decades, students of social movements have recognized that movements do not simply pursue instrumental goals: ‘they also make and manipulate meanings’ (L3806). The framing approach (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow et al., 1986; Benford, 1997) has led scholarship in this field. Benford and Snow write of their field’s focus on ‘meaning work—the struggle over the production of mobilizing and countermobilizing ideas and meanings’ which ‘until the mid-1980s the literature largely ignored’ (2000: p. 613). Benford and Hunt (1992) state that ‘movement interpretive work… stimulates audiences to redefine their situations as unjust and mutable so that existing power structures can be altered’ (p. 48). Movements ‘frame contentious politics… [they] define, crystallise and construct collective identities’ and they engage the emotions of followers (Tarrow, 2011: p. 143). Benford and Snow (2000) write,

social movement scholars interested in framing processes begin by taking as
problematic what until the mid-1980s the literature largely ignored: meaning work—the struggle over the production of mobilizing and countermobilizing ideas and meanings. From this perspective... movement actors are viewed as signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers... They are deeply embroiled, along with the media, local governments, and the state, in what has been referred to as “the politics of signification’ (Hall, 1982)’. (p. 613)

Benford and Snow outline how collective action frames project a shared understanding of the situation, define who is at fault, portray a vision of the future, and are used to call on others to take action. Francesca and Ho (2006) add: ‘Frames matter. The ways in which political actors package their messages affect their ability to recruit adherents, gain favorable media coverage, demobilize antagonists, and win political victories. The ways in which ordinary citizens think about gains and losses shape their political preferences... The term “frame” reminds us that persuasion works in part by... making events and circumstances intelligible as much as by advancing a compelling point of view’ (p. 203).

The framing approach clearly provides rich resources for conceptualising the role of meaning in politics and shares significant common ground with this thesis; however, given some particular limitations of the existing framing literature, this project has looked elsewhere for theoretical foundations. The framing perspective is descriptively rich in discussing the role of meaning in the work of social movements, but its lack of attention to affect limits its analytical power. It does not provide a vocabulary or framework to describe the compelling, gripping power of imagery and narrative which invests an issue with emotional energy. For example, framing climate change as dangerous might simply involve making an assertion linking the concept of climate change with the concept of danger. By contrast, establishing stark images of bushfire, storm surges or reef bleaching in the public mind can provide a vivid and enduring sense of what is at stake and why it matters. Unlike much framing literature, this form of political communication responds to the ways in which we think in images and stories as well as propositions. Further, terms such as ‘frame resonance’ and ‘frame transformation’ (Snow et al., 1986) specify important goals or functions that frames are said to perform; however, they are used without a depth of analysis of the dynamics that make ‘resonance’ and ‘transformation’ possible.
Importantly, the framing perspective has placed little emphasis on emotion. Reviewing literature developed across two decades of work on framing, Benford and Snow (2000), describe the relationship between framing and emotion as among ‘the more glaring unresolved issues’ in the field (p. 633). In *Hot Movements, Cold Cognition*, Ferree and Merrill (2000) comment, ‘The emphasis in recent social movement theories on frames, the purely cognitive element in political discourse, implicitly excludes the “hotter” concepts of emotion and values from analysis, even when studies of the active process of framing make clear that passionate feelings are often involved in talking about injustice’ (n.p.). This branch of framing literature talks the language of meaning, without emphasising the affective power of symbols, or aspects of cognition which do not rely on conscious information processing (Kihlstrom: 1987, 2013; see also Lakoff: 2010a, 2014; Lakoff and Johnson, 2008). Lakoff’s work complements the Benford-Snow ‘framing and social movements’ tradition. He writes about ‘metaphors we live by’, and ‘reasoning in metaphors’ (Lakoff and Wehling, 2016). Lakoff (2014) critiques rational actor assumptions about politics, and emphasises emotion, imagery and moral dimensions of politics. Lakoff has his critics (see below); however, these aspects of his work are aligned with the approach taken in this thesis.

Broader literature in the field of political communication has been criticised for the lack of an adequate focus on analysing symbolic communication (Schill, 2012; O’Shaughnessy, 2003; Alexander, 2003; Brysk, 1995; Wedeen, 2002; Apter, 2006). The field’s major preoccupations offer significant room to consider the role of imagery, narrative and political theatre. Political communication literature analyses issues such as agenda setting, messaging, framing, election campaigns, the role of traditional media and of new media, and political marketing (Kaid, 2004; McNair, 2011; Graber & Smith, 2005; Benford & Snow, 2000; Savigny 2011; Crompton, 2008). Bodies of literature on imagery and narrative are reviewed in the chapters that follow; however, a several points are worth noting here to highlight the research gaps that this thesis addresses. The ‘pictorial turn’ (Mitchell, 1994) is yet to extend far into the study of political communication. Dumitrescu (2016) reviews literature on nonverbal communication in politics with a strong focus on imagery. She identifies a growth in research in this field; however, comparing nonverbal political communication to dark matter in the universe, she states, ‘it is everywhere and affects how citizens react to political events, evaluate politicians, and participate in political life. Yet, despite [its] ubiquity … we know comparatively little about the
influence nonverbal information wields on public opinion and political behavior’ (p. 3). In The Visual Image and the Political Image: A Review of Visual Communication Research in the Field of Political Communication (2012), Schill argues that images play a central role in political communication: they powerfully shape political attitudes and are the dominant mode of learning and gaining political information. He argues that despite this, visual symbols have traditionally been neglected in the political communication literature, where the focus instead has been on themes such as rhetorical strategies, framing, and the use of linguistic symbols. According to Schill, ‘the visual aspects of political communication remain one of the least studied and the least understood areas, and research focusing on visual symbols in political communication is severely lacking’ (p. 119). The significance of imagery for climate politics is a major theme of this thesis.

Moser and Dilling (2011), key figures in the field of climate communication, observe that the state of public opinion on climate change raises critical questions about the effectiveness of climate communication. The ‘information deficit model’, which assumed that sufficient fact would be enough to sway public opinion (Norgaard, 2011b; see Chapter 2 and Moser and Dilling, 2011; Kahan, 2010), is now widely dismissed. Its failure has generated a range of literature exploring approaches to climate communication. Each approach is based on an implicit or explicit understanding of the obstacles to changing the climate debate, and of corresponding solutions. Climate change is, for example, perceived as distant and remote, and people need to see the issue as personal (Leiserowitz, 2007). Climate change is often thought of as invisible and intangible: its impact needs to be made immediate to people (Dilling and Moser, 2007). The climate debate has been caught in the political polarisation between right and left (Hamilton, 2010; Kahan, 2010) and in a conflict driven by the distinct social identities of believers and sceptics: intergroup conflict resolution techniques may be valuable (Bliuc et al., 2015). Messages that persuade climate activists may not resonate with a wider audience (Johnson, 2012), and audiences need to be understood more fully (Dilling and Moser 2007; Leiserowitz, 2007; Kahan, 2013). Addressing climate change is seen as a threat to values and self-interests (Dilling and Moser, 2007; Gardiner, 2006) and there is a need for a strong ethical dimension to the debate (Gardiner, 2006; McFague, 2013). This research adds to the existing literature, effectively suggesting that while an information deficit may not be the problem, there is a problem due to a ‘cultural-symbolic deficit’ in the field.
Further, there is a ‘political deficit’ in climate communication literature. Reviewing the development of the field of climate change communication, Moser (2016) states that ‘the role of communication specifically in mass mobilization and the climate movement has remained relatively neglected’ (p. 351). Much of the existing communication literature is informed by perspectives outside the fields of climate politics, or politics and sociology more broadly, looking instead to fields such as cognitive psychology, marketing, risk perception and health promotion (Randall, 2013, Brulle et al., 2012). Randall observes that the approaches that predominate in climate communication have much in common with social marketing, with its orientation towards simple behavioural and lifestyle changes. The lack of focus on the nexus between communication and political change has also been noted by Johnson (2012), Brulle (2010) and Cox (2010). The issues are methodological as well as substantive. Communication research that seeks to inform complex political processes by relying on quantitative data generated in laboratory settings can generate useful findings; however, laboratory research also frequently focuses on components of a political process that are abstracted from actual social and political conditions. Brulle (2010) argues that while research that is grounded in communications and social psychology can be valuable, the existing literature of this field neglects larger cultural and political contexts. Criticising approaches taken by Lakoff (2010a, 2004) and ecoAmerica, he argues:

Because their environmental communication approaches are based exclusively on cognitive science, rhetoric, and psychology, they lack any contextual basis within a larger theoretical structure of the role of communication in facilitating large-scale social change… Application of cognitive science by professional communications experts… may offer short-term advantages [but] it is most likely incapable of developing the large scale mobilization necessary to enact the massive social and economic changes necessary to address global warming. (p. 83)

Notwithstanding the value of Brulle’s critique, other writings by Lakoff (2008, 2014) make points that speak to the mobilising and organising work of the climate movement. Lakoff describes how symbols evoke emotion and are deeply connected to identity. He reflects, for example, on the powerful nexus between the September 11 attacks on the US World Trade Centre, symbolism, identity and political
responses to these events (Lakoff, 2014). In *Metaphors We Live By* (2008), Lakoff and Johnson argue, ‘the categories of our everyday thought are largely metaphorical and our everyday reasoning involves metaphorical entailments and inferences… ordinary rationality is therefore imaginative by its very nature’ (3270). For Lakoff emotional concepts (Kövecses, 2012) are primarily comprehended through metaphors, and abstract concepts are incomplete without them. Lakoff and Johnson cite Aristotle, who stated ‘ordinary words convey only what we know already; it is from metaphor that we can best get hold of something fresh’ (Aristotle, 300s BCE: L44106). In the same work, Aristotle also adds, ‘Metaphor… gives style [of expression] clearness, charm, and distinction as nothing else can’: L43869).

Climate change is something we need to ‘get hold of’ in a compelling, clear and distinct way: this matters, both as a source of movement mobilisation and for broader public engagement. Opponents of action on climate change have skilfully engaged emotion, with their efforts to spread resentment towards climate science, or their evocations of the importance of coal for jobs, the economy and families’ wellbeing. Effective social movement campaigning also frequently engages emotion, and symbolic politics is one of the key avenues for doing this work. An emphasis on political communication using images and stories complements a reliance on facts, scientific findings and reason. If we ‘think in images and narratives’ as well as in propositions (see Chapter 2) and if political behaviour is non-rational as well as rational, and is significantly grounded in identities and emotions, (Hamilton 2013; Weintrobe, 2013a; Lakoff: 2008, 2010a, 2014; Achen and Bartels, 2016) the climate movement’s use of symbolic politics to engage people about climate change is worth investigating.

The cultural and ‘non-material’ domains of power that influence climate politics could be explained in terms of discourse (see, for example, Dryzek, 2013) rather than symbolic politics. The two are distinguished for the purposes of this study because the concepts developed in discourse analysis, with its emphasis on language (Glynos et al., 2009), do not speak to everything that symbolic politics does. To the extent that

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34 See, for example, the ‘Let’s cut emissions, not jobs’ campaign launched by Australian Coal Association (McKnight and Hobbs, 2017)) and ‘Australian Mining. This is Our Story’ (Minerals Council of Australia, 2011a, 2011b; Lawrence Creative Strategy, 2011a, 2011b). Both were developed by Neil Lawrence, who also developed Kevin Rudd’s 2007 election strategy.
discourse analysis relies on conceptual resources which originate from the ‘linguistic turn’ and a tradition built on linguistics, it may miss out on insights that are offered by approaches grounded in the pictorial or performative ‘turns’, and even the narrative turn. As soon as we imagine (or ‘picture’) what words and narratives tell us, we have moved outside the realm of language into the domain of imagery. In a sense, the ‘performance’ of political theatre is ‘narrative that we can see.’ A focus on discourse can also emphasise abstract systems of seeing the world. The focus of this thesis is on particular images, narratives and instances of political theatre.35

Foucault’s emphasis on the way discourses reflect interests and institutions and a means by which control is exercised makes it difficult to theorise ways in which culture can act as a force independent of the forces of domination. Because Foucault treats discourse as bound to social structure, he leaves no room ‘for understanding how an autonomous cultural realm hinders or assists actors in judgment, in critique, or in the provision of transcendental goals’ (2003: L270). Reflecting on his earlier work, Foucault observed in 1980 that he had ‘insisted… too much on the techniques of domination’ as opposed to ‘techniques of production… signification [and of] the self’ which he describes as ‘the processes by which the individual acts upon himself’, continuing ‘We must not understand the exercise of power as pure violence or strict coercion… I would like in years to come to study government… starting from the techniques of the self’ (Foucault and Blasius, 1993: p. 203-204).36 Yet Foucault never elaborated a framework for conceptualising discourse that distinguished it from domination (Alexander 2006a).

Another approach to culture has been to analyse it in terms of the circumstances in which it is produced. The production of culture perspective has placed the focus on ‘how the symbolic elements of culture are shaped by the systems within which they are created, distributed, evaluated, taught, and preserved’ (Peterson and Anand,

35 Further, the language of ‘domination’ and ‘resistance’ that is prominent in the tradition of discourse analysis developed by Foucault is not the language adopted in this thesis. Power certainly includes acts of domination, and social movements certainly ‘resist’; however, these terms often veer too immediately into a melodramatic frame, without making enough room for other positions along the spectrum of political agency, and without questioning how accurate it is to separate the world into a ‘virtuous us’ and a ‘villainous them’. Further, creative political activity which has a larger horizon than power over others or opposition to domination does not fit into the ‘domination-resistance’ polarity: a more nuanced - and more ‘real’ - approach to power is needed.

36 Foucault elaborates, ‘One of the main political problems would be nowadays, in the strictest sense of the word, the politics of ourselves’ (p. 223).
Alexander (2003) comments that this perspective effectively works to ‘explain away culture as the product of sponsoring institutions, elites, or interests.’ Cultural production is widely seen as driven by pursuit of ‘profit, power, prestige, or ideological control’ (p. 20). Peterson and Anand offer other contexts: technology, law and regulation, industry structure, organization structure, occupational careers, and market, while posing the question of how these facets of production depend on ‘the logics of corporate capitalism, the nation state, and democracy’ (p. 328). Peterson comments that this ‘production perspective’ was originally ‘conceived as a useful tool, not the whole tool kit.’ However, he acknowledges Alexander’s point: ‘the production perspective usually considers culture as the dependent variable, while cultural sociology focuses on culture as the independent variable’ (Santoro, 2008: p. 52). Further, analysts of the reception of culture treat it as ‘determined by social location’ according to class, race, and gender. ‘The aim of analysis is not so much to uncover the impact of meaning on social life and identity formation but rather to see how social life and identities constrain potential meanings’ (p. 297). The focus of this research is on how meanings conveyed by symbolic politics are an active force in their own right.

**Why focus on perspectives from the climate movement?**

While audience research is essential for informing decisions about political communication, this research examines a different source of insight - the views of people active in the climate movement. Audience research can be essential for gauging public attitudes (see, for example, polls conducted by Essential Research, 2018 and the Lowy Institute: Oliver, 2013, 2015, 2018) or providing insights into how audiences engage with the climate movement’s messages or images (Corner et al., 2015). Corner and Clarke (2016) rightly point out that campaigners’ intuitive assumptions can be inaccurate, and that audience research compensates for this limitation. They argue that ‘the most important first step for creating effective new approaches to public engagement is being prepared to test (and revise) assumptions about what works’ (p. 33). There can be no argument with the value of this kind of testing. However, by contrast, the position taken in this thesis is that audience research is *one* among a number of valuable steps for informing decisions about public engagement. Reflecting on the ‘practical wisdom’ of people within the climate movement matters as well.
Calls for evidence-based research on climate communication (Corner and Clarke, 2016; Maibach, 2011) beg the question of what counts as ‘evidence’ (Cartwright et al., 2010). The tendency in the evidence-based movement has been to slide from ‘evidence’ to ‘data generated in laboratory conditions’ according to positivist assumptions (Goldenberg, 2006; Gray and McDonald, 2006). Reflection on practice does not have a place in this framework. Further, attitude research using a Likert scale reduces people’s reactions to a single numerical value, and may not detect complex, ambivalent and multi-layered responses (Lertzman, 2013). This kind of research may thus provide a partial and oversimplified picture of the multiple and sometimes competing reactions people may have to issues like climate change. Leiserowitz (2007) adds to this picture, observing,

While useful, public opinion polls have limited ability to explain public risk perceptions of global climate change. Most polls use only relatively simple, holistic measures of concern (e.g. ‘How serious of a threat is global warming?’) which provide little insight into the determinants and components of public risk perception. For example, a critical finding of recent research on risk perception is that public perceptions are influenced not only by scientific and technical descriptions of danger, but also by a variety of psychological and social factors, including personal experience, affect and emotion, imagery, trust, values, and worldviews - dimensions of risk perception that are rarely examined by opinion polls. (L736)

These observations point to the need for richer methodologies for gauging and understanding public opinion.

Yet while developing richer methodologies and waiting for richer data, decisions need to be made in the present, and reflection on experience is a significant source of insight to inform these decisions. Applying ‘practical knowledge’ and judgment is in fact an inevitable part of political action. Even after exhaustively testing messages using audience research, political judgement will still be applied to what is done with the data. Laboratory results can be essential for informing this judgment; however, ‘practical wisdom’ provides a necessary parallel source of insight. As Hammersley (2009) points out, professional practice is reliant on tacit knowledge
and judgment based on experience. Reflection on practice is an important source of knowledge in its own right. Nisbet (2011) offers an additional reason for placing the focus on the work of the climate movement. Noting how much research has been dedicated to analysing conservative and denialist communication campaigns against action on climate change, he observes that few systematic studies... have turned the focus in the opposite direction, evaluating the communication resources, initiatives, strategies, successes and failures of environmental groups... To date there exists not a single comprehensive evaluation of the communication activities of the US environmental movement or scientific community. (pp. 358-9)

While Nisbet’s focus is on the US context, the need for research that he highlights also applies to Australia.

**Why focus on Australia?**

The project focuses on the work of the climate movement in Australia, a country which has faced particular challenges in coming to grips with climate change (see, e.g., Chubb, 2014; Lisle, 2015; Hamilton, 2007; Crabb, 2018). Researching Australian climate politics involves studying a country which gained and then lost a carbon tax following a concerted campaign by the combined forces of the Liberal and National parties and the fossil fuel lobby. Australia has world’s largest coal export port (Port of Newcastle, 2014), and its annual per capita emissions have been amongst the highest in the Western world (World Bank, n.d.). In 2019, despite the efforts of NGOs to make the federal election a ‘climate election’ (ACF, 2019), voters returned the government of Scott Morrison, famous for holding up a lump of coal in Parliament (Hansard, 2017). Australia has adopted a stance on climate change that is damaging to the Pacific (Tiumalu, 2012), a region highly exposed to climate impacts. Further, Australia is a country where extractive resource industries have had a central place, not just in the National Accounts (ABS, 2018) but also in the public imagination, with vivid evocations of miners and mining being used to mount successful campaigns against climate policies (McKnight and Hobbs, 2017). Addressing these challenges...

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37 The same phenomenon is evident in other contexts: over many years the power of the mining lobby has been evident in campaigns against Aboriginal land rights (Short, 2016) and taxation of mining profits (McKnight and
will take much more than symbolic politics alone; however, this thesis will argue that symbolic politics has a major role to play in the process. Australia is also a country with a spirited anti-coal campaign in the Stop Adani movement, strong movements against coal seam gas and for fossil fuel divestment, and a high uptake of renewable energy (Hu and Australian PV Institute, 2018). It is a country where national icons such as the Great Barrier Reef are pitted against the icons invoked by opponents of action on climate change, and where the climate movement has been in transition, undergoing a significant shift towards a focus on community organising, which, as the analysis in subsequent chapters indicates, is often accompanied by powerful instances of symbolic politics.

Symbolic politics in the literature of the climate movement

Scholarship recognising the significance of symbolic power for political change has not been matched with a research agenda that investigates its role in the work of the climate movement. Literature on the climate movement, such as Rosewarne et al. (2013), Woods (2012), Klein, (2014), Burgmann and Baer (2012), McKibben (2013), and Riedy and Kent (2015), tends to focus on political strategy, ethnographies of the movement, community organising, themes such as climate justice, or the relationship between the climate movement and the formal political process. If symbolic politics features at all in these works, it tends to be mentioned in passing, or it is treated as a factor that contributes to community organising. In terms of the framework outlined in the Introduction, other forms of politics including information politics, leverage politics and accountability politics, as well as community organising and movement mobilization, are well-canvased in the existing literature of the climate movement and climate politics (see, for example, Moser and Dilling, 2007; Crow and Boykoff, 2014; Alexander et al., 2014; Corell and

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Hobbs, 2013). There has been a consistent pattern of the mining industry using symbolic power to influence public debate and political outcomes through vivid advertising campaigns, which have not been challenged in the ‘cultural-symbolic domain’ of power with sufficiently effective images and narratives representing what Eaton (2013) terms a ‘counter-imaginary.’

38 For example, Burgmann and Baer (2012) present an overview of the Australian movement, describing the relationship of different groups to mainstream politics—climate politics ‘from above’, in the middle’, or ‘from below’—and they discuss the development of grassroots activism and the emerging message of climate justice. Riedy and Kent (2015) examine Australian climate action groups and how they have ‘advanced the quality of public deliberation by bringing new voices and preferences into public deliberation, holding decision makers accountable and acting as trusted information sources for at least some citizens’ (p. 363).
Betsill, 2001; Newell, 2008; Staples, 2014; Brulle, 2010, Whelan 2012). The work of Smith and Howe (2015) comes closest to the current study. Their main focus, however, is on intergovernmental climate conferences, ‘Climategate’, An Inconvenient Truth, and major art projects rather than on the work of NGOs and civil society groups within the broader climate movement. They do include a critique of the climate movement’s use of melodramatic themes, which is taken up in Chapter 7 below.

Some of the recent climate movement literature overlaps more strongly with the concerns of this thesis, while focusing on other national contexts, particular themes such as legitimacy, or on single cases such as divestment. Gunningham (2017) shares common ground with this thesis in arguing that climate politics ‘is not only an instrumental process of coercing changes in behavior and exercising material power but also an expressive and symbolic one of nurturing new norms and institutionalizing a new set of moral principles’ (p. 387). Analysing the divestment movement, he argues that the climate movement’s use of symbolic politics ‘has managed to shift the contest onto a terrain where it holds a comparative advantage’ (p. 372). Similarly, Ayling (2017) presents the conflict between the divestment movement and the fossil fuel industry as a contest for legitimacy, noting the lack of scholarly accounts that treat climate change activism in these terms. Ayling notes that winning the battle of legitimacy alone is not sufficient: as with the politics of tobacco, government regulation will be necessary. Yet, she concludes, ‘a shield of political legitimacy protects the fossil fuel industry’, and ‘legitimacy gains for the movement and legitimacy losses for the industry undoubtedly increase the pressure’ for governments to act (p. 366). Del Rio (2017) conducts ethnographic fieldwork with Canadian climate movement participants, investigating the narratives, discourses and imaginaries that unite activists. She shares with this thesis an interest in the theme of the imagination, yet notes that ‘Among activists working to inspire action on climate change, it is uncommon to encounter the view that a lack of imagination lies at the heart of humanity’s failure to prevent the climate crisis. The far more conventional wisdom is that a lack of will is our greatest obstacle in this endeavour’ (p. 19). McDonald (2016) draws on Bourdieu to examine why Australian environmental NGOs have ‘found it difficult to compete against countervailing forces that have sought to shape public attitudes to climate action’ (p. 1058), contrasting the approach of large NGOs with newer groups in the climate movement. He argues that ‘central to the capacity for effective strategic action… [is]
the capacity to accumulate and wield symbolic power... the capacity of actors to articulate—and secure social endorsement for—a compelling vision of the world, a community’s role within it, and/or particular actions that advance them’ (pp. 1070, 1072). McDonald points to the need for narrative to be ‘tailored to specific audiences, less abstracted, and... located in prevailing conceptions of community values’ (p. 1072), thus addressing different issues to those examined in this thesis, with its focus on aspects of narrative including plot, the ‘moral of the story’ and opportunities for audiences to be actors in the story.

Other recent work that overlaps with this thesis includes Oosterman (2016), whose research analyses the communication practices in the New Zealand climate movement, drawing on interviews with climate campaigners. He highlights the need for a ‘concrete visual idea’ (p. 141) of invisible or abstract concepts in the climate debate, and the way that ‘stories... and clear “mental images” and metaphors’ (p. 139) make communication accessible and climate change meaningful. Skadsheim (2017) investigates the debate about the Adani mine in Queensland, studying narratives of residents of the town of Mackay, the discursive strategies used by Adani and its opponents and the relationship between these and Australia’s national narrative. Rimmer (2015) offers a survey of forms of cultural expression about climate change, addressing themes ranging from climate fiction to art and photography, music, theatre, documentaries, and climate cinema, and highlighting the work of 350.org, which also figures prominently in this thesis. He cites the People’s Climate March, which emphasized: ‘Social movements do not succeed without arts and culture that spark the public imagination and help give rise to a popular movement’ (People’s Climate March, 2014).

Conclusion

The scholarly case for new research into symbolic politics in the work of the Australian climate movement derives principally from (1) the political importance of symbolic power as discussed in the previous chapter; (2) the ways in which symbolic power has been omitted from the analysis; and (3) the lack of existing research at the intersection of five fields: climate politics, the politics of social movements, political communication, climate change communication, and studies of cultural-symbolic power. Among these fields, the first four are established in their own right. The fifth
has drawn insufficient scholarly attention for an array of reasons. ‘Realist’ approaches have been understood in opposition to an emphasis on symbolic power, rather than needing to include symbolic power if they are to be realistic at all. ‘Real power’ has been identified with overt, tangible and material forces. The real power of social movements has been associated with ‘people power’ and leverage such as that which can result from direct action. Before the 1980s, social movement theory overlooked culture, and when framing perspectives emerged during the 1980s and 1990s, they were informed by a rationalist approach which did not encompass the role of images, narratives and political theatre in engaging emotion. Nor did they emphasise that we think in images and stories as well as propositions. Approaches to discursive power have been based on language rather than imagery, and climate communication literature has lacked a grounding in political contexts, including the work of the climate movement. Prevailing approaches in the fields of climate communication, political communication and framing need to be supplemented with the kinds of perspectives offered by cultural sociology in order to provide an adequate base for examining the questions asked in this research.

The lack of an existing focus on cultural-symbolic power means that there is plenty of room for research in the tradition developed by Alexander, which recognises culture as a determining force in politics. ‘Power must be redefined’, he writes (2006a: L3904). He argues that power is typically conceived as ‘control over instruments of domination, as maximizing resources, as asymmetrical exchange, as contingent struggle for strategic advantage’, or as the reproduction of elite dominance (L6346). Alexander et al. (2010) add, ‘In the push for a hard-headed realism, sociological analysis had, in truth, become unrealistic. Surely, life was more than a collection of strategies, ideologies, institutions, and coercions?’ (L407). While cultural sociology recognises the reality of more coercive forms of power, its position is that culture is also central to social and political phenomena. Traditional ‘realist’ approaches to politics, Alexander (2010) argues, fail to offer the tools necessary to understand empirical democratic processes, which rely on persuasion. Certainly, a traditional ‘realist’ focus captures some key drivers of what is happening in climate politics; however, it does not give due recognition to cultural-symbolic power. An expanded approach to political realism is needed, which includes a focus on the political use of imagery, narrative and social drama alongside ‘hard’ or ‘raw’ power.

Omitting symbolic politics can make accounts of political change thin, flat, and
lacking in explanatory power when it comes to understanding dimensions of politics such as political will, movement mobilisation and shifts in public sentiment. ‘Politics without symbolic politics’ would be like the battle to save the Franklin River in Tasmania without the powerful visual images that were used to convey what was at stake (see Chapter 8), the global anti-apartheid movement without the story of Nelson Mandela or the images of life under apartheid that were circulated by the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (Thörn, 2006), or the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act in the USA without the Montgomery Bus Boycott, the Freedom Rides and the Selma-to-Montgomery marches. These examples certainly involve more than just symbolic politics; however, none of them are ‘just’ symbolic, and, in each, symbolic power was central to the work of the movements that were involved, and to the political dynamics that they generated.

The symbolic dimension of these cases is not simply a factor that contributes to exercising leverage, nor is it ‘ultimately’ or ‘in the last instance’ the outcome of structural conditions, tensions between the forces and relations of production, demographic trends or market forces: there is something irreducible about the ‘cultural-symbolic dimension’ itself. Thus, leaving the political impact of images, narratives and political theatre out of the equation is to overlook symbolic power as a central factor that not just marks significant events but propels these events in new directions.39 This thesis proceeds on the assumption that the importance of symbolic politics for climate politics is no different, and its role is worth investigating.

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39 It is also worth noting another scenario, that a negative form of symbolic power can limit the public and political imagination, acting to keep political forces ‘stuck’ in a fixed pattern. A combination of symbolic power, grievance and prejudice can also create downward spirals, which this thesis argues need to be countered by symbolic power in response.
Chapter 4

‘Fear and myths’: symbolic power and political outcomes in the Rudd-Gillard-Abbott era

In March 2011, a concerted scare campaign against the Gillard government’s recently-announced plans for a carbon tax was building momentum (Chubb, 2014; Combet and Davis, 2014). That month, activist group GetUp organised a rally in Melbourne to show support for ‘climate action and clean energy’ and commented, ‘the fear campaign against a price on pollution has become so absurd that talkback radio hosts are claiming this means the end of life as we know it’ (GetUp, 2011). Tony Abbott was calling for a ‘people’s revolt’, and Gillard argued that ‘a long and hard debate’ was ahead, but that the Government would prevail, based on ‘reason, not fear’ (Kirk, 2011). The political contests of this period were ‘fought out’ on terrain that is familiar for the climate movement: progressive climate policies faced determined opposition from an alliance of fossil fuel interests, Coalition MPs and conservative media. Labor climate spokesman Greg Combet stated that the carbon tax would be ‘a difficult issue to prosecute against a scare campaign’ (Woodley, 2011a). He later observed that Abbott was ‘propagating fear and myths’ (Taylor, 2011). Others have noted the role of fear (e.g. Chubb, 2014; Gillard, 2011); however, the role of the ‘myths’ around which fears can cluster is itself worth investigating—and more broadly, it is valuable to analyse the role of imagery, narrative and political drama in a period which saw Australia gain a price on carbon, only to see it abolished within two years. Before focusing on the climate movement in the

40 In July 2010, for example, 2GB’s Alan Jones stated during an interview with Tony Abbott, ‘Can you understand the anger and anxiety out there when they read… the Government’s going to do a deal with the Greens, or the Greens are doing a deal with the Government, Labor’s going to swap preferences with a Party that wants to devastate the national economy by taxing the miners even more, and agrees with Julia Gillard to tax carbon?’ (Jones, A, 2010). Other talkback hosts were strongly opposed to Labor climate policies. Andrew Bolt (2011), for example, said during a program on Melbourne’s MTR, ‘Look at page one of The Age today, $5.5 billion is being spent by Federal Governments on global warming campaigns for close to zero result. Have you noticed this $5.5 billion of spending on wildly expensive schemes many of them, detailed here in The Age, that the temperature has gone up or down, have you noticed any change to the temperature and why we should we pay a single dollar more?’

41 Interviewed for this research, LT observes that ‘Abbott used the lie of the great big tax… It was the Abbott government’s lie, [combined with the influence of] the Murdoch press… that created fear in the general community’. 

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chapters that follow, this chapter shows how symbolic power shaped the ‘political climate’ in which the movement works. It analyses the political discourse of Labor and the Coalition in the period between Kevin Rudd becoming Labor leader in 2007 to Tony Abbott’s repeal of the carbon tax in 2013. The research question for this thesis asks, How does symbolic politics figure in the work of the Australian climate movement, and in what ways is it important for achieving political change? One of the secondary research questions is: How does the use of symbolic power by other political actors create obstacles to the achievement of the climate movement’s goals? Whenever the climate movement’s opponents use symbolic power to influence the ‘climate of opinion’ and the ‘political climate’, symbolic politics ‘figures’ in the work of the climate movement, regardless of the movement’s own actions. Its own goals become more difficult to achieve. This chapter makes the case that symbolic power significantly influences what happens in the parliamentary ‘domain’ of climate politics: in the period examined here, it played a key and arguably a causal role in shaping the outcomes of climate politics—and federal politics in general. In doing so, this chapter establishes an important context for the climate movement’s own use of symbolic politics.

Studies of climate politics during the Rudd-Gillard-Abbott era examine the role of

42 Since the climate movement is not centre-stage in this chapter, it is worth noting what these goals were. Each of the goals listed below could not be achieved without government support, and thus every time the opponents of carbon pricing were effective in their use of symbolic politics, they built political momentum in the opposite direction. One statement of the climate movement’s goals comes from a coalition of Australia’s largest environmental organisations and supporters like GetUp and the ACTU that joined together under the banner of the ‘Say Yes’ campaign (Say Yes, 2011). They called for:

1. An effective price on pollution that starts reducing Australia’s carbon pollution within 2 years.
2. Growing clean industries and jobs—protecting and growing jobs in energy efficiency, renewable and cleaner energy, carbon farming and existing industries
3. Ensuring low income households are not adversely affected
4. Assisting workers and communities affected by the structural change to access all the opportunities in a low pollution economy
5. Helping the global effort to tackle climate change.

Many people interviewed for this project were critical of ‘Say Yes’, though the concerns they expressed did not focus on the goals stated above as much as the campaign’s messaging strategy and its centralised approach, in contrast to a focus on building a base grounded in local communities. At the time, however, some sections of the movement were also developing much wider goals, including ‘a national plan for transitioning to a zero emissions economy’, ‘ceasing subsidies for fossils fuels use immediately’, and ‘mechanisms to prevent building of large scale coal or gas power infrastructure and coal or gas mining’ (National Community Climate Action Summit, 2011).
factors such as leadership, the influence of fossil fuel interests, intra-party dynamics, the relationship between the government and the public, political strategy, and parliamentary tactics (Chubb, 2014; Crowley, 2013; Ferguson, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c; Bailey et al., 2012; McKnight and Hobbs, 2013). Political communication figures frequently in this research, and failures in political communication are regarded by many as central to the process by which Tony Abbott became Prime Minister and repealed the carbon tax (Chubb, 2014; Barry, 2015; Bailey et al., 2011; Gurney, 2013). Chubb, who highlights communication strategy much more directly than symbolic politics, provides the fullest account of the climate debate during this period. He reflects, ‘the communications failures beginning in 2008... all but destroyed the cause of carbon pricing’ (L2965). Both the Rudd and Gillard governments, he argues, failed to develop effective communications strategies to support their policies. Rudd and Gillard opened up a ‘communications void’ (L2345, 2346), which was ‘filled by those who saw their role as being to foster and capitalise on anxiety, fear and doubt’ (L1141). The result was a ‘communications catastrophe’ (L3420): ‘climate change sceptics [and opponents of action] took control of the debate’ (L1152). This chapter complements his analysis by highlighting ways in which control of the debate was gained by exercising symbolic power, and how political outcomes related to skill in using symbolic politics, or conversely, to failures in recognising its importance.

Symbolic politics and climate politics: a narrative of the Rudd-Gillard-Abbott era

In tracing the role of symbolic politics in Australia’s climate politics, the following account outlines key events from Kevin Rudd’s successful challenge for the Labor leadership to Tony Abbott’s repeal of the carbon tax. The focus is largely confined to the debate between the major parties. A great deal could be added by building in the perspective of the Greens and of environmental NGOs; however, the focus here is on the role of symbolic politics in ‘mainstream’ politics as articulated by Australia’s two main electoral actors. Symbolic action is not the preserve of the Pacific Climate Warriors, Stop Adani, campaigners for divestment and smaller parties, but is integral to all aspects of politics. The symbolic actions and statements described in this chapter belong to the same ‘cultural-symbolic domain’ of politics as those which are analysed in the rest of the thesis. Below is a narrative of the era that highlights symbolically-significant events, actions and statements. They include key images and metaphors used by politicians, as well as statements and actions that are
important for what they ‘signal’ or ‘signify’: political action or inaction can also be symbolically significant. Subsequent sections analyse how symbolic power influenced national politics, and ways in which symbolic power ‘is’ political power. Table 4.1, which follows, presents a selection from these events schematically, with their symbolic dimension highlighted in bold. It provides a way to readily see the role of symbolic power as a dimension of the politics of this era.

‘I stand for a bold vision on climate change. We cannot in conscience leave for the generation which comes after us an environment which is no longer sustainable.’ It was December 2006, and Kevin Rudd was speaking on the eve of his challenge to Kim Beazley for leadership of the Labor Party. Climate change, he declared, was the ‘moral challenge’ of our time (Murphy and Doherty, 2006). Rudd and his new deputy, Julia Gillard, succeeded in deposing Kim Beazley and Jenny Macklin as Labor’s leader and deputy leader. In the process, Rudd marked out climate change in moral terms, as a defining issue for his leadership.

Eleven months later, Rudd won the 2007 federal election. John Howard, until then the victor in four successive elections, lost office, and lost his own seat to former ABC presenter, Maxine McKew. In his first official act as Prime Minister, Rudd ratified the Kyoto Protocol, formalising Australia’s commitment to legally-binding greenhouse gas emissions targets. Climate policy moved fast. While in opposition, Rudd had commissioned the Garnaut Climate Change Review as an independent study, and on 21 February 2008—less than three months after Labor’s victory—Garnaut (2008) released his interim report. The following day, John Boshier, representing electricity generators, warned that adopting the targets that Garnaut recommended would send prices skyrocketing. Coal-fired power stations would close, and Australia’s electricity supply was at risk (Donovan, 2008). Pearse (2009) explains that Boshier was a board member of the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network, ‘an alliance representing almost all of Australia’s biggest fossil-energy producers and consumers, [whose members] affectionately referred to themselves as the ‘greenhouse mafia’ and ‘the mob’’ (p. 38). The electricity generators Boshier represented were at the centre of efforts to undermine the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS), lobbying energetically for compensation and for a watered-down policy (Chubb, 2014). Thus, Labor’s response to the ‘great moral challenge’ was itself under challenge.
In the period that followed, Labor worked to negotiate the details of its Emissions Trading Scheme, aiming for a package that could be passed in the Senate and gain widespread legitimacy through bipartisan support. During this time, Labor failed comprehensively to engage and educate the community on carbon pricing. The government certainly had other events on its mind as well. In September 2008, the Global Financial Crisis erupted: within a single month, investment bank Lehman Brothers collapsed, home lending agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were bailed out, and Bank of America acquired investment firm Merrill Lynch. Yet Labor’s public silence on carbon pricing contrasted with its earlier rhetoric about climate change as a great moral challenge (Chubb, 2014).

At the end of 2008, the government released the White Paper for its Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme. The response to the ‘great moral challenge’ was presented in technical language: Australia would cut its greenhouse gas emissions by 5% of 2000 levels by 2020, but could make a cut of up to 15% if other countries also signed up to stronger reductions (Department of Climate Change, Australia, 2008). The measures were so weak that the government's own advisor, Ross Garnaut, told a Senate Committee:

If there were no changes at all... it would be a line ball call, whether it was better to push ahead or say, 'We still want the ETS... but we’ll have another crack at it and do a better one when the time is right…
Now is a good time to be honest with ourselves... The recent discussion of climate change policy in this country has not provided a sound basis for Australian participation and development of a global climate change agreement that suits Australian interests. This is the dilemma exposed before the Senate as it deliberates on whether an imperfect emissions trading system is better than nothing. (Cited in Senate Select Committee on Climate Policy, 2009)

The government which had articulated the ‘great moral challenge’ was offering a weak and compromised response.

Nationals Senate leader Barnaby Joyce launched the kind of rhetorical attack that would continue throughout the debate. Ruling out ever supporting the ETS, Joyce
asked, ‘Do you want to pay $150 for a roast... even though it did nothing for the global climate?... If we’re going to be voting for a gesture, why don’t we have a tax for world peace?’ Joyce also warned that Labor’s climate change response would spell ‘the end of our beef industry’ (AAP 2009; Kerr, 2010).

The CPRS was defeated for the first time in the Senate in August 2008 by the combined vote of Coalition and the Greens. As the media speculated about a possible double dissolution election over climate change, Barnaby Joyce continued: ‘I don't think Australian working families are going to be particularly fond of it when they find that the price of a roast is around about $100 and the price of mince and the price of sausages have all gone through the roof for something that is never, ever going to change the climate’ (Lane, 2009a). He added, ‘Everywhere there is a power point in your house, there is access to a new tax for the Labor government’. There would be ‘a new tax on ironing, a new tax on watching television, a new tax on vacuuming. If you go to the supermarket Kevin will be in the shopping trolley’ (cited in Kelly, 2010).

The fossil fuel industry also weighed in. In September, the Australian Coal Association launched its ‘Let’s cut emissions, not jobs’ campaign. Significantly, this campaign was developed by Neil Lawrence, who had designed Rudd’s ‘Kevin 07’ campaign, as well as the Liberal pollsters and strategists Crosby Textor. The campaign warned, ‘A new tax on coal mines is coming. Thousands of regional jobs could be going’ (Maher, 2009).

The assaults on climate policy included a focus on cost of living and jobs; however, they were also highly symbolically-charged, condensing climate policy into vivid and emotionally-charged images of its personal financial impact and the prospect of job insecurity. There was also another layer: Rudd’s opponents were building a broader image of climate policies as ridiculous, intrusive and unnecessary. These images, rather than policy details, were the currency of political debate.

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At the end of November, Rudd and Turnbull announced a deal on Emissions Trading. There was immediate unrest within the Coalition. Kevin Andrews
announced he would contest the leadership if there was a spill (Lane, 2009b). The following day, seven Coalition frontbenchers resigned (Curtis, 2009a) and Abbott soon announced he would stand (Colvin, 2009). Days later, Abbott became Liberal leader.

On the night that he seized the leadership, Tony Abbott was interviewed on ABC’s *PM*. He declared, ‘I am going to turn the next election into a contest… The Australian people… do not want to be frogmarched into a premature tax on everything and that’s what this emissions trading scheme is.’ He spoke of ‘coming up with policies which are an effective response to climate change but which don’t involve a giant new tax on everything which will add, as we saw just yesterday, 30 per cent to electricity bills in NSW in just the next couple of years’:

> There is no way that what this country needs now is a giant new tax on everything just so that Kevin Rudd can look good in Copenhagen… And why this insane rush to pass this legislation just so the Prime Minister can strut the world stage rather than be here solving problems in Australia, I just don’t see why and the Australian public don't see why… I’m confident that we can and will make Labor’s great big new tax the [election] issue. (Curtis, 2009b)

Abbott’s first action as leader was to block the CPRS legislation in the Senate. He wrote in *The Australian*, ‘As things stand, there will almost certainly be a climate change election. It won’t just be about climate change, but that will be the totemic issue’ (Abbott, 2009).

In the final fortnight of 2009, the Copenhagen climate summit ended in failure. John Sauven, head of Greenpeace UK, stated, ‘The city of Copenhagen is a crime scene tonight, with the guilty men and women fleeing to the airport’ (BBC, 2009).

On 2 February 2010, Parliament commenced for the first time with Abbott as Coalition leader, and the Coalition released its ‘Direct Action’ policy. Twenty million trees would be planted, there would be solar panel rebates for home owners, and industry and farmers would be assisted with soil carbon storage (Rodgers, 2010). Tree planting, solar panels, cash, and soil—these were not just tangible, but also
visible and easily-imagined images of the Coalition’s climate policy in action.

The same day, Newspoll released bad news for the government: the Coalition’s primary vote was ahead of Labor’s for the first time since the 2007 election. Its two-party preferred vote had climbed to within four points of Labor (Curtis, 2010a). Kevin Rudd acknowledged the need to improve communication, stating, ‘I think our challenge is to communicate more effectively that which we have done, to communicate our record of achievement more effectively... And I think we all share some responsibility for that, including myself.’ He offered the following explanation of his ETS:

The emissions trading scheme does three basic things: puts a cap on carbon pollution; the second thing it does is that it charges Australia’s biggest polluters for their pollution; and thirdly it uses that money to provide compensation to working families for the 1.1 per cent increase in their cost of living which comes from that, which also gives them the opportunity to invest in energy efficient appliances to make a difference to those costs in the future. (Curtis, 2010b)

Rudd’s summary of the ETS may have been succinct; however, it did not compete with ‘great big new tax’, or the ‘$150 Sunday roast’.

By March, Labor’s ETS was ‘in limbo’ (Kirk, 2010a), and climate change no longer appeared to be ‘the number one priority for Kevin Rudd anymore’ (Bain, 2010). Labor policy was slammed by Ross Garnaut as an ‘abomination’ because it allocated ‘large amounts of public money to private industry for no good public purpose’. Liberal policies, he added, were ‘delusional’ (Kirk, 2010b). As an election approached, internal tensions over how to proceed with climate policy and anger at Rudd’s management style tore at Labor (Chubb, 2014). Something had to shift. Rudd opted to abandon the CPRS.

On 27 April, Prime Minister Rudd announced that the CPRS would be shelved due to the Coalition’s opposition and the slow progress of international talks. ABC PM’s Mark Colvin commented, ‘The planet may be warming, but Australia’s plan to cut greenhouse gas emissions has been put in the freezer’. PM’s political correspondent Lyndal Curtis added, ‘For a Prime Minister that had been talking last year about
sending a signal to the world that Australia was prepared to act, he’s now happy to sit and wait to see what the world comes up with’ (Curtis, 2010c). Tony Abbott observed, ‘Really, it’s very hard to take this Prime Minister seriously when he has reneged apparently on this solemn judgement and solemn commitment to the Australian people’. In Newpoll, Rudd’s satisfaction rating plummeted from 50% the previous fortnight to 39% (News Ltd, 2010).

Two days before Parliament rose for the winter recess, with Rudd about to fly to a G20 meeting in Canada, and with the government under pressure over its mining super-profits tax, there were sudden rumblings from Canberra. On the 7.30 Report, the ABC’s Kerry O’Brien described ‘reports of leadership tensions growing within the Rudd Government’. It had become a ‘fluid situation’ (O’Brien, 2010a). Shortly afterwards, in a special evening edition of the ABC’s PM, presenter Brendan Trembarth reported, ‘Tonight the ABC has been told senior ministers and factional powerbrokers are in talks and counting numbers for a potential move against Mr Rudd’ (Trembath, 2010).

As more news of a challenge broke, Paul Howes of the Australian Workers Union appeared on ABC’s Lateline, announcing that the AWU was backing Gillard. For Howes, political communication was a central issue for Labor:

    Tonight’s events are about ensuring that Labor gets its message through, that we’re able to talk about the accomplishments of this Government, they’re able to talk about the case of why an Abbott prime ministership would be bad for the environment, would be bad for health, would be bad for working people.

    Unfortunately, that message has been lost over the last couple of months…
    What’s important for our union, and what’s important for our movement is that Labor gets its message back on track. That we recognise the fact that Tony Abbott is a major risk…

    Howes referred to climate change, but his emphasis was on other issues: ‘Labor stands for… fairness in our workplace, it stands for a strong health and hospitals network, it stands for a fair redistribution of wealth out of the mining industry and if we can’t get that message out under the current Prime Minister that’s why it’s time
for a change’ (Jones, 2010).

By the following morning, Rudd had been ousted, and Julia Gillard was Australia’s 27th Prime Minister. Chubb observed, ‘Rudd—with help from Abbott—[was] free to cast himself as a martyr to a conspiracy by faceless thugs (2014: L2107).

Less than a month after she had replaced Kevin Rudd, Gillard announced a federal election for 21 August. Two weeks later, as part of a package of climate initiatives, she announced a ‘Citizens’ Assembly’ of ‘real Australians’ would be held in order to build community consensus on climate change. Abbott ridiculed the proposal as a ‘giant focus group’ (Morton and Arup, 2010a).

On the day Gillard formally launched her campaign, she was interviewed on Channel 10 (2010). She declared, ‘There will be no carbon tax under the government I lead’. The same day, Abbott expressed doubts about climate science, suggesting the world had stopped warming (Morton and Arup, 2010b).

On 21 August 2010, Australian voters delivered a hung parliament. Negotiations with cross benchers resulted in the minority Labor government led by Gillard. Within a month, Gillard, the Greens, and Independents Tony Windsor and Rob Oakeshott announced a carbon tax transitioning to an ETS. Labor presented its case:

JULIA GILLARD: Carbon pricing will start on the 1st of July 2012. That it will be a market-based mechanism. That for the first few years there will be a fixed price. And I don't want to mince any words; that works effectively like a tax.
GREG COMBET: Its effect will be to cut pollution levels, to drive investment in clean energy and to create certainty for investment in important parts of the economy like the energy sector.
PENNY WONG: Giving the economy and business the certainty that's needed to move to a low pollution, cleaner energy Australian economy. (Woodley, 2011b)

Tony Abbott responded
I think there will be a people's revolt against this because as I said there is only one member out of 150 who has a mandate for carbon tax [Greens MP Adam Bandt] and 1/150th of the Parliament is no popular mandate...

I think in electorates right across the country people will be saying to their local members, 'you have no right to do this. I will be ripped off by this. There'll be a $300 a year hit on my power bill. There'll be a 6.5 cents a litre hit on my petrol. Every time I turn on the lights I'll pay tax. Every time I go to the petrol pump I'll pay tax. Every time I open my wallet I will pay tax'...

What we will do instead is a better plan. It is to, it is more trees, it is better soil, it is better technology—paid for from the budget that will reduce carbon dioxide emissions. (Lane, 2011a)

Abbott’s language was already vivid compared to Labor’s. Soon, he went further, addressing a March rally in Canberra while standing in front of placards reading ‘Juliar—Bob Brown’s bitch’, and ‘Ditch the Witch’ (Woodley, 2011c).

Under assault from Abbott’s cost-of-living scare campaign, Labor responded by emphasising household assistance to compensate for the carbon tax: Gillard’s communications director, John McTernan, titled a letter to Centrelink recipients ‘Extra Cash for You’ (Chubb, 2014, L3556). It was an approach which Abbott ridiculed in Parliament:

They spent $36 million on a carbon tax which they will not even name… They are even sending letters to millions of Australians: 'Extra cash for you… And they never mentioned the carbon tax! The last communication most people got like that was from the Nigerian lottery scammers! (Hansard, 2012)

The government announced details of its plans for the carbon tax on 10 July 2010, ‘Carbon Sunday’. It released Treasury modelling showing that a typical shopping trolley of groceries valued at $200 would rise by just 80c. Under the heading ‘Julia Gillard’s Tim Tam plan to soften the carbon tax blow’, News Ltd reported that Labor sought support for the carbon tax by reassuring the public that price rises for Tim Tams and Weet-Bix would be minimal (Silmalis, 2011).
Tony Abbott declared the following day that the next election would be a referendum on the carbon tax: ‘This was a package designed by the Greens... This is a bad tax and we are against it. We say that you can't fix it, you've just got to fight it’ (Lane, 2011b). His cause was helped by the Minerals Council of Australia and associated organisations, which launched a new series of advertisements entitled ‘Australian Mining: This is Our Story’ (2011a, 2011b). Again, Neil Lawrence developed the campaign (Lawrence Creative Strategy, 2011a, 2011b).

November saw Parliament pass the carbon tax and other provisions of the Clean Energy Act, 2011. Yet the government had lost its nerve on the issue, to such an extent that ministers stopped using the words ‘climate change’. Chubb describes what happened:

A government communications expert said: ‘The strategy had gone from sell the carbon tax to immunise the government against the carbon tax by telling people they are not going to be any worse off.’ (2014: L3560)

Signaling the extent of the government’s fear, disillusion and disappointment, a mid-March 2012 meeting of ministers decided that to continue talking about climate change was playing into Abbott’s hands, so they agreed to stop. In just over four years, Australia had moved from a country galvanised by the need to act on climate change to a place where ministers no longer dared even to use the words... The lack of core belief among ALP strategists in the Clean Energy Future as being a good and necessary reform became more and more clear. (2014: L3560, L3578)

Labor faced electoral oblivion under Gillard, and in June 2013 Kevin Rudd returned as Prime Minister. The government announced plans to scrap the carbon tax and replace it with an ETS, moving from a fixed carbon price of $24.15 a tonne to a floating price of about $6 by July 2014 (ABC News, 2013). Tony Abbott countered, dubbing the ETS ‘a so-called market in the non-delivery of an invisible substance to no-one.’ He added that ‘abolishing the carbon tax will take $5,000 off the price of the average new home’ (Metherell et al., 2013).
Labor was abandoning a policy for which it had not gained support and was replacing it with an abstraction that few people comprehended. Abbott’s focus was on what was visible, tangible and financially appealing.

******

On 7 September 2013, Tony Abbott came to office as Prime Minister, vowing to repeal the carbon tax. Some of the wind was taken from his sails when—in a striking piece of theatre—Senator Clive Palmer held a joint press conference with Al Gore announcing that while he would support the repeal of the carbon tax, he would vote to retain the Clean Energy Finance Corporation, the Climate Change Authority and the Renewable Energy Target. Despite this, in July 2014, the carbon tax was repealed.

Abbott declared, ‘Today the tax that you voted to get rid of is finally gone. A useless destructive tax which damaged jobs, which hurt families’ cost of living and which didn’t actually help the environment is finally gone. So that international oddity, that international aberration has now gone’. On the same broadcast, Labor’s new leader, Bill Shorten, replied ‘Today Tony Abbott has made Australia the first country in the world to reverse action on climate change… Tony Abbott has demonstrated time and time again that he is an environmental vandal with no view of the future’ (Kirk, 2014). Adam Bandt, deputy leader of the Greens, commented, ‘This is the Australian Parliament’s asbestos moment, our tobacco moment, when we knew what we were doing was harmful but went ahead and did it anyway’ (Lane, 2014). Environment Victoria (2014a) stated,

Mr Abbott, you can repeal our most effective piece of legislation to fight climate change, but you can’t make the need for urgent climate action go away. And Australians who overwhelmingly want action to reduce pollution from all levels of government aren’t going away either. Our challenge now is to ensure that this backwards step is momentary and fleeting, and to rebuild political pressure for leadership on climate change.

These events are represented schematically in Table 4.1 below. These include key images and metaphors, as well as statements and actions that are symbolically-significant because of the signals they send to the public.
Table 4.1: Symbolic politics and the events of the Rudd-Gillard-Abbott era.
Some key instances of symbolic politics are highlighted in bold. (Note: some events listed in the table are not referred to in the narrative above, and references for these are included in the table).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Notes on symbolic politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard successfully challenge Kim Beazley and Jenny Macklin for Labor leader and deputy leader.</td>
<td>Kevin Rudd describes climate change as the 'moral challenge' of our time. 'I stand for a bold vision on climate change,' he said. 'We cannot in conscience leave for the generation which comes after us an environment which is no longer sustainable.'</td>
<td>Climate change as a leadership issue and a moral issue. Kevin Rudd as the flag-bearer of a bold vision based on conscience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>Kevin Rudd wins the 2007 federal election</td>
<td>Rudd rides the wave of concern about the 'great moral challenge' of climate change. John Howard loses his own seat</td>
<td>Rudd's victory over Howard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>In his first official act, Kevin Rudd ratifies the Kyoto Protocol</td>
<td></td>
<td>Australia ratifies Kyoto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>Electricity generators warn of threats to Australia's energy supply and of the closure of coal-fired power stations</td>
<td></td>
<td>An image of Labor's policy as a threat and a danger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labor fails to engage and educate the community while it is busy negotiating the ETS, and while business lobbies for compensation and a watered-down scheme.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Labor's public silence contrasts with its earlier rhetoric about a 'great moral challenge'.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Septembe</td>
<td>The peak of the Global Financial Crisis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td></td>
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<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Septembe r 16</td>
<td>Malcolm Turnbull replaces Brendan Nelson as Opposition Leader</td>
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</table>
| December 15 | CPRS White Paper released                                                                  | Kevin Rudd says Australia will cut its greenhouse gas emissions by 5% of 2000 levels by 2020, but could make a cut of up to 15% if other countries also sign up to stronger reductions.  

The measures are so weak that the government's own advisor, Ross Garnaut, states to a Senate Committee some months later: 'If there were no changes at all... it would be a line ball call, whether it was better to push ahead or say, 'We still want the ETS... but we'll have another crack at it and do a better one when the time is right.'

The government which articulated the ‘great moral challenge’ has offered a weak and compromised response

The government's own climate change advisor doubts whether the ETS is worth supporting |
| 2009       |                                                                                           |                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| June 4     | CPRS passes the House of Representatives                                                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| July 24    |                                                                                           | Barnaby Joyce, Nationals Senate leader, rules out ever supporting the ETS. He warns it would spell 'the end of our beef industry'.  

'Do you want to pay $150 for a roast... even though it did nothing for the global climate? If we're going to be voting for a gesture, why don't we have a tax for world peace?' |
<p>| August 13  | CPRS defeated for the first time in the Senate                                            | Joyce claimed: 'Everywhere there is a power point in your house, there is access to a new tax for the Labor government.' There would be ‘a new tax on ironing, a new tax on watching television, a new tax on vacuuming. If you go to the supermarket Kevin' |
| August 2009|                                                                                           |                                                                                                                                                                                                          |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Septembe  r 28</td>
<td>'Let's cut emissions, not jobs' campaign launched by Australian Coal Association</td>
<td>The ETS is not supported by ordinary Australians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1</td>
<td>Rudd and Turnbull announce a deal on emissions trading</td>
<td>Abbott as a leader prepared to fight a climate change election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1</td>
<td>Abbott becomes Liberal leader: the deal between Turnbull and Rudd is overturned</td>
<td>Abbott as a leader prepared to fight a climate change election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2</td>
<td>Abbott's first action as leader is to block the CPRS legislation in the Senate</td>
<td>Abbott's first action—opposing carbon pricing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 12</td>
<td>Abbott writes in The Australian: 'As things stand, there will almost certainly be a climate change election. It won't just be about climate change, but that will be the totemic issue.'</td>
<td>Abbott as a leader prepared to fight a climate change election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 18</td>
<td>Copenhagen climate summit falls to deliver agreement.</td>
<td>John Sauven, head of Greenpeace UK, states, 'The city of Copenhagen is a crime scene tonight, with the guilty men and women fleeing to the airport'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Coalition releases its 'Direct Action' climate policy</td>
<td>Visible, tangible images of climate policy in action—tree planting, cash, soil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2</td>
<td>'Direct Action' features planting 20 million trees, solar panel rebates for home owners and initiatives to assist industry and farmers with soil carbon storage.</td>
<td>Visible, tangible images of climate policy in action—tree planting, cash, soil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 27</td>
<td>Prime Minister Rudd announces that the CPRS will be abandoned</td>
<td>Tony Abbott comments, 'Really it's very hard to take this Prime Minister seriously when he has reneged apparently on this solemn judgement and solemn commitment to the Australian people.'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 'great moral challenge' can be disregarded.</td>
<td>The government no longer believes its own policy is worth advocating for.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
June 24
Kevin Rudd deposed: Julia Gillard becomes Prime Minister
‘Rudd—with help from Abbott—[was] free to cast himself as a martyr to a conspiracy by faceless thugs’ (Chubb, 2014: L2107).
• Gillard’s ascendance is illegitimate

August 16
Julia Gillard formally launches her 2010 election campaign.

August 21
Federal election delivers a hung Parliament
On 7 September, negotiations between Labor, the Greens and Independents result in a minority Labor government led by Gillard

2011

March 12
GetUp rally in support of climate action and clean energy, called during a concerted conservative campaign against Labor’s policies (Chubb, 2014).
GetUp (2011) states, ‘With your help, we’ll prove there are more of us than there are of them—and in doing so we’ll make a powerful statement for climate action’. It was a day when the far-right were also organising rallies against climate action.
The strength of numbers makes a statement: numbers send a (symbolic) signal

March 23
Tony Abbott speaks at a rally outside Parliament
Tony Abbott addresses a rally in Canberra standing in front of signs reading ‘Ju-liar - Bob Brown’s bitch’ and ‘Ditch the Witch’
Abbott associates himself with protesters with these slogans

April 28
Launch of ‘Australian Mining: This is Our Story’ series of ads, from the Minerals Council of Australia
Images of the importance of mining for Australia and ‘ordinary Australians’ (Lawrence Creative Strategy, 2011a, 2011b).

May 16
Launch of ‘Say Yes’ campaign representing a coalition of NGOs and
In a campaign that features iconic Australian actors Cate Blanchett and Michael Caton, NGOs call for a price on carbon pollution, growth in clean industries and
Carbon emissions as ‘carbon pollution’; Blanchett and Caton

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43 It is important to recognise this as symbolic: this is not ‘just’ about ‘people power’: it is about the political signal that people power can send, and a sense of how political action communicates. The turnout was not just politically important because of strength of numbers alone, but what this show of strength means. In this case, GetUp’s focus was on outnumbering the far-right. Takver (2011) records that ‘The rally was organised to counter a rally by climate deniers and those opposed to a carbon price outside Julia Gillard’s electoral office. The numbers tell the story: an estimated 8000 in support of a carbon price, 200 against’.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 8</td>
<td>Carbon Tax and other provisions of the Clean Energy Act 2011 are passed by Parliament</td>
<td>jobs and support for global efforts to tackle climate change (Say Yes Australia, 2011; GetUp, 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2012</td>
<td>Ministers stop using the words 'climate change'</td>
<td>Chubb writes, ‘a mid-March 2012 meeting of ministers decided that to continue talking about climate change was playing into Abbott’s hands, so they agreed to stop’ (2014: L3565).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td></td>
<td>Labor MPs cannot speak about climate change with conviction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Septembe r 7</td>
<td>Tony Abbott wins the 2013 federal election, vowing to repeal the carbon tax</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>The Senate votes to repeal the carbon tax</td>
<td>Tony Abbott: ‘Today the tax that you voted to get rid of is finally gone. A useless destructive tax which damaged jobs, which hurt families’ cost of living and which didn’t actually help the environment is finally gone. So that international oddity, that international aberration has now gone.’ Bill Shorten: ‘Today Tony Abbott has made Australia the first country in the world to reverse action on climate change...Tony Abbott has demonstrated time and time again that he is an environmental vandal with no view of the future.’ Adam Bandt, Australian Greens: ‘This is the Australian Parliament’s asbestos moment, our tobacco moment, when we knew what we were doing was harmful but went ahead and did it anyway.’ Abbott’s portrayal of the carbon tax functions to reinforce an image of it in the public mind: associating it with destruction, damage, a negative impact on people’s wellbeing, thus contributing to the gradual ‘accretion’ of symbolic power (Bartmański, 2012: p.47) that can be used against Labor’s climate policies in future.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The role of symbolic politics in the climate politics of this era: analysis

The table and the narrative above illustrate how political symbols were central to the political rhetoric and to the outcomes of Australian climate politics during this era. Without the images and metaphors highlighted in bold, or listed in the ‘symbols’ column, what would have happened in climate politics? Symbolic events, action and statements account not just for ‘colour and movement’, but for much of the dynamism, energy and persuasive power which shaped political debate during the period. It is difficult to imagine this period and its outcomes without the images, metaphors and political theatre evident above. Symbolic politics gave significance to events and exerted persuasive power. Thus, a strong claim can be made for the importance of symbolic politics for political outcomes. Symbolic power is central to conveying the political significance of events. While many of the images and metaphors listed above are among the more vivid that were used, even more prosaic instances of signifying involve symbolic communication of some form. ‘Significance’ is about what is signified as important, and aspects of politics such as party identification, caring about a political issue and political will are all mediated through this process. In other words, key aspects of politics pivot around what an issue means to people. Without symbolic politics, the events described above would be drained of much of their significance. Gillard’s declaration ‘There will be no carbon tax under the government I lead’ would have been ‘just words’, whereas in the cultural-symbolic ‘domain’ of politics, it was a key basis for Abbott’s attack on her legitimacy. Rudd’s abandonment of the CPRS would have ‘just’ been a shift in policy, yet it meant something to the public, and what it meant had devastating political impact.

There is a pattern in the events described above where Abbott gained a ‘symbolic ascendancy’ which corresponded to ‘political ascendancy’. Conversely, Labor’s lack of symbolic strength repeatedly created opportunities for its political opponents. Joyce painted a vivid picture of ‘a new tax on ironing, a new tax on watching television, a new tax on vacuuming. If you go to the supermarket Kevin will be in the shopping trolley.’ All of these were powerful and memorable images, and Labor’s technical arguments for the value of an Emissions Trading Scheme could not compete with them. Even the Coalition’s focus on the cost of living had symbolic power, for example by condensing the complexity of climate policy into an image of
a $150 (or $100) Sunday roast. Labor had no equivalent image. Chubb writes about Abbott’s claims about a ‘great big tax on everything’: ‘He said it again and again. He was attempting to spook both Rudd and voters, and he was spectacularly good at it’ (L1574). ‘Great’ and ‘big’ connoted more than ‘extensive’ or ‘large’: Abbott was building a picture of a monstrous tax that Labor was ‘letting loose’ to devour the land. Offering no powerful symbolic reply ceded the cultural-symbolic high ground to Abbott. ‘Ascendancy’ is also about who is seen as credible and legitimate. Contests over these qualities take place in the symbolic domain of politics, determining whether a politician’s public image is associated with a perception of authenticity, fitness for office and trustworthiness, or inauthenticity and a lack of substance. Political debate after Gillard became leader was organised around defining images of her as inauthentic, strengthened by her own statement that voters would see more of ‘the real Julia’ (Holmes and Fernandes, 2012). ‘Painting’ Gillard and Labor in this way was integral to Abbott’s ability to win power and abolish the price on carbon. Chubb reflects, ‘Abbott establish[ed] a sense that Australia was on the edge of disaster, carried there by cheats, fakes, crooks and incompetent liars’ (L2528). The Coalition’s skill in mobilising imagery, waging scare campaigns, ‘casting’ Labor as ‘cheats, fakes, crooks and liars’ and delegitimising Labor’s leaders and policies was skill in symbolic politics. Symbolic successes translated into political successes, and symbolic ascendancy became political ascendancy.

Labor’s failure to understand the importance of symbolic power was an important factor during this period. The removal of Rudd provides an example. Labor did not see that its long silence on carbon pricing during 2008, its weak CPRS, and its lack of real commitment to a carbon tax sent symbolic signals. When the Great Moral Challenge did not come with a policy to match it, when the CPRS was shelved, when the carbon tax was justified with reference to the limited impact on the price of Tim Tams, and when Labor stopped speaking about climate change, Labor’s actions ‘spoke’ much louder than any of its words, and this registered with the public. Further, following the 2010 election, Craig Emerson had repeatedly approached Julia Gillard, trying to get her not to use the term ‘carbon tax’: ‘I said... don’t call this... a carbon tax, because you’ll be seen to have broken a promise’ (Ferguson, 2015c). ‘The response I got was: “We’re not going to get drawn into a game of semantics here” (Ferguson & Drum, 2016: n.p.). Gillard wanted to avoid semantics in favour of sound policy. However, as Emerson added, ‘It’s clear that Julia didn’t calculate the damage
that would do to her’. In the end, ‘semantics’ was central to her demise, and to Abbott’s success in eliminating Australia’s price on carbon. Labor needed to answer symbolic attacks with symbolic as well as rational responses, using imagery, narrative and theatre to make its point; however, it lacked a view of political realism that treated semantic power as real power.

Instead of being attuned to ‘semantic’ or symbolic power—or seeking to make their policies emotionally engaging (Barry, 2015)—Labor often relied to a great extent on rational argument and macroeconomic language when making the case for climate action. During Question Time on 1 June 2011, Julia Gillard challenged Tony Abbott on his lack of rational argument:

I think the Australian people will increasingly be asking themselves: why is it that the Leader of the Opposition can never engage in the climate change debate by dealing with the facts? Why is it that he always has to rely on falsehoods and fear? You rely on falsehoods and fear when you do not have a rational argument, and that is the Leader of the Opposition’s problem. He has no rational argument, no rational policy, no rational belief in the science; all he is peddling is fear and falsehood, and every Australian should understand that. (Gillard, 2011)

A rational debate about climate science, however, was not on offer. As Chubb (2014) demonstrates in analysing Abbott’s scare campaign, the climate debate was never about reality. Gillard’s approach can be compared to Obama’s comments as his standing was eroded during his first term by the theatrically-skillful Tea Party. Alexander and Jaworsky (2014) describe Obama’s stance:

The president, in an interview with television news commentator George Stephanopoulos, reflected on his performative failure: ‘I think the assumption was if I just focus on policy, if I just focus on this provision or that law or if we’re making a good rational decision here, then people will get it.’ What people were ‘getting’ instead, apparently, was the counter-narrative projected by the newly energized Tea Party. (L344)

Instead of rational debate, Labor was faced with the (real) impact of the
symbolically-charged ‘falsehoods and fear’ that Abbott mobilised. It had no effective answer.

The symbolic work of both sides of politics during this period can be understood in terms of political theatre. Australian political journalist Laurie Oakes provides some context. In a speech following his retirement as Channel Nine’s political editor, he reflects, ‘The idea of politics as theatre is important’. Looking back on decades of Australian politics, Oakes recalls ‘intrigue, great drama and fascinating characters’ and the theatrical skills of politicians such as Keating, Whitlam and Costello. He recalls Keating telling him of the ‘grand stage for the grand performances’ and the need to align policy and rhetoric, creating ‘long straight lines of rhetoric that stay straight for years at a time’. As Oakes notes, not every politician has a sense of theatre (or courage, or political judgement). Some—such as Turnbull, in Oakes’ estimation—are not ‘very good at politics’. They ‘lack the skills’. Oakes asks, ‘where are the contemporary politicians with the smarts or the talent to bring theatrical skills back to the political stage?’ (Oakes, 2017: pp. 2, 5-6). In Alexander and Jaworsky’s (2014) analysis,

Leaders do not offer policy to clear-eyed citizens who rationally evaluate its effectiveness and register their deliberative judgment through their votes. Political leaders project complex and multilayered performances to audiences who engage these symbolic actions with more and less enthusiasm, with more and less criticism, and may not actually engage with them at all. Strictly speaking, such responses are not even interpretations of political actions. What citizens have available to them is only ‘news’ about these actions—only journalistic reconstructions. What voters interpret are mass-mediated performances. (L154)

The views of Paul Howes on the eve of Rudd’s removal illustrate how Labor misread or neglected the symbolic or theatrical significance of political events. Although he was centrally preoccupied with political communication, Howes did not comprehend the symbolic significance of deposing Rudd. Greg Combet reflected: ‘There was no democratic touchstone for [Gillard] that legitimised her leadership—it was done in the dead of night’. Sam Dastyari concurred: ‘We took her from lady-in-waiting and we made her Lady MacBeth, and she never ever recovered from it’
(cited in Ferguson, 2015c). Here the language of performance comes not from academic analysis but from a political player who was deep within the Labor establishment.

The political shifts described in this chapter can thus be seen as hinging on what happens in the political theatre of Australian politics. Defeating Howard, Rudd began his ‘performance’ as something of a dragon-slayer. In the ‘scenes’ that followed, he failed to live up to the task he set himself in the opening scene. Alexander’s (2010) analysis of McCain’s 2008 Presidential campaign could be applied to Gillard: she ‘couldn’t seem to make [her] political performances fly. [She] was such a bad actor that voters often felt [she] seemed to be acting, following a script rather than being [her]self’ (L94). This prompted her in August 2010 to declare that she was changing her approach so that people would see the ‘real’ Julia Gillard (Kirk 2010c). Abbott replied: ‘Would the real Julia please stand up? What have we been seeing for the last five weeks if it’s not the real Julia?’ (O’Brien, 2010b). Alexander (2010) writes, ‘Political actors… want to convince us of how things are. If their performances are successful, we are persuaded’ (2010: L6098). Whether discursive claims take root, he argues, ‘is a matter of performative success’ (L334). For Rudd and Gillard, the performance failed.

The communication failures of the Rudd and Gillard governments (Chubb, 2014) are striking given the powerful preoccupation with messaging and media management that shaped Labor’s approach to politics during these periods (McKnight, 2016; Murphy 2009; Tanner, 2011). Yet, an understanding of symbolic politics was missing from Labor’s thinking about political communication and political outcomes. Abbott gained ascendancy in a dimension of politics in which Labor tended to be flat-footed. The above analysis of Labor’s failure and Abbott’s success suggests the need for a perspective which goes beyond the ‘cognitive’ emphasis of framing (Lakoff, 2014, Benford and Snow, 2000: for a critique, see McArthur, 2013) or the reductionism of culture to power that characterises much of discourse analysis (Alexander and Smith, 2001).

It is also valuable to look at this period in terms of a nexus between symbolic power and emotion. In Barry’s (2015) analysis, the carbon tax ‘failed to engender the emotional appeal or valence (policy “stickiness”) within the community’ (p. 1) and
Australians ‘failed to emotionally connect with the CEFP’ (p. 19). His conclusion is that ‘Paradigm Change Minus Valence Equals Failure’ (p. 1). By contrast, Abbott and Joyce’s rhetoric fused indignation with imagery and narrative. Chubb’s account repeatedly highlights how the Coalition’s rhetoric was emotionally-charged. He describes how opponents of carbon pricing ‘exploit[ed] fears of the unknown’ (L2345). ‘The communications void that Rudd created was filled by those who saw their role as being to foster and capitalise on anxiety, fear and doubt’ (L1143). The debate was ‘one of the angriest public policy contests for many decades’ (L2350). Hatred of the Greens was ‘an electrifying force’ (L2226). The minority government led to a dramatic escalation in the ‘fury of public discourse’ (L2535). Paul Kelly told Insiders that Turnbull was faced with ‘panic, confusion, disunity and right-wing ideologues on climate change’ (ABC, 2009). Greg Combet stated, ‘Abbott and his backers among the shock jocks and News Corp whipped up fear and we lost the politics of the debate’ (Combet and Davis, 2014).

The combination of symbol and emotion is evident in the following table where a selection of symbols and at least some of the emotions that they were designed to evoke is outlined.
Table 4.2: Symbolic politics and some emotional responses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbolic event or issue</th>
<th>Emotional responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • Rudd’s election, Howard’s defeat  
  • The Great Moral Challenge  
  • Rudd ratifies the Kyoto Protocol | Hope and enthusiasm amongst supporters of action on climate change (Chubb, 2014) |
| | |
| • The spectre of power blackouts as a result of climate change policy  
  • ‘Climate change = end of the beef industry’  
  • ‘Let’s cut emissions, not jobs’ campaign  
  • Predictions of rising electricity prices  
  • a ‘Giant New Tax on Everything’  
  • ‘Every time I turn on the lights I’ll pay tax. Every time I go to the petrol pump I’ll pay tax. Every time I open my wallet I will pay tax…’ | Fear, anxiety, hatred, anger (Chubb, 2014) |
| | |
| • The weak CPRS  
  • Labor’s abandonment of the CPRS | Disappointment and disillusionment amongst supporters of action on climate change: ‘public disquiet’ (Holmes and Fernandes, 2012) |
| | |
| • Gillard ousts Rudd | Public indignation that ‘the leader we elected’ has been ousted (Kearney and Passmore, 2010; Holmes and Fernandes, 2012) |
| | |
| • ‘No carbon tax under a government I lead’ | Cynicism (Chubb, 2014). The carbon tax becomes ‘a touchstone for much wider resentment of the Labor government’ (Ian Ward in Nancarrow, 2011) |

Alexander (2003) writes about the role of emotion in social life:

Cultural sociology makes collective emotions and ideas central to its methods and theories precisely because it is such subjective and internal feelings that so often seem to rule the world. Socially constructed subjectivity forms the will of collectivities; shapes the rules of organizations; defines the moral substance of law; and provides the meaning and motivation for technologies, economies, and military machines. (L81)

What Combet (Taylor, 2011) described as ‘fear and myths’ made for a potent mix. While Combet may have thoughts of ‘myths’ as ‘falsehoods’, their symbolic power mattered, and, together with the images that defined much of the debate, they created a rich focus for the ‘subjective and internal feelings’ that Alexander describes. Political change of the kind analysed above happens only when there is
some momentum behind it. The propagation of ‘fear and myths’, the pursuit of political advantage by fomenting ‘anxiety, fear and doubt’, and the ‘fury of public discourse’ all generated ‘political energy’ that propelled the outcomes of this period in Australian politics. Removal of these subjective dimensions would mean a very different (and probably unrecognisable) political picture. This analysis points to the value of analysing symbolic politics and aspects of ‘subjectivity’ together—a theme which subsequent chapters return to.

Without the power that was exerted in the symbolic ‘domain’ of politics, much of what happened in Australia’s climate politics would not have happened at all. The story of Australian climate politics illustrates how in many ways, strength in symbolic politics is political strength, and a politician’s political position is their symbolic position. Public enthusiasm for Rudd in 2007 had everything to do with what the Rudd–Howard contrast meant to the public. Rudd—new and energetic—prevailed over Howard, who was burdened with perceptions that his government’s time was up, and that he favoured the WorkChoices policies that would have further deregulated the labour market (Fraser, 2008; Bongiorno, 2008, Kelly 2008). Clearly, climate change was important among the election issues. According to Ferguson (2015a), it was Rudd’s ‘symbolic point of difference [with] John Howard’. ‘Symbolic points of difference’ play a key role in determining election outcomes—whether they are over climate change, or other issues (such as immigration, WorkChoices, the need for an apology to the Stolen Generation, or legitimacy and fitness for office).

From this perspective, symbolic politics provides an account of the fates of both Rudd and Gillard. Disillusionment with Rudd after he abandoned the CPRS was a response to the meaning that the public gave to Rudd’s shift in position. Rudd’s satisfaction rating fell by 11 points in Newspoll—the largest-ever fall. The Coalition moved ahead in two-party preferred terms for the first time since Labor’s 2007 victory, and Labor had lost 1 million voters in a fortnight (News Ltd, 2010; Ferguson, 2015b). Lachlan Harris, Rudd’s senior Press Secretary, called the CPRS decision a ‘huge, huge mistake’ and wondered why the ALP thought it ‘could get away with dumping’ a policy of such importance for Rudd (Ferguson, 2015b). Chubb commented, ‘How would Australians be told Rudd had abandoned his cherished climate policy? His prime ministership had been founded on his moral commitment to action. He had persuaded many people. Their support was passionate. Could they
just turn off the tap?’ (L1730). The perception of Julia Gillard as illegitimate was laden with symbolism. First, she was the leader who deposed Rudd ‘in the dead of night’ (Ferguson, 2015c), and then she was the leader of a minority government that was perceived as being beholden to the Greens. Gillard’s declaration ‘There will be no carbon tax under the government I lead’ was translated symbolically by Abbott into a ‘broken promise’ and a ‘betrayal’ (Abbott, quoted in Scott, 2011) Abbott successfully did the symbolic work that it took to make Gillard’s statement emblematic of her status as leader.

Conclusion

Abbott showed an acute awareness of symbolic power shortly after becoming opposition leader in 2009 when he stated, ‘There will almost certainly be a climate change election. It won’t just be about climate change, but that will be the totemic issue’ (Abbott, 2009). ‘Totemic’ is an unusual term to apply to climate politics, and Abbott was not the only one to use it. Lachlan Harris, reflected on Rudd’s abandonment of the CPRS: ‘dumping such a totemic and important policy for Rudd… was a huge, huge mistake’ (Ferguson, 2015b). Thus, at least some key political operatives and party leaders talk about the significance of political action in terms of symbolic politics—and, in these cases, using a vocabulary that is more commonly associated with religious ritual. Durkheim would be at home with talk of ‘the totemic’, and Alexander—in his youth a Marxist—has integrated themes from Durkheimian thinking into a powerful model for the role of culture as an independent variable in social and political life. Durkheim wrote about ‘the central role of powerful modern substitutes for traditional religious life—totemlike symbols, public rituals, and postmetaphysical versions of the… sacred and profane’ (Alexander, 2006a: L290).44 Alexander’s work speaks to themes addressed in this thesis, such as credibility, legitimacy, success or failure in political ‘performance’ or theatre, symbolic power, symbolic ascendancy and the role of meaning in shaping political outcomes. These themes are powerfully evident in the events discussed in

44 Not everyone speaks the language of sacred and profane, and less still the contemporary political significance of totems. However, in Australia’s dominant political discourse, ‘sacredness’ of various forms might apply to ANZAC, ‘border security’, and the Great Barrier Reef. ‘Profane’ might be include higher electricity prices, terrorism and people who try to reach Australia by boat as asylum-seekers. Each of these examples has a centrality in Australian political consciousness and is charged with a kind of political energy which is larger than their policy or material significance. In this sense, the term ‘totemlike’ above applies.
this chapter. There is much to be gained by ‘doing symbolic politics well’—whether this is done by political parties or by social movements. Equally, there is much to be lost by neglecting symbolic politics, or failing to see its importance: the consequences can be significant, and sometimes catastrophic.

Symbolic politics did not just add colour and vividness to otherwise-inevitable events: symbolic power influenced what happened as Rudd, Gillard and Abbott gained and lost office, navigated political opportunities and pitfalls, and crafted and implemented their policies. Symbolic politics created political opportunities for Abbott, it played a significant role in bringing Rudd and Gillard down, and it shaped the political environment in which politicians acted. Had Labor applied greater skill in symbolic politics, the political fortunes of a price on carbon may have been significantly different. Thus, it makes sense to speak of a causal role for symbolic politics, and it is important to assess what is happening in the ‘cultural-symbolic domain’ when analysing how power is exerted in any form of politics. This period could be understood in terms of other ‘domains’, such as the power of the media, parliamentary power, and economic power. The ‘fear and myths’ that Combet referred to (Taylor, 2011) were propagated through the media, by politicians in defence of economic interests (and arguably, in defence of group and subjective interests organised around conservative political identities—see Kahan et al., 2011 on ‘cultural cognition’ and climate change, and Achen and Bartels, 2016). However, to understand the events of this era, it is also necessary to include a focus on symbolic power—the ‘myths’ component of Combet’s ‘fear and myths’, as well as drama and imagery. These require an analysis of their own.

This chapter provides some important context for the period that followed. Notably, the first interviews for this thesis were conducted immediately after Tony Abbott became Prime Minister, as the climate movement adjusted to new conditions and pursued new goals in the face of the reality that the centrepiece of Australia’s climate policy had been abolished. Importantly for this thesis, this chapter points to ways in which conservatives’ use of symbolic power is a key aspect of what the climate movement is ‘up against’. ‘Fear and myths’ can create a political climate where it is more difficult for the climate movement to achieve public and parliamentary support for its goals. This raises important questions for understanding the work of the climate movement, and suggests that the conservative use of symbolic power in
the form of ‘fear and myths’, as well as imagery and political theatre, needs to be
analysed alongside other forms of power as a political obstacle facing the movement.
Having investigated the role of symbolic politics in ‘mainstream’ politics, the focus
of this thesis shifts to investigating how it figures directly in the climate movement’s
own work. Following the Design and Method chapter, the thesis begins this process
with the case study of the work of the Pacific Climate Warriors and their supporters
in the 2014 blockade of Newcastle coal port. This kind of event is in part the climate
movement’s reply to the use of imagery, narrative and political theatre by political
opponents. It is also an avenue for the climate movement to take the political
initiative, establishing its own narratives and images in the public imagination as it
seeks to build a political climate different to the one described above.
Chapter 5
Design and Method

This thesis takes a qualitative approach, given the descriptive and exploratory task of investigating how symbolic politics figures in the work of the climate movement, as well as the research objective of gaining insight into how climate movement campaigners understand the role of imagery, narrative and political theatre. The thesis analyses assessments and judgements that were made by interviewees, and it was important to apply methodologies which retained the richness of the original data (Patton, 2002; Suter, 2011). The project’s design follows the format and philosophy of case study research (Yin, 2009), however it departs from classical case study approaches since its focus is on the ‘case’ of the Australian climate movement rather than on a single instance, such as a study of ‘symbolic politics in the work of the Stop Adani campaign’, or a comparison of a small number of cases such as this. What Australian climate movement participants had in common as a ‘case’ included their shared objectives, their involvement in similar campaigns, and the social and political context in which they work. This chapter begins with background to the project, and outline of what led me to pursue the research question. (Here, the account is in first person, which is not conventional in all disciplines. However, clearly there was a real person behind the decisions to embark on the research, and the project was propelled by particular interests and starting points. Thus, it makes sense to write about ‘my’ approach to this project.) Following this background, the chapter outlines the research design and methods, provides a profile of the interviewees, and presents an account of the data collection and analysis. It closes with some methodological reflections on validity and how this research complements approaches to political communication that rely on audience research.

Background to the research

My choice of symbolic politics as the focus of this thesis was significantly influenced by my earlier experience of involvement in NGOs and social movements. Before beginning this thesis, I worked for about seven years with Amnesty International, based in Australia and participating in a global network of staff working on human rights education. This involved a close engagement with campaigns addressing
issues such as the rights of asylum seekers, Indigenous Peoples’ rights, and human rights and the ‘war on terror’. Prior to this, I was active in a range of social movements, including the anti-apartheid movement, beginning in the mid-1980s. While the politics of climate change differs from these issues in a range of ways, there are important commonalities, and these led directly to the research questions addressed in this project.

The example of South Africa and the anti-apartheid movement brings several issues into focus. Images of courageous campaigners standing up to police violence filled TV screens during the 1980s as unrest rose in the townships. The United Democratic Front emerged, and figures such as Desmond Tutu and Jay Naidoo were at the forefront of the movement. The situation in the country was shifting as the apartheid regime, which had a great deal of ‘raw’ power, lost international legitimacy. In 1989, ANC leaders like Walter Sisulu and Ahmed Kathrada were released, and in 1990, the African National Congress was unbanned and Nelson Mandela himself was freed after twenty-seven years in prison. All this was part of the dramatic transition to majority rule. The South African case both illustrated the work of a successful and inspiring social movement and also provided an image of the whole world and the divisions within it. The white minority lived largely insulated from the black majority: although they were geographically close, they were largely ‘worlds apart’ in experience, material wealth and views of the world.

‘Views of the world’ were an important factor in the equation. During the transition, journalist Allister Sparks (1990) wrote The Mind of South Africa, and sociologists Adam and Moodley (1993) published The Opening of the Apartheid Mind. These authors seemed to be onto something: for all our talk in the anti-apartheid movement about structural causes, working to bring down the regime through sanctions and disinvestment, and factors such as the influence of the media, ‘hearts and minds’ were also central. Public support and opposition were shaping the pace of change, and the kind of post-apartheid South Africa that would develop. The movement’s use of the image and story of Nelson Mandela and other black leaders, and imagery of life under apartheid (Thörn, 2006) were integral to the anti-apartheid movement’s persuasive and mobilisation work. These were pitted against the apartheid regime’s imagery of Mandela and the ANC as ‘communists’ and ‘terrorists’ (Mandela, 1995). One indication of how imagery had an effect became
apparent when the State President, P.W. Botha, declared a nationwide State of Emergency on 12 June 1986.\textsuperscript{45} The flow of images of street protests and of police violence was cut off following the South African government’s media restrictions (South African History online, n.d.; Beck, 2000; du Toit and Manganyi, 2016). The Melbourne University Anti-Apartheid Club, which had been drawing large numbers of students—and where I was involved—shrank discernibly in the period immediately afterwards.

‘Battles of images and narratives’ seemed important, whether the issue was apartheid or the ‘War on Terror’. ‘Rational actor’ models of politics seemed to be of no help at all in understanding the issues, and ‘rational action’ was not always evident. The problem was not located in a lack of understanding of ‘the facts’ (to recall the language cited above in relation to comparable challenges in climate politics). When attempting dialogue with people who opposed democracy in South Africa—or who opposed refugee rights or Aboriginal land rights—‘the facts’ could simply ‘bounce off’. Politics seemed propelled not just by control of the economy, political institutions or the capacity to use force, but also by a nexus between powerful imagery and stories, political identity, emotion, and ways of imagining political events. The emotions and identities of many white South Africans were anchored in images and stories of the ‘Great Trek’, the Anglo-Boer War, and the imagined swart gevaar or ‘black menace’ (Schutte, 2016; Mandela, 1995). Similarly, many Australians who supported harsh refugee policies had been influenced by the spectre of a deluge of ‘boat people’ making their way to Australia from the north—an echo of older ‘White Australia’ fears of the invading ‘Yellow Peril’ (Brawley, 1995). Campaigns for refugee rights have had difficulty in establishing alternative images and stories in the public mind. Further, prosecuting the ‘War on Terror’ relied on images and stories that distinguished ‘us’ and ‘them’. The whole politics of terrorism following September 11, 2001 would never have eventuated in the way it did without this use of symbolic power (see Alexander, 2004; Smith, 2005).

Thus, in cases like these, I believed that political dynamics were driven in part by the

\textsuperscript{45} This was four days before the anniversary of the 1976 Soweto uprising on June 16. It was another indication that the symbolism was politically significant—in this case it was symbolism in the form of commemoration of past events which the movement treated as defining moments. Soweto represented the defiance of black people, particularly young people. The government’s response to the uprising was used internationally to symbolise the violence of apartheid.
way imagery and narrative were used politically. Conservative forces seemed to be able to stir up fear and confusion using symbolic politics, and exerted real power by doing so. Sometimes progressive forces were caught in replying with rational assertions that failed to generate a strong emotional response, and did not succeed in establishing an alternative way of ‘seeing’ the issues in the public imagination. I wanted to write a thesis about these issues. The topic was initially unclear, however climate change was emerging as the most significant issue facing the world, and some of the same patterns seemed to apply in the climate debate. There seemed to be further parallels with the issues outlined above in terms of the importance of persuasion, the need for a movement to address the issues, and the role of symbolic power in both buttressing existing power relationships and creating avenues to bring about political change.

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At its earliest stages, the project began with a set of observations drawing on the personal and professional experience described above:

1. in charged political debates, asserting ‘the facts’ was not enough to ‘win hearts and minds’
2. NGO efforts to persuade the public would often rely on social marketing (Donovan and Henley, 2003)
3. this approach, for all its value, had significant limitations if used on its own.46

Social marketing tended to orient communication to existing perspectives of audiences, when these perspectives needed to be transformed if change was to occur; it was significantly informed by models based on ‘laboratory’ research and was to this extent it was detached from social and political processes; and it was grounded in commercially-oriented models of communication (see the discussion below, as well as McArthur (2013), Crompton (2008) and Chapters 3 and 6). These observations were combined with three further starting points for inquiry:

46 This is in no way to deny the value of insights from social marketing for communication campaigns: for example, if an NGO wants to run newspaper advertisements or put up billboards, taking proposed messages and images through a rigorous process of testing with focus groups makes absolute sense.
(4) the historical experience of social movements could provide important sources of insight for ways of engaging the public about climate change. Regardless of differences in context between these movements and the climate movement, there were important common challenges
(5) these movements’ use of imagery and narrative often appeared central to effecting major shifts in public opinion of the kind that climate politics also required, however; and
(6) the role of symbolic power needed to be analysed. There was no currently available model for the place of symbolic power among the ‘theories of change’ that were influential in social movements and in the NGO sector.  

Over time, and through dialogue with supervisors, the contemporary climate movement was chosen as the focus for the thesis.  

Outline of the research design based on Maxwell’s model

The following description of the design of this thesis follows a model described by Maxwell (2012), which specifies five domains for research design: goals, conceptual context, research questions, methods and validity. Goals and conceptual context are addressed in the chapters above, and the central research question is outlined in the Introduction. Maxwell’s framework describes four elements of research methods: the

47 This led to the formulation of an initial proposal for a research project that would analyse what campaigners from previous social movements had to say about symbolic power and its importance for achieving political change. Thus, the research might study the US Civil Rights Movement, and leaders of SNCC had to say about how they saw the impact of symbolic power in the 1960 lunch counter sit-ins and the 1961 Freedom Rides. It could investigate what Gandhi said about what he was setting out to achieve when planning the 1930 Salt March and other instances of Satyagraha, and how he evaluated them afterwards. An approach to thinking about the role of symbolic action in political communication could be developed and constructed by analysing insights from leaders of previous social movements, which could then complement insights from audience research and social marketing. Contemporary NGOs and social movements including the climate movement could look not just to the latest marketing techniques but the history of social movements as a reference point for making decisions about how to address contemporary challenges. The findings of this analysis would then be tested through a dialogue with climate movement activists, and the research would report on the results of this dialogue. (Perhaps there were three or four PhDs in this project).

48 Still, historical cases and the views of politics described above have remained prominent in my thinking throughout the project. Additional instances of the destructive uses of symbolic power in recent years have been a horizon against which the thesis has been written. These have included the election of Trump in the US, with his imagery of ‘Making America Great Again’, ‘Building the Wall’, ‘Mexicans’ and ‘Crooked Hilary’. Debates about Brexit in the UK highlighted how the symbolic power of ‘the EU as the villain’, ‘immigrants taking our jobs’ and ‘Brexit as a return to British sovereignty’ could hold great sway in political debate. I believed that symbolic power of these kinds needed to be met with symbolic responses— as well as ‘people power’.
relationship with interviewees; site selection and sampling decisions; data collection methods; and data analysis techniques. Validity is discussed further below.

**Methods (i): the relationship with interviewees**

As Maxwell notes, ‘the research relationships are the means by which research gets done’ (p. 91). My own involvement in the climate movement made it possible to approach potential interviewees on the basis that I shared their concerns. I knew thirteen of the twenty-seven interviewees through climate movement networks before the interviews commenced. This assisted with snowball sampling (see below). Response rates were higher when invitations were issued to prospective interviewees who I knew as opposed to those who were approached, for example, through an email to the CEO of an organisation. Overall, those I already knew were more likely to be involved in smaller NGOs, work as volunteers and participate at local and state levels. They were less likely to be communications specialists or current or former political staffers. The ‘emic’ position of being involved with the climate movement already meant that I was familiar with topics that interviewees raised, and I had a sense of worthwhile follow-up questions. To the extent that I held a different view of the importance of symbolic power to many interviewees, the interviews involved a degree of ‘etic’ distance: in a sense, the research applied ‘criteria developed outside the culture as a framework for studying the culture’ (Willis et al., 2007, p. 100). Few interviewees approached their work with a sense of the importance of symbolic power comparable to what is outlined in this thesis, however many described the importance of imagery, narrative and theatre in their work, and this research has sought to ‘distil’ these comments. (It was striking how references to ‘narrative’, for example, could come up in interviews without direct prompting from interview questions, although written communication sent in advance of the interviews that briefed interviewees about the aims and process of the research highlighted the broad themes of the project, and this may have led them to raise these issues.)

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49 This took place through an email and a formal explanatory statement.
Methods (ii): site selection and sampling decisions

Interviews were conducted at locations agreed with the participants, such as cafes or their workplaces, or were conducted via phone or Skype. Those participants who I did not know—the majority—were selected according to snowball and purposive sampling approaches (Creswell 2013; Maxwell 2012). In line with ethical guidelines, only people whose contact details were publicly-available were approached for snowball sampling—or initial participants sent details about the project to other potential participants. This process opened up opportunities to talk with many interviewees who I would not have thought of approaching. It significantly broadened the range of insights and experiences amongst interviewees.

Other interviewees were approached based on purposive sampling. Suter (2011) describes how participants are selected with a particular aim in mind, rather than in order to generalize across a population. They are selected ‘to maximize the value of data for theory development by gathering data rich enough to uncover conceptual relationships’ (p. 350). Patton (2002) writes of purposive sampling as a means to ‘yield insight from its illuminative and rich information sources’ (p. 40). Yin (2011) lists selection criteria including: criticality for the theory being tested, topical relevance and access. For this project, participants were selected through purposive sampling with the following factors and characteristics in mind:

- people working for organisations whose approach to engaging the public on climate change stood out within the movement, including in the area of symbolic politics
- representatives of a range of approaches and currents of thinking within the climate movement
- people with extensive experience of the climate movement.

The interviewees

Twenty-seven people were interviewed for the project, of whom thirteen were female and fourteen male. Twenty-five were—and are—active in the Australian climate movement, and two have significant other involvements in the climate change field. Some interviewees organise nationally-prominent climate campaigns.
Others focus more at local or regional level, working for example in key federal electorates and with communities affected by the use of fossil fuels. Several have worked with young people, a number are involved in the arts, and a large number were actively involved at state or national level in strategic discussions about the direction of the climate movement. Interviewees included staff of environmental organisations, specialists in political and climate communication, board members of large environmental NGOs,\(^50\) divestment campaigners, members of religious organisations, and local community activists. The following charts provide an overview of the background of interviewees. (Note: many interviewees had more than one role or area of work, and the charts below reflect multiple areas of involvement.)

![Figure 5.1: Organisational background and forms of involvement of interviewees.](image)

\(^{50}\) The tables refer to ‘small’ and ‘large’ NGOs. Here, ‘small’ NGOs might have had three or four staff. ‘Large’ NGOs had 20 or more staff, or had a smaller number of Australian staff but were part of a global network.
Figure 5.2: Geographic focus of interviewees’ work.

Figure 5.3 Some of the expertise and skills of interviewees.
Methods (iii): data collection methods: semi-structured interviews and documentary research

Data was collected using semi-structured interviews, based on an interview guide (Wengraf, 2001). Broadly, the interviews addressed questions about: (1) the ways in which the complex issues of climate change were condensed into images or symbols that motivated people to act, captured the public imagination and built a constituency for change; (2) interviewees’ involvement in the climate movement’s work; (3) how the climate movement was addressing the challenges of engaging the public, including the challenge of ‘the facts not being enough’; (4) the approaches to public engagement that seemed most effective; and (5) how interviewees saw movement strategies in relation to current challenges in Australian climate politics. Insights from Blee and Taylor (2002) informed the project’s use of semi-structured interviews. They write that semi-structured interviews are valuable for understanding the perspectives of social movement actors or audiences. This format offers a way of investigating research questions derived from social movement theory, and is useful in research on thinly documented social movements. Semi-structured interviews provide ‘greater breadth and depth of information, the opportunity to discover the respondent’s experiences and interpretation of reality, and access to people’s ideas, thoughts and memories in their own words rather than in the words of the researcher’ (pp. 92-3). To complement interview data, the project also involved documentary research, using materials including climate movement media releases, research reports, emails, strategy documents and books written by climate movement leaders.

Methods (iv): data analysis techniques

Interviews were analysed using an approach drawing on grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967), in that categories ‘emerged’ from the data (Wengraf, 2001; Suter, 2011). Participants’ responses not only provided data for answering research questions, but also generated categories for the analysis itself. The interview process reflected Blee and Taylor’s comments about the flexibility of semi-structured interviews: being open-ended, they can ‘generate, challenge, clarify, elaborate or recontextualise understandings of social movements’ (p. 94). Alongside the categories emerging from the data, additional categories shaped by the primary and
secondary research questions were also applied.

The following process for data analysis is drawn from approaches outlined by Creswell (2013) and Zucker (2001), who adapt the process outlined by Miles and Humberman (1994), and Bryman and Burgess (1994).

**Step (1) Characterising approaches to symbolic politics in the Australian climate movement**

*What Goes with What*

Patterns in approaches to symbolic politics were identified. When interviewees identified common issues, these were tagged, initially using NVivo. Interview content relevant to the analytic categories in Step (2) were identified.

*What’s There/ Sharpening our Understanding; and Seeing Things and Their Relationships More Abstractly*

Key issues emerged and headings were used to descriptively group elements of data on the same theme. For example, interview data was coded in relation to how symbolic politics

- influenced the politics of reputation and social license
- influenced political impacts
- led to the escalation of movement activity
- projected an alignment between the problem and the action taken to address it
- provided a source of motivation
- normalised different approach.

The role of symbolic politics in building the climate movement was one of the themes that emerged from the data, adding to the initial focus on engaging the public. Other themes emerging at this point included the role of emotional engagement, actions that ‘made a statement’ or sent a signal, and how
symbolic politics provided visibility, condensed the issues, provided a focal point, made the issues clear, simple and tangible and demonstrated agency.

**Step (2) Analysis of approaches to symbolic politics according to the analytic categories selected for this project**

Here, the findings described above were related to the themes described in Chapters 2 and 3. Interview quotes about credibility, cultural resonance and ‘something people can relate to’ linked to persuasion and political communication. Quotes about inspiration, hope, local engagement, visualising success and a picture of ‘what you can do’ linked to movement mobilisation. If community organising (Alexander, 2010; Whelan, 2012) was to be effective, compelling stories and images played an important part in mobilising a movement and building political will (see Chapter 6 on the Pacific Warriors and Chapter 8’s discussion of imagery and political will). Quotes about narrative (Chapter 7) and findings that linked to the public imagination (Chapter 9) linked to literature on the political importance of social identities (Achen and Bartels, 2016; Bliuc et al., 2015). Statements about imagery linked to the status of climate change as invisible and intangible (Dilling and Moser, 2007): see Chapter 8.

As the analysis progress, a structure for the thesis emerged. At an earlier point, the research question had been *‘How does the climate movement understand, utilise and evaluate symbolic politics as a component of its strategies for achieving political change?’* The initial plan was to write chapters on the ‘understand’ ‘utilise’ and ‘evaluate’ components of this question. However, as data from interviews was analysed, a different focus emerged. The frequency with which campaigners referred to imagery and to narrative suggested chapters on these themes. The value of a single case study was suggested at a review panel, and the Pacific Warriors blockade of Newcastle coal port stood out for its vividness and theatre, and for its success in mobilising campaigners.
Step (3) Validity

In terms of the first part of the research question, which focused on how symbolic politics figures in the work of the climate movement, the validity of the results is largely a matter of selecting a broad sample, and then effectively categorising the interview data. For example, interviewees stated that imagery is important for making climate change visible, focused, tangible, and emotionally compelling, among other factors—see Chapter 8). The interview data were allocated to these categories, and the thesis reports the findings. Clearly, other researchers would add other categories, and in-depth case studies or longitudinal research would provide rich additional insights. The purpose here was not to attempt a ‘final’ and ‘comprehensive’ answer to the research question, but to report findings and contribute to the field, based on data derived from a rich and varied sample of participants. The second part of the research question raises more complex validity issues. The thesis extends and interprets the findings about the role of symbolic politics to make further claims about its significance for political change. Themes here include factors such as building political will and shaping the public imagination. The claims that the thesis makes are necessarily qualified by the limitations of the data, the design, the research subjects and the methodology, although the existing data provides a strong basis for assessing factors that contribute to movement mobilisation. Claims about building political will—at least at the level of the broad public—and influencing the ‘climate of opinion’ clearly require audience research as well.

Findings relating to political impact are more in the nature of assessments of what the data points towards, based on significant convergences between (1) multiple sources of interview data, (2) documentary evidence, (3) relevant theory, (4) patterns evident in comparable contemporary and historical events where symbolic power is an important factor, and (5) empirical findings such as those reported in Chapter 2 on the importance of imagery in cognition. In relation to influencing the ‘climate of opinion’, it is worth noting that many campaigners are in close contact with audiences and that they are centrally concerned with effective communication. Their ‘practical wisdom’ on influencing audiences is worth taking seriously, while the need for audience
research to complement this study is affirmed throughout the thesis.

**Methodological reflections in relation to audience research**

The methods applied in this thesis depart from those used to assess audience effects and impacts in many studies of political communication (McNair, 2011, Kaid 2004). Rather than using focus groups or survey research to gauge audience responses to imagery and narratives, this research involves interviewing the ‘practitioners’ of symbolic politics themselves. The approach that is applied here can be compared to the task of evaluating the work of teachers and curriculum design: as an ‘audience’, students have much to say about their learning experiences. However, teaching professionals’ own reflections on their work are worth investigating as a distinct and complementary source of insight. Teachers have a sense of ‘what went well’, and what it took to engage students. There are some aspects of a learning experience that students know ‘went well’; however, they may not be able to articulate exactly how the experience was designed, whereas a teacher may be well-placed to describe this. Social movement campaigners are in a comparable position. Their sense of the impact of their own message and actions will always need to be complemented by audience research, however the ‘practical wisdom’ of social movement activists is worth recognising as a source of insight in its own right (see Maddison and Scalmer, 2006, who discuss ‘activist wisdom’).

Further, it is possible to test messages endlessly in laboratory conditions and generate inconclusive results: the judgement of political actors still needs to be applied.\(^\text{51}\) Good laboratory results can be essential for informing this judgement, however ‘practical wisdom’ also needs to be applied. This derives in part from the limitations of laboratory findings. McNair (2011) notes that ‘the audience's relationship to the message is ambiguous, and extremely difficult to investigate empirically’ (L303), and he discusses the methodological limitations of a range of data-gathering techniques in political communication research. Opinion polls, he

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\(^{51}\) The results can remain inconclusive, even when they find statistically significant differences. The problem derives from questions about how accurately quantitative research data maps onto the complex social and political world, and also questions about what exactly needs to be done about the findings. Inevitably, decisions about what will be done rely on judgements that cannot be reduced to ‘what the data says.’ In the real world of social movement campaigning, campaigners make political judgements all the time, drawing on their ‘practical wisdom’ as well as their ‘theories of change’.
notes, can involve a demonstration effect, 'cueing' undecided voters to respond in certain ways. Secondly, when investigating patterns in voting behaviour, assessments of the relationship between a political campaign and how people voted always involve interpretation. McNair asks, ‘Can a laboratory experiment, no matter how sensitively prepared, really reproduce the complex political environment in which individuals make their decisions? Can it compensate for the weight of cultural and social resonances that will accompany a political message in the real world?’

(L677) Laboratory research can generate invaluable insights—see, for example, Corner et al. (2015) who used an online survey as well as discussion groups to assess how people responded to a range of visual materials about climate change). However, generalising from results like these to wider social processes and phenomena is a significant leap, since this kind of research is removed from political contexts and the processes of attitude-formation that take place over time and are informed by other perceptions and cultural currents (see, for example, Appendix 1 on voter perceptions of Bill Shorten, which may well have had a larger impact than images of climate change in Australia’s 2019 election). Drawing on complementary sources of insight is important, and the ‘practical wisdom’ of campaigners is one of them. Methodological issues relating to laboratory research are also discussed in Chapter 3.

The original plans for this project included an additional step relating to validity: inviting research participants and other interested people to review findings in order to gain their perspective, and ‘reality check’ the results. Suter (2011) describes stakeholder checks as a measure to improve validity. Research participants are asked to evaluate the conclusions of the research, addressing questions such as ‘Does this represent your experience?’ and ‘Have I captured what you feel is most important about this issue?’ This was not envisaged as an invitation to interviewees to ‘approve’ the findings so much as a process of dialogue and a further stage in a cycle of reflection which benefits from the insights of people other than the researcher. This would have enriched the study had it been possible, but it turned out to be a ‘post-PhD’ project.

52 For example, Chapter 8 identifies five functions of imagery: making an issue visible, tangible, and emotionally compelling, as well as focusing it in the public mind and projecting a vision of what the future could look like. People reviewing the research might think in terms of additional categories. Convergences and divergences between the findings and comments made in focus groups of interviewees and others could then be reported.
Conclusion

This thesis has documented and analysed rich statements about the importance of symbolic politics for climate politics. The findings have been analysed (1) in the light of the gaps in the field identified in the review of research in Chapter 3; (2) in relation to relevant theoretical literature; and (3) against the background of historical literature which suggests that something important will be found if a researcher goes looking for what is ‘happening’ in the ‘cultural-symbolic’ domain of climate politics. Clearly, additional steps such as audience research, external validity checks, and longitudinal and in-depth case studies would provide a more complete picture. There is plenty of room for more to be said about the place of symbolic politics in the work of the climate movement, how it relates to other forms of power, and how and why it matters. However, the process of this research has allowed for some strong claims to be made about how symbolic politics figures in the work of the climate movement and the ways in which it is important for achieving the movement’s goals.

As well as featuring throughout the thesis, a number of these statements are also collected in Appendix 2, where they are grouped according to themes such as ‘The power of images and narratives’; ‘The need for creativity’; ‘Missing the significance of symbolic politics’; ‘The use of symbolic politics by the climate movement’s opponents’; and ‘Changing the story’.
Chapter 6

The Pacific Climate Warriors and the 2014 Newcastle blockade

Among all of the cases studied in this thesis, the work of the Pacific Climate Warriors stands out. This chapter analyses the 2014 blockade of Newcastle coal port that this group organised. This was the richest and most vivid example of symbolic politics studied in the course of this research—if not the example most immediately linked to policy change, although this chapter will argue it is politically significant in important ways. In analysing how symbolic politics figures in the work of the climate movement, and how it is important for achieving political change, this chapter begins by presenting an overview of the blockade. Next, it addresses critical questions about the blockade’s significance for achieving political change. Thirdly and fourthly, the Pacific Warriors’ work is analysed in terms of movement mobilisation and political communication. A concluding section reflects on why an event like this matters for climate politics. The chapter argues that while the blockade had limitations as well as strengths, it generated extensive climate movement mobilisation, and with its imagery of canoes confronting coal ships, it attracted worldwide media attention. Rather than being a one-off ‘stunt’, it became a foundational event and node around which ongoing political action was organised. The blockade became a springboard for the development and strengthening of the 350 Pacific network, and provided the basis for divestment campaigning and engagement with government officials in the region. The blockade also provided a powerful basis for redefining climate change within the climate movement, and created a communication platform for the Warriors’ message. Within Australia, the event may not have attracted broad public support; however, that was not its objective. At a time when the Australian anti-coal movement was beginning, and when the Stop Adani campaign (see Chapter 9) had not been launched, the Pacific Warriors focused attention on coal as central to the problem of climate change, and

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1 The research question focuses on how symbolic politics figures in the Australian climate movement: although the initiative and leadership for this event came from outside the Australian branch of the movement, it took place in Australia, Australian climate campaigners actively participated, the event was the springboard for these campaigners to develop an ongoing partnership with Pacific activists, and the work of the Pacific Warriors influenced the agenda of the Australian movement.
prompted concerned Australians and Pacific Islanders to respond. This provided impetus for a cascade of subsequent movement activity. The result was that this symbolic action contributed to building an enabling environment where further change became possible: it introduced new and important dynamics into the ‘political climate’ of a kind which are important for further change to occur.

‘We’re blockading the world’s largest coal port’:
an overview of the Pacific Climate Warriors’ blockade

In October 2014, a group of thirty young Pacific Islanders—the ‘Pacific Climate Warriors’—arrived in Australia to dramatise the dangers of climate change. Organised by 350 Pacific, a regional branch of the climate change organisation 350.org, they came to blockade Newcastle’s coal port with traditional canoes to highlight the links between Australia’s coal industry, global warming, and their homes. Milaň Loëak (2014), daughter of the president of the Marshall Islands, explained: ‘We’re blockading the world’s largest coal port in Newcastle to show that elsewhere in the world, whole nations are paying the price for Australia’s coal and gas wealth’. In the face of what one interviewee described as ‘a pretty scary and what many people see as hopeless situation’ (DE), organisers of the blockade sought to create an event which showed determination and strength, and which could change perceptions of the issues. Speaking ahead of the event, DE reflected: ‘with the scale of the challenge we face… you need to do actions that will actually start to shift the way the future is heading. You need to try and create those moments where mass public consciousness and the psychology starts to—even just incrementally—shift a little bit’ (emphasis added). More than any other case analysed in this research, this event exemplifies the ‘political theatre’ dimension of symbolic politics, and its capacity to create a dramatic and defining moment.

For 350 Pacific, there were several reasons to focus on Australia. Tony Abbott was in power, and Australia’s regressive stance on climate change stood out internationally (Lisle, 2015). 350 Pacific particularly wanted to challenge Australia’s plans to expand its coal industry in the face of the dangers of climate change. Two and a half months before the blockade, the Abbott government had approved the Adani project, scheduled to produce 60 million tonnes of coal annually, making it the country’s largest coal mine (Mining Engineering, 2015). At international level, 350 had
strategically chosen to target the fossil fuel industry. They believed that the climate movement needed a new focus—leaving fossil fuels in the ground. Australia was the world’s second-largest coal exporter (International Energy Agency, 2015), and the Pacific Warriors aimed to call the country to account. A number of possible locations were considered (TS). Newcastle was selected given its status as the world’s largest coal export port (Port of Newcastle, 2014).

The blockade would happen at a time when climate change was in the news and Australia’s stance was in the spotlight. Four weeks beforehand, an unprecedented number of world leaders gathered in New York for the 2014 UN climate summit. ‘Peoples’ Climate Marches’ were held worldwide, with record-breaking numbers of people participating (BBC, 2014b). Kathy Jetnil-Kijiner, a Climate Warrior and poet from the Marshall Islands, addressed the opening ceremony. Selected from more than 500 candidates to represent civil society, she told the audience:

Climate change is a challenge that few want to take on. But the price of inaction is so high… To tackle it, we need a radical change of course. This isn’t easy, I know. It means ending carbon pollution within my lifetime (Global Call for Climate Action, 2014).

She then read out a poem addressed to her daughter, a young girl who loves morning walks past a ‘lucid, sleepy’ lagoon - which may someday become a threat. It may

…gnaw at the shoreline
chew at the roots of your breadfruit trees
gulp down rows of your seawalls
and crunch your island’s shattered bones
they say you, your daughter
and your granddaughter, too

2 350 calculated that a day-long blockade would delay 578,100 tonnes of coal from being exported. The Media Pack for the event drew attention to coal exports from the Maules Creek Coal Mine in New South Wales, which would pass through Newcastle. It stated, ‘This coal will release 30 million tonnes of CO2 emissions, which is equivalent to the annual emissions of New Zealand’s entire energy sector. This will continue for 30 years’ (350, 2014a, pp.8, 7).

3 Australia’s Tony Abbott did not attend the summit (Rimmer, 2014); however, a growing number of governments recognised the need to reach a global agreement in the approaching Paris talks.
will wander rootless
with only a passport to call home.

Describing some of the ways communities are working to prevent this prospect, Jetnil-Kijiner mentions

engineers dreaming, designing, building,
artists painting, dancing, writing...

as well as a form of action that would occur within just weeks:

canoes blocking coal ships.

The origin of the Pacific Climate Warriors and the background to the blockade

The Pacific Climate Warriors had emerged as a result of sustained work to build a climate movement across the Pacific. 350 staff member Aaron Packard (2014a) describes the background:

Their rise is rooted in a grassroots network, 350 Pacific, with organisers in 16 Pacific Islands… As the 350 Pacific network has developed in the last five years, the priority has been to take the lead from young Indigenous peoples at the grassroots, using the strength of culture and faith to stand up for the Pacific. That’s led to the formation of local country groups like 350 Tonga, 350 Solomon Islands, and 350 Vanuatu…

350 Pacific Coordinator Koreti Tiumalu explained that the idea of a Pacific Warriors campaign resulted from discussions at Powershift, 350’s youth climate conference, held in Auckland in 2012:

We wanted to take a concept that is common in the Pacific. All the Pacific islands have a warrior history. We’re taking the positive aspects of being a Pacific warrior, which are about protecting and providing—protecting their land and providing for their families.
The Newcastle action would be the first time Pacific Islanders across twelve different nations gathered to engage in nonviolent protest. Packard recalls that the idea of the blockade came from thinking, ‘Right, what’s the most ambitious plan we can come up with for our Pacific Islands?’ At first, many thought it was a ‘crazy idea’, yet it would become what many would describe as ‘the most remarkable week of action they had ever seen or experienced’ (Yacono, 2015).

In March 2013, a Pacific Islands Day of Action was held with the message, ‘We are Not Drowning: We are Fighting!’ (350 Pacific, 2013a). In December, a Pledge to Stand Up for the Pacific was launched, which within three months had been signed by more than 600 Pacific Islanders (Lutunatabua, 2014a). Through an intensive process of working with elders, the Warriors built traditional canoes to bring to Australia. In March 2014, a Day of Action was organised to build momentum across the Pacific ahead of the Newcastle protest. Six months later, 350 (2014b) publicly announced plans for the blockade, stating: ‘This is going to be an incredible, landmark action, and will send a powerful message: we will not stand idly by as the coal industry sinks the future of the Pacific Islands’.

The Warriors arrived in Australia amid reports that oceans in the southern hemisphere were warming faster than expected (Francis, 2014), and that residents of Torres Strait may become Australia’s first climate refugees (Bagnall, 2014). A week before the blockade, the late Tony de Brum, then Foreign Minister of the Marshall Islands, tweeted:
During their first days in Australia, the Warriors visited the Redfern Aboriginal Tent Embassy for an official Welcome to Country (Packard, 2014b). Local Pacific communities then welcomed them at a ceremony in Campbelltown (NSW Council for Pacific Communities, 2014). Five days ahead of the blockade, the Warriors visited the Maules Creek coal mine. A 350.org media release highlighted what was at stake:
after being exported through Newcastle, coal from Maules Creek would release 33 million tons of carbon dioxide, creating a greenhouse impact greater than that of 165 individual nations (350, 2014a, 2014c). Maules Creek was ‘the front-line of the battle against new coal developments in Australia’ (350, 2014d). Mika Maiava from Tokelau told Seven News, ‘We’re here to bring the human faces—the people that face the realities of climate change’ (Prime 7, 2014).

As the Warriors visited Maules Creek, the Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, was visiting the $4.2bn Caval Ridge coal mine in Queensland. It was at the opening ceremony for
this mine that he made his ‘coal is good for humanity’ statement:

Coal is vital for the future energy needs of the world. So let’s have no
demonisation of coal. Coal is good for humanity… The trajectory should be
up and up and up in the years and decades to come… The future for coal is
bright… It is a great day for the world because this mine will keep so many
people employed… it will make so many lives better… This mine epitomises
the have-a-go spirit (Chan, 2014; Qldaah, 2014).

The day before the blockade, the Warriors visited Newcastle harbour. That evening,
they were joined by supporters from around Australia. Clark (2014) describes the
‘electric’ atmosphere, as supporters ‘heard from the Pacific Warriors who shared
their powerful story about why they have come to Australia… It’s hard to describe
the creative, focused and powerful energy that is present when you are with the
Warriors’. Paris (2014a) also describes the scene:

I recall someone writing about how the whole place was buzzing with their
energy, and it was true. Many of the warriors come from a deeply spiritual
upbringing and there were many prayers. There was a creativity and
joyousness, mixed with deep reflection, in their gathering that was unfamiliar
yet appreciated amongst some of our Australian support crew. Joy and tears
and cheeky, cheeky laughter were always close to the surface, and sometimes
at the same time.

On the day of the blockade, 17 October 2014, the Newcastle Herald reported:

Thirty climate warriors from across the Pacific came to Newcastle… with a
simple message for King Coal—the coal industry’s relentless quest for profit is
destroying their island homes… By mid-morning, Newcastle Harbour had
become the backdrop for one of the country’s largest anti-coal protests in recent
years (Kelly, 2014).

Events began with an Aboriginal welcome. A Catholic priest from New Zealand,
Father Joe Savesi, blessed the group (ABC News, 2014). Then, to the sound of chants
and singing, the Warriors launched their canoes (Briand, 2014).
The first canoe has arrived. Today the #ClimateWarriors will #StandUpForThePacific

Figure 6.4 The blockade begins (350 Pacific, 2014a).

Figure 6.5 The Vanuatu canoe being unloaded (Packard, 2014d).

Note that Twitter here was set to a different timezone: the 17 October date is correct.
Mika prepares the warriors. Remembering why we are here #climatewarriors #standupforthe pacific

Figure 6.6 Mikaele Maiava from Tokelau prepares the group (Tan, 2014b; Paris, 2014b).

Figure 6.7 Ceremony before departure (Tan, 2014c).
As canoes were being launched and coal ships appeared, a Greenpeace blogger commented:

Standing on the beach, it looks like there’s an endless stream of people carrying kayaks, ready to paddle out in solidarity. As the Warriors prepare to confront these coal ships head on, a hush falls over the crowd… The Warrior canoes start to paddle out… soon supporters are launching kayaks from every available piece of beach (Dickison, 2014).

Within half an hour of the canoes being launched, the Rhine, a 226-metre bulk carrier, approached. The Warriors, together with about a hundred supporters in kayaks, then moved in to block it. Police arrived on jet skis and in boats, towing protesters away. The Warriors chanted their slogan: ‘We are not drowning. We are fighting!’
Among the Warriors’ supporters was 18-year-old Marshall Islander, Maureen
Briand, who was living in Newcastle at the time. She was quoted in the *Marshall Islands Journal*: ‘It was hard work paddling out there because of the wind, but it is such an important issue I had to be out there fighting against climate change and the destruction of our islands’ (Briand, 2014). She records that as a coal ship made its way past, there were ‘tears of sorrow on the water and on the shore’. One of the largest canoes, *Ta Reo Vanuatu* (‘Voice of Vanuatu’), was damaged when its outrigger broke in a confrontation with a police boat. The capsized canoe returned for repairs, and with ‘prayers and powertools, the Vanuatu canoe was back on the water within half an hour’, stated Hannah Fair, (2014), a UK climate activist who participated (see also Packard, 2014a).

![Figure 6.12 Ta Reo Vanuatu in action (Tan, 2014f).](image1)

Several protesters were detained; however, no arrests took place through the day (Kelly, 2014; ABC News, 2014).
The blockade continued until 6pm. When the Warriors returned to shore, they issued a statement: ‘The coal which leaves this port has a direct impact on our culture and our islands. It is clear to us that this is the kind of action which we must take in order to survive. Climate change is an issue which affects everyone and coal companies may expect further actions like this in future’ (Pacific Media Centre, 2014). A Greenpeace blogger reflected: ‘At the end of the day, I am exhausted, wet, and a little bit sunburnt, but the energy among the crowds is still impressive. The word is going round that of twelve ships scheduled to pass through the Port of Newcastle today, only four have made it through this powerful blockade. Celebration is in the air and we can all go home safe in the knowledge that we were part of something massive’ (Dickison, 2014).

The Warriors’ actions provided the focal point for campaigning and generated a series of subsequent events. On the day of the blockade itself, 350 Australia organised a National Day of Divestment Action, stating: ‘Money speaks. That’s why, on October 17–18, Australians everywhere joined together to move our money out of the financial institutions that are funding climate destruction’ (350 Australia, 2014a).
Divestment events occurred across the country, with depositors closing accounts and holding events outside bank branches (Ten News, 2014). Around Australia and across the world, people expressed their support for the Warriors. There were gatherings from Perth to Coffs Harbour to Auckland. Supporters from countries including Fiji, the Marshall Islands, Samoa, South Africa, Guyana and Poland sent enthusiastic messages on social media, featuring the campaign’s hashtag, #StandUpForThePacific. In Canada, Lasqueti Islanders made statements of support, as did climate activists in places including Ventura, California, the University of Bern, Switzerland, and the University of Pennsylvania. Campaigners from Massachusetts called on coastal communities to unite (350, 2014h; 350 Aotearoa, 2014).

During the following week, a series of events took place across Australia. They were characterised by visual theatre, the use of social media, direct action forms of protest, and collaboration between Pacific Islanders and their Australian supporters. Table 6.1 outlines what happened.

Table 6.1: Follow-up events during the week after the blockade.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19 October</td>
<td>Brisbane</td>
<td>Flotilla on the Brisbane River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 October</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>Occupation of the headquarters of Whitehaven Coal, which was developing the Maules Creek coal mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 October</td>
<td>Canberra</td>
<td>Occupation of the office of Minerals Council of Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perth</td>
<td>Occupation of the offices of Buru Energy, which planned 'massive expansion of unconventional gas exploration and extraction in WA' (Sas, 2014).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 October</td>
<td>Melbourne</td>
<td>Occupation of the global headquarters of the ANZ bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>Release of two open letters from academics at Sydney University and the University of NSW, calling on their institutions to divest from fossil fuels (Greenpeace Australia, 2014; UNSW Academics for Divestment, 2014).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 October</td>
<td>Brisbane</td>
<td>Public forum, Brisbane</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
‘But what did the Pacific Warriors really achieve?’
Addressing some challenges and critical questions

Competing assessments of the blockade provide some starting points for thinking about its impact. The Pacific Warriors were upbeat about what they had achieved, declaring, ‘we are stronger than ever. We are determined, we are empowered, we are hopeful, and we are still doing what we must to stand up for the Pacific… Together, we can shape and grow this climate movement. Together, we can win this fight!’ (Lutunatabua et al., 2015). However, some were unconvinced. One interviewee for this project argued that what the Warriors did was ‘great in a whole bunch of ways in that it demonstrates impacts that are happening now’; however, there was a ‘flipside’:

my concerns at the moment if I’m the average punter are—paying the bills, wages keeping up with inflation… The [Newcastle blockade] does not go anywhere near addressing them. It’s a stunt. It’s not going to change the debate significantly’ (BL).

BL’s statement is representative of a view of political communication which takes the perspective of ‘the audience’ (understood here as the broad Australian public) and their prevailing values and material concerns as its starting point. If the objective was to win over public opinion, imagery of coal ships and canoes would be ineffective. ‘The first thing you need to do is understand what people see as the problem’, BL argued. Climate communication, he maintained, needs to recognise the issues that are most important for the audience, such as the economy, health, and education: ‘It is about the values that people hold—people think that a strong economy is the most important thing… If you put information to people that does not adhere to their value structure, they will find ways to [negate the message]. You need to find the values that they hold that will bring them around’. BL suggests, for example, that engaging people about the Great Barrier Reef could highlight the place of the tourism industry, ‘using the evocative nature of the Reef, with the economic angle: “this is putting people under threat”’.

BL’s scepticism about the Warriors is complemented by insights from Cox’s (2010) critique of Step It Up, a 2007 campaign run by 350 in the US. Cox raises important
questions for reflecting on the relationship between communication, strategy and impact. He identifies a gap between communication that mobilises, and mobilisation that enables a particular end (p. 125). Focusing on what it takes to achieve systemic change, Cox argues that there has been a ‘neglect of the strategic’ (p. 126) in recent climate communication campaigns. Political communication, he argues, needs to be integrated into a strategy where ‘specific communicative efforts are related to expected outcomes or “effects” within a system of power’ (p. 124). Cox criticises Step It Up, arguing that it implicitly assumed that increased awareness would of itself lead to policy change. While Step It Up featured a series of creative and inspiring actions, Cox argues ‘little happened afterwards. [There was] little or no political follow-through at the policy level’ (p. 127). As an example of successful strategy, Cox points to the Sierra Club’s Beyond Coal campaign, which focused on closing down coal-fired power stations. Other critiques of environmental communication provide additional yardsticks that can be used to assess the Newcastle blockade: Brulle and Jenkins (2006), for example, dismiss approaches to environmental advocacy that are premised on changing cultural beliefs without addressing political and economic change. Criticising framing approaches (Lakoff, 2004) and the assumption that ‘social institutions can be transformed by cultural redefinition alone’, they call for a linkage between rhetoric and ‘a broader political strategy that includes grassroots organizing at its base’ (p. 84). Further, Cox and Schwarze (2015) have argued that dramatic protests or ‘stunts’ can have diminished impact over time: gaining public attention and establishing public legitimacy stand in tension, and while a staged event may be visually-striking, it may also quickly disappear from the media agenda.

These critiques suggest a number of ‘yardsticks’ for evaluating the Pacific Warriors blockade. Did it:

- complement rhetoric with grassroots mobilisation—and do so in a way that would change ‘the structure of power’? (Brulle and Jenkins, p. 84)
- connect with audiences beyond an existing activist base (BL, Cox and Schwarze), and engage with these audiences’ views of the world?
- establish a basis for long term public attention and media engagement (Cox and Schwarze)?
- establish wider legitimacy for their cause? (Cox and Schwarze)
enable wider outcomes or effects at the system level? (Cox)

succeed in ‘mobilizing a constituency capable of demanding changes on the scale and timetable that climate and other system crises require’? (Cox, p. 125)

The points above represent a substantial checklist for any political initiative. For social movements addressing challenging political issues such as the power of the fossil fuel industry, success across all of these dimensions would be likely to require a combination of many of the forms of politics outlined in the Introduction, and a sustained campaign: symbolic politics would need to be accompanied, for example, by leverage, accountability and institutional politics. ‘Changing the structure of power’ (Brulle and Jenkins) and achieving ‘outcomes at the system level’ (Cox) are goals that only multi-faceted political initiatives can achieve. The Warriors’ work certainly meets aspects of Brulle and Jenkins’ concerns, in that it emphasised mobilisation. However, in relation to ‘enabling wider outcomes at the system level’, it is fair to say that the Newcastle blockade was not directly integrated into the kind of systemic project that Cox describes. (It is worth noting, however, that their work did contribute to strengthening the leverage being applied by divestment campaigns—see below.)

In relation to establishing broad public legitimacy, this was not the Warriors’ immediate goal, though it is worth noting that international media coverage was sympathetic (see below). Further, the Warriors have not escalated and extended their symbolic presence in Australia over time on the scale of their initial event. Further efforts to reach the public (see below) have been important, but limited. Yet the Australian public was not the only relevant audience: the Warriors have developed an audience in the Pacific, and the influence of the Warriors on the agenda of the Australian climate movement has been important in its own right.

In terms of the critiques outlined above, the relevant question is not whether particular symbolic actions effect systemic change on their own, or even whether they have widespread public appeal, but whether they make particular contributions to changing the political situation, doing distinct work in the ‘cultural-symbolic domain’ of politics that is valuable for achieving wider political goals. The Aboriginal Tent Embassy, Gandhi’s Salt March, and the Montgomery Bus Boycott.

Further, it would be interesting to see what the Pacific Warriors would have done had they had the financial resources and staffing of the Sierra Club!
did not effect policy or structural change by themselves; however, as events which fused powerful symbolism with movement mobilisation, they created conditions which made further changes possible. Cox’s critique of Step It Up is important; however, it is not an argument against symbolic action in itself, and nor is it presented as such. Cox himself (2010) notes the value of symbolic action, writing: ‘environmental communication [is] a form of symbolic action… it is through different social and symbolic modes that we understand and engage this world, infuse it with significance, and act toward it’ (L701, L1552). Cox’s critique of Step It Up certainly is an argument against symbolic action in isolation from, for example, the kind of leverage politics that has been used by the Sierra Club in Beyond Coal. It is also an argument against any wishful thinking that symbolic action will ‘magically’ change hearts, minds and public consciousness, leading somehow to policy change. There are no historical examples of symbolic politics having this kind of effect; however, as the first chapters above highlight, there are repeated examples where symbolic politics has played an integral role in achieving change through, for example, creating the conditions where leverage and other forms of politics can become effective.

The ‘yardsticks’ above can be supplemented with an additional list: does a climate movement initiative change the political climate by:

**mobilising a movement**

- building and mobilising networks that are strategically important for the movement’s capacity to act effectively?
- generating ‘political energy’—momentum, focus and enthusiasm?
- providing a focus and ‘springboard’ for subsequent political action, and creating symbolic ‘nodes’ (e.g. images and theatrical events) around which a movement acts and grows?

**communicating with supporters and with the public**

- redefining the issues and capturing the imagination of politically-important audiences?
- raising the profile of the issue in the media?
- creating significant ‘resources for persuasion’ (Cox, 2012) that did not
previously exist?

- conveying the often complex and remote abstractions about climate change in vivid and compelling ways?
- conveying a new sense of what is possible?
- building a new focus and agenda for the climate movement?

When these things happen, the ‘political climate’ has changed: the previous balance of forces has shifted, in ways that may be essential for eventual policy change, particularly when inertia or opposition in the existing political system obstructs change and a social movement needs to be built. The points above in no way ‘complete the circle’ of a process of political change; however, it is worth reflecting on what happens in climate politics when these elements are lacking, and what is added when they are present. The analysis below examines how the work of the Pacific Warriors relates to these questions.
Mobilising the movement: the cascading impact of the blockade

Movement mobilisation was a strength of the Warriors’ work. The Warriors’ symbolic action was not just a protest, but the launch of an ongoing political initiative. This involved follow-up events in Australia, and community engagement in the Pacific before and after the event. The blockade led to the formation of local and regional networks and alliances, and to initiatives that fused recovery of traditional culture with community organising work. The blockade became a node around which subsequent initiatives were organised over a sustained period. At the time it occurred, the Stop Adani movement was yet to develop in Australia. For this to happen, ‘stopping coal’ first had to be ‘imagined’ as a climate movement goal. In fact, several key Stop Adani staff, as well as leading Stop Adani volunteers, were involved in organising the blockade and associated events from the Australian side. It is people like this who became a key nucleus of the Stop Adani movement (Field notes, 2017).

The ‘cascade’ of activity generated by the Warriors began well before the blockade itself. Pacific Climate Warriors events were held as early as a Day of Action in March 2013 (350, 2013). That November, 350 Pacific members at a Vanuatu Youth Climate Change Symposium conducted ‘a role play of the plans for confronting the fossil fuel industry’, stating, ‘Watch out Australian coal industry... and Prime Minister!’ (350 Pacific, 2013b). In April 2014, 350 Pacific held a regional Day of Action: Climate Warriors walked through Port Moresby, for example, raising public awareness about climate change. In Tonga, Warriors performed the traditional *Sipi Tau* (war dance) and began the process of canoe building (Lutunatabua, 2014b). Publicity for the event explained, ‘Over the last few months, 350 Pacific Climate Warriors have undergone training in leadership, climate change awareness and traditional understanding, to prepare themselves for the coming months. This Day of Action will mark the next step these courageous young people are taking to #StandUpForThePacific’ (350, 2014i). Shortly afterwards, 350 Pacific launched a petition against Australia’s Maules Creek coal mine (350, 2014j).
The blockade was the springboard for the next phase of the #StandUpForThePacific campaign: divestment from fossil fuels. In November 2014, Climate Warriors across the Pacific delivered letters to ANZ bank managers, calling on them to cease investment in the industry. Campaign spokesperson, Kathy Jetnil-Kijiner, stated that ‘organizations and financial institutions, such as the ANZ, must align their money with their morals’ (350, 2014k). Images of these events circulated across the Pacific and in Australia, energising local campaigns (e.g. 350 Australia, 2014b). In December, the College of the Marshall Islands announced it would divest from fossil fuels (Hazan, 2014). In February 2015, 350.org organised a Global Divestment Day. Timed to coincide with Valentine’s Day, the event was an opportunity for people to ‘break up with the fossil fuel industry and sever their ties once and for all’ (Go Fossil Free, 2015). Participants joined with ‘over 500 active divestment campaigns underway worldwide at universities, cities, churches, banks, pension funds and other institutions’ (Jetnil-Kijiner, 2015). Significantly, iconography from the Pacific Warriors blockade was prominent in publicity for the event, both in Australia and the Pacific (350 Pacific, 2015a, below, and 350, 2014l).
The Warriors’ symbolic action also led to high-level engagement with government officials including former President of Kiribati, Anote Tong (350 Pacific, 2017a). The Government of Tokelau (2014) announced the participation of the Tokelauan Warriors in the blockade on their official website. The Warriors’ training event for Samoa was officially opened by Samoa’s Prime Minister, Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi. He ‘spoke of the importance of addressing climate change at the youth level, as it is an issue that is affecting not only Samoa but the entire Pacific’ (Talamuna, 2014). The Vanuatu Warriors’ send-off ceremony indicates something of the depth of the response that the Warriors gained from Pacific political leaders. The Vanuatu Daily Post reported on the role of Edward Nipake Natapei, twice Prime Minister of Vanuatu as well as its President, and then MP for Port Vila and President of the Vanua’aku Party. He launched a traditional canoe ‘on its way to stir up international awareness about climate change impacts’ (Willie, 2014), and stated: ‘On
behalf of the community and Vanuatu’s participation in the actions coming up in Australia, I have the privilege to announce that this canoe is named Ta Reo Vanuatu —the Voice of Vanuatu’ (Island Reach, 2014). The Daily Post reported that Natapei likened the warriors in the expedition to ‘small ants trying to talk to a big man. Sometimes the big men don’t want to listen, and the only way to be heard is when the ants bite the big man’s toe.’ The Acting Director of Vanuatu’s Ministry of Climate Change, Albert Williams, also addressed the ceremony: ‘You are going to Australia as ambassadors of Vanuatu. The main thing we need to tell the Australians is this: Australia, you need to do more to help small countries like Vanuatu. In our islands, we now have more periods of drought. We are experiencing more intense cyclones. We are experiencing sea level rise and coastal erosion. We are losing our coral reefs as temperatures change’ (Willie, 2014; Island Reach, 2014). Chief Kawea Sausiara, of the Iasoa community, told the Warriors, ‘This canoe travels with a message. It concerns culture. If climate change is not stopped then we will lose our cultural activities. This is the message that we must remember. If not, Vanuatu will be nothing more than a wasteland’ (Island Reach, 2014).

The ‘cascade’ of follow-up events continued after the 2014 blockade in locations across the world. Just some of these events appear in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2: The ‘cascade’ of events which began with the 2014 blockade.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date/event</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘People’s Parliament’ in the foyer of Parliament House, Canberra</td>
<td>A group of Warriors joins hundreds of Australians to demand that politicians put people ahead of polluters (City News, 2015).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘People’s Pilgrimage’</td>
<td>Warriors join the ‘People’s Pilgrimage’, organised by Yeb Saño, former international climate negotiator from the Philippines (Lutunatabua, 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Film Forum</td>
<td>Pacific Warriors conduct a Pacific Film Forum at COP21 climate talks (Indigenous Peoples’ Pavilion, 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mock trial of ExxonMobil</td>
<td>Pacific Warriors are among the judges in a mock trial held to mirror the official COP21 climate talks (Ahram online, 2015).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Frontline Truths’</td>
<td>The Pacific Warriors launch their own digital storytelling project, featuring text, video and images designed to tell their own stories of climate change (350, 2015e).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fa’anoanoa (Act of Contrition) at the</td>
<td>The Pacific Warriors hold a 3-day ceremony designed to demonstrate the grief and loss being experienced in the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To elaborate on just a few of the events in the table: the 2015 Fa’anoanoa at the Vatican was integrated into a larger community project: before reaching Rome, participants had travelled throughout the Pacific to listen and collect stories of how climate change is affecting the Pacific way of life. These stories were woven into traditional mats which were used during the event, one of which was handed directly to the Pope (350 Pacific, 2015b). Thus, again, symbolically significant action and community engagement were combined. In 2016, Newcastle was again chosen as the
focus for a national protest against fossil fuels. The event was part of 350’s global ‘Breakfree’ initiative, designed to target ‘some of the most iconic and dangerous fossil fuel projects’ in the world (Davidson, 2016). On 8 May—the same day that Prime Minister Turnbull called a federal election—no coal went in or out of Newcastle as protesters in kayaks and canoes again blockaded the port, and others blocked the rail line (Newcastle Herald, 2016; Connell, Carr and Kirkwood 2016). The Newcastle Herald reported the event as the biggest anti-coal protest in Newcastle’s history (Kirkwood, 2016), and an experienced activist rated it ‘the largest single act of civil disobedience in the history of Australia’s climate movement’ (Counteract, 2016). As was the case with earlier divestment initiatives, photographs and video of the 2014 blockade featured prominently in publicity for ‘Breakfree’ (350 Australia, 2016a, 2016b).

These were just some of the events which illustrate the generative impact of the Warriors’ action in Newcastle, and also the internationally-recognised status of the Warriors as a group who have something credible, significant and compelling to say. Symbolic action had created a node around which a series of subsequent events were organised. This reflects a phenomenon described by Sewell (1996) in his analysis of what ranks as a historical event. ‘Historical events produce more events’, he observes (p. 871). The work of the Warriors matches Sewell’s description of the ‘cascading character of events’ as well as his account of their often-ritualized form, the role of emotion as ‘a constitutive ingredient of many transformative actions’ and how events can bring about ‘bursts of collective cultural creativity’ (pp. 871, 865, 845). Sewell’s analysis focuses on more epochal events such as the fall of the Bastille, and he stipulates that events result in ‘durable transformation of structures’ (p. 844). However, as Berezin (2012) points out, Sewell’s analysis can be applied more generally: there are many events which lack the iconicity of the events discussed by Sewell, but which remain politically important.

**Political communication: media impact, political theatre and redefining climate change**

Writing about another movement where political communication mattered, Alexander (2006a) states that the US civil rights movement ‘engaged not only in instrumental but in symbolic action, creating a compelling, arresting, existentially
and politically encompassing narrative, a social drama with which the audience... could identify and through which they could vicariously participate’ (L3743). This assessment could also be applied to the Pacific Climate Warriors and the appeal of their message for their supporters. The importance of symbolic as well as instrumental power is evident when factors like persuasion, perception, and the ‘public imagination’ are given weight. Making climate change ‘compelling’ and ‘arresting’, and creating and enacting a powerful narrative with which audiences can ‘identify’ matters for climate politics. In addressing factors like these, Alexander also uses the term ‘communicative mobilization’ (2006a, L4113) to refer to mobilisation that sends a signal and is significant for its message as well as its sheer ‘people power’. Across the chapters that follow, the communicative power of the Newcastle blockade will be addressed in terms of imagery, narrative and iconic power. In the analysis below, the focus is on the Warriors’ use of ‘communicative mobilization’ and symbolic power to gain media coverage, create a platform for political communication, and redefine climate change. Further, the blockade is analysed in terms of political theatre, using a framework based on ‘the elements of performance’ described by Alexander (2006c). This framework makes it possible to see both how symbolic politics ‘figures’ in the work of the climate movement, and to think about factors that affect the success of the blockade as a form of political communication.

The Pacific Warriors were highly visible in the media, gaining local and international coverage in outlets including the BBC (2014b); the Financial Times (Smyth, 2014); the Voice of America (Mercer, 2014); Al-Jazeera (2014); The Guardian (Bowers, 2014a); Radio New Zealand (2014) and the Marshall Islands Journal (Briand, 2014). Media reports featured the striking imagery generated by the Warriors, beneath headlines such as ‘South Pacific flotilla to protest climate change inaction at Australia coal port’ (Reuters, 2014) and ‘Australians divided over coal policy’ (Financial Times (2014). Coverage of the blockade in the Financial Times led with the news of the relocation of almost 300 Fijians due to rising sea levels and erosion, and reported on the falling global prices for coal (Smyth, 2014). The BBC’s account highlighted Australia’s position as the worst polluter per head of population in the developed world, as well its status as the world’s largest coal exporter. In the Huffington Post, Lutunatabua (2014a) described how the Warriors represented a movement of thousands of Pacific Islanders who were ‘rising to protect ourselves in the face of climate change’. Media coverage continued following the blockade. For example: in 2015, Vogue profiled
Kathy Jetnil-Kijiner (Russell, 2015), the Marshallese Warrior whose poetry was quoted earlier in this chapter in ‘Climate Warriors’, an article on women climate change campaigners from around the world. During the COP 21 climate talks in Paris, the Warriors developed a strong international media presence (see Tiumalu, 2016). In 2017, Deutsche Welle reported on their participation in anti-coal protests in Germany ahead of the 2017 Bonn climate talks (Wecker, 2017).

The Newcastle blockade made the Pacific Warriors a recognisable, visible and authoritative group, and this enabled them to build a ‘platform’ for communication. As Spyksma (2014) observed, ‘Stopping trade at the Port of Newcastle is a way to… put the voices of the Pacific Islands into a discussion about why Australia is continuing to invest in coal at the expense of its neighbouring countries’ (emphasis added). The Warriors’ involvement in public events created a sense of occasion, and media outlets became attentive to what they had to say. The Warriors also launched their own digital storytelling project, ‘Frontline Truths’, featuring text, video and images designed to tell their own stories of climate change (350 Pacific, 2015e). A ‘platform’ is one way to describe what the Pacific Warriors created. Lutunatabua (2014b) offers another image. Writing in advance of the blockade, he describes the canoes as a ‘vessel’ for communication: ‘traditional styled canoes… will be used as a vessel to deliver our messages on climate change to Australia’. Representing cultural traditions that were being lost, the canoes offered a powerful symbolic avenue to make a statement. The decision to use canoes to confront Australia’s coal industry grew out of deep cultural traditions (see, for example, Dateline Pacific, 2014; TVEInspiringChange, 2015; Matavai Pacific Cultural Arts, 2016; Tiumalu, 2015). While canoes carry great symbolic significance in the Pacific, traditions of canoe-building had been receding, writes Lutunatabua (2014b):

> the two hulled sailing vessels built by the proud people of the Pacific have slowly been phased out… in the name of progress and technological advancements.

350 Pacific has embarked on a journey to be part of the small group of people in

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the Pacific who are trying to revive this very important aspect of the Pacific Culture. In an attempt to regain the ancient knowledge and the art of canoe building and traditional sailing, 350 Pacific... [has] launched a campaign to encourage young Pacific Islanders across the region to build traditional styled canoes.

With this platform, or via this ‘vessel’, the Warriors worked to redefine climate change. Rather than being nebulous and unclear, climate change was shown to have a cause, in the form of coal. Further, it had a culprit, in the form of Australian political leaders. Rather than coal being seen as a source of jobs and growth, it was presented as a threat which had to be challenged and stopped. Stopping it was not an aspiration, a policy or a distant objective—the Pacific Warriors physically stood in the way of coal leaving Newcastle, recording images of this event for future use. Rather than Australia being a ‘beneficent big brother’ to the Pacific, the Australian government was presented as putting the wellbeing of Pacific Islanders at risk. The Warriors’ message involved a shift away from technical aspects of climate policy to a focus on the fossil fuel industry and its human impact. Perceptions of climate change as distant and remote were challenged with a message that climate change is happening now and is affecting people who were given a ‘human face’ (Kassman, in Mercer, 2014). Further, instead of Pacific Islanders being seen as passive, helpless victims, they were defiant and took the initiative. One dimension of redefining the issues was to emphasise a moral dimension in the debate. The Warriors displayed something of the sense of politics described by Horgan (2014) who argues ‘arguments must become moral if they are to succeed’ (p. 751). Arianne Kassman

Horgan describes a case of symbolic power shaping political decision-making when ‘a moral community coalesced around a shared conception’ of what was really important, or in Durkheimian terms, ‘sacred’ (759). Applying this ‘religious’ language in the secular context of a dispute about the rezoning of agricultural land to benefit commercial, industrial and residential developers, Horgan argues, ‘The sacred both connects actors to one another and forms the basis for solidary ties more generally... Moral communities form, cohere and mobilize... around shared conceptions of what is sacred. The sacred is a shared point of reference for the group’ (p. 744). Horgan concludes:

The power to harness particular interpretations—symbolic power—has consequences that are more than symbolic. Power can accrue to those who appear to lay legitimate claim to strong communion with, and the right to use, those symbols in ways that matter. Laying claim to what is sacred and bringing others under the umbrella of shared sacred collective representations gives power to an argument; it moves people (literally and figuratively) less with authority than with influence (Alexander 2006, p. 70), and influence here is neither the wielding of coercive power and authority in a
from PNG stated, ‘Addressing climate change must be our moral choice’ (350 Pacific, 2015c). Koreti Tiumalu described the Warriors’ work in terms of challenging the moral license of the fossil fuel industry (Tokona, 2015). In a Facebook post supporting Global Divestment Day, 350 Pacific (2015d) stated, ‘If it’s wrong to wreck the planet, then it’s wrong to profit from that wreckage’. Launching the Pacific-wide divestment campaign following the Newcastle blockade, Kathy Jetnil-Kijiner asserted, ‘it is not acceptable to profit from the destruction of our Islands’ (350, 2014k). Importantly, this moral message was not simply asserted verbally but enacted symbolically through the Newcastle blockade, making the message significantly more powerful than words or memes alone. 

Enacting their message meant using political theatre: see below.

The Pacific Warriors had no illusions that the blockade would effect a transformation in the attitudes of Australians by itself (Loeak, 2014). Their actual impact on Australian public opinion is, of course, a question for audience research. BL, quoted above, was sceptical about their communicative impact. Certainly, although the blockade gained significant media coverage, it was not designed to appeal widely to the ‘middle ground’ of Australian public opinion. Yet it would be worthwhile to scrutinise assumptions about ‘mainstream’ audiences and political communication. For the ‘average punters’ who BL refers to, is the world confined to concerns centred around material self-interest to such a degree that they are impervious to news of the plight of others, especially when conveyed in a vivid, creative and ‘authentic’ way? Here, the points made in Chapter 3 about numerically gauging people’s attitudes on a single scale are important. People’s attitudes can be complex and ambivalent (Lertzman, 2013)—it is possible, for example, to be concerned about climate change while also being reluctant to abandon coal ‘just yet’. This complexity cannot be captured by a single ranking on a ‘strongly agree-strongly disagree’ continuum. Further, there is an important difference between taking account of existing attitudes and making them the defining factor in political communication strategies. To adapt a phrase of John Howard’s, to the extent that ‘mainstream’ values and outlooks are ‘comfortable and relaxed’ (Jackson, 1996) with the fossil fuel industry, the ‘climate of

8 Howard, on the eve of his election as Prime Minister in 1996 was asked by ABC Four Corners reporter Liz Jackson for a ‘John Howard vision for the year 2000’. Howard replied, ‘By the year 2000 I would like to see an Australian nation that feels comfortable and relaxed about three things. I would like to see them comfortable and
opinion’ needs to change if action on climate change is to occur. Sometimes, processes of attitude change involve communication which leaves us ‘uncomfortable and confronted’ rather than ‘comfortable and relaxed’.

One indication of how climate change has been redefined through the cumulative effect of climate movement initiatives—including campaigns like divestment that have used symbolic politics—comes from a May 2016 editorial in the *Newcastle Herald* in response to 350’s ‘Breakfree’ protests. The editorial argued that gradual policies that delay decarbonisation are unlikely to be sufficient, and concluded: ‘Whatever coal industry leaders think of the protests, they must realise that their industry is losing its social license’ (Newcastle Herald, 2016). It can be argued that the Pacific Warriors contributed to the process of eroding the standing of the coal industry in Newcastle by popularising the anti-coal message within the climate movement, and by gaining national and international media coverage. The canoe blockade was one of many initiatives in Newcastle over the years by a range of groups that have campaigned to end the coal economy (Connor, 2012). Thus, the Warriors’ flotilla provided one ‘ripple’ among many in contributing to this outcome; however, the combined effect has been important, as developments three months after *Breakfree* suggest. In 2015, Newcastle City Council announced it would abandon fossil fuel investments, and called on its major banks to divest from fossil fuels.

Challenged on this response, and whether a vision should also excite Australians, Howard continued, ‘You can’t possibly hope to feel excited about something unless you feel comfortable and familiar with it. If you really want to drive Australians away from interest in something, you disturb their sense of… comfort about it and you’ll succeed in driving them away from it.’

An analogy can be drawn from the task of political communication with white South Africans during the transition from apartheid. Nelson Mandela spent much of his life engaged in symbolic and other forms of confrontation with the apartheid regime; however, he also made overtures to the ‘white mainstream’. Mandela’s overtures to the Afrikaans-speaking community, such as his quotation from an Afrikaans poem in his inaugural State of the Nation address to Parliament in May 1994, and his entry into the stadium for the 1995 Rugby World Cup, hosted by South Africa, wearing the Number 6 jersey of Springbok captain, Francois Pienaar, are discussed by le Cordeur (2015). It was a both-and approach, which at times meant upholding multiple values that normally stood in opposition. Climate politics is different; however, some of the climate justice issues have parallels with the divided society under apartheid—and there are comparable challenges to do with the need to *imagine politics differently* in a white community where it was easy for a very real crisis to be largely invisible. If ‘conventional’ attitudes of white South Africans had been the defining factor for communications strategies, these attitudes would never have been challenged. Cases like the Selma-to-Montgomery marches (see Chapter 2) also illustrate the point.
Ryan, 2015). *Australian Mining* reported the decision, noting the role played by 350:

Anti-coal activists 350.org Australia welcomed the council’s decision to divest from fossil fuels... The Australian divestment movement, pushed by 350.org, has experienced a groundswell of support since its inception 18 months ago, with $400 million worth of loans shifted from the big four banks to financial institutions without fossil fuel investments (Validakis, 2015).

The Warriors’ ‘communicative mobilisation’ and their symbolic as well as instrumental action can be understood in terms of ‘political theatre’ (Alexander, 2006a: 2010). Vivid and dramatic acts of political theatre are important ‘resources for persuasion’ for any social movement. While politicians have the national ‘stage’ available to them on a daily basis, the Pacific Warriors *put* themselves, coal, climate change and the Australian government on stage. Alexander discusses the capacity of political theatre to ‘reach’ an audience, writing, ‘Observation can be merely cognitive. An audience can see and can understand without experiencing emotional or moral signification’ (2006c, p. 35). By contrast, he argues, effective political theatre builds a psychological identification and an emotional connection between actors and audiences. Giesen (2006) observes that the ‘extraordinary reality on stage can have an emotional impact that is even stronger than the ordinary non-theatrical reality (p. 347). For Apter (2006), ‘Politics as theatre... [can] endow a particular space with a certain clarity, miniaturizing, focusing, concentrating and intensifying public attention, by magnifying a symbolic register’ (p. 227). In terms of political impact, Alexander cites the example of the Boston Tea Party. Its ‘immediate, material effect... was negligible, but its expressive power... created great political effects’ (p. 53). When Packard (2014a) writes about the ‘scenes’ that the Warriors created and

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10 The gap between what is ‘performed’ and what is ‘real’ makes performance a double-edged term if the real conditions which many performances aim to portray are lost sight of. This is not a charge levelled at Alexander (see his critique of the ‘postdramatic’ in Alexander, 2014), although I would qualify references to performance and ‘the performative’ more strongly than he does. Everyday understandings of what ‘acting’ and ‘performing’ involve convey a sense that what is being performed is not real, and that once the actors who do the performing are finished, they return to their real lives. This distinction is not always maintained with sufficient clarity in scholarship, where a sense of the performative can be over-stated and performance as a valuable metaphor can be lost sight of. In dealing with the realities of climate change, making strong distinctions between different performances on the basis of their relationship to and alignment with real social and environmental conditions is fundamentally important.

11 Alexander also points to the example of Thomas Becket: from an instrumental perspective, Becket was killed and King Henry II ‘won’. Yet, ‘the drama Becket enacted captured the English imagination and provided a new background text of moral action for centuries after’ (p. 52).
describes them as ‘intense, dramatic and moving’, he is describing an event that demonstrated features that these writers point to. One particular image, analysed in Chapter 10, encapsulates this—see Figure 6.17 below.

Figure 6.17 Canoes vs Coal: (Bowers, 2014b / Australscope pictures).

The Pacific Warriors share an emphasis on theatrical communication with the US civil rights movement. For both movements, the ‘theatrical’ dimension to their work has been important for generating political energy, moving and motivating supporters, and getting people to ‘imagine’ the issues in a new way.\(^\text{12}\) Comparing the Pacific Warriors with the Selma-to-Montgomery marches (see Chapter 2) is useful for clarifying the ways in which the Pacific Warriors used political theatre, and for thinking about their capacity to effect political change. Table 6.3 presents this comparison using categories adapted from Alexander’s (2006c) list of the ‘elements of performance’.\(^\text{13}\)

\(^{12}\) Martin Luther King’s own assessment of the civil rights movement’s work could also be applied to the Warriors. ‘We needed a sense of drama’, King wrote (L4601). Symbolic action, he claimed, enabled the movement to galvanize support and boost morale (Carson, 2001: L2856). King wrote of seeking ‘to dramatize [racial injustice] so that it can no longer be ignored’ (Carson, 2001: L3216). He aimed to make ‘the movement powerful enough, dramatic enough, morally appealing enough so that people of goodwill’ would put pressure on political leaders (L5858). Just as the Selma-to-Montgomery marches (see Chapter 2), were part of a campaign designed to ‘attack the very heart of the political structure of the state of Alabama’ (L4568), the Pacific Warriors travelled to Australia ‘to stop the destruction of their Islands at its source’ (Packard, 2014e).

\(^{13}\) Alexander’s list includes: direction, actor, background culture, mise-en-scene, and audience.
Table 6.3: Comparison of the 2014 Pacific Warriors blockade and the 1965 Selma-to-Montgomery marches in terms of *elements of political theatre*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of political theatre</th>
<th>Selma-to-Montgomery marches, USA, 1965</th>
<th>Newcastle blockade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| (1) Cultural horizon and symbolic referents | • the *history* of the civil rights movement  
• *narratives* of slavery and racism  
• the drama of the 1963 *Birmingham* campaign, also in Alabama  
• the story of *George Wallace*  
• *Judeao-Christian* tradition and its application to civil rights  
• the *killing of 4 girls* at Birmingham's 16th Street Baptist Church in 1963  
• *Pacific tradition and culture*  
• *David and Goliath*  
• the story of the Warriors in the eyes of Pacific communities and leaders  
• *Australia’s* historical relationship with the Pacific  
• the *Abbott* government’s stance on climate change | |
| (2) Scripts and narrative content | • the unfolding events of the three *Selma-to-Montgomery* marches  
• the police killing of *Jimmie Lee Jackson* as a precipitating event, as well as the murder of white civil rights activist *James Reeb*  | • the story of the *Pacific Warriors’ actions* as outlined above |
| (3) Characters/actors | participants including:  
• Martin Luther King  
• John Lewis  
• Amelia Boynton  
• George Wallace  
• Alabama police  
• Sheriff Jim Clark  
• Lyndon Johnson  
• people participating in the marches  
• the general public  | • the *Pacific Climate Warriors* and their supporters  
• profiles of individual warriors were available in a media kit (350, 2014a) and individual warriors were interviewed (e.g. Ewart, 2013). Warriors then spoke at public forums across Australia  
• police  
• Bill Ryan, Kokoda veteran |
| (4) Observers/audience | a national audience, sustained over time | • significant impact on climate campaigners who were involved;  
• unknown but limited impact on national audience  
• large audiences for public forums with the Warriors, including (e.g.) forums following the event and ahead of the 2019 election in regional Queensland (Field Notes, 2014; 350 Australia, 2019).  |
| (5) Location/‘stage’, | • *Edmund Pettus Bridge*  
• the *road* from Selma to  | • *canoes* as the ‘vessel’ for the message |
| ‘props’, ‘costumes’ and ‘set’ | Montgomery  
• uniformed police and National Guard  
• Congress  
• State House, Montgomery  
• the White House | • Newcastle harbour and coal ships, representing the ‘source of the problem’  
• national flags of Pacific Island nations  
• traditional Pacific Island dress |
|---|---|---|
| (6) Production design and overall visual impact | • dramatic images at Edmund Pettus bridge  
• images of the final march | • powerful ‘David and Goliath’ imagery, juxtaposing coal ships with Pacific Warriors in canoes  
• Aboriginal, Pacific and Christian ceremonies as part of the event  
• production of imagery with iconic elements, well-suited to social media |
| (7) Choreography and direction | • applying the civil rights movement’s sense of drama (see discussion in Chapter 2)  
• Selection of Selma as a target for a campaign  
• Planning of the journey from Selma to Montgomery | • designing an event where Australian coal exports, climate change and Pacific opposition could come into sharp focus  
• selection of Newcastle as the location and planning of the canoe–coal ship confrontation |
| (8) The means to transmit the drama to an audience | • national media coverage, covering the story as it unfolded | • national media coverage largely for a single-day event  
• local forums, featuring a strong sense of dramatic ‘stage presence’ (Clark, 2014; Paris, 2014).  
• A team of photographers, filmmakers, bloggers and supporters on social media  
• The Warriors’ use of social media |
| (9) Power and the political context | • direct engagement with President Johnson and members of Congress  
• sustained media coverage  
• existing political will and political strength, developed throughout the civil rights movement  
• a high level of existing tension in the political climate, where an event like these marches could trigger a national crisis | • building an entirely new movement  
• strong connections to powerful people in the Pacific  
• weak connections with powerful people in Australia  
• law enforcement limits the Warriors’ capacity to expand the blockade |

Both ‘Selma’ and ‘Newcastle’ took place against a rich and deep ‘cultural horizon’, or cultural-symbolic background: powerful narratives of historical experience and cultural identity created a key context for how the political theatre created by both
events would be interpreted. The interaction between cultural horizon, ‘script’ and overall message is important for political communication: the strength of the resonance between each of these influences the depth of the ‘chord’ that is struck for audiences. Following the successful third march from Selma, King spoke on the steps of the capitol at Montgomery. He evoked themes including: ‘the realization of the American dream’; ‘moving to the land of freedom’; and ‘the arc of the moral universe’ (in Carson, 2001; L4805).\textsuperscript{14} Buckingham (2014) also invoked Biblical imagery, calling the Warriors’ blockade the ‘David versus Goliath campaign of the year’ in her assessment of ‘the ‘Top 10 sustainability campaigns of 2014’. Others drew the same ‘David and Goliath’ parallel (e.g. Lutunatabua, 2015b; PL). As well as strong Judeo-Christian roots, grounding in Pacific traditions was also fundamental to the Warriors’ campaign. 350 Pacific Coordinator Koreti Tiumalu explained:

The idea behind the canoes is about connecting the past with the present. It’s about showing that our Pacific Island communities have been living sustainably off the land for generations, and that we are now being affected by climate change. Our key message is around saying that ‘We’re not drowning, we’re fighting.’ We want to stand up for the Pacific...

Our idea is to share and use our traditional knowledge of our warrior history to be able to help guide us in how we can change and heal what is happening to our islands today. Those canoes and how they have been built are symbolic of a people who are desperate to stand together and do something in a way we’ve never done before, but to use those traditional skills and knowledge as a way to tell that story (Butler, 2014).

It is easy to imagine that the Warriors had a powerful effect on audiences in the Pacific (PL argues that this was in fact the case). Yet perhaps the fact that a rich Australian cultural horizon was not included in the Warriors’ message limited the

\textsuperscript{14} Continuing to draw on a symbolic universe that had deep resonance in his context, King also invoked the actions of ‘the Lord’, who, in the words of the \textit{Battle Hymn of the Republic}, was ‘trampling out the vintage where the grapes of wrath are stored’, who has ‘loosed the fateful lightning of his terrible swift sword’, and whose ‘truth is marching on’. It was a message that dovetailed with other words in his speech: ‘We are on the move now. The burning of our churches will not deter us. We are on the move now. The bombing of our homes will not dissuade us. We are on the move now. The beating and killing of our clergymen and young people will not divert us. We are on the move now…’ (in Carson, 2001; L4805).
potential to strike a chord with Australian audiences (in the way that the Aboriginal Tent Embassy did,\textsuperscript{15} or in the way that Selma did in the US).

To address other ‘elements’ of political theatre: in Selma, ‘actors’ were re-enacting an existing plot line involving a predictable but powerful sequence of events (King in Carson, 2001: see Chapter 2). For the Pacific Warriors, the slower consequences of climate change were harder to establish in a dramatic way, although dramatic photographs were taken, and events such as the king tides in the Marshall Islands immediately beforehand—see Figure 6.1—pointed to what was at stake. Key events in the Selma campaign unfolded over a period of months in the public eye (Lewis, 2015). By contrast, although the Pacific Warriors’ ‘script’ spanned many months, only the events of a single day became widely known. In this sense, what happened in Newcastle—for most of the ‘audience’—was a ‘one-scene play’, and a richer dramatic sequence was visible only to those who followed the events more closely. The symbols associated with Selma were charged in a way that drew in the public and demanded a response from politicians. These included the visible violence that was emblematic of racism in the US, and which intensified public reactions. A dramatic sense of ‘What will happen next?’ was not strong in the Warriors’ blockade. Selma featured charismatic leaders—as did the Pacific Warriors (Field Notes, 2014); however, in the case of Selma, many of them were nationally well-known, whereas, as the following chapter will argue, most of the ‘characters’ at Newcastle were being introduced to Australians for the first time. They were known as individuals only to those who followed the event closely. Yet, through their identification with Pacific culture, the Warriors brought to climate campaigning not just a political ideology or a mobilised network, but also a sense of authenticity.\textsuperscript{16} This was not about being

\textsuperscript{15} In the case of the Aboriginal Tent Embassy, despite the divide between black and white experience, there were commonalities in the ‘cultural horizon’ used by the Aboriginal activists, including the significance of Canberra as a shared and iconic location, and a shared history, even though it was one that was experienced in very different ways by black and white people in Australia. Perhaps as well, the symbolism of camping in a tent and the ‘larrikinism’ and humour of pitching a tent where ‘they were not supposed to’ resonated with audiences. Symbolic politics does not necessarily need to ‘speak the language’ of its audience, particularly if it addresses fundamental human experiences that are shared across contexts. For example, iconic images of human suffering in war or natural disasters do not require the subject of the image to be of the same ethnic group or to have similar cultural experiences to the audience. Yet, the points at which a symbol and its audience share common ground are important for political communication, and are worth assessing when analysing symbolic politics.\textsuperscript{16} Alexander and Mast (2006) treat authenticity as a perceived quality, writing, ‘authenticity is an interpretive category rather than an ontological state. The status of authenticity is arrived at, is contingent, and results from processes of social construction’ (p. 7). Encircled by postmodernism, constructivism and poststructuralism, the concept of authenticity may appear to have limited prospects in the contemporary academic world—at least
frozen in the past, but, as Tiumalu states, integrating cultural tradition into the present. In terms of political communication, this authenticity may also have registered with Australians (again, this is a question for audience research).

Perhaps most importantly for political impact, Selma represented the ‘crest’ of a ‘wave’ of civil rights movement activity, building on substantial existing political momentum. Alexander includes power in his list of ‘elements of performance’, and the civil rights movement had established a substantial amount of it. They had strong existing community support, and they also had developed relationships with national decision-makers. This was the result of a ‘wave’ that had been building for years, and the Pacific Warriors lacked this advantage. Further, campaigners at Selma were able to precipitate a national crisis—something far beyond the aims of the Pacific Warriors. As quoted in Chapter 2, Martin Luther King wrote about ‘creat[ing] such a crisis and foster[ing] such a tension that a community which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue’ and dramatising the issue so that ‘it can no longer be ignored’ (in Carson, 2001: L3218). The creation of such a crisis is a function not just of theatrical skill and existing perceptions of the issues, but also of the stability and strength of existing power relationships. Unlike the US civil rights movement, the Pacific Warriors were beginning a new ‘wave’. They drew attention to the nexus between coal, climate change and Australia; however, the circumstances did not yet exist for them to do so in a way that could create a national political turning point.

While the Newcastle blockade did not involve symbolic power exercised on the scale of Selma—or Gandhi’s Salt March—these are not the most appropriate yardsticks to apply to this event. Perhaps a better ‘yardstick’ for the Pacific Warriors precedes the movement of the 1960s. In the 1947 ‘Journey of Reconciliation’, a small group of activists blazed a trail (or ‘began a wave’) by challenging segregation on interstate bus travel. Their work was a precursor to the 1961 Freedom Rides, and involved some of the same campaigners (Rustin, 2003; Arsenault, 2011). Similarly, rather than

insofar as it is used to refer to a characteristic that inheres in a person or group. If, however, the Pacific Warriors are from islands that are really under threat from climate change, and if climate change is really caused mainly by carbon emissions, and if Newcastle really is the world’s largest coal port—and if the Warriors hold real fears for their islands’ future, then the Warriors were doing something much larger than calculated image-construction and relying on dramatic ‘artifice’. There was a deep relationship between what was being ‘signified’, the people who were doing the ‘signifying’, and the ‘signifiers’ they used.
gauging the political significance of the Newcastle blockade by the standards of Gandhi’s Salt March, it might be more readily compared to the 1906 meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa, where members of the Indian community inaugurated the first nonviolent satyagraha campaign (Gandhi, 1968 [1928]). Whether the Pacific Warriors go on to reach the heights of the Freedom Rides or the Salt March is a question for the future; however, the examples provide instances of how, to quote Paul Kelly and Kevin Carmody (1993), ‘from little things, big things [can] grow’.  

The analysis of political theatre shows that the Pacific Warriors have many of the ingredients for ‘big things’ to grow. The case being made here is not that any case of symbolic action like the Pacific Warriors’ blockade is ‘potentially’ politically important because it ‘just might’ escalate into something larger. It is already clear that the Pacific Warriors have had a significant impact on movement-building and have been highly successful in creating a platform for engaging with their audiences. This thesis argues that, of themselves, these are political changes because they change political conditions and make new things possible (see the definition in Chapter 1).

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17 Gandhi’s method has often been known to the world as ‘nonviolence’, which he termed Ahimsa. Gandhi also used a different term, ‘Satyagraha’, which roughly translates as ‘truth force’. Thus, the 1930 Salt March was the ‘Salt Satyagraha’. Significantly for this thesis, through combining ‘truth’ and ‘force’ the term Satyagraha implies a form of action-that-communicates. The term Satyagraha originates from Gandhi’s work in South Africa. In 1908, over a year into the nonviolent struggle of the Indian community in that country, Gandhi (1968 [1928]) writes that a prize was announced in the newspaper Indian Opinion, ‘to be awarded to the reader who invented the best designation for our struggle. We thus received a number of suggestions… Shri Maganlal Gandhi was one of the competitors and he suggested the word “Sadagraha”, meaning ‘firmness in a good cause.’ I liked the word, but it did not fully represent the whole idea I wished it to connote. I therefore corrected it to “Satyagraha”. Truth (satya) implies love, and firmness (agraha) engenders and therefore serves as a synonym for force. I thus began to call the Indian movement “Satyagraha”, that is to say, the Force which is born of Truth and Love or non-violence, and gave up the use of the phrase “passive resistance” in connection with it’ (p.105-6).

18 This song celebrates another ‘small’ symbolic event which had enormous repercussions for the land rights movement—the 1966 Walk Off from Wave Hill, led by Gurindji elder Vincent Lingiari (Hokari, 2000).
Assessing the political significance of the Newcastle blockade

Given the analysis of mobilisation, communication and ‘communicative mobilisation’ above, what conclusions can be drawn about the political significance of the Newcastle blockade? Comments from John Maynard Keynes and political sociologist Mabel Berezin offer some valuable perspectives. Concluding his *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, Keynes (1920) writes,

The events of the coming year will not be shaped by the deliberate acts of statesmen, but by the hidden currents, flowing continually beneath the surface of political history, of which no one can predict the outcome. In one way only can we influence these hidden currents—by setting in motion those forces of instruction and imagination which change *opinion* (p. 296).\(^ {19} \)

Keynes may not have been thinking of symbolic protest action; however, his points about ‘setting in motion’ the ‘forces of imagination’ which ‘change opinion’ are

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\(^ {19} \) Reflecting on the First World War, Keynes continues: ‘The assertion of truth, the unveiling of illusion, the dissipation of hate, the enlargement and instruction of men’s hearts and minds, must be the means’ for this process. He then quotes Shelley’s *Prometheus*, and adds some poignant statements:

Our power of feeling or caring beyond the immediate questions of our own material well-being is temporarily eclipsed. The greatest events outside our own direct experience and the most dreadful anticipations cannot move us.

In each human heart terror survives
The ruin it has gorged: the lofiest fear
All that they would disdain to think were true:
Hypocrisy and custom make their minds
The fanes of many a worship, now outworn.
They dare not devise good for man’s estate,
And yet they know not that they do not dare.
The good want power but to weep barren tears.
The powerful goodness want: worse need for them.
The wise want love; and those who love want wisdom;
And all best things are thus confused to ill.
Many are strong and rich, and would be just,
But live among their suffering fellow-men
As if none felt: they know not what they do.

We have been moved already beyond endurance, and need rest. Never in the lifetime of men now living has the universal element in the soul of man burnt so dimly.
For these reasons the true voice of the new generation has not yet spoken, and silent opinion is not yet formed.
To the formation of the general opinion of the future I dedicate this book’ (pp. 296-8).
worth applying to instances of the climate movement’s use of symbolic politics. Berezin (2012) adds to the picture in an analysis of the significance of Ronald Reagan’s 1987 speech at the Brandenberg Gate, when he told Mikhail Gorbachev, ‘Tear down this wall’. Reagan’s speech, she argues, ‘was politically important even if it was not causal with respect to the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc’ (L15482). For Berezin, Reagan’s speech was an ‘event’, as distinct from just an ‘occurrence.’ Events, she writes, can be ‘templates of possibility’ (L15646). They engage the collective imagination and have the capacity to alter public perceptions that may in the future alter political actions. Because they make manifest the possible, they have the power to engage collective emotions from fear to collective euphoria… Events worthy of study force changes in collective perception (L15642, 15695).

Berezin argues that ‘events’ can become ‘political facts’—Durkheimian ‘social facts’ that ‘combine emotional valence, collective perception, institutional arrangements, and implicit cultural knowledge’ (L15643). They mark ‘salient moments in collective national perceptions’ (L15867) and provide templates for what is politically possible. She discusses ‘spectacular’ events, which ‘aim to create experiences that can be re-absorbed into collective experience’ (L15812), and which articulate ‘what is legitimate and what is not’ (L15822). The Berlin Wall did not fall as a result of Reagan’s speech—yet, to use the term discussed in Chapter 2, it fell when a new ‘political climate’ had developed, and this speech contributed to creating it. This new climate was shaped by new ‘templates’ for what was politically possible. The shifts in perception that were associated with this new climate mattered politically. Berezin does not argue for direct ‘links in a causal chain’ (L15879) between Reagan’s speech and the fall of the wall.20 However, drawing on her analysis, lines can be drawn between symbolically significant and emotionally charged events, the ‘climate of opinion’, the political climate’ and political outcomes. Instead of causal chains, perhaps the net effect of ‘forcings’ (Hansen, 2009a) that influence the Earth’s climate is a better analogy.21 Climatic events cannot be attributed to any one coal-fired power

20 Perhaps an expanded sense of causality is needed, since ‘politically important’ surely means ‘causal’ in some sense, even if it is impossible to precisely pin-point its extent and how it comes about.

21 A climate forcing is ‘an energy imbalance imposed on the climate system either externally or by human activities’ (National Research Council, 2006: online). Climate forcings include: solar irradiance, greenhouse gases, aerosols, land use and surface reflectivity.
station, solar plant, country or industry; however, they all make an impact, and some do so more than others.

The Pacific Warriors’ blockade may not be a political event on the scale of those described by Keynes or Berezin. Clearly, however, the blockade was imaginative, and it set a dynamic ‘in motion’. It is best understood as the first in a series of events. Less can be claimed about its role in changing opinion; however, as the first in a series of events, its impact is not yet complete. The level of ‘changes in collective perception’ it achieved is a question for audience research; however, as is argued above, the blockade provided rich ‘resources for persuasion’ which did not previously exist. Further, it had an important impact not just in ‘causing mobilisation’ but in shaping the outlook and ‘opinion’ of those who mobilised (for relevant quotes from interviews, see the chapters that follow). In turn, these people became active in a movement that aims to further influence opinion and political outcomes. In these senses, while the Warriors’ blockade does not attain the status of a Durkheimian social fact (or maybe even a Berezinian ‘political fact’), it can be understood as contributing to an enabling political environment for shifting the politics of coal. The Pacific Warriors ‘engaged the collective imagination’ and ‘collective emotions’ of climate campaigners who responded to the blockade. The experiences at Newcastle were powerfully ‘reabsorbed’ into the collective experience of 350 Pacific and the Australian climate movement. The blockade challenged the ‘implicit cultural knowledge’ (Berezin 2012: L15641) about coal and Pacific Islanders, and articulating ‘what is legitimate and what is not’ was central to the Warriors’ message. The possibility of ending Australian coal exports was ‘made manifest’, in a sense comparable to the possibility of the fall of the Berlin Wall being made manifest culturally if not materially through Reagan’s speech: a new political ‘current’ was established, and existing currents (e.g. plans to challenge the coal industry articulated by Hepburn et al., 2011) were strengthened.

Conclusion

The case of the Pacific Climate Warriors illustrates important aspects of symbolic politics. The task of drawing lines between symbolic power and broader political outcomes is more difficult in this case than it is, for example, when analysing events like the 1965 Selma-to-Montgomery marches. At ‘Selma’, social drama was followed
by public outcry, which was followed by more social drama—which was followed by legislation. In Cox’s (2010) terms, there was a clear link between ‘communication that mobilises, and mobilisation that enables a particular end’ (p. 125). Selma demonstrated what Alexander (2006a) called a ‘spiral relationship between communication and regulation’ (L3919). In the case of the Pacific Warriors, the clearest politically-significant spiral was between communication and movement-building. Yet, as well as this, the blockade created new and vivid ‘resources for persuasion’ that carried cultural weight and depth, a new ‘vessel’ for the Warriors’ message, and a new platform from which to communicate it. There were also new ‘templates’ for what could become politically possible: for key climate activists, it became possible to imagine a campaign against coal, focusing on impacts in the Pacific and on Australia’s global responsibilities. In response to the ‘raw’ power of the fossil fuel industry, the Warriors and their supporters offered vivid political theatre, compelling images, and a cascade of political actions. Their political theatre, in Apter’s (2006) terms, gave climate politics ‘clarity, miniaturizing, focusing, concentrating and intensifying’ the issues (p. 227). The moral authority that the Warriors gained has added an important dimension to their work. The Pacific Warriors exemplify points made by Bill McKibben (2013): ‘If this fight was about power, then we who wanted change had to assemble some. Environmentalists clearly weren’t going to outspend the fossil fuel industry, so we’d need to find other currencies: the currencies of movement. Instead of money, passion; instead of money, numbers; instead of money, creativity’ (L174). As is argued earlier in this chapter, it is worth reflecting on what happens in climate politics when elements like those listed above are lacking, and what is added when they are present.

Thus, like the 1906 meeting of Satyagrahi activists in Johannesburg, or the 1947 Journey of Reconciliation, the Pacific Warriors have ‘started something’—the existing cascade of subsequent events already demonstrates this. Taking up Cox’s (2010) critique of Step It Up, there is a good answer to his concern that ‘Although the day’s events were creative and the participants enthusiastic, little happened afterwards’ (p. 126). In fact, 350.org ‘happened’. Now an international movement, it has given new energy and focus to global climate campaigning, placing the role of the fossil fuel industry front and centre. The divestment movement that 350 initiated has surged

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22 One instance of the ‘spiral’ between ‘communicative mobilisation’ and regulation is evident in 350’s campaign against the Keystone XL pipeline. It was stopped in the US under Obama’s Presidency, confounding
globally. Through 350’s emphasis on local organising, 350 Pacific developed, giving rise to the Pacific Warriors. In Australia, 350 and its staff have played a central role in developing and building the Stop Adani movement (Beresford, 2018; Field Notes, 2017). The Pacific Warriors have been engaged in the ‘cascade’ of activities described above, such as school strike events (e.g. 350 Pacific, 2019). Thus, just as 350.org shifted from a small local network to a global movement, relying on symbolic actions as well as community organising, 350 Pacific’s work is also growing, as is their partnership with the Australian climate movement.

Cox’s critique of communication-without-systemic-strategy is pointed and important, and it is worth factoring in to any concerted effort to influence or analyse the work of the climate movement. However, the Newcastle blockade took place at a time when campaigns to close the Australian coal industry were at a nascent stage (see Denniss, 2015). As long as coal mining in Australia brings in significant export income and retains broad institutional and parliamentary support, there are formidable obstacles facing any groups which aim to end it. The political outcomes that Cox would like to see require a shift in the political climate—one that is now occurring, but is a long way from being fully realised. This is illustrated by the outcome of Australia’s 2019 election. Despite the efforts of NGOs to make it a ‘climate election’ (e.g. Australian Conservation Foundation, 2019), the results show that most Australian politicians and the Australian public do not ‘imagine’ climate change as a crisis that requires measures such as an end to the Australian coal industry. The position taken in this thesis is that (1) the way in which coal is ‘imagined’ as central to Australian life and the Australian economy\(^{23}\) is itself a significant political obstacle to achieving the objectives of the climate movement; (2) the pathway between an initial vision of ending the coal industry and eventually achieving this goal goes through a process of changing the ‘climate of opinion’—the way we ‘imagine’ coal and climate change; (3) a powerful social movement is necessary for change like this to occur (McKibben in Dhabuwala, 2016; Klein, 2014; La Rocca, 2014); and (4) symbolic politics is important for making this happen—both for building this kind of movement and for engaging the public imagination. This widespread expectations amongst Washington insiders (Mark, 2015; Russell et al., 2014).

\(^{23}\)See for example the advertisements developed for the Minerals Council of Australia entitled ‘Australian Mining: this is our story’ which appeared after Julia Gillard confirmed plans for a carbon tax for Australia (cited in Chapter 4: see Lawrence Creative Strategy, 2011a, 2011b; Minerals Council of Australia, 2011a, 2011b).
may involve dramatising the problem and its causes so that they become visible, ‘capturing the imagination’ of significant sections of the public, eroding the legitimacy of coal, projecting what a new future could look like, ‘normalising’ this new future, allaying people’s fears, and demonstrating links between this new future and positive values that people hold. The case of the Pacific Warriors’ blockade and the events that followed demonstrates important aspects of this process at work. ‘Changing the climate of opinion’ creates conditions that may be needed for achieving instrumental aims: the perspectives offered by Alexander, Keynes and Berezin point to the importance of this aspect of politics. A focus on instrumental aims alone leaves out a great deal of politically significant terrain, and, without the effective use of symbolic power, instrumental aims like ending Australian coal exports may remain out of reach for the climate movement.

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In a report about the king tides that swamped the capital of the Marshall Islands the week before the Newcastle blockade, Marshallese Warrior Milañ Loeak commented on what the Warriors were trying to achieve:

Stopping one day of coal exports alone won’t keep our homes above water, but it marks the rise of the Pacific Climate Warriors, and the beginning of our defence of the Pacific Islands (Yeo, 2014).

Elsewhere she wrote:

Blocking the Newcastle port may not, in the end, make even the slightest bit of difference to the mining companies of the world, but our aim is to send a message to the organisations that profit from the extraction of fossil fuels: they can no longer distance themselves from the impacts of their actions (Loeak, 2014).

Lutunatabua (2015b) described the blockade as ‘a turning point for us’, stating, ‘our focus must be on building large social movements that can work across cultures and differences—creating the political power necessary to challenge the world’s largest corporations’. Packard (2014a) adds:
The odds of success at keeping the Islands above water remains an outside chance. But prior to the Warrior blockade of Newcastle Port, there was no genuine fight for the Islands beyond what Pacific Prime Ministers and Presidents could do through formal governmental channels. There is now a fight on for the Islands, and that story will deepen in the approaching months as the Warriors now plan for where, when and how they will strike next.

Sending a message to the fossil fuel industry, establishing and strengthening a movement which will ‘fight’ for the Pacific Islands, creating ‘turning points’ and defining moments, and beginning a ‘story’ where coal and Pacific Islanders are part of the climate change narrative (see e.g. Packard, 2014a; Tiumalu in Butler, 2014; 350 Pacific, 2015e)—all these are factors in creating the political power the climate movement needs. Cox points beyond these factors to what else needs to happen. Alexander, Berezin and McKibben emphasise the political significance of symbolic action because of how it communicates and mobilises, and the political energy it gavlanises. Questions about broader strategy and political leverage raised by Cox are important. So is symbolic action, since what McKibben called the ‘currencies of movement’ and what Keynes called ‘hidden currents’ that are shaped by the ‘forces of instruction and imagination’ are important for shaping the directions that climate politics takes.
Chapter 7

Narrative and the work of the climate movement

In a collection of essays about responding to climate change, US political scientist Bill Chaloupka (2007) discusses the capacity of a ‘dramatic, well-aimed story’ to produce the kind of changes in awareness that spark a movement, and that in turn create political change. Citing the example of Rachel Carson’s *Silent Spring*, he asks how climate science can be translated into stories that make a difference, arguing, ‘It’s clear that to build a green future, we must change our politics. To begin, we must recognise a simple truth: politics is distinctively narrative. It’s done with stories’ (p. 198). Chaloupka’s position suggests that narrative is an important dimension of any form of politics. Certainly, bringing about ‘changes in awareness’ and ‘sparking a movement’ are important for achieving the climate movement’s goals. This chapter addresses the central research question’s focus on (1) how symbolic politics figures in the movement’s work and (2) how it matters for political change, first by examining the place of narrative in the way climate campaigners understand their own work and how narrative figures in formal climate movement strategy statements. Concepts from narrative theory such as plot, ‘the moral of the story’ and the tensions between romantic and melodramatic genres are used as a basis for analysing how narrative figures in the climate movement’s work. The chapter then addresses how this matters for political change by analysing interviewees’ comments in relation to three areas: the contribution of narrative to movement mobilisation and to political communication, and its importance in debates which hinge on legitimacy and reputation. The chapter reflects that while the climate movement can sometimes apply a limited approach to narrative (where, for example, ‘story’ is interchangeable with ‘message’), a rich understanding of narrative supplies valuable concepts both for understanding the movement’s work, and for assessing how narrative is used to influence political outcomes.

The importance of narrative

The difference between rational argument and narrative can be compared to the difference between IPCC reports and the story of Greta Thunberg, the founder of the #SchoolStrike4Climate movement (Crouch, 2018). For all their importance, IPCC
reports lack the compelling power of narratives. Narratives translate the issues into dramatic ‘story events’ which the story’s characters influence and respond to. Story events occur in settings, and are structured by plots (Labov and Waletzky, 1967; McKee, 2010; Labov, 2003; White, 1980). Fisher (1984) speaks to the contrast between narrative and logical argument. He argues that narrative is more effective: it works through identification, not deliberation, and comes closer ‘to capturing the experience of the world, simultaneously appealing to the various senses, to reason and emotion, to intellect and imagination, and to fact and value’ (pp. 14-15).¹

Polkinghorne—like Fisher, a key figure in the ‘narrative turn’ in the social sciences (Riessman, 2008)—argues that narrative is ‘the primary form by which human experience is made meaningful’ (1988: p. 1). He explains that narratives enable us to make sense of human situations by placing them in a plot which gives them a context and makes them comprehensible. Bruner (1985, 2003), who distinguishes narrative and ‘paradigmatic’ modes of thought, maintains that narrative is ‘our preferred, perhaps even our obligatory medium’ for expressing the human condition (2003: p. 89). Significantly for climate change, he argues that narrative ‘specialises in what is in jeopardy’ (p. 90). From a narrative perspective, stories are more than sources of insight and information: they are constitutive of the way we see the world and how we act in response (Squire et al., 2013; Paschen and Ison, 2014). Stone (2002) extends the argument to policy analysis, arguing that policy definitions usually rely on a narrative structure.

Narrative is integral to the visions of symbolic power articulated by key thinkers whose work informs this thesis. Brysk (1995) argues, ‘We think about politics in stories, and our consciousness is changed when new stories persuade us to adopt a new paradigm. Collective action itself then involves a kind of storytelling or political theater, performing the new paradigm to persuade others’ (p. 561). In Brysk’s view, symbolic politics produces collective action and agenda change through the ‘narrative structuring, interpretive resonance, and projection of affective information’ (p. 561), opening hearts and changing minds. Consequent changes in political behaviour come about through, for example, ‘shifting priorities, building collective identities, shaping social agendas, or challenging state legitimacy’ (p. 561). Brysk’s focus on the ‘enacted narratives’ of political theatre is emphasised in cultural sociology. Smith and Howe (2015) argue that ‘climate change… is a signifier within a

¹ For Fisher, this applies unless the purpose of communication is technical.
discursive field that is made up of codes and narratives, characters and plots, performances and settings whose totality is captured in the concept of the social drama’ (L4433). Mast (2012) writes that political campaigns ‘work through theatrical and narrative means to impose a particular dramatic structure on an electoral competition. They seek to define the event’s protagonists, emplot them into a world characterized by the centrality of particular issues facing the voting community, and dramatize the consequences of audiences’ potential voting actions. Put another way, campaigns are in the business of character development and plot construction’ (L16235). Alexander (2006a) describes ‘the rich narrative forms’ that shape political life (L757). He analyses how social movements rework existing narratives, drawing on images, metaphors, and myths. Contests between social movements and their opponents involve ‘archetypical narrative structures com[ing] forcefully into play’ (L2870). In Alexander’s analysis, US civil rights movement leaders ‘translat[ed] the particular experiences and conditions of the racial underclass into compelling codes and narratives that [could] gain psychological identification’ from supporters’ (L4836).

A growing body of literature on narrative and social movements (Polletta, 2009; Polletta and Chen, 2012; Davis, 2012) complements existing literature on framing (e.g. Snow et al. 1986; Benford and Snow, 2000; Lakoff, 2010). While framing literature has largely been grounded in cognitive psychology (Ferree and Merrill, 2000) and cognitive linguistics (Lakoff, 2014), recent research on narrative and social movements has addressed the role of stories in motivating audiences and engaging emotion and identity (Polletta, 2009; Davis, 2012). Davis explains: ‘the framing perspective… overemphasises the role of clearly articulated and coherent reasons for movement activism… In many contexts of action, stories precede frames, stories make frames compelling, and stories overshadow frames in mobilising power and as a political resource.’ Noting the ‘symbolically evocative’ power of stories, he adds, ‘Participants… must do more than agree with a particular formulation of grievances or a rationale for… action, they must be moved to act, to take risks, to get involved. Participants’ involvement is perhaps never simply logical and instrumental, but… also imaginative, intuitive, and emotional’ (pp. 24-25).

Literature on climate change and narrative has addressed themes including influencing public opinion (Jones, 2010), climate change adaptation (Paschen and
Ison, 2014), media coverage of climate change (McComas and Shanahan, 1999) and climate change communication (Jones and Peterson, 2017). Smith and Howe (2015) introduce insights from literary theory to the analysis of public discourse on climate change. Ghosh (2016) identifies a broad ‘imaginative and cultural failure that lies at the heart of the climate crisis’ (L111) and addresses the difficulties that writers of literary fiction have faced in coming to grips with climate change. (Further, he offers provocative suggestions about where responsibility for the crisis lies, stating that future generations ‘will certainly blame the leaders and politicians of this time for their failure to address the climate crisis. But they may well hold artists and writers to be equally culpable—for the imagining of possibilities is not, after all, the job of politicians and bureaucrats’: L1837.) Much of this literature usefully informs thinking about the role of narrative in climate politics; however, a focus on the strategic use of narrative by the climate movement is generally missing.²

The climate movement’s use of narrative

References to narrative featured repeatedly in interviews conducted for this research—often unprompted, indicating that the term is part of many interviewees’ everyday language. EF reflects on the climate rallies held shortly after Tony Abbott became Prime Minister:

We’ve got a conservative government, they [scrapped the carbon price]... they weren’t scared of us, or we weren’t doing our job as communicators effectively, and Tony Abbott took over the narrative... Part of the [rally] objective was to change the narrative, and I think we did for about a week—but he’s so damn good at it... those messages [of his] stick (emphasis added, in this quote and those immediately below).

She elaborates:

Abbott was arguing that he had a mandate to cut action on climate change. We were trying to show him that there was this huge group of people who [opposed him]. 50,000 to 60,000 people turning out—who knows whether that

² For existing work on the use of narrative by the climate movement in other national contexts, see for example Wicks (2017) and de Moor and Wahlström (2019).
changed anything, but the idea was to get our messages across with a photo that showed enough people... for us to be able to tell the story that no... You don’t have a mandate...

I think it worked momentarily... I don’t think it worked long term—I think he’s better at [communicating] than we are... The big one for me—a question that I can’t answer is—how you stop [the loss of the carbon price] from happening again?... I don’t know what went wrong really. But I think a big part of the answer to that is the narrative stuff and the communications stuff.

AR places stories at the centre of the process of engaging with people about climate change: ‘I think narrative is the key to communication... Trust and authenticity come into it. Narrative, values... they’re really fundamental, but for me, narrative is really, really important’. LT observes, ‘The Labor party doesn’t have a narrative to support climate change. They are very poor communicators’. CS argues that to ‘communicate the story’ is a form of impact: ‘to know, become aware is the first and most important step for any change to happen’. CF argues, ‘What we are doing—in my opinion—should be much more artistic—not just artistic in a beautiful sense, but artistic in a way that grips people into a story that’s about their values and society’s values’. She asks, ‘How can we enter into dialogue with the ANZAC story... different stories that a broader part of society engages with?’, adding, ‘I like dealing in metaphors and I guess in stories... I think it’s really important to have at the forefront of our mind the symbols of our culture and how to use a campaign to re-inscribe those symbols in a new way, or to reinterpret the stories of the culture in a new way. I think that some of the most powerful movements have been able to do that’. PL describes ‘the story that environment and economics are at loggerheads’ as a political obstacle for the climate movement, and argues that ‘narrative-based, a meaning-based change’ provides a way to shift what is ‘deeply embedded in our political economy’.

The frequency of references to narrative by climate campaigners is not always matched with a clear model of narrative and how it works. As Andrews et al. (2013)

3 She comments on how An Inconvenient Truth was ‘so powerful... [It] just really shifts people and wakes them up... Gore’s film was a fine example of communication. I think it fell down at the very end because it didn’t give you something powerful to do... But he tells that story really well... weaving it in with his personal story’.
note, narrative is ‘a term frequently heard in popular discourse’ and politicians’
political standing is widely attributed to their use of narrative—yet the term can
have ‘a meaning so broad as to rob it of descriptive, let alone explanatory power’
(pp. 3, 7). As Paschen and Ison (2014) state, narrative has become a buzz word. At
times in the interviews, ‘narrative’ could readily be substituted with ‘message’,
‘theme within a communication strategy’, or even ‘communication strategy’ and
‘overall public understanding of an issue’. Interviewees in this project used the term
in both this more limited sense and in richer ways. They referred to ‘the narrative of
moving beyond fossil fuels’ (SR) and ‘shifting the narrative in the public square’
(GL). MH spoke of tensions between ‘the science story’ and other messaging. EF
commented that ‘it’s hard to measure the impact of that kind of stuff, but I think it
changes the narrative’. Richer examples included ‘there’s a lot of theatre in
campaigning… often you have to tell your story through symbols’ (SR); and ‘We
offered the Coalition [the chance to] be heroes in the story’ if they showed support for
renewables (GL). For PL, ‘some really great… storytelling’ from the Lock the Gate
movement⁴ ‘is explicitly about changing the meaning… shifting the discourse, I
guess—that’s the point’.

Thus, it is not difficult to find references to narrative climate movement members’
accounts of their work, and a sense that narrative is somehow centrally important.
Given the linkage between narrative and political impact that is implicit in
Chaloupka’s argument about politics being ‘done with stories’, how does narrative
figure in the climate movement’s formal strategic thinking?

Narrative in formal climate movement strategies

To gain insights into the role of narrative in climate movement strategic thinking,
three strategies are analysed below. The first, Pollution, Politics and Power: Getting on
the Path to Winning on Climate Change, was developed as a basis for national strategy
development by La Rocca (2014). It identifies ‘deliver[ing] a powerful and resonant
story’ as one of seven key interventions. La Rocca observes, ‘It is no news that the
story about climate change is heavily shaped by powerful vested interests... Our job

⁴ Lock the Gate is a campaign against coal mining, coal seam gas and fracking, organised at local level across
Australia.
is to tell a more compelling story’ (p. 7). As indicated in Figure 7.1, ‘changing the story’ is a key element of the framework, standing alongside movement-building, economic pressure and political and legal change. The central goal of ‘changing the story’ is to ‘[frame] the dominant narrative in a way that engages our base, shifts the centre, neutralises our opponents and delivers outcomes for a safer climate’. La Rocca calls on the climate movement to develop a new story featuring ‘visible villains and heroes (e.g. big polluters exposed as bad guys, clean industry leaders seen as good guys)’. This story would portray how the villains are ‘poisoning people and the planet and need to be controlled by the community (victims/heroes) and those who wish to represent us’. Significantly, the community is seen as a character in the story: supporters have ‘roles to play and power to win’ (p. 11).

Figure 7.1: Key strategies outlined by La Rocca (2014).

A second document, Stopping the Australian Coal Export Boom (Hepburn et al., 2011), received front page coverage in the Australian Financial Review (Stevens et al., 2012). This document outlines proposals for opposing the expansion of the Australian coal industry. ‘Changing the story of coal’ is listed as one of several strategic projects. The document envisages that coal would become seen as ‘a destructive industry that destroys the landscape and communities, corrupts our democracy, and threatens the global climate’. The authors explain: ‘The Australian
community tolerates the massive negative environmental, social and health impacts of the coal industry because these impacts are largely invisible, and the industry is widely seen as the backbone of the economy, creating jobs and prosperity. In order to win significant ground against the coal industry, we need to change the story of coal’ (p. 9). After outlining goals to do with changing perceptions of the coal industry, the authors explain: ‘We can [achieve these goals] by telling powerful, visual stories that resonate with widely held values in the Australian community’. ‘Changing the story’ would involve articulating ‘an inspiring vision of a future beyond coal’, and would enable the movement to ‘build new alliances, engage and mobilise new parts of the community’. It would undermine the social license of the industry, ‘thereby gradually removing political support’. The project envisages creating ‘powerful visual materials that reframe the story of coal’, and creating an ‘investigations capacity to continually expose the many scandals of the coal industry’, which would create a steady stream of news stories to ‘undermine key myths upon which the social license of the coal industry depends’ (p. 9).

These documents articulate approaches that have become prominent in climate campaigning in subsequent years, and in both, narrative is a central factor in the climate movement’s strategic thinking. The authors envisage a powerful connection between (1) ‘changing the story’ and (2) ‘changing political outcomes’. The pathway between the two includes changing perceptions, building new alliances, engaging and mobilising people, removing social license, and shifting political support. All of these are seen as responses to the climate movement’s story. Further, both documents fuse climate politics, narrative and other forms of symbolic politics. La Rocca’s proposals to ‘change the story’ envisage community members playing out the symbolic role of heroes and villains in a social drama (Turner, 1975; Smith and Howe, 2015). Hepburn et al. envisage a story about coal that is reinforced by powerful imagery.

Significantly, however, narrative is omitted from a third framework, applied by the Stop Adani campaign. This campaign uses much of the language of La Rocca’s document, however a focus on ‘changing the story’ was omitted from the stated goals, which became ‘Build the Movement, Shift the Politics and Stop the Money’.6

6 This three-prong framework for stopping Adani was shared across the climate movement, for example by the Australian Conservation Foundation (2018b), the Australian Youth Climate Coalition (2017) and the Climate
The following table compares Stop Adani’s goals with the statements of strategy in *Pollution, Politics and Power*. Stop Adani’s three main goals are listed together with explanatory text from the campaign website and campaign material.

Table 7.1: Comparison of the Framework for Action outlined by La Rocca (2014) and the national Stop Adani goals.

Elements associated with symbolic politics are indicated in blue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>Pollution, Politics and Power</em> (La Rocca, 2014)</th>
<th><em>Stop Adani movement goals</em> <em>(Stop Adani 2018a, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c)</em>.</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Build a powerful movement</strong>&lt;br&gt;‘Goal: A powerful, vibrant, well-connected and growing movement that is continually winning bigger and more ambitious reforms to cut greenhouse pollution and solve the climate crisis’ (p. 11).</td>
<td><strong>Build the Movement.</strong>&lt;br&gt;‘The only thing that will #StopAdani is a groundswell of people who will stand up and stop this mine. We are building a powerful, growing movement of people who want to #StopAdani… We are over two million people strong and growing. [Activities include] over 160 local #StopAdani action groups… thousands of film screenings… a National Day of Action spelling out #StopAdani in human signs, knock[ing] on thousands of doors and phone bank[ing] hundreds of thousands of people, and… thousands of weekly community actions, protests and creative stunts.’</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Change the story</strong>&lt;br&gt;‘Goal: A compelling and resonant story frames the dominant narrative in a way that engages our base, shifts the centre, neutralises our opponents and delivers outcomes for a safer climate’ (p. 11).</td>
<td><strong>Shift the Politics</strong>&lt;br&gt;‘What's going to motivate our political leaders to #StopAdani? Loud, visible, consistent pressure from our people-powered movement! The #StopAdani movement is using people power to take on the wealth and undue political influence of Adani and the coal lobby. #StopAdani action groups have organised hundreds of meetings with local MPs…’ <em>Campaign initiatives have</em></td>
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<td><strong>Shift the politics and the law</strong>&lt;br&gt;‘Goal: Political conditions ensure only political parties with effective climate policies are electable, the anti-action agenda is marginalised and laws are introduced and enforced to solve the climate crisis’ (p. 12).</td>
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Action Network Australia (2017).
<table>
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<th>Shift the money</th>
<th>Stop the Money</th>
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<tr>
<td>‘Goal: Climate-related risks and opportunities in the finance sector change the dominant narrative… resulting in reduced backing for dirty industries and increased support for clean economy initiatives’ (p. 11).</td>
<td>‘Community pressure has stopped Adani getting a billion-dollar taxpayer-funded loan and stopped 35 of the world’s biggest banks from investing in Adani’s destructive coal mine…’</td>
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<th>Diminish the power of our opponents</th>
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<tr>
<td>‘Goal: Individuals and institutions aligned with big polluters, vested interests and deniers no longer have the power to control a political and business agenda and to hold back action on climate change’ (p. 12).</td>
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(Presenting opponents as the ‘bad guy’ of the story was one of a series of proposed initiatives.)

This table shows that narrative lacks a prominent place in the formal statements of Stop Adani’s campaign’s strategy. In pursuing the goals of building the movement, shifting the politics and stopping the money, the campaign’s most central focus has been on community organising (see Staples, 2014; Rosewarne et al., 2013; Whelan, 2012, 2015 and Chapter 3), which is evident in each of the three goals outlined above, and has certainly been successful in building this movement’s ‘people power’. Stop Adani’s goals articulate a clear ‘theory of change’ that places faith in ‘people power’ to ‘take on the wealth and undue political influence of Adani and the coal lobby’ (Stop Adani 2019b). Yet door-knocking, phone-banking and local group formation on the one hand and establishing powerful narratives in the public mind on the other are distinct (while mutually-reinforcing) tasks. Without organising, Stop Adani (and other campaigns like divestment and Lock the Gate) would never have achieved their successes. Yet, ‘organising’ does not fully describe how these movements have exerted power. In practice, Stop Adani has projected rich stories—even ‘sagas’ (Cousins, 2018)—into the public sphere. It has relied strongly on these for the internal and external tasks of building the movement and engaging the public.7

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7 For example, advertising a screening of the Stop Adani film, Guarding the Galilee, Getup (2018a) writes that it is ‘filled with stories from the front lines of the proposed Adani coal mine’.
Analysing the climate movement’s work in narrative terms: the role of plot, genre, the moral of the story and the ‘unresolved resolution’

Important concepts from narrative theory provide a framework for a broader analysis of how narrative figures in the work of the climate movement. The following section examines the place of narrative in the climate movement’s work in terms of story features including plot, narrative structure, the ‘moral of the story,’ and genre, as well as narrative fidelity (whether a story ‘rings true’). Addressing the point made by La Rocca above about community members having ‘roles to play’, the analysis examines how climate movement storytelling creates opportunities for people to become ‘characters’. Using these concepts gives greater content and depth to understandings of how narrative figures in the climate movement’s work, ensuring the focus is extended beyond the narrower approaches that can equate narrative with ‘message’.

A compelling narrative? The importance of plot: For narratives about climate change to become compelling in the imaginations of audiences, a strong plot matters. Conventionally, a plot features a ‘beginning, middle, and end’. It can also be understood as comprising an orientation (time, setting, characters, and their situation), a complication (an obstacle that needs to be overcome), an evaluation (why this matters, or ‘the moral of the story’), a resolution (outcome) and sometimes a coda (a return to the present: Labov and Waletzky, 1967; Labov, 1972). For White (1980), plot is ‘a structure of relationships by which the events contained in the account are endowed with a meaning by being identified as parts of an integrated whole’ (p. 13). Polletta (2009) describes plot as ‘the logic that makes recounted events meaningful. Plot is the structure of the story. Without it, events would be mere occurrences, discontinuous and separate moments’ (p. 9). In Narratives in Social Science Research (2004), Czarniawska argues that the truth or falsity of a story’s statements do not determine the story’s power: what makes a story powerful is how its events are configured in a plot.

For screenwriting educator Robert McKee (2010), plot is comprised of ‘story events’:

A story event creates meaningful change in the life situation of a character that
is expressed and experienced in terms of a value and achieved through conflict… producing emotion in characters and audience alike. Event choices… must be composed, and ‘to compose’ in story means much the same thing it does in music. What to include? To exclude? To put before and after what?… If the value-charged condition of the character’s life stays unchanged from one end of a scene to another, nothing meaningful happens. If a scene is not a true event, cut it. If the scene is only there for exposition, it needs more justification. Every scene must turn (pp. 33-34).

McKee adds:

Your goal must be a good story well told… The craft [of story composition] is neither mechanics nor gimmicks. It is the concert of techniques by which we create a conspiracy of interest between ourselves and the audience. [It] is the sum total of all means used to draw the audience into deep involvement, to hold that involvement, and ultimately to reward it with a moving and meaningful experience (pp. 21-22).

Thus, for any narrative developed by the climate movement, what matters as well as exposition or factual accuracy is how its plot transforms occurrences, such as bushfires, storms or campaign initiatives, into a sequence of meaningful story events that belong to a larger whole, spanning orientation, complication and resolution, and carrying a strong evaluation. A powerful story features an unfolding sequence of dramatic scenes and characters who experience significant conflicts and challenges, thus striking emotional chords in audiences, and gaining and maintaining their interest.

The first two documents discussed above call on narrative to play a key role in climate movement strategies; however, they provide only some clues about how this might happen. The authors may well have a wider view of narrative than appears in the documents themselves; however, as they stand, the documents describe only elements of narrative, such as villains, heroes and story themes. If ‘narrative’ is so important, and if it means something different to ‘message’ or ‘communication strategy’, what narrative elements are called upon to bring the story to life? A more limited approach may lack the elements described by people like McKee, which keep
people on the edge of their seats, waiting to find out what happens next. Expectations that have been developed in a story’s ‘orientation’ may lose momentum if scenes fail to ‘turn’. If key story elements are missing or weak, a message may not prompt people to get up out of their seats to ‘play their own part in the story’. The difference here is between naming the coal industry, for example, as ‘villainous’, and an unfolding series of events that audiences experience as a compelling story, which shows the industry to be playing the role of villain; and which uses plot, character and story events to intensify this impression. One test for assessing the power of a climate change narrative might be to ask how compelling it would be as a feature film.

The importance of a strong plot for climate campaigning is evident in comments from GJ, whose work focuses on renewable energy: ‘For me, one of the key—if not the key—determining factors for where we operate will be the strength of the story: why did we work in [a particular electorate]? It was a really good story, it’s also a marginal seat, it had an interesting political race going on’. AR conveyed a sense of narrative that extends beyond ‘message’: she described how a powerful story ‘can tug at peoples’ emotions’ and states, ‘for me, narrative is really, really important… I think to engage someone you have to tell the whole climate change story, and that story is that there is a terrible problem, there are solutions, those solutions are possible and they’re economically viable. It’s a race against time and vested interests are holding us back. The only thing that can overcome vested interests is people power, and this is how you can fit in to that picture… if you try to tell any one part of that without the rest of it, it’s very hard to make your case and to bring people in’. In these quotes, narrative can govern strategic campaigning decisions, and the strength of the story is central. Further, engaging people and their emotions involves telling the ‘whole’ story, or at least combining a range of story elements.

The work of the Pacific Climate Warriors featured rich elements of plot, as Table 7.2 outlines below.
Table 7.2: Elements of plot in the story of the Pacific Climate Warriors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plot elements</th>
<th>Key themes and ‘story events’</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Orientation</strong></td>
<td>Pacific Islands face the threat of climate change</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Internationally and within Australia, existing processes and policies prove unequal to the challenge of addressing climate change</td>
<td>In Australia, the Abbott government strongly supports coal mining. Its regressive stance on climate change stands out internationally</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Pacific Climate Warriors arrive in Australia amid reports that oceans in the southern hemisphere were warming faster than expected (Francis, 2014), and that residents of Torres Strait may become Australia’s first climate refugees (Bagnall, 2014).</td>
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<td>King tides occur in Majuro, Marshall Islands, immediately before the Pacific Warriors blockade in Newcastle (deBrum, 2014).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Almost 300 Fijians are relocated due to rising sea levels and erosion (Smyth, 2014).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Comments from Tony Abbott that ‘coal is good for humanity’ (Chan, 2014; Qldaah, 2014).</td>
<td>Abbott’s comments are delivered on opening the Caval Ridge coal mine in Queensland, shortly after the Warriors arrived in Australia, and while they were visiting Maules Creek coal mine, then under construction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Complication</strong></td>
<td>A spirited network of campaigners, the Pacific Climate Warriors, forms (Lutunatabua, 2014a; Butler, 2014).</td>
<td>Setting: Newcastle was selected given its status as the world’s largest coal port (Port of Newcastle, 2014)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Pacific Islanders develop the idea of challenging coal exports at their source through a blockade of Newcastle harbour (Tiumalu in Butler, 2014; Packard in Yacono, 2015).</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Pacific Climate Warriors gain support from local communities and build their network</td>
<td>Canoe-building workshops with traditional leaders (Lutunatabua, 2014b).</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Training events (Talamuna, 2014; 350, 2014i).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Launch of Ta Reo Vanuatu by senior political figures in Vanuatu (Island Reach, 2014; Willie, 2014).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resolution 1</strong></td>
<td>The Newcastle blockade</td>
<td>Arrival in Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 3</td>
<td>The unfinished task of addressing the issues introduced in the Orientation</td>
<td>In this sense the ‘resolution’ of the story remains incomplete and is left to the future.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Evaluation / the ‘moral of the story’ | Arianne Kassman, Pacific Warrior from PNG: ‘Addressing climate change must be our moral choice’ (350 Pacific, 2015c). Koreti Tiumalu described the Warriors’ work in terms of challenging ‘the moral license of the fossil fuel industry’ (Tokona, 2015; Lutunatabua, 2015a). 350 Pacific (2015d): ‘If it’s wrong to wreck the planet, then it’s wrong to profit from that wreckage’. | It is easy to imagine the unfolding drama of the Pacific Warriors as a film, although it is worth noting that, so far, the ‘characters’ have not become publicly-known in Australia on a wide scale. The Pacific Warriors have actively worked to tell rich personal stories, for example through their Frontline Truths website (350 Pacific, 2015c), and for audiences within the climate movement and the Pacific, or for people who attend public forums with the Warriors (e.g. Paris, 2014a; 350 Australia, 2019a) the full drama of the Pacific Warriors is intelligible as a story with recognisable characters and scenes that ‘turn’, however for broad Australian audiences, their narrative lacks a strong sense of McKee’s story events that create meaningful change ‘in the life situation of a character’. At least in the public narrative of the Warriors, perhaps few of the ‘protagonists’ in events such as the Selma-to-Montgomery marches (see Chapter 2) or the Freedom Rides (Arsenault, 2011) were widely publicly-known either. However, the ‘antagonists’ facing the US Civil Rights Movement such as ‘Bull’ Connor and George Wallace played an active part within the unfolding public narratives generated by the Civil Rights movement, and the movement worked strategically to design ‘story events’ that would make sure that this happened—see Alexander’s (2006a) analysis of drama in the Civil Rights movement. Civil rights strategist James Bevel articulates the movement’s thinking: ‘Every nonviolent
there are no lead characters comparable, for example, to Greta Thunberg (Bourke, 2019) whose experiences audiences follow as the story unfolds.

An opportunity for the audience to complete the plot: the ‘unresolved resolution’: If story plots are structured around an orientation, complication and a resolution, then political stories often combine orientation and complication, leaving the resolution ‘unresolved’—audiences are urged to play their part in bringing it about. Stone’s (2002) examples of ‘story of control’ and ‘story of decline’ illustrate how an ‘unresolved resolution’ invites a political response:

The situation is bad. We have always believed that the situation was out of our control, something we had to accept but could not influence. Now, however, let me show you that in fact we can control things…

In the beginning, things were pretty good. But they got worse. In fact, right now, they are nearly intolerable. Something must be done…. Unless such-and-such is done, disaster will follow… (pp. 113, 109).

A rich example of an ‘unresolved resolution’ comes from the campaign against the Maules Creek coal mine in NSW. This mine rose to national prominence in 2013 when campaigner Jonathan Moylan issued a mock press release ‘announcing’ the ANZ bank was withdrawing its $1.2 billion investment in the mine on environmental grounds. A community blockade of the mine developed—the longest-running in Australian history (Frontline Action on Coal, 2015). The sense of the narrative qualities of the protest was articulated by 350.org (2014m):

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movement is a dialogue between two forces, and you have to develop a drama to dramatize the dialogue to reveal the contradictions in the guys you're dialoguing with… That’s called a socio-drama’ (interview with Aldon Morris, quoted in Morris, 1984: 260).

Certainly, audiences can identify with or be emotionally affected by ‘characters’ whose names they do not know (see, for example, Kurasawa (2012) who analyses how humanitarian movements used iconic imagery to portray how people suffered in the 1921-23 Russian famine). Still, it is worth considering questions of how strongly the climate movement’s public narratives feature recognisable characters who experience the kind of ‘story events’ that McKee describes. What avenues exist for translating climate movement campaigns into rich protagonist-antagonist stories in the minds of the public, and amplifying this dimension of the climate movement’s work?

9 or Jonathan Moylan—see below.
These past weeks you’ve no doubt read updates about the action taking place out at… Maules Creek… Today, we wanted to take a look back on the story of this campaign and let you know how to help write its next chapter… Like any good story, the Maules Creek Story has a beginning, middle and end.

First, 350 recounted the origins of the mining project and the depth of community concern. The ‘middle’ of the story featured concerted opposition to the mine: ‘the community… decided to take matters into their own hands—they called for support from across the country to help build a blockade… In January, as the bulldozers first moved in to the forest… 100 people were there to meet them … And since then many hundreds more have [joined them]’. Stories of opposition to the mine were featured, before the statement closes with:

‘The end—you can help write it!’

There is still much to be written in to the Maules Creek story—and we need more and more folks to add their own chapter… We don’t yet know how this story will end… But we know the more people who take action… the greater our chances of stopping this project.

Thus, the call to action is built around narrative, and the prospect of being part of the narrative’s conclusion. Readers are invited to identify with story ‘characters’ who have ‘added their own chapter’. None of this had to be conveyed in narrative terms, however a sense of narrative provided a way of conveying the significance of the event, and of drawing supporters in.

The ‘moral of the story’: The moral of the story, or its ‘evaluative component,’ is emphasised by several narrative theorists. For Labov (2008), a story’s ‘evaluation’ is in fact its real point. White (1980) argues that giving events a moral meaning is necessary for a story to be complete. He maintains, ‘Where, in any account of reality, narrativity is present, we can be sure that morality or a moral impulse is present too’ (p. 26). When climate change is discussed in technical rather than narrative terms, however, a ‘moral’ may be missing. Without a narratively rich sense of much really being at stake, IPCC reports, for example, have lacked moral urgency. Interviewees frequently discussed a moral or ‘values’ focus in campaigns. RH, for example, called
for moral language in the climate debate, arguing for communication that states ‘this is a moral issue… There is a line in the sand’. GJ described the dramatic tension that can result when political debates are cast in moral terms:

It’s the classic fairytale, you know? You’ll have your heroes and your villains and your victims. You’ll have that Han Solo character who’s on the fence. There are moral questions that they need to answer: will they be selfish and do what’s in their own self-interest or will they be altruistic and generous and do what’s in the community interest? There’s kind of like a drama triangle of the villain and the victim and the hero, or a variation on that where we’ve got another character who’s on the fence and we’re trying to bring over.

One of the clearest articulations of a ‘moral of the story’ comes from the divestment movement. SR, who described divestment as essentially an ethical debate, argued: ‘the key driver of climate change is the burning of fossil fuels, and we need to keep the vast majority in the ground… The fossil fuel industry stands in the way of that.’ TS saw moral arguments as central to the campaign:

[The divestment movement has] gone to the area of strength for fossil fuel industry and used moral arguments that work for us to tackle it. There’s been some talk [that the] coal industry is financially doomed… but really, the actual focus has been on ‘this is a bad industry morally destroying our planet so therefore you have the moral responsibility to take your money away from them’.

SR added, ‘Divestment is really about… stigmatising the industry, to highlight that they are acting in an amoral… way and… mark them out as a rogue industry—an industry that we as a society need to distance ourselves from’.

Divestment campaigning has gained an audience: TS states, ‘What we’ve found is there’s quite a response… people [see the] connection between their social responsibilities and what they are doing with their money’. SW observes that the divestment movement has ‘exploded around the world’. Discussing how people see their investment decisions ‘and whether or not that aligns with their morals’, he makes a connection with narrative: ‘That whole frame and space [has been] very
new and important ground over the last 12 to 24 months... it's really exciting because there is so much rich research and [so many] stories to be exposed’. Several interviewees describe a shift towards a new emphasis on values by the climate movement, in contrast to relying on technical arguments about science or public policy. TS describes a focus on values as ‘a big shift in the climate movement in the last [couple] of years, not just in Australia but internationally’: ‘[In the past] there was a real focus on responding to attacks from the right—a lot of focus on jobs, the economics—it didn’t work... The shift has been we need to focus on the values that hold us together as a movement, rather than trying to respond to the right’s values and using their values to win the argument, because it’s their values that are causing the problem’. Rather than using technical arguments, he advocates asking, ‘What are our core values? What is the reason we actually want to stop this [project] and let’s talk about that.’ Alexander writes about the importance of ‘aligning political struggle with moral right’ (2010: L5961).

Genre: the debate about melodrama, ‘enemy’ narratives and Frye on the romantic alternative: Evidence from La Rocca’s paper and from interviews points to how narrative figures in the work of the climate movement in the form of melodrama. References to ‘villains’ and ‘heroes’ are prominent in accounts like those of GJ above. DE describes a shift in the climate movement’s thinking during the first half of the 2010s, led by 350.org: ‘We started to shift our focus to “OK, so what’s actually holding action on climate change back?”’ 350’s answer was ‘the fossil fuel industry’, and it conveyed this through narrative: ‘We shifted to naming an opponent, or a villain in the traditional sense of storytelling’. This approach caught on: RL spoke of ‘Encourag[ing] our organisation to do more to identify a villain... as part of the story so that climate change is not just something that’s happening to us but is being done to us’. AL reflected: ‘Bill McKibben came and focussed people’s attention on the fossil fuel industry as an enemy, so we were not in this nebulous fight with nature. In the early days, people... did not clearly enough identify the enemy’.

Including ‘heroes’, ‘villains’ and ‘victims’ has been prominent in climate change story-telling, however its value is debated, and this debate raises some important issues for thinking about how narrative figures in the climate movement’s work. In a key article stating one side of the argument, 350.org’s Bill McKibben (2012) asserted that ‘enemies are what climate change has lacked... A rapid, transformative change
would require building a movement, and movements require enemies’. McKibben presents the fossil fuel industry as ‘Public Enemy Number One to the survival of our planetary civilization’. Yet environmental campaigner and communications expert George Marshall (2014) argues that the hero-villain line cannot be clearly drawn: ‘we ourselves are the baddies’, he writes. Marshall argues that ‘in high-carbon societies, everyone contributes to the emissions’, though we would rather not face this (pp. 39, 42). For him, fossil fuel companies are ‘not the enemy… They are an obstacle’ (p. 43). Elsewhere, Marshall (2013) calls for narratives ‘about co-operation on common ground’, arguing that ‘solutions need to be presented that can speak to the common concerns and aspirations of all people’. He warns that enemy narratives beget enemy narratives from opponents: they ‘take on a life of their own and come back to bite us… As climate impacts intensify there will be a lot of confusion, blame and anger looking for a target’. Here, then, is a debate about how narrative figures—and should figure—in the climate movement’s work.

Smith and Howe (2015) address these issues. They argue that ‘climate change has become a melodramatic conflict between… two ideological extremes. The plots and characters are too thin and predictable’ (L4534). They warn against oversimplistic melodrama—a climate change version of a ‘Punch and Judy’ show which loses a sense of civil solidarity or a greater common purpose. They argue that we need ‘not only a sense that the world is in peril but also a more romantic sensibility that empowers action and generates solidaristic emotional energy’ (L1677). Drawing on Northrop Frye’s work (1976, 2000), they distinguish the genre of low mimesis (where pragmatism and technocracy reign, the world works according to business as usual, heroism is absent, and little is at stake) from romance, where narratives feature ‘the

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10 Climate campaigners who read Smith and Howe’s work may find some passages which they disagree with and others that challenge them. However, they will also find perspectives on the use of narrative and social drama which speak richly to their work. Smith and Howe analyse the social drama of climate change drawing on an approach to drama originally developed by Aristotle. Aristotle writes about how pathos—audience sympathy for a character—is generated by the combination of a powerful message (logos) and the moral character of the speaker (ethos). According to Smith and Howe, much more is at stake than simply creating an engaging story. Audience judgments can hinge on their perceptions of character and who can be believed. Writing about the ‘Climategate’ controversy, they argue that when the ‘limits of scientific knowledge are in question, “credibility contests” develop’. When pathos from the audience is withheld, and the logos of the facts are contested, ‘ethos comes to the fore’ (L1066). They continue, ‘In important ways, the social drama of climate change that people actually get to see is a story about trust. In this sense, it is a story not just about science or nature but about how we know whom to believe—artists? politicians? children?’ (L1121). Their analysis provides insight into avenues through which the climate movement may either gains or lose ground through the narration of character and the ‘moral of the story’. For more, see Appendix 1 on the 2019 electoral contest which Bill Shorten lost to Scott Morrison.
need to overcome barriers and tests of resolve to build a better world’ (L1168). In romantic narratives, action originates in higher motives of ‘sacrifice, sharing, and the pursuit of a common good’ (L1438). Rather than being about vanquishing foes, Smith (2005) argues, romantic narratives move towards a better world and social integration, emphasising ‘charismatic authority, legitimacy, trust and good will’ (L365).\(^\text{11}\)

Perhaps, however, it is possible to think in a different way about potential tensions between melodrama, romance and stories with dramatic power. A starting point is to ask what narrative elements are needed to combine (1) the romantic pursuit of a better world with (2) a compelling story featuring a dramatic conflict between protagonists and antagonists; while also (3) avoiding the pitfalls of the kind of melodrama that switches people off because the story is ‘thin and predictable’. Frye himself (1976) speaks about the ‘moral polarising’ that can occur in romance (p. 50). Romance, he argues, ‘avoids the ambiguities of ordinary life, where everything is a mixture of good and bad’ and offers a ‘simplifying of moral facts’. For Frye, romance is built around a tension between an idyllic world—notably, ‘a state of existence in which there is nothing to write about’ (p. 54)—and a ‘night world’, which is the domain of ‘exciting adventures… which involve separation, loneliness, humiliation, … and… pain’ (p. 53). Romance offers a ‘plunge downward at the beginning and a bounce upward at the end’ (p. 54). Marshall’s position—as stated in his works cited above—makes it difficult to narrate the ‘plunge downwards’ in terms of a tension between protagonist and antagonist. Stories without some kind of antagonist ultimately leave a protagonist without a real task. For Frye, there is room within romance for both antagonists and protagonists, as well as the theme of a ‘quest’ (which Marshall (2014) describes). From this perspective, stories of heroes and villains need not be restricted to ‘thin and predictable’ melodrama. A story about the urgent need to decarbonise our societies can be a romance. It can portray the challenges of real opposition and self-interested obstruction (as well as public apathy, widespread wishful thinking, complacency and hoping-for-the-best) while still calling out actions that damage and even imperil human and environmental

\(^{11}\) Smith and Howe argue powerfully that genre matters for the way in which audiences engage with stories. Genre ‘provides a gestalt that retrospectively determines how the clues are put together into a more coherent picture’ (L1259). Their analysis paints a picture where political outcomes, audience response and genre choice are linked: from their perspective, emplotting stories in a romantic genre is indispensable for social movement success.
wellbeing, and people who wittingly or unwittingly perpetrate or share responsibility for them. It is possible to speak with sharp moral clarity about the actions of fossil fuel companies or governments without losing sight of different levels of responsibility, and without locating all the ‘blame’ in any one place. Consumers who buy fossil fuels and voters who support governments that deny climate change share responsibility as well: there is room for this in the story, too.¹²

**Narrative fidelity or ‘ringing true’ and the climate movement’s political theatre:**

In his work *Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument*, Fisher (1984) writes about stories having narrative fidelity, meaning that they ‘ring true with the stories [that audiences] know to be true in their lives’ (p. 8). Fisher’s focus is on how audiences assess stories in relation to personal experience; however, ‘narrative fidelity’ can also be understood in relation to the consistency between characters’ actions and a story’s ‘moral’. SR speaks to these issues as she talks about ‘the narrative of moving beyond fossil fuels’:

Campaigns are a story basically and you’re kind of telling your supporters about it. And if you don’t live up to the drama of the campaign then you let yourself and your supporters down… Something… I’m always encouraging my groups to do—and it’s not always that easy—is to really think about… their action—what it’s communicating, is it consistent—does it make sense, and does it tell the story of what you’re saying (emphasis added).

GJ describes the importance of ‘directly demonstrating the values that you are for… calling into question the values of your adversaries. We value community engagement, community self-determination, which is why we’re in the communities. By doing that we’ve provided a point of comparison and contrast to [government figures] who [aren’t] in the community—you create this thesis/antithesis relationship’. Here, he cites the book *Strategy and Soul* (Hunter, 2013), which has been influential in sections of the climate movement. SW refers to the same author, and makes a similar observation: ‘How are we showing what we want through our actions? …That principle [has] become for me a good checkpoint… From there flows logic and storytelling and people creating their own mini-narratives’. The Pacific

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¹² Weintrobe (2013b) speaks to this point, arguing ‘the relation between leaders and led is a complex collusive dance. I do, however, think that this is a dance heavily led by one side’ (L1627).
Warriors blockade can be understood as an effort to create a story with narrative fidelity. The story affirms that carbon emissions cause climate change, Pacific Islanders are bearing the brunt of it, coal is one of the main sources of emissions, and Newcastle is the world’s largest coal port. This makes Newcastle the place to be and stopping coal ships the thing to do\(^{13}\) in order to ‘live up to the drama of the campaign’ and ‘show what we want through our actions’. Because their story ‘rang true’, the Pacific Warriors were able to make their point powerfully.

One aspect of narrative fidelity involves an alignment between the courage shown by story ‘characters’ and the high stakes that the climate movement asserts that climate change involves. Stories about climate change point to a planet in peril and ecosystem collapse (Hansen, 2009). However, assertions about what is at stake are not always matched with narratives which reflect a sense of this kind of danger, and a lack of narrative fidelity can result. Communities involved in Lock The Gate face a tangible threat, and the Lock The Gate campaign has been rich in narratives about how this threat has been met with courage. A Google search for “Lock The Gate” “gas” “courage” yields hundreds of results. Typical accounts of the movement’s work feature communities showing ‘incredible courage, integrity and imagination’ (Lock The Gate, 2019) and ‘personal stories of suffering and courage as local communities stand up against the mining industry’ (Greenpeace 2013a). Campaigner Deborah Lilly speaks of ‘the courageous stories of everyday Australians who have decided to take a stand to protect the country they love’ (Echo Net Daily, 2013).

The role of courage is evident in the story of protests against coal seam gas at Bentley, NSW. In 2013, communities in the Northern Rivers region of NSW succeeded in pressing Metgasco to suspend its coal seam gas operations. When the company returned in 2014 to drill on a farm at Bentley, it was met with the Bentley Blockade, comprising a broad coalition of community members opposed to the project. Just as up to 800 police were expected to move against the blockade, the NSW government suspended Metgasco’s license (Metgasco, 2014; Curran, 2017; Nicholls, 2014). ‘Courage—to go beyond comfortable roles and taken-for-granted assumptions and step into the unknown’ was listed as one of six contributing factors

\(^{13}\) Saying ‘the’ thing to do’ is perhaps too limiting, since there must be many other forms of action as well as the blockade that have narrative fidelity. However, in SR’s words, the blockade certainly ‘lived up to the drama’ of the situation, and many more routine forms of action would fail to do so.
in an analysis of the protest (Whelan, 2014). Brendan Shoebridge, director of the film *The Bentley Effect: the story of a social movement*, reflects:

This is a story that simply must be told…
After following the social movement and the build-up to the Bentley Blockade from its early beginnings, I have the privilege of telling an incredible story of courage and heroism…
After the historic showdown at Bentley, we now have a well-documented victory for the power of community and a major turning point in the battle for a safe clean future.
What happened in this once peaceful valley has now become the stuff of legend and is reverberating around the globe (Shoebridge, 2018, 2015).

An email promoting the film (Lock The Gate, 2018a) invites readers to ‘watch this uplifting story’ of a ‘dynamic community campaign culminat[ing] in the historic Bentley blockade—where thousands of people from all walks of life showed up to take a heroic stand to protect their region’. It closes with, ‘Now is a good time to inspire action, so tell your friends and help share the story’.

**Narrative and impact**

Climate movement participants interviewed for this project discussed narrative in relation to a number of concrete political shifts. In Victoria, Anglesea power station closed down. Lock The Gate won moratoriums and bans on coal seam gas exploration. Repower Port Augusta’s campaign led to the South Australian Government agreeing to build a solar thermal power plant in a former coal town (Parkinson and Vorrath, 2017). Pacific leaders were galvanised to act by the actions of the Pacific Warriors (PL). Australian and international banks declared that they would not fund Adani. Lend Lease refused to fund a coal terminal at Abbot Point. Divestment has shifted assets now worth trillions of dollars worldwide (GoFossilFree, 2019; Arabella Advisors, 2018). In each of these cases, interviewees credited narrative with a significant role. The following section examines some of the ways that interviewees said narrative was important: how it provides a platform for action and a focus for communication, how it inspires and energises the climate movement, and its role in the politics of reputation.
Author and environmentalist William Kittredge describes how narratives can be ‘platforms from which to act’. A narrative can become ‘a set of implicit instructions from a society to its members, telling them what is valuable and how to conduct themselves if they are to preserve the things they value’ (quoted in Iovino, 2010: pp. 40-41). What creates these ‘platforms’ is not simply a political action, but the strength of the story that articulates what is at stake—or the strength of the enacted stories in the form of a social drama. GJ’s point above about the strength of the story being ‘one of the key… determining factors for where we operate’ illustrates the point. The Pacific Warriors blockade provides an example of a platform from which a ‘cascade’ of subsequent actions followed. For participants, the blockade was a response to narrative (‘narrative as a platform to act’) and it provided a basis for further narratives to be created. One interviewee, who holds a senior position in a major Australian environmental NGO, believes that the power of the Warriors’ narrative was an important contributing factor in creating the circumstances where former Kiribati President Anote Tong made his call for a moratorium on coal mining (Office of the President, Republic of Kiribati, 2015; see also The Australia Institute, 2015). SR observes, ‘I think always in campaigning, there’s a lot of theatre in campaigning… Often you have to tell your story through symbols.’ Describing the drama created by the public delivery of a petition, she observes, ‘it’s very much the theatre of it because we could send it to them in an email… You’re publicising it, making it a public conversation and bringing it out through all those symbols. A lot of the time it’s about finding potent symbols that are meaningful and speak to people.’

LH reflects on the stories generated by key moments in the Repower Port Augusta campaign—a community vote held in Port Augusta and a ‘Walk for Solar’ from Port Augusta to Adelaide. The community vote, he explains, ‘made the Repower Port Augusta campaign a story at the South Australian level. The Walk for Solar put the campaign on the map nationally’ and led to a state government inquiry. The campaign led to the State’s Premier announcing in 2017 that the world’s largest solar thermal power plant of its kind would be built at Port Augusta (Weatherill, 2017). LH observes,

14 For supporters of Repower Port Augusta, the situation has since deteriorated. A Coalition government came to power in South Australia and in April 2019, SolarReserve, the company that was working to build the plant, announced that it had been unable to raise finance. Supporters of the plant argued that ‘questions need to be answered by the State and Federal Government about how this has happened’ (Parkinson, 2019).
I think images and stories are really powerful communication tools: [it’s] not only the fact that a community vote happened but also the story of a community that has been living with a coal station for decades choosing to have a vote on what their future is. I think that’s inherently democratic but also a powerful story. The same with the idea of 80 people walking 328 km from Port Augusta to Adelaide.

In a context where ‘we have run out of time to do things slowly and incrementally’ (CE) but the political system is failing to move at the necessary scale and speed, energising and inspiring supporters is important for the climate movement. Interviewees repeatedly referred to the importance of these themes. CF argues that the purpose of narrative includes ‘tell[ing] stories not just for the outside but for themselves to keep themselves going’. SW spoke of the capacity of the Warriors’ story to inspire people, ‘wake them up’ and motivate them: ‘The energy they brought to the work that we were doing, and seeing them inspire hardened and wearied activists and just bring such energy and life was incredible to watch’. EF described rising anger and despair in the period following the election of the Abbott government. SR speaks of the need to learn the stories of previous movements ‘as a way of inspiring people’.\footnote{AR points to the stories about ordinary people who have got together and made a difference and how they did it, the wins they had’. These stories ‘show [people] the power that they could have’. LJ reflects, ‘you have to keep your own morale up’.}

Among all the stories of action that inspired people, the Pacific Warriors blockade stood out. SW spoke of the capacity of the Warriors’ story to inspire, to ‘wake [people] up’ and motivate them’. DE commented, ‘showing that fierce warrior energy is what is needed to confront this issue now, not like depressing ... Saying “no we are doomed”’. TS adds, ‘I had people [saying to me] this was one of the best days of their lives. People were definitely very excited to be involved and felt quite inspired by the connection of having people who were really affected by it and then

\footnote{She continues: ‘[Campaigners] in the USA have talked more about [social movement] history—it’s much more well-known in the States. Perhaps there hasn’t been enough work around acknowledging that history and telling that story. After watching [the work of other movements] it’s so exciting… hearing about it is quite energising”.
}
feeling that they could do something real and direct to help.’ 350 (2014e) observed, ‘Their story inspired thousands of people across Australia, and even more around the world to step up the fight against fossil fuels’. Blogger Maureen From Freo (2014) commented, ‘The story of the Pacific Climate Warriors draws into sharp focus the potential impact of catastrophic climate change. Their response is inspiring. This David and Goliath action will send a message to the world about what is at stake.’ SW discusses the challenge of evaluating this kind of impact. He notes the difference between ‘transactional’ measures of success and ‘transformational metrics—or however you’d want to describe it’. ‘Transactional’ measures included level of media coverage, the number of new people signing up to be involved, the numbers who attended public talks. He states that these were recognised; however, ‘we placed value in the stuff that’s less easy to measure—but seemed to be important’. One of the six elements of the strategy outlined in the Hepburn et al. paper was to ‘withdraw the social license of the coal industry’ (p. 5). The objective was to ‘change the story of coal’ so it is seen as ‘a destructive industry that destroys the landscape and communities, corrupts our democracy, and threatens the global climate’ (5). Here, the outcomes of climate politics are understood as depending on public perceptions, and ‘changing the narrative’ is seen as a key way to shape them. Influencing perceptions of a company’s or a project’s reputation was widely seen by interviewees as a significant political lever. SW reflects on the Adani campaign: ‘Not only are we telling the reputational story and impact story but also the context that this project looks like a fizzer—are you actually going to get return on investment?’ Observing that ‘the role of national public opinion is huge’, LH comments on the same campaign: ‘one of the reason banks have been ruling it out is that they don’t want to [be identified as] part of a project [that] would be incredibly controversial and that’s risky’. At least on the question of social license, the climate movement and sections of industry share a common language. Senior BHP Billiton executive Vandita Pant describes the company’s response to falling levels of trust in business: ‘Our license to operate stems from being trusted by the communities [where we work]… The first thing that we need to do, as a business community, is to tell a better story about our contribution to society’ (BHP Billiton, 2017, emphasis added).

GJ discusses the role of social license and reputation in a campaign which eventually led to the closure of the coal power station at Anglesea (see Alcoa, 2015):
[The Anglesea campaign] demonstrated the withdrawal of social license that in effect made it a stranded asset… It was very systematic. There was a [social media] graphic that listed all of the potential buyers of the coal plant and through writing letters to potential purchasers or tweeting directly at them, the responses from the power companies ruling out their purchase… would go on the list. It was kind of telling the story—‘Oh, AGL, they’re not going to buy it… Origin don’t want to buy it either’. A story that industry leaders don’t want to go near it.

Reputational narratives were also central to GJ’s work in advocating for renewable energy. He describes ‘a campaign that we ran: it was effective, grabbed attention and told a story really well’. The Abbott government had commissioned industrialist Dick Warburton to head a review of the Renewable Energy Target. GJ explains that the government review was ‘open to public submissions:

That was the extent of community consultation. We thought that was inadequate. We thought there should be on-the-ground fact-finding undertaken by the review committee. So we thought, ‘if they are not going to do it, and hear the community’s stories then we will do it’.

The story they developed was built around the creation of a ‘thesis-antithesis relationship’:

By [organising our own consultations] we’ve provided a point of comparison and contrast to Dick Warburton who isn’t in the community—“he’s doing his review in Canberra, he’s in the Qantas lounge… He’s disconnected from community, we’re connected to community…”

Campaigns for renewable energy built significant public support, creating a climate where Victoria announced a substantially increased Renewable Energy Target (Yes2Renewables, 2016; Graham, 2017). This campaign, and others described above, show evidence of the ‘slow building of a movement around narratives and around

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16 Victoria was the first state in Australia to write its target into law (Vorrath, 2017). In the 2018 Victorian election, the Labor party was re-elected on a platform of a Renewable Energy Target of 50% by 2030 (Vorrath, 2018).
images’ that is described by US documentary film-maker Jon Else (Climate One, 2012: see Chapter 10). The cumulative impact of powerful narratives is integral to the political tasks of eroding trust in fossil fuels and building confidence in an alternative.

Conclusion

Chaloupka’s view that ‘politics is distinctively narrative. It’s done with stories’ (2007: p. 198) is shared by leaders of industry as well as climate movement campaigners. In a speech to the American Chamber of Commerce in 2015, Mike Henry of BHP Billiton reflects on the public standing of the mining industry. He concedes that the industry is losing the public relations battle in relation to coal and climate change, and describes the situation in terms of narrative:

It would be fair to say that as we stand here today, in the court of public opinion, the ‘no coal’ camp has been more effective…

Recent research conducted for the industry indicated that there is a widespread public view that coal use will be phased out over the next 10 to 20 years in favour of renewables.

We need to be more active and effective in building common ground with elements of civil society who can acknowledge the future role of coal and the benefits that flow from coal’s ability to underpin affordable energy… At the end of the day, no-one else will tell our story for us (BHP Billiton, 2015).

It is a statement that could only delight interviewees for this project who have campaigned for an end to coal. Henry places narrative at the centre of the change in mindset which he describes. Narratives about the negative effects of coal mining are understood to have had a cumulative social effect. Sometimes these narratives have had strong plots and ‘morals of the story’, and sometimes they have featured strong images, such as the Great Barrier Reef. Certainly, something has been ‘working’—and it is significant that this industry leader speaks in terms of the power of narrative.
SW, when asked what was powerful about the Pacific Climate Warriors tour of Australia, reflected:

it brought a story—a very personal story of climate impacts and the fact that these are already happening… The Climate Warriors said [climate change] is happening to us right now, [in] my home, I have seen it. That was a real wake up call for a lot of people…

It is worth noting that SW’s answer to ‘What was powerful?’ moved quickly to themes of storytelling and the power of narrative. Further, while the Warriors had a story to tell, their actions also created a story that could be seen, illustrating a point made by Boulton when she described theatre as ‘literature that walks and talks before our eyes’ (1960: p. 3). Seeing live theatre is ‘more exciting and memorable’ than reading a novel, Boulton argues: ‘actually seeing and hearing the events represented’ concentrates and intensifies the audience’s emotional response (p. 4). She could just as well be speaking to the impact of seeing the ‘literature that walks and talks before our eyes’ in the form of the Pacific Warriors, the Howard-Rudd-Gillard-Abbott-Turnbull-Morrison era, Maules Creek or Lock the Gate. Clearly, narrative holds an important place in some strands climate movement thinking: ‘changing the story’ is nominated as one among a number of key strategies for achieving national climate movement goals, and ‘narrative’ is part of the everyday language of climate movement participants. Its absence from Stop Adani’s key goals illustrates the fact that narrative and symbolic power more broadly lack an established place at the centre of climate movement ‘theories of change’ (see Chapter 1). Given the insights of people like Stone, Polkinghorne, Fisher and White about just how fundamental narrative is in human societies, it is likely that stories would be used intuitively in a skillful and effective way, without necessarily relying on an articulated model for how they are used. Despite this, working with a model of narrative provides a basis for understanding and assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the climate movement’s storytelling work.

Given that climate campaigners, representatives of industry and scholars like Chaloupka share the view that politics is ‘done with stories’, it is valuable to analyse the linkages between narrative strength and political impact. The role of narratives in supplying a platform for action and a focus for communication, in inspiring and
energising the climate movement, and in the politics of reputation are just some of the places where narrative and political outcomes intersect. This chapter has also highlighted the importance of going beyond treating ‘narrative’ and ‘message’ interchangeably, and applying a rich sense of narrative. For example, questions for analysing the climate movement’s use of narrative include: what else needs to happen to ‘change the narrative’ beyond assembling a large crowd of people? If an event is understood as a scene within a narrative, what is the broader ‘plot’, starting with what ‘orientation’, affected by what ‘complication’, and moving towards what resolution? What ‘moral of the story’ inflects the story’s outcome? Beyond a single event, what is the series of scenes, and what happens in the lives of the characters to make each scene ‘turn’? What will give the narrative ‘fidelity’? What unfolding plot and other story elements grasp and hold the attention of audiences, informing the public understanding of why climate change matters and what is at stake? Further, what is the place of both antagonists and protagonists in the story? Will antagonists be cast as melodramatic villains? Can Smith and Howe’s case for romance and Frye’s framework offer more nuanced and perhaps even more powerful narratives, which envisage a safe future while still speaking with sharp clarity when the values and policies that are needed to get there are breached or ignored? It is possible to have a message without a plot, a plot without depth, consistency or fidelity, and a ‘moral’ without a story. A strong, compelling plot with a powerful ‘moral’, which is enacted in a sequence of episodes in a social drama, and within which members of the public can ‘imagine themselves’ through characters with whom they identify, offers a great deal to the task of engaging the public about climate change, establishing a new sense of what is at stake, of what the story is really about, of where it is heading and of our roles in it, thus contributing to changing the terms and the focus of climate politics.

The document cited above by Hepburn et al. (2011) refers to the need for ‘powerful, visual stories’. In the following chapters, the focus shifts to the visual dimension of climate politics: the role of visual imagery, imagery and the imagination and iconic power in climate movement campaigns.
Chapter 8

‘The picture is much more important to the message than the words’: imagery and the climate movement

‘Ours is a visual age… [we are] bombarded by pictures from morning to night’ writes art historian Ernst Gombrich (1972: p. 82). Imagery sometimes holds a secondary or incidental place in political analysis; however, since the ‘pictorial turn’ in the social sciences (Mitchell, 1994), new perspectives have emerged that make imagery central. Politicians and observers widely acknowledge the importance of images in defining and shaping political outcomes, however their role remains under-researched. This chapter situates the role of imagery in climate politics in relation to literature about the broader place of imagery in political and environmental communication. It then presents findings from interviews on how imagery figures in the climate movement’s work, thus addressing the first part of the research question.¹ Five themes emerged from interviewees’ comments: how images made climate change visible and tangible; how images project a vision of the future; how they bring issues into focus; and their emotional power. In addressing how symbolic politics matters for political change—the second part of the research question—this chapter relates these five functions of imagery to one particular aspect of politics, political will. Political will was as a topic raised by several interviewees and was selected because of its critical importance for climate politics, as statements from leading campaigners and key observers of climate politics quoted below attest. Analysing the factors needed to build political will is suited to a study of how symbolic politics contributes to climate politics. Building political will involves persuasion and generating ‘political energy’, and infusing issues with urgency and moral power. Here, symbolic politics and the ‘subjective domain’ of politics intersect: influencing attitudes and perceptions and motivating supporters is central to the process. Imagery is important, for example, because of how it makes climate change recognisable, establishes and popularises a broad perception of the problem and its solutions, and how it can galvanise commitment to address the

¹ i.e. How does symbolic politics figure in the work of the Australian climate movement, and in what ways is it important for achieving political change?
issue.

A few quotes from interviewees illustrate ways in which imagery is seen as important in the work of the climate movement. SE argues that ‘people—usually—respond more to images than they do to words’. SW describes ‘putting on display the kind of opposition that is out there to Abbot Point coal terminal in Queensland’. LT reflects on the impact of Queensland coal developments on ‘the Reef, which is... an icon’. LH concurs, adding ‘I think images of the Great Barrier Reef are incredibly powerful in engaging people to campaign against [the Adani coal mine]’. RG speaks of people’s attitudes changing when they ‘see the big picture’. EL refers to ‘stepping back and seeing what’s going on and coming to new conclusions’ and describes changes in attitudes as ‘re-seeing’. CS describes Maldives political leader and climate campaigner Mohamed Nasheed’s Underwater Cabinet as creating ‘a very powerful image that went around the world in the news media’.2 These quotes reflect a broad range of forms that imagery takes. The ‘public image’ of fossil fuels, for example, is influenced by visual images, and differs from and is prior to the propositional statements which put this image into words. In the analysis that follows, ‘imagery’ refers particularly to visual images, but also includes the ‘overall impression’ of an issue that these visual images often play an important role in condensing and conveying.3 This chapter is the first of three chapters that address the role of imagery. The following chapter examines additional ways in which climate politics occurs ‘as’ image politics and is shaped in the public imagination, drawing on the cases of the Stop Adani and divestment campaigns. The third of these chapters examines the role of iconic imagery in the climate movement’s work.

Imagery and political communication

Politicians, political consultants and commentators all recognise the importance of imagery in politics. Discussing image management in Tony Blair’s government, O’Shaughnessy (2003) argues that symbolic acts are at the core of politics, and ‘the display of symbols outweighs discursive argument’ (p. 297). When Alexander analyses Obama’s 2008 election victory, he describes the role of imagery in terms that

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2 See Chapter 10.
3 This broad approach to imagery is consistent with both common uses of the term and with the scholarship cited below. For a more detailed rationale for this approach, see the following chapter.
are familiar from popular accounts of political communication: the Obama–McCain contest is a ‘battle over image’ (2010: L2351); Obama’s chief strategist is ‘the “image maker and political guru” David Axelrod’ (L434). Obama spokesman Robert Gibbs describes himself as ‘a protector of the image’ (L3854). Alexander notes that throughout the campaign, ‘operatives and journalists alike spoke of “painting” the other side’. Significantly, he comments, ‘Painting is an aesthetic activity, not a cognitive… one’ (L336). An example from Australian climate politics illustrates the place of imagery: in 2017, Scott Morrison held up a lump of coal in Parliament, declaring: ‘This is coal. Do not be afraid. Do not be scared. It will not hurt you’ (Hansard, 2017). For commentators like Hartcher (2018), the visual image connotes the past, and an out-of-touch government. For others, however, the image may be an emblem for why they support the government. This image may be a political problem or a political asset for Morrison, depending on the constituency. However, perceptions of Morrison and coal are organised to a significant extent around images like this, rather than around a detailed reading of his policies. In relation to the other side of politics, Strangio (2019) notes ‘the perception of Shorten as shifty’ and his ‘peculiar difficulty in projecting authenticity down the barrel of the television camera’. Perhaps the fact that the Morrison government was elected in 2019 indicates that any misgivings some voters may have had about Morrison’s overall image were eclipsed by misgivings about Labor leader Bill Shorten as a potential Prime Minister—as mediated to a significant degree by images of Shorten (see the following chapter and Appendix 1).

Imagery clearly stands at the centre of the way many analysts, political operatives and politicians think about politics, and it condenses a sense of what political debates are about. It deserves corresponding scholarly attention. Schill (2012) address these issues, arguing that images ‘play a foundational role in the political communication process… Not only are we now campaigning largely by pictures—we are also governing by pictures, and these televised images create the political culture from which we debate candidates and policies’ (p. 133). Citing communications staff of presidential candidates, and research in politics, psychology, learning, rhetoric, and media studies, Schill presents evidence that images powerfully shape political attitudes and are the dominant mode of learning and gaining political information.
Literature from the field of environmental politics highlights the powerful role of imagery. Jasanoff (2001) writes that the image of the earth hanging in space (NASA, 1968, 1972) is ‘deeply political’ and ‘renders visible and immediate the object of environmentalists’ concern’ (p. 310).

Figure 8.1 Earthrise, Seen from the Moon (NASA, 1968).

Figure 8.2 The Blue Marble (NASA, 1972).
Just before Australia’s 1983 federal election, an image of Tasmania’s Franklin River (Dombrovskis, 1979) appeared in full-page advertisements in The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age under the headline ‘Could you vote for a party that would destroy this?’ The Liberal government at the time would have allowed the flooding of Tasmania’s Franklin River to build a hydro-electric dam. This image became a focal symbol for the successful campaign to save the Franklin (Crowley, 2003; Hutton and Connors, 1999). John Button, Industry Minister in the Hawke and Keating governments, described it as the most powerful political advertisement he had ever seen (Darby, 1996).

Anders Hansen (2010) argues that images of the environment, together with language and cultural values, are about power: they involve the power to define our relationship with nature and our perceptions of the problem, of who is responsible and of possible solutions. Dobrin and Morley place representation—including visual representation—at the centre of environmental politics: ‘The environmental dilemma is not just a political/ecological crisis about the protection of the environment but a dilemma of representation, a dilemma of rhetorical and visual-rhetorical choice’ (2009, L71). Their point is borne out by the use of imagery by Greenpeace in gaining international attention for issues such as nuclear tests and whaling (Hunter, 1979; Zelko, 2013). Analysing the work of radical environmental groups, Delicath and

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4 The original image is available online at https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-147241885/view
Deluca (2003) argue that image events—‘staged acts of protest intended for media dissemination’ (p. 317)—not only inform political debate but can also be the focus of the debate and the terrain on which it takes place. Delicath and Deluca’s contention is that image events used in public argument are not just a means of gaining attention, but instead ‘constitute the site and substance of the argument’ (p. 325). Taken literally, their position appears somewhat over-stated: imagery never does ‘all the work’ in an argument or in shaping a political outcome. Social movements’ use of images is only effective in conjunction with factors such as political alliances, community organising, media coverage and parliamentary advocacy. Despite this, their account of how ‘in image events it is an action, an image, not words, that serves as the basis for claims-making and refutation’ (p. 325) points to issues that are worth investigating.

Calls for research into imagery

The perspectives outlined above reflect broader concerns about the need for a focus on imagery, both in environmental communication and in the social sciences more generally. Jasanoff (2001) reflects, ‘the power of words to compel action has been a subject for philosophical and political analysis from Plato down to modern times. The power of images may be no less profound… but it has yet to receive the same sustained scrutiny’ (p. 334). Discussing the visual dimension of environmental rhetoric, Dobrin and Morey (2009) argue that scholarship on environmental communication has focused on language to the exclusion of images. In this, the field follows a trend which is evident in broader approaches to communication research (Doerr et al., 2014). Schill concurs, arguing that visual symbols are traditionally overlooked in academic political communication literature, where the focus instead has been on themes such as rhetorical strategies, framing, and the use of linguistic symbols. According to Schill, ‘the visual aspects of political communication remain one of the least studied and the least understood areas, and research focusing on visual symbols in political communication is severely lacking’ (p. 119; see also Domke et al., 2002). Identifying a series of functions of political symbols ranging from the image ‘as argument’, to agenda setting, to engagement with emotion, Schill describes an ‘urgent need for theoretical and applied research on the functions of visual symbols in political contexts’ (p. 120).
Dobrin and Morey (2009) call for the study of ‘Ecosee’: the ‘study and the production of the visual (re)presentation of space, environment, ecology, and nature’ (p. 2). Their work enlarges on an earlier book on environmental rhetoric, *Ecospeak* (Killingsworth and Palmer, 1992) which had treated language as ‘our chief tool for mediating thought and action’ (p. 235). Dobrin and Morey argue for a wider agenda, seeking to understand ‘the visual facet of environmental rhetoric’ (p. 2), and the ways in which visual rhetorics construct or challenge a particular ‘seeing’ of nature or the environment. While Killingsworth and Palmer brought a focus on discourse to environmental issues, Dobrin and Morey argue that the environmental dilemma is also ‘a problem of image/imaging’ (p. 3). Szasz (1994) locates a rationale for this broader approach in the dynamics of perception and meaning construction, writing:

> We need to find a way of thinking about opinion formation that recognizes the distinctiveness of a process that relies more on image than the word, a process that is more figural than discursive, a process that creates ‘meanings’ in which the cognitive content is underarticulated and is dominated by highly charged visual components. (p. 57)

Several authors extend calls for research into imagery into the field of climate politics. DiFrancesco and Young (2011) note that ‘few studies have been completed to date that empirically investigate the kinds of images that are being attached to… climate change’ (p. 518). O’Neill and Smith (2014) describe the ‘nascent research area of the visual representations of climate change, and public engagement with visual imagery’ (p. 73). Reviewing literature on climate change and public discourse, Greyson (2011) writes that textual content has tended to be ‘the sole focus of analysis… Images… tend to be considered mere “supplements” to the accompanying written content’ (p. 14). O’Neill et al. (2013) note calls from scholars across a range of disciplines ‘to attend to a research gap concerning the visual representation of climate change’ (p. 420). O’Neill and Smith (2014) write about the ‘nascent research area of the visual representations of climate change’, noting that ‘Imagery, and public engagement with this imagery, helps to shape the cultural politics of climate change in important ways’ (p. 73).

Existing work on visual communication and climate change includes a focus on the images appearing in the media (e.g. Smith and Joffe, 2009; DiFrancesco and Young, 2010; Rebich-Hespanha et al., 2015; O’Neill, 2013) and empirical analyses of audience
responses to climate change imagery (O’Neill et al., 2013; Leiserowitz, 2006; and Corner et al., 2015). In Seeing Climate Change (2011), DiFrancesco and Young review literature from media studies, philosophy, discourse studies and political science to highlight how visual metaphors and representations ‘connect and communicate more profoundly with audiences than do linguistic metaphors’. They argue for the importance of the combined effect of visuals and text, and that a lack of central visual images for climate change is ‘an important ‘blank spot’ in current claims-making about the issue’ (p. 533). Research into the role of imagery in the work of the climate movement is less prominent. Doyle (2007) and DeLuca (2009) discuss Greenpeace’s use of imagery to engage the public about climate change. Wozniak et al. (2016) examine NGOs’ use of visual communication to gain media coverage at UN climate conferences. Greyson (2011) offers a thematic analysis of climate change imagery presented by news organisations and NGOs. Manzo (2010) examines imagery in climate change campaigns in Britain. Further, Endres et al., (2009) analyse the use of iconic locations, mythic symbols, ritual and artistic performances and installations in the US climate movement. This thesis adds to research based on single case studies, examinations of media coverage, and research that uses quantitative approaches to evaluate audience responses to climate imagery (e.g. Corner et al., 2015). The findings below analyse how interviewees in this research described key functions of imagery in their work.

Five functions of imagery in the work of the climate movement

When reviewing interviews conducted for this thesis, five aspects of the role of imagery stood out. Interviewees observed how images made climate change visible and tangible. They spoke of how images could project a vision of the future, and how they brought the issues into focus. Further, they highlighted the emotional power of images. The case of the ‘Accept The Gift’ campaign provides one instance of how these factors can combine. It highlights how a visually-rich and imaginative event generated public support and media coverage, and catalysed subsequent public pressure. While Accept the Gift was a small-scale initiative, this campaign illustrates the role that imagery can play at any scale.

In 2014, over a period of four days in the period before Christmas, supporters of
renewable energy crowdfunded a gift of twelve solar panels for the Prime Minister’s residence, Kirribilli House. The organisers, the church-based organisation Common Grace, arranged with the Australian Solar Council for the solar panels to be installed at no cost, and invited the then Prime Minister Tony Abbott to ‘Accept the Gift’. Participants gathered at Manly Beach and arrived at Tony Abbott’s electorate office with a solar panel wrapped in a ribbon:

Figure 8.4 At Tony Abbott’s office (Ausburn, 2015a).

Figure 8.5 On Manly beach (Ausburn, 2015b).
GL describes the government’s response: ‘We received a letter which basically said that the government would not be accepting the gift based on heritage value, security and cleaning concerns… At that point, we… spoke with experts in the sector, who informed us that those reasons for not accepting the gift did not really stack up… [We] put together a petition and encouraged the government to reconsider’. The government continued to decline the offer.\(^5\)

Tony Abbott’s intransigent attitude to renewable energy was made visible by his response. The project gained extensive media coverage, becoming ‘one of the most popular stories on the day that the article went up across a range of Fairfax papers. [The story was] shared in a positive way in Newscorp papers as well’ (GL). Media headlines included ‘Government rejects gift of solar panels for Kirribilli House’ (Sydney Morning Herald: Cox, 2015) ‘Christian group attempt to present the Prime Minister with solar panels for Kirribilli House’ (News.com.au and Herald-Sun: Whigham, 2015a, 2015b) and ‘Abbott rejects Christian solar gift due to security concerns, cleaning costs’ (Renew Economy: Vorrath, 2015). Event coordinator Jody Lightfoot wrote that the event was shared on Facebook by over 10,000 people (Common Grace, 2015a).

The government’s attitude to renewable energy was rendered tangible through its refusal to accept the gift. A contrast was drawn with the approach of other governments: ‘the City of Sydney has already installed 5,500 solar panels on nearly

\(^5\) In the end, the panels were donated to farmers who had been leaders in sustainable agriculture and had been active in protecting agricultural land from the encroachment of coal projects (Common Grace, 2015a).
30 buildings’ (Common Grace, 2015b). GL explained that the original intention was to organise an event which would ‘demonstrate a voice for a stronger Renewable Energy Target’ (emphasis added). The event was an instance of the maxim ‘show don’t tell’, which sums up a sense that people respond most to what they see, and to what is shown to be the case.6

The campaign sought to project a vision of a government embracing renewable energy. Common Grace (2015a) stated, ‘We’re here to provide the Prime Minister with an opportunity to choose a brighter future for all Australians and to back the 9 in 10 Australians who want a strong Renewable Energy Target’. GL reflects that Accept the Gift’s messaging was oriented to ‘what our nation could be in terms of encouraging a fast track towards a clean energy future… We were trying to harness the sense of hope… [that] this is symbolic of the kind of nation that we want to see.’

Tony Abbott’s stance came into sharp focus as a result of the initiative. He would be the Prime Minister who would either ‘accept the gift’, or reject it. The imagery generated by the initiative provided a focus for media coverage of renewable energy. Common Grace (2015) wrote, ‘The rejection of our gift of solar panels for Kirribilli House is symbolic of the government’s failure to invest in renewables’.

In terms of emotional power, the campaign was specifically designed to ‘inspire’ and to be ‘something that appealed to everyone—[something that people] could see on Facebook and get excited about… Just about all of the responses were highly positive’ (GL). Common Grace (2015a) writes about the enthusiasm and momentum generated by the event, with 800 supporters signing their petition within five days. GL explains that when the project was launched, Common Grace had ‘virtually no-one on our database, no social media presence but… we were able to crowd fund the solar panels in just a few days’.

While this initiative hardly succeeded in changing the government’s mind, this was not the only goal that mattered. For those who were aware of the campaign—and the level of media coverage indicates that Accept The Gift had a significant audience—

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6 The phrase ‘Show, don’t tell’ originates in the fields of creative writing and screenwriting (e.g. McKee, 2010), but has been adopted in fields ranging from science communication (Spartz, 2018), activism and campaigning (Canning and Reinsborough, 2010; Oswald and Mitchell, 2012) and climate communication (Moser, 2016).
the imagery provided a way to challenge and delegitimise the government’s position on renewable energy. While the particular factors contributing to the overall public image of the government’s stance on climate change can be difficult to track and quantify, ‘image events’ like this are memorable, and make their own contribution to slowly accumulating broader public perceptions. Further, Common Grace was seen to be doing something worthwhile, enhancing the organisation’s capacity to attract new supporters. In the sections that follow, interviewees’ accounts of the five functions of imagery described above are analysed in greater detail.

(1) Making climate change visible

TS states, ‘All the research shows is that one of the key reasons climate change is difficult for people is that they can’t see it’. The status of climate change as invisible, abstract and outside most people’s direct experience is a problem for engaging the public (Doyle, 2011; Smith and Leiserowitz, 2012; Dilling and Moser, 2007). Yale researcher Anthony Leiserowitz reports that most people in the USA ‘[lack] vivid, concrete, and personally–relevant affective images of climate change, which helps explain why climate change remains a relatively low priority national or environmental issue’ (p. 55). He explains that people in the US ‘perceive climate change as a moderate risk that will predominantly impact geographically and temporally distant people and places’ (p. 44). Visibility matters for getting issues onto the political agenda; however, climate change presents particular challenges given the relative invisibility of climate impacts (and when pollution and extreme weather events do make the issues visible, for many people, the causal connections involved can remain ‘invisible’—or at least unclear).

TS continues, ‘When you are talking about coal projects and people like Pacific Islanders it is very direct, it is very visible… Bringing [the Warriors] to the source of the problem was a really powerful thing that really connected with people quite a lot.’ TS points out additional examples: ‘You can see the impact of a coal mine in the Hunter Valley region—you can see the impact not just on climate but on people’s homes, water, and land. You can see the impacts of building a coal port on the Great Barrier Reef.’ Campaigns on carbon pricing, he argues, were ‘complicated—difficult to understand, and difficult to communicate’. PR explains [Climate change] ‘is very difficult to see and feel and touch’. LJ notes, ‘You get a small percentage of people
who understand what it means and most people don’t’.

The ‘invisibility’ of climate change was turned to rhetorical advantage by Tony Abbott, who described emissions trading as ‘a so-called market in the non-delivery of an invisible substance to no-one’ (Metherell and Hawley, 2013). As described in Chapter 4 above, Abbott’s rhetorical advantage became a political advantage. To the extent that climate change remains remote, invisible, distant and difficult to understand, it is challenging to generate political will for change. People interviewed for this project reflected on the value of condensing the complexities of climate change into meaningful symbols such as the Great Barrier Reef, extreme weather events and the ‘underwater cabinet’ held by the President of the Maldives. The images below provide examples of how this has been done.

![GetUp Facebook post](image-url)

Figure 8.7 GetUp Facebook post (GetUp, 2018b). Original image: *Coral bleaching at Heron Island Feb 2016* (The Ocean Agency / XL Catlin Seaview Survey / Richard Vevers, 2016a).
Figure 8.8 Flooding due to king tide in Majuro, Marshall Islands, October 2015 (Loeak, 2015).

Figure 8.9 Impact of the 2016 ‘Sydney storm’, Collaroy beach, Sydney (Ewbank, 2016).
One of the climate movement’s greatest successes with making climate change visible was with the Australian Youth Climate Coalition’s ‘Climate Elephant’ during the 2010 election. LH reflects:

We basically knew that climate change was not being talked about and is such a huge issue that we need to elevate it on the agenda, and what better way to do it than with a cheeky fun symbol that AYCC is so good at. It… had a major impact in national media. The climate elephant… went and met with Julia Gillard. I think we were the first environment group to meet with Julia Gillard after she was elected and that was largely because of the climate elephant. We also had hundreds if not thousands of volunteers on polling booths running a campaign called powervote: there was a whole campaign but the climate elephant was definitely the public media image that came out.

AG also describes the elephant: ‘It was this really positive cute funny thing. Our objective was to get climate back on the agenda in a political space where it possibly wouldn’t have. [It conveyed] all these great positive simple messages and… cut through. The positivity and simplicity of it I found really impactful’. PL adds: ‘I
personally loved the elephant. It was incredibly powerful symbolically at that election... the perfect symbol of how climate change was being ignored by the major parties.'

(2) Making climate change tangible

The climate movement has deliberately chosen tangible images such as the Reef, farmland at risk from mining and a ‘river on fire’ to focus the debate and to energise
its base. SG discusses how climate change can be made intelligible through ‘analogues’ from risk management such as in aviation safety, insurance against fire, bridge building or ‘the possibility of a large dam collapsing’. PR contrasts the slow progress on climate change with the concerted international response to the danger of Ebola, noting that climate change is ‘very difficult to see and feel and touch’. (Ebola itself, she pointed out, may appear a distant reality; however, the issue is made prominent through vivid imagery in the news and a sense that the danger might spread). BL, who works as a communications strategist, concurs: ‘The problem has to be tangible’. It also needs to be in ‘bite sized pieces’ such as: “energy bills are too high” [and] “you can reduce pollution”…’

EF comments on how conservatives have successfully used tangible images: ‘[If] you tell them a Sunday roast will cost $100 [because of the carbon price]—people remember that and it gets into their frame whereas our stuff doesn’t. That stuff sticks really well and it’s really hard to scratch it off… Campaigning on climate when people do not have any tangible experience is very hard’. The chapter on the Rudd-

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7 The image was published by former NSW Greens MP Jeremy Buckingham on his Youtube account on April 22, 2016, and reported nationally (e.g. Williams, 2016) and globally (e.g. CNN, 2016 and Vulliamy, 2016).
Gillard-Abbott era investigated how the Coalition’s imagery of roast dinners and taxes on vacuuming prevailed against Labor’s more abstract and rational arguments for its carbon policies. LJ reflects on what happened when the climate movement itself fell into the trap of promoting abstract policies: ‘at that point… we lost public support—we went into minutiae of policy details that the public were not across or engaged with—the public knew that they wanted action on climate change but they didn’t have a lot of passionate opinions about what that looked like… [Question:] should it be 5% or 10% or 15%?… [LJ]: Exactly—and what does a percentage mean?’ YW adds that we are ‘being asked to rely more and more on less understandable information’.

The fossil fuel industry is tangible and identifiable, and is also readily cast as an ‘enemy’. Describing the approach being taken by organisations like 350.org, TS observes: ‘[We are] moving away from the abstract policy changes—carbon trading schemes and global negotiations [which] have come across as abstract and difficult to understand. The climate movement has turned away from a lot of that to instead say the fossil fuel industry is the problem’. He comments on how campaigning has expanded from opposition to fossil fuel projects to targeting the banks that finance them: ‘I think that the shift that’s happened recently has been a focus on the banks… That’s made it more tangible. There’s a target there, a goal that’s achievable.’

A number of interviewees linked making climate change tangible to making it local and experiential. LH speaks of making the issue of climate change ‘more tangible and local’ in the Port Augusta community: ‘to be able to go in there and… say “here is an actual real local solution”… Having the big broad top-level conversation about climate change is crucial, and we need to keep that focus, but we also need tangible examples of how communities can benefit and have a better life from action on climate change’. Asked about the obstacles to achieving the climate movement’s goals, CF reflected, ‘I think the block is… the only ways that we make climate change tangible in people’s lives is through encouraging individual action’. AL observes, ‘campaigning on climate when people do not have any tangible experience is very hard’, and speculated that the return of extreme weather would make a difference: ‘The main thing [that would generate concern about climate change would be if] El Nino [came] back again’. MH argued that people’s concern about climate change increased at a time of ‘a long extended drought… In some country
areas... water restrictions [were] very severe. [There were] dried out sporting grounds, dried up lakes, people getting injured on footy fields because the ground was so hard... Water-related climate impacts made people connect “climate change is bad because...”

Figure 8.16 Protest outside Commonwealth Bank, Melbourne (350, 2015a).

(3) Focusing the issue

It is possible for climate change to be visible and tangible without being focused in the public mind. Climate change may ‘exist’ in background awareness, with a sense of its causes and solutions being neither prominent nor compelling. Alternatively, it can have the kind of immediacy that creates a sense that ‘this is important and a choice must be made to address it’. Interviewees speak to the tension between unfocused and compelling images: ‘You can’t excite people with a vague picture’, states EF. RG describes how climate change differs from the issues of the past: ‘It’s the biggest, most complex problem... Even nuclear war, which is big, you can still focus on... It’s not a threat to our entire lifestyle and superannuation fund—and it’s not that hard to explain—if you push the button and the weapon goes off, we might all get annihilated. That’s sort of straightforward. Climate change is way more complex’. TS observes that ‘people are getting tired of going to rallies where the ask is a little bit vague’. To the extent that climate change appears confusing, blurred or unclear, advocates for political change have a problem. Conservative or denialist assertions about power blackouts, wind turbines or the potential loss of mining jobs have plenty of room to gain traction if the climate movement is offering only a ‘vague picture’.
Climate campaigners have sought to focus public attention on the fossil fuel industry as the source of the climate problem: as TS observes, ‘the focus has been on this is a bad industry… destroying our planet’. More recently, campaigners have turned their ‘focus to banks to say if [they] support this project there’ll be grave consequences for [them]’ (TS).

Figure 8.17 Whitsunday Residents Against Dumping (WRAD) members calling on banks to divest (350, 2015b).

Figure 8.18 Students create an oil spill on campus as part of the divestment campaign (350, 2017b).

Commenting on 350’s work, AL observes: ‘We are up against a very very hard
fight… Bill McKibben came and focused people’s attention on the fossil fuel industry as an enemy. The consequence is ‘we were [no longer] in this nebulous fight with nature.’

A different kind of episode where climate change and politicians’ response to it came into focus occurred at a public forum organised by the community group ‘Lighter Footprints’ ahead of the 2014 Victorian election. Hundreds had gathered at the Hawthorn Town Hall. A row of chairs was arranged on the stage at the front—yet some were empty: Liberal candidates had decided not to participate. TR describes what happened: ‘Mary [Crooks, the MC] said “take a good look at this, these are people who did not want to be counted in this discussion” and pointed to them, and said, “You might want to take a photograph of this”. All of a sudden in the audience… click, click, click—hundreds of photographs were taken… It became a focus [for] what they subsequently described as “the arrogance” of them—how could they simply say, “we’re not turning up—well, I tell you what, I’m not voting for them.”’ The absence of these candidates and the symbolic action of leaving the seats vacant ‘spoke’ volumes—in a way that can be difficult to achieve with words.

Figure 8.19 Empty chairs at Lighter Footprints forum, Hawthorn Town Hall (image: the author, 2014). 8

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8 The limited capacities of an early model mobile phone are evident in this image; however, it captures the empty chairs!- DM.
Like Accept the Gift, this example is small in scale—a local event, involving some hundreds of people. Yet, it is emblematic of what symbolic politics can do at a larger scale: a vivid image can crystallise the issue and define it in people’s minds, influencing political attitudes. This and the other examples above illustrate Edelman’s earlier statement about symbolic politics: ‘condensation symbols evoke the emotions associated with the situation. They condense [strong feelings] into one symbolic event, sign or act… [They] thereby… influence… political value structures’ (1985 (1964): pp. 6, 106). (While the forum was just one factor in the election campaign, it is notable that there was an 8% swing against the Liberal party in the local seat where this event took place: Victorian Electoral Commission, 2014, 2010).

(4) Projecting a vision of the future

Brysk (1995) writes that symbolic politics can bring about political change ‘by creating an alternative reality, transferring daily experience to a different realm in which it is valued and thus opening the recipient to consider a new social order’ (p. 577). For Alexander (2006a), persuasively communicating a broad vision of social problems rather than simply responding to existing problems is a condition for social movement success. Indeed, ‘behind social movements’, he argues, ‘is a reference to a highly idealized community’ (L2852). CF concurs: ‘Utopian energies are really important. I think the left must bring utopian energies in… aesthetics is an important part… bringing in beauty, what kind of world we want to be, what is the picture of the beautiful, good world’. Interviewees described the need for communicating vision in terms of inspiring and mobilising climate movement members. RH reflects on the impact of the blueprint for a renewables-powered Australia when it was released by Beyond Zero Emissions (BZE): ‘I think the vision was so alluring it just drew people in… I think a lot of people in the environment movement were in [a] headspace of feel[ing] like you’re “kicking against nothing”—there is nothing to get leverage to get momentum on… With the BZE vision—wow—there’s something… Bold, it made perfect sense and there were little steps you could take along the way.’ RG describes ‘envisaging a future that is free of fossil fuels [that people] can look forward to and feel excited about’. Discussing recruitment of new campaigners, EF states, ‘We talk to them, bring them in… and then create a vehicle for inspiring them, so you have to paint this picture of a solution—“we can actually get ourselves out of this, we’ve got these awesome policy solutions”, and create a
pathway for them to get involved’.

Interviewees also noted the role of vision in establishing new norms, projecting an image of power in the face of a sense of powerlessness, creating a shift in the perception of climate policy from being seen as job-destroying to job-creating. DE described ‘showing normal people doing what might sometimes be perceived as radical actions—trying to normalise that—make it not radical but hopeful and inspiring—a connecting point for the wider public’. He also describes the conscious choice to ‘positively frame imagery and symbols… to show [Pacific] Islanders looking powerful—not looking violently powerful… being a warrior can be as simple as standing there strongly’. LH identifies a shift in how community members in Port Augusta imagined themselves, their community and their own agency: people became ‘able to connect not only has this coal station caused my community problems but actually contributing to this bigger global problem and we can be a part of the solution to that’. Through the work of Repower Port Augusta, people came to see a solar thermal plant as ‘a solution which would provide benefits to the community—it’s about creating new jobs, not about getting rid of jobs’.
EF describes the process of ‘visioning’ as being integral to communication about climate change, and as something that the climate movement has not developed sufficiently. Imagery is important for building momentum behind technical solutions and making them seem possible:

I don’t think as a movement we have communicated what the world could look like effectively enough. [For example] there’s this plan to power Las Vegas with a concentrating solar thermal plant. In Australia, we don’t have that—our story is of coal and not much else, and the anti-wind stuff is biting really hard… I feel if we had a picture to sell… of the way the world could be in 10 years’ time…

Part of it is that BZE work that’s been done and having an idea of what [technical] solutions there are… but it is more [an issue of] “here is this scary unsafe horrible thing that big money is controlling”, and as communities and participants in our democracy “here is this thing that we are trying to create” and bringing them along—and that’s how you grow the movement, and I don’t think that’s something that we’ve nailed yet.

(5) The emotional power of images

AL states, ‘Climate change information is coming to the public devoid of emotion—
that’s the problem’. She is articulating a dimension of climate politics that is missing from accounts that rely on cognitive and ‘rational actor’ models. Writers such as Norgaard (2011a) and Weintrobe (2013b, 2013c) have examined climate change and emotion, though not from the perspective of climate politics or the climate movement. This nexus is worth analysing, given its importance for the ‘will’ part of political will, the ‘move’ part of ‘climate movement’ and for the motivation and momentum that is necessary to achieve change. Jasper (2011), a scholar of emotion and social movements, writes that ‘twenty years ago, emotions were almost entirely absent from scholarly accounts of politics, protest, and social movements’, adding:

Emotions are present in every phase and every aspect of [social movements]… They motivate individuals, are generated in crowds, are expressed rhetorically, and shape [movements’] stated and unstated goals… The intellectual pendulum has swung in the past two decades from structural theories of social movements toward cultural ones that include motivation for action, the meaning of events for political participants, strategic dilemmas and decision-making processes, and the need for a theory of action to complement the theory of structural context developed in the 1970s and 1980s. (p. 286)

Alexander’s cultural sociology (e.g. 2003, 2006a, 2010, 2011) offers a way of thinking about the nexus between emotion, the energy with which a political issue is charged, symbolic politics and broader political processes. In Alexander’s framework, emotional engagement and powerful symbols fuse to motivate people to join social movements, or to propel politicians like Obama into office. Alexander’s approach looks beyond ‘cognitive repositories of verified facts’ to ‘symbols that [are] shaped by deep emotional impulses’ (2003: L2786). He offers the example of civil rights protests in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1963, where Bull Connor, the local ‘Commissioner of Public Safety’, turned police dogs on protesters. Photographs of these events generated an enduring emotional resonance: ‘From being symbols that directed the viewer to an actual event, they became icons, evocative embodiments, in and of themselves, of the fearful consequences of anticevil force’ (L4384). Citing contemporaneous commentary about the emotional power of news images, movement historian David Garrow (1978) writes about a photograph of a police dog lunging at high school student Walter Gadsden as ‘perhaps the best remembered and most commented upon visual image of the movement’s efforts in the first half of
Bartmański and Alexander (2012) reflect further on how imagery has the capacity to evoke emotion. Introducing Kurasawa’s (2012) research on global humanitarian responses to the 1920s Russian famine, they argue that ‘It was the iconic evocation of collective sentiments rather than instrumental and normative arguments that were decisive in motivating [people to respond]… Icons of distant suffering [can] make ignorance and lack of empathy a deeply moral problem, not just a cognitive… issue’ (p. 7). Townsley (2012) discusses Alexander’s work and ways in which it addresses dimensions of social and political life that that are disregarded by theorists such as Habermas and Bourdieu. She argues that ‘cultural and psychological processes of communication, such as symbolism, aesthetic expression… and emotional identification’ need to be taken seriously as they ‘affect virtually all social communication in the public sphere’ (L7704). They are needed, she argues, to make sense of the emotion that Obama ignited and which swept him to power, and the horizontal ties that create social solidarity.

Smith and Howe (2015) discuss similar issues in their work on climate change as social drama. They point to Al Gore’s ‘use of myth [and] emotion’ in his efforts to engage people about climate change (L1697). Noting the failure of many attempts to communicate about the issue, they argue that ‘emotions… are essential to collective judgment and rational deliberation’ (L1047). The combination of emotive imagery and rational argument is illustrated in comments from Bev Smiles, spokesperson for

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9 The statue is adapted from an iconic photograph of Walter Gadsden being attacked by a police dog, taken by AP photographer Bill Hudson. Walter Gadsden was in fact a bystander during protests held in Birmingham in May 1963; however, the image was readily rendered in terms of a narrative of ‘good versus evil’ (see Berger, 2011: p. 39).
the Hunter Central Rivers Alliance, who describes coal mining in her area:

Mining companies have been living the high life. When the party is over, mining multinationals are free to walk away, leaving the public these huge voids, that if left unfilled, will exist for centuries, drawing in and tainting vital groundwater... Big, open mining pits, which can be hundreds of metres deep and kilometres long, are an eyesore for people who live nearby and sterilise the land from productive use. The pits, which will eventually become vast, ugly, saline lakes, pose serious risks to local groundwater’ (Lock The Gate, 2016a).

Figure 8.23 New Oakleigh coal mine near Rosewood, Qld (Lock the Gate Alliance, 2013a).

Interviewees for this project speak to the nexus between imagery, emotion and the task of engaging people in climate politics. AL, a psychologist as well as a climate campaigner, states, ‘Images go straight in through the eyes to the bottom of the brain, where all the emotions are—and all the decisions are made... The picture is much more important to the message than the words—people are sold on the picture.’ She continues, ‘the problem is that people’s brains are a lot more primitive than they think they are. Much as we might believe we are altruistic and care about people in far flung countries, we actually don’t that much—we are very affected by what we see and feel and hear... Our brains really only do empathy for a small
number and you’ve got to make it a very personal story before people actually care.’

Asked about the ‘ingredients’ of reaching people at an emotional level, AR speaks about the place and value of imagery. She describes the technique of Al Gore: It is really powerful to see. [Gore] uses a lot of visuals. He also [focuses on the] here and now—rather than in 100 years’ time. [He highlights] what’s happening in Antarctica... [Showing Australians] images of bushfires in Australia: we know that people are more likely to relate to things when it relates to the immediate situation. I think that he tells that story really well. He brings in a lot of facts. You have to be careful when you present them that they don’t become just dry...' DH comments on the Weld Angel—an image of a woman dressed as an angel protesting against logging in Tasmania (Van Vuuren and Lester, 2008): ‘It pulls you, it grabs you by the gut... It [makes you feel] “I want to learn about this—I want to know about this now”... Nobody who sees that can be unaffected’.

![The Climate Elephant in Melbourne](https://example.com/image.jpg)

**Figure 8.24 The Climate Elephant in Melbourne (©AYCC, 2010e).**

EF speaks of ‘paint[ing] a picture’ of the future and the power of the imagery such as the Climate Elephant in changing perceptions. She articulates the need for building an emotional connection, contrasting a focus on personal stories with climate science
alone: ‘what you are trying to get across is the emotional connection to the issue. [The] communication I was involved in was about building stories and emotional connections.’ She continues, ‘I guess the logic we are working on is that people’s minds aren’t changed by facts, they are changed by emotions and stories, and if you can leave someone a feeling of having connected with someone who is like them and they are left with a good feeling, then that is sort of most the effective thing, as opposed to blah metres of sea level rise by x date with x percentage... they are not the details we ask our volunteers to remember’. AR reflects that a key part of engaging people about climate change is emotion: ‘I do think you need to get people emotional about the problem—it needs to touch them in some way… you want people to feel something to shift within them that makes them want to fight against what’s happening’.

Political will, symbolic politics and imagery

To analyse one dimension of the role of imagery in achieving political change, this chapter adapts recent work done to clarify the concept of political will. Political will (or in some studies, political commitment) has been described as a concept standing ‘at the crossroads of politics and policy’ (Post et al., 2010). It is widely identified as a key ingredient for achieving political change. Quotes from interviews highlight its importance. SE notes that the obstacle to addressing climate change is not located at the level of money or technology: ‘I would contend that it is just a lack of political will’ (emphasis is added here, and in the quotes below). LH describes the campaign for a solar thermal plant in Port Augusta: similar plants were ‘being built in other places around the world, and there’s no reason it can’t be built in Port Augusta if there’s the political will to do it’. MH observed that some people would accept that the climate is changing, but respond, ‘do I want to pay for that?’ LJ notes the tension between the widespread stated support for action on climate change and the question of ‘how much cost people are willing to bear for the good for the planet’. SR describes shifts in decisionmakers’ willingness to engage as a result of successful campaigning. RL describes the outcome of successful advocacy in terms of a ‘considerable shift… in terms of the willingness of more people… to prioritise’
climate change.10

These perspectives are echoed by others who are involved in the climate movement and climate politics. School strike leader Greta Thunberg (2019) asks, ‘what do we do when there is no political will?’ Public figures including former UN General Secretary Ban Ki Moon and the Australian Conservation Foundation’s Kelly O’Shanassy called for political will ahead of the Paris climate talks (United Nations, 2014; O’Shanassy, 2015). Ross Garnaut described it as essential for achieving the policies that he advised the Rudd government to implement (Colvin, 2008). Alden Meyer of the US Union of Concerned Scientists described the lack of it as ‘the main barrier to confronting the climate crisis’ (2013). Mohammed Nasheed, the former President of the Maldives deposed in a 2012 coup, argued, ‘What we lack is not technology, but political will’ (Henn, 2009). US climate movement leader Bill McKibben adds, ‘As yet we don’t have anywhere near enough political will… The question is how to make the change, and this is the hard part. There’s no shortcut to building political will. It doesn’t help to just complain about not having it. There’s no substitute for going out and building movements that make things happen’ (2009). Australia’s Sam La Rocca elaborates, ‘Climate change has featured heavily in national debates over the past few decades and we have built significant support for action. When public opinion has been with us, we’ve shuffled towards reform. But on the whole, we have failed to generate sufficient and widespread political will to sustain momentum for ambitious reforms’ (2014: p. 6).

For all the widespread use of the term, exactly what political will is has often remained unspecified. Hammergren (1998) characterises political will as ‘the slipperiest concept in the policy lexicon. It is the sine qua non of policy success, which is never defined except by its absence’ (p. 12). It is ‘more a rhetorical than an analytic concept’ (p. 13). For Post et al. (2010), it is ‘an idea riddled with ambiguity and imprecision’ (p. 670). McCourt (2003) describes political commitment as ‘a cloudy

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10 Building political will relates to internal climate movement dynamics as well as public audiences—RL discusses the arguments the movement ‘has been willing to take on’ and the ‘appetite to run more on’ a particular agenda. SR discusses the growth of a campaign in terms of activists being increasingly ‘willing to push the envelope’. For SW, publicly demonstrating ‘the lengths to which people were willing to go to oppose’ Adani is a strategic task for the movement.
concept’ and ‘a classic black box’ (p. 1016). Heaver and Israel (1986) comment that ‘in spite of its importance and pervasiveness… [commitment] has seen little systematic treatment or research’ (p. 13).

In a series of three papers, Post et al. (2008, 2010) and Raile et al. (2014) seek to remedy this situation. They develop the concepts of political will and public will, and write about the use of public will in order to achieve political will. Post et al. analyse political will in terms of its role at decision maker level. In their framework, political will exists when (1) a sufficient set of decision-makers (2) with a common understanding of a particular problem on the formal agenda (3) is committed to supporting (4) a commonly perceived, potentially effective policy solution. The ‘political’ will that exists at the level of the public is defined in a later paper as ‘public will’ by Raile et al. (2014), who treat it as (1) a social system’s (2) shared recognition of a particular problem and (3) resolve to address the situation (4) in a particular way through (5) sustained collective action.

In this thesis, political will is understood in a slightly different way. The distinction between ‘political’ and ‘public’ will that these authors make remains important for some purposes. However, it is not always necessary or useful to separate them out. When ‘public will’ as defined above exerts political influence, it is also ‘political’. When civil society groups and social movements contend with initial opposition and build support for change, they are generating political will, that, if they are successful, becomes shared by decision-makers. In this thesis, political will is understood as existing when: (1) concerned members of the public (2) and supportive decision-makers (3) who recognise a problem, and share a vision of how to address it (4) are committed to achieving change through sustained collective action. When there is limited political will, decision-makers who oppose change can readily ignore calls to address an issue. When a significant level of political will exists, the ‘political climate’ is more conducive to gaining increasing parliamentary and institutional agreement that change is needed. Using this framework, the following table lists aspects of political will, some of its key elements, the contribution of symbolic politics,11 and instances of the contribution made by imagery. It is worth reflecting on the level of political will that would exist without the kinds of images described in the final column, and

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11 Clearly other forms of symbolic politics are important for building political will as well as imagery: narrative, for example, matters for ‘providing a focus around which concern about the issue crystallises’ and ‘defining … why the issue is significant’. The third column of the table provides a broader view of the role of symbolic politics.
on what strong images like these add to the dynamics of climate politics.
Table 8.1: Roles of imagery and symbolic politics in building political will. Key points and examples are highlighted in bold.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect of political will</th>
<th>Key elements</th>
<th>Role of symbolic politics</th>
<th>Examples of the role of imagery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Concerned members of the public | Individuals and groups who are concerned about a problem | Defining the issue in the public imagination: \((V1, F, T, E)\) establishing why the issue is significant and how it is aligned with other goals \((V2)\) and values, so that people are concerned and motivated to respond | • Imagery of the Great Barrier Reef displayed in front of banks contemplating funding coal projects, or in front of MPs’ offices, associating banks or MPs with damage to the Reef.  
• Melting icebergs, bushfire, the ‘river on fire’, providing a vivid sense that something is wrong.  
• Imagery of farmers standing together against coal seam gas, establishing a public image of determined and courageous opposition: this has been integral to the movement which led to bans on Coal Seam Gas exploration across much of Australia (Reuters, 2017). |
| and supportive decision-makers | • Increasing number of statements and actions from MPs that share civil society concerns  
• Growing consensus amongst decision-makers about the need for change | • Placing the issue on the formal political agenda and strengthening its place on the agenda through:  
- making the issue politically visible \((V1)\)  
- diminishing the credibility of opposing positions  
- providing a focus \((F)\) around which concern about the issue crystallises  
- defining \((V1, F, T, E)\) why the issue is significant and how it is aligned with other goals \((V2)\) and values, so that decision-makers are motivated to respond | • Al Gore’s *An Inconvenient Truth* and the Maldives Underwater Cabinet provide defining images of climate change that played a central role in generating a sense that ‘something must be done’.  
• Imagery used by the Stop Adani campaign such as the Great Barrier Reef elevates Adani on the agenda for the Queensland and federal ALP (e.g. Australian Marine Conservation Society (AMCS), 2018; Shorten, 2018). For discussion of Stop Adani, see Chapter 9. |
| who recognise a problem, and share a vision of how to address it | Similar perceptions of the problem: similar - narratives about the issue - images of its significance | • Making the problem visible and recognisable \((V1, F, T)\)  
• Generating the narrative and images that define the problem \((V1, F, T, E)\) | • Images of extreme weather events highlighting what will happen more often if climate change is not addressed.  
• Imagery generated by the Pacific Warriors: images of islands under threat and of... |
are committed to achieving change through sustained collective action

| Depth of commitment and the level of passion, momentum and 'political energy' directed towards addressing the issue | Providing imagery and narratives that - **galvanise commitment to achieving change**, and - infuse the issue with **emotional energy and urgency** (E) | Images of damage done by coal mines to farmland as an affront to the values of people who care about this land. Images that **associate the fossil fuel industry with damage to what is valued**: e.g. ‘Exxon killed the Reef’ displayed in front of bleached coral (see Chapter 10). **Firefighters and doctors visibly supporting action on climate change**, showing that trusted and authoritative professionals who save lives are concerned about the issue (AAP/AFP, 2015). |
| Shared commitment to strategies for change | - Using imagery, narrative and political theatre to create a **node** (*V1, F, T, V2*) around which political action is organised (E) | - **Lock the Gate Gasfield Free Declaration Days** establishing an image of strength, determination and defiance in the imagination of local communities and their supporters. |

A sense that ‘we can do this’: perceived collective efficacy

- **Projecting a sense that change is possible** (*V2, E*)
- **Projecting a vision** (*V2*) of a way forward, including a sense of how the ‘plot’ or ‘script’ of the story will play out
- **Images of solar panels and wind farms**, showing that change is possible.

Willingness to commit significant time and resources

- **Portrayal of a problem** (*V1, F, T*) that demands a response, and a **solution** (*V2*) which people mobilise behind (E)
- **Images of a polluting coal fired power station at Port Augusta**, contrasted with the Spanish Gemasolar plant, illustrating what is possible for Australia.
- **Images of polluting coal plant at Anglesea**, combined with narratives about public health (Seccombe, 2015; McCaskill, 2014).
If political will stands ‘at the crossroads of politics and policy’ but ‘we don’t have anywhere near enough’ of it, Table 8.1 above suggests a significant role for imagery (and symbolic politics more broadly) in the process of building and sustaining it. It is difficult to think of political will existing without a strong image of what is at stake and why change is needed: building political will requires a recognition of the need to address a problem, and imagery is important in making a problem recognisable. Images can place issues in focus and build commitment to address them. When people say, ‘This is a problem we need to do something about’, their sense of what ‘this’ is is often encoded in imagery (see Chapter 2). A number of examples illustrate these points. Images like those used in Al Gore’s *An Inconvenient Truth*, which was referenced by several interviewees, have shaped perceptions of the need for change. Imagery of the impacts of coal seam gas exploration have built up a common perception of CSG as dangerous, and several states have banned or restricted it (e.g. Andrews, 2017; Reuters, 2017). In the Repower Port Augusta campaign, imagery of the Walk For Solar and of the Gemasolar plant in Spain projected a vision for what was needed and what was possible. In 2017, the South Australian Government announced its support for a solar thermal plant for Port Augusta (Weatherill, 2017; Spencer, 2017). Getting this far demonstrates how the climate movement was able to
make the issue visible and bring it into focus in a way that popularised a shared perception of the issue, sustained collective action, and galvanised commitment to change; however, under the new Liberal government in South Australia, the project was shelved, highlighting the need for ‘policy sustainability’ (Pierson, 2005).  

Depth of commitment to a political goal is strengthened when imagery generates ‘political energy’ and momentum and infuses an issue with urgency, and sometimes moral power. Imagery of the Great Barrier Reef has been integral to the Stop Adani campaign (see the following chapter), building political will for an end to both this mine and an end to coal mining overall that did not exist before this campaign. Arguably, the commitment and passion driving the involvement of many in the Stop Adani campaign has foundations in images of the importance of ending the coal industry generated by earlier initiatives such as the campaigns against mining at Maules Creek and the Pacific Warriors blockade. Further, political power of another kind is exerted when financial institutions respond to brand pressure and develop the will to change their policies: the functions of imagery outlined above are consistent features of fossil fuel divestment campaigning.

Thus, the way that climate change is pictured matters for climate politics. When imagery has a significant impact on what happens in the columns describing aspects of ‘political will’, climate politics is being played out through imagery. These instances exemplify or at least approach Delicath and DeLuca’s account of imagery as ‘the site and substance of the argument’ or Dobrin and Morey’s point about the environmental dilemma as ‘a problem of image/imaging’. The relationship between imagery and political will can be understood by thinking about how the extent of political will varies with the power and salience of images like those mentioned in the final column. Images of melting icebergs and extreme weather events, or more recently footage of striking students calling on adults to take responsibility for addressing climate change (School Strike 4 Climate, 2018), create a picture of the issue in the public imagination. Making this picture compelling matters for building

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12 Labor lost power in South Australia in 2018 after four terms in office. In April 2019, the new South Australian Government announced that the company behind the project, SolarReserve, was unable to raise finance for the project (van Holst Pellekaan, 2019). The outcome was an enormous blow to the Repower Port Augusta campaign. Repower Port Augusta stated, ‘The SA and Federal Government must answer how a project with their promises of support is now at risk with the developer walking away, whether they could have done more to prevent this and what they are doing now to ensure Port Augusta’s promised solar thermal plant is built’ (Repower Port Augusta, 2019).
political will, and for shaping the place of climate change in the public imagination more broadly.

**Conclusion: imagery, political will and climate politics**

This chapter began with some strong claims for the role of imagery in politics. As well as Delicath and DeLuca’s characterisation of ‘image events’ as the ‘site and substance’ of political argument, Schill (2012) has argued that images ‘play a foundational role in the political communication process’, adding, ‘We now campaign… largely by pictures’. Hansen (2010) has argued that images of the environment are about power. Dobrin and Morley (2009) have claimed that ‘the environmental dilemma is not just a political/ ecological crisis… but a dilemma of representation, a dilemma of rhetorical and visual-rhetorical choice’ (2009, L71). They maintain that as well as ‘ecospeak’, we need ‘ecosee’. The analysis in this chapter points to important ways in which imagery shapes climate politics. The climate movement’s use of images influences the ‘public image’ of climate change. Because imagery conveys what is at stake and why it matters, it needs to be built into an understanding of the factors that make for political will. Effective projection of strong images can intensify political will by providing a visible, vivid, focused, tangible, emotionally compelling sense of the issue and of the future a movement is working towards. The strength of the imagery used in a debate influences how strongly an issue is defined, the degree to which a case for change is compelling, and the extent to which commitment can be galvanised through a visible focus.

The political significance of the five functions of imagery identified in this chapter becomes clearer if we think of the very real political consequences that occur when climate change is invisible, intangible or unfocused in the public mind, and when a compelling vision is not projected, or when the issue is presented without emotion. Making climate change visible and focused is a necessary condition for the problem first to be recognised, and then to be elevated on the political agenda. Visibility and vision are especially significant when ‘politics as usual’ would make climate change a second order issue, or relegate it to the ‘too hard basket’. Further, for the climate movement to be built and be sustained, it matters to infuse its work with emotional and moral energy and to portray a focused image of what is at stake. Thus, this
analysis suggests that one of the ‘variables’ that influence the level of political will to address climate change is the strength of imagery that portrays it.

Political will, brought out of a ‘black box’ by the work of writers like Post and Raile, needs to be recognised as a factor in climate politics alongside entrenched interests, alliances, political leadership and social movements’ organising work. Political will and a visible, tangible, focused and emotionally compelling image of what is at stake clearly count when inertia, the power of the fossil fuel lobby, intra-party dynamics, lack of vision, or fears of immigration or terrorism stand in the way of achieving change. As the observers cited above have argued, if the goals of the climate movement are to be achieved, there is a need for more of it. The framework presented in Table 8.1 provides a way to go beyond an intuitive-but-unformed sense of what political will is, and to map out some of the elements that generate it.

AL’s observation that ‘images go straight in through the eyes to the bottom of the brain, where all the emotions are—and all the decisions are made’ points to the value of seeing will, decision-making, emotion and imagery in conjunction. If her statement that ‘the picture is much more important to the message than the words—people are sold on the picture’ is even partially right, then imagery needs attention, alongside discourse and political cognition. This chapter has sought to outline and analyse some of the senses in which she is right about the centrality of images to climate politics. Additional ways in which imagery shapes climate politics are examined in the next chapter on imagery and the public imagination, which will draw particularly on the case of the Stop Adani and divestment campaigns, and in the subsequent chapter on iconic imagery.
Chapter 9

Imagery, climate change, and the public imagination: ‘changing the political climate’

‘Increasingly, the electorate is thinking politically, not in terms of policies but of images’.

Jamaican-British cultural theorist Stuart Hall (2016 [1987]: p. 239) is reflecting on Margaret Thatcher’s re-election for a third term in 1987. The ‘Iron Lady’ had won in the Falklands, defeated the mineworkers, and teamed up with Rupert Murdoch using ‘Fortress Wapping’ to prevail over the printers (Lang, et al., 2011). Now she had defeated Labour at the ballot box—again. Hall addresses a paradox: polls had shown that ‘significant majorities consistently preferred Labour on unemployment, health, housing, education’. Voters named these as the most important issues; however, ‘both before and during the election, if asked about image—who was “doing a good job”, “giving the country a lead”, making people “feel good to be British again”—a majority consistently said “Maggie”’ (p. 239). Hall reflects:

This doesn’t mean that policies don’t matter. It does mean that policies don’t capture people’s political imaginations unless constructed into an image with which they can identify… Electoral politics—in fact, every kind of politics—depends on political identities and identifications. People make identifications symbolically: through social imagery, in their political imaginations. (2016 [1987]: pp. 238, 239)

The dilemma of how to address a gap between how issues are imagined and the level of stated support for policy positions is familiar for climate campaigners who have seen politicians dismantle Australia’s price on carbon and voters in Australia’s 2019 federal election support a government led by Scott Morrison, a politician famous for bringing a lump of coal into Parliament (Hansard, 2017). If images are a primary form of ‘political cognition’ and are fundamental to capturing people’s political imagination—and, in turn, if ‘the imagination’ is a determining (but easily disregarded) factor that shapes political outcomes—then inquiring into how the climate movement is using imagery to shape the people’s political imagination is an important task.
Points made in the earlier chapter on the Pacific Warriors overlap with Hall’s comments above. Chapter 6 argued that (1) the way in which coal is ‘imagined’ as central to Australian life and the Australian economy is itself a significant political obstacle to achieving the objectives of the climate movement; (2) the pathway between an initial vision of ending the coal industry and eventually achieving this goal goes through a process of changing the ‘climate of opinion’—the way we ‘imagine’ coal and climate change; (3) a powerful social movement is necessary for change like this to occur; and (4) symbolic politics is important for making this happen—both for building this kind of movement and for engaging the public imagination. The current chapter builds on this perspective and takes Hall’s statements about the importance of imagery and ‘people’s political imagination’ as a context for thinking about climate politics. It focuses on three areas of the climate movement’s work which stood out in interviews for this research: the Stop Adani and fossil fuel divestment campaigns, and the politics of social licence and reputation. The sections that follow address the central research question¹ in terms of how the political use of imagery figures in these instances of the climate movement’s work, and how can it be understood in terms of ‘captur[ing] people’s political imaginations’ as a condition for achieving political change. Efforts to influence the imagination of the public and of climate campaigners are discussed in terms of ‘battles of images’, whose images have a more central role in the imagination of relevant ‘publics’, the mobilising impact of what people see, and perceptions of reputation and legitimacy.

**Imagery and the imagination: background and context**

In emphasising the political importance of images and the imagination, Hall had a predecessor in Walter Lippmann (1922), who offered a famous account of ‘the world outside and the pictures in our heads’ (p. 3). Today, Lippmann is remembered more for his role in the fields of opinion research, political communication and media studies, yet as Müller (2007) notes, he also deserves a significant place in the field of visual communication. Lippmann had practical experience in this field, having worked as a propaganda leaflet writer during the First World War. His accounts of

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¹ For reference, the central question is: ‘How does symbolic politics figure in the work of the Australian climate movement, and in what ways is it important for achieving political change?’
politics feature a nexus between images, imagination, and political outcomes. He also shares Hall’s emphasis on psychological identification, writing: ‘Pictures have always been the surest way of conveying an idea, and next in order, words that call up pictures in memory. But the idea conveyed is not fully our own until we have identified ourselves with some aspect of the picture’ (pp. 162-3). For Lippmann, the way that people imagined the 1920s Russian famine, a strike, a future classless society, Mexico, the Ku Klux Klan or the ‘Great War’ had a profound impact on politics. He maintains, ‘The only feeling that anyone can have about an event [they do] not experience is the feeling aroused by [their] mental image of that event… The way in which the world is imagined determines at any particular moment what [people] will do’ (pp. 13, 25).

‘Imagery’ and ‘the imagination’ figure strongly in familiar ways of thinking about politics: politicians cultivate their ‘public image’, they use visual imagery in the process, and their successes are commonly described in terms of capturing the public imagination. ‘The public imagination’ and ‘the way we imagine climate change’ provide more focused—and more familiar—concepts than ‘the cultural-symbolic domain of politics’, or technical terms such as discourse and representation. ‘The’ public imagination is, of course, differentiated: people have divergent ways of imagining the issues, and, even for individuals, competing ways of imagining reality stand in tension with each other. Yet, ‘the public imagination’ remains a useful concept, particularly when assessing the political role of imagery, narrative and social drama. The term points to the role of ‘the pictures’ as well as ‘the ideas’ in our heads, and the emotions that are associated with these pictures. To speak of people’s imagination rather than simply their ‘attitudes’ makes room for a view of politics which attends to the interactions between imagery, emotion, identity, identification, and political action.2

This chapter discusses a range of forms of imagery, including visual images, verbal metaphors, and also ‘public image’—the overall way an organisation or issue is imagined. This breadth of focus corresponds to the range of ways of understanding images that is evident in the work of Hall and Lippmann. Mitchell (2013), a key thinker in the pictorial turn in the social sciences, offers an even broader

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2 These belong to the ‘subjective domain of politics’ described in Table 1.1 in Chapter 1.
understanding of imagery, which includes pictures, verbal metaphors, memories, and mental images (see Figure 1). For the purposes of this chapter, including both visual and verbal imagery in the analysis makes sense, given the strong evidence that we think in images as well as abstractions (see Chapter 2). It is also consistent with Lippmann’s observations about ‘the pictures in our heads’, the way that visual images only retain their power through memory as mental images, and the role of metaphor in thinking (see Lakoff, 2008, 2014). Public image can be understood as an overall ‘gestalt’ comprised of verbal and visual images, narratives and understandings. A focus on imagery offers one way of thinking about how climate politics is ‘imagined’. Points made about narrative in Chapter 7 also apply to the imagination, and images and narratives—as well as the factual arguments of ‘Information Politics’—work together. Yet, images are not just an alternative means of conveying what might otherwise be articulated in ‘a thousand words’. The word imagination points to the significance of images as part of what is ‘imagined’. If, as is argued in Chapter 2, we often ‘think in images’, then a focus on imagery allows us to get closer to a fundamental human way of knowing and engaging with the world.

Figure 9.1 Meanings of ‘image’ (from Mitchell, 1986: p. 10).

The importance of the imagination is recognised in rich traditions in the social sciences. For example, in After Nature: A Politics for the Anthropocene (2015), Purdy examines the political significance of the environmental imagination and its role in driving fundamental dynamics in US history. One form of imagination has pictured

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3 The ‘public image’ of fossil fuels, for example, is influenced by visual images, and differs from and is prior to the propositional statements that put this image into words.
nature as a storehouse to be utilised commercially, whereas conservationists envisaged places where national parks could be, and were driven by their imagination to make these national parks a reality. Purdy reflects,

far from being frivolous make-believe, imagination is intensely practical. What we have become conscious of, how we see it, and what we believe it means—and everything we leave out—are keys to navigating the world… Imagination… enables us to do things together politically. (p. 7)

Describing Obama’s first presidential victory, Alexander (2010) writes that political candidates evoke pictures ‘in the imaginations of their listeners… Whether we become convinced is less a matter of rightness in a moral or cognitive sense than aesthetic power’ (L6103). Chapter 2 noted the work of Taylor (2004) on social imaginaries. Scholars working in the tradition he developed speak to the relationship between imaginaries, imagination and political reality. Yussof and Gabrys (2011) argue that the imagination ‘creates the conditions for material interventions in and political sensibilities of the world’ (p. 516). For Appadurai (1996), the imagination is ‘central to all forms of agency, is itself a social fact, and is the key component of the new global order’ (p. 31). Speaking as one of a group of scholars who led international thinking on social imaginaries, Gaonkar (2002) writes,

social imaginaries are ways of understanding the social that become social entities themselves… They are first-person subjectivities that build upon implicit understandings that underlie and make possible common practices… They [involve representation], even when they acquire immense institutional force; and they are the means by which individuals understand their identities and their place in the world. (p. 4)

Lederach (2005) adds to this picture, with his focus is on the imagination in conflict resolution. Lederach has extensive experience at the sharp end of peacebuilding around the world. Reflecting on cases where entrenched conflicts were transformed,

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4 As Chapter 3 states, insights from peacebuilding are worth attending to, given the extent to which climate politics is driven by a conflict between ‘believers’ and ‘sceptics’, and given the need to find creative and imaginative ways forward in the face of entrenched group differences. Hamilton (2010) and Kahan (2010) have described how climate politics has been caught in the political polarisation between right and left. Bliuc et al. (2015) argue that intergroup conflict resolution techniques may be valuable for addressing the impasse.
he observes that what made these changes possible was ‘not… techniques, technical expertise, not political, economic, or military power [but the role of] the moral imagination in human affairs’ (L498). For Lederach, a purely intellectual, cognitive approach is limiting and unhelpful. He looks to the arts because of their capacity to ‘build a bridge between the heart and the mind’ (2005, L3233) writing, ‘My feeling, is that we have overemphasized… technical aspects and political content to the detriment of the art of giving birth to and keeping a process creatively alive. In so doing we have missed the core of what creates and sustains constructive social change’ (L1457). Rather than resulting from cognitive analysis, he argues, transformative moments often arise through sudden insight that comes ‘in the form of an image’ (L1431). He reflects that in informal settings, people rarely talk about conflict analytically. Instead, they ‘talk in images’. Seeing the essence of an issue, he continues, is the hardest challenge of peacebuilding: ‘If you do nothing else, take time to get a picture, an image… When you see the picture better, you will have achieved a synthesis… What I find is this: If I can see it, I can understand it better’ (L1482, 1358, 1507).

These perspectives support Hall’s view that both imagination and the images that populate it are politically significant. The way we imagine an issue is a determining factor in political change because imagination is integral to perceiving the world, and to the political actions shaped by these perceptions. Imagination gives content to identity, it is required for envisaging a different future, it undergirds power relationships, and it energises social movements and gives them direction. Talking and thinking in pictures is basic to everyday political cognition and communication, and picturing something in our imagination can make it possible to understand what is otherwise vague or unclear. Climate politics is thus entwined with what is ‘imagined’. Within one ‘imaginary’, coal is ‘good for humanity’ (Abbott, in Lay, 2014), whereas in another, the fossil fuel industry and a healthy planet cannot coexist (McKibben, 2013b). Influencing how climate change is imagined is an essential task for the climate movement.
The Stop Adani campaign and the public imagination: images and counter-images

Environment movement strategist John Hepburn (2017) writes, ‘The campaign against the Adani mine has become a powerful symbol in the struggle over the future of coal in Australia… For the environmental movement, the campaign is a line in the sand in the fight over the future of the global climate’. From an early stage, coal from the proposed Queensland mine had been described as ‘unburnable’ (Leaton, 2012): it would push the climate beyond the ‘point of no return’ (Greenpeace, 2013b). A series of public meetings held in March 2017—the ‘Stop Adani Roadshow’—began the process of placing a new objective on the political agenda: stopping a coal mine because of its impact on climate change. Speakers at the Roadshow argued that the politics of Adani are driven by ‘money, power and influence’ and that what is needed is a process of ‘building the movement’, ‘shifting the politics’ (lobbying local MPs) and ‘stopping the money’ (preventing finance for the mine: Stop Adani, 2017b). Essential as they are, ‘money, power and influence’, or ‘building the movement, shifting the politics and stopping the money’ do not describe the dimensions of politics which Hall emphasises. If, as he claims, ‘the electorate is thinking politically, not in terms of policies but of images’ and if the imagination matters, then these factors also belong in the picture. Regardless of the statements above, the actual Stop Adani campaign has relied extensively on imagery. When a leading Stop Adani campaigner asked people at a rally in Melbourne, ‘Did you attend the Roadshow and see the images of the Reef?’ (Field Notes, 2017), it was as though these images carried the movement’s message. The analysis below argues that imagination and imagery can take their place alongside ‘money, power and influence’—and are also central to success in ‘building the movement, shifting the politics and stopping the money’. Looking at climate politics from one angle, imagery is a ‘resource’ that contributes to more fundamental political goals—yet from another angle, the public imagination and the images that infuse it can be understood as one among a number of ‘domains’ where the politics of Adani is won or lost.

Early in 2017, when contaminated water spilled from Adani’s Abbot Point coal terminal, environmental organisations released drone images from the site. The ACF’s Geoff Cousins argued that these photographs provided ‘a tragic and shocking
picture of what the future of the [Great Barrier Reef] coast looks like if we don’t stop digging up coal’ (Robertson, 2017). Resources Minister Matt Canavan (2017a) claimed that the wetlands were nothing more than ‘a manmade swamp that was created for duck shooting in the 1950s’. A report commissioned by the Queensland Government (BMT WBM, 2012) described a nationally-important wetland system that met many of the criteria of the Ramsar Convention.\footnote{It is worth noting that even the more formal language to do with international conventions protecting wetlands can evoke ‘pictures in our heads’, to use Lippmann’s words: speaking of a ‘nationally important wetland system’ can evoke images of what important wetlands look like.}

Opponents of the mine speak in terms of ‘a dirty, dying industry’ (ACF, 2017a) and warn that the mine would ‘super-charg[e] dangerous global warming’. The mine has been described as a ‘deathly project’ (AMCS, 2017a) that will lead to ‘a dead Reef and the pollution of our planet’ (ACF, 2017b) and as one of the projects that would push the climate beyond the ‘point of no return’ (Greenpeace, 2013b). Campaigners have highlighted the allegations of corruption levelled at Adani (Ferguson, 2017). The ACF’s Kelly O’Shanassy stated, ‘Basically, the government is using the drug dealer’s defence—the argument that if we don’t dig up this coal and burn it,
somebody else will’ (2017c). The Wangan and Jagalingou Family Council (2015), representing Traditional Owners and Native Title Applicants in the region of the proposed mine, stated: ‘If the Carmichael mine were to proceed it would tear the heart out of the land… It would literally leave a huge black hole, monumental in proportions, where there were once our homelands… Our land will be “disappeared”’. Further, a wide range of eminent Australians—including Ian and Greg Chappell, Missy Higgins, Tim Winton, and Peter Garrett—have associated their image with opposition to the mine (ACF, 2017a).

The mine is imagined by its supporters as a boon for ‘North Queenslanders [who] are calling out for jobs’ (Canavan, 2017b). Supporters present it as ‘a light at the end of the tunnel for all of those communities that are feeling it fairly tough at the moment’ (Christensen in Iggulden, 2015). Senator Canavan asserted, ‘our voice gets drowned out. We don't have the multimillion-dollar bank accounts that these activist groups have’ (Canavan, 2016). Adani’s supporters speak of coal as ‘our second biggest export’, which it would be ‘nonsensical’ for ‘an Australian bank, a bank that purports to be a proud Australian [to] turn its back on’ (Canavan, 2017c). The Minerals Council of Australia (2017) accused opponents of ‘a cynical activist campaign underpinned by foreign funding’ which would ‘deny economic and social advancement of millions of Indian people’. Josh Frydenberg argued as the Energy Minister that there was a ‘strong moral case’ for the mine (Norman, 2015), presenting it as a source of improved living conditions in developing countries.

The examples above illustrate how a ‘contest of images and counter-images’ figures in the ‘politics of the public imagination’. The Stop Adani campaign evokes imagery of prominent Australians, a Reef at risk, dirt, pollution, drug dealing, a black hole and a ‘deathly project’—almost suggesting a horror movie. Supporters of the mine want Adani to be imagined in terms of people ‘calling out for’ local jobs, ‘light at the end of the tunnel’, and downtrodden mine supporters, who are contending with cashed-up activists who would expose Queenslanders to economic peril, and stand in the way of anti-poverty programs in India. Here, imagery and verbal argument

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6 This organisation has sought to establish a public image of credibly speaking for the community on whose traditional lands the mine would be built. Yet they are challenged by a group that supported the mine (and whose members had received payments from Adani via previously-undisclosed transfers to their bank accounts: Robertson, 2016). At the time of writing, their case against the mine is being taken to the High Court.
are intertwined. The arguments, however, tend to be laden with imagery, and it is difficult to imagine them holding persuasive power without it.

The political importance of making climate change visible and tangible, focusing the issue, conveying a vision and generating an emotional response is discussed in the previous chapter. Below, these themes are used to identify features of the visual imagery used by the Stop Adani campaign. (For analysis of what makes images powerful, see the following chapter on iconic imagery). Some common features are evident, such as the Reef, the red ‘Stop’ sign, and groups of campaigners gathered at symbolically significant locations. The issue of the Adani mine was made visible and vivid by highlighting the effects of climate change on the Reef and marine life.

![Figure 9.3 Coral bleaching at Lizard Island March 2016 (The Ocean Agency / XL Catlin Seaview Survey / Richard Vevers, 2016).](image)

![Figure 9.4 #StopAdani Cairns Cabinet Rally, 10 July 2017 (Stop Adani, 2017c).](image)
The Stop sign, the campaign’s logo, is present across campaign events. Linked to everyday experience, it conveys a warning, connotes danger, and points to the need to respond in order to prevent harm.
Figure 9.7 Brisbane Commbank Protest (Stop Adani / Alex Bloom, 2017).

Figure 9.8 Rally held on the first Monday after the 2017 Queensland election calling on the government to veto a loan to Adani (Stop Adani, 2017d).

Figure 9.9 During a week of actions at Commbank branches across the country: Canberra goes back to Commbank (Stop Adani, 2017e).
Campaigning against a coalmine that does not yet exist, Stop Adani works to make the issues **tangible**. Images convey a sense of what the endangered Reef looks like and convey what is at risk.

While you’re in QLD @gautam_adani, visit our Reef. Because it’ll look like this if you burn all that coal. #StopAdani Credit: Ocean Agency
In relation to projecting a vision: since the whole campaign focuses on preventing a project from going ahead, images conveying a desired future are harder to find, though a future where the Reef is protected is central to the campaign. The campaign has also argued for investing money in ways other than in this mine:

![Figure 9.13 Queensland Parliament Protest, 25 May 2017 (Stop Adani, 2017g).](image1)

Tourism jobs as well as marine life are at stake. Some protesters bring models of wind turbines and solar panels to Stop Adani events.

![Figure 9.14 Perth Rally against new coal (Stop Adani / Gabrielle Fairall, 2017).](image2)

Protests held outside banks brought their decisions into focus. The relationship
between Turnbull and Adani was highlighted, and events such as a human sign outside Parliament House sought to direct public attention to the issue.

Figure 9.15 Malcolm Turnbull and Gautam Adani puppets outside Parliament House (Stop Adani, 2017h).

Figure 9.16 Human sign on the lawns of Parliament House, Canberra (Stop Adani, 2017i).

Imagery of the Reef at risk and of enthused groups of campaigners figure consistently in the campaign, showing how engaging emotion and evoking imagery can coincide. It is worth recalling Lippmann’s statements about links between emotion and people’s ‘mental image’ of events, and how ‘the way in which the
world is imagined determines... what [people] will do’ (1922: pp. 13, 25). Taking these points further, the way an issue like Adani is imagined can be understood in terms of the associations people have to it (Lorenzoni et al., 2006) and their emotional valence (Barry, 2015). The question ‘Did you attend the Roadshow and see the images of the Reef?’ referenced above may have been asked for several reasons, but one of its functions was to stir the crowd (Field Notes, 2017). Emotionally evocative images were also connected to other powerful cultural and historical themes. Kokoda veteran Bill Ryan joined the campaign:


Former Australian test cricket captains Ian and Greg Chappell added their support, as did singers Peter Garrett and Bernard Fanning, and Michael Caton, star of the popular Australian film The Castle:
With images like those above, Stop Adani has engaged the public and also sought to capture the imagination of its supporters to build an effective and powerful movement. A Stop Adani toolkit on *How to Take and Send Us Great Photos and Video* illustrates the movement’s thinking. It states, ‘It’s vital that the movement to #StopAdani is visible… As any Millennial can tell you—“pics or it didn’t happen”’ (Stop Adani 2017k). SW comments on the role of imagery in 350’s early contribution to this campaign:
One thing we always prioritise in 350 is visuals in our communications. I think we used images and videos a lot more than most.

Question: Where do you think that’s coming from: is it a personal judgment of [campaigners]?

SW: It’s a more thought-out thing—the use of visuals kind of goes back to 350’s roots—those first global days of action where the emphasis was on thousands of people across the world taking a stand, creating their symbol and then sharing that image into a global platform... using visuals to bring individuals’ or communities’ stories to the forefront... That’s written into our digital style guides...

I think a part of it is the organising theory of change that 350 holds... The best way to... capture the interpretations that people make of [the campaign] is often though photos and video.7

What do people think of when they think of Adani? The political climate has changed if large numbers of people come to think of the Reef, the damage done by a coal mine and a future based on sources of income other than coal in preference to

7 The importance of imagery for capturing the imagination of movement supporters is illustrated by Stop Adani’s use of the films Guarding the Galilee and A Mighty Force. ‘Host a screening’ has been one of the key actions that supporters have been invited to take (Stop Adani, 2018c). The film Guarding the Galilee is presented by iconic Australian actor Michael Caton (‘Darryl Kerrigan’ in The Castle), and by early 2018, it had screened over 400 times, reaching approximately 10,000 people (Stop Adani, 2018d). Promotional material for the film highlights the images it portrays:

The award-winning documentary team captures the raw beauty of Central Queensland, where Adani’s mine threatens essential water resources. Just downstream from the proposed mine, a grazier fears for the impact on the river that quenches the thirst of his cattle, and flows through to the Coral Sea. On the coast, a boat owner operating out of the Airlie beach tourist hotspot worries about the hundreds of extra ships steaming through the Great Barrier Reef each year (Stop Adani, 2017l).

Guarding the Galilee was in fact produced because of a belief that imagery was necessary for building a real challenge to the mine: images would complement the existing facts and arguments, and would evoke an emotional reaction in the public. The concept for the film was also inspired by the model of Lock The Gate, where films had played a significant role in movement-building (Field Notes, 2017; Lighter Footprints, 2017; Lock the Gate, 2016b). Screenings of this film across Australia have been a node around which the Stop Adani movement has developed.
images of people in hi-vis vests employed in Australia’s coal industry. For this to happen, the work of establishing powerful images in the public mind is crucial. And yet, while the movement has made important gains in winning public support (Gartrell, 2017; Roy Morgan, 2017; AYCC, 2018), in influencing politicians to express their support (Stop Adani, 2019) and in successfully pressuring politicians to oppose financing for the mine (Stop Adani, 2018), the outcome of Australia’s 2019 federal election raises questions about what it will take to stop Adani.

Environmental groups billed the federal election of May 2019 as the ‘#climateelection’ (Australian Conservation Foundation, 2019), and the Adani mine was one of several prominent election issues (Jones, 2019). Despite strong evidence of voter concern about climate change (Kassam, 2019; Oliver, 2018), these concerns did not translate into the result that the climate movement had hoped for—and had reason to expect (Cockburn and Kontominas, 2019). At the time of writing, debates about the election remain at an early stage; however, the arguments about imagery and the public imagination outlined above can be applied to analysing how Morrison defeated Shorten. To return to Thatcher’s 1987 victory as a basis for comparison: Hall argues that one reason Labour failed to ‘shift minds, hearts and votes’ was that it lost the struggle over political imagery: ‘how else can you discuss what Britain and the British people are to become, except in terms of broad images? The future has to be imagined—“imaged”, to coin a word’ (p. 240). Hall’s work was chosen to open this chapter before the result of the 2019 election was known, but his insights are valuable for thinking about this outcome. The following observations

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8 Stop Adani (2018a) records that 22 federal MPs had ‘spoken publicly in opposition to the Adani mine. A larger group of politicians have gone on the record to oppose public funding for Adani’.

9 The annual Lowy Institute poll, conducted two months before the election, found that ‘Climate change tops the list of potential threats to Australia’s vital interests over the next ten years, with 64% of Australians saying it is ‘a critical threat’’ (Kassam, 2019: p. 4). Further, ‘six in ten Australians (61%) say ‘global warming is a serious and pressing problem’, about which ‘we should begin taking steps now even if this involves significant costs’. This is a 25-point increase since 2012’ (p.14).

10 Some parallels between the two elections add to the value of applying his analysis, including

- an extended period of conservative government
- A Labor / Labour challenger who failed to capture the imagination of voters (Hall (2016 [1987]; Wallace, 2019)
- a gap between stated support for Labour policies and votes cast for Labour (Butler and Kavanagh, 1988: p. 271; Cockburn and Kontominas, 2019)
- uneven national results (Butler and Kavanagh, p. 265; Australian Electoral Commission, 2019)
- significant support for conservative candidates from traditional Labour-voting constituents (Butler and Kavanagh, p. 275; Evershed, 2019).
and conjectures provide some perspectives for thinking about factors that shaped the result. (For further discussion, see Appendix 1).

In arguing that electoral politics ‘depends on political identities and identifications’, Hall (2016 [1987]: p. 239) recognises that these identities and identifications are unevenly shared across the electorate. Different ‘publics’ engage with different images differently (see also Lippmann (2011 [1927])). The politics of Adani features ‘anti-Adani publics’ and ‘pro-Adani publics’, as is evident from divergent views of the Stop Adani convoy from Tasmania to the Galilee Basin. Led by former Greens leader Bob Brown, the convoy was intended as ‘an act of defiance’ that would become ‘part of the nation’s public discourse’ and offer opportunities to hold public meetings and rallies. In Canberra, the convoy would pose the question of ‘whether Australia really wants to back pro-Adani candidates in the federal election’ (Brown, 2019). Brown stated, ‘Our convoy will be a success if… the Adani issue chang[es people’s] vote’ (Bob Brown Foundation, 2019a). Comments from Liberal Senator Matthew Canavan illustrate Coalition rhetoric in response:

Bob Brown is driving from one end of the country to another… to tell us in Central Queensland what to do.

Today, former Greens leader Bob Brown set off on his hypocritical convoy from Tasmania to Central Queensland to stop coal mining jobs… Bob and his band of southern activists think they know better than the people of regional Queensland. And they have plenty of friends in the Labor Party. In the LNP we believe in supporting new jobs in industries like mining and agriculture which make regional Queensland great. (2019a, 2019b)

These comments are worth considering in terms of how symbolic power can be used against the climate movement. ‘Winning hearts and minds’ in Queensland is important for achieving Stop Adani’s objectives. However, Adani’s supporters exerted their own symbolic strength by making the convoy a target. Canavan’s arguments may not address Brown’s (2019) concerns about climate change, but if his symbolic politics trumps Brown’s—at least for regional Queensland voters—the Stop Adani campaign has a political problem. Canavan’s message, ‘It’s us against them, and they are a group of outsiders telling us what to do’, is a strong basis for building
the kind of political identifications that Hall describes. The electoral impact of the convoy remains disputed (Woods, 2019; Manning, 2019; Grattan, 2019; Norman, 2019; Karvelas, 2019a) and winning over Queensland voters may well have been challenging regardless of the convoy; however, there is strong sentiment that its most significant impact was to galvanise the pro-Adani forces. The convoy certainly featured some rich elements of political theatre (see Chapter 6); however, performances can ‘fail’ (Alexander, 2010)—at least in relation to some publics if not others.

More broadly, Hall’s point about how politics is ‘imagined’ and ‘imaged’ raises the question of how political imagery figured in the election result. Further research using empirical data on the ‘identifications and loyalties’ of voters in regional Queensland would illuminate the issues raised here; however, Figures 9.21, 9.22 and 9.23 are included to pose the question of which images were most central in voters’ minds during the election, and how images such as those in Figure 9.21 would have engaged audiences who hold identifications and loyalties such as those appearing in Figures 9.22 and 9.23. Stop Adani’s imagery may have engaged certain Labor, Green and Independent voters, but it did not succeed in making its images come to life for other constituencies on a broad scale, despite its work with partner organisations like Farmers For Climate Action (2019), which drew attention to damage done by coal mining to farmland and water in the Great Artesian Basin.

Queensland swung heavily to the Coalition: the swing was more than double the size of that in any other state (Australian Electoral Commission, 2019). Clearly, the Queensland result was only one factor in determining who formed government (and the result in this state reflects voters’ responses to a wide array of candidates and issues). With a strong enough campaign, Labor could have lost in Queensland and still formed government. Nevertheless, questions about the role of the Stop Adani convoy are worth noting in the context of the themes of this chapter.

The post-election momentum within Labor towards more vocal and unqualified support for the coal industry (e.g. Palaszczuk, 2019; Wong, 2019; Fitzgibbon, 2019) may be based on a desire to blame its stance on coal as a reason for its loss while avoiding deeper questions of where its 2019 campaign went wrong. Yet even before the final result, Adani was perceived within Labor as an issue that was losing them votes: ‘Labor says Adani is killing them in Queensland’ records Jensen (2019: p. 45), who followed Labor on the campaign trail.
Figure 9.21 Examples of imagery used by pro- and anti-Adani forces.

Figure 9.22 Identifications and loyalties that may be held by Adani supporters.
Still, the task of persuading voters falls predominantly to the major political parties. Labor lost an election it was expected to win, and its campaign was widely criticised (Karvelas, 2019b; Jones, 2019; Norman, 2019; Murphy, 2019a; Jensen, 2019). In a ‘battle of images’, imagery of Bill Shorten being untrustworthy (Crosby, 2019), of Shorten as ‘the Bill Australia can’t afford’ (Liberal Party of Australia, 2019a), of Labor imposing a ‘retiree tax’ and a ‘death tax’ (Liberal Party of Australia, 2019b; Koslowski, 2019), or of the ‘Stop Adani Convoy’ telling regional Queenslanders what to do (Horn, 2019) may have held a more central place in many voters’ identities and identifications than both Stop Adani’s and Labor’s imagery. Labor’s failure to take a definitive position on Adani was another factor (Grattan, 2019), projecting an image that on this issue it lacked courage or conviction (or both). Whatever factors actually influenced public attitudes, existing parliamentary opposition to Adani (Stop Adani, 2018a) swiftly lost ground following the election. The Queensland Premier moved quickly to progress approvals for the mine (Palaszczuk, 2019), and Labor figures reaffirmed their commitment to coal (Wong, 2019; Fitzgibbon, 2019). Until Labor—one way or another—arrives at a position on coal comparable to the Hawke-Keating position on tariffs in the 1980s,12 (and until Labor and the climate movement both

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12 This analogy should not be pushed too far, since the Hawke-Keating position on internationalising the Australian economy was significantly shaped by free market ideology (Pusey, 1991) as well as political and economic realism—and free market ideology points to Australia’s ‘comparative advantage’ as an exporter of coal. However, the 1980s was an era where Labor was prepared to face down economic interests which it had traditionally supported in the name of policy it believed in, which meant being prepared to treat certain
create the political climate where this can happen), Australian climate politics will lack the kind of synergy between parliamentary power and the environment movement’s ‘people power’ that has been evident in cases such as the Franklin Dam, protection of the Wet Tropic Rainforests of North Queensland, and the expansion of Kakadu National Park (see Staples, 2012). Linkages between imagery, imagination, emotional valence, associations, identity, and identification are a worthwhile focus for further research into the factors that shape electoral outcomes.13

The fossil fuel divestment movement

The fossil fuel divestment movement similarly highlights how the use of imagery and the imagination figure in the climate movement’s work. The movement has relied heavily on community organising as well. Originating with the work of a student group at Pennsylvania’s Swarthmore College in 2010 (Healy and Debski, 2017), divestment was launched as a global movement late in 2012 through 350’s ‘Do the Math’ tour, presented by Bill McKibben (Grady-Benson and Sarathy, 2016). Much of the early activity took place on university campuses, though it also extended to faith communities, local councils and initiatives aimed at financial institutions (350 Australia, 2013).14 Do the Math came to Australia in June 2013. McKibben’s Sydney presentation provided the opportunity to launch the Go Fossil Free Australia campaign. Following the tour, Go Fossil Free Australia established training events and a campaign network. 350 Australia established Go Fossil Free Australia, developing partnerships with other organisations and links to resources including Fossil Free: A Campus Guide to Divestment; Sample petitions and letters; Sample Municipal divestment resolution; Printable Petition Template; Sign-up sheet; Sample Powerpoint Presentation (Go Fossil Free Australia, 2013a, 2013b). Bank customers queued outside banks to announce that they were moving their money, and industries as industries of the past.

13 Further research could investigate questions of which images hold a ‘central’ or defining place for different voting ‘publics’, as well as the process by which these images come to be imagined as central. Greater clarity about these questions is important for analysing and interpreting the climate movement’s efforts to persuade the public, and their influence on electoral outcomes.

14 In April 2013, the Uniting Church of NSW and ACT was among the first Australian institutions to announce it would divest from fossil fuels (Insights Magazine, 2013; Carson and Langford, 2013). Campus divestment began at the Australian National University, building on an earlier initiative of the ANU Environment Collective targeting the university’s investment in Metgasco (Shenfield, 2013). Just before McKibben’s arrival, the Student Representative Council at the University of NSW voted unanimously to support divestment (Fossil Free UNSW, 2013).
community members called on local councils to divest (350 Australia, 2013). By August 2013, Fossil Free UNSW announced it had received the official support of the UNSW Branch of the National Tertiary Education Union, as well as the University’s Postgraduate Council (Fossil Free UNSW, 2013a). This was good community organising in practice: relationships were built; alliances were developed with important partners; new people were trained, and there was a growing base of supporters.

Yet if the movement’s work is described solely in these terms, what does not come through is the spark that sets this process in motion, the motivation to participate, the imaginative work that creates the compelling sense that something needs to be done, and the vision of what a different world would look like. ‘Imaginative work’ can be done well or poorly. Once begun, it can be sustained, or it can falter. It can consist of episodic and disconnected jolts of energy—or it can feature something much more like a coherent story, at best fired with defining images that energise participants and make an enduring impression on audiences. Bill McKibben’s Do the Math tour exhibits many of the latter qualities. ‘Capturing the activist imagination’ was a first step in engaging the public imagination about divestment, and the images below illustrate some important aspects of how McKibben and 350 went about this.

McKibben evoked the iconic image of the Great Barrier Reef, and his message about CO2 took graphic form. The Do the Math presentations featured vivid imagery both of climate impacts, and of people gathered to take action in response.
Figures 9.24-9.31 Left to Right: Bill McKibben speaking at Do the Math with reef graphic (350 /Steve Liptay, 2012a); Bill McKibben with Do the Math iconography (350 /Steve Liptay, 2012b); Bill McKibben with Do the Math carbon emissions graphics (350 /Steve Liptay, 2012c); Naomi Klein at Do the Math in Boston (350, 2012d); Bill McKibben speaking at Do the Math with images of young people around the word taking action (350 /Steve Liptay, 2012e); Bill McKibben speaking at Do the Math with images of young people around the word taking action (350 /Steve Liptay, 2012f); Bill McKibben speaking during the Do the Math tour (350 /Steve Liptay, 2012g); Band playing at Do the Math, (350/ Steve Liptay, 2012h)
Significantly, for people who attend events like the Do the Math tour or the Stop Adani Roadshow, this imagery is experienced within the context of a well-choreographed public event. An important aspect of the process of ‘capturing people’s imaginations’ can involve attending events like this. Events like Do the Math derive at least some of their power from having the qualities of a secular ritual (Alexander, 2010, 2006a). Just as members of many religious traditions meet weekly and participate in symbolic action to renew and re-connect with their faith, in the largely secular world of climate politics, the ‘faith’ of the climate movement and of the public is renewed, deepened and challenged by events such as Do the Math, which come complete with a charismatic speaker who tells an inspiring story, with music, and with symbolic actions such as standing together, fists in the air, in the tradition of the anti-apartheid and other movements, to express determination to live up to the challenges that the event, with these theatrical qualities, has put before the group.

The importance of the ‘imaginative work’ done with images figured significantly in divestment campaign resources. As with Stop Adani, toolkits from the early stages of the campaign highlight the significance of imagery. Fossil Free: A Campus Guide to Fossil Fuel Divestment (350, 2012a) stated ‘Think about the creative actions… that will

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15 See Table 6.3 in Chapter 6 on the elements of political theatre, adapted from Alexander (2006c).
win student body support and turn up the heat on your administration… Think about the photo you want in the paper: a great picture really is worth a thousand words’ (pp. 21, 30). The Trainers Handbook: Student Divestment Workshop (Russell et al., 2013) emphasises: ‘The visual for your event is as important as your spokespeople… Your action photo is KEY, it’s your best tool for leveraging your event in the media and the community after the fact’. The handbook urges campaigners to plan ‘the image you want people to remember’ (p. 60).

Further, interviewees spoke about the impact of divestment in terms of what people could see:

- There’s a picture of it—of the impact it can have on a global scale. That’s why people have been really engaged with it… It was something that is really tangible… for groups to be involved in… (TS).
- The divestment movement enabled people concerned about climate change to ‘see that there was something that they could actually personally do that has some impact’ (DE).
- ‘A lot of inspiration [for the Australian movement] does come from the US and UK—that’s what people are seeing’ (SR).
- ‘People are starting to see the fossil fuel companies as the bad guys’ (RH).

Examples of the images used by the divestment movement to fire the imagination of supporters appear below. Some common elements combine into ‘signature’ themes: small, spirited groups of campaigners stand holding signs in front of buildings that represent institutions, often showing an institution’s logo. Images of campaigners are set alongside iconic images of the Reef and iconic bank brands. People speak out in a dignified, determined manner, calling institutions to account for their stance on fossil fuel investments. Climate change is treated as a responsibility to be faced by a local bank, or a university where students study. The images portray orange as the theme colour of the movement, representing something broader than ‘green’ (Gardner, 2013), and some images display the GoFossilFree logo, with an orange cross. The use of humour, such as the call to ‘break up with fossil fuels’ on Valentines Day, complements the mood of indignation evident in other images.\textsuperscript{16} As

\textsuperscript{16} AG comments: ‘More than 90% of people know what Valentine’s Day is. So we say OK, here is this day.
the image of Swarthmore students from the early days of divestment indicates, visual tropes like these have appeared consistently. Thus, these images give supporters a sense of being part of something global. As divestment imagery circulates on social media, these ‘signature themes’ help define the issue in the activist and public imagination.

Figure 9.33 Divestment Day, October 2014 (350, 2014n).

coming up that most people are going to be thinking about and all the advertisers are going to be talking about it—so how can we piggyback on that frame that's sticky, and stick our idea to it?”
Figure 9.34 Australian launch of Global Divestment Day (also Valentines Day) in Canberra (350, 2015e).

Figure 9.35 UNSW occupation Day 1, 10am (Poppy Danis/ 350, 2016).

Figure 9.36 Flood The Campus rally, University of Queensland, April, 2016 (350, 2016a).
Figure 9.37 Flood The Campus launch, UNSW (350/Elizabeth Morley, 2016).

Figure 9.38 Australian National University National Day of Action ANUNDA1 (350, 2015f).

Figure 9.39 QUT Flood The Campus Rally (350, 2016b).
The divestment movement, states SW, has ‘exploded around the world’. ‘People are fired up’, says SR. *Time* magazine notes the ‘huge acceleration for a campaign that began at just a handful of colleges in 2011’. It quotes Ellen Dorsey, of the Wallace...
Global Fund: ‘What began as a spark of conscience on college campuses and in faith-based organizations has lit a fire’ (Luckerson, 2015). A striking feature of the campaign is its ability to exert pressure with comparatively few active participants but applying significant symbolic power. Imagery is one component of the movement’s power, standing alongside narratives and arguments like those articulated in McKibben’s *Global Warming’s Terrifying New Math* (2012), as well as sustained community organising in the ‘people power’ dimension of climate politics. Without imagery, however, much of the ‘spark’, motivation and vision essential for the movement to grow would be absent, as would be much of the capacity to influence institutions’ public image.

**Social licence and the public imagination**

The politics of social licence, reputation and legitimacy have been important in climate movement strategies. Whenever they figure in the movement’s work, they can be understood in terms of efforts to engage the public imagination using symbolic power. The analysis below points to the very real—if intangible—impact of influencing the public image of corporations. The term ‘social licence’ originated within the mining industry during the 1990s as it grappled with challenges to its reputation from environmentalists (Smith and Richards, 2015). However, NGOs have since adopted the term, and many interviewees referred to it. Boutilier et al. (2012) explain social licence in terms of a spectrum ranging from legitimacy (involving community ‘acceptance’) to credibility (conferring ‘approval’) to trust (which is rarer, but involves ‘psychological identification’ with a project: p. 7). The significance of social licence has been recognised across industry and government (KPMG, 2017; Commonwealth of Australia, 2006). The Minerals Council of Australia (2012) writes, ‘The industry’s social license to operate is a critical asset that the MCA works hard to maintain and enhance’ (8). Without social licence, communities may seek to block project developments; employees may choose to work for a company that is a better corporate citizen; and projects may be subject to ongoing legal challenge, even after regulatory permits have been obtained, potentially halting project development’ (p. 2). Thus, social licence, which exists *in* the public imagination, is understood as having powerful ‘real-world’ outcomes. In the

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17 The Minerals Council continues that it does this ‘often in the face of spirited opposition from a misguided minority’ (8).
framework developed for this thesis, the power that is exercised when social licence is withdrawn is cultural-symbolic power, where shifts in the imagination rely significantly on the use of imagery, narrative and social drama.

Interviewed for this thesis, GJ describes the impact of social licence in the ‘Shut it Down’ campaign that targeted the Anglesea power station, the first coal plant to close in Australia in the context of the climate debate:

In Anglesea, social licence was withdrawn... The withdrawal of social licence... occurred through on-the-ground activities, rallies, doorknocking, petitioning and also a sophisticated social media campaign where Surf Coast Air Action¹⁸ asked all of the likely buyers whether they would rule out buying this polluting power plant... [The local community] demonstrated the withdrawal of social licence. That, in effect, made it a stranded asset.

The picture here is of multiple forms of political action effecting a shift in how coal is imagined, thus demonstrating the lack of social licence. A range of factors led to the closure of Anglesea power station (Seccombe, 2015; Cannon, 2015; McCaskill, 2014). However, when GJ was asked whether he was saying that social licence made a material difference, independent of economic factors, he replied, ‘It was the keystone. Without having that keystone there, there was nothing to hold up the archway’.

The strategies of divestment campaigns have been stated explicitly in social licence terms. Bill McKibben argues, ‘We need to take away their social licence’. He explains that divestment aimed to ‘challenge the underlying legitimacy of the whole coal and gas and oil machine... We need to... turn them into pariahs, and make it clear that they’re to the planet’s safety what the tobacco industry is to our individual health’ (2013: L1317; Rimmer, 2016). The Wallace Global Fund’s Ellen Dorsey adds that divestment is ‘like tobacco, like apartheid’ (Gunther, 2015). Australian divestment campaigner SR puts the aims of the movement in these terms: ‘It’s not just about establishing the dangers of fossil fuels... but it’s also establishing the fossil fuel industry as a key blocker [on] climate change—a rogue industry, basically, that we as

¹⁸ Surf Coast Air Action (2018) is a local community group focused on ‘damage to our air, health & environment caused by coal mining & combustion & unconventional gas’.
a society should be condemning and moving away from’. She adds: ‘the modus operandi is to stigmatise the industry, to highlight that they are acting in an amoral… way... It should ultimately reduce their political influence.’

While critics of divestment (e.g. Stavins, 2014) have questioned the value of symbolic action, strong evidence points to its significant practical outcomes. In December 2018, GoFossilFree reported that more than 1000 institutions with over $7.9 trillion in assets had made commitments to divest from fossil fuels (Hazan et al., 2018). An earlier figure, published in September 2018, put the figure at $6.24 trillion, ‘up from $52 billion four years ago—an increase of 11,900 percent’ (Arabella Advisors, 2018: p. 1). Thus, fund managers themselves have increasingly come to ‘re-imagine’ what it means to make prudent and appropriate decisions. SR sees stigmatisation as leading to legislation and government regulation: ‘There’s no doubt in my mind that when [there’s] that real lack of social licence, governments ultimately will legislate… because the signals are so clear from civil society and from well-respected institutions’. Governments will ‘feel that they have the license to legislate against the industry… We have seen it:… The Lock The Gate movement has led to strong legislation against gas’. She adds, ‘People say, “It’s not going to affect the share price so it’s a useless strategy”, but… it’s not primarily an economic strategy, it’s primarily a political or social… strategy.’

An Oxford University study analyses how changes in the public image of fossil fuels translate into broader outcomes. It found that stigmatising the fossil fuel industry ‘poses [a] far-reaching threat to fossil fuel companies and the vast energy value chain’ (Ansar et al., 2013). A firm’s resulting negative image can affect suppliers, subcontractors, potential employees, customers, governments, politicians and shareholders. Stigmatised firms may face restrictive legislation, and they may be ‘barred from competing for public tenders, acquiring licences or property rights for business expansion, or be weakened in negotiations with suppliers. Negative consequences of stigma also include cancellation of multibillion-dollar contracts or mergers/acquisitions’ (pp. 12, 13). These concerns are mirrored in Shell’s 2017 Annual Report, which states, ‘Rising climate change concerns have led and could lead to additional legal and/or regulatory measures which could result in project

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19 This figure was released some months ahead of the 2018 UN climate talks in Katowice, Poland, where major divestment commitments were announced.
delays or cancellations, a decrease in demand for fossil fuels, potential litigation and additional compliance obligations’. Shell warns of the risk of ‘additional costs or financial penalties, delayed or cancelled projects, and/or reduced production and reduced demand for hydrocarbons, which could have a material adverse effect on our earnings, cash flows and financial condition’ (Royal Dutch Shell, 2017: p. 13).

Stephen Heintz, president of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, observes: ‘[divestment] is largely symbolic, but symbols have power. They motivate people. They inspire people. They can change behavior’ (Gunther, 2015). McKibben adds: the campaign’s focus is on ‘weaken[ing] the fossil fuel industry’s political standing’, and ‘fossil fuel companies care a lot about image, after all—it’s what makes it easy for them to exert their political control. It’s why they run those back-to-back-to-back TV ads about “clean coal”’ (Rimmer, 2016, McKibben, 2013b). Political decisions are taken in a climate where perception and momentum matter. Christiana Figueres, former Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, credited the global Divest-Invest movement with being ‘a primary driver of success at the Paris Climate Talks in 2015’ (Divest-Invest, 2016). The signals sent by the shifts in investment outlined above, and the assessments that point to reduction in the fossil fuel industry’s standing, represent important shifts in the industry’s capacity to influence political outcomes and pursue its commercial activities. The politics of social licence has been powerful enough to influence some of the largest financial and corporate actors (BHP Billiton, 2015; Chambers, 2015; Johnston, 2017; Reuters, 2017a). Changes in the political climate that favour or obstruct the fossil fuel industry’s agenda are important parts of the overall ‘political climate’. For a campaign whose impact relies in part on shifts in the imagination, the outcomes and assessments above point to significant gains.

The focus on social licence and reputation also figures in the politics of Adani. Geoff Cousins, President of the Australian Conservation Foundation (2014-2017) and a former Howard government advisor, describes its impact. He observes that when a company ‘can see the project will have… a bad influence on their reputation’, this

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20 Heintz was speaking for a fund built from the profits of Rockefellers’ Standard Oil. In 2014, in a decision weighted with symbolic significance, it decided to divest from fossil fuels.

21 Cousins was also a successful campaigner against the Gunns pulp mill in Tasmania (Beresford, 2015) and had been a leading businessman in advertising and telecommunications.
often makes a ‘critical difference’ (Bennett, 2017). Based on his dealings with the banks, Cousins reflects, ‘I know that [they] are very concerned about [the Adani project]… They’re not only concerned about the economics of the proposal, but they’re concerned… about the reputational issues’ (Haxton 2015). Greenpeace concurs, arguing that it has been reputational risk that has prompted international banks to shun Adani (Pearson, 2014). Market Forces (2017) adds: ‘Companies are sensitive about their public image… If [Stop Adani] has taught us anything, it’s that companies don’t want the reputational risk that comes from being associated with dirty coal projects like Adani’s mine’. A similar picture applies to efforts to influence the image of Australian banks as lenders to Adani. SW points to the practical impact of the intangible challenge to the banks’ reputation: lobbying banks makes ‘that reputational cost much higher than the amount of money they get from loaning to Adani’. TS sums up the message to the banks: ‘if you support this project there’ll be grave consequences for you. If you pull out now, there will be good things coming your way in terms of public support’. Observing that ‘the role of national public opinion is huge’, LH adds: ‘one of the reasons banks have been ruling [Adani] out is that they don’t want to [identified as] part of a project [that] would be incredibly controversial and that’s risky…’ He describes the thinking behind the AYCC’s ‘dump my bank’ campaign: ‘It’s crucial that they know their customers don’t want them to invest in this and it is a huge brand risk… We’re making the connection that if these ports go ahead… it’s these banks that are funding it and their brand will be tied to the potential destruction of the Reef.’

Here, the use of visual imagery and public-image-as-reputation-or-social-license are linked. Visual images are used to associate the public image of large institutions with damage to the Reef or the environment more broadly, and to link a tarnished brand (Adani) with the brand of the banks. SW reflects on ‘telling the reputational story and impact story… If we could get one of the major Australian banks to rule out this project I think that would be quite a game changer’. By August 2017, each of Australia’s big four banks had ruled out financing Adani.
Figure 9.42 Sydney Global Divestment Day (350, 2015g).

Figure 9.43 Melbourne: StopAdani March to Commbank (350/Julian Meehan, 2017).

Figure 9.44 Westpac’s dead fish — #StopAdani (Englart, 2017).
Stop Adani’s efforts to use the politics of reputation thus follows similar strategies to the divestment campaign. The ‘brand risk’ to banks described above by LH turned out to be powerful on a wider scale: 27 banks worldwide ruled out support for Adani, including all four major Australian banks (Market Forces, 2017). The impact was both financial and symbolic. When the Commonwealth Bank pulled out, Market Forces observed that the banks ‘provide not just debt but credibility. Losing Commonwealth Bank from the pool of prospective lenders is a huge blow’ (Slezak, 2017). 350 Australia (2017) declared, ‘At the moment, it is only our federal and Queensland governments that are willing to back this massive coal project with virtually no commercial investor willing to touch it’. In the political climate following the 2019 election, where parliamentary support for Adani has strengthened (e.g. Palaszczuk, 2019), reputational pressure is an important source of political power for the Stop Adani movement.

**Imagery, imagination and the climate movement: reflections and conclusion**

This chapter began with Hall’s focus on imagery and imagination in his account of Thatcher’s 1987 victory. His insights, and those of writers like Lippmann, are worth returning to. Their approach offers perspectives that are absent from or under-developed in positivist, behaviourist, materialist and discourse-based accounts of politics. Giving weight to imagery and the imagination means seeing beyond policies, attitudes, facts, arrays of institutional, economic and parliamentary power and perceptions of the world that are grounded simply in language. Hall writes, ‘Images are not trivial things. In and through images, fundamental political questions are being posed and argued through. We need to take them more seriously than we do’ (2016: pp. 239-240). It is a perspective worth applying to the unfolding politics of coal and climate change in Australia.

Focusing on the imagination offers a distinct way of thinking about a distinct dimension of politics. Imagination involves more than signification and representation—‘imag-ination’ involves how we ‘picture’ politics. There is a richness to the term that is not present in ‘discourse’, ‘worldview’, ‘perception’ or ‘attitude’. It evokes the ways in which public opinion is symbolically and emotionally ‘charged’, how issues are ‘seen’ and how futures are envisaged. As Lederach argues, it
connotes the creative capacity to see and do things differently, finding new ways forward. Additionally, it provides a basis for seeing every political action taking place in response not only to reality-as-it-is, but also to reality-as-it-is-imagined-to-be. As a concept, it readily accommodates the way in which political debates are often ‘about’ imagery, and the way in which projecting powerful images in a compelling way influences political outcomes. Influencing the public imagination with powerful imagery—whether it is about a ‘rogue industry’, ‘Southern Greenies telling us what to do’ or a ‘deathly project’ that will lead to ‘a dead Reef’ shapes the climate of opinion—a process that is central to climate politics.22

The cases examined above highlight the importance of imagery and imagination across a number of dimensions, which are summarised in Table 9.1. The divestment and Stop Adani movements work to shape the way people imagine the fossil fuel industry’s legitimacy. Having the strongest and most compelling images creates political advantages, at least in the cultural-symbolic dimension of politics. Imagery is used to provide energy and direction for campaigning. Establishing imagery in the public mind is important for gaining public support. Imagery provides a focus and node for thinking about what is at stake and why an issue matters. A campaign’s message and strategy are founded on an imagined future. When the divestment movement was launched, it represented a shift in the way that climate politics itself was imagined, (see McKibben, 2012, 2013a) with a new sense of the overall goal (leaving ‘unburnable’ fossil fuels in the ground); a new sense of the obstacle to change (the fossil fuel industry as the ‘enemy’); a new focus for campaigning (campuses and financial institutions); and a new task for the movement (stigmatising the fossil fuel industry as the source of the problem).

22 The argument for the importance of imagery that is made in this thesis needs to be qualified by two considerations where further research in neuroscience and cognition would be useful. Images do not interpret themselves: they take on meaning through a ‘story’ that is told about them and information that describes them. Yet, as the case of contamination of wetlands at Abbot Point illustrates, images can ‘lead’ a story: once the story is told, the image can condense its meaning. This raises a question: to what extent does the story itself thus become ‘encoded’ and condensed in memory as an image? Further, the degree to which people form mental images varies (Logie et al., 2011), so imagery may be relatively more important for people who are more ‘visually-oriented’. Yet, recalling Hall’s arguments about images in UK politics, how important is imagery even for those whose thinking is not as ‘visual’? Overall, to what extent are political attitudes and judgments encoded in and mediated by imagery—imagery of ‘the problem’, our relationship to ‘the problem’, ‘the solution’, and contemporary political events? Further research in neuroscience and cognition could clarify these issues. It would also be valuable to see the results of focus group research which tracks the way that people imagine climate change over time and the factors—including imagery—that inform this.
Table 9.1: How imagery and the imagination matter: some dimensions highlighted in this chapter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of climate politics where imagery matters</th>
<th>Examples from this chapter</th>
<th>Political outcomes*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The politics of reputation and legitimacy</strong></td>
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<td>• leverage over financial institutions: e.g. Adani lacks support from Australian banks</td>
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<td>- the place of coal mining or fossil fuel investments in the ‘public imagination’</td>
<td>• social licence of the Anglesea power station</td>
<td>• significant shifts in investment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• reputational risk: banks being told: ‘risk the Reef and you’re dumped’</td>
<td>• Anglesea power station closes down</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• • fossil fuels as a rogue industry</td>
<td>• a political climate where the fossil fuel industry is delegitimised</td>
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<td>• social licence of the Anglesea power station</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• reputational risk: banks being told: ‘risk the Reef and you’re dumped’</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>'Battles of images'</strong></td>
<td>• the Reef</td>
<td>• audiences persuaded by establishing defining imagery in the public mind</td>
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<td>Creating defining images</td>
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<tr>
<td>- which images gain a central place in the public imagination and define the issues?</td>
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<tr>
<td>- whose imagery is most strongly and centrally related to people’s political identifications and identities?</td>
<td>• mining jobs</td>
<td>• the use of images to build electoral opposition to Labor in 2019</td>
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<tr>
<td>- making imagery about fossil fuels visible and tangible, focusing the issue, conveying a vision and generating an emotional response</td>
<td>• Shorten as untrustworthy; ‘death taxes’</td>
<td>• Conservative undermining of climate policy under Rudd and Gillard (see Chapter 4).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• the “battle of images” about Adani</td>
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<td><strong>Energy and direction for climate movement campaigning</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• the growth of the divestment and Stop Adani movements</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>A focus and node for thinking about what is at stake and why an issue matters</strong></td>
<td>• Reef bleaching</td>
<td>• see above</td>
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<tr>
<td>- the associations people have to fossil fuels: e.g. when people think of Adani, they think of...</td>
<td>• the Stop Adani Convoy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• impacts of Adani on the Great Artesian Basin</td>
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<td>• prominent Australians who oppose Adani</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>The importance of projecting an imagined future that appeals to audiences</strong></td>
<td>• better ways to spend public money than in a dying industry</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Re-imagining climate politics: its goals, the obstacles to change, the focus for campaigning and the climate movement’s political tasks</strong></td>
<td>• new approaches to climate politics pursued by the movements described above</td>
<td>• ending coal is established on the agenda of the climate movement and on the public agenda</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• the growth of movements in support of this goal</td>
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* Here, political outcomes include shifts in the climate of opinion and the political climate, shifts in the balance of existing forces, and the creation of new political conditions, as well as policy change.
Strength in dimensions like those outlined in Table 9.1 are important for achieving the goals shared across the Stop Adani campaign: building the movement, shifting the politics and stopping the money (ACF, 2018b; AYCC, 2017; Climate Action Network Australia, 2017), as well as the goal of divestment campaigning described by McKibben (2013): taking away the fossil fuel industry’s social licence. The analysis in this chapter has illustrated the contribution of imagery to each of these goals. Images are important for energising movements. Prevailing in battles of images, withdrawing social licence and undermining legitimacy shifts the politics. Establishing fossil fuels in the public mind as a rogue industry and aligning Adani with damage to the Reef have played a key role in stopping the money. Thus, if the pathway to achieving movement goals ‘goes through’ shifts in the imagination, and if images play a powerful role in the process, then these dimensions to politics deserve due weight. They are part of ordinary political activity; however, placing them in focus makes it possible to recognise and analyse aspects of political power that might otherwise be overlooked. Especially when political opponents use imagery and imagination with powerful effect, it is important to be alert to the dimensions of politics that Hall describes above. The consequences of neglecting imagery and imagination can be dire—and the political opportunities created by their creative and effective use are too important to leave out of the analysis.

Significantly, it is possible for movements both to be mobilised and also to lose the ‘battle’ over the public imagination. When the task is to challenge a strong alignment of economic and parliamentary power, the ‘people power’ of an organised movement is certainly essential. Yet capturing the public imagination and establishing defining images in people’s minds matter as well: they may accompany a well-organised movement; however, they are not the same. The climate movement deployed extensive ‘people power’ during the 2019 election (Seccombe, 2019; ACF, 2019). However, for reasons that are yet to be fully analysed, fewer voters than anticipated shared the movement’s vision of a ‘#climatelection’. Opinion polls cited above had shown strong community concerns about Adani. In terms of the framework presented above, these concerns were not central enough in voters’ imaginations to be a deciding factor. The Stop Adani movement has strengths in the ‘battle of images’, yet the climate movement’s opponents have imagery of their own. Adani had long been working on a public relations offensive (e.g. Adani Australia, 2017). Rhetoric about ‘Southern Greenies telling us what to do’ emerged in a
particularly sharp way just ahead of Australia’s 2019 election, and provided one way for conservatives to undermine the strength of Stop Adani’s message in Queensland. It is unclear to what extent voters’ central concerns related to economic security or, for example, to unfavourable views of Bill Shorten. The framework outlined in this chapter suggests that part of the persuasive task of the climate movement can be understood in terms of establishing defining images in the public imagination. This involves making the dangers of climate change and the desirability of a safe climate more ‘central’ in enough voters’ imaginations than their identifications with coal and the Coalition, and more compelling than some of the immediate benefits that coal and the Coalition might offer.

A number of important political outcomes thus revolve around what happens in the public imagination. When the public imagination is ‘captured’, a sense of urgency can develop, hearts and minds can be ‘won’, and an issue can become focused in the public mind. If this does not happen, social movements’ capacity to change prevailing political dynamics is correspondingly limited. The way in which issues are defined in the public imagination shapes political reality, whether this strengthens or diminishes the power of the fossil fuel industry: political campaigns and policy responses are based on what is imagined to be politically desirable, urgent, necessary and possible. The politics of social licence has created the conditions for leverage politics to be used, as is evident in the climate movement’s pressure on banks and financial institutions. Further, the way in which people imagine the Adani mine is central to how the mine’s supporters and opponents act politically. It determines, for example, whether their actions are directed towards protecting the Reef, averting the danger of climate change or pursuing short-term jobs in regional economies. Shifts in the way fossil fuels are imagined influence investment decisions, with significant flow-on effects for corporations. Clearly, changes in the way issues are imagined do not create political change by themselves; however, shifts in the public imagination change the political climate, opening up or closing off opportunities for the use of forms of power.

A combined focus on imagery and imagination can help make sense of ways in which politicians who use powerful emotive imagery can gain a hold on the imagination of large sections of the public. In recent years, the climate movement has experienced significant setbacks resulting from the electoral victories of politicians
like Trump, Abbott and Morrison. Their use of imagery has been central to their effectiveness in political communication. Themes such as ‘building the wall’, ‘Hillary’s emails’, ‘stopping the boats’, and ‘the Bill Australia Can’t Afford’ (see Appendix 1 and 3) have given them a commanding place in key dimensions of politics outlined in Table 9.1 above. The spectre of a ‘great big tax on everything’ and the imagined illegitimacy of Gillard as leader played an important part in creating the political climate where Australia’s carbon tax could be abolished. The Liberal Party of Australia’s (2019b) fusion of imagery of Australia’s carbon tax and an imagined-but-politically-very-real ‘Death Tax’ influenced voters in 2019 (Murphy, 2019b: see Appendix 1). Political phenomena like these are not exceptions and aberrations. They keep recurring, and they represent significant obstacles to creating a political climate conducive to addressing climate change (Mehling and Vihma, 2017; Lockwood, 2018). The challenge of making climate change imagery truly compelling, and not just influencing but ‘capturing’ the public imagination, is important for the climate movement’s capacity to achieve political change. The Stop Adani and divestment movements, and the climate movement’s use of the politics of legitimacy illustrate what the climate movement has been doing in this field. The growth of the Stop Adani and divestment movements shows how much has been achieved; however, the result of the 2019 election shows how far there is to go.
Chapter 10

Iconic imagery in the work of the climate movement

Introduction

In a dialogue about climate change communication, documentary filmmaker Jon Else reflects on the need for powerful images in the climate debate:

There [are] a few images in *An Inconvenient Truth*... the glaciers are very powerful. But there’s nothing that’s quite as hot imagistically as what we’ve seen in previous movements [such as] the anti-apartheid movement...

Recalling the imagery generated by the US Civil Rights movement, he observes,

I think one of the problems with climate change—no-one ever succeeded in tying that to a dog going after a demonstrator and fire hoses in Birmingham, Alabama....

If we’re talking about big movements like the environmental movement, like the Civil Rights Movement... I mean you could, in a way, say that the facts about slavery were known for a long time. And it took things like ‘Uncle Tom’s Cabin’... it took the slow building of a movement around narratives and around images... The power of single images [is] underestimated. (Climate One, 2012)
Else’s comments raise a number of questions: if images can be politically powerful, what factors make some images particularly powerful or ‘iconic’? To what degree do
images generated by the climate movement reflect these factors—and how does an analysis based on these factors illuminate their strengths and weaknesses? Against the background of the case made in the two previous chapters for the political importance of imagery, this chapter addresses the first part of the central research question¹ by asking How does iconic imagery (or imagery with iconic elements) figure in the work of the climate movement? It reviews contemporary understandings of the political significance of icons. It then distils eleven factors that make for ‘iconicity’, and uses these as a basis for assessing the iconic properties of three particular images. The analysis finds that some of the images used by the climate movement have elements of iconicity; however, their potential iconic power is diminished by the lack of some of the factors that this chapter identifies, such as the lack of the development of links with existing cultural themes following their creation, and the lack of ongoing re-creation, appropriation and ‘curation’ of the image. This chapter demonstrates what some of the ‘missing factors’ look like in practice, describes ‘local’ and ‘network’ iconicity, and finds that iconic effects often result from an array of related images, even if single images lack sufficient iconic properties of their own. The importance of identification with ‘characters’ in iconic images is emphasised: this factor brings together themes addressed across the chapter: the importance of theatre and narrative, the human story conveyed by icons, and the subjective process by which icons can generate a political response.

What is an icon? Insights from the literature

Literature on iconicity points to rich ways in which iconic images influence social and political life. For Smith, (2012), icons are ‘striking visual compressions of complex narratives.’ They ‘emerge like “tips of icebergs” in culture and society, becoming powerful cultural resources that [can] be re-mobilized in the future for social action’ (Solaroli, 2015: p. 22). An icon is an ‘evocative crystallization… of shared, often visceral collective feelings’ (Bartmanśki, 2015: p. 27), and these feelings can be a catalyst for political action (Kurasawa, 2012). Icons are ‘affectively evocative actants that trigger viewers’ moral imaginations’ (Kurasawa, 2012: p. 79). They ‘condense and constitute the meaning of major events’ (Hansen, 2015: p. 265). They have ‘social traction’ (Solaroli, 2015: p. 22). They are ‘condensed clusters of meaning’

¹ For reference, the central research question is: How does symbolic politics figure in the work of the Australian climate movement, and in what ways is it important for achieving political change?
which can ‘recharge, rework, and energize social life’ (Smith, 2012: p. 181). They become emblems for what matters in public debate, and for why it matters. They thus provide ‘symbolic tools for the potential reshaping of political culture and public policy’ (Bennett and Lawrence, 1995: pp. 23-27). Significant examples include the Berlin Wall (Bartmański, 2012), Nelson Mandela (Olesen, 2015), Kim Phuc, burned by napalm during the Vietnam war, who is portrayed screaming as she runs along a road (Hariman and Lucaites, 2003; Griffin, 1999), Dorothea Lange’s 1936 ‘Migrant Mother’ (Hariman and Lucaites, 2007), prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib (Mitchell, 2011; Binder, 2012), the Woodstock festival (Smith, 2012), and Hector Pieterson, killed by apartheid police during the 1976 Soweto uprising (Gassner, 2009).

Discussing iconicity as an explanatory notion, Bartmański (2015) observes that just as ‘our languages contain visually constituted metaphors we live by [Lakoff and Johnson, 2003], so our late modern cultures have icons we live by’ (p. 2). He argues that an emphasis on grand narratives has neglected ‘grand imageries’ (p. 4) and that iconicity involves a ‘performative’ combination of a ‘visually arresting phenomenon’ with ‘socially potent meanings’ (p. 2). Elsewhere, Bartmański (2012) examines how the fall of the Berlin Wall became central to the way in which people imagined the end of communism. Changes in Hungary and Poland had occurred earlier in 1989 (Garton Ash, 1990); however, they were eclipsed by the Wall’s iconic power.

Thus, icons are much more than vivid and memorable images. Discussing icons in the news, Bennett and Lawrence (1995) describe how icons ‘enter the narrative streams of subsequent, disparate, and often unconnected events. And in contrast with other dramatic news images, icons… are used by journalists to evoke larger cultural themes, symbolizing values, contradictions, or changes that have begun to surface in society.’ They conclude that news icons do not so much cause change as focus attention upon political, social and cultural changes, tensions and contradictions. In the process of working these out, significant cultural changes can sometimes occur’ (p. 37, emphasis added). Whether larger changes happen, they argue, depends on other contingent factors such as the actions of public officials, journalists and the public; however, icons create conditions where change becomes possible.
Two types of iconicity

Iconic images stand for things we cannot see but that are profoundly important in society: they connect what is visible with what is significant. Iconic images point beyond themselves to ‘the elusive but very real domains of feeling and thought’ (Bartmański and Alexander, 2012: p. 2). They link the ‘perceptual and palpable’ with discursive meanings, giving these meanings ‘aesthetic and sensual force’ (Bartmański and Alexander, 2012: pp. 2, 11). Literature on iconicity developed within cultural sociology distinguishes between ‘type 1’ and ‘type 2’ iconicity. The visible surface of an icon (type 1) ‘has an immersive capacity to rivet attention and draw audiences in, i.e. engage them emotionally and morally’ (Bartmański, 2015: p. 17). Type 2 iconicity involves the meanings associated with an image. Table 10.1 outlines the distinction.

Table 10.1: Iconicity: Surface and Depth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surface: ‘type one iconicity,’</th>
<th>Depth: ‘type two iconicity,’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An icon is a striking image</td>
<td>An icon is ‘a person or thing regarded as a representative symbol, especially of a culture or movement’ (Smith, 2012: 172)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The visible and tangible</td>
<td>What is powerfully significant and deeply felt, while being invisible and intangible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What we see and perceive</td>
<td>Everything that an image evokes and how this intersects with what we care about</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The visual impression</td>
<td>The range of themes, images and experiences which are triggered through viewing an image</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The surface of what we see</td>
<td>Its depth and significance; connections with other images, icons and narratives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreground</td>
<td>Background, context, and associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visual image</td>
<td>A ‘paradigmatic condensation of meaning’ (Bartmański, 2015:17).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Smith (2012), Bartmański & Alexander (2012), and Bartmański (2015).

Maintaining the distinction between these two types of iconicity is valuable for recognising that there is more to icons than their visual (‘type 1’) power alone. A focus on type 2 iconicity, which is emphasised in this chapter, provides a basis for thinking about the social significance of iconic power and how it figures in the work of the climate movement.
Factors that make images iconic

‘What makes [images] succeed or fail?’ asks Mitchell (2005, p. 86), or in Solaroli’s (2015) words: ‘What determines whether cultural objects will light a fire or not?’ (p. 13). Aesthetic features are important in determining whether images become icons; however, the cultural processes that build ‘type 2’ iconicity are also central. Identifying a list of contributing factors provides a way of analysing iconicity as well as a basis and for evaluating and comparing images. Perlmutter’s (1998) list of eleven factors is one existing example, however this list particularly emphasises photojournalism, and thus is more concerned with iconicity in ‘traditional’ media, whereas the list that follows points to a wider range of ‘type 2’-related factors. These are summed up in Table 10.2 below and then outlined in more detail. (Note: additional factors that were identified in the literature review for this chapter and are significant for iconicity are outlined in Appendix 9).

Table 10.2: Factors that can make an image iconic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narration and dramatisation</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Visible political theatre</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Narrative strength</td>
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<tr>
<th>Processes which enable icons to be established in the public mind</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Wide circulation of images in the media</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Beforehand: steady building of ‘symbolic capital’ over time</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Afterwards (1): Linking an icon with existing cultural meanings</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Afterwards (2): Ongoing re-creation, appropriation and ‘curation’</td>
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<tr>
<th>Content</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Cultural resonance and articulation of cultural ‘myths’ and narratives</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Simplicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Controversy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A human story / humanly poignant</td>
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<tr>
<td>• ‘Characters’ who audiences identify with</td>
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(1) Narration and dramatisation

Visible political theatre: Scenes from dramatic events figure consistently in iconic images, such as the ‘tank man’ in Tiananmen Square, black students sitting at ‘whites only’ lunch counters in the US in the 1960s, the Aboriginal Tent Embassy, and Gandhi illegally picking up salt by the sea during the ‘Salt March’. Events like these fit Alexander’s description of a ‘social drama with which the audience [can] identify and through which they [can] vicariously participate’ (2006a: L3743). Visible theatre created by exuberant crowds was integral to the iconography of the fall of the Berlin Wall: Bartman’ski (2012) comments,

the German revolution was a paradigmatic social performance… It had a clearly defined address (stage), a transfixing typical plot (script), numerous participants (social actors), a totemic symbol (prop), a spontaneous carnivalesque style (authentic mise-en-scène), and… it was perfectly public. (p. 53)

East Germany was just one of the Eastern European countries experiencing a revolution in 1989. Why didn’t events in countries like Poland or Hungary become iconic in the way that the fall of the wall did? Bartman’ski argues that their lack of powerful political theatre was central. Audiences’ identification with ‘characters’ in a ‘theatrical’ event is important when considering what makes an image powerful: identification is discussed further in a number of sections below.

Narrative strength: In On Photography (1973) Sontag argues, ‘only that which narrates can make us understand’ (p. 18). Images can evoke powerful narratives, and their strength is an important dimension of iconicity. This implies that iconic power varies with the characters involved, the plot, the sense of something important at stake, and the level of suspense about an uncertain outcome. Smith (2012) observes ‘we might think of Woodstock as the outcome of storytelling’: Woodstock’s iconic status as the world’s most famous rock music festival resulted from ‘a process of narration and mythologization’ (p. 173). Bartman’ski and Alexander (2012) argue that icons have a powerful place in public discourse ‘because they galvanize narratives’ (p. 3). The relationship between image and narrative can be mutually reinforcing: if narratives enhance iconic power, ‘grand narratives’ can be reliant on images which condense and articulate them (Bartman’ski, 2015).
Processes which enable icons to be established in the public mind

Wide circulation of images in the media: Icons rely on being reproduced and circulated in the media, both for prominence and for investment with social meaning (Hariman and Lucaites, 2018; Leavy, 2007; Kurasawa, 2012; Perlmutter, 1998). The significance of the fall of the Berlin Wall, for example, was intensified by immediate global media coverage (Bartmański, 2012). For Hariman and Lucaites (2018), icons must be appropriated across a wide range of media; the icon is ‘a recurrent visual artefact within a dynamic media system having incredible volume and forward impetus’ (p. 290). Leavy writes, ‘the mass media are central to the construction of… iconic events, which once legendary… can then be used to further political and/ or corporate agendas’ (L123). While the mainstream media are important, social movements can also create and manage their own media. Raiford (2007) examines the ‘formidable media structure’ of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in the US, which ‘published its own newspaper and promotional materials, printed its own posters and press releases, and conducted research and incident investigations’. SNCC’s media output extended to ‘political primers and teaching tools and… art exhibits, calendars, postcards, and… photo-essay books’ (pp. 1139-40). Kurasawa (2012) describes similar work done by NGOs during the 1921-3 Russian famine.

Beforehand: steady building of ‘symbolic capital’ over time: Analysing the case of the Berlin Wall, Bartmański (2012) describes the importance of ‘steadily accruing symbolic capital’ (p. 47) for creating the conditions where the fall of the Wall became iconic. An array of powerful images had become associated with the Wall over the decades prior to 1989: guards, attempted escapes, the ‘death strip’, divided families, defecting soldiers, and checkpoints all shaped how the public imagined the Wall. Bartmański observes that by 1989, the Wall was already ‘a story of considerable depth… This spawned the accretion of symbolic capital… a protracted process of endowing the wall with… iconic properties… [In 1989] all those meanings could be and were activated’ (p. 47). Sonnevend (2012) makes a related point about ‘overlapping iconic layers’ and how 9/11 was ‘a meeting point of intertwined old and new icons’ (p. 222). Multiple such ‘layers’ helped make the Aboriginal Tent Embassy (Foley et al., 2013) an icon, including Parliament House itself, and Canberra as the location of international embassies, fusing with images of Aboriginal people living on the fringes, displaced from their land, only to face removal again by police.
Accruing symbolic capital is one of the processes by which icons acquire ‘culturally resonant’ content (see below).

**Afterwards (1) Linking an icon with existing cultural meanings:** One way images become iconic is through being linked to existing cultural themes following their creation. Smith (2012) states that an icon needs to be connected to ‘broader vital concerns—the involvement of a polluted politician… a mythmaking film, a culture war’ (p. 182). Woodstock, he argues, only became iconic by becoming connected to themes such as the definition of a nation and an era. While debates about ‘the USA’ or ‘the ‘60s’ were ultimately refracted through debates about Woodstock, the festival’s connection to these themes had to be established first. For Leavy, an event becomes iconic when it ‘undergoes intense initial interpretative practices but also becomes mythic within the culture through its appropriation into other political or social discourses’ (2007, L160). Here, the emphasis is not on the icon’s internal content (addressed below), but on the subsequent cultural process of ‘becoming mythic’ through becoming associated with themes that are already culturally significant.

**Afterwards (2) Ongoing re-creation, appropriation and ‘curation’:** Iconicity is reinforced through social practices where icons are re-created and appropriated—where they are turned into art, made into sharable objects, and where they are adapted and ‘curated’ in public ritual and commemoration. Hariman and Lucaites (2018) observe that ‘meaning and effect are produced not only by the image and its circulation but also through appropriation into other artefacts’ (p. 286). Hansen (2015) discusses this process in relation to the image of ‘The Hooded Man’ at Abu Ghraib, arguing it became iconic not just because it was frequently reproduced, but also because of ‘the numerous ways in which it has been appropriated by image makers across a variety of genre, media, and locations. It has been the template for magazine covers and editorial cartoons, on murals, public posters, sculpture, re-created in Lego, and inserted into paintings and montages’ (p. 264). Similarly, Gassner describes how the photograph of Hector Pieterson has been ‘endlessly reproduced onto T-shirts, on posters and front pages of newspapers’ thus becoming a ‘visual synonym’ of the Soweto uprising (p. 99). Leavy (2005, 2007) notes this kind of process taking place in relation to the Titanic, Pearl Harbour, Columbine and September 11. Bartmański (2012) describes how pieces of concrete from the Berlin
Wall ‘cheaply enter[ed] millions of households as aural “shards of history”’ (p. 56), and memorial centres were established at places like Checkpoint Charlie. By contrast, nothing like this happened with the Hungarian border fence. Poland had Lech Walesa, Round Table talks and empty grocery shelves: with these, Bartmanński writes, the Poles appeared ‘to have settled for a curatorial minimum’ (p. 55).

(3) Content

Cultural resonance and articulation of cultural ‘myths’ and narratives: Griffin (1999) argues that the most enduring images are those that most strongly symbolise national and cultural myths: they ‘operate at the level of myth rather than description’ (pp. 123, 129). Perlmutter (1998) lists cultural resonance as one of the key characteristics of iconic images, stating that when icons combine common cultural history with ‘primordial’ themes, they can tap into a ‘deeper human sensibility’ (p. 17). Fisher (1984) writes that ‘the most compelling, persuasive stories are mythic in form’ (p. 16). In Australia, ‘the Reef’, ‘ANZAC’, ‘the bush’, and ‘Kokoda’ carry something of this ‘mythic’ status—as do bushfires; ‘the fair go’; Ned Kelly; Uluru; Sydney Harbour and its bridge; the ‘underdog’; hardship in the face of natural disaster; the search for an inland sea; all kinds of sport; the beach; surf lifesavers; and drought. Rather than later being linked to these themes, an icon may immediately articulate them from the beginning.

Beyond referring to established mythic content, icons can resonate because they give expression to deeply-felt social issues that may not previously have been symbolised effectively. Bennett and Lawrence (1995) discuss how icons bring existing ‘societal tensions and contradictions into sharper focus’ (p. 24). Hariman and Lucaites (2018) observe: ‘images may achieve iconic status because they offer strong enactments or provisional resolutions of deep problems’ (p. 293). Solaroli makes a similar point: icons are not just connected to significant cultural themes but also a means by which these themes are brought to the surface, enabling people to experience them. While the Aboriginal Tent Embassy drew on Canberra’s existing symbolic capital, it also articulated tensions which were immediately recognisable once the iconic protest occurred, while also existing below the level of everyday national awareness.

3 The list is long: other instances include: the Southern Cross; the larrikin; the national flag; the Boxing Kangaroo; the thylacine; the kangaroo; Simpson and his donkey; ‘Well may we say God Save the Queen’; Port Arthur; and the Snowy Mountains Scheme.
Simplicity: Smith’s (2012) analysis of the Woodstock festival treats simplicity as central to iconicity. He observes how Woodstock ‘condensed a particular set of representations, visual, textual and sonic, drawing these into a coherent pattern. Then it exploded them outwards. Simplification, condensation, expansion: these are the hallmarks of iconic process’ (p. 176). Perlmutter (1998) discusses the image of the tank man in Tiananmen Square, and its ‘spareness’, observing, ‘almost all icons have very few distinct visual elements’ (p. 18). Similarly, Hansen notes the simplicity of the ‘Hooded Man’ in Abu Ghraib prison. Mitchell (2011) describes this image as ‘like a Rorschach inkblot, inviting projection and multiplicity of association’ (p. 149). The image ‘requires and inspires an imaginative reading by the spectator’ (Binder, 2012: p. 109). Being simple can thus stand in tension with being definitive—icons can ‘leave something open’, prompting viewers to make their own sense of the image. This creates a degree of ambiguity; however, according to anti-apartheid campaigner and jurist Albie Sachs, ambiguities and contradictions are necessary characteristics of powerful art (cited in Simbao, 2007: p. 54). Binder (2012) concurs, arguing that ambiguity and ‘openness’ (p. 107) prompts audiences to develop narratives that explain these images.

Controversy: Controversy may strengthen an icon. Smith argues that in the case of Woodstock, disputes over its significance have contributed to the ongoing iconicity of the event: ‘it is seen as a cultural node, or some high ground that needs to be fought over… Emotive disputes over the “true” meaning of the festival continually renew the charismatic energy of the event. They give it a ritual charge’ (p. 181).

A human story / humanly poignant: Many icons focus on a particular individual: well-known examples include Dorothea Lange’s ‘Migrant Mother’, photographs from Abu Ghraib, and images of Gandhi and Nelson Mandela. In each case, either the individual is famous, or there is already widespread public awareness of the social context that their image evokes. For Bartman’ski (2012), human poignancy and an ‘intensely human story’ are key elements of iconic images. Sontag (1973) describes the importance of photographs in building opposition to the Vietnam War, citing the image of Kim Phuc, sprayed by napalm, ‘running down a highway toward the camera, her arms open, screaming with pain’ (p. 13). Kurasawa (2012) describes this as an instance of personification, where one person’s condition is singled out ‘as a figurative... embodiment of the gravity or intensity of the suffering caused by a
humanitarian crisis’ (p. 72). Personification often involves close-up images of an individual, or sometimes a small group. These icons convey ‘unfiltered, powerful emotions’ and often portray a suffering child, who has not caused a disaster but suffers its consequences (p. 72).

‘Characters’ who audiences identify with: Smith and Howe (2015) note how people can identify with Anne Frank, while ‘the six million deaths of the Holocaust are barely comprehensible’ (L3846). For Hariman and Lucaites (2018), identification is central to iconicity: they define iconic photographs ‘as those images that are widely recognized and remembered, are thought to represent an important historical event, evoke strong emotional identification or response, and are appropriated across a wide range of media, genres, and topics’ (p. 286). Elsewhere, they discuss how images can be the basis for identification with one’s own group, or in the case of Kim Phuc, identification with a stranger that prompts the public to ‘counteract the violence of their own state’ (Hariman and Lucaites, 2007: p. 179).

Three cases from the research

The factors outlined above can be understood as ‘axes’ along which iconic power can be assessed. In the analysis that follows, these factors are applied in order to evaluate the iconic properties of three images used by the climate movement. One factor, ‘characters who audiences identify with’, is discussed more fully in a separate section below.
(1) AGL and the Reef

The image above, taken in 2016, dramatises climate change, AGL and the Reef. Significant bleaching events affecting coral reefs have been one sign that the earth’s climate is changing, and the climate movement has worked to alert the public to the problem (350 Australia, 2016c). This image goes a step further in identifying AGL as one of those responsible: climate change is no longer a ‘problem without a cause’: corporate actions are placed squarely in the spotlight.

This image presents audiences with a visual drama whose story is implied. Declaring the Reef to be a ‘crime scene’, the ‘actors’ draw attention to a conflict between AGL and the Reef. The otherwise abstract reality of AGL’s role as Australia’s biggest polluter is rendered in a simple, confrontational way. The image also captures a moment when they are publicly naming the ‘criminal’. 350’s image of AGL and the Reef differs strongly from other images where the Reef functions as physically-distant background or ‘horizon’ for action.\(^4\) Here, it is the scene of the action: the

\(^4\) Political drama relating to the Reef tends to make it a backdrop and context, rather than placing it centre-stage. The ‘plot’ and drama centre, for example, on Adani, or the actions of governments, financial institutions or contractors. ‘Is your bank going to make a decision that will destroy the Reef?’ remains a powerful and effective message, yet banks are ‘down the street’ while the Reef is ‘somewhere out there’. This means that it is difficult
location provides ‘Type 1’ iconicity, and it is strongly aligned with the intended ‘Type 2’ message. While the image conveys a sense of action being taken, there are some limitations to its narrative and theatrical strength: if the divers are protagonists or actors, the image does not convey who they are or what they will do next: these ‘story elements’ are absent. As the ‘culprit’ of the story, AGL is also only ‘present’ through its logo.

The image received some media coverage by the ABC (Sweeney, 2016; ABC, 2017). Images taken on the same occasion but with a different focus—‘#Exxonknew’—became the focus for a sustained international campaign with wider coverage. These images almost belong to a mini-genre that was launched by the Maldives Government’s 2009 Underwater Cabinet, which became truly iconic.

to create the kind of type 1-type 2 alignment that existed with the Berlin Wall, where the action happened at the scene. The action in Reef-related imagery tends to happen ‘somewhere else’.

Further, unlike an icon like the Berlin Wall, the Reef has no ‘Checkpoint Charlie’ or Brandenburg Gate. ‘The’ Reef in fact comprises 3000 coral reefs, stretching across 2300 kilometres. It is ‘bigger than Victoria and Tasmania combined’ (Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, 2018). The icon lacks a single focus, and each of the reefs that comprise ‘the’ Reef are distant from where large crowds gather and where political action is seen to happen. These factors add to the challenge of creating iconic imagery about the Reef, the actions of politicians and corporations, and climate change.
CS commented that the then President of the Maldives, Mohamed Nahseed, is ‘a powerful performance artist as much a climate change activist… a real politician as well as a human rights activist and visionary. He is the Mandela of Maldives’. Nasheed’s actions created ‘a significant symbol… [and a] real story that can be used in the global climate movement. It was a very powerful image that went around the world in the news media… It’s helpful to start a conversation with an action you can remember.’

‘The Reef’ is recognisable for Australians, making this image rank as highly as any in its symbolic capital. The Reef has semi-‘sacred’ status in Australia, though perhaps it is not quite ‘mythic’—there are no stories about the Reef comparable to those about Ned Kelly or Kokoda. As an image of the actions of AGL, there is much less symbolic capital to work with. While power companies have been powerful lobbyists in Canberra, their role as ‘culprits’ has not been in the public eye. For this

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5 The image shows Mohamed Nasheed, President of the Maldives presiding over cabinet and gaining the ‘OK’ signal that documents have been signed.

6 The work of linking AGL to climate change in the public mind had certainly begun by the time the image was taken. AGL had been the focus of climate campaigning at least as early as 2014 (Environment Victoria, 2014b; O’Shanassy, 2014). Supporters of the Australian Conservation Foundation received an email naming AGL as the ‘biggest polluter of them all’ (Cousins, 2016). Five months before the photograph was taken. Thus, people
image to become iconic, and for people to identify widely with it, AGL’s place as Australia’s biggest polluter would need to become much more widely known. Thus, this image functions to help create a public perception rather than intensify and add to one that already exists. It has the potential to contribute to the ‘steady accrual of symbolic capital’ referred to by Bartmański, in relation to a damaged Reef, and to AGL’s role in the process.

In terms of ‘ongoing re-creation’, video footage taken from the same dive appeared on Facebook with the statement ‘this is the worst coral die-off in history’ (350 Australia, 2016d). The video, which received over 30,000 views, asks, ‘Who is responsible for this disaster?’ This time the answer is ‘Australia’s biggest polluters’: AGL is no longer centre-stage but figures in a list alongside Origin and Energy Australia. The AGL banner in the image above does not feature in this video. While AGL is clearly not alone as a polluter, the simplification and condensation that Bartmański calls the hallmarks of iconicity are diluted when the narrative about who is responsible becomes more diffuse.

Figure 10.6 Exxonknew Great Barrier Reef, Australia (350, 2016d).

The role of AGL was also eclipsed by 350’s global focus on oil giant Exxon Mobil. 

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associated with the environment movement may have been familiar with AGL’s role; however, a larger public process of building symbolic capital ‘against’ AGL remains in the early stages.
350’s international message at the time of the release of this image was that ‘Exxon killed the Reef’ (e.g. 350 Australia, 2016e). McKibben (2016), writing in the Guardian, stated: ‘Exxon knew everything there was to know about climate change by the late 1970s. [However] what they didn’t do was tell the rest of us. Instead, they—and many other players in the fossil fuel industry—bankrolled the rise of the climate denial industry’. Here, the narrative is much stronger, with a focus on revelations of corporate cover-up, and a focus on Exxon fuelling both climate change and climate denial. Thus, opportunities to use this image to generate public debate about AGL and to link it with damage to the Reef were not pursued. In terms of building subsequent links with existing themes, there is great potential to build on this image; however, the #DirtyAGL campaign it mentions has relied on a broad range of images to get its message across.7 #DirtyAGL, supported by small environmental NGOs, became prominent within parts of the climate movement. This campaign may re-surface; however, at the time of writing, #DirtyAGL is in abeyance.

7 The range of themes in imagery used by #DirtyAGL can be seen in 350’s Flickr photo album, ‘AGL Campaign #dirtyAGL Holding Australia’s biggest climate polluter to account’, available at https://www.flickr.com/photos/350org/albums/72157673396997186. Themes range from a ‘renewables vs coal’ tug of war outside AGL’s offices to smoking chimneys to mock windmills, to protesters holding banners about AGL.
This confrontation between the small canoes and the coal ship made for powerful visual theatre which was featured in national and international media (see Chapter 5). The protagonists and antagonists are locked in a visible battle and, in terms of narrative, the image invites questions about ‘what happens next’, as well as curiosity about the story behind the event. The coal ship—an impersonal, imposing metal mass, appears looming above Pacific campaigners who are fighting for their future using the technology of their ancestors. The confrontation was immediately linked with ‘David and Goliath’ (Packard, 2014f, PL). The Guardian dubbed the blockade as ‘The David versus Goliath campaign of the year’, ranking it second in the Top Ten Sustainability Campaigns of the year (Buckingham, 2014). The simple clash between canoes and coal ships ‘spoke’ volumes: little needs to be added to make it intelligible. The image provides a visual statement of the Warriors’ objectives: to ‘show [Australia] that there must be limits to how much coal they dig up’ (350 Pacific, 2014d), and ‘directly challenging and halting the very activities that are causing climate change’ (Packard 2014a). The image could be understood as portraying a kind of ‘stop sign’ being held up to the coal industry. It also gives visible form to the Pacific Warriors’ refrain, ‘We are not drowning—we are fighting’.
The blockade occurred at a time when the idea of ‘stopping coal’ was yet to emerge in Australian public discourse. Thus, this aspect of the image had little symbolic capital behind it. Groups like GetUp!, Greenpeace and 350 had been campaigning on Adani as early as 2013 (Beresford, 2018); however, political debate tended to be located somewhere between Abbott’s ‘coal is good for humanity’ (Chan, 2014) and Shorten’s ‘there is a role for coal in Australia’ (Murphy, 2018). The period following the blockade saw some significant anti-coal initiatives. A campaign against new coal mines in Australia was launched in August 2015 (Denniss, 2015). ‘Stop Adani’ gained national prominence after the launch of its national ‘roadshow’ early in 2017 (see Chapter 8).

In terms of cultural resonance, the image appeals to sympathy for the underdog and for contemporary ‘Davids’ in their battles with ‘Goliath’ figures. The theme of small boats pitted against large ships is familiar from the work of Greenpeace. Newcastle has long been identified with coal, and the sense that machines are menacing and damaging echoes a long tradition of romantic critiques of modern life. The Warriors’ work was also related to at least one aspect of Australian ‘myth’: Kokoda veteran Bill Ryan joined their protest (see Chapter 6). The image fuses these familiar elements with new themes it seeks to introduce into the public and activist imagination: the coal export industry as a ‘villain’ and Pacific Islanders as ‘warriors’, fighting for survival in the face of a threat which the image seeks to make visible.

Some ongoing recreation of imagery from the blockade has developed through the use of Pacific Warriors iconography in subsequent events such as the 2016 Breakfree protests, and the Canberra ‘Peoples Parliament’, held to coincide with the Paris climate talks. Globally, the process of recreating and adapting the imagery from 2014 has extended to the Warriors’ presence at a variety of international forums (see Chapter 6). However, since 2014, the Pacific Warriors have not featured in prominent, publicly visible ‘image events’ in Australia on anything like the scale of the original blockade.
No individual Warrior became widely known to onlookers, which may limit audiences’ capacity to identify with the characters in the story (see the discussion of identification below), however the *humanly poignant* elements of the story are suggested by the ‘David and Goliath’ encounter, and are developed further in the Pacific Warriors’ communications. For example, Pacific Warrior Milan Loeak (2014) commented in the *Guardian* on the day of the blockade, ‘Climate change is an issue which will eventually affect every individual on this planet and some day, you may need someone else’s help to defend your home too’.
This image depicts the 400 people who gathered in Narrabri in 2014 ‘to show clear and urgent opposition to the NSW Government’s NSW Gas Plan and Santos Narrabri Gas Project’ (Lock The Gate, 2014a). This project is ‘the largest development ever proposed under the modern planning system in New South Wales’ (Lock the Gate, 2018b) and has been designated a ‘Strategic Energy Project’ (Hansard, 2017). ‘Be Part of the Big Picture’ was the headline of a poster advertising the event. This ‘big picture’ was to be a professional photograph, designed ‘to celebrate the strong community, beauty and productivity of our region’ (No CSG Coonabarabran, 2014). The resulting image features many of the visual elements that are characteristic of Lock the Gate’s work: yellow triangles, farmers, and community members expressing united opposition to coal seam gas. The *symbolic capital* built up by Lock The Gate makes the ‘big picture’ recognisable within rural and regional communities. The picture was taken behind Narrabri’s Crossing Theatre, where nine months earlier, over 600 people had unanimously adopted the ‘Narrabri Resolution’ against coal seam gas (ABC, 2014). The Lock The Gate Alliance (2014c) commented, ‘This is one of the most awesome photos you’ll see this year’. Supporters in Lismore described the event as ‘the most strategic and powerful show of community strength against Santos’ gas field plans yet’ (Lismore Greens, 2014).
Because farmers have a place in Australian mythology, they can say ‘farms not gas’ with real cultural force. Local media paid attention. Regional television station Prime 7 (2014) reported, ‘Four hundred people have rallied in Narrabri in a show of strength against Coal Seam Gas mining in the Pilliga. While the state government is open to more plans, local residents are refusing to go down without a fight’. Local newspaper the Courier (2014) featured the event, and afterwards the image was circulated on social media, attracting congratulations as well as controversy amongst residents holding differing views of CSG (People For The Plains, 2014).

In terms of visible political theatre, some of the other imagery generated by Lock The Gate is more dramatic (see below); however, for people in the region, the ‘Big Picture’ image can easily be read as a scene in an ongoing drama. There is a conflict, whose simple and clear human story involves people gathering to stand against Santos, the off-camera ‘villains’ of the piece, which pursues profit at the expense of the livelihoods of local farmers. Pro-CSG politicians must change their outlook and support farmers against commercial interests: land, water and life are at stake. Lock The Gate’s campaigning is built around a narrative with elements like these, and this kind of ‘image event’ turns this narrative into a public drama—however only some of these narrative elements are directly portrayed by this image.

While outside the Narrabri community, this image does not take on the appearance of a unique, distinctive event which is particularly worthy of commemoration, locally it became the first in a series of events. ‘People For The Plains’ hosted a repeat Big Picture event in Narrabri the following year. Organiser Sarah Ciesiolka said that the 2014 event had been ‘so successful that we have decided to do it again’, aiming to ‘showcase the community’s opposition to coal seam gas… and reaffirm that Santos has no social licence to operate in North West NSW’ (Northern Daily Leader, 2015). On the four-year anniversary of the event, a ‘Quiet Walk’ was held in Narrabri to celebrate town survey results showing a large majority were concerned about the Narrabri Gas Project (People For The Plains, 2018). Further, the image was re-created widely within Lock The Gate circles (for just some examples, see Lock The Gate, 2014b; No CSG Coonabarabran, 2015a, 2015b; Woods, 2014). Lock The Gate’s local campaigning, in which images like this have been prominent alongside its sustained
community organising, has had an impact in the local community, with significant swings against incumbent National Party politicians and similar swings towards candidates opposed to CSG (NSW Electoral Commission, 2011, 2015; Lock The Gate, 2015). Appendix 6 outlines voting results from Narrabri during the period being studied.

**Iconic factors: what’s present, and what’s missing**

The analysis above provides an opportunity to see how multiple factors work together to create iconicity, and highlights how the eleven factors identified for this chapter are unevenly represented. Significantly, images that rank highly on iconic content may lack other factors that make for iconicity. The Pacific Warriors image, for example, is laden with iconic characteristics, and initially gained wide media coverage—yet outside activist circles, it has not retained the kind of ongoing profile that makes it a well-known contemporary reference point for why climate change needs to be addressed. Iconic content and a level of drama did not make the Reef-AGL image iconic. It featured actors and the potential for a strong narrative; however, this was not sustained, and the anonymity of the divers limited the potential for a ‘human story’. The image was visually powerful; however, it was not reinforced, appropriated and ‘curated’. #Exxonknew featured a richer story, and more was done to profile it in the media and create a sense of narrative around it. In both the AGL and Narrabri images, the ‘villain’ is mentioned, but is not portrayed. Narrative and political theatre are at their strongest in the Pacific Warriors image. There are protagonists, and they enact a strong story. This image exemplifies how icons can display the dramatic actions of an energised, enthusiastic, ‘effervescent’ group (Smith, 2012; Bartmanński, 2012).

Among the three images examined above, two factors in particular were not strongly evident: linking an image with existing cultural themes following its creation and ongoing re-creation, appropriation and ‘curation’. One interviewee spoke to the importance of these aspects of the climate movement’s work:

> I think it’s really important to have at the forefront of our mind the symbols of our culture and how to use a campaign to re-inscribe those symbols in a new way, or to reinterpret the stories of the culture in a new way. I think that
some of the most powerful movements have been able to do that, and have been able to create images that are about that symbolism…

I’d like to see the Left in Australia think about what is the meaning of, say, sporting events—how can we enter into dialogue with the ANZAC story, different stories that a broader part of society engages with...

A lot of this stuff is hard to interpret in a progressive way. I guess the Eureka Stockade… turning these things into public images or public theatre has potential (CF).

What can the two ‘missing’ factors look like in practice? Linkages with existing cultural themes are evident in Lock The Gate’s efforts to evoke the mythology of ANZAC. In the examples below, ANZAC imagery is associated with a movement rather than an image; however, they illustrate the point. References to ANZAC appear in Lock the Gate’s film Undermining Australia (Tranter et al., 2017). Protesting against CSG at the Bentley Blockade involved ‘honour[ing] the ANZAC tradition’, argued local clinical psychologist Wayne Somerville (2014). According to environmentalist Robin Mosman (2014), who has spent decades campaigning against coal and CSG, those who stand against the ‘appalling destruction’ of CSG are ‘the true Anzacs of this century… Our country is being invaded and occupied by armies of largely foreign mining companies’. In her poem The Anzac Spirit—One Hundred Years On, Harper (2013) writes about farmers opposing CSG:

Yes, that Anzac Spirit lives again to march across our land…
our foe’s here in Australia not on Turkish battle lines…

Frida Forsberg’s song ANZAC Day in Acland (ActionOnCoal, 2011) invokes ‘Lest we forget’ to challenge the mining interests that have turned a thriving community into a ghost town. Each year, Lock The Gate supporters join others who still gather there to commemorate ANZAC Day (Oakey Coal Action Alliance, 2013, 2016). On ANZAC Day in 2018, Frontline Action on Coal posted a Facebook graphic remembering Australia’s Frontier Wars, adding: ‘the ongoing process of colonisation by governments and corporations is still happening today’. Further, the film Sacrifice Zone features ANZAC themes including the story of Kokoda veteran and anti-fossil fuel campaigner Bill Ryan. Additional images of Ryan follow below:
The Great Barrier Reef itself is an ‘existing cultural theme’, and it is consistently featured in the work of the Australian climate movement. Interviewees repeatedly referred to the centrality of the Reef for engaging the public, and for achieving political impact. TS comments that images of the Reef have been ‘much more powerful than talking about percentage cuts in CO₂ or emissions trading schemes’. LT describes ‘really strategic thinking’ within the climate movement about campaigning based on the iconic status of the Reef. Similarly, LH observes,

The Great Barrier Reef is a natural icon… Images of the Great Barrier Reef have been incredibly powerful in engaging people to campaign against the [Abbot Point] coal port⁸… The campaign on the Great Barrier Reef has been incredibly successful [in making] the issue… so prominent… There’s been companies pulling out… There’s been banks internationally saying they won’t invest, there’s the result of the [2015] Queensland election⁹ [where] the Reef was such a highly influential issue…

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⁸ Abbot Point is the location of the port where coal would be exported from the Adani mine and other subsequent mines in the Galilee Basin.
⁹ SW also highlights the importance of the Reef as an election issue in Queensland. For an analysis of the place of the Reef in this election, see a report by the Parliamentary Library (McCann and Speldewinde, 2015). For background on public attitudes to the Reef, see Stoeckl et al. (2014).
The images below are not iconic in themselves; however, they illustrate the climate movement’s use of imagery of the Reef as an iconic theme.

Figure 10.15 Melbourne protest against using the Northern Infrastructure Fund to support Adani. *One fish, two fish - Reef not Coal* (Takver, 2016d).

Figure 10.16 *Coral bleaching at Lizard Island, March 2016* (The Ocean Agency / XL Catlin Seaview Survey / Richard Vevers, 2016c).
The Reef’s iconic status is the basis for strategic campaign choices made by the climate movement. SW comments, ‘There’s been a calculated and strategic decision to focus on the Reef… I think nationally there’s a lot of understanding that
something is going on up there and the Reef is in danger.’ Discussing the banks’ refusal to support the Adani project, LH explains how the icon of the Reef is linked to commercial icons—bank logos and brands:

We’re making the connection that if these ports go ahead not only is it Adani [or the government] that’s done it… it’s these banks that are funding it and their brand will be tied to the potential destruction of the Reef and the massive climate impact [of] these projects… It is a huge brand risk…

One of the reason international banks have been ruling it out is that they don’t want to be part of something that is so internationally significant around the Great Barrier Reef.

The other ‘missing’ factor, ongoing re-creation, appropriation and ‘curation’ is evident in the manifold ways in which Stop Adani iconography has been reproduced. The cumulative effect is to build Stop Adani into an iconic movement. Below are just some examples:
Figures 10.19-27 Images from left to right: Interfaith candlelight #StopAdani vigil in Federation Square, Melbourne (Julian Meehan, 2017); 2018 Batman by-election: #StopAdani Community Survey (Stop Adani / James Thomas, 2018); Melbourne Stop Adani Summit (Stop Adani: 2017m); Melbourne Stop Adani Summit (Stop Adani, 2017n); Newcastle BEAUTIFUL crowd shot 02 (Stop Adani, 2017o); CongoBeach Eurobodalla GillianneTedder1 (Stop Adani, 2017p). Bondi Beach human sign (Stop Adani, 2017q). $1BN for coal or renewables? (Stop Adani, 2017r). $1BN could be used to worsen coral bleaching or protect the Reef (Stop Adani, 2017s).
Local and network iconicity

If images are not iconic at national level, local and social media provide opportunities to profile them within farming communities and climate movement circles. Here, as with Raiford’s (2007) example of SNCC above, the media impact is at least partly within NGO control. This means that iconicity can exist at local level and within networks: the full range of iconic effects can be present on a more limited scale. Local iconicity may involve local recognition of the narrative and content, local media coverage and local ‘curation’. When people in a particular locality or network wield political power (e.g. through running local electoral candidates, or by influencing the agenda of the climate movement), smaller-scale iconic effects can extend into much wider communities. In the case of the Narrabri image, the relevant community might be the electors of Barwon. ‘Network iconicity’ figured in the case of the Pacific Warriors. Their iconography became important within climate movement circles: it played an internal agenda-setting role that outweighed its immediate public impact. Much of the current leadership of the Stop Adani campaign was present in Newcastle, where many activists caught the vision of climate justice and bringing an end to coal in Australia.

Iconic power and arrays of images

Iconicity is not always manifested through the ‘single images’ that Else speaks of above. Iconic power may be effected through an array of related images. This is evident in the Stop Adani and Reef images above, and in images from Lock The Gate below. Although there is no single defining image, ‘image arrays’ share common themes and elements. Hansen’s (2015) distinction between discrete and generic icons is helpful here. There is no single (‘discrete’) image of, for example, Nelson Mandela, the Nazi death camps (Sontag, 2003) or even the ‘tank man’ in Tiananmen Square (Hariman and Lucaites, 2018). In these cases, iconic effects belong to the cumulative impression made by multiple images, thus generating ‘generic iconicity’. Hansen points out that discrete icons themselves may derive ‘some of their visual power from referring to previous [often generic] icons’ (p. 269). It has been useful for the purposes of analysis to apply the list of iconic factors to individual images; however, the iconic impact of these images can also be understood in relation to the array of images they belong to.
The Narrabri ‘big picture’, for example, may not have been iconic by itself; however, it featured and reinforced iconic elements common to Lock The Gate images across the country. These images reflect community strength and unity (Lock The Gate, 2014a), and community members of all ages standing together against a threat. They often appear as a vibrant and exuberant group (Smith, 2012; Bartmanński 2012). Lock The Gate argues from the imagery and from the depth of community concern that CSG companies lack a social license to operate (e.g. *Northern Daily Leader*, 2015). Lock The Gate’s yellow triangles have appeared on farm gates across rural Australia, carrying on a protest tradition that extends at least as far back as the campaign against the damming of the Franklin River, to which Lock The Gate’s work has been compared (Hutton, 2012; Alcorn, 2015). As a protest symbol, the triangle thus carries a depth of *symbolic capital*. AL stated in an interview, ‘The best messaging I can think of is the yellow triangle—it fits the criteria—it is used a thousand times—everyone… know[s] what the yellow triangle means’.

Lock The Gate evokes the image of a farm gate closed to intruders, and backs its rhetoric with courageous, even ‘heroic’ action (Lock The Gate, 2016b). Yellow triangles are complemented by yellow posters, placards and banners. Other elements of Lock The Gate’s iconography include a visual backdrop of rural land, and farmers, often wearing Akubra-style hats. The following series of images illustrates the common visual features which combine to build Lock the Gate’s iconic presence in Australian rural communities. This selection from the total ‘array’ of Lock The Gate images illustrates something of what Bartmanński describes in his analysis of the Berlin Wall as the ‘accretion of symbolic capital’ as well as his reference to the *protracted process of endowing the wall with manifold iconic properties prior to its fall* (p. 47, emphasis added).
Figures 10.28-35 Left to right: Gasfield Free Northern Rivers (Lock The Gate Alliance, 2013b); Farmers in the Pilliga (Lock The Gate Alliance 2014d); Santos AGM Protest (Lock The Gate Alliance, 2016a). South Eastern Midlands ‘Gasfield Free’ (Lock The Gate Alliance, 2016b); Bentley Blockade (3 images) (© Mary-Ellen Peters, 2014. Used with permission); Time to Choose Rally, Sydney, featuring actor Michael Caton (Lock The Gate Alliance, 2018).
Figures 10.36-38 Left to right: Our Land Is Our Life march, Darwin 2015 (Lock The Gate Alliance, 2015); Western Australia Ute Muster (Lock The Gate Alliance, 2017); Queensland’s first Mining Free Community Declaration, Rosewood (Lock The Gate Alliance, 2013c).

Figure 10.39 Coonamble Gasfield Free Declaration (Lock The Gate Alliance, 2014e).

10 On Flickr, this image is dated 2006; however, the event took place in 2013 (Munro, 2013).
‘Characters who audiences identify with’: reflections on icons and identification

As noted above, one reason that icons are politically important is because political action can be mobilised around them. Identification is central to this process. Lippmann, quoted above, wrote about the importance of identification, arguing that pictures are the most powerful way to convey an idea; however, this process is not fully realised until we identify ourselves with an aspect of the picture (1922: pp. 162-3). Smith and Howe (2015), whose focus on social drama speaks to narrative and political theatre as dimensions of iconicity, attribute failed communication to the lack of ‘emotional identification of audience with performer’ (L2727). In their account, encouraging identification is a key objective of climate campaigners. Alexander (2010) argues for the role of identification in Obama’s first presidential victory. A nexus between identification, political commitment, mobilisation and political momentum relates strongly to most of the ‘iconic effects’ summarised earlier in this chapter. Identification differs from identity. As a concept in political science, ‘identity’ generally refers to emotional attachments to groups differentiated by factors such as race, ethnicity, gender, class, or nationality. Identification offers the prospect of people aligning themselves with characters in political narratives who may have identities quite different to their own. The challenge is to find stories that are rich enough and ‘big’ enough to enable this, and to find icons that can ‘simplify, condense and expand’ their themes (Smith, 2012).

Identification with iconic images involves a visual encounter (type 1 iconicity) where people respond strongly because they recognise something of themselves and what matters to them in the image (type 2). Writing about the links between the persuasive impact of visual material, emotion and identification, Joffe (2008) describes an interaction between (1) the content and tone of images and (2) identifications which ‘produce engagement and concern or detachment and apathy’ (p. 91). Joffe argues that existing research has emphasised identity to the exclusion of identification, and calls for research examining ‘the mechanisms by which people detach themselves from, and identify with, visual material, and [how this links] to persuasive impact’ (p. 91). This necessarily involves audience research; however, some general points can be made in relation to the three images studied in this chapter. Their strengths and weaknesses can be understood in terms of whether they feature elements which make it likely that people will identify with the ‘characters’
which they portray.

People may identify with the AGL-Reef image through extending an existing identification with the Reef, or, for the ‘converted’, because it articulates their concerns about AGL. Identification requires a story character to identify with, however. It is difficult to identify strongly with the divers beyond agreeing with their concerns: apart from naming a culprit, who they are or what they are going to do is unclear. Anti-whaling imagery from Greenpeace provides a contrast: campaigners evoke rich stories, full of dramatic scenarios. Looking on, supporters ‘will them’ to succeed. For others, identification may be limited because the image’s central contention conflicts with their view of AGL or of the world, or because AGL’s particular role as ‘biggest polluter’ is invisible in the image apart from the text that makes this claim. Audiences may not recognise the dramatic context that exists behind the picture. In the case of the Pacific Warriors, identification may occur through sympathy for ‘Davids’ in ‘David and Goliath’ conflicts, and negative reactions to the coal ship. It may be limited by lack of existing identification with Pacific Islanders, support for the coal industry or lack of identification with this form of political expression. People may identify with the Narrabri ‘Big Picture’ through support for farmers and the ‘underdog’, and concern about coal seam gas. Identification may fail to occur when people do not recognise the story, drama and human experience that is being conveyed, or when their views of CSG are rooted in factors which are not addressed by the image.

Does a particular image evoke strong identifications that matter for climate politics? This is different to the question of whether images win broad public appeal. At the very least, a politically-relevant group needs to identify with an image. The Stop Adani campaign, for example, did not begin to establish itself on the national agenda (Jones, 2019) by first appealing to the middle ground. Instead the middle ground was influenced by the work of politically active leadership within the climate movement who identified with and then promoted Stop Adani’s message. Yet, breadth of appeal matters. Can a broad range of audiences ‘locate themselves’ in these images? None of the three images is designed to appeal to ‘middle Australia’, though the Narrabri image is designed to engage the community in the Narrabri area, and iconic impact on this scale is significant in its own terms. Many images that have become iconic in the past have not sought a ‘middle ground’ to reach a
maximum audience—yet people across social divides have often been able to find something in these images which they recognise in themselves. We do not need to have been burned by napalm in Vietnam or chased by police dogs in Alabama to empathise with people portrayed in these images.

Writing about how the Holocaust came to be defined as a trauma for humanity, Alexander (2002) illustrates how personalisation of an issue through compelling narratives makes identification possible. Initially, the Holocaust was recognised as a trauma within Jewish communities, but not broader Western publics. As a result of a sustained process of communication, ‘the Holocaust drama became… the most widely understood and emotionally compelling trauma of the twentieth century’ (p. 34)—at least for a significant number of Westerners. Alexander describes how Anne Frank’s story typified a process which created the basis for widespread psychological identification. The events of the Holocaust were portrayed ‘in terms of small groups, families and friends, parents and children, brothers and sisters. In this way, the victims of trauma became everyman and everywoman, every child and every parent’ (p. 35). Since none of the images above feature a character who is known to broad audiences, the scope for the kind of personalisation leading to identification that Alexander describes is diminished.11

The more universal the human drama that is depicted, the wider the potential for broad identification. The violation of core values, damage to ‘sacred’ places such as the Reef, the plight of an underdog, and the courage of a ‘David’ in the face of a ‘Goliath’ always have potential to elicit identification. One task for climate campaigners is to align ‘type 1’ visual power with the kind of ‘type 2’ meaning that people identify strongly with, even if they may not share the climate movement’s concerns, and then to build on this meaning through ongoing re-creation of images, and relating them to themes with powerful cultural resonance. Here, the iconic elements in the imagery created by the global ‘School Strikes 4 Climate’ stand out. Greta Thunberg herself has become an international icon, inspiring mass school

11 Clearly, personalisation is one pathway to identification, and images that are humanly-poignant while portraying ‘characters’ who we do not know can still generate identification (see the discussion under ‘humanly-poignant’ above). In terms of the literature discussed above, the issue is whether images feature ‘personification’ (Kurasawa, 2012), or ‘personalisation’ as well (as in Alexander’s discussion of one or more characters whose stories become well-known), and what this means for audiences’ ability to identify with ‘characters’ depicted in the images.
walkouts spreading worldwide (Bourke, 2019) and featuring, for example, on the cover of Time (Jaynes, 2019) and GQ (McGurk, 2019). People can readily identify with and respond to children’s hopes for a safe and positive future, regardless of nationality or group identity.

Figure 10.40 Greta Thunberg at the European Parliament (European Parliament, 2019).

Figure 10.41 Climate Kirtag. Austrian World Summit (Bundesministeriums für Europa, Integration und Äusseres, 2019).
Conclusion

‘What is… going to be the story and the image that connects with people?’ asks LH.\textsuperscript{12} Icons that ‘connect with people’ matter in politics. For Hariman and Lucaites (2007), icons are important for the way in which they provide defining representations of political crises and how they motivate public action. They are ‘moments of visual eloquence that acquire exceptional importance within public life’ (p. 45). For Smith (2012), they ‘recharge, rework, and energize social life’ (p. 181). Clearly, icons need to be much more than vivid illustrations. DiFrancesco and Young (2011) argue that climate change ‘is still awaiting its iconic image(s) with the power to steer arguments… in the public sphere’ (pp. 532-3). They argue that the lack of central visual images for climate change is an important ‘blank spot’ in the debate.

\textsuperscript{12} Replying his own question, he cites the success of campaigns using imagery of the Reef, ‘the \textit{Gasland} movie showing people setting their water taps on fire’ due to contamination of water by coal seam gas, and the electoral impact of ‘the democratic image of farmers and rural communities declaring themselves CSG-free’.
The kind of iconic qualities that these authors refer to are difficult to find in climate politics—at least in single images: actively creating and ‘curating’ icons with something of this power is an ongoing task for the climate movement, though, as noted above, Greta Thunberg is emerging as an icon. None of the three images analysed in this chapter quite ‘recharge, rework, and energize’ climate politics on a broad scale, and the list of eleven factors identified in this chapter points to some of the reasons why this is the case. The list is designed to provide greater clarity about why an image is, or is not, iconic: if an image has some iconic qualities but ‘something is missing’, the factors list may illuminate what is missing. In the cases analysed above, linking an image with existing cultural themes following its creation and ongoing re-creation, appropriation and ‘curation’ did not figure significantly. Yet the three main images analysed above belong to broader arrays of images, where these factors are evident to some extent. While powerful ‘discrete’ icons are the most obvious expressions of iconic power, arrays of images also display iconic effects. This kind of iconic power is evident in the cases of the Reef, the Pacific Warriors, Lock The Gate and Stop Adani. The chapter offers the terms ‘local’ and ‘network’ iconicity to account for an image having iconic effects within particular communities such as rural communities, and the sections of the climate movement influenced by the Pacific Warriors. All of the ways that iconic images are significant for social change can apply in these cases. Over time, these iconic effects can then sometimes extend into much wider communities, illustrating Else’s point about the ‘slow building of a movement around narratives and around images’, and Bartmański’s point about the ‘protracted process of endowing [an object with] iconic properties’ (2012: p. 47). Changing perceptions of coal and climate change are, inevitably, processes that take time.

Iconic power exists in tandem with other forms of power. All of the gains that Lock The Gate has achieved have relied on the power generated by mobilised communities. This chapter speaks to the way that this movement also relies on iconic power—and has been very good at using it. There is a circular process involved: Lock The Gate’s icons portray mobilised communities, and communities create, circulate and mobilise around icons, projecting them to broader audiences to gain wider support. The same process can be seen in the growth of 350 Pacific described in Chapter 5, and in Stop Adani’s use of the Reef and its logo. Notably, if iconic power was removed from the picture, it is difficult to see these other forms of power
having the same effect.

The focus on identification above complements existing discussions of identity, providing a bridge between subjective responses to powerful images and political engagement. Here, established perspectives on political communication relying on framing (Snow et al., 1986) can be augmented. Critics see framing as offering too limited a conception of how political ideas are transmitted, as well as a one-dimensional view of how they are adopted (e.g. Oliver and Johnson, 2000). This perspective can be augmented by attending to imagery as well as language, and by, working with a larger model of the emotional and other subjective processes that are associated with shifts in attitudes. More broadly, identification and the processes that enable it belong on the agenda when thinking about the relationship between icons, political loyalties (see Achen and Bartels, 2016) and social movements—and when analysing the political outcomes that are shaped by them.

Given the political importance of icons, a framework for analysing iconicity is valuable for interpreting what is happening in climate politics and for evaluating political tasks of the climate movement. Icons offer more than ‘memes’ that last for a moment. They can make an enduring impression that defines an issue in the public imagination, or ‘the public mind’. Sometimes, such images are, in Else’s words, ‘as hot imagistically as what we’ve seen in previous movements’. The ‘slow building of a movement around narratives and around images’ that he refers to can happen by a mix of inspiration and accident. It can also occur when people who recognise the significance of icons plan a ‘Big Picture’, a dive on the Reef with a message, an ‘underwater cabinet’ event, or a David-and-Goliath encounter between people in canoes and coal ships. Looking at more recent events, perhaps the School Strike movement will generate powerful and defining imagery about climate change—and in doing so, help shift climate politics.
Chapter 11

Conclusion: symbolic power, the political climate and political impact

The work of picturing, narrating and dramatising climate change is central to influencing what happens in climate politics. The chapters above have shown how symbolic power is significant in two key ways: it shapes how climate change is understood and ‘imagined’ by the public and within the climate movement, and it generates momentum and energy for this movement (see Figure 11.1). Across both of these dimensions, symbolic politics contributes to shaping the overall political climate, and creates conditions where other forms of power can become effective. In one scenario, symbolic politics can influence the political climate in such a way that the danger of climate change and the need to decarbonise the economy are made visible, focused, tangible and emotionally compelling, both for the climate movement and for the public. Alternatively, the need to address climate change can remain invisible, unfocused, intangible and emotionally flat—or it can simply be less compelling than other concerns. Which of these two scenarios prevails is powerfully influenced by the political use of stories, imagery and political theatre, and how the symbolic power they generate resonates with audiences (or fails to do so). Shifts in public attitudes and a mobilised movement are not enough by themselves to effect political change. However, in many political situations that involve persuasion, shifts in the overall balance of forces that have been effected by symbolic politics have been necessary for broader change to occur. This chapter reviews the findings of the empirical chapters above, highlighting key ways in which the thesis has addressed its central question. It summarises the innovations developed in the thesis, and makes suggestions for further research. It then closes with some reflections on political ‘realism’, calling for an expanded understanding of the forces that ‘really’ shape politics, and some reflections based on the case of the Pacific Climate Warriors.
How does symbolic politics figure in the work of the climate movement—and how is it important for achieving political change?

To adapt a statement that Foucault (1990) made about power, symbolic politics is ‘everywhere’. It is pervasive in the climate movement’s efforts to ‘win hearts and minds’, build political will, engage people emotionally, mobilise the climate movement, and exert power through the politics of reputation and social license. Imagery and narrative are everywhere-to-be-found in political debate. The chapter on the Rudd-Gillard-Abbott era identified ways in which symbolic politics figures as a dimension of ‘mainstream’ politics. It argued that symbolic politics played a consequential role in political outcomes, including the abolition of Australia’s price on carbon. Symbolic politics figures prominently in campaigners’ accounts of their own work, and a rich picture of its importance is evident when campaigners’ statements are drawn together.¹ Symbolic politics also figures in important statements of campaign strategy (see Chapter 7); however, it lacks an established place in climate movement ‘theories of change’. The Stop Adani campaign illustrates the point. While the national Stop Adani strategy borrowed much of the language of Pollution, Politics and Power (La Rocca, 2014), its headline goals omitted a focus on symbolic power. A call to recognise the importance of cultural-symbolic power is not a call to downplay a focus on any other forms of power, but to recognise cultural-symbolic power as an important dimension of politics and an important way that social movements make a difference. Symbolic power can be emphasised, it can be disregarded, or it can be used without a strategic approach being taken to assessing its role in ‘the problem’ that the climate movement faces (see Figure 11.2), or to planning its role in achieving the ‘solutions’ the climate movement pursues.

¹ Drawing together statements about symbolic politics and why it matters in climate politics accounts for much of the work of this thesis. A sample of interviewees’ comments about the importance of symbolic politics is presented in Appendix 2.
**Figure 11.1:** Symbolic power and the climate movement

**Figure 11.2:** The use of symbolic politics *against* action on climate change
Ways in which symbolic politics figures in the work of the climate movement can be placed along a continuum. More minor instances, such as Accept the Gift, can be important at a particular moment or for a particular audience. They attract short term attention and make their own contribution to building overall public perceptions. The Climate Elephant was more significant, at least during the 2010 Federal election. However, it never appeared prominently on the national stage afterwards. More powerful instances of symbolic politics involve defining narratives and images that can build the case for climate action (or undermine it, as described in Chapter 4). Narratives and images have featured prominently in the divestment movement’s efforts to diminish the legitimacy of the fossil fuel industry, and divestment has now shifted assets worth trillions of dollars worldwide (GoFossilFree, 2019; Arabella Advisors, 2018). Imagery of the Great Barrier Reef featured in campaigns that led major banks to rule out funding for Adani. Stop Adani has powerfully tarnished Adani’s image, though at the time of writing, parliamentary support for Adani has strengthened following the 2019 federal election. Still, reaching the point where saying ‘no’ to a major coal project is imaginable at all has represented significant political progress for the climate movement, and it establishes political ground which the climate movement can work from into the future.

The empirical work of this thesis began with an analysis of the Rudd-Gillard-Abbott era. This chapter identified a consistent pattern where conservative forces used symbolic power to establish political strength, and where Labor’s lack of attention to symbolic politics weakened its political position. Symbolic politics was identified as a central factor in creating the political climate that made it possible to abolish Australia’s price on carbon. Conservative symbolic strength may have been a political problem for Labor, but it was also a political obstacle to achieving the climate movement’s goals. Australia lacked a political climate which favoured a price on carbon: instead, what Labor climate spokesperson Greg Combet described as ‘fear and myths’ prevailed (Taylor, 2011). The analysis in this chapter highlights the need to recognise the importance of ‘myths’ in climate politics: not just as distortions and untruths but also as powerful narratives combined with rich imagery that influence the place that climate change holds in the public imagination. In terms of the research question, the Coalition’s use of symbolic power against the goals of the climate movement showed that symbolic power figures in the work of the
climate movement as a problem that it needs to address.

The focus then shifted to the case of the Pacific Warriors’ blockade in Newcastle. The work of the Pacific Warriors provides a significant example of the strong linkages between symbolic politics and movement mobilisation, and of how symbolic politics can create a platform for taking subsequent action. The blockade became the starting point for a ‘fight for the Islands’ that had not previously existed (Packard, 2014a). It became a node around which ongoing political action was organised, and a basis for engaging the public—a phenomenon which was evident in other cases analysed above, such as divestment, Stop Adani, Repower Port Augusta and Lock the Gate. Capturing the activist imagination—and constantly renewing it—builds movements’ capacity for political impact. Symbolic power is important for generating the momentum that makes a movement move (Eyerman, 2006). Eyerman’s question, What makes movements move? might appear to be an obvious focus for research. Yet, as described in Chapter 2, resource mobilisation and political process models of social movements overlooked these questions. The focus on cognitive framing that developed in the 1980s at least put meaning on the agenda; however, the framing approach has disregarded emotion, a theme which has figured in much of this research. Further, engaging the activist and public imaginations with a new sense of what is at stake and a new vision of what needs to happen matters in order to lay the basis for subsequent political shifts to occur—an important aspect of changing the overall political climate.

The following chapter demonstrated how narrative is a prominent factor in climate movement strategic thinking. Campaigners frequently understood their work in narrative terms, and narrative gave form and focus to climate campaigns. (Divestment campaigning, for example, is built around a plot where the fossil fuel industry figures as the ‘villain’). This chapter found that at times the term ‘narrative’ could be interchangeable with ‘message’ or ‘communication strategy’, and that frameworks for thinking about climate politics tended to draw on a limited range of narrative features. It argued that it is possible to have a ‘message without a plot, a plot without depth, consistency or fidelity, and a ‘moral’ without a story’. Working with a richer model of narrative provides a larger basis for ‘reading’ climate politics, in narrative terms (and for the climate movement to use it with effect). Further, this chapter addressed the debate about the place of ‘heroes’ and ‘villains’ in narratives.
of climate politics. The risk of descending into simplistic melodrama is real; however, this chapter argued that the ‘romantic’ pursuit of a better world could coexist with a compelling story featuring conflicts between protagonists and antagonists. Three key areas where interviewees reflected on the political significance of narrative were identified: its role in providing the climate movement with a platform for action and a focus for communication, the way it was important for inspiring and energising the movement, and its role in the politics of reputation.

The way that climate change is pictured matters as well as the way it is narrated. Chapter 8 showed how the climate movement used imagery to make climate change visible, focused, tangible and emotionally compelling, and to convey a vision of the future. In 2010, when the climate movement knew that ‘climate change was not being talked about’ and the task was to ‘elevate it on the agenda’ (LH), the Australian Youth Climate Coalition turned to the Climate Elephant. When Tony Abbott was opposing renewable energy, Accept the Gift brought his stance into focus by donating solar panels to his official residence ahead of Christmas 2015. Opponents of coal seam gas circulated an image of a river on fire. This chapter extended the case for the importance of imagery by arguing for its role in building political will. Political will needs to be brought out of a ‘black box’ where it is recognised as important, while exactly what it is remains vague. The sources of political will are important as well as its components, and this thesis has argued that symbolic politics plays a significant role in generating it.

Political outcomes can hinge on the way the issues are imagined. Chapter 9 offered an alternative way of describing ‘the use of symbolic power’ and ‘the cultural-symbolic domain of politics’ by describing the themes of the thesis in terms of engaging and capturing the public imagination. Much of the work of establishing climate change in the public imagination is done with images, and the challenge of making imagery compelling or central in people’s imaginations matters for how political debates unfold. The Stop Adani movement has developed around images and narratives that portray the damage that would be done by the mine, and one dimension of the politics of Adani is a ‘battle of images’, where visuals of workers in hi-vis vests compete with imagery of damage to farmland and the Reef. In 2017, the Adani mine was new to national political discourse, and within two years it had become a major focus of national debate. The outcome of Australia’s 2019 election, however, showed
that opposition to Adani had not grown to the extent that the climate movement had hoped. Comparing the relative strength of the Coalition’s overall imagery and that of Labor and the climate movement provides one way of analysing this outcome. This chapter also analysed divestment and social license campaigns. The divestment movement had small beginnings on a US campus in 2010. By 2013 it was a global movement, and the use of imagery has held a central place in growth of the movement and in its impact. Social license and reputation exist in the public imagination, and they are developed or withdrawn as a result of meaningful social action. They are understood by the climate movement as well as industry and government as having direct and powerful ‘real-world’ outcomes. Social license and the politics of legitimacy and reputation figured strongly in climate movement strategic thinking, and in comments made by interviewees.

Chapter 10 built on the earlier chapters which had established the political importance of imagery by analysing iconic imagery. It found that images with iconic elements figure in the work of the climate movement; however, comments cited in this chapter from Else (2012) about the lack of images comparable to those that emerged from the civil rights and anti-apartheid movement still apply. Nevertheless, the chapter found that arrays of related images can have iconic effects and iconic power can be evident at local level or within networks: these aspects of iconicity are also significant for the work of the climate movement. Late in the process of writing this thesis, Greta Thunberg emerged as an icon of youth action on climate change, and the #schoolstrike4climate movement became a global phenomenon. Iconic imagery may well emerge from this movement in the period ahead.

This thesis, its contributions, and suggestions for further research

In emphasising the importance of imagery, narrative and political theatre and arguing that cultural-symbolic power is an important ‘domain’ where climate politics is worked out, this thesis shares common ground with writers in the field of cultural sociology like Alexander (2006a, 2006b, 2006c; 2011), Eyerman (2006) and Smith and Howe (2015) in the field of cultural sociology. The concerns of this thesis also correspond to themes that have emerged onto the scholarly agenda as a result of a series of ‘turns’ in the social sciences, including the narrative turn, the pictorial turn, the performative turn, the affective turn, and the cultural turn. There is thus a
basis for symbolic power to hold a place in the academic world that did not exist three or four decades ago. In a context where perceptions of climate change are central to climate politics and voters continue to elect federal governments which are hostile to action on climate change, research at the intersection of symbolic politics, climate politics, studies of social movements, political communication and cultural power is important.

Cultural sociology has grown in part through a process of dialogue with other research traditions and classical texts. This has included the classics of social theory (Alexander, 2003, 2006a) but also extends, for example, to Aristotle’s analysis of drama and Northrop Frye’s literary criticism (Smith and Howe, 2015) and Alexander’s use of Thrasymachus from Plato’s Republic as a representative of ‘realist’ views of politics. This thesis has drawn on the work of Lippmann, and Keynes made an appearance, as did Aristotle. The classical writings of practitioners of symbolic politics like Gandhi, Lewis and Martin Luther King have been an important reference point in the development of the thesis. More broadly, this thesis has drawn its empirical findings into relationship with thinking in the fields of climate politics, social movement studies, political communication and cultural power, including the work of scholars such as Stuart Hall, Mabel Berezin, Susanne Moser, Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels, Charles Taylor, Heather Eaton, John Paul Lederach, Alison Brysk, and WJT Mitchell. Additional fruitful dialogue might take place between cultural sociology and the work of thinkers like these. It might be further enlarged by integrating thinking from fields such as neuroscience and political communication and (see Chapters 2 and 3) as well as peacebuiding and conflict resolution literature (see Lederach, 2005), given the way this field addresses the need to change entrenched ways of seeing the world.

Innovations in the thesis include (1) the findings about the role of symbolic power in the work of the climate movement (2) the findings about symbolic power in relation to the *Australian* climate movement, (3) the use of a method that draws on the perspective of movement participants to gain insight into symbolic politics, and (4) bringing the particular array of concepts developed above to bear on the research question. The thesis has offered a way of thinking about climate politics which draws together ‘the political climate’, the ‘climate of opinion’, and imagery, narrative

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2 See Appendix 10.
and political theatre. In turn, it has related these themes to others including political will; social licence; the ways in which symbolic politics makes an issue visible, focused, tangible and emotionally compelling; ‘political energy’; the role of emotion, identities and identification; the value of a rich sense of narrative in political communication; symbolic ‘ascendancy’; images, narratives and moments that have ‘defining’ power; the use of symbolic politics to create nodes for thinking about the issues; the factors that make for iconic power; the use of symbolic power against the goals of the climate movement; and the public imagination. The thesis has highlighted the possibility that movements may be mobilised and yet lose the ‘battle’ for the public imagination. Thinking about climate politics in terms of which group’s imagery and narratives are the most powerful and which hold the most central place in the minds of voters provides important insights that complement analyses focused on the strength of ‘people power’, or on the cognitive content of the climate movement’s message.

The concepts listed above are useful for further research. They could be applied to cases such as the #schoolstrikes4climate, the ongoing politics of Adani, the future of coal in Australia, and the shifting place of climate change on the agenda of political parties. Such research could trace and analyse interactions between symbolic politics, other forms of politics, shifts in the political climate and political outcomes. In order to assess the relationship between symbolic politics, ‘people power’, leverage politics and other forms of politics, triangulating the observations of campaigners, audiences and policymakers would be valuable. Such research could undertake in-depth analyses based on the statements made above about changes in the public imagination becoming political changes when they change political conditions, enabling other forms of politics to become effective. The approach taken in Chapter 4, including the schematic account in Table 4.1, provides one indication of what a ‘symbolic politics analysis’ can look like. It could readily be applied to the role of images, narratives and political theatre in shaping political outcomes in the Abbott-Turnbull-Morrison-era and beyond. Chapter 4 focused on parliamentary politics: a larger picture would result from looking at the interaction between parties, leaders, industry and the climate movement, and how each use images, narrative and political theatre to influence ‘hearts and minds’, define what matters in public debate and galvanise political support.
The thesis has developed the term ‘the public imagination’ in relation to climate politics. It is a useful concept, offering a richness not available in terms like ‘discourse’, ‘culture’, ‘representation’ or ‘public opinion’. It connotes much more than ‘the way we think about an issue’, because it evokes the importance of narrative and imagery, as well as the affectively-charged and creative dimensions of how we engage with the world. The concept of ‘imagination’ points to the role of ‘the pictures’ as well as ‘the ideas’ in our heads. To speak of people’s imagination rather than simply their ‘attitudes’ makes room for a view of politics which attends to the interactions between imagery, the emotions that are associated with this imagery, identity, identification, and political action. The work of scholars like Bottici (2014), Taylor (2004) and Eaton (2011) overlaps with the approach taken here, with their focus on ‘imaginal’ politics and social ‘imaginaries’. There is a place for coining new terms like these; however, it is not clear that something new is needed when ‘the public imagination’ is so widely recognised and understood. A great deal can be done with the concept.

This discussion of the imagination began with Hall’s (2016 [1987]) analysis of Britain’s 1987 election. He describes a political situation where policy preferences for Labour were trumps by voters’ identification with an image of Thatcher and of the nation. This political situation can be repeated at any time when progressive forces neglect symbolic power, or where the symbolic power of the opponents of action on climate change exceeds that of its advocates. It is a familiar pattern in the Rudd-Gillard-Abbott era, and arguably it was repeated in Morrison’s 2019 defeat of Shorten (see Chapter 9 and Appendix 1). Given high levels of stated public concern about climate change (e.g. Merzian et al., 2019) the gap between stated policy preferences and voting behaviour that Hall analyses can be understood as one dimension of the ‘wicked’ problem of climate change (Biermann, 2011, p. 685).³ In this context, it is useful to recall some observations made by Lukes back in 1974 in another work which aimed to expand established understandings of power. He notes the political importance of the capacity to shape peoples’ ‘perceptions, cognitions and preferences’, and ‘people’s wants’. Lukes also observes how subjective factors such as ‘wishful thinking’ and ‘cognitive biases, fallacies and illusions’ can influence politics (Lukes, 2005 [1974]: pp. 28, 38, 116). As well as

³ As a policy problem, climate change has also been described as ‘super-wicked’ and ‘diabolical’ (Levin et al., 2007, p. 2; Garnaut 2008, p. xviii).
shaping perceptions, defining the issues and motivating responses, symbolic politics can counter opponents’ use of symbols to ‘foster and capitalise on anxiety, fear and doubt’ (Chubb, 2014: L1143) or to ‘propagat[e] fear and myths’ (Combet in Taylor, 2011). To achieve its goals, the climate movement needs to be able to address these challenges and obstacles. Further research into how the movement tackles these challenges, tracing the use of symbolic power over time, would be valuable. Historical analyses of the various configurations of symbolic and other forms of power used by social movements and their opponents could illuminate the challenges faced by the climate movement.

In making claims about shaping the public imagination and engaging people with symbols, this thesis focused on perspectives from within the climate movement. Audience research is the obvious ‘other side of the coin’. To gain a clearer picture of the impact of symbolic politics, audience research could assess who is being reached by the climate movement’s images and narratives, and how reactions vary across groups. Audience research could apply Achen and Bartels’ (2016) account of the importance of identities to climate politics, and investigate particular ways in which images and stories shape these identities. ‘Identity’, however, can be a static concept. It would also be valuable to research the experience of people who change their views on climate change, and how these changes relate to engagement and identification with imagery and narratives. Investigating shifts in attitudes over time moves the focus beyond research that measures individuals’ immediate reactions to propositions or images outside the context of unfolding political processes. Audience research could draw on insights into the linkages between images, identification and imagination described by Hall (1987), and the centrality of imagery in cognition described in Chapter 2 and by neuroscientist Drew Westen (2008, 2011), who states, ‘Of particular importance for understanding politics are networks of associations: bundles of thoughts, feelings, sounds, images, memories, and emotions that have become linked through experience’ (2011, n.p.). This research might examine how depth of concern about climate change varies with characteristics of narrative such as plot, characters, and genre—and with imagery, such as the factors that make for iconicity.

Thinking of climate politics in relation to ‘the political climate’, and the ‘climate of opinion’ was not a starting point for this thesis. It seems a rich and valuable way to
approach the issues. Further research could focus on tracing the cumulative impact of symbolic politics over time, and how its use creates political conditions that strengthen or obstruct climate policies. This research could relate symbolic power to ‘policy sustainability’, a concept developed by Patashnik (2003). Given the way that carbon-pricing was abolished under Abbott, it is clear that something more than legislative change is needed: it matters to create a supportive environment which allows for policies to be sustained. Such research could draw on perspectives offered by Pierson (2005), who calls for reflection on the factors that make policy change possible. Pierson criticises the ‘snapshot orientation’ of much social science, where explanations of policy outcomes focus on causal processes which are evident immediately prior to political changes. He argues, ‘we should not see policy enactment as [the beginning—or the end] of the story…. many things in the social world take a long time to happen… In many contexts… a long, slow erosion of the status quo may be a crucial factor in generating policy change’ (p. 40). Pierson’s own focus is on how structural causes can be missed in analyses that emphasise immediate sources of change. Yet his comments about long, slow processes can equally be applied to symbolic power and its role in building conditions where change can be imagined, and where what is imagined becomes politically urgent and compelling.4

Reflections and conclusion

Picturing, narrating, and dramatising climate change are all symbolic tasks which take place in the public imagination, or in the ‘cultural-symbolic domain’ of politics. The thesis has argued that defining moments, iconic images and the theatre of politics play a key role in developing a persuasive and compelling case for action on climate change. Symbolic politics matters not just because of what it adds to politics, but because political judgements rely on it and are mediated by it. Saying that symbolic politics is ‘everywhere’ involves much more than recognising that it is widespread. We ‘picture’ political situations, and our understanding of them is informed by the way political narratives turn events into stories with characters and

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4 In comments that apply directly to Australia’s experience with a carbon tax, Pierson also draws attention to the need to reinforce policy change following the enactment of new policies. His comments about slow erosion of the status quo correspond to the observations made by Else (Climate One, 2012) and Bartmański (2012) about the processes of ‘slow building’ and ‘gradual accretion’ of images and narratives over time, which are discussed in the chapter on iconic power.
a plot, and into a series of scenes in which we are in various ways both the ‘audience’ and the ‘actors’. These narratives make current events intelligible by locating them in a plot that unites the present, past and future. Every political situation is shaped by the way in which political actors ‘imagine’ it: we imagine ‘the problem’, its history, possible solutions, the pathways from problem to solution, what is politically achievable, the goals and motivations of political actors, and our own location within the whole picture.\footnote{Symbols, to borrow a phrase from anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss (1985 [1965]), are ‘good to think [with] (bonnes à penser)’ (p. 132). Levi-Strauss applied his phrase to animal totems, and the kind of thinking that he was concerned with involved systems of binary opposition that were located in myths and replicated in kinship relationships between clans. It is possible to think about symbols in broader ways, however his insight applies.}

Symbols are politically important whenever it matters to ‘win hearts and minds’, and to establish and define issues in the public imagination. Changing the way that climate change is defined, narrated or ‘pictured’ in the public imagination drives political change when it changes political conditions in ways that help make new things politically possible (see Chapter 6 on Berezin, 2012) and allow other forms of politics to become effective. Re-imagining fossil fuels and climate change itself is a precondition for many of the political changes sought by the climate movement: enough people with enough power of other kinds need to ‘see’ the issues in a new way. Tony Abbott changed political conditions in a way that made abolition of Australia’s price on carbon possible. Conversely, Lock The Gate’s campaigning led to bans and moratoriums on coal seam gas. Arguably, the Pacific Warriors contributed to the conditions where a campaign to close down the coal industry could be imagined. Policy change may or may not result: this depends on alignments with other political forces involving, for example, community organising, leverage politics and parliamentary politics. Yet, without symbolic power, the conditions for achieving change may not eventuate at all.

While ‘the symbolic’ is often seen as standing in tension with ‘the real’, overlooking symbolic power means missing its real impact. In Democracy For Realists, a book published the year Trump became US President, Achen and Bartels (2016) critique assumptions that voters are driven by rational responses to the facts, and that governments enact their policy preferences. Assessing empirical data from the last century of US political history, Achen and Bartels argue: ‘Most people are not making rational decisions based on the real-world impact [these decisions] will have
on their life’ (interview with Illing, 2017). In their view, what really happens is that political ‘loyalties, not the facts of political life and government policy are the primary drivers of political behaviour’ (2016: p. 2). They maintain that views of the political world are driven by group identities: voters ‘typically make choices not on the basis of policy preferences or ideology, but on the basis of who they are… Group ties and social identities of the most important bases of political commitments and behaviour’ (pp. 319, 4). This is an important corrective to a view of politics which Alexander (2010) critiques: ‘Reducing democracy to demography, students of politics have focused upon interests, making broad correlations between political opinion and stratification position. Class, race, gender, religion, region, age, ethnicity—such prior commitments are said to determine the vote’ (L251). Alexander instead offers a model that ‘concentrates on shared emotions and symbolic commitments and on what and how people speak, think, and feel about politics’ (L5951). In line with this approach, Achen and Bartels’ argument can be taken a step further. As well as focusing on group identities, a realist approach to politics also needs to attend to the symbolic factors that give content to these identities, and around which they are organised (see Hall, 2016 [1987]; Somers, 1994).

Claims about ‘real’ power that disregard symbolic power miss key dynamics that shape climate politics. Of course, the role of ‘organised money’ is a significant factor in ‘real’ power. Yet even from within the circles where this ‘raw power’ is exercised with the greatest effect, we hear statements such as ‘The first thing that we need to do, as a business community, is to tell a better story about our contribution to society’ (BHP Billiton, 2017), and ‘social licence is as critical if not more enduring than a regulatory licence’ (Minerals Council of Australia, 2012: 12). Symbolic power is a significant dimension of the fossil fuel industry’s power: business invests heavily in advertising which tells its story and conveys its images. Politicians also rely on symbolic politics—all the time—with their attention to image, their propagation of narratives, and their use of theatre (Oakes, 2017; Alexander, 2010; O’Shaughnessy, 2003). Similarly, the climate movement consistently relies on symbolic power to ‘win hearts and minds’, build ‘people power’ and to create conditions where leverage can be exercised. The movement tells stories, projects iconic images, and dramatises the issues, in cases ranging from the Pacific Warriors’ blockade to the unfolding scenes in the national drama of Stop Adani and the place of coal in Australian climate politics.
This thesis closes by returning to the case of the Pacific Warriors’ blockade in Newcastle. While it was being planned, DE commented, ‘with the scale of the challenge we face… [we need] actions that will actually start to shift the way the future is heading. You need to try and create those moments where mass public consciousness and the psychology starts to—even just incrementally—shift a little bit’. Chapter 6 posed the question of what the Pacific Warriors really achieved, quoting Cox (2010), who highlights the importance of ‘mobilisation that enables a particular end’ (p. 125). Clearly, the Pacific Warriors’ blockade did not lead to policy change on the part of the Australian Government (although in PL’s view, it was influential in shaping the stance of Pacific political leaders). However, there is a need for a larger sense of what kinds of ‘particular ends’ count as important, and of what it takes to create the political conditions or ‘political climate’ for achieving them. Building and energising movements for change and infusing the debate with new political and imaginative energy are important contributions to shifting the political climate (and, for a start, the development of a movement that goes on to achieve political changes is itself a political change). It would be easier to make the case for the importance of symbolic power if there was an equivalent of a ‘Selma event’ in the Australian climate movement. By contrast with ‘Selma’, for most Australians, the Newcastle blockade lasted for a single day on the national political stage, and it did not generate a sense of national political crisis. Yet as Chapter 6 notes, Selma was the culmination of a series of earlier events involving a fusion of symbolic power and ‘people power’. Without them, Selma would not have struck a chord, and may never have occurred.

The kind of policy change that Cox (2010) points to will not happen without significant changes in the way that Australians ‘imagine’ coal. As long as the coal industry is economically viable and Australians identify with it, as long as it retains its social licence, as long as politicians in major political parties see supporting it as politically necessary or advantageous, and until it is perceived as scandalous and a risk to Australians’ wellbeing, the political conditions do not exist to achieve the changes that the climate movement seeks. To ‘shift the politics’ in these circumstances, the political use of images, narrative and political theatre are important as part of what Cox (2012) calls ‘resources for persuasion’ (L1608). It is also valuable to recognise the cultural-symbolic ‘domain’ of politics as a key arena in
which the politics of fossil fuels is played out.

The Pacific Warriors were alert to the importance of symbolic power, and the Newcastle blockade displayed many of its elements in action. The blockade condensed the issues of coal, Australia’s role, and impacts on the Pacific into vivid images and political theatre. While it lacked the media profile of Abbott’s *Great Big New Tax on Everything*, it gained prominent media coverage, nationally, regionally and globally. It featured a theatrical ‘David and Goliath’ battle, with canoes being used as a symbolic ‘vessel’ for the Warriors’ message (Lutunatabua, 2014b). Symbolically-rich political action like this can give political messages a dynamism of the kind that is needed to effect shifts in ways people imagine fossil fuels. This event, with its vividness and its iconic features, its moral message and its theatrical qualities, its grounding in communities and its deep cultural roots, as well as its cascading impact, shares many of the characteristics of classical examples of symbolic politics exemplified by the work of the US civil rights movement, Gandhi, and the anti-apartheid movement.6 Perhaps the #SchoolStrike4Climate is also building something of this kind of power.

Bill McKibben shares something of DE’s views on the political importance of shifts in perceptions. In April 2016, eighteen months after the Pacific Warriors held their blockade in Newcastle—and as final plans were being made for the follow-up ‘Breakfree’ event at the same location—he addressed a conference at the University of the South Pacific:

> Since the Pacific faces [a more urgent] danger than any part of the world, you have more right, more credibility to stand up and push this movement on the fast track… We have to make the world understand about the crisis, which is the most difficult job. We have got to figure out the way to make them understand (Dhabuwala, 2016).

In terms of the discussion above, McKibben is talking about the need for a shift in the ‘political climate’ and the ‘climate of opinion’. ‘Making people understand’ is integral to another task that McKibben’s speech highlights: ‘building the movement’.

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6 Chapter 6 also outlines some of what the Newcastle blockade lacked in relation to these more ‘epochal’ examples: see for example the discussion of Table 6.3.
This process might rely on information politics; however, ‘understanding’ needs to be of the kind that generates concern, engages people’s identities and identifications, reconfigures their sense of what is at stake, and motivates a response. As Moser and Dilling argue, ‘the public is aware of the term “global warming, but not energized by it to act’ (2007: p. 15). PR spoke of the impact of a powerful image: ‘it pulls you, it grabs you by the gut’. EF reflected, ‘I guess the logic we are working on is that people’s minds aren’t changed by facts, they are changed by emotions and stories’. Challenging and enabling people within and outside the climate movement to understand in a way that is compelling and moves them to act is a key function of symbolic politics. It belongs in climate movement ‘theories of change’. A great deal hinges on the way that climate change is pictured, narrated and dramatised.
Appendices

The appendices below address the following topics:

1. ‘The Bill Australians can’t afford’, ‘Carbon Tax Death Tax’, and Morrison’s victory in the unwinnable election of 2019: some notes on the difference made by imagery, character and ‘political theatre’.

2. What interviewees and others say about symbolic power: a sample of quotes from interviewees and from this research

3. Symbolic politics and the challenge of the rise of the far-right: some notes

4. ‘Arguments must become moral if they are to succeed’: the fusion of moral, symbolic and political power.

5. Climate change, peacebuilding, conflict resolution and creativity: insights from peace and conflict studies

6. The electoral impact of the anti-Coal Seam Gas message in Narrabri: Notes to accompany the chapter on iconic power

7. Imagery, imagination and the way we ‘see’ the world

8. Notes on evaluating symbolic action

9. Factors that make for iconicity: a more detailed list

10. Symbolic politics, the ‘Thrasymachus tradition’ and political realism— together with some notes on engaging with historical and cultural sources
Appendix 1

‘The Bill Australians can’t afford’, ‘Carbon Tax Death Tax’, and Morrison’s victory in the unwinnable election of 2019:

some notes on the difference made by imagery, character and ‘political theatre’.

As this thesis was being completed, the climate movement was rocked by the outcome of Australia’s 2019 Federal election. Environmental groups had urged voters to make it the ‘climateelection’ (Australian Conservation Foundation, 2019). Students had gone out on strike in large numbers as part of a national #Schoolstrike4climate event ahead of the election (SchoolStrike4Climate, 2019). Progressive group Getup campaigned for action on climate change and against key Coalition conservatives, mobilising ‘9,433 volunteers’, knocking on ‘36,315 doors’, making ‘712,039 phone calls’, and handing out ‘798,900 how to vote cards’. Further, it created digital ads that were seen ‘15,238,418 times’ (GetUp, 2019). Multiple polls had predicted a Labor win (see Bowe, 2019; Beaumont, 2019; Fidler, 2019). Yet the Liberal-National coalition led by Scott Morrison prevailed.

Labor had made some strong statements about climate change (e.g. Shorten, 2019), including a reference to a climate ‘emergency’ in Shorten’s closing speech of the campaign (Chan, 2019). Labor ran advertisements on climate change on TV, calling out the failure of conservative politicians to address the crisis while warning of the ‘chaos of a Morrison-Palmer-One Nation government’ (Australian Labor Party, 2019). Labor was offering a range of progressive climate policies. It held out at least the possibility of overturning approvals for the Adani coal mine once in government, however its approach to Adani had been cautious and ambivalent, raising questions about whether it had the courage of its convictions, and just what those convictions actually were (see a Guardian Essential poll conducted over a year ahead of the election: Murphy, 2018). By contrast, Liberal and National MPs were clear and unambiguous in their support for the mine.

‘You can say… all you like but if people are convinced [“death taxes” are] your policy, then you’ve got a problem’  

Labor Treasury spokesman Chris Bowen

Scott Morrison, famous for holding up a lump of coal in Parliament (Hansard, 2017), led his assault on Labor with a scare campaign about the prospect of Labor’s taxes, presenting Opposition leader Bill Shorten as ‘the Bill Australia can’t afford’ (Liberal Party of Australia, 2019a). It was a clear, consistent message, relentlessly argued. Liberal supporters circulated a video on the theme, ‘Carbon Tax Death Tax’ (Liberal Party of Australia, 2019b; Senator Jane Hume, 2019; see also Frydenberg, 2019). It featured Bill Shorten denying the (untrue) rumours that Labor planned a ‘death tax’, and portrayed this denial alongside Julia Gillard’s promise not to introduce a carbon tax. These ‘death tax’ rumours were circulated widely on social media (Koslowski, 2019; Workman, 2019; AAP FactCheck, 2019) and gained significant traction amongst members of the public (ABC Insiders. 2019). Labor Treasury spokesman Chris Bowen commented after the election, ‘A death tax is not our policy. I got more feedback about death taxes than anything else. It was the single biggest problem for us and it’s pretty hard to deal with when it is not your policy. You can say that all you
like but if people are convinced it is your policy, then you’ve got a problem’ (Murphy, 2019b).

Arguably, in 2019, Labor led with an ambitious idea-driven policy agenda whose merits were overwhelmed by the symbolic force of Morrison’s campaign. Labor made itself a large target in policy terms, whereas Morrison had little to say about his policy agenda, instead leading with a message that relied on fear and symbolically painted Shorten as untrustworthy (Crosby, 2019; Karvelas, 2019). Here, Morrison was reinforcing existing problems with Shorten’s political image (Strangio, 2019). What some hoped would be the ClimateElection appeared to become, to some degree, the ‘We’re-not-going-to-risk-Labor-because-they-might-tax-us-to-death-and-also-we-don’t-trust-Bill-Shorten’ election. It was certainly about economic self-interest, but beyond this, it was about perceptions of self-interest, ways in which Labor’s policies figured in the ‘public imagination’, questions of who could be trusted, and perceptions of the character of political leaders. Was Morrison the kind of leader who voters would trust to manage the economy? Was Shorten the kind of leader who (in the minds of at least a significant number of voters) just might impose a ‘death tax’?— or at least other taxes, while (as the narrative went) mismanaging the economy at the same time. One factor in the election was the question of which potential leader voters felt more comfortable about—or more uneasy about.

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The credibility of the ‘characters’ in the ‘drama’ of climate change is fundamental to the way audiences perceive the issues.

Did voters trust Bill Shorten? If the election is understood in terms of a drama, featuring the key ‘characters’ of Shorten and Morrison, then ‘audience’ perceptions of these characters counts for a lot. Smith and Howe (2015) offer a valuable perspective along these lines. They argue that the credibility of the ‘characters’ in the ‘drama’ of climate change is fundamental to the way audiences perceive the issues. Drawing on ancient distinctions made by Aristotle, they describe the interaction of ethos (the moral character of the speaker), logos (speech or logical argument), and pathos (audience sympathy for a character). They argue that it is ‘the combination of these dimensions... explains why audiences would spontaneously stand and applaud after screenings of Al Gore’s Inconvenient Truth... And it is the inability to fuse these dimensions that explains why so many other attempts to communicate climate change have fallen flat... Character can be the decisive factor in cultural performance. In this social drama, logos and pathos arguably exist in abundance. Ethos, however, is in short supply’ (L1024).

In important ways, the social drama of climate change that people actually get to see is a story about trust.

In this sense, it is a story not just about science or nature but about how we know whom to believe...

Philip Smith & Nicolas Howe

In other words, there is no shortage of argumentation and audience reaction and engagement, however there is a need for more trusted figures in the debate. Importantly, Smith and Howe argue that when arguments and audience sympathies are contested, ‘ethos comes to the fore:

When the limits of scientific knowledge are in question, “credibility contests” develop’... In important ways, the social drama of climate change that people

‘Erratic’. (Morrison was thought to be more ‘Narrow-minded’ and ‘Out of touch with ordinary people’). The largest gap between the two was on 'More honest than most politicians'; 'A capable leader'; 'Visionary'; 'Intelligent'; 'Trustworthy'; 'Good in a crisis'; 'Hard-working'; 'Understands the problems facing Australia'; 'Intolerant'; 'Superficial'; 'Aggressive'; 'Arrogant' and
actually get to see is a story about trust. In this sense, it is a story not just about science or nature but about how we know whom to believe—artists? politicians? children? (L1066, L1121)

The implication is that when political debates are charged, it is extremely hazardous to entrust the task of leading the case for progressive climate policy (or national leadership) to an Opposition leader who was not widely trusted.

Smith and Howe cite the example of ‘Climategate’. At an early stage, climate sceptics were winning the public debate—or were at least making significant inroads that were damaging public trust in climate science. Climate scientists were being cast as villains who distorted their findings to fit their preconceptions or personal agendas, and it was only when a new story was told that the debate changed. Smith and Howe write,

Reading through the spate of post-Climategate commentary from both the Right and Left, it is remarkable how rarely the actual details of the controversy are debated. Much like the science itself, the scientists’ emails seem to have interested a small minority of inside players. What mattered to everyone else was character. What kind of people are these scientists, their defenders and their critics? What makes them tick? This… is the central question wherever climate change becomes a social drama.

[In the face of an ‘environmental melodrama’ where climate scientists were cast as ‘skulking villains’], scientists and their defenders fought back with a… nonstory consisting of disconnected, itsy-bitsy justifications for each individual infraction. This checking-off-of-boxes response did nothing to restore trust. Only when they cast the scientists as the embattled protagonists of a romantic struggle against paranoid inquisitors were they able to stem the bleeding. (L3231, L3275)

There were plenty of ways in which Scott Morrison’s own character could have been placed in question during the election campaign, not least because of his consistent opposition to the Royal Commission into the banks, and his opposition to gay marriage. Yet these never became central to the symbolic politics of the election campaign in the way ‘the Bill Australia can’t afford’ did. There was no corresponding sustained and effective assault on the character of Scott Morrison from the Labor party.

Note: there were, however, other character and symbolic contests in the campaign. Helen Haines won as an Independent in Indi, and former Olympian Zali Stegall, vanquished Tony Abbott in his own seat. Kerryn Phelps, another Independent, came close to retaining Malcolm Turnbull’s former seat of Wentworth. Former Liberal Julia Banks did not unseat Greg Hunt, however she significantly reduced his margin. In a sign of hope for the climate movement, all strongly advocated action on climate change. These results relied on many factors, and solid community-based campaigns were clearly essential to the results. It is also worth looking also at the symbolic and ‘theatrical’ contests in each case—including contests over character—as a dimension of what these candidates achieved.

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2 A similar analysis of the importance of character and trust could be applied to Rudd and Gillard in government: Rudd gained a great deal of trust at an early stage, but lost it with his failure to deliver a climate policy that matched his earlier rhetoric. Regardless of how trustworthy Julia Gillard really was in relation to Tony Abbott, Abbott successfully painted her as a leader who could not be trusted because of her ‘broken promise’ about the carbon tax (see Chapter 4).
Appendix 2

What interviewees and others say about symbolic power: a sample of quotes from interviewees and from this research

This Appendix presents a sample of the statements about climate politics and symbolic politics made by interviewees, as well as by some others who are quoted in this thesis.

The power of images and narratives

‘The picture is much more important to the message than the words—people are sold on the picture… Images go straight in through the eyes to the bottom of the brain where all the emotions are and all the decisions are made’ (AL).
‘I think images and stories are really powerful communication tools’ (LH).
‘The Great Barrier Reef is a natural icon … I think images of the Great Barrier Reef incredibly powerful in engaging people to campaign against the [Abbot Point] coal port’ (LH).
Activist toolkits point to the importance of symbolic politics, with statements such as “It’s vital that the movement to #StopAdani is visible… pics or it didn’t happen’ (Stop Adani 2017k).
‘People love stories… people love to imagine, people love beauty—beauty is such an important motivator for people… [Powerful art] pulls you, it grabs you by the gut…’ (PR).
‘I guess the logic we are working on is that peoples’ minds aren’t changed by facts, they are changed by emotions and stories’ (EF).
‘A lot of [the] conversation is about what the visual is’ (SW).

Stephen Heintz, president of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund: ‘[divestment] is largely symbolic, but symbols have power. They motivate people. They inspire people. They can change behavior’ (Gunther, 2015).3

Narrative, and ‘changing the story’

‘We need to change the story of coal’ (Hepburn, et al., 2011: p. 9).
It comes down to narrative—the stories about ordinary people who have got together and made a difference and how they did it’ (AR).
‘The ALP doesn’t have a narrative to support [action on] climate change—they are very poor communicators’ (LT).
‘Campaigns are a story basically and you’re kind of telling your supporters about it’ (SR).

Commenting on Abbott’s victory, EF stated, ‘I don’t know what went wrong really. But I think a big part of the answer to that is the narrative stuff and the communications stuff.’
‘It’s the classic fairytale, you know? You’ll have your heroes and your villains and your victims. You’ll have that Han Solo character who’s on the fence… There are moral questions that they need to answer: will they be selfish and do what’s in their own self-interest or will they be altruistic and

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3 Heintz was speaking for a fund built from the profits of the Rockefellers’ Standard Oil. In 2014, in a decision weighted with symbolic significance, it decided to divest from fossil fuels.
generous and do what's in the community interest. There's kind of like a drama triangle of the villain and the victim and the hero...’ (GJ).

The importance of symbolic politics

[Campaigning based on withdrawing the social license of fossil fuels was] the keystone: without having that keystone there, there was nothing to hold up the archway’ (GJ). 4

LH on the Climate Elephant: ‘We basically knew that climate change was not being talked about and is such a huge issue that we need to elevate it on the agenda. And what better way to do it than with a cheeky fun symbol... It was a major effort and had a major impact in national media’.

LH on symbolic power being used to get banks to rule out funding Adani: ‘The role of national public opinion is huge. One of the reason international banks have been ruling [Adani] out is that they don't want to be part of something that is so internationally significant around the Great Barrier Reef... We're making the connection that if these ports go ahead not only is it Adani that's done it... it's these banks that are funding it and their brand will be tied to the potential destruction of the Reef and the massive climate impact that these projects will have in the community which is a brand risk’.

GJ describes the impact of social license in the ‘Shut it Down’ campaign that targeted the Anglesea power station, the first coal plant to close in Australia in the context of the climate debate: ‘In Anglesea, social license was withdrawn... The withdrawal of social license... occurred through on-the-ground activities, rallies, door-knocking, petitioning and also a sophisticated social media campaign where Surf Coast Air Action asked all of the likely buyers whether they would rule out buying this polluting power plant... [The local community] demonstrated the withdrawal of social license. That, in effect, made it a stranded asset’. When GJ was asked whether he was saying that social license made a material difference, independent of economic factors, he replied, ‘It was the keystone. Without having that keystone there, there was nothing to hold up the archway’. 5

Lachlan Harris, Rudd's Senior Press Secretary (2006-10) on Rudd's abandonment of the CPRS: ‘He has to take responsibility as the Prime Minister, for that misjudgment, but so do all of the rest of us. As a party we have to look back on that decision and understand what was it about the way we made the decision that we thought we could get away with dumping such a totemic and important policy for Rudd. It was a huge, huge mistake’ (Ferguson, 2015).

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4 This was in response to GJ being asked whether social licence made a material difference, independent of economic factors.
5 Clearly, a range of factors led to the closure of Anglesea power station (Seccombe, 2015; Cannon, 2015; McCaskill, 2014), and this is reflected in the interview. The picture that emerges is of multiple forms of political action exerting pressure on the power station, including those that effected a shift in how it was perceived publicly. In GJ’s view, demonstrating the power station’s lack of social license was a central factor.
The use of symbolic politics by conservative groups, the mining industry and the climate movement’s opponents


‘Tony Abbott took over the narrative’ (EF).

Barnaby Joyce: There would be ‘a new tax on ironing, a new tax on watching television, a new tax on vacuuming. If you go to the supermarket Kevin will be in the shopping trolley... Everywhere there is a power point in your house, there is access to a new tax for the Labor government.’ (Kelly, 2009).

On the night he seized the Liberal leadership, Tony Abbott declared, ‘I am going to turn the next election into a contest... The Australian people... do not want to be frog marched into a premature tax on everything and that's what this emissions trading scheme is... I'm confident that we can and will make Labor’s great big new tax the [election] issue’ (Curtis, 2009b).

Every time I turn on the lights I'll pay tax. Every time I go to the petrol pump I'll pay tax. Every time I open my wallet I will pay tax... What we will do instead is a better plan. It is to, it is more trees, it is better soil, it is better technology—paid for from the budget that will reduce carbon dioxide emissions -Tony Abbott (Lane, 2011a).

‘As things stand, there will almost certainly be a climate change election. It won’t just be about climate change, but that will be the totemic issue’ (Abbott, 2009).

Labor Treasury spokesman Chris Bowen commenting after the 2019 Federal Election, ‘A death tax is not our policy. I got more feedback about death taxes than anything else. It was the single biggest problem for us and it’s pretty hard to deal with when it is not your policy. You can say that all you like but if people are convinced it is your policy, then you’ve got a problem’ (Murphy, 2019b).

Bernie Fraser, chairman of the Climate Change Authority from 2012-2015, described the ‘uncivilised’ nature of the climate debate, lamenting ‘the wild assertions blaming every lost job on the carbon tax ... assertions not based on any objective consideration of the evidence’ (Taylor 2014).

Mitch Hooke, CEO of the Minerals Council of Australia throughout the Rudd-Gillard era, and former chair of the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network (the peak organisation for Australia’s top fossil-energy producers and consumers): ‘social licence is as critical if not more enduring than a regulatory licence’ (MCA, 2012: p. 12).

In a letter to members designed to raise funds for its campaign against the carbon tax, Mitch Hooke wrote, ‘The new paradigm [for public policy development] is one of public contest through the popular media more so than rational, considered, effective consultation and debate’ (Taylor, 2011; Minerals Council of Australia, 2011: p. 9)."
‘Our license to operate stems from being trusted by the communities [where we work]… The first thing that we need to do… is to tell a better story about our contribution to society’ (BHP Billiton, 2017) - BHP Billiton Executive, Vandita Pant.

The need for creativity

‘What we are doing—in my opinion—should be much more artistic—not just artistic in a beautiful sense, but artistic in a way that grips people into a story of that’s about their values and society’s values’ (CF)...

‘we’ve got creativity on our side... creative actions that communicate our message are important to get both media [and] also to catch the attention of decision makers... we try creative things all the time... some of them stick and some of them don’t’ (AG).

‘People love stories... people love to imagine, people love beauty—beauty is such an important motivator for people’ (PR).

‘I think it has to be a combination of clear messaging—written and spoken—with a symbolic act where you can clearly communicate this is why we’re doing that... it requires a bit of creativity’ (SR).

‘It is pretty depressing but our work is to create the possibility that we might have some hope in this and to be really creative in that’ (DE).

Missing the significance of symbolic politics

‘We’re not going to get drawn into a game of semantics here’... (Julia Gillard, quoted in Ferguson and Drum, 2016).

‘I don’t think the movement is seriously grappling with how change happens... There is very rarely any discussion of the symbolic-cultural power of what we are trying to do through community organising... [Many people in] the environmental movement still have an extraordinarily instrumentalist view of politics and political change... If it is not [based on an assumption about an] information deficit, it is still based on idea of leverage—that we somehow need to build a movement that is stronger than the fossil fuel companies... We need to change the meanings through which we understand our politics... The divestment campaign has allowed those arguments to come through much stronger... [generating] a narrative-based, a meaning-based change’ (PL).

PL characterises the earlier approaches which emphasised Information Politics and Parliamentary lobbying in these terms: it was built on the assumption that ‘We need to be in the room lobbying the right politicians... Trying to get them to change their minds and convince them through providing information that they might otherwise not have... that they are doing the wrong thing and need to change’.

shares wealth and how it positively touches peoples lives and communities’. Their campaign relies ‘on authenticity, credibility and a compelling narrative’
'Making the climate movement move'

‘A movement... needs **moments of energy**’ (SW).

‘Movements need to build culture [and] to **tell stories**—not just for the outside, but for themselves—to **keep themselves going** (CF).

SW spoke of the capacity of the Pacific Warriors’ story to inspire people, ‘wake them up’ and motivate them: ‘It’s kind of become a story I’ve heard a lot of people in Australia telling as part of their narrative of why they care about taking action on climate change, what they see as their motivation... **The energy they brought to the work** that we were doing, and seeing them **inspire hardened and wearied activists and just bring such energy and life** was incredible to watch’.

Symbolic politics and the media

‘The visual for your event is as important as your spokespeople... **Your action photo is KEY**, it’s your best tool for leveraging your event in the media and the community after the fact’ (The Trainers Handbook: Student Divestment Workshop: Russell et al., 2013).

We understand that creative actions that communicate our message are important to get both media but also to catch the attention of decision makers. So **not only are we showing up to have a meeting with a local bank branch manager but we might turn up in a Nemo costume** (AG).

We wanted to **get out there into mainstream media** and talk about the issue of climate change **using these sorts of iconic images** (TS on the Pacific Warriors blockade).

PR on the Climate Guardians: ‘The press internationally had these **images of the angels** surrounded by 40 police and... helicopters overhead. [It was] a **very powerful way to communicate**, because it backed up what a politician had just said. The images married with that story. That’s where we’ve been most successful—when we’ve been able to create some spectacle that’s been married with what a political is saying at the time.

EF on the climate elephant: ‘We had this thing called the climate elephant. It was this really positive cute funny thing:

**Our objective was to get climate back on the agenda** in a political space where it possibly wouldn’t have... You can’t point to a campaign and say that we won, but I think it did make a dint. We got heaps of press in a really tight space, we got loads of airtime on Sky News for example...

I remember this one clip where someone was dressed in an elephant costume and... these two journos standing up out the front of the Press Club and the elephant standing right behind them, and he had his trunk and he was tapping one of them on the shoulder...

If anyone else had have done it they would have told you to piss off ‘cause you’re an activist but it was this cute young person and [it]... was totally on message in an elephant suit and he was just like I’m just worried about our future and said **all these great positive simple messages and he cut through**. The positivity and simplicity of it I found really impactful and I
Dramatising the issue: ‘showing, not telling’

‘With the scale of the challenge we face, and the Islands face, it means you can’t just... faff about taking photos in the Islands and asking for people to do stuff elsewhere. You need to do actions that will actually start to shift the way the future is heading and try and create those moments where mass public consciousness and the psychology of the issue starts to (even just incrementally) shift a little bit’ (DE).

Citing Daniel Hunter’s book ‘Strategy and Soul’, GJ argues that ‘direct action is about directly demonstrating the values that you are for and calling into question the values of your adversaries’

‘The Walk for Solar... led to a state government Inquiry being set up... showing that [a solar thermal power plant] was something that the community was asking for’ (LH).

Political theatre is exemplified by SW’s description of a protest at the Abbot Point coal terminal in Queensland. He refers to ‘putting on display the kind of opposition that is out there to this project’ and ‘demonstrating strong community dissent and the lengths to which people were willing to go to oppose it’ (emphasis added). He asks, ‘How are we showing what we want through our actions? From there flows... storytelling and people creating their own mini-narratives’.

‘I think always in campaigning, there’s a lot of theatre in campaigning: It’s very much about.... often you have to tell your story through symbols.... I think it has to be a combination of clear messaging—written and spoken—with a symbolic act where you can clearly communicate this is why we’re doing that this is why that makes sense/ this is how that fits with our messaging— so it’s certainly both but if we aim to be symbolic and have our actions speak beyond just what we are saying they are, then that’s ideal. It requires a bit of creativity’ (SR).
Statements of the problem and the climate movement’s task

AG: ‘Fear is really powerful; politicians use fear a lot’.

AL: ‘We are up against an extraordinarily well-financed, extremely clever disinformation campaign…’

We are up against a very very hard fight. Having a clear sighted view of who the enemy is and what they are doing, not blaming ourselves all the time that our messaging is not right… Since Bill McKibben came and focused people’s attention on the fossil fuel industry as an enemy so we were not in this nebulous fight with nature—in the early days, people tried to talk about it as a problem with nature and did not clearly enough identify the enemy.

LT describes some of the major obstacles facing the climate movement as including ‘the stance of the major political parties: the climate deniers in the Coalition are very strong, the influence of the mining industry on that party is really powerful…The Labor party doesn’t have a narrative to support climate change. They are very poor communicators and haven’t shown any commitment… [In the period under Rudd and Gillard], Labor at no stage successfully defended climate [policy]. Unfortunately, public opinion… will be shaped to some extent by the major parties… The other major obstacle…is the Murdoch press: when we have a situation where the country is so dominated by that outlet — some cities have only the Murdoch press… The Greenhouse mafia… the extent to which… industry has infiltrated the regulatory bodies in this country, the way lobbyists move backwards and forwards between government and industry and think tanks… Industry is in the ear of all the decision-makers’.

SG comments on ‘deep political divisions in the US… I think those divisions have become stronger in Australia just recently and I think that’s largely due to groups with vested financial interests funding campaigns critical of the climate change science’. He reflects on the ‘scares about paying for greenhouse gas emissions… Part of the problem… is very short term thinking. [The challenge is to get people in industry] to think on a broader timescale and accept some social responsibility in a fairly short timescale.

RG argues that ‘as a society we’re mostly at [the] stage [where] we are addicted to fossil fuels but we don’t admit it’. It is as though ‘everyone else knows that uncle Joe’s an alcoholic but he won’t admit it, so he’s never going to go to AA of find out what to do about being an alcoholic because he won’t acknowledge that he’s an alcoholic… What keeps us stuck in that… stage… I suppose the sheer attractiveness of it.

I presume no-one stays addicted to alcohol and drugs because it’s horrible but because they get something out of it.

It’s very attractive—it’s great being able to get on a plane and visit… It’s incredibly attractive if you don’t think about what it’s doing to the planet… I think what is standing in the way is lifestyle [and] our underlying psychology, our fear of moving out of our comfort zone, and how to address that’.

The debate about carbon pricing was ‘toxic’ (LH, AL). Tony Abbott ‘ran a very good scare campaign’ (AL). The imagery generated as part of this scare campaign was effective: EF reflected:

They’re just better at it—it’s that classic framing thing. You tell them a Sunday roast will cost $100 [because of the carbon price]—people remember that and it gets into their frame
whereas our stuff doesn’t.

I don’t know— the big one for me—another question that I can’t answer is how you stop it from happening again. We’ve got a conservative government, they screwed us... or they weren’t scared of us, we weren’t doing our job as communicators effectively and Tony Abbott took over the narrative.

He’s so damn good at it—those messages stick.

EF: ‘politically speaking neither major party thinks [climate change] is an issue that will decide the outcome of the election—so we’ve got to change that’.

DE described the ‘coal and gas industry in Australia and the corrupting influence they have over politics’:

and also the very effective PR campaigns that they run so they mislead the public about their importance and their influence—all these things are what we are up against as well as just the politicians who are ideologically opposed renewables, ideologically wedded to fossil fuels.

TR: ‘I think you have to work on a wider base than the one we did. We focused on the Green policy largely and we didn’t work strongly enough on Liberal and Labor views’.

GL: ‘We need to work together far more in terms of building power in the electorates that matter most. We need to develop effective messages so that climate change is not seen as far away or abstract but actually affecting Australians, happening right now’.

RH: ‘values are so important—we are pushing our society off the edge of a cliff, and we need to fundamentally change what we consider to be valuable’.

SW: ‘We need to be demonstrating strong community dissent and the lengths to which people were willing to go to oppose [coal projects]’.

MH: ‘I think what is important is providing a consistent message over a long period of time so that that message gets through... A risk management approach to the future... is probably the message that needs to be used rather than “you’re causing this problem, so you need to change”—that’s not working’.

AR: ‘We really want to focus on how ordinary individuals can change the world because I don’t think people will be compelled to act as long as they see the big problem with high level solutions:

we need to bring it back to this is your problem, this is something you can do, this is your role in it—how you can make a difference—almost doing the math and showing how their actions down here will amount to this big change up here.

The truth is we need to radically transform our society and it’s not going to happen organically. Governments and industry have to decide that they are going to do this and do it quickly—and they’re just not going to do it unless there’s the pressure to do that and pressure can come from a number of places but it’s got to come from the people.

CE: ‘Yeah, I think there are a series of levels of solution-making. One is... the science-based solutions...
what would you have to do in the environment [to] actually restore a safe climate?

The next level is are there technical solutions that would deliver that scientific outcome: and that's kind of where [groups like Byond Zero Emissions] work. And then there's a third one—we know scientifically we could do it or technically we can do it but we can't afford it or you couldn't run an economy that way. So you need the solutions for how you'd logistically deliver it at scale... And then the final one—we know we could [do it] scientifically, technically [and] administratively or economically, but in the end because we're never going to do it because people don't care and we can't get the politics to make it happen.

I suppose there's even [an issue of] psychology—have humans got the psychological capability to solve this problem? And then the other one is can we make the politics work? I just don’t think we can get to an emergency response by convincing people to close down one power station at a time... we need a package, outside business as usual. If that understanding is there, then we might use single issue campaigning to heighten certain elements.

It seems... that you have to work at both grassroots mobilisation and... mobilizing [elites].

LH: ‘We are able to reach a lot of people through face to face conversations. By having a conversation with someone you are able to communicate at a much better level than if you’re just posting something at them because you are able to build a relationship’.

BL: ‘We've lost so bad... There are some powerful interests on the other side of this when there are powerful self interested people, you are not going to beat them with reasoned, enlightened argument’.

TS: ‘[People] realise the grave reality of the problem and they realise a lot of the other tactics aren’t working because the powerful interests are so strong that a rally is not going to overturn the fossil fuel industry. We need to do something more…’

SR: ‘The modus operandi is to stigmatise the industry, to highlight that they are acting in an amoral (not amoral immoral) way and kind of mark them out as a rogue industry—an industry that we as a society need to distance ourselves from.’

The need for inspiration and hope

Interviewees described the situation that the climate movement faces as ‘depressing’ (DE, CF, RG), ‘dire’ (EF, CS), ‘hopeless [in the eyes of many]’ (DE) or an emergency (LM, GL, CE). Further comments add to this picture. People readily ‘shut off’ (AG), people often feel they are ‘the only one’ (RG). LJ adds: ‘you have to keep your own morale up’. CE observed, ‘We've got to find ways of connecting people with the reality sufficiently strongly that they think they actually do know that they should be that scared—but they've also got this sense of hope’.

Climate change can be presented as an ‘apocalypse’ (BL) and the climate movement’s work ‘is to create the possibility that we might have some hope’ (DE) and where ‘we have run out of time to do things slowly and incrementally’ (CE) but the political system has been failing to move at the necessary scale and speed, an energised and inspired movement is important for shifting the politics
of climate change. Like other commentators on climate politics (Hansen, 2009; Hamilton, 2013), CE sees the narrative created by Churchill and its importance for the politics of the Second World War as an analogue for the climate movement. He states that Churchill ‘had to project… hope and possibility and conviction, grit and determination and so on, so that people could think “yes, maybe this could work”. He created a fiction for people to believe that they could make it work’.

CF argues that the purpose of narrative includes ‘telling stories not just for the outside but for themselves to keep themselves going’. DE commented that Pacific Warriors showed ‘determination in the face of a pretty scary and what many people see as hopeless situation… showing that fierce warrior energy is what is needed to confront this issue now, not like depressing … Saying no we are doomed’. TS adds, ‘I had people [saying to me] this was one of the best days of their lives. People were definitely very excited to be involved and felt quite inspired by the connection of having people who were really affected by it and then feeling that they could do something real and direct to help’. Blogger Maureen From Freo (2014) commented, ‘The story of the Pacific Climate Warriors draws into sharp focus the potential impact of catastrophic climate change. Their response is inspiring. This David and Goliath action will send a message to the world about what is at stake’. EF described rising anger and despair in the period following the election of the Abbott government: ‘SR speaks of the need to be learn the stories of previous movements ‘as a way of inspiring people… [Campaigners] in the USA have talked more about [social movement] history—it’s much more well-known in the States. Perhaps there hasn’t been enough work around acknowledging that history and telling that story. After watching [the work of other movements] it’s so exciting… hearing about it is quite energising’. AR points to the stories about ordinary people who have got together and made a difference and how they did it, the wins they had’. These stories ‘show [people] the power that they could have.’
Appendix 3

Symbolic politics and the challenge of the rise of the far-right: some notes

The contemporary rise of the political far-right poses new challenges for supporters of action on climate change. Environmentalists have always been engaged in ‘battles of images and narratives’ with industry and government, however what happens in the cultural-symbolic domain of politics has particular kind of importance when imagery and narrative are used to stir up fear and mobilise constituencies behind a far-right agenda. The far-right does not always *lead* with climate policy, but its political success has consistently created significant obstacles to the prospects for addressing climate change. The far-right consistently relies on symbolic power to marshal public support, and more progressive political forces have not always met this kind of symbolic challenge with a symbolic response (or symbolic efforts to change and set the political agenda).

‘I play to peoples’ fantasies’, Trump (2016) declared in *The Art of the Deal*. He did exactly this in his contest with Clinton, using powerful symbolic appeals such as ‘Build the Wall’, ‘Make America Great Again’, ‘Drain the Swamp’, ‘Hillary’s emails’, ‘Mexican immigrants’, the ‘Muslim ban’, as well as ‘the people be[coming] the rulers of this nation again’ (Trump, 2017). His use of symbolic politics energised his base and helped propel him into office (see Allen and Parnes, 2017; Bitecofer, 2018). Barnaby Joyce added that there would be ‘a new tax on ironing, a new tax on watching television, a new tax on vacuuming’ (Kelly, 2009). EF comments: ‘You tell them a Sunday roast will cost $100 [because of the carbon price]—people remember that and it gets into their frame whereas our stuff doesn’t... That stuff sticks really well and it’s really hard to scratch it off’. In cases like these, ‘cultural-symbolic ascendancy’ can mean political ascendancy. In different ways, Trump, Nigel Farage, Boris Johnson, Tony Abbott and Scott Morrison have been more effective than their opponents in wielding this kind of power.

In Australia, the spectre of asylum seekers arriving by boat as a threat to the nation’s borders is a more long-standing example of symbolic politics, but one that belongs to the same ‘genre’. ‘Stopping the boats’ has become associated with fitness to govern. Abbott undertook a similar symbolic assault on climate policies with his scare campaign about the *Great Big New Tax on Everything*, and his efforts to de-legitimise Australia’s climate votes while in office (Conifer, 2019). It remains to be seen whether the formidable skills he displayed when campaigning for Brexit will be replicated during his time as Prime Minister and into a national election.

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7 His political success with ‘Stop the Boats’ was similar: see Martin (2015).
8 At the time of writing, Boris Johnson has been having a bad week as British Prime Minister, consistently losing votes on the floor of the House of Commons—his first
policies and Gillard’s standing as national leader. To extend the analogy of ‘the political climate’ applied in this thesis, his symbolic assault on climate policy coursed across the Australian political landscape like a (political) ‘superstorm’. As the chapter on the Rudd-Gillard-Abbot era demonstrates, it played an important role in creating the ‘climate’ where Australia’s price on carbon could be abolished.

In the UK, images and narratives have powerfully shaped the Brexit debate. The way people have ‘imagined’ British sovereignty, Britain’s relationship with the European Union and what Brexit might offer have had deep political effects. For commentary, see Kettle (2018), as well as Freedland (2019), who writes,

For at least three decades, “Europe” served as the all-purpose bogeyman of British politics. Cheered on by a Europe-loathing press… politicians of all stripes found it convenient to blame Brussels for any and all ills. How easy it was for British politicians to say they’d love to act on this or that issue, but their hands were tied by those villains in the EU. Every summit was a “showdown” pitting plucky Britain against the wicked continentals. Both of the main political parties played this game…. Underpinning Brexit, with its belief that Britain should separate itself from its closest neighbours, is a refusal to accept that we are one part of an interdependent European economy. For the Brexiteers, Britain remains a global Gulliver tied down for too long by the Lilliputians of Little Europe.

As Chapter 9 argues, political phenomena like these are not exceptions and aberrations. They keep recurring, and they represent significant obstacles to creating a political climate conducive to addressing climate change (Mehling and Vihma, 2017; Lockwood, 2018). The capacity of politicians like Trump, Abbott, Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage to stir up a maelstrom of symbolic power, and—for many voters—public anxiety, raises the question of how the climate movement and other movements find cultural-symbolic answers to cultural-symbolic challenges.

Progressives’ traditional approaches to political communication are not likely to be sufficient in addressing the cultural-symbolic challenge. Westen (2011) reflects on approaches to political communication that have characterised debate in the US: ‘Democrats typically bomb[ard] voters with laundry lists of issues, facts, figures, and policy positions, while Republicans offer them emotionally compelling appeals, whether to their values, principles, or prejudices’. It is symbolic politics that engages ‘the imagination’ (or in Trump’s words, ‘people’s fantasies’), making these appeals compelling and powerful for audiences.

Relying unduly on information politics and the hope that rationality will necessarily prevail in public debate can be a recipe for political failure. Challenging cultural-symbolic power with reason alone can amount to a failure to fight fire with fire. If cultural-symbolic power is real power (in that symbolically-driven, emotionally compelling appeals can influence and sway political behaviour), then it makes no sense to leave the symbolic field to one’s political opponents. When symbolic power used by advocates of the fossil fuel industry is met only with rational arguments, then the symbolic domain of politics will be dominated by opponents of action on climate change. Their use of symbolic power may or may not be arguing on the grounds of policy rather than a bigger-picture vision for the country. Further, her campaign relied heavily on the rigorous analysis of evidence provided by polling and data analytics—‘information number crunch[ing]!’ (Allen and Parnes, 2017: p. 25).

Allen and Parnes paint a rich picture of the thinking that drove the Clinton campaign. They record that one senior Clinton adviser on her approach to policy and public debate: ‘This is her deeply held thing: elections should be about policy… There’s a textbook quality to her

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9 The most familiar term in Australian weather forecasts is ‘low pressure system’, however this hardly describes the political effect.

10 The contrast between Trump’s skill in symbolic politics and Clinton’s preference for rational argument and policy provides a case in point.

Clinton lost a race that she ‘should’ have won overwhelmingly had the standards of ‘Habermasian’ rational deliberation in the public sphere applied (Habermas, 1985, 1989). Clinton had a preference for
outweighed in other domains by institutional, legal or ‘people’ power, but for the purposes of ‘winning hearts and minds’, ‘capturing the public imagination’ and defining the issues in the debate, articulation of things.’ (6). Policy was ‘the only thing she ever felt comfortable discussing in elections’ (p. 93).

The following quote points to Clinton’s broad difficulties with political communication, and to areas where greater skill in the use of imagery, narrative and political theatre could have helped her (emphasis added):

Hillary was at her wit’s end when it came to her messaging — dismayed by the campaign’s lack of inspiration. Here she was, a year into her campaign and about to get trampled by a socialist, and “Breaking Barriers” was the best her staff could come up with…In late January, as Hillary’s campaign began to think about “evolving the core message,” Ron Klain [a long time Democrat advisor, campaign aide and political operative] chimed in with a succinct analysis of what was missing. “We need to invest more time in describing what HRC wants to do for America, if she becomes President,” he wrote to her top campaign brass. “What is it that she wants to do as President? How would America be different? What should people be excited about?… What we need to deliver is a more compelling message on America under HRC.” [Clinton’s chief speechwriter, Dan] Schwerin replied with a telling insight into Hillary that everyone in her orbit understood but couldn’t, or wouldn’t, impress upon her. “I think Ron’s right, but the irony here is that HRC talks about hardly anything else,” the frustrated speechwriter asserted. “Her stump has always been a long recitation of what she wants to do as President. We’ve rolled out a million detailed policies. Our problem is missing the forest for the trees. We’ve never found a good way (or at least a way she embraces) that sums up her vision for how America would be different” (pp. 137-8).

This leaves open the question of what kind of images, narratives and political theatre are selected for a response. There room here for further research. This might include a survey of instances of progressive-conservative contests of a range of kinds (e.g. Abbott vs. Rudd and Gillard; Morrison vs. Shorten; Thatcher vs. Kinnock; Thatcher vs. Foot; Viktor Orbán vs. his opponents; Reagan vs. Mondale; Bush vs. Gore; PW Botha vs. the African National Congress and the United Democratic Front; Gandhi vs. various Indian Viceroys; the US Civil Rights movement and various Presidents and Governors). This research might develop a typology of configurations of symbolic power in relation to other forms of power.

symbolic power used by climate denialists needs to be met with symbolic power in response.\textsuperscript{11}
Appendix 4

‘Arguments must become moral if they are to succeed’: the fusion of moral, symbolic and political power.

Comments from a number of thinkers provide valuable perspectives on the way that symbolic politics and moral power can combine. Bill McKibben offers a perspective that fuses ‘moral witness’ and movement mobilisation. In a letter written in 2011 where he called for a new agenda for the US climate movement, he stated, ‘Twenty years of patiently explaining the climate crisis to our leaders hasn’t worked. Maybe moral witness will help’ (2013: L333). In Fight Global Warming Now, he advocated for a focus on ‘moral depth’ in order to make climate campaigning ‘connect with the heart and the soul as much as with the brain’:

The simple reason is, it works. To opponents of the climate change movement, power is mostly a function of money and the influence it can buy. ExxonMobil made $40 billion in profit last year, which guarantees it political clout. Community activists will never have that kind of cash, but if onlookers come to see our struggle as a moral witness, they will be swayed nonetheless...

The more you organize actions with an eye to their emotional depth, the more you deepen your own commitment... And it will help create a purposeful and soulful community that has both the hope and the passion to continue this movement into the future. That’s way beyond strategic... The strongest parts of your campaign will likely be those that push beyond self-interest to appeal to something deeper. (2007: L841)

Alexander (2006a) describes the dramatic moral confrontations of the US Civil Rights Movement:

Civil rights activists felt themselves to be participating in an utterly serious morality play, and they tried as hard as they could to ensure that the drama would be presented to the surrounding civil audience in a manner that would evoke sympathy, generate identification, and extend solidarity.

King was able to translate what could have been viewed simply as a social, political, and racial conflict over the distribution of resources, centering on aggression and struggles over structural position, into a moral confrontation in which the excluded and denigrated minority won legitimate authority and those who excluded them lost out.’ (L3752, 3779)

Horgan (2014) argues ‘arguments must become moral if they are to succeed’ (p. 751). He describes a case of symbolic power shaping political decision-making when ‘a moral community coalesced around a shared conception’ of what was really important or in Durkheimian terms, ‘sacred’ (p. 759). Applying the language of the sacred in the secular context of a dispute about the rezoning of agricultural land to benefit commercial, industrial and residential developers, Horgan argues, ‘The sacred both connects actors to one another and forms the basis for solidarity ties more generally... Moral communities form, cohere and mobilize... around shared conceptions of what is sacred. The sacred is a shared point of reference for the group’ (p. 744). Horgan concludes,

The power to harness particular

threatening or damaging it involves crossing a line that is deeply unacceptable to cross. ‘Sacrificial’ thus applies to ANZAC, The Reef, and the ‘fair go’. (For more, see the discussion at the end of Chapter 4 above).

12 In secular Australia, the ‘sacred’ is rarely publicly invoked outside religious circles, yet the division between what is sacred and what is not is evident in public discourse whenever there is a sense of something deeply valued that must be protected, and when...
interpretations—symbolic power—has consequences that are more than symbolic. Power can accrue to those who appear to lay legitimate claim to strong communion with, and the right to use, those symbols in ways that matter. Laying claim to what is sacred and bringing others under the umbrella of shared sacred collective representations gives power to an argument; it moves people (literally and figuratively) less with authority than with influence (Alexander 2006a, p. 70), and influence here is neither the wielding of coercive power and authority in a political structural sense, nor is it hegemonic consent’. (pp. 757-8)

Horgan’s views find echoes in unexpected quarters. Tony Abbott is not known for his contributions to moral philosophy, however his tweet on the day of Australia’s 2019 Federal election is illuminating. Taken at face value, the implication is that when the climate movement can render climate change as a moral issue, it gains in political power. The power of imagery, narrative and political theatre is important for making this happen.

Interviewees comment on moral power

Below are some instances of comments about moral power from this research.

For TS, arguments shorn of moral power have failed. He states that in the past, there was ‘a real focus on responding to attacks from the right—a lot of focus on jobs, the economics—it didn’t work…The shift has been we need to focus on the values that hold us together as a movement, rather than trying to respond to the right’s values and using their values to win the argument, because it’s their values that are causing the problem’. AG describes ‘the moral message of being young’ which conveys ‘it is not OK for you to threaten our future… You need to meet with us, you need to listen to us.’ She adds, ‘It is very hard to look a young person in the face and discount their point of view… You’re not going to be here [in the future]’. AG’s comments speak powerfully to the impact of the 2018 and 2019 #SchoolStrikeForClimate.

GL speaks of ‘recaptur[ing] moral energy’ and of how people seeing others take an ethical stance leads them to want to be a part of it, and CF describes how moral dynamism drew people into the climate movement. She speaks of the stance taken by many against the Rudd government’s Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme: ‘I think there was a certain gravitas… that came with facing a very serious future, and saying OK, morally are we prepared to endorse this future… A whole lot of people got on board and said OK, we need to be serious.’ Some in the movement dispute her assessment of Rudd’s policies, however her point about the mobilising power of moral concern stands. DE, TS, SW and SR describe how divestment campaigns are designed to stigmatise the fossil fuel industry and invest economic arguments with moral energy. SR argues, ‘ethically, divestment is really about... stigmatising the [fossil fuel] industry, to highlight that they are acting in an amoral… way’. SW discusses whether or not investments align with people’s morals. TS describes a strong public response to the divestment campaign’s emphasis on the ‘connection between their social responsibilities and what they are doing with their money’. TS sees moral arguments as central to the campaign: ‘[The divestment movement has] gone to the area of strength for fossil fuel industry and used moral arguments that work for us to tackle it. There’s been some talk of coal industry is financially doomed... but really, the actual focus has been on “this is a bad industry morally destroying our planet so therefore you have the moral responsibility to take your money away from them”’. SR, who describes divestment as
essentially an ethical debate, reflects, ‘Divestment is really about... stigmatising the industry, to highlight that they are acting in an amoral... way and... mark them out as a rogue industry—an industry that we as a society need to distance ourselves from’.

The moral message of the Pacific Climate Warriors

The Pacific Climate Warriors energised their supporters with a fusion of symbolic and moral power. Arianne Kassman from PNG, stated, ‘Addressing climate change must be our moral choice’ (350 Pacific, 2015c). Koreti Tiumalu described the Warriors’ work in terms of challenging the moral licence of the fossil fuel industry (Tokona, 2015). In a Facebook post supporting Global Divestment Day, 350 Pacific (2015d) stated, ‘If it’s wrong to wreck the planet, then it’s wrong to profit from that wreckage’.

Launching the Pacific-wide divestment campaign following the Newcastle blockade, Kathy Jetnil-Kijiner asserted, ‘it is not acceptable to profit from the destruction of our Islands’ (350 Pacific, 2014c). Loeak (2014) wrote, ‘We’re blockading the world’s largest coal port in Newcastle to show that... whole nations are paying the price for Australia’s coal and gas wealth’. Lutunatabua, (2015a) wrote about the Warriors ‘challeng[ing] the moral license of the fossil fuel industry’. When aged 15, Moemoana Schwenke (2016), originally from Samoa and now based in Australia, described the work of the Warriors: ‘Small island developing states have contributed less than 1% to the global stock of greenhouse gasses... Islands in a place that i come from, the Pacific, are awaiting to be swallowed up by the leftovers of our world’s broken morals, in seas consisting of melted ice caps from warmer temperatures that we created... We must each become our own Climate Warrior to tackle the issue’.

Introducing questions of the moral license of the fossil fuel industry, the ethical status of profits made from coal and the consequences of Australian business-as-usual for the Pacific involved important re-definitions of climate change. Importantly, this moral message was not simply asserted verbally but symbolically enacted through the Newcastle blockade: asserting it symbolically through a ‘theatrical’ action was significantly more powerful than relying simply on words, memes or advertisements.

Further research into the alignment between moral power, symbolic power and political outcomes might address questions such as:

• How is a combination of symbolic and moral power evident in the work of the climate movement?
• How is symbolic power magnified through a compelling moral message, or diminished without it?
• Who speaks with moral authority in the climate debate and what impact is their contribution making?
• How does the ‘moral energy’ generated by images, narratives and social drama relate to the level of public concern, the depth of political commitment, and the formation of new political identities and identifications?
• How does moral power figure in the #SchoolStrikeForClimate, and what does it add to this movement’s impact?
Appendix 5

Climate change, peacebuilding, conflict resolution and creativity: insights from peace and conflict studies

Peace and conflict studies might not immediately appear to be a place to look for insights into climate politics, however several writers point to its relevance and applicability, noting how climate politics has become caught in broader political polarisations. Hamilton (2010) describes climate change as a ‘battleground in the wider culture war’ (L861). Kahan (2010) argues that views of climate change are shaped by group values: people are drawn to positions which reinforce their sense of connection to others who share their outlook. Noting the competing ‘us’ and ‘them’ identities that characterise climate sceptics and believers, Bliuc et al. (2015) suggest that it would be valuable for the climate debate to be informed by intergroup conflict resolution techniques.

Lederach (2005) offers an additional perspective, derived from his experience at the sharp end of peacebuilding and conflict resolution around the world. He focuses on the centrality of the moral imagination to overcoming conflict. Imagination, he writes, involves ‘the art of creating what does not exist’ (L661). He examines a series of cases of conflict, and in each, creating something new is hard work, as political momentum pushes in the opposite direction. He suggests that ‘a singular tap root... gives life to the moral imagination: the capacity of individuals and communities to imagine themselves in a web of relationship even with their enemies,... [recognising] “I am part of this pattern. My choices and behaviors affect it”’ (L784).

Imagination requires creativity, moving beyond dualistic polarity of ‘my’ vs. ‘your’ community. It also requires risk: stepping into the ‘unknown that lies beyond the far too familiar landscape of violence’ (L212). People living in settings of deep-rooted conflict, he writes, contend with an ‘extraordinary irony’: ‘violence is known; peace is the mystery’ (L877). Lederach’s thoughts prompt some questions. In looking at the challenges of moving beyond the ‘familiar landscape’ of fossil fuels, what do we see if we understand these as intergroup challenges which need imaginative responses? What does ‘climate politics as conflict resolution’ look like?

Reflecting on cases where entrenched social conflict was transformed, Lederach observes that what made these changes possible was ‘not... techniques, technical expertise, not political, economic, or military power [but the role of] the moral imagination in human affairs’ (L498). A focus on applying techniques can be pursued at the expense of ‘keeping a process creatively alive’. Techniques are not be thrown out: Lederach’s point is that skill and the moral imagination need to be integrated.

Lederach emphasises the place of art and imagery in the moral imagination, and how in turn they figure in achieving social change. Rather than resulting from cognitive analysis, he argues, transformative moments often arise through sudden insight that comes ‘in the form of an image’ (L1431). He reflects that in informal settings, people rarely talk about conflict analytically. Instead, they ‘talk in images’. Seeing the essence of an issue, he continues, is the hardest challenge of peacebuilding: ‘If you do nothing else, take time to get a picture, an image... When you see the picture better, you will have achieved a synthesis... What I find is this: If I can see it, I can understand it better’ (L1358, 1507).

Lederach thus shares common ground with Stephenson (2011) who suggests that the ‘aesthetic imagination’ is a primary way of understanding and challenging existing
imaginariums. As Taylor argues, imaginaries are carried in ‘images, stories and legends’ (2004: p. 23). It therefore makes sense if ‘images, stories and legends’ are a primary means by which changes come about in the way we imagine things.

Quotes from interviewees on related issues

On working across social divides

CE, who was interviewed for this project, speaks to aspects of the issues raised by Lederach.

Below are some quotes from his interview.

‘What do we do to make it more possible for [people] in the elites to form an organised majority to take on the problem and [support] change?… Normally what we do is say, “Here’s our demand—this is what we want you to do,” and politicians routinely expect constituents to come in demanding things of them—that’s the norm…

What I’ve found—I’ve started experimenting a couple of times with a different form of engagement where you go to somebody who would normally expect you to demand something of them and say “what should we do to make it easier for us to achieve something?”…

And so, it’s kind of like a facilitation process rather than bailing people up and demanding stuff of them…

It seems to me that you have to work at both grassroots mobilisation and elite mobilising, but it seems to me that we [in the climate movement] are most used to doing grassroots [work].

How you go about doing elite mobilising is a bit of a mystery to most people.

If you just do a bottom-up strategy then it will be portrayed and possibly seen as “insurrectionary”, which then helps to unite the elites together. If they already have a significant amount of power, they will lock [in] that power… to [promote] an agenda that you don’t support…

I think the [Cathy] McGowan campaign [for the seat of Indi] was excellent.

They were trying to find common ground in a conservative but nevertheless somewhat diverse community.

They were trying to raise decency in politics, and fair treatment…

Their goal wasn’t to win support for a radical new direction. It was simply to bring back decency in the way people work together….

Maybe [a way forward is to] create a platform for dialogue across the community and then say, ‘are there any key issues that will be challenging our community?’…

We have to find points of connection with each person/ network/ whatever so that people can see some reason why they should engage.

And then we have an educational/informational responsibility to put people in touch with the necessary level of understanding about the issue.

CF adds

It took me a long time to become comfortable going to protests. [Some hard left groups] switch off the more creative dimensions of people’s ability to communicate, becoming no longer in dialogue with broader society but just in dialogue with themselves…

GL reflects on ‘Accept the Gift’

We did offer the Coalition [the chance to] be heroes in the story— if they accepted that they would be accepting a symbolic gesture that “yes we do want to head towards a clean energy future” which is hugely popular amonsgst the electorate…
We used messages around “this is symbolic of the kind of nation that we want to see”... we were trying to harness the sense of hope around what we could be while acknowledging that the RE industry was declining due to the uncertainty created by this government... We wanted to have a feeling of generosity about it....

I think getting the tone right, getting the right messengers to be part of a range of creative tactics, to continually share those messages..., and building power through community organising in key electorates will be really significant.

On the role of art

PR

Everybody recognises that creative communication is essential...David Buckland, who is a really rising star who started having conversations with scientists in the late ‘80s and they were all saying ‘we’ve got this incredible thing... and nobody ever listens to us’. And he’s saying, ‘Of course not, that’s really boring.’ So that’s what prompted the whole Cape Farewell project. But these things take a long time...

CS raised the question of what artistic communication can add or contribute, and stated:

We work with humor, so this is different from most protest, legal action etc. and gives a way for people to engage rather than becoming passive spectators. We don’t have a raised pointy finger saying ‘this is good, this is bad’. It’s a two-way conversation making use of play, hav[ing] fun and learning...

AG

[It is useful when] you can find a common

idea and “stick your message to it”. Nemo has been made famous by Disney and Pixar but the Clownfish is this great cute image that not only evokes the Great Barrier Reef instantly but also children.

CF

I think it’s really important to have at the forefront of our mind the symbols of our culture and how to use a campaign to re-inscribe those symbols in a new way, or to reinterpret the stories of the culture in a new way. I think that some of the most powerful movements have been able to do that, and have been able to create images that are about that symbolism.

On creativity and the limitations of rationality

AG

Finding things that people already recognise and using them is incredibly important—and we don’t do enough of that in the climate movement because a lot of climate activists are boffins who have read all the science and the policy and they really like rational argument and they are not thinking about silly images that 99% of people like and make them laugh—they see that as very far from talking about climate change policy.

CF

Our movement culture is mainly built in universities... Universities are great and I totally endorse building our rational capacities and there is an ethical dimension to thinking that Hannah Arendt wrote about, but at the same time I think that when you go too much into the rational, you forget the other dimensions of life... University people often become less and less able to relate with the broader society, and become less aware of how to hold a

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space and how to create secular rituals—create the sacred almost in a secular domain...
Appendix 6

The electoral impact of the anti-Coal Seam Gas message in Narrabri:
Notes to accompany the chapter on iconic power

Chapter 10 above analyses Lock the Gate’s ‘Big Picture’ photograph, which was taken four months ahead of the 2015 state election in New South Wales. Narrabri is National Party heartland—part of the seat of Barwon, which had been held in 2011 by Nationals MP Kevin Humphries with a two-party preferred vote of 82%. However, in 2015, Rohan Boehm, running as an anti-CSG independent, made significant gains at the Nationals’ expense, winning 16.87% of the vote, and 21.8% in Narrabri booths. Following concerted campaigning, there were also significant swings against National MPs elsewhere in the state. The electorate of Lismore was barely held by the National party, which only just withstood a swing of 21.5%. Lock The Gate (2015) reported heavy swings in conservative country booths where communities had declared their communities ‘Gasfield Free’. Following this result, the Nationals Leader joined other party members in opposing CSG in the Northern Rivers (Brown and MacKenzie, 2015).

Voting results in the seat of Barwon: comparing 2011 and 2015 figures.

The results below show the strong inroads made by Lock the Gate through their local campaigning.

The data shows

1. (1) the inroads made into the primary vote for the National Party
2. (2) how the vote for Boehm—and for the anti-CSG Greens—was higher in Narrabri booths than the average across Barwon (NSW Electoral Commission, 2011, 2015).

Note: Labor did not stand in 2015, but ‘Country Labor’ won 13.4% of the vote, which was consistent with Labor’s 2011 result.
First preference votes, Electorate of Barwon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Boehm (anti-CSG independent) 2015</th>
<th>Humphries 2015</th>
<th>Humphries 2011</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Narrabri booths</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
<td>82.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electorate of Barwon</td>
<td>16.87%</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
<td>79.13%</td>
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2011 results in Narrabri booths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Booth</th>
<th>ALP</th>
<th>Green</th>
<th>National Party</th>
<th>Total formal</th>
<th>Nation al %</th>
<th>Green %</th>
<th>ALP %</th>
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<tr>
<td>Narrabri Public</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>86</td>
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<td>1663</td>
<td>81.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nurruby OOSH</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>83.6%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
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<td>939</td>
<td>81.6%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>82.3%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>13.13%</td>
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2015 results in Narrabri booths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Booth</th>
<th>Green</th>
<th>Country Labor Party</th>
<th>Boehm —anti-CSG independent</th>
<th>No Land Tax Campaign</th>
<th>National Party</th>
<th>Christian Democratic Party (Fred Nile Group)</th>
<th>total formal</th>
<th>Nation al %</th>
<th>Boehm %</th>
<th>Boehm + Greens %</th>
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<tr>
<td>Narrabri Public</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1020</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1658</td>
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<td>19.2%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nurruby OOSH</td>
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<td>90</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Lawrence’s Anglican</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>749</td>
<td>56.6%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Narrabri Average</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>58.7%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Vote across the electorate</td>
<td>6.17%</td>
<td>24.01%</td>
<td>16.87 %</td>
<td>1.35 %</td>
<td>49.10 %</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td>49.10 %</td>
<td>16.87%</td>
<td>23.04%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 7

Imagery, imagination and the way we ‘see’ the world

This thesis has consistently focused on the links between imagery, the public imagination and politics. It argued, for example, that re-imagining fossil fuels (and climate change itself) is a precondition for many of the political changes that the climate movement works to achieve. Enough people with enough power of other kinds need to ‘see’ the issues in a new way.

Some further points about imagery and the way that we ‘see’ are added below.

Images hold a particular place in perception and the ‘imag-ination’, both of which involve ‘seeing’ the world. Mitchell (2013) observes that the word ‘idea’ derives from the Greek word ‘to see’, and is frequently linked with the notion of the eidolon, meaning ‘the visible image’. In fact, visual language is built into the everyday ways we think about communication and perception. Saying ‘I see’ is a way to convey ‘I understand’. We speak about an organisation’s vision. Our attitudes are our views. We portray a situation and imagine a solution. Showing something involves pointing it out, or making it clear. Politicians are concerned about the optics of a situation. Visual imagery of polar bears, melting icebergs, extreme weather events, collapsing ice shelves, flood, parched earth and smokestacks shapes the way climate change is imagined (Leviston et al., 2014, Nerlich and Jasper, 2013, Leiserowitz, 2007). While images like these had already figured in the public imagination before Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth was released (see Lorenzoni et al., 2006) this film did much to create a visual sense of climate change in the public mind (Sheppard, 2012; Greyson, 2011; Johnston, 2013; Nolan, 2010). The climate movement’s imagery can make an impact of the same kind, if not always of the same extent.

These linkages between references to ‘seeing’ and ‘cognition’ are cross-cultural. For example, the Chinese 看 (kan) means ‘see,’ but also means think, consider or appraise. 见地 (jiandi)—insight, judgement—combines jian (see, catch sight of, meet with, be exposed to, show evidence of) and 地 (the earth, land, soil, locality). Similarly, 慧眼 (huiyan)—mental perception or discernment—comprises 慧 (intelligent, bright) and 眼 (eye, look, glance). The Punjabi ਦੇਖੋ (dekho) and Hindi देख (dekh) mean ‘see’ but also connote ‘pay attention, understand, discern, assess following reflection, and perceive’. The linkages continue: in Scottish Gaelic, faic means ‘see, envisage, visualise and discern’, and lèisinn means ‘vision, eyesight, perception and insight’. In Indonesian, lihat means to see. The related term kelihatan means ‘seeming or appearing’, as well as ‘apparent, visible and evident’. Further, in ancient Greek, as well as eidolon, theoria also connotes looking and viewing. This is the word from which ‘theory’ derives. These examples add weight to an insight from Aristotle that is over two thousand years old. He stated that ‘the soul never thinks without an image’, adding ‘images serve as if they were contents of perception’ (De Anima, III.7).
Appendix 8

Notes on evaluating symbolic action

Interviewed by the Voice of America at the time of the Newcastle blockade, PNG Pacific Warrior Arianne Kassman raised the issue of what made symbolic action worthwhile, and how its value might be evaluated:

Whether or not we stop the coal ships we believe that we have been successful. We have brought our stories, we have brought our human stories, our human face to climate change... and, you know, that is what we wanted to do, to highlight the impacts that the Pacific islands are facing, and to also... bring to light the fact that Australia’s commitment to expanding the fossil fuel industry is also expanding the destruction of the Pacific islands (quoted in Mercer, 2014).

How can the value of ‘bringing issues to light’ ‘bringing our human face’ ‘highlighting the impacts’ and ‘bringing our stories’ be assessed? As Cox (2010) emphasises, symbolic action is incomplete on its own (see Chapter 6). SW, who was involved in planning the Newcastle blockade, reflected on what was achieved:

I think a lot of 350s work, how we approach campaigns particularly in Australia, probably the same around the world is with a specific campaign strategy—to get X decision maker to do Y thing that we want, but the Pacific climate tour was something different—a much bigger narrative... We weren’t going to achieve any one particularly targeted outcome, but looking back on it, it achieved incredible things... creating this moment in Newcastle which I hear people talking about all the time...

I guess you’ve got transactional measures of success and ‘transformational’ metrics, or however you’d want to describe [them]...

Transactional stuff [includes] good media global [and] Australian media coverage. We did get a bunch of new people signing up to be involved in campaigns. We did engage ‘x’ thousand people in public talks... We had that side as well, but we placed value in the stuff that’s less easy to measure—but seemed to be important...

Interview question: “Some people might dismiss it as “just symbolic”. What do you think is powerful about what happened?”
Answer:

I think there were powerful outcomes for the climate movement internally: one—the number of groups and individuals who took part in a big direct action for the first time and saw that that was something safe and powerful to do. It brought a story—a very personal story of climate impacts and the fact that these are already happening. We often get caught up in discussions of impacts for our children and our children’s children here in Australia. The Warriors said, ‘It’s happening to us right now, my home, I have seen it’. That was a real wake up call for a lot of people, both within the movement and obviously the public message was really important.

There were really important lessons and challenges around Australian campaigners—predominantly from white and middle class backgrounds. The Pacific Warriors themselves came from 15-20 cultural backgrounds.

It’s kind of become a story I’ve heard a lot of people in Australia telling as part of their
narrative of why they care about taking action on climate change, what they see as their motivation. [People] made it kind of their go-to as an example of why this is important, why they care...

The energy they brought to the work that we were doing, and seeing them inspire hardened and wearied activists and just bring such energy and life was incredible to watch....

Packard recalls that the idea of the Pacific Warriors’ blockade came from thinking, ‘Right, what’s the most ambitious plan we can come up with for our Pacific Islands?’ At first, many thought it was a ‘crazy idea’, yet it would become what many would describe as ‘the most remarkable week of action they had ever seen or experienced’ (Yacono, 2015).

The most obvious impacts of the Warriors’ blockade were within the climate movement itself, though as Chapter 6 indicates, it generated a much wider variety of outcomes. Yet mobilising and energising the climate movement—including the movement within the Pacific—as well as shifting its agenda towards an anti-coal stance all represent changes in the dynamics of climate politics, and are thus politically important in their own right.

*****

Some other quotes from interviewees speak to the challenge of evaluating symbolic politics

CS comments: If you plant a new idea and some new information in people's heads, this is change, but it is hard to measure—how many people learned how much, then there’s the number of [people who engage with a project]... He argues that to ‘communicate the story’ is a form of impact: ‘to know, become aware is the first and most important step for any change to happen’.

EF reflects on the work of the Australian Youth Climate Coalition: ‘You’ve always got a bubbly... girl in front of the camera with a bright T-shirt on with a smile on her face and that changes perception of the movement in a really great way and it talks to people.’ She discusses how politicians react to the number of people an environmental group represents:

I’ve been to meetings where... you’d say “I'm here on behalf of 60000 young Australians”—they wouldn’t write down anything else... and then they’ve got this nice picture with young people... It’s hard to measure the impact of that kind of stuff but I think it changes the narrative.

Question: do you think it's important to measure it in order to keep doing it? Answer: It's so hard.

I've been thinking for my campaign a lot about metrics

How do you communicate it... Part of what we do because we are answerable to donors of course—we want to get funding the next time around: you have to demonstrate the impact of... your campaign but you have to know you are doing the right thing. If I am spending 5 years doing something I'd want to make sure it was the right thing and if someone could prove to me it was the wrong thing and give me a better way of doing something, I'd do that. So I think it is important.

I don’t know how to do it—the metrics that we often use are things like media hits or numbers of volunteers engaged or numbers of meaningful conversations are a metric that we use.

You can demonstrate political impact to some extent but one of our wins was the carbon price, so... it's tricky...

You can try to be objective when you are looking at the press coverage—you've got how frequently is the media using our messaging as opposed to external messaging, how much are they using our press grabs [or] the photos we want them to use.

How are politicians responding to it—we got Julia Gillard tweeting to us asking for
a meeting with the climate elephant. That sort of demonstrates, “Whoah—we’ve been noticed”, but what’s the next step—how do you translate that into political impact? I’ve got no idea—because that’s really what the objective is. But then in terms of comms, maybe that’s a different objective: if you’re talking about shifting the narrative, I don’t know how you measure that...

PL reflects on the climate elephant, including on how the symbol was not taken further beyond the election: ‘It was a beautiful piece of messaging... It was the perfect meaning, the perfect symbol of what was happening with climate change at the time. And I do believe it had a very substantial impact. But then it dissipated. It was something for the moment which was ideally suited to its moment. Beyond that, it didn’t have any further impact’.

Asked how we can tell whether something was successful, LH responds:

It’s a hard thing to do because often it’s hard to tell if one specific thing resulted in something or not and it’s often a combination of a whole bunch of things that results in something happening. There’s a few ways you can break it down—how much media reach did this thing get when there a tangible policy outcome [results], what that [is]. There’s the feedback that’s less measurable and more me getting phone calls from interested people... going, “Hey this is a really interesting, exciting thing, we want to be involved”.

That kind of feedback, while it is not something you can really measure and make public in terms of “this is what we did “, it does give you the sense that you are making an impact...

That’s why for people who are community organising, it’s so important to be grounded in the community that you are working in because when you are working as part of a connected community you are able to get those pieces of feedback much more easily than if you don’t have those relationships...

That’s hard to measure on a national scale, but if you are hearing it from hundreds of community organisers in hundreds of different communities, then suddenly you can [assess], hey, this is a pretty [inaudible—big?] thing.
Appendix 9

Factors that make for iconicity: a more detailed list

The chapter on iconic power listed a series of factors that make for iconicity: the list from this chapter is outlined below.

Narration and dramatisation

- Visible political theatre
- Narrative strength

Conditions which enable an icon to be established in the public imagination

- Wide circulation of images in the media
- Beforehand: steady building of ‘symbolic capital’ over time
- Afterwards (1): Linking an icon with existing cultural meanings
- Afterwards (2) Ongoing re-creation, appropriation and ‘curation’

Additional factors which were identified in the literature review are outlined in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other factors that can make for iconicity</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Striking visual elements — ‘type 1 iconicity’ (Perlmutter, 1998, Smith 2012)</td>
<td>• All of the instances below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Condensation of deeply-felt issues into a visual image (Smith, 2012; Edelman, 1985) / 'metonymy' (Perlmutter, 1998)</td>
<td>• All of the instances below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Media prominence and frequency of publication (Perlmutter, 1998)</td>
<td>• Tiananmen square • Greenpeace whaling imagery • Berlin Wall • Kim Phuc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Grounding in community experience, enhancing the authority of people to speak and the authenticity of their message (See chapter 5 on the Pacific Warriors)</td>
<td>• Lock The Gate • Pacific Warriors • protests against Pass Laws in South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Created and publicised by an inspired and organised group which speaks with moral authority (Arsenault, 2011) and authenticity (Alexander, 2006; Giesen, 2006)</td>
<td>• Pacific Warriors • Freedom Rides • Lock The Gate • Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee lunch counter sit-ins • Salt March</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- **Moral power** (Binder, 2012; Kurusawa, 2012; Alexander 2006a) e.g. the photo of Kim Phuc burned by napalm ‘dramatises social relationships in a way that ‘provide[s] a basis for moral comprehension and response’ (Hariman & Lucaites, 2010: 44)

- Abu Ghraib as a ‘moral Chernobyl’ (Hitchens, 2004)
- Civil rights protests in Birmingham, Alabama (Alexander, 2006b)
- Anti-slavery movements (d’Anjou, 1996; Perry, 2002)

- A focus on a **particular individual** as well as a broader ‘human story’

- Nelson Mandela • Kim Phuc • Mohammed Nasheed
- Yeb Sano • Jonathan Moylan
- Nicky Winmar

- A famous **location** (Bartmański, 2012)

- Berlin Wall • 2017 Uluru Statement from the Heart
- Aboriginal Tent Embassy
- Tiananmen Square • Fall of the Bastille

- A simple, immediately-recognisable **logo** (Šuber and Karamanić, 2012)

- Stop Adani • Lock The Gate
- Aboriginal flag • 'No Dams'

- **Portraying emotion** and crystalising **collective feelings** (see Bartmański, 2012, who argues these are central to iconic power).

- Greenpeace anti-whaling imagery
- Gandhi violating salt laws during the Salt March
- Berlin Wall

- Portraying the **dramatic and courageous** actions of an energised, enthusiastic, ‘effervescent’ group (Smith, 2012; Bartmański, 2012)

- Tiananmen Square • Greenpeace whaling imagery
- Berlin Wall • Pacific Warriors • Salt March

- An anonymous but conspicuous **crowd** publicly **overcoming** a symbolically-charged **obstacle** (Bartmański, 2012).

- Berlin Wall • March on Washington
- EDSA ‘people power’ revolution against Marcos
- Storming of the Bastille
Appendix 10

Symbolic politics, the ‘Thrasymachus tradition’ and political realism— together with some notes on engaging with historical and cultural sources

While ‘the symbolic’ and ‘the real’ are often seen as opposites,14 as the Conclusion argues above, dismissing political symbolism in the name of realism means missing the real impact of symbolic power. It can also involve demanding more of symbolic politics than other forms of politics, which—like symbolic politics—are incomplete on their own. The tensions between the symbolic and the real have a long history. One of the archetypical advocates of ‘political realism’ is Plato’s Thrasymachus, who appears in the Politeia (Πολιτεία, translated ‘Republic’, but meaning something more like ‘the public and political life of a community’).15 This foundational text provides some perspectives for thinking through the role of symbolic politics. Alexander revives the character of Thrasymachus for twenty-first century political analysis in The Civil Sphere (2006a) and The Performance of Politics (2010). Thrasymachus stands for an outlook which recognises ‘raw power’ but sidelines or dismisses other key aspects of politics. Alexander (2010) explains:

Thrasymachus sees social actors as cynical egoists; against this sophist philosopher, Socrates defends the possibility that political actors respect one another and that they are motivated by feelings of reciprocity and guided by the ethical power of cultural ideals. A bright line runs from Thrasymachus to philosophers, theorists, and empirical social scientists who see contemporary elections primarily in terms of tactics, strategy, money, and organization. Against this tradition stand the intellectual descendants of Socrates, who make meaning central and place morality and feeling at the center of struggles for democratic power (L5885).

******

In the opening scene of Plato’s narrative, Socrates and Glaucion, one of his students, are on their way back to Athens from the port of Piraeus where they have seen the sights of a festival. A young slave pulls at Socrates’ cloak: ‘Polemarchus says you’re to wait for him’, he announces, gesturing towards a man in the distance (327b)16.

Arriving at the scene, Polemarchus prevails on Socrates and Glaucion to visit his house for dinner. At night, they can go and watch a torch-race on horseback in honour of Artemis, goddess of the hunt and wild animals. In the meantime, they can talk. Arriving at Polemarchus’s house, they find a group already there, one of whom is Thrasyvoulos the Chalcedonian, whose name means ‘fierce fighter’. After discussing old age, the pleasures and desires of youth, the love of money, freedom from enslaving desire, ‘the way people are’ (329d) and a life lived justly and well, the conversation turns to the question of just what ‘justice’ is.

Before long, Thrasyvoulos, who has been chafing at the bit to have his say, enters the and downplayed.

14 The statements ‘it’s just symbolic’ and Gillard’s ‘We’re not going to get drawn into a game of semantics’ about the carbon tax (Ferguson & Drum, 2016, n.p; see Chapter 4) illustrate how symbolism can be disregarded

15 see Waterfield, 1993: pp. xi-xii.

16 Quotes are taken from the translation by Rowe (2012).
discussion. Plato writes that he ‘couldn’t be contained any longer, gathering himself together like some wild animal, he launched himself at [the others] as if to tear [them] to pieces’ (336b).

*****

Thrasymachus is the ‘anti-hero of the Republic’ (Anderson, 2016: p. 1). He is a teacher of rhetoric, and as such is something of an expert in political communication. After launching a contemptuous tirade against Socrates (and demanding payment for his opinions) he leads his contribution to the dialogue with the famous assertion: justice is ‘nothing more than what is in the interests of the stronger’ (338c).

The claims made by Thrasymachus provide the springboard for Plato’s whole discussion of what the ideal ‘Politeia’ should look like. Thrasymachus presents himself as ‘seeing through’ Socrates arguments to what is ‘really’ happening. Barney (2004) reflects, ‘his boldest, albeit implicit claim is that there is nothing more to be said about it — no other level of analysis worth pursuing’. Thrasymachus looks at politics and sees ‘hard’ or ‘raw’ power. Because Plato’s Thrasymachus is inconsistent on questions of justice and power (Anderson, 2016; Barney, 2006)—and because the historical Thrasymachus is unknowable beyond surviving fragments of his work (Betti, 2011), it is not possible to identify a single line of thought that unites his views. It is possible, however, to draw a line between his opening position on ‘the interests of the stronger’, his regard for raw power, and instrumentalist and so-called ‘realist’ views of politics. This ‘Thrasymachus tradition’ in political philosophy is present in Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Clausewitz, Bismarck, Metternich, Reinhold Niebuhr and Henry Kissinger. Outside ‘the West’ these figures have counterparts ranging from Mao Ze Dong, for whom power came ‘out of the barrel of a gun’ to Kautilya (c350-283 BCE), the Chief Minister to the founder of the Maurya empire in modern-day India, who Boesche (2003) calls ‘The First Great Political Realist’. The ‘Thrasymachus tradition’ can thus be located in views of politics that dismiss so-called ‘soft power’ (Nye, 2004) and cultural-symbolic power as inconsequential in the name of ‘realism’. While ‘raw’ power deserves due recognition, the ‘Thrasymachus tradition’ is confined by a kind of tunnel vision that prevents recognition of other dimensions of politics.

*****

The Piraeus-Athens road, the debates occurring at the world’s first Academy (or at least the first one of that name) and the dialogue at the house of Greece, a treaty more inglorious than had ever been the result of any war to those defeated in it’ (Stephenson, 2000).

If the date of 387 BCE for the founding of Plato’s Academy is correct, this ephocal event occurred in the same year in which the Academy was launched. (The 387 BCE date for the founding of the Academy is an estimate, however it is widely cited: see Gerson, 2013 and Schofield, 2011).

Socrates and the historical Polemarchus were to feel the full force of Thrasymachus-style power when both were executed by the Thirty tyrants. For Thrasymachus, this might be the end of the story—the powerful win and the weak lose. Here, Thrasymachus would miss the enduring ‘cultural-symbolic’ impact of the story of Socrates, with all its questions about the legitimacy of his executioners’ actions that this story has conveyed ever since. Thrasymachus would also miss the possibility that the story of the democratic experiments that took place on the hills of Athens during his own lifetime might have an enduring impact.

17 Henry Kissinger (2014) discusses Kautilya in his book World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History. He compares him to Napoleon and Qin Shi Huangdi, (p. 196) and also to “a combination of Machiavelli and Clausewitz” (p. 195).

Kautilya may not have welcomed being classed with this company. Indeed, he argues for self-restraint and humility for the ruler, and that the greatest enemies of the king are not others but ‘lust, anger, greed, pride, arrogance and foolhardiness (quoted in Boesche, 2003: 38), yet he had few ethical scruples about behaviour in the public sphere.

18 There is an irony in Plato’s story. Thrasymachus (c459–400 BCE), comes from Chalcedon, a town just across the mouth of the Bosphorus from Byzantium. Chalcedon was part of a large territory which was traded away to Persia’s King Artaxerxes II to Sparta’s advantage in the ‘Peace of Antalcidas’. The treaty amounted to a kind of reversal of the outcomes of the battles of Marathon and Thermopylae. In his The Life of Greece (1966), Durant describes the deal as “the most disgraceful event in Greek history” (p. 461). In Plutarch’s estimation, it represented “the disgrace and betrayal of
Polemarchus may seem a long way from addressing the ‘diabolical’ problem of climate change (Garnaut, 2008a: p. 287). Separated by time, they still overlap in human experience and outlook. Thrasymachus’s disregard of anything but the most conspicuous and forceful forms of power, and Plato’s resort to rationality and abstractions are familiar today. Plato wished to banish poets from his Republic, lest they lead people astray with their ‘partial’ views of reality. He came to see the imagination as ‘dangerous, irrational and subject to error’ (Day, 2014: p. 47). Plato’s writings are thus hardly a place to find a defence of symbolic politics. He can even be seen in the same corner as Thrasymachus in relation to the value of symbols.

The irony is that Plato relies extensively on rich imagery and narrative skill to make his points. His dialogues are imaginative pieces of literature, full of images such as the cave and its fire, the signet ring and the imprint it makes on wax, and the charioteer who contends with horses pulling in different directions. Plato’s style of thinking was built around imagery and narrative, yet his worldview dismissed their importance. Squeezing symbolism out of the picture in the name of realism and rationality are clearly nothing new. By contrast, this thesis has sought, in Brysk’s (1995) words, to ‘bring… symbolic politics back in’ (p. 585).

Why return to Plato? Or…

Why return to Plato? Or Aristotle? Or Gandhi? Or Marx, Durkheim and Weber? Or indeed Bob Dylan, Rumi, Hildegard of Bingen, Isaiah, Lao Zi, Buddha, Kabir, Kevin Carmody, or Joan Baez? Lederach writes, ‘If I can see it, I can understand it better’ (2005: L1507). Relating contemporary challenges to narratives and viewpoints with significant historical and cultural roots and/ or imaginative power can be valuable when we are trying to ‘see’. It can provide perspective, offer historical yardsticks, point to continuities in human experience, remind us that in many ways, others have ‘been there before’, and locate the challenges of the present in relation to the resources of rich historical and cultural traditions. It can connect current challenges to contexts that are similar-but-different, creating linkages with wider ways of thinking about the issues, and posing questions about how our own ways of thinking—and ‘seeing’—are conditioned. It can generate ‘sparks’ of insight. It can provide a sounding board for bouncing off ideas and finding out what comes back.

When ‘classical’ perspectives are found to be helpful for this process, they are worth pursuing. (Of course, unless there is a sense of affinity or being ‘in tune’ with a particular text or author, and a sense that what they write is valuable and sheds light on current concerns, sources of insight are best sought elsewhere).

Campaigners and students of social movements may look to the writings of figures like Gandhi, Martin Luther King, the leaders of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (e.g. Carson, 1990; Lewis, 2015), as well as the history of Greenpeace (e.g. Hunter, 1979), the writings of Nelson Mandela, and histories by leaders of the feminist movement, (e.g. Grimke, 1991; Lerner and Grimké, 1998; Stanton et al., 1881). As Ghosh (2016) underlines, climate change will not be addressed without imagination—or ‘seeing’ things in new ways.

Maybe there is some irony in the arguing for the value of historical traditions when also highlighting the need for new ways of thinking. If new approaches always involve some kind of break with the past, they often also build on it, reassemble elements of it, or are inspired by it. To return to the example of the Pacific Warriors, their work offers a striking fusion of past and present. The same group that met coal ships with canoes, and talked with traditional elders about traditions of canoe building, used snapchat, Facebook and digital storytelling.

Engaging with ‘classical’ works like these provides sources for the political imagination. For many of the purposes outlined above, art, conversation, music, Leunig cartoons, sitting under the stars, and reflection on ‘the political action that happened last week’ can be valuable in different ways, alongside the history of political and social philosophy and the work of civil society groups.
Maybe all of these can belong (somewhere) if not necessarily in research methodology, at least in the research process—and in the campaigning process as well. This kind of dialogue with cultural tradition won’t be for everyone. However, using symbols in politics is one thing: symbols with some historical and cultural roots is another. This is one reason why the Pacific Warriors stood out as a case study in this thesis. Perhaps one among a number of tasks for those in the climate movement who find this interesting is to work to address climate change with the ‘resources’ that can be found in cultural and historical traditions and bringing the results to life in new ways.
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