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Hegel and the Politicality of Song in the Musical

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Abstract

Musical theatre scholarship has been a growing field since the inception of the Song, Stage, and Screen conference in 2006 and *Studies in Musical Theatre* journal in 2007 (both headed by Dominic Symonds and George Burrows). Despite *SMT* entering its 13th volume, the discussion of song function in the journal is limited to Dan Dinero's acknowledgment of how a 'big black lady song' can "halt a show's progress" (Dinero 2012) and Matthew Lockitt's opposing consideration of the "songless moment" (Lockitt 2012). Beyond *SMT*, Scott McMillin proposed his challenge to the dominance of integration theory in *The Musical as Drama* (McMillin 2006); otherwise the prevailing influence of song function across the literature has remained static for many years.

In this thesis I argue that musicals are one way in which society reflects upon its customs, practices, and beliefs, and that song is an integral part of this function. The politicality of the genre itself is readily accepted, but the political function of song has yet to receive the attention it warrants. Consensus across existing theories of song function is far from universal, deriving instead from disparate and wide-ranging approaches to dramatic impetus. This thesis argues that, while these existing theories are in themselves inherently political, this politicality is not recognised and could be a more effective description of song function in the musical. This question is important, not only because it can explain how musicals and musical theatre song can be used as a tool for social reflection, but also a guide for artists and creators engaged in the creation of new, political musical theatre works.

The methodology employed in this research utilises three case study songs from *Urinetown* (2001), *Company* (1970), and *Dr Horrible's Sing-Along Blog* (2008) through a comparative study situated within the philosophical principles posited by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, with direct

relation to Hegel's theories of right and Spirit in parallel with the existing theories of song function. This research contributes to a diverse field of knowledge in its application of Hegel's theories to an artform in which they have previously not been considered (the musical theatre), in order to reveal new information about that field.

The conclusion contends that applying a Hegelian philosophical standpoint to the characters' social and political situations in the broader social context of the world of the musical can further articulate the extent of dramatic meaning expressed in the show, its intention, and audience experience as they relate to both the fictional, onstage world and their reflective experience in our own social world.

Declaration

This thesis is an original work of my research and contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at any university or equivalent institution and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Ian Nisbet

13 October 2019

Publications During Enrolment

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Environmental Statement

All research materials for this project were handled in Portable Document Format (PDF) where possible. When required, all drafts and research materials were printed on recycled and/or PEFC-certified sustainable paper.

The font used in this thesis is 10 pt. Century Gothic, which, when printed, "uses 30 per cent less ink than Arial" according to Diane Blohowiak, Director of Computing and Information Technology at the University of Wisconsin (Page 2010).

A Note on Quotations

Many of the Hegelian quotations include original square brackets, usually, but not always, to identify the original German term. Authorial inclusions are identified in the accompanying reference (e.g. 'ellipsis added'); otherwise any square brackets can be considered to be original.

This is not the case for the non-Hegelian references where square brackets imply conventional authorial inclusion.

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1 Introduction

> Political trends have been present in almost all musical theatre storytelling over the years. Casts became integrated as America became integrated. Female characters became overtly sexual (in shows like *On the Town* and *Pal Joey*) when American women became overtly sexual. Musical comedy morality became more ambiguous as mainstream American culture moved away from the certainties of traditional organized religion. Every choice made by writers, directors, and designers was political, and each choice either reinforced or challenged prevailing social and political values. *No, No, Nanette* was about wealth and its implications. *Anything Goes* was about America's cultural preoccupation with celebrity. *Gentlemen Prefer Blondes* was about America's reinvigorated postwar hypermaterialism. It was all political, as well as a heck of a lot of fun. (Scott Miller 2007, 5)

As Miller argues, many elements of the musical are inherently political, the outcome being an artform capable of 'reinforcing or challenging prevailing social and political values'. Historically, musicals have represented and responded to a wide variety of political topics, including issues of representation, gender and sexuality, race and religion, and the ideas of individuality, community, and utopia. Yet despite the fact that the musical theatre's predominant mode of engagement is song, the inherent politicality of song is overlooked. A musical can be political in its content, construction, or context (as is the case for the shows examined in this research), but the idea of the political function of song has yet to be examined.

I argue in this thesis that musical theatre songs are themselves inherently political, and that, by considering them in terms of existing sociological and anthropological frameworks, the

researcher possesses a valuable tool for reflecting on how the musical can play a role in both contemporary and historical cultural change.

Traditionally, 'political' musicals (such as the war-themed shows like *South Pacific* [1949], *Cabaret* [1966], and *The Sound of Music* [1959]) have been thought of as representing issues of formal politics. According to political scientists Joe Painter and Alex Jeffrey, 'formal politics', can be defined as "the operation of the constitutional system of government and its publicly-defined institutions and procedures" (2009, 7): "The common-sense view is that [formal] politics is about governments, political parties, elections and public policy, or about war, peace and 'foreign affairs'" (2009, 7 – edited). In contrast, 'informal politics' (Painter and Jeffrey use the example of 'office politics') is the lesser form as it is grounded in cultural hegemony. Painter and Jeffrey describe this as the process of "forming alliances, exercising power, getting other people to do things, developing influence, and protecting and advancing particular goals and interests", with their examples including the politicality of the household, industry, education, and even television (Painter and Jeffrey 2009, 7).

Kevin Harrison and Tony Boyd define politics as the "acquisition and maintenance of power" (2003, 6) and it is in this way that the politicality of character can be seen in the musical. The politicality of television can be seen in *Matilda*'s (2010) "Telly", where we learn that "All you need to make you wise, / Is twenty-three minutes plus advertisements" (Minchin 2012, 89). The politicality of the household in Audrey's "He's Father, he knows best" from *Little Shop of Horrors* (1982) (Howard Ashman in De Spain 2009, 191). The politicality of industry in "Seven-And-A-Half Cents" from *The Pajama Game* (1954), and the politicality of race and education in *South Pacific*'s "You've Got to be Carefully Taught". All of these examples demonstrate some form of "acquisition and maintenance of power", either by marketing corporations, a spouse in the home environment, an employer, or a parent/educator. Painter and Jeffrey's formal politics can also be seen in the musical (e.g. "The Name's La Guardia" from *Fiorello!* [1959]), but "if we are

talking about informal politics, there is no aspect of life which is not political: politics really is everywhere" (Painter and Jeffrey 2009, 7).

The politics of the musical can be seen off-stage, too, including our inability to precisely define what a musical is. John Kenrick documents the form's genesis back to Ancient Greece (2008, 18) and, although what constitutes a musical has varied greatly over time and even medium, William A. Everett argues that it is "undoubtedly one of the most recognizable musical genres of the twentieth century but also one of the most difficult to define with any kind of precision" (2004, 1). Julian Woolford emphasises the traditional understanding of the genre, "where the content of the story is communicated through speech, music and movement in an integrated fashion to create a unified whole" (Woolford 2012, 5) while Millie Taylor avoids the contentious term 'integration', calling musicals "a combination of song, visual spectacle and verbal text that is performed in live theatres" (M. Taylor 2012, 1). Kenrick is even more precise in his definition of "a stage, television, or film production utilizing popular style songs to either tell a story or to showcase the talents of writers and/or performers, with dialogue optional" (Kenrick 2008, 14). Kenrick's definition, however, excludes non-book shows such as concept musicals, song cycles and sung-through musicals, and does not include dance. Furthermore, Len Platt argues that musicals in America have become an "institution, a cultural tradition entwined with nation-building and the national identity" (Platt 2004, 16). For the purposes of this study, I expand upon these definitions to suggest 'a stage, television, or film production that exists in a cultural tradition, and uses popular-style song and/or dance to express stories, explore concepts, or showcase the talents of writers and/or performers, with dialogue optional'. While this expanded definition does include sub-genres such as minstrelsy, vaudeville, and revues, the case studies in this project are nevertheless limited to two book musicals with linear plots (one of which was filmed) and one concept musical with songs that focus on a single concept, namely marriage and relationships, all of which demonstrate elements of formal and/or informal politics.

The question able to be posed is whether the politicality of the musical extends beyond the definitions to which it is commonly ascribed, and specifically in relation to its use of song. It can be argued that politics, in regard to the interaction of humans in civil society, can be communicated through musical theatre song as an extension of the inferred content of the musical itself. A song's particular ability to draw culturally accepted conditions into question raises issues of power, hegemony, cultural influence, class, and gender, and these are the concern of the social sciences. In this thesis, I am interested in the inherent 'politicality' of song, a term originating in criminology where it refers to the "political nature" of justice: "The administration of justice, contrary to common belief, is not 'above politics' but is by its very nature political" (Quinney 2008, 138). The term 'politicality', then, refers to a thing's political nature. Musicals inherently contain this politicality, and, although the term is traditionally applied to criminology and legal studies, so, I argue, does song function. The extent to which this can be substantiated necessitates a discursive understanding of the existing theories of song function in the musical that will now be discussed.

1.1 Existing Theories of Song Function

1.1.1 Diagram of Existing Theories of Song Function



In contrast to the way politics and the political are studied within the history of musicals, the study of song within this milieu is inner-directed, concerned almost exclusively with the

instantiation of the drama in that moment. Reviewing the literature on existing theories relating to song in the musical reveals twelve areas of thought:

1. When Emotion Becomes Too Great for Speech, You Sing
   (L. A. Brown 2007; Bryer and Davison 2008; A. Cohen and Rosenhaus 2006; D. Spencer 2005; Woolford 2012; Sondheim 1978)
2. Integration Theory Where Songs Progress the Drama
   (L. A. Brown 2007; Bryer and Davison 2008; D. Spencer 2005; Woolford 2012; Sondheim 1978; Frank 2000; M. Taylor 2009; Frankel 2000; Haagensen 2003; Styne 2006)
3. How the 'Break' into Song Causes a Metaphysical Shift (Culp 2012)
4. The Idea That Songs Add Value to the Source Text (Woolford 2012)
5. Fusion Theory, Related to Integration (M. Taylor 2009)
6. George C. Wolfe's Concept of the Off-Stage 'Dark World' (Bryer and Davison 2008)
7. Bob Fosse's 'I Am', 'I Want', and 'New' Songs
   (Frankel 2000; L. A. Brown 2007; A. Cohen and Rosenhaus 2006; Woolford 2012; Kenrick 2003)
8. The Idea That Songs Reveal the Subtext of the Scene (Woolford 2012; A. Cohen and Rosenhaus 2006; Fitzpatrick 2016)
9. Coherence Theory (McMillin 2006; Knapp 2005)
10. The Composer's Instinct (Swayne 2007)
11. Brechtian Commentary (Woolford 2012)
12. Matthew Lockitt's Concept of Apollonian and Dionysian Dynamics (Lockitt 2014)

Each of the above theories provides some justification for the movement from speech to song, however not all of them address song function, nor song's potential politicality. As the focus of this thesis is the function of song in the musical the following discussion will therefore be limited to both the most prominent theories in the discipline, and those specifically related to song function.

The five commonly adopted theories that specifically address song function, then, are:

1. When Emotion Becomes Too Great for Speech, You Sing
2. Bob Fosse's 'I Am', 'I Want', and 'New' Songs
3. Integration Theory Where Songs Progress the Drama
4. Coherence Theory, and
5. The Idea That Songs Reveal the Subtext of the Scene

1.1.2 When Emotion Becomes Too Great for Speech, You Sing

Conventional wisdom has held that when emotion becomes too great for speech, you sing. According to theatre professor Larry A. Brown, "When characters reach a point in the drama where they can't help but explode with feelings of love or success or simply the joy of life, music serves to amplify these emotions to a level above mere words" (L. A. Brown 2007). Lyricist Sheldon Harnick has said that some of his best work, especially his love songs, "have come out of anger" (Harnick in Bryer and Davison 2008, 78). Similarly, theatre director, producer and writer Julian Woolford believes "characters can sing only the most rapturous emotions, or the most mundane banalities, but as long as it is consistent with the theatrical language of the piece, then the audience will accept it" (2012, 251). Conversely, composer and lyricist Jason Robert Brown voices his concern regarding issues being "too small" to sing about: "if they were singing about things like that, you wouldn't buy it as an audience member. […] Singing ultimately magnifies everything you're feeling; when you sing it, it becomes epic" (Brown in Bryer and Davison 2008, 34).

Emotion is also regularly touted as a tool for 'song spotting'. Stephen Citron defines song spotting as the quest for "moments that 'sing' better than they 'speak'" (1997, 171), in other words,

moments that would be better suited to song than dialogue. A number of references in the literature support this method. Lyricist Lynn Ahrens has suggested "You look for characters with deep emotions, and you look for dramatic circumstances in the story" (Bryer and Davison 2008, 11). David Spencer agrees: "High points of the story, emotion, and character development, in most cases, define the placement of songs within a score" (2005, 43).

Similarly, Cohen and Rosenhaus contend:

> Song spotting can proceed in a number of ways, but a useful approach is simply to look through the scenario or outline, over and over, until you have identified the important emotional and structural high points. There should be a song at each of these high points, unless you decide that certain moments would be more effective without a song – for instance, if you decide that the best place for a song is shortly after a highpoint, when a character reacts to what has just happened (2006, 191).

In contrast to these previous discussions, David Spencer proposes a "new-age variation" (2005, 69) to the rule in response to Stephen Sondheim's shows that tackle issues of "uncertainty and self-exploration" (Kenrick 2008, 326), specifically that "when things get a little too tense to talk about, you sing" (2005, 69).

This theory is well established in the discipline, as can be seen from the examples above. It does not, however, discuss either the politicality of song or the politicality of these emotions, an element of song yet to be addressed in the scholarship.

It could be asked why this oversight is important, why it matters that politicality has been excluded from the discussion of song function in the musical. Has this been merely overlooked, or is it consistent with the broadly accepted approaches to musical theatre song analysis, and

also the relative paucity of research that looks beyond the dramatic function of song? Or is it because some still consider musicals to be "middlebrow[,] popular entertainments" (Savran in Wolf 2007, 51), incapable of political social comment? Why has this politicality of song not been researched before and why is it imperative for a project such as this to be undertaken in our tumultuous political times of autocrats, threats to democracy, toxic xenophobia, and climate crisis?

For the purposes of this research there is no need to address the "middlebrow" dismissal of the genre; the political content and history of the form is well established, it is simply song's participation in this function that is overlooked. Our existing understanding of the dramatic function of song is limiting as it inhibits our ability to understand the meaning/influence of song beyond the world of the show. Politicality, then, becomes important not only when examining the inherent drama of a musical, but also for our ability to interpret song outside the world of the show and within our own social frameworks i.e., for song to work *outside* the show as much as in it. The drama of a musical is inherently political, and it possible to examine it in this way, too, but musicals have lives beyond the stage, out in the real world of their creation, that can tell us just as much about our social world as their own, and I argue that there are existing sociological and anthropological frameworks that are capable of revealing, examining, and exploring both sides of this politicality of song.

1.1.3 Fosse's 'I Am', 'I Want', and 'New' Songs

One of the most well-known, yet least supported theories in the literature is director and choreographer Bob Fosse's concept of 'I Am', 'I Want', and 'New' songs. This is due mainly to the widespread loose appropriation of Fosse's terms, which have been passed down with little to no explanation as to their meaning or application.

The origin of the term 'I Want' to describe a type of song in a musical is unclear. Some authors attribute it to Lehman Engel (de Giere n.d.; Vandevender 2009, 299), while others consider it in addition to Engel's ballad, charm, and comedy songs (Hicks 2015, 7–8; Knapp, Morris, and Wolf 2011, 34).

Fosse's theory is most-thoroughly outlined in Aaron Frankel's *Writing the Broadway Musical* (2000). According to Frankel, Fosse described three kinds of "tool" songs in the musical: "either *I Am* or *I Want* songs, otherwise they are *New* songs" (2000, 95):

> In the *I Am*, the character's *need* is to confront. It may assert itself in several ways: to define an attitude, to take a stand, to apply the past or to change the future. The action may question or affirm, yield or persist – but the character commits himself in some way. *To claim* or *to discover* some new or greater awareness is its essence. *I Am* also appears as "I was," "had," "did," "you are," "we could" and so on, plus their interrogatives. (2000, 95)

Cohen and Rosenhaus, while not explicitly using Fosse's term in their examples from a musical adaptation of *The Prince and the Pauper* (first performance date unknown), suggest the use of songs that "highlight the vast gulf between the lives of the haves and have-nots" (2006, 193), "give the perspective of the courtiers" (2006, 194), and "anticipate the reign of Edward with optimism and support" (2006, 196).

In contrast to 'I Am' songs:

> In the *I Want*, the character's *need* is to reach. It also takes several forms: to yearn, to crave, to pursue, to seize – to desire so strongly that, again, the character acts upon it in some way. The *I Want* has a greater innate thrust than the *I Am* to *turn character out*, to relate him more deeply or more quickly

> to others and to the world. *To strive for* or *to demand* something more or something different is its essence. *I Want* also comes out in other words: "I tried," "I won't," "can't we?" and so on". (Frankel 2000, 95–96)

Much like 'I Am' songs, 'I Want' songs can take other names. Larry A. Brown describes them as "conflict songs [where] characters struggle to attain differing goals" (2007).

Finally there are New songs: "*New* songs defy categorizing more precisely because they are designed to meet needs which are novel; this is also a large aspect of *special material*" (Frankel 2000, 96).

Frankel puts much effort in to describing each of Fosse's categories but provides no practical method for determining which song type any particular song may be. Is a song 'I Am' if it starts in an 'I Am' state? Or if it ends in one? Should the majority of the lyric be in one state to clearly define the function of the song? Or what if there are multiple simultaneous states as in some duets or chorus numbers? Fosse and Frankel leave all such questions unanswered.

On the question of multiple simultaneous states in musical theatre songs, Frankel claims that "If a song idea seems to be both *I Want* and *I Am*, ego and biology are after all aspects of each other – what I want often reveals what I am" (Frankel 2000, 96). With this statement, Fosse's originally tripartite system, of which one term ('New') already acts as an umbrella for any and all uncategorisable songs, shrinks to a binary of songs that are either 'I Am', 'I Want', or both; and everything else.

Despite the contradictory definitions of Fosse's song types, they do address elements of politicality in terms of characters reflecting on their situation and desiring change. Notwithstanding, Fosse's theory does not directly address the potential political effect on the audience, or how we can interpret their actions and decisions as being political in nature.

1.1.4 Integration Theory (Songs Progress the Drama)

Integration theory remains the touchstone for discussion relating to the function of song in the musical. Rodgers and Hammerstein's *Oklahoma!* (1943) is commonly accepted as the original example of a fully integrated musical, where "all elements of [the] show – plot, character, song, dance, orchestration, and setting [–] blend together into a unity, a seamless whole" (McMillin 2006, 1 – edited). Bordman, however, argues that Gilbert and Sullivan's *HMS Pinafore* (1878) gave audiences a "rare, but not new, kind of musical theatre in which book, lyrics and music combined to form an integral whole" as far back as 1878 (Bordman in Jones 2011, 10).

Many practitioners – those engaged in the writing of musical theatre – have a strong grasp of integration theory, as can be seen from their discussions in the literature. Composer Stephen Flaherty believes that "In the contemporary musical, the music carries the drama. The music is as important as the book settings, and oftentimes the music is the book scene" (Flaherty in Bryer and Davison 2008, 14). Jason Robert Brown argues that "Pop songs by their nature are about establishing a mood, sustaining it, and finishing with it. Theater songs are about the opposite; good theater songs go from one end of an idea to a different place" (Brown in Frank 2000). Stephen Sondheim agrees: "that's what the song's supposed to accomplish – the season change" (Sondheim 1978, 17). Sondheim also considers songs capable of performing a book function, referring to them as "tunes in the service of telling a story" (Sondheim in Bryer and Davison 2008, 194).

Though integration theory may be widely accepted, its long-standing hold on the genre has been challenged by Scott McMillin who argues that songs are capable of pausing the drama in a musical as well as progressing it.

1.1.5 Coherence Theory (Songs Pause the Drama)

In *The Musical as Drama* (2006), Scott McMillin takes up a contrary position to integration theory to posit what he considers to be a more fundamental account of the function of song in the musical.

McMillin argues for 'Two Orders of Time', specifically 'book' time and 'lyric' time:

> The book represents the plot or the action. It moves (in terms borrowed from Aristotle's *Poetics*) from a beginning through a middle to an end. This is progressive time, in the sense that the ending is different from the beginning – things are not going to be the same after this. (2006, 6)

Lyric time, in contrast, is steeped in repetition: "The effect of breaking into song (or dance) is to double the characters into the second order of time, the lyric time of music, so that they gain a formality of expression unavailable to them in the book" (McMillin 2006, 20). McMillin does not value one form of time over the other but argues that "what matters most is the alternation between the two. That is what gives the musical its lift, its energy, its elation" (McMillin 2006, 33):

> When a character breaks into song or dance, the plot is being suspended for the insertion of a different element. Musical time takes over from plot time, which is to say that plot time is interrupted for the sake of a new dimension of characterization, a doubling of character into lyric repetitions. This doubling into musical performance breaks the illusion of realism which attends the libretto–scenes and let some characters give a second account of themselves, an account transpiring in song and dance (McMillin 2005, 324).

McMillin coined the term 'coherence' to describe his theory: "Coherence means things stick together, different things, without losing their difference" (2006, 209). McMillin's work has had a profound effect on the musical theatre, generating a shift of thought that had not changed since the 1940s.

Relatedly, Raymond Knapp briefly refers to a similar idea of "suspended animation" in *The American Musical and the Formation of National Identity* (2005, 12), and a recent article on writing for the theatre by Jason Robert Brown demonstrates how, although he may not be aware of it, his own thinking in relation to song function has changed since an interview on the same topic with Jonathan Frank in 2000 (cited earlier):

> A song, in a contemporary audience's mind, is a) repetitive and b) contained. […] The composer of a musical, therefore, has to constantly negotiate between the sheer musical pleasures that the audience (and the composer!) desires and the basic storytelling that the audience is following. Containment and repetition are guideposts to help the composer thread that needle (J. R. Brown 2016 – edited).

McMillin argues that book time moves the drama forward: "the ending is different from the beginning – things are not going to be the same after this" (2006, 6). But it is not hard to think of songs that perform this same function, songs that progress the drama in between book scenes. Songs can indeed pause and reflect on the drama in a musical, and McMillin's theory demonstrates this new understanding of their dramatic function, but it is not their only role, nor does it address any potential politicality.

1.1.6 Songs Reveal the Subtext of the Scene

Within the limits of constructs considered so far, the remaining theory of song function proposes that "characters may also sing because the music may reveal the subtext of the scene" (Woolford 2012, 252). According to Cohen and Rosenhaus, "composers can [also] create subtext by using music to contradict the lyrics" (2006, 137). Related to the 'I Am' and 'I Want' songs, musical numbers can reveal to the audience something of the internal life of the character in a way that dialogue cannot. According to Peter Fitzpatrick: "Sometimes it's about saying things that prose can't say; sometimes it's articulate subtext. Sometimes it can play in ironic counterpoint to the line of action, and suggest other layers of thought and emotion" (Fitzpatrick 2016). Examples of this function can be seen in Sondheim's feverish accompaniment to the lyrics of "I'm Calm" from *A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Forum* (1962), or the jaunty waltz accompanying Sweeney and Mrs. Lovett's song about "popping [people] into pies" (Sondheim 2010, 339).

There is a clear politicality in the potentiality of subtext to undermine meaning, and also in the ability of musical accompaniment to send contradictory messages to the audience (such as the joy of waltzing along to the idea of murder). However, while this theory does contain elements of politicality, it is still introspective to the world of the musical and lacking in specificity. I contend that both of these issues can be better addressed by other existing theories yet to be applied to the musical theatre.

1.1.7 Summation and Suggestions

A consistency applicable to the foregoing approaches to song function theory is the centralisation of drama as the key to understanding the function of song in the musical. Rather than providing an analysis that solely refers to the internal motivation of the drama, in this thesis I argue that, by combining approaches from the field of sociology with close reading analyses, we become able to move beyond these purely dramatic conceptions, to look instead at the

function of song as yet another way of emphasising, supporting, and promoting the political nature of the musical.

Political analysis requires a political theory, and there is one name that can we can use to examine song's politicality within a sociological and anthropological framework – Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. According to David Duquette, Hegel (1770–1831) is "one of the greatest systematic thinkers in the history of Western philosophy": "In addition to epitomizing German idealist philosophy, Hegel boldly claimed that his own system of philosophy represented an historical culmination of all previous philosophical thought. […] Of most enduring interest are his views on history, society, and the state, which fall within the realm of Objective Spirit" (Duquette 2018). Hegel's work influenced such prominent thinkers as Marx, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Sartre, and, Adorno, among others, and his social theories are still relevant to this day. Hegel's theories of Spirit and social reconciliation remain perceptive in that they track not only an individual's development within their social world, but also the reasons/logic for their actions.

By applying Hegel's theories to song function in the musical, we can move from the existing introspective and purely dramatic understanding of a character's diegetic actions, to an opened-out, reflective position that can not only explain their actions within the drama of the show, but also allows us to reflect on and reconsider our understanding of the world outside the show, and our roles and duties within its institutions. These theories can therefore bridge the gap between our current historical understanding of the musical as well as our dramatic understanding of song, creating an interplay between the function of musicals as tools of social reflection and the process of world history.

I contend that Hegel's theories can reveal the political nature of both the content and function of song in the musical, a characteristic currently overlooked by the existing theories. Subsequently, while still providing valid descriptions, each of these theories of song function offer only a partial explanation of the phenomenon and raise more questions than they solve. I argue

that this thesis demonstrates discursively, through the examination of three case studies, that Hegel's theories provide a more nuanced and fundamental account of the function of song, an account capable of revealing the character's political situation within the musical, that can work more effectively across both book and concept musicals, a sub-genre that evades the current theories.

The methodology employed in this research is derived from a philological approach to the language of musicals, specifically through a close reading of three case studies. Distilled through the lens of Hegelian social theory, the function of song in *Urinetown*, *Company*, and *Dr. Horrible's Sing-Along Blog* is examined in order to expose potentially unrevealed political content. Although I contend that all musicals contain their own politicality in a number of ways, these three shows have been chosen specifically for their own politicality. *Urinetown*'s plot has a clear dramatic drive propelled by and focused on the politicality of a civil uprising. *Company* is political for three reasons. Firstly, it is structurally innovative in that it is considered to be one of the first 'concept musicals' that challenged audience expectations of what a musical could be. Secondly, because it explores the shifting nature of marriage and relationships in an important period of social change in the late 20th century, and thirdly in the political development of the main character (Bobby) throughout the show. Finally, *Dr Horrible's Sing-Along Blog* is an Internet musical written by Joss Whedon during the 2007–8 Writers Guild of America strike. Whereas not a movie musical adhering to the common conventions of films that fall within this category, this show's inclusion is intended to demonstrate the possibility of applying Hegelian theory to non-stage musicals, just as *Company* demonstrates its relevance to non-book musicals. *Dr Horrible* is not only political for its online dissemination, but also as an artifact of the social and political context of its creation.

All three shows have clear political imperatives in their content, construction, and social context, and I contend that this politicality can also be seen in the function of their songs. The close reading will therefore approach a song from each show both in terms of its dramatic context,

but also in an effort to reveal the politicality of the characters' situations through the application of Hegel's theories. This will be achieved through a comparison with existing theories of song function, identifying their gaps, and applying the Hegelian philosophical standpoint to the characters' social and political situations. Moreover, this method is intended to also reveal the broader social contexts of the song, not only in the world of the musical, but also its relevance to the real social world from which the musical derives. This approach will not only provide a distinctly political background for the diegetic drama, but also reveal the ways that we can reflect on the characters' presented situations and compare them to what we take to be "authoritative" in our own social world (Pinkard 1996, 241). The application of Hegelian theory, consequently, allows us to distinguish between the internalised, in-world drama of the show in comparison to the manifestation of the representation of this drama in the real world.

The ultimate aim of this research, then, is to reconsider the current understanding of song function in the musical by taking a distinctly political and Hegelian viewpoint, and, in doing so, provide an argument for the musical as a vehicle of Hegelian Spirit. Previous studies have identified the predominantly dramatic function of song, and, just like Hegel's social spheres (to be discussed further in Chapter 3), this research does not intend to tear down these theories but to synthesise them into a larger, more sophisticated, and distinctly political frame. The concept of politicality has already been discussed, and it is my contention that Hegel's theories provide a more fundamental understanding of song's ability to function in this way. The theoretical background to this research has also identified a gap in the literature that neglects the potential application of historically significant Hegelian theory to the musical, and this project makes the first contribution to that field.

I argue that the inherent politicality of the musical allows it to be a valuable tool for social reflection. This project's significance, therefore, lies in its ability to outline a new method for understanding the musical's ability to function in this way, through the lens of Hegel's social theories and the function of song. The findings of this research have a clear cultural benefit as I

argue that musicals play an important role in society's reflection on what it takes to be "authoritative for itself" (Pinkard 1996, 241), Miller's 'social and political values' from the start of the chapter. At a more grass-roots level, studies such as this will aid writers and performers of musicals in their engagement with existing shows and the development of new works. Finally, this project makes a unique contribution to knowledge in its application of two historically significant social theories, Hegel's philosophy of right and his concept of Spirit, to a field to which they are yet to be applied (the musical theatre) in an effort to provide a more nuanced and fundamental understanding of the genre.

The politicality of musical theatre song matters because it allows us to understand the political nature of the characters' situations, not only within the world of the show, but also in relation to the greater society from which the work emerges. It is my contention that each and every character on the musical stage is striving to be at home in their social world, to achieve what Hegel terms reconciliation (to be addressed in the Chapter 3), as we do in our own lives. In understanding the plights and situations of the characters, we can rehearse potential challenges in our own lives, and the lives of others, in order to reflect upon and consider what we take for granted in our own society and potentially reconsider our assumptions and biases. Hegel's model reveals this process at work.

In order to move towards a conclusion as to the efficacy of Hegelian theories applicable to the musical, the remaining chapters present the following:

Chapter Two discusses the history of political musical theatre in the United States, both more broadly and in relation to the three case-study musicals, as well as the those engaged in the writing of politically themed musicals and the political development of the genre.

Chapter Three examines potential alternate phenomenological theories before outlining Hegel's concepts of Spirit and social reconciliation in order to prepare the reader for their application in the following case-studies.

Chapter Four then examines one number from each of *Urinetown, Company, and Dr. Horrible's Sing-along Blog* through this Hegelian lens in order to reveal the politicality of both the musicals and their songs.

Chapter Five reconsiders the existing theories of song function alongside this new-found information and demonstrates how they can be synthesised into a unified, political whole.

Chapter Six then explores the new insights generated by the application of Hegel's theories while also arguing for the musical's ability to function in the larger world as a vehicle of Hegelian Spirit, before addressing the project's limitations and making suggestions for future research.

2 Political Musical Theatre in the United States

> Culturally speaking, musicals matter. How they matter and to whom may change. But the fact *that* they matter has remained fairly constant in American culture overtime. While popularity may not be the sole measure of worth, their popularity attests to the degree to which they resonate with something vital in the tenor of an age. Musicals provide one way of taking the pulse of American culture. The pleasures they afford are sufficiently varied to cover a spectrum of tastes. And it is through such pleasures that audiences have traditionally taken stock of who they are at any given moment. (Stempel 2010, 13)

2.1 Political Musical Theatre Since the Great Depression

As has been recognised with political theatre in the USA (Bartnik 2014; Barton 2012; Eisler 2012; Fine 2011; Herr 2001; Nadler 1995; Shaffer 2002; Vincentini 1976), musicals equally, as Stempel asserts, "provide one way of taking the pulse of American culture" at any given time. American musical theatre, including those shows not composed in a specific geographical location but written in the Broadway style (e.g. *Miss Saigon* [1989]), can be seen to have reacted/responded to historically significant political events over time. *Come From Away* (2017) represents informal political events geographically removed from 9/11 but caused by the event itself. *Hair* (1967) acts as a social commentary/protest against the formal politicality of the Vietnam War, while *Assassins* (1990) and *Rap Master Ronnie* (1984) explore the political lives (and deaths) of American presidents through allegory and satire. Two of the case-study musicals for this research are politically themed but not directly related to any specific historical event (*Urinetown* and *Company*). *Dr. Horrible's Sing-Along Blog*, while not representing a specific event, was created during the 2007–8 Writers Guild of America strike. Although none of these works recreate specific

political events on the musical stage all three are political in some way, either through their content, the context of their creation, or their construction. This inherent politicality will be discussed further below.

Since the 1930s, musicals have repeatedly represented and responded to a wide variety of historical events, figures, and political issues, and this practice can be seen to be part of the tradition of the form. The subject matter of these musicals commonly focuses on issues of formal politics such as representation (Wolf 2002; 2006; 2008; Vandevender 2009; Jones 2011; Shih 2014), gender and sexuality (Mulvey 1999; Wollman 2008; Lawrence 2009; Charlton 2012; Savran 2012; Pysnik 2014), race and religion (Most 2004; S. Smith 2005; Van Aken 2006; Sebesta 2007; Thomas 2010; B. Wood 2010; Jones 2011; Dinero 2012; Hoffman 2014), and the ideas of individuality, community, and utopia (Dolan 2001; 2005; Dyer 2002; Adiseshiah 2011; Jones 2011; Ellis 2013; M. Taylor 2014). While some of these issues could be considered those of informal politics (e.g. gender and sexuality), they can also cross into formal territory when involved in issues of policy and equity. Specifically, it is important to note why there are so many responses to war, or musicals about race and immigration, as these themes are clearly central to the American experience as displayed through the musical theatre. In the words of Raymond Knapp, "The American musical has always been deeply involved in questions or race and ethnicity, with racism and other forms of xenophobia continuing to constitute one of America's most contentious and persevering problems" (Knapp 2005, 181). Furthermore, "The American musical has always played a part in helping to define how America sees itself, and this has been especially important in the wake of World War II" (Knapp 2005, 228). These familiar themes, as well as others, can be seen in tables included in Appendix 1. These tables outline shows that responded to or represented a range of formal political issues on the musical stage (including those reproduced for film or television), since the Great Depression.

Although one of the case studies is a filmed, Internet musical, movie musicals have been excluded from this sample group. While acknowledging that the importance and achievements

of movie musicals "cannot be disputed" (Barrios 2014, 13), movie musicals need to be removed this discussion as their politicality adds layers of considerations wholly removed from the aesthetics of on-stage drama. Moreover, I would contend that interrogating movie musicals (especially as adaptations of theatrical productions) is a separate thesis in the politics of film-making as it has evolved since the first musical filmed in 1927 to the present day. It is therefore beyond the scope of this study to provide a comprehensive analysis of the wealth and depth of movie musical history.

While it could be argued that all musicals, both on stage and on film, express some element of informal politics, the space at my disposal must limit the examples in Appendix 1 to shows produced post-1930 that represent issues of formal politics on the musical stage in order to demonstrate repeated efforts to imbue politicality into the genre.

2.2 Introduction to the Politicality of Musical Theatre

While it is impossible to identify every show that could conceivably be seen to derive from, or rise from, a reaction to any given political event in the USA within the space at my disposal, there are a number of creators who have repeatedly engaged with political themes throughout the history of musical theatre, as can be seen in the tables in Appendix 1.

From the many high-profile names in the history of musical theatre listed in Appendix 1, it can be seen that some of these writers, such as the Gershwins, were simultaneously working on multiple shows that addressed different formal political issues being faced by early-20th-century American society (in their case one show about the Great Depression and two on prohibition). But how is this politicality communicated? Many of the named writers authored politically themed shows that realistically, satirically, ironically, or allegorically represented or responded to political events or themes of their time or the past. But a musical does not have to specifically

address or represent specific historical events in order to be political in its content, nor is it necessary for the plot to cover formal political issues (or for there to even be a 'plot' at all). For example, *CATS* (1980) does not address historical political events, but it could still be argued to be political in its content as a series of characters appealing to "their leader, the wise Old Deuteronomy, who will choose which of the Jellicle Cats will journey tonight to the Heaviside layer to be reborn into a new life" ("The Story of Cats" 2019). This is an example of Harrison and Boyd's "acquisition and maintenance of power" (2003, 6), as the cats vie for 'power'/influence over Deuteronomy's decision. Similarly, *Avenue Q* (2003) does not relate to any specific historical event but still addresses formal and informal political issues of sexuality, racism, and homelessness (among others), and does so with puppets!

The contributions of other scholars who have made important contributions to the social and cultural politicality of the musical include John 'Bush' Jones (2011), David Walsh and Len Platt (2003), Raymond Knapp (2005; 2009), and Miranda Lundskaer-Nielsen (2008). Jones covers the "centuries-long, multidimensional relationship between theatre and American society" (2011, 1), Walsh, Platt, and Knapp respectively discuss how musicals "voice society's own sense of its life and values" (2003, 1) and helped Americans "envision [themselves] as a nation of disparate peoples" (2005, 7), while Lundskaer-Nielsen addresses how West End shows "challenged the idea of musicals as an intrinsically American art form" (2008, 1). This research builds on the work of these scholars by dedicating its focus to song in the musical and introducing a framework with which we can understood how song functions as a tool for expressing this social politicality.

One example of a writer whose shows address multiple formal political issues, including those not necessarily related to a specific historical event, is lyricist Fred Ebb. *Flora the Red Menace* (1965), *Cabaret*, and *The Scottsboro Boys* (2010) address specific historical events (Communism, the Great Depression, World War II and the Scottsboro Boys trial), while *Chicago* (1975) takes general aim at the American justice system and the (informal) concept of the celebrity criminal:

Give 'em the old Razzle Dazzle

Razzle dazzle 'em

Give 'em a show that's so splendiferous

Row after row will crow vociferous

Give 'em the old flim flam flummox

Fool and fracture 'em

How can they hear the truth above the roar?

Throw 'em a fake and a finagle

They'll never know you're just a bagel,

Razzle dazzle 'em

And they'll beg you for more!

Give 'em the old double whammy

Daze and dizzy 'em

Back since the days of old Methuselah

Everyone loves the big bambooz-a-ler

Give 'em the old three ring circus

Stun and stagger 'em

When you're in trouble, go into your dance

Though you are stiffer than a girder

They'll let you get away with murder

Razzle dazzle 'em

And you've got a romance

(Kander and Ebb, n.d., 76)

Earlier, during "Sign Here" from *Flora*, Harry sings:

> Are you in favor of democracy?
> You must be in favor of democracy!
> Well, since you're in favor of democracy,
> Here, sign; sign here!
>
> How do you feel about the rights of man?
> Are you a supporter of the rights of man?
> You must be in favor of the rights of man;
> Here, sign; sign here!
>
> The rights of man?
> Democracy?
> Then it's clear! It's clear!
> You're a Communist; sign here!
> (Kander and Ebb 1988, 76–78)

Prior to Kander and Ebb, in the midst of the Depression, Irving Berlin "snubbed [his] nose at monogamy" ("Bringing Back Berlin" 2007)/the formal social conventions of marriage in *Face the Music* (1932):

> Don't worry because I fell
> You don't have to do right by Nell
> 'Cause I don't wanna be married, I just wanna be friends
>
> Don't worry 'cause I gave in

Best of families live in sin

'Cause they don't wanna be married, they just wanna be friends

While all the happy married couples sit and fight

We'll be still going strong

And fifty million Frenchmen say it's quite alright

And that many can't be wrong

I never would change my name

Even after the baby came

'Cause I don't wanna be married, I just wanna be friends

(Berlin n.d.)

These examples discuss challenging formal and informal political content (misleading juries, Communism, and socially progressive approaches to relationships), yet all are sung in a light, and, in the case of "Razzle Dazzle" and "I Don't Wanna Be Married", swung musical style. The musical theatre has long been synonymous with 'musical comedy', and this light-hearted approach to song may be a contributing factor to this description. However, not all musical theatre has to be light-hearted or 'comedic'. In fact, when searching for the term 'anti-musical' (to be described further later in relation to *Urinetown*), the term "grotesque" appears a number of times, both in relation to *Adding Machine: A Musical* (2007) (including 'The Gospel According to Shrdlu', a "gospel swing number'" about deserving punishment for murdering your mother/being damned to Hell – Hitchings 2016) and Bob Fosse's *All That Jazz* (1979) (including 'Bye Bye Life', a parody of the Everly Brothers' 'Bye Bye Love' – Debaere 2016). For Roberto Aguirre-Sacasa, book writer of *American Psycho* (the musical, 2013), the decision to "write something that was fundamentally dark with the comedy coming second, resulted in a piece that remains true to its morbid roots while also expressing deep satirical smarts" (Auriemma 2016). It appears that the musical theatre can also be political without being playful. In the

words of Stéphanie Debaere, "sparkly outfits sometimes go with heavy subject matter" (Debaere 2016).

These selective examples are intended to introduce a nascent awareness of the politicality of song in the musical. This function is not new and can be argued as far as back as Gilbert and Sullivan (C. Williams 2011; Carrette 2015) and beyond. However, the centrality of the politicality of song has received significantly less coverage in academic writings on politically motivated or politically informed musical theatre works and this study takes the first steps towards filling this gap.

2.3 Acquisition and Maintenance of Power in the History of the Musical

Historical timelines of the musical generally follow a commonly accepted path from light opera to vaudeville to Rodgers and Hammerstein and beyond. A timeline of politically themed shows since the Great Depression has been provided in Appendix 1, along with the creators responsible for their development, but what is yet to be explored is the political impact some of these writers also had on the genre itself. The following discussion tracks the development of the musical alongside the seminal works of these writers in order to demonstrate how these politically themed shows also played a role in the acquisition and maintenance of power within the genre.

Prior to our starting point of the 1930s, Claudine van Hensbergen argues that John Gay's *The Beggar's Opera*, as far back as 1728, was "just as politically provocative [as *Hamilton* (2015)] – and just as popular", mainly due to the politicality of its content:

> The success of *The Beggar's Opera* was due, in part, to its gritty setting in Newgate Prison – and a cast of characters that included criminals, prostitutes and corrupt prison officials. But it was also down to its political message. This

> was a hugely provocative work: the musical took satirical aim at the whole of British society, showing the hypocrisy and corruption that filtered down from the highest levels of power to the poorest on the streets. It suggested that Newgate Prison was a mirror for the nation, with the poorest condemned for committing the same crimes excused in the wealthy. (van Hensbergen 2017)

Nearly three centuries later, Thomas Kail uses the same terminology, stating that "he and [Lin-Manuel] Miranda always intended for [*Hamilton*] to feel relevant, holding up a mirror to society" (Ellis-Petersen 2017). This idea of "holding up a mirror"/reflecting upon society is a primary theme of this thesis, and also, I argue, a primary theme of the musical.

The "implicit criticism of the then-prime minister, Robert Walpole" in *The Beggar's Opera*, and Gay's sequel show, *Polly* (1729), resulted in the 1737 Stage Licensing Act, "making it law that all productions had to submit to the controlling eyes of the government censor prior to performance" (van Hensbergen 2017). While *The Beggar's Opera* contains political material it also exhibits clear political intent in its targeted attack on the British aristocracy. Therefore, it can be argued that, from its earliest days, the musical has not only contained formal political content but has also been a vehicle for political acts on the world.

The British influence on the fledgling American musical has been widely discussed (Jones 2011, 4; Knapp 2009, 5; Kenrick 2008, 13; Kantor and Maslon 2004, 42; et al.). However, following this initial impact, American writers took it upon themselves to develop a distinctly American version of the artform, possibly in order to shine the "mirror" onto their own society rather than that of England:

> Developing musical comedy as an American genre distinct from the British model involved adapting the form to suit the native wit. […] For audiences generally, Americanizing musical comedy depended more on the efforts of personalities working in the limelight rather than behind the scenes –

> performers such as George M. Cohan and Al Jolson; songsmiths such as Irving Berlin and Jerome Kern (Stempel 2010, 136).

Kern and Berlin appeared in the tables outlining shows written with political themes or in response to political acts. These writers, and their peers, were not only writing shows about American political events, they were writing shows that were about "holding up a mirror" to their own, American society. Ben Sanderson, in a press release regarding the British Library's acquisition of the D'Oyly Carte archive, describes it as "British in the sense of the audiences it reached, and its subject matter, which relates to stage works offering a unique view on aspects of British society and culture from the late Victorian period" (Sanderson 2015). American audiences did not want to see "aspects of British society and culture from the late Victorian period" on their stages, they wanted American stories and the writers were happy to oblige. In the words of Irving Berlin:

> My ambition is to reach the heart of the average American […] Not the highbrow nor the lowbrow but that vast intermediate crew which is the real soul of the country. The highbrow is likely to be superficial, overtrained, supersensitive. The lowbrow is warped, subnormal. My public is the real people (Berlin in Berger 1989)

According to Kern: "Irving Berlin has no place in American music […] He is American music" (Kern in Holden 1987). Similarly, Isaac Stern argues that "American music was born at his [Berlin's] piano" (Stern in Berger 1989). But, according to Berlin's own description, his music is that of the "average American" (Klein 1994). This is, in itself, a political decision by Berlin.

Harrison and Boyd's definition of politics as the "acquisition and maintenance of power" (2003, 6) could be read as a pessimistic conception of power, i.e. a controlling power intended to manipulate others. Berlin's intention to target the American middle class is a move of power, but

not one of manipulation. In the words of Kamala Sankaram: "All stories are inherently political in that all stories choose a perspective and place it front and center. If you're thinking, 'I have never chosen a perspective', that is because you are assuming that your perspective is the default" (2019). By earmarking a particular social class and choosing to place their perspective "front and center", Berlin made a political choice in an effort to acquire and maintain power/influence over that class, an act that may have contributed to the form's consideration as an afore-mentioned "middlebrow[,] popular entertainment" (Savran in Wolf 2007, 51).

The next commonly accepted turning point of the musical was Kern and Oscar Hammerstein II's *Show Boat* (1927). Billed by producer Florenz Ziegfeld as "An All-American Musical Comedy", *Show Boat* broke the mould of the musical with its "multigenerational American saga that began in the nineteenth century and ended half a century later in what was then the present" (Stempel 2010, 173). According to Ethan Mordden, "instead of the usual configuration of one romantic couple and one comic couple, *Show Boat* counts five extremely diverse couples" (Mordden 2013, 125). Rather, it is the fact that there was "so much sheer character in a form that ran on stars and stereotypes [that] makes *Show Boat* important aside from its music" (Mordden 2013, 126). Furthermore, *Show Boat* challenged the formal politics of the "segregation of black-cast and white-cast [on] Broadway", being the first show with an 'integrated' cast, although Todd Decker notes that "the mixed-race cast is not equally balanced [–] whites dominate the story; blacks are featured in many of its most effective musical moments" (Decker 2013, 6).

According to Mordden:

> No musical before *Show Boat* unfolded such a panorama, nor dared comment on it with such omniscient perspective. In Friedrich Schiller's terminology of "naïve" and "sentimental" art, musicals before *Show Boat* were naïve: free of perspective. *Show Boat* is sentimental: observant. It sorts through

> what, in this life, is a vanity and what is worthy, consistent, natural. As the river goes, so time goes (Mordden 2013, 129).

Any historical timeline of American musical theatre would be remiss to exclude 1943's *Oklahoma!* (Music by Richard Rodgers, book and lyrics by Oscar Hammerstein II). *Oklahoma!* made political waves in the Broadway community as the first show that "didn't greet the audience with a rousing opening number that set the scene – the musical comedy norm" and included "self-conscious […] integration of drama and music, speech and song, action and dance" (Stempel 2010, 302 & 308). Recent discourse, however, has cast shadows over the history of this nationally prized show, to be discussed later in this section.

In the words of William Goldman: "Before *Oklahoma!* came along […] a show about Oklahoma would have begun with 'Oklahoma'", which, in this case, turned out to be the show's "rousing final number" instead (Goldman in Stempel 2010, 302). Furthermore, *Variety*'s critic at the time noted that through the "play's unorthodox opening (girls do not come on for 35 minutes), [the] audience is made aware early that '*Away*'[1] is not the conventional type of song-and-dancer. Roles are played straight rather than operetta fashion, which enhances the script angle of the production" (Stempel 2010, 301). And it appears that Hammerstein was aware of this at the time of writing, highlighting the politicality of his choices:

> [Had *Oklahoma!* been a conventional musical comedy] I'd have an opening chorus sung by a row of cowgirls in high boots, short skirts, bare knees, and ten-gallon hats. Aunt Eller would be a musical-comedy heavy woman making wisecracks, and Ado Annie's comedy would be broader and noisier. [Yet] no matter how much the audience laughed, I'd have killed *Oklahoma!* because the rest of the story wouldn't go with that beginning, The start of your play tells

[1] *Oklahoma!* was originally known as *Away We Go!* during its out-of-town tryouts (Stempel 2010, 301).

> audiences the kind of thing they're going to see and you mustn't mislead them (Hammerstein in Stempel 2010, 302)[2].

Instead of a "rousing opening number that set the scene – the musical comedy norm", the audience was met by "Aunt Eller, a middle-aged woman, who sat quietly on a porch churning butter by herself, while offstage a lone cowboy sang a ballad called 'Oh, What a Beautiful Mornin' – almost exactly the way the original play began" (Stempel 2010, 302). *Oklahoma!* was not "short on 'gals'" but they were "different" to those expected by audiences at the time (Stempel 2010, 302). Similarly, "Oh, What a Beautiful Mornin'" "departed from the standard AABA of show tunes in favour of the verse-refrain of a folk ballad" (Stempel 2010, 302). Indeed, "something in the very spirit of Hammerstein's adaptations and appropriations seemed to go against the grain of a musical production aimed at Broadway" (Stempel 2010, 301), which may explain how its "influence on subsequent musicals was both immediate and far-flung" (Stempel 2010, 300).

However, despite Hammerstein's acquisition and maintenance of power over the genre, even his own protégé, Stephen Sondheim, could see that there was still more to be done:

> Despite his influence on my life, Oscar Hammerstein II is not my idol. […] The truth is that in Hammerstein's shows, for all their revolutionary impact, the characters are not much more than collections of characteristics – verbal tics and quirks, like Southern accents or bad grammar, which individualize a character only the way a black hat signifies a villain – and his lyrics reflect that naïveté. Refining his innovations was left to my generation, and a lot of us went at it at will. Songwriters like Kander and Ebb, Bock and Harnick, Strouse and

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[2] For discussion regarding this issue and the multiple opening numbers of *A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Forum* see Sondheim (2010, 87).

> Adams – we all explored the new territory with playwrights who happily accepted the notion that musicals could be more than constructs of block comedy scenes and novelty songs leavened by the occasional ballad, or lightly cynical cartoon shows like *Of Thee I Sing* and *Pal Joey*. Thus *Cabaret*, *She Loves Me*, *West Side Story*, etc. (Sondheim 2010, xix).

Sondheim mentions *Cabaret* as one example of a musical that could be "more than [a construct] of block comedy scenes and novelty songs leavened by the occasional ballad". While Christine Young-Gerber does not consider *Cabaret* to be a specific concept musical, she does argue that it is one of the musicals directed by Hal Prince that contains "strong concepts" (Young-Gerber 2010, 333).

Despite *Cabaret* premiering on Broadway in 1966, Thomas Hischak argues that Rodgers & Hammerstein and Lerner & Weill were writing concept musicals as far back as the late 1940s (*Allegro* (1947) and *Love Life* (1948) – Hischak 2008, 166). That being said, Christine Young-Gerber still considers the form to have come into its own through the work of Hal Prince, whom she considers to be the "primary director who contributed to [the concept musical's] creation" (Young-Gerber 2010, 333):

> The concept musical possesses non-linear structure, utilizes situations unified by theme, and employs the characters and songs to comment on the specific thematic issue(s). By utilizing these four attributes common to all musicals in a unique way, the concept musical is distinctive from the musical comedy, revue and integrated musical (Young-Gerber 2010, 341).

We already know of *Oklahoma!*'s political impact on the genre by eschewing casting norms and avoiding traditional song structures, whereas the concept musical's influence addressed

the form’s reliance on linear plots and chronological timelines. This will be discussed further below in regard to *Company*.

Around the same time as *Cabaret*, another political power move was occurring Off-Broadway, the arrival of rock music. While Elizabeth Wollman argues that “rock has always had an uneasy relationship with the American musical theatre” (Wollman 2006, 1), *Hair*’s 1967 opening broke the musical theatre mould once again, and its writers were conscious of what they were doing:

> In the case of *Hair*, we were very aware of breaking the form of the musical. We were audacious because *Hair* was the first book show we had written. We proceeded to sort of demolish the book, or bring in twice or three times as much music and still maintain the characters. We were exploring, we were open to changing and rewriting and finding out what worked for us. There *was* a story line, even though some people thought there wasn’t – and we just knew this was a new form of the musical (James Rado in Wollman 2006, 46–47).

Bob Mondello notes the other shows that were playing on Broadway the week *Hair* opened (*Hello, Dolly!* [1964], *Man of La Mancha* [1965], *Funny Girl* [1964], and *Fiddler on the Roof* [1964]):

> One of *Fiddler*'s signature numbers, of course, is an anthem about the importance of "Tradition." And Broadway was a place of tradition — of stars, clearly enunciated lyrics, tap-dancing chorus kids and soaring ballads. The [*Hair*] counterculture wasn't part of that tradition. Especially when it sounded like Jimi Hendrix's fuzzy guitar licks. Broadway's idea of rock music had been the Elvis-like character in *Bye Bye Birdie*. Galt MacDermot's music for *Hair* was closer to the real thing. And the flower-power lyrics of James Rado and Jerome Ragni — like those from the second act's "Three-Five-Zero-Zero" — didn't sound like show-tunes either”. (Mondello 2018)

But Ragni, Rado, and MacDermot's "exploring" worked. Due to its "youthful orientation, its topical themes, its eclectic score, and its young, interracial cast, *Hair* attracted a significant number of young people, and a greater proportion of African Americans than attended most Broadway shows" (Wollman 2006, 54). According to George Nash, "forty-six percent [of *Hair*'s audience] were under thirty, only 13 percent were fifty or over, and 7 percent were black, all of them under thirty" (Nash in Wollman 2006, 54). Furthermore, "at least five songs from *Hair* – 'Aquarius', 'Hair', 'Easy to Be Hard', 'Good Morning Sunshine', and 'Let the Sunshine In' – all became US Top Forty hits" (Warfield 2008, 239).

According to Sheri Sanders, "back in the day":

> many of the big hits on the radio *came* from the scores of musicals[.] For example, "Summertime" by composer George Gershwin and lyricist DuBose Heyward came from their 1935 opera *Porgy and Bess*. The standard "My Funny Valentine" by composer Richard Rodgers and lyricist Lorenz Hart came from their 1937 musical *Babes in Arms*. "All the Things You Are" by composer Jerome Kern and lyricist Oscar Hammerstein II came from their 1939 musical *Very Warm for May*. There songs became the popular, or "pop" tunes of their era. (Sanders 2011, 2)

Moreover, "within a season of *Hair*'s premiere, two new rock musicals were playing off-Broadway, and by the early 1970s more than a dozen shows with pop/rock scores had been produced on Broadway" (Warfield 2008, 239).

Writers have repeatedly tried to 'tap in' to the styles and sounds of an era in order to shine a mirror back on their own contemporary society, including, three decades after *Hair*, Jonathan

Larson. According to Bill Aronson, who originally conceived the idea of a modern adaptation of *La Bohème* and provided additional lyrics for *RENT* (1996):

> "Right off the bat, [Larson] said, 'This could be our generation's *Hair*,' and I had not been thinking along those lines at all. I was thinking of a story [with] a few characters, like Bohème is. He said, 'No, this is *Hair* for our generation… I've been waiting for a chance to bring the MTV generation,' which he then was calling us, 'to the theatre. Nobody goes to the theatre who likes MTV or who likes rock music, and we have to change that, and this will do it.' It's sort of amazing, looking back how clear-sighted he was about it. (Aronson in Gioia 2016)

More recently, Lin-Manuel Miranda attempted to make his latest musical as "relatable as possible" to contemporary audiences:

> *Hamilton*'s core elements—its hip-hop and R&B-inspired music and its racially diverse cast—are geared specifically towards making history as relatable as possible. "This is a story about America then, told by America now," Miranda explains, "and we want to eliminate any distance between a contemporary audience and this story". (Miranda in Delman 2015)

Hair's introduction of rock music to the Broadway stage also had a further, far-reaching political influence. According to Sheri Sanders, "in the mid-1980s, after great labor, [Andrew] Lloyd Webber rebirthed the rock musical":

> He delivered a big, big baby, the theatrical phenomenon we now call the mega-musical. With "mega" being the second child of the rock musical

> movement, it has been much easier for audiences to handle – so easy, in fact, that the kid is still kicking around today. (Sanders 2011, 5)

Sanders goes on to explain the politicality of the mega-musical: "ticket buyers who did not want to see an actual "high-brow" opera could plunk their money down and get "culture" in the form of *The Phantom of the Opera* (1986). […] The mega-musical is marketing genius" (Sanders 2011, 5). This acquisition and maintenance of power can be seen in other well-known mega-musicals include *Les Misérables* (1985), *CATS*, and *Miss Saigon*.

A decade later, another political move occurred on Broadway with the development of Disney Theatrical Productions. At time of writing, Disney's *Beauty and the Beast*, their first musical that opened in 1994, is the 9th-longest running musical on Broadway at 5,462 performances (and 46 previews – "Beauty and the Beast" 2019). As of 2013 *Beauty and the Beast* had grossed $1.6 billion at the box office (*The Economist* 2013), an economic example of Harrison and Boyd's "acquisition and maintenance of power" (2003, 6). But this figure pales into insignificance against Disney's second musical venture, *The Lion King* (1997), that had achieved global takings of $8.1 billion as of 2017 (Seymour 2017).

But it is not the sheer immensity of these shows that constitutes political activity. Disney's focus on Broadway had begun many years earlier. Prior to Disney's arrival Times Square was not the thriving theatrical cornucopia we know of today. In fact, in order to commence operations there, Disney struck a deal with then Governor of New York Mario M. Cuomo to "get rid of the filth" (Martin 1994): "The deal, which [had] been under negotiation for several months, [called] for the city and state to lend Disney $21 million at 3 percent interest, and to receive an undisclosed share of the profits. [In return,] Disney […] agreed to spend $8 million of its own to renovate the [New Amsterdam Theater]" (Martin 1994), where *The Lion King* opened in 1997.

Amy Osatinski describes Times Square before Disney's arrival:

> Despite the appeal of restoring the historic theatre, the neighborhood still posed several problems. Since the early 1970s the Times Square area had been a den of porn and prostitution. Fueled in part by the 1967 ruling that massage parlors did not have to have a license and the 1971 lessening of criminal charges for prostitution, illegal "massage parlors" sprang up all over Times Square. These newly relaxed regulations gave rise to the adult playground that Times Square became in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1993, Times Square was not a place that Disney wanted to invite families. (Osatinski 2019)

Disney took distinctly political action to change the face of Times Square in order to produce its musicals there, and its influence is still being felt today. In 2000, Disney had three shows running simultaneously on Broadway (*Aida* [2000], *Beauty and the Beast*, and *The Lion King* – Capaccio 2018, 77). At time of writing, the trio, collectively billed as 'Disney on Broadway', are *The Lion King*, *Aladdin* (2011), and *Frozen* (2017) (Capaccio 2018, 78). Audiences travelling to Broadway to see a Disney show are instantly exposed to multi-metre-long billboards promoting the variety of other shows playing on the Great White Way, and those attending shows like *Beetlejuice* (2018) and *Hadestown* (Broadway 2019) are simultaneously met by Disney's own marquees and promotions[3]. Disney, then, has created a form of promotional mutualism on Broadway, a symbiotic relationship wherein all parties benefit from each other's presence. This is clearly a case of Harrison and Boyd's "acquisition and maintenance of power" (2003, 6), a power Disney wields to this day.

A decade after *Beauty and the Beast* opened, composer Michael John LaChiusa penned a contentious opinion piece in *Opera News*. Titled "The Great Gray Way: Is it prognosis negative for the Broadway musical?", LaChiusa opens with the declaration "The American musical is

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[3] It is not hard for many Broadway fans to picture this image of Times Square.

dead" before taking aim at what he terms "*faux*-musicals" (LaChiusa 2005, 30, 32). Discussing *The Producers* (2001) and *Hairspray* (2002), LaChiusa states:

> If that label sounds disparaging, it's not meant to be. The creators of these shows set out to make musicals based on formulae, and they delivered. Neither transcends its source material (both are based on wonderful cult films), but as facsimiles of the real thing, they do very nicely — and the box-office receipts prove that. In no way do these two shows aspire to be the next *West Side Story* or *Sunday in the Park with George*. There's not even an attempt to deliver an old-fashioned, knock-'em-dead, lodge-like-bullet-hook number à la Jerry Herman. All sense of invention and craft is abandoned in favor of delivering what the audience thinks a musical should deliver. Everyone involved, from the usher to the stage manager to the producer to the landlord to the critic, is satisfied. There is no challenge, no confrontation, no art — and everyone sighs with relief. (LaChiusa 2005, 32–33)

LaChiusa notes a number of musicals appearing on Broadway based on existing properties. Naming *The Producers*, *The Lion King, Mamma Mia!* (1999)*, The Phantom of the Opera, Hairspray,* and *Movin' Out* (2002), LaChiusa goes on to describe these shows as "simulacra: Plato's 'copy of a copy,' a fake that seems more real than the real thing" (LaChiusa 2005, 33).

The acquisition and maintenance of power is clear here. Like the mega-musical, these '*faux*'/'jukebox' musicals allow audiences to "plunk their money down and get 'culture'" (Sanders 2011, 5) without having to risk their hard-earned cash on unknown properties. Audiences were already familiar with the movies of *The Producers*, *The Lion King, and Hairspray*; the reputation of *The Phantom of the* Opera; and the music of ABBA (Mamma *Mia!*) and Billy Joel (*Movin' Out*) and felt comfortable they were going to enjoy whatever was presented to them. However, some of these 'faux' shows still presented clearly political content, albeit in

these highly accessible and 'safe' packages. *The Producers*, for example, lampoons Nazism through the situational comedy of attempting to produce the worst play ever written (*Springtime for Hitler: A Gay Romp with Adolf and Eva at Berchtesgaden*) while *Hairspray* tackles the formal politicality of integration/segregation and the history of civil rights in the United States.

LaChiusa acknowledges that "it's a hostile environment for the real thing; no wonder it's gone missing. But it is learning how to adapt; in the nonprofits, in opera houses, in school cafeterias in Vermont, in basements in Boston, it's alive and well — far away from the economics of Broadway" (LaChiusa 2005, 35). According to Ben Brantley, "People who complain about the demise of the American musical have simply been looking in the wrong place" (Brantley in Stempel 2010, 682) and that place may be the bright lights of Broadway. In fact, the last five Best Musical winners at the American Theatre Wing Tony Awards have all gone through a period of Off-Broadway development, the "nonprofits" described by LaChiusa[4].

Critics have used the term "Sons of Sondheim" to describe the "handful of writers whose works such companies [as the Public Theater, Playwrights Horizons, and Lincoln Center Theater] have produced" (Stempel 2010, 676). The glaring issue with this term, however, is that the group of writers in question includes at least two females, Jeanine Tesori (*Caroline, or Change*, Broadway 2004) and Ann Duquesnay (*Bring in 'da Noise, Bring in 'da Funk*, 1995). Stempel therefore, and rightly, terms Ricky Ian Gordon, Jeanine Tesori, Michael John LaChiusa, Adam Guettel, and Jason Robert Brown the "Mighty Handful" (Stempel 2010, 676), ignoring the biological gender issue completely.

[4] *Fun Home* (2013) and *Hamilton* – The Public Theater, *Dear Evan Hansen* (2015) – Second Stage, *The Band's Visit* (2016) – Atlantic Theatre Company, and *Hadestown* – New York Theatre Workshop

Oscar Hammerstein's political influence over the genre and his impact on Stephen Sondheim cannot be disputed. This lineage can be drawn further from Sondheim to the composers listed above, and also, in the case of Guettel, from his maternal grandfather, Richard Rodgers:

> Every youngish theater composer (Guettel is 38) must nod to Sondheim, and many genuflect so deeply that their spines turn into S's. But Guettel acknowledges the master in a privileged, unslavish way, as befits a lifelong family friend. The rhythmic inventiveness and restless harmonies are duly saluted, but in the supple long lines of the gorgeous melodies, it's Rodgers you hear on top. And more surprisingly, Oscar Hammerstein you hear in the words (Green 2003).

Sondheim's own political influence can then be traced even further to Lin-Manuel Miranda, the Emmy, Grammy, Olivier, Tony, and Pulitzer Award winning composer/lyricist of *Hamilton*. Miranda also views Sondheim as his "idol" (Marks 2018), and Alexis Soloski outlines "16 ways that the success of [*Hamilton*] has altered Broadway and beyond", from proving that "hip-hop and rap can thrive at the box office", to increasing "genuine diversity on Broadway" and resetting "the metric on what people are willing to pay for Broadway tickets" (Soloski 2016) (premium tickets hit $1,150 each in the last week of 2017 – Cox 2017).

Stempel argues that the musical "has changed as a medium, bent to the imaginative wills of those intent on catching us and showing us to ourselves as we change as a nation" (Stempel 2010, 685). Hammerstein's (and *Oklahoma!*'s) political influence on the genre itself has already been established, but, close to 80 years after its initial premiere, the show is still finding new ways of "showing us to ourselves as we change as a nation" (Stempel 2010, 685).

According to Frank Rich, *Oklahoma!* has long been "synonymous with sunny American nationalism for more than three-quarters of a century": "*Oklahoma!* was greeted as jingoistic

entertainment in 1943, perhaps in part because a wartime audience didn't want to see that the musical's celebration of the platonic ideal of Great America was qualified by a brutal acknowledgment of how cruelly America can fall short" (Rich 2019). In his article discussing director Daniel Fish's new revival, Rich describes the overlooked elements of the show's history:

> You'd never guess from *Oklahoma!* that its setting, outside the town of Claremore, is just 60 miles from Tahlequah, the capital of the transplanted and decimated Cherokee Nation. Nor would you know that white settlers like Curly were able to grab Indian territory because Congress abolished tribal land ownership in 1887, less than 20 years before we find him singing "Oh, What a Beautiful Mornin'." There is an itinerant immigrant peddler, Ali Hakim, in *Oklahoma!*, but not a single Indian. (Rich 2019)

Furthermore, Rich describes how Lynn Riggs, playwright of *Green Grow the Lilacs* on which *Oklahoma!* is based, was "born in 1899, had grown up [in Indian Territory], and had a Cherokee mother" (Rich 2019). Riggs also "added a second outsider's identity to his Cherokee bloodline [when he] realized he was gay" (Rich 2019). Yet neither of these identities are represented in *Oklahoma!*. In Riggs' words:

> It so happens that I knew mostly the dark ones [growing up in Oklahoma], the unprivileged ones, the ones with the most desolate fields, the most dismal skies. And so it isn't surprising that my plays concern themselves with poor farmers, forlorn wives, tortured youth, plow hands, peddlers, criminals, slaves — with all the range of folk victimized by brutality, ignorance, superstition, and dread. And will it sound like an affectation (it most surely is not) if I say that I wanted to give voice and a dignified existence to people who found themselves, most pitiably, without a voice, when there was so much to be cried out against? (Riggs in Rich 2019)

Yet the "unprivileged", those "without a voice" are not represented in *Oklahoma!*, specifically not those like Riggs himself who were worthy of "a dignified existence". This oversight has been recently corrected, however, with the premiere of a same-sex version of the show at the Oregon Shakespeare Festival directed by Bill Rauch (Collins-Hughes 2018). Despite this, Rich recognises that the formal and informal politicality of the Other is still alive and well in contemporary America:

> [Fish's] production is not a slab of agitprop in the current fashion. There are no Trump masks or Trump impersonators or MAGA caps. (Fish first conceived his version in pre-Trump 2007.) There is no Trumpian villain — or villains at all, actually — only the earnest, flawed Americans of the original. It's by looking anew at what was there all along that this *Oklahoma!* illuminates the tragic fault lines that were built into the show as they had been built into America: the conflicts between the white-American majority and the Other — whether the Other is defined by race, immigrant origins, class, or sexuality. Though Trump has been maliciously adept at exacerbating and exploiting these divisions, they were there from the nation's birth. Our history tells us that they won't vanish once Trump is gone. (Rich 2019)

But within this discussion can be seen the central argument of this thesis. According to Rich, "*Oklahoma!*'s exhilarating title song was understandably embraced by wartime America as a patriotic anthem. But Rodgers and Hammerstein's patriotism was not mindless jingoism, and their art was not propaganda" (Rich 2019).

In Act II of *Oklahoma!* Jud pulls a knife on Curly after Curly refuses to let him kiss his new wife, Laurey. They scuffle and Jud dies after falling on his own knife. However, in Fish's new production, "there's no knife for Jud to fall on [and] Curly plainly shoots him on the paper-thin

provocation that Jud has taken a vaguely menacing step in his direction" (Rich 2019). Rich argues that the misfortune of Jud's death was Rodgers and Hammerstein's original intention, that they "never would have let Jud's murder intrude on their show's celebratory climax, with its triumphal sanctification of both marriage and statehood, had they not wanted us to see the blood of the Other America on Great America's hands" (Rich 2019). Nevertheless, Fish's revival takes things one step further. In his version:

> Jud rises to join the company and belts the song as vehemently as everyone else, though with a blistering, tearful rage that belies the jubilant lyric. It doesn't matter if you've never heard of Lynn Riggs. You can't help but hear a singular voice crying out, in protest and in grief, to be heard above the harmonious din of "You're doing fine, Oklahoma! — Oklahoma! O.K.!". (Rich 2019)

Here is another example of song expressing politicality, and a demonstration of the progressive nature of formal politics/our understanding of freedom. In Fish's revival, Jud's "You're doing fine, Oklahoma!" takes on a cynical quality not heard in the original interpretation, implying that the state is, in fact, not doing fine by continuing to stifle the voices of the Other. And here it is, situated within a pioneering work of the genre that continues to resonate politically with the American experience over half a century after its premiere. In Rich's words, "A great America has always been a work-in-progress" (Rich 2019), and *Oklahoma!* appears to play an important role in the continuation of this process.

2.4 Three Political Musicals

Our understanding that musical theatre is political in nature is commonplace and has been demonstrated throughout the form's history. What is still missing from the discussion is both song's involvement in this function, but also the need for a theory that is capable of detailing the

politicality of song rather than simply claiming that song is political. The following case studies, then, are intended to not only demonstrate this function discursively, but also to reveal how far the depth of politicality extends into the artform.

2.4.1 Urinetown

Urinetown is set in a dystopian "Gotham-like city […] sometime after the Stink Years", a drought that gripped the city for two decades (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 7 – edited). In order to conserve the limited water supply, industry mogul Caldwell B. Cladwell initiates high fees for the use of public toilets. All amenities are maintained by the UGC (Urine Good Company), and "Peeing / For free" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 10) is illegal. Punishment is harsh and offenders are sent off to the mysterious 'Urinetown', a place from which no one has ever returned.

Lyricist and book writer Greg Kotis "conceived the original idea for *Urinetown* after encountering a pay-per-use toilet whilst travelling in Europe":

> 'It was written in a mindset of despair,' says creator Greg Kotis. 'I thought: how about writing something that offers no solutions or hope. It just allows us to spend time with the things that we know are happening to our world'. (Lukowski 2013)

Urinetown is an instance of a long and persistent tradition of musicals that deal with dark and explicitly political themes, in contrast to the more-prevalent tradition of musical comedies. The plot of *Urinetown*, along with the death of its hero, places it squarely within the sub-genre known as the 'anti-musical'.

The term anti-musical was first aimed at producer/director Hal Prince and composer/lyricist Stephen Sondheim for their "modern school of musicals" (Bordman 2001, 777). *Washington Times* critic John Podhoretz accused the pair of "art-slaughter," labeling *West Side Story* (1957) an "anti-musical, a self-destructive form in which characters were taken to task and made fun of for doing things like bursting into song" (Bordman 2001, 777). Wiley Hausam describes the development of the anti-musical in *The New American Musical: An Anthology from the End of the Century*:

> The composers and writers of the new generation have taken the anti-musical several steps further to genuinely confound the expectations, responses and needs of the Broadway musical audience. The have dispensed almost entirely with the two most cherished conventions of the form: the Song (simple in its traditional structure and therefore memorable) and the Happy Ending. Next, entertainment has been made secondary to the political concerns that were the heart of the not-for-profit theaters in the 1980s and 1990s – especially the politics of race, sexual preference and gender. Finally, the mythology of the American Dream, which was merely questioned by Prince and Sondheim, has been indicted by this new generation. Consequently, the [drama] is ironic, skeptical and sometimes disenchanting and disbelieving. When it's funny, it's biting. It leaves teeth marks. Obviously, this is no way to be popular. (Hausam 2003, xx – edited)

Another facet of this sub-genre is the use of Brechtian elements to generate this "self-destructive"-ness, reminding the audience that they are watching a performance and not allowing them to get swept up in the drama. In the case of *Urinetown* some examples include Officer Lockstock frequently addressing the audience through the fourth wall ("Well, that's it for Act One" – Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 59) and, at the start of Act Two, Lockstock referring to the poor's secret hideout that is identified by an onstage 'Secret Hideout' sign (Kotis and Hollmann

2003, 61). However, despite Greg Kotis's acknowledgement that "Brecht is a clear, albeit indirect influence on *Urinetown*" (Kotis 2020)[5], it cannot be said that *Urinetown* is a work of Brechtian epic theatre, for reasons that will be outlined in Chapter 3.

Urinetown's content is political in nature as it chronicles the battle between controlling corporations and the oppressed, citizens versus the state. The satirical presentation questions not only the actions of the characters but also what it means for a work to be a musical itself. Instead of being led down a traditional musical comedy path, the audience are asked to consider whether their bladders will last until interval and to applaud the townsfolk fleeing for their lives. In Hausam's words, "this is no way to be popular" (Hausam 2003, xx – edited). However, back at the start of the chapter, Stempel argued that "While popularity may not be the sole measure of worth, […] popularity attests to the degree to which [shows] resonate with something vital in the tenor of an age" (Stempel 2010, 13), and *Urinetown* certainly holds up a mirror to our contemporary social world of climate change and misinformation, calling on us to challenge our own assumptions of what we see and hear and to ask whether the loudest voice is always right.

2.4.2 Company

Company is based on "a group of eleven brief one-act plays written in the late 1960s by George Furth" (Sondheim 2010, 165). The "notion" for the work, in Sondheim's words, was:

> A man with no emotional commitments reassesses his life on his thirty-fifth birthday by reviewing his relationships with his married acquaintances and girlfriends. That is the entire plot. (2010, 165)

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[5] Kotis's full email has been included in Appendix 2.

Sondheim had experience with "experimental" forms and styles of musical theatre thanks to his work with, and mentoring by, Oscar Hammerstein II (2010, 165). However "the problem of merging unrelated scenes [in *Company*] into a unified evening seemed an impossible one to solve (making the project irresistible)" (Sondheim 2010, 165 – edited):

> "Furth's writing [was] antithetical to singing [so] every time I tried to develop a song out of dialogue it didn't work. Which is why all the songs in *Company* are either self-encapsulated entities or Brechtian comments on what is happening. In the score of *Company* nothing comes out of the play, nothing. It's absolutely the reverse of what Oscar [Hammerstein] taught me. And it is, for lack of a better word, Brechtian, in the sense of comment songs like "Another Hundred People," "The Little Things You Do Together," and "You Could Drive a Person Crazy." Others are soliloquies, like "Someone is Waiting," "Being Alive," and "The Ladies Who Lunch." Then there are songs like "Barcelona," which is a musical scene. (Sondheim in Secrest 1998, 192 – edited)

Sondheim's solution was to "turn the different outsiders into a single person", namely Robert (Bob, Bobby, Robby, Rob-o, etc. – Sondheim 2010, 165). The result was a 'concept musical', a term of contentious origins (Young 2008, 9), described by Sondheim as "a meaningless umbrella term used to describe this new amalgam of old forms" (2010, 166). The term is usually used to describe shows with no linear plot but instead with songs that focus on a central concept or theme. In this case "all the songs would deal either with marriage in one sense or another or with New York City" (Sondheim 2010, 167). According to Sondheim:

> *Company* does have a story, the story of what happens inside Robert; it just doesn't have a chronological linear plot. As far as I know, prior to *Company* there had never been a plotless musical which dealt with one set of characters from start to finish. (Sondheim 2010, 166)

Company's construction is political in nature as it challenged the existing paradigm of how a musical should be formed. Additionally, according to Sophie Gilbert, *Company* "represented a shift in the national psyche that had been brewing since the end of the Second World War. As women gained power in society and the free-love movement distinguished sexuality from marriage, questioning the institution itself became more commonplace":

> Before the Broadway premiere of Stephen Sondheim and George Furth's *Company* in April 1970, American musicals mostly had a single purpose: to bring a man and a woman together in romantic (and melodic) harmony. But *Company* upended this tradition, offering instead a collection of vignettes featuring marriages in different states of (un)happiness, seen from the perspective of a flaky 35-year-old bachelor named Bobby. Bobby's ambivalence toward marriage frustrated his friends and shocked early audiences, as did the fact that he ended the show still single. So much so that *Company*, Rob Kendt wrote in The Los Angeles Times in 2004, "represented a full-scale assault on two venerable institutions, marriage and the musical theater". (Gilbert 2016)

However, new life has been breathed into the politicality of *Company* with a "revolutionary" revival production that opened at the Gielgud Theatre on 26 September 2018 (Gilbert 2016). This version, with 'many' lyric changes by Sondheim himself (Criscitiello 2018), and "A female Bobbie, updated for audiences who have a more fluid understanding of sexual desire, offers the opportunity to further expand the musical's ambitions" (Gilbert 2016). Furthermore, the characters of Amy and Paul have been reimagined as Jamie and Paul, a same-sex couple that "feel like a lot of the contemporary gay male friends" of director Marianne Elliott (Criscitiello 2018). And how is this politicality communicated? Through the songs, as will be argued below in a case study of the original musical.

2.4.3 Dr. Horrible's Sing-Along Blog

Dr. Horrible's Sing-Along Blog is a musical miniseries created and written by Joss Whedon, Zack Whedon, Maurissa Tancharoen, and Jed Whedon. Written during the 2007-8 Writers Guild of America strike, the series was produced specifically for Internet distribution, and starred Neil Patrick Harris, Nathan Fillion, Felicia Day, and Simon Helberg. The musical tells the tale of Dr. Horrible (Neil Patrick Harris), an aspiring bad guy destined to become the "Worst Villain Ever" (Whedon et al. 2011, 2), striving to achieve entrance into the Evil League of Evil. Alongside his dream of being a super villain, Dr. Horrible's human alter-ego, Billy, has a crush on Penny (Felicia Day), a girl from his local laundromat. After his nemesis, Captain Hammer (Nathan Fillion), foils Horrible's latest plot, saving Penny in the process, Penny falls in love with Hammer, much to Horrible's disgust. Later, Hammer bumps into Billy and Penny at the laundromat and realises Billy is Dr. Horrible. Hammer teases Billy with the image of giving Penny the "Hammer"[6], strengthening Horrible's hatred for him. Back in his lab, Horrible is adapting his secret weapon, a freeze ray, into a death ray, intent on killing Captain Hammer at the opening of a new homeless shelter for which Penny has been campaigning. At the opening, Horrible is overpowered by Captain Hammer, who targets him with his own death ray. Hammer pulls the trigger, causing the death ray to explode, throwing Hammer across the room, and sending shrapnel flying in all directions. Horrible rises to see Penny slumped against a wall with two pieces of shrapnel embedded in her chest and stomach. She dies in Horrible's arms and the story closes with Captain Hammer now a stammering coward on a psychiatrist's couch having lost his superpowers, and with Horrible being accepted into the Evil League of Evil for committing Penny's murder. He has won his infamy, but, in the process, he has lost his freedom and the one he loves.

[6] "The Hammer is my penis" (Whedon et al. 2011, 47).

Dr. Horrible is political both in its creation as a response to a historical political event (the writers' strike) and its representation of the struggle between good (Captain Hammer) and evil (Dr. Horrible). Just like *Urinetown*, though, the audience is asked to question the intentions of both the hero and the villain, challenging our perception of the unmarred hero and the dishonourable villain, and this function is achieved, once again, through song.

2.4.4 Summation

The politicality of the musical theatre has now been discussed but the politicality of song is still yet to be explored. What remains is to find an existing political theory that is capable of both revealing song's politicality and describing the musical's ability to function as a vehicle of social and political self-reflection. The next chapter will introduce existing political theories that may be able to describe the politicality of song in the musical before Chapter 4 applies Hegel's chosen theories to the three case studies.

3 Political Theories

We offer you gods and heroes.

We offer you rites and revels.

We offer you paeans and pageants.

We offer you jokes and insults.

Bacchanales and social comment.

(Sondheim 2010, 288)

In order to examine the politicality of song in the musical we require a theory appropriate to interrogate this politicality. This theory must be able to position the characters within a political social world but must also be capable of expressing the politicality of song in the musical, and, ultimately, the musical itself.

Philosophical thought can be traced back to the Vedic era of Ancient India (c. 1200 BCE – 10th century CE – Singh and Roy 2011, xiv) and Classical Greece (5th and 4th centuries BCE – Sahakian and Sahakian 1966, 59) and since this time many thinkers have pondered the question of politicality. Let us now consider some potential candidates for our examination of the politicality of the musical.

3.1 Political Theories

3.1.1 Table of Political Theories



3.1.2 Plato (428/427 or 424/423 – 348/347 BCE) and Aristotle (384 – 322 BCE)

One of philosophy's earliest and most famous political texts is Plato's *Republic* (c. 380 BCE). According to Eric Brown, "Plato's *Republic* centers on a simple question: is it always better to be just than unjust?" (E. Brown 2017). A collection of Socratic dialogues, the *Republic* discusses what it means to be a just man, the function of hypothetical city-states, Plato's theory of forms, the concept of the soul, and indicts the role of poetry in civil society:

> the center of Plato's *Republic* is a contribution to ethics: a discussion of what the virtue justice is and why a person should be just. Yet because Socrates links his discussion of personal justice to an account of justice in the city and makes claims about how good and bad cities are arranged, the Republic sustains reflections on political questions, as well. Not that ethics and politics exhaust the concerns of the Republic. The account in Books Five through Seven of how a just city and a just person are in principle possible is an account of how knowledge can rule, which includes discussion of what knowledge and its objects are. Moreover, the indictment of the poets involves a wide-ranging discussion of art (E. Brown 2017).

The *Republic* may be an appropriate model for examining the politicality of the character's situations in a musical, but Brickhouse and Smith note that "Most of poetry and the other fine arts are to be censored out of existence in the 'noble state' (*kallipolis*) Plato sketches as merely imitating appearances (rather than realities), and as arousing excessive and unnatural emotions and appetites" (Brickhouse and Smith n.d.). While the *Republic* is an important historical artifact of political theory, Plato's theory is constrained by its rejection of "imitating appearances" making it inappropriate for our current purposes.

Aristotle's *Politics* is a text divided into eight books that discuss such topics as the purpose of the city, slavery and women, the good citizen and the good man, the importance of the middle class, varieties of democracy, characteristics of the best city, and the education of the young (Clayton n.d.). According to Aristotle, "Man is a political animal": "human beings are creatures of flesh and blood, rubbing shoulders with each other in cities and communities" (Kenny 2019). The aim of the *Politics* is to "investigate, on the basis of the constitutions collected, what makes for good government and what makes for bad government and to identify the factors favourable or unfavourable to the preservation of a constitution" (Kenny 2019).

Aristotle outlines three types of political "communities": "The most primitive communities are families of men and women, masters and slaves. Families combine to make a village, and several villages combine to make a state, which is the first self-sufficient community" (Kenny 2019). In terms of how the state should function, Aristotle believes that constitutional monarchies are the best form of state providing the "community contains an individual or family of outstanding excellence", otherwise he champions constitutional democracy, what he terms 'polity' – a "state in which rich and poor respect each other's rights and the best-qualified citizens rule with the consent of all" (Kenny 2019).

Objections aimed at Aristotle's theory include his justification of slavery and dismissal of the charging of monetary interest (Kenny 2019). While he agrees that "in practice much slavery is unjust", he nevertheless argues that "some people are so inferior and brutish that it is better for them to be controlled by a master than to be left to their own devices" (Kenny 2019).

Aristotle's *Poetics*, his critique of poetry, is "much-disdained" (Sachs n.d.). According to Sachs, Aristotle reduces "drama to its language, people say, and the language itself to its least poetic element, the story, and then he encourages insensitive readers like himself to subject stories to crudely moralistic readings, that reduce tragedies to the childish proportions of Aesop-fables" (Sachs n.d.). Despite this, Sachs still supports Aristotle's concept of catharsis:

> Pity is one of the instruments by which a poet can show us what we are. We pity the loss of Gloucester's eyes because we know the value of eyes, but more deeply, we pity the violation of Gloucester's decency, and in so doing we feel the truth that without such decency, and without respect for it, there is no human life (Sachs n.d.).

Although Aristotle's critique of poetry appears to be overly reductive, his theories of the *kallipolis* and catharsis are the most adequate of the currently assessed theories for our purposes. This research requires theories capable of positioning characters within a political social world while also being capable of expressing the politicality of song in the musical, and Aristotle's theories may prove capable of achieving these aims. However, we must consider whether there are any potentially more appropriate political theories for our purposes before moving on.

3.1.3 Niccolò Machiavelli (3 May 1469 – 21 June 1527)

Discussion of Niccolò Machiavelli's political philosophy will be brief as *The Prince* remains:

> notorious for its seeming recommendations of cruelty; its seeming prioritization of autocracy (or at least centralized power) over more republican or democratic forms; […] its seeming endorsements of deception and faith-breaking; and so forth. Indeed, it remains perhaps the most notorious work in the history of political philosophy. (Honeycutt n.d.)

Despite this prevailing opinion, Erica Benner asks "Have We Got Machiavelli All Wrong?" (Benner 2017). Calling Machiavelli the "first honest teacher of dishonest politics", Benner argues that "it's time we got him right, because no contemporary writer is a better guide to understanding and

confronting our own political world" (Benner 2017). Furthermore, Machiavelli does make improvements on Aristotle's treatment of slaves. According to Machiavelli, "no one man can overpower a free people unless they let him. 'Men are so simple,' he tells us, 'so obedient to present necessities, that he who deceives will always find someone who will let himself be deceived'" (Benner 2017).

While it may be time for us to reconsider Machiavelli and the insights he can add to the discussion of our current political climate, his theories do not address the requirements of this thesis regarding the politicality of character/environment and the politicality of art and will therefore be discarded for our current purposes.

3.1.4 John Locke (29 August 1632 – 28 October 1704)

John Locke, commonly considered the "Father of Liberalism" (Korab-Karpowicz 2010, 291) defines political power as the:

> right of making Laws with Penalties of Death, and consequently all less Penalties, for the Regulating and Preserving of Property, and of employing the force of the Community, in the Execution of such Laws and in defense of the Common-wealth from Foreign Injury, and all this only for the Publick Good (Locke in Rogers 2019).

According to Locke, "the State of Nature, the natural condition of mankind, is a state of perfect and complete liberty to conduct one's life as one best sees fit, free from the interference of others. This does not mean, however, that it is a state of license: one is not free to do anything at all one pleases, or even anything that one judges to be in one's interest" (Friend n.d.). By this conception, Locke argues that "private property is created when a person mixes his labor with

the raw materials of nature. So, for example, when one tills a piece of land in nature, and makes it into a piece of farmland, which produces food, then one has a claim to own that piece of land and the food produced upon it" (Friend n.d.). Therefore, according to Locke, anyone is at "liberty to conduct one's life as one best sees fit, free from the interference of others", including the cultivation of land. However, this theory "led Locke to conclude that America didn't really belong to the natives who lived there, because they were, on his view, failing to utilize the basic material of nature. In other words, they didn't farm it, so they had no legitimate claim to it, and others could therefore justifiably appropriate it" (Friend n.d.), an abominable conception by contemporary standards.

Yet, Locke's state is not entirely immoral: "The Law of Nature, which is on Locke's view the basis of all morality, and given to us by God, commands that we not harm others with regards to their 'life, health, liberty, or possessions'" (Friend n.d.), but this law does not appear to apply to indigenous people/possessions.

Despite this:

> Locke's definition of political power has an immediate moral dimension. It is a "right" of making laws and enforcing them for "the public good." Power for Locke never simply means "capacity" but always "morally sanctioned capacity." Morality pervades the whole arrangement of society, and it is this fact, tautologically, that makes society legitimate. (Rogers 2019)

This distinction stands in contrast to Hobbe's earlier conception of morality where "Moral terms do not […] describe some objective state of affairs, but are rather reflections of individual tastes and preferences" (Friend n.d.). However, one criticism leveled at Locke's theory is that it "invokes God, posing a problem for those who seek a moral basis for rights that does not rest on religious assumptions" (Sandel 2010, 104).

According to Locke:

> Political society comes into being when individual men, representing their families, come together in the State of Nature and agree to each give up the executive power to punish those who transgress the Law of Nature, and hand over that power to the public power of a government. Having done this, they then become subject to the will of the majority. In other words, by making a compact to leave the State of Nature and form society, they make "one body politic under one government" and submit themselves to the will of that body. (Friend n.d.)

However:

> the justification of the authority of the executive component of government is the protection of the people's property and well-being, so when such protection is no longer present, or when the king becomes a tyrant and acts against the interests of the people, they have a right, if not an outright obligation, to resist his authority. The social compact can be dissolved and the process to create political society begun anew. (Friend n.d.)

While Locke's theory has made clear progress on earlier iterations of the concepts of right and freedom, it still lacks the depth of detail required for our project, nor does it include a conception of the politicality of art.

3.1.5 Immanuel Kant (22 April 1724 – 12 February 1804)

According to Frederick Rauscher, “Kant held that every rational being had both an innate right to freedom and a duty to enter into a civil condition governed by a social contract in order to realize and preserve that freedom” (Rauscher 2016). Kant sets three conditions that “have to be met for something to be enforceable as right”:

> first, right concerns only actions that have influence on other persons, directly or indirectly, meaning duties to the self are excluded, second[,] right does not concern the wish but only the choice of others, meaning that not mere desires but only decisions which bring about actions are at stake, and third[,] right does not concern the matter of the other’s act but only the form, meaning no particular desires or ends are assumed on the part of the agents (Rauscher 2016).

For Kant, “freedom of choice can be understood both in terms of its content (the particular decisions individuals make) and its form (the free, unconstrained nature of choice of any possible particular end)” (Rauscher 2016).

In terms of governmental structure, Kant advocates for three different “forms of sovereignty”: “rule by one person, rule by a small group of people, or rule by all people” (Rauscher 2016). He then identifies two distinct “forms of government”, what he terms ‘republican’ and ‘despotic’ (Rauscher 2016). Kant’s republican model also incorporates the “separation of the executive power (the government) from the legislative power” (Rauscher 2016), recognizable in the modern democratic structures of today.

As noted by Sandel, “Kant wrote no major work of political theory, only some essays” (Sandel 2010, 138), but his concept of the categorical imperative endures. Kant’s first version of his “formula” states that we should “Act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (Kant in Sandel 2010, 120). In Sandel’s words, it is a “way

of checking to see if the action I am about to undertake puts my interests and special circumstances ahead of everyone else's" (Sandel 2010, 121). Kant's second formulation encourages us to "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end" (Kant in Sandel 2010, 122).

Besides Plato and Aristotle's early opinions on art, Kant is the next theorist of those currently under examination to have formed a conception of art in his philosophy. His *Critique of Judgement* examines the concept of aesthetics, both how we make such judgements and whether they are valid. According to Burnham, Kant considers these to judgements to be:

> both universal and necessary. This means roughly that it is an intrinsic part of the activity of such a judgment to expect others to agree with us. Although we may say 'beauty is in the eye of the beholder', that is not how we act. Instead, we debate and argue about our aesthetic judgments - and especially about works of art - and we tend to believe that such debates and arguments can actually achieve something. […] But Kant insists that […] there is no objective property of a thing that makes it beautiful. (Burnham n.d.)

Despite Kant's assertion that "debates and arguments [about art] can actually achieve something", the theory required for this research must be able to assess a work's political rather than aesthetic function, making Kant unsuitable for our current purposes.

3.1.6 John Stuart Mill (20 May 1806 – 8 May 1873)

John Stuart Mill was a Utilitarian attempting to respond to objections against Jeremy Bentham's theory claiming that it assigned a monetary value to human life and "reduced everything of moral importance to a single scale of pleasure and pain" (Sandel 2010, 48). According to Mill, "people should be free to do whatever they want, provided they do no harm to others" (Sandel 2010, 49). Further to this, and as long as they do no harm to others, "independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign" (Mill in Sandel 2010, 49). Mill argues that:

> We should maximize utility, not case by case, but in the long run. And, over time, he argues, respecting individual liberty will lead to the greatest human happiness. Allowing the majority to silence dissenters or censor free-thinkers might maximize utility today, but it will make society worse off – less happy – in the long run. (Sandel 2010, 50)

Michael Sandel takes two issues with Mill's approach: "First, respecting individual rights for the sake of promoting social progress leaves rights hostage to contingency. […] Second, basing rights on utilitarian considerations misses the sense in which violating someone's rights inflicts a wrong on the individual, whatever its effect on the general welfare" (Sandel 2010, 50).

At the outset, Mill's idea that "people should be free to do whatever they want, provided they do no harm to others" sounds agreeable. Take speed limits. According to Mill's doctrine, an individual should be free to drive as fast as they desire as long as they do no harm to others. Mill's model appears reasonable at first glance but not imposing speed limits could lead to some drivers travelling at far higher speeds than other drivers, potentially increasing the risk of accidents and infringing right by causing fear amongst other road users. Just as a pedestrian should be able to walk down the street without being scared by a passer-by so should drivers on the roads. Furthermore, allowing drivers to choose their own limits could lead to increasingly higher speeds as individuals become competitive resulting in a slippery slope until top speeds

become uncontrollable. Even Germany's autobahns that have famously and historically been speed-limit-free are currently, at time of writing, being considered for speed limiting with debate occurring around environmental impact, reduction of the death toll, and personal freedom (Bershidsky 2019).

Mill's second argument against objections to Bentham's approach relates to whether or not some pleasure can be considered 'higher' than others. In Mill's words: "Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure" (Mill in Sandel 2010, 54). Sandel outlines the contrary position that sometimes we "prefer lower pleasures to the higher ones" ("'Don't we sometimes prefer lying on the sofa watching sitcoms to reading Plato or going to the opera?" – Sandel 2010, 54). In taking this approach, Mill "saves utilitarianism from the charge that it reduces everything to a crude calculation of pleasure and pain, but only by invoking a moral ideal of human dignity and personality independent of utility itself" (Sandel 2010, 56).

Mill's theory describes 'higher' and 'lower' forms of art but does not consider art's potential politicality, making it unsuitable for our current purposes.

3.1.7 Karl Marx (5 May 1818 – 14 March 1883)

For Marx, "the dialectical nature of history is expressed in class struggle" (Chambre and McLellan 2019). In Marx's mind:

> When people have become aware of their loss, of their alienation, as a universal nonhuman situation, it will be possible for them to proceed to a radical transformation of their situation by a revolution. This revolution will be

> the prelude to the establishment of communism and the reign of liberty reconquered. (Chambre and McLellan 2019)

While Marx's ultimate goal is the "reign of liberty", Chambre and McLellan note some "inconsistencies" with his theories:

> If one reads *The Communist Manifesto* carefully one discovers inconsistencies that indicate that Marx had not reconciled the concepts of catastrophic and of permanent revolution. Moreover, Marx never analyzed classes as specific groups of people opposing other groups of people. Depending on the writings and the periods, the number of classes varies; and unfortunately the pen fell from Marx's hand at the moment when, in *Das Kapital* (vol. 3), he was about to take up the question. Reading *Das Kapital*, one is furthermore left with an ambiguous impression with regard to the destruction of capitalism: will it be the result of the "general crisis" that Marx expects, or of the action of the conscious proletariat, or of both at once? (Chambre and McLellan 2019)

It appears there are some concerns regarding Marx's political formulation, but a Marxist perspective on art may be able to address our secondary need for this research.

According to Graham, "Sociological alternatives to philosophical aesthetics may be grouped under a variety of labels [but] the origins of all of them are to be found in Marxism. The aim of the sociological approach is to understand art as an historical phenomenon and a social construction, and it is Marxist theory which sets the terms in which this is to be done" (Graham 1997, 109). Furthermore, "Central to the Marxist conception is the idea that art has a social function. It can confirm and it can unsettle the preconceptions upon which the structure of social and economic power rests" (Graham 1997, 116). This idea that "art has a social function" that "can unsettle the preconceptions upon which the structure of social and economic power

rests" seems the most appropriate theory of those currently under consideration to explain the political nature of art and its ability to function as a form of social reflection. However, this idea is also present in the writings of Edmund Husserl.

3.1.8 Edmund Husserl (8 April 1859 – 27 April 1938)

Husserl's concept of "renewal" describes the "process of *social*, *political*, and *ethical* transformation" towards "the best possible" form of "human culture" (Steinbock 1994, 449). Written from 1922–24, Husserl's *Kaizo* articles describe "any type of becoming that develops over time", including the "historical becoming of a community", what he terms "genesis" (Steinbock 1994, 451). This "genesis of renewal" requires the "highest" "ethical dimension" of "value", although Husserl does not consider artists to have achieved this state:

> The genuine artist, for example, is as such not yet a genuine human being in the highest sense. But the genuine human being can be a genuine artist, and *can* only be so *if* ethical self-regulation *demands* this from him. (Husserl in Steinbock 1994, 453)

Accordingly, art is not a mode through which one can achieve "ethical self-regulation" but is a practice freely available to those who have achieved this status.

Instead, Husserl argues that philosophers are the "representatives of the spirit of reason or the spiritual organ through which the community reaches an awareness of its true determination (its true self)" (Husserl in Staehler 2017, 98):

> Philosophers are exemplary, as it were, in leading a critical life of self-reflection. It is their task to perceive crises and reflect critically on them. How is the

> philosopher supposed to recognize a crisis? Husserl implies that a crisis makes itself known and will be discerned by the philosophers if they are attentive to their community. A crisis can be recognized through certain moods in the consciousness of a community, such as a fundamental, existential discontent. (Staehler 2017, 98)

I will argue later that art is one of the modes through which "certain moods in the consciousness of a community" can be expressed but before doing so there are two more phenomenologists to consider.

3.1.9 Bertolt Brecht (10 February 1898 – 14 August 1956)

Of several prominent theories pertaining to politicality in theatre, Brecht's theory of epic theatre is commonly referenced in musical theatre studies (Block 1997; D. Walsh and Platt 2003; Dolan 2005; Knapp 2005; McMillin 2005; 2006; Westgate 2009; Lundskaer-Nielsen 2008; M. Taylor 2012; Robson 2017; Gow 2018). While the influence of Hegelian thinking on Brecht's principles is recognised (Bloch, Halley, and Suvin 1970; Bishop 1986; Brask and Loewen 1988; Luebering 2018), there are two fundamental reasons why Brecht is an ill-suited reference model for this specific research:

1. In the epic theatre there remains a "strict separation of the music from all other elements of entertainment offered" (Brecht 1992, 85), an approach unsuitable for the traditionally 'integrated' and character-driven musical theatre.
2. Epic theatre requires the audience's alienation from the on-stage action, which is an aesthetic contrary to almost all of commercial musical theatre.

Brecht argues that:

> When an actor sings he undergoes a change of function. Nothing is more revolting than when an actor pretends not to notice that he has left the level of plain speech and started to sing. The three levels – plain speech, heightened speech and singing – must always remain distinct, and in no case should heightened speech represent and intensification of plain speech, or singing of heightened speech. In no case should singing take place where words are prevented by excess of feeling. (Brecht 1992, 44)

Brecht's claim that "In no case should singing take place where words are prevented by excess of feeling" goes against one of the most pervasive (although not uniformly adopted) theories of song function in the musical: the idea that when emotion becomes too great for speech, you sing (L. A. Brown 2007; Bryer and Davison 2008; A. Cohen and Rosenhaus 2006; D. Spencer 2005; Woolford 2012; Sondheim 1978). Many of the characters in the case studies presented in this thesis are indeed singing from 'excesses of feeling' (the groupies, Penny, and the news anchors in *Dr. Horrible*; Bobby, Cladwell, and Hope in *Urinetown*); heightened states of emotion that act to express the politicality of situation in which the characters exist. The phenomenon of 'breaking into song' in musical theatre is commonly considered to be marked by an excess of emotion, as seen in the discussion of the existing theories of song function, yet there remains a need to theorise why this happens in relation to the political predicament of the character's situation in the social world in which they reside.

Secondly, there is the obstacle of alienation. Described as 'making strange', "Brecht's alienation effect, also called a-effect or distancing effect, German *Verfremdungseffekt* or V-effekt […] involves the use of techniques designed to distance the audience from emotional involvement in the play through jolting reminders of the artificiality of the theatrical performance" (Luebering 2018). Brecht developed his technique not only a "specific aesthetic program but also as a political mission of the theatre [considering it a] way of helping spectators understand the

complex nexuses of historical development and societal relationships [while allowing them to] more clearly perceive the 'real' world reflected in the drama" (Luebering 2018). The goal of audience alienation is a dominant part of Brechtian theory; however, it is not a goal of the commercial musical theatre.

Brecht uses the term *Verfremdung* (estrangement), borrowed and adapted from Hegel and Marx's term *Entfremdung* (alienation)[7], to describe how the audience can be distanced from the onstage presentation. Specifically:

> Hegel employed his concept of *Entfremdung* to describe the process whereby an observer derives knowledge about the world by perceiving it as if it were 'strange'. Brecht's concept, by contrast, is an aesthetic device whereby the world depicted or represented on stage is made to appear strange so that observers (the audience) may derive knowledge about it (Brask and Loewen 1988, 70).

From a Hegelian perspective, the real world is viewed from a distance, as if it were strange, in order to reveal truths about that world. In the epic theatre, the real world is purposefully made to appear strange and alien in an effort to distance the audience from that world, allowing them to reflect upon it. This dichotomy in relation to the constructs commonly evident in musical theatre is supported in a Hegelian perspective but problematic to reconcile from a Brechtian standpoint.

When witnessing non-Brechtian theatre, and specifically non-Brechtian musical theatre, I contend that the audience does not need (or potentially desire) to be alienated in order to

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[7] In fact, Brecht originally used the term *Entfremdung* in his early writings before moving to *Verfremdung* (see Brecht 1992, 99).

perceive the politicality of the character's situation, just as we do not have to be *verfremdet* in order to identify a dysfunctional relationship witnessed in public. In short, I consider Brecht's goal of social and political reflection is primarily achieved in the musical, through song, without the need for alienation of the audience, or the separation of song and character described above. Specifically, Brecht's theory of song and his concept of audience alienation remain at odds with the analysis of the political function of song in contemporary commercial musicals, which is the focus of this thesis. Therefore, I am of the view that its general exclusion is apposite within the framework of this research.

3.1.10 John Rawls (February 21, 1921 – November 24, 2002)

According to Michael Sandel, John Rawls' 1971 *A Theory of Justice* provides the "most compelling case for a more equal society that American political philosophy has yet produced" (Sandel 2010, 166). Rawls' central thesis argues that "the distribution of income and wealth that results from a free market with formal equality of opportunity cannot be considered just" (Sandel 2010, 153). Specifically, Rawls argues against the rewarding of virtue or "moral desert":

> We do not deserve our place in the distribution of native endowments, any more than we deserve our initial starting point in society. That we deserve the superior character that enables us to make the effort to cultivate our abilities is also problematic; for such a character depends in good part upon fortunate family and social circumstances in early life for which [we] can claim no credit. The notion of desert does not apply here. (Rawls in Sandel 2010, 160)

Rawls suggests that:

> Once the principles of justice set the terms of social cooperation, people are entitled to the benefits they earn under the rules. But if the tax system requires them to hand over some portion of their income to help the disadvantaged, they can't complain that this deprives them of something they morally deserve. (Sandel 2010, 161)

Rawls acknowledges that some of us may achieve greater success and therefore greater income in life as we may be "fortunate to possess, at least in some measure, the qualities our society happens to prize" (Sandel 2010, 163). However, if we were to have been born in a society that values different skills or attributes, we would no less worthy in our pursuits: "We might receive less, and properly so. But while we would be entitled to less, we would be no less worthy, no less deserving than others":

> So, while we are entitled to the benefits that the rules of the game promise for the exercise of our talents, it is a mistake and a conceit to suppose that we deserve in the first place a society that values the qualities we have in abundance. (Sandel 2010, 163)

"Compelling" as Rawls' case may be, his theory lacks the specificity required for this study, nor does it have a conception of the politicality of art. That being said, Rawls' *magnum opus* was adapted into *A Theory of Justice: The Musical!* at the 2013 Edinburgh Fringe Festival, resulting in an "all-singing, all-dancing romp through 2,500 years of political philosophy" with book, lyrics & music by Eylon Levy, Ramin Sabi and Tommy Peto (A Theory of Justice: The Musical 2012).

3.1.11 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (August 27, 1770 –November 14, 1831)

Without diminishing their respective contributions, none of the theories outlined above meet our requirements of a theory that can position characters within a political social world while also being capable of expressing the politicality of song in the musical, and the musical itself. The theories of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel therefore become the most appropriate philosophical framework to interrogate the musicals under scrutiny, as will be demonstrated below.

For the purposes of this research I will be applying the theories espoused in Hegel's *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* or *Natural Law and Political Science in Outline* (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts –2003) and his *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Phänomenologie des Geistes – 1977). The *Philosophy of Right* provides a thorough and multi-faceted exploration of the rights of individuals within civil society as well as their interaction with Hegel's social spheres and institutions (the family, civil society, and the state). The *Phenomenology of Spirit*, on the other hand, outlines an individual's development from consciousness through self-consciousness and reason to Hegelian Spirit as well as describing how human beings have historically used religion, art, and philosophy to reflect on and improve their social worlds.

The standard German edition of Hegel's collected works is the twenty-volume "Association of his Friends" edition that has been reprinted and revised four times since his death, most recently in 1970 (Hegel 1970b). English translations of his major works include *The Science of Logic*, translated by A. V. Miller (Hegel 1969); and *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, published in two parts (Hegel 1874; 1970a). The primary texts used in this study are the 1991 Cambridge University edition of Hegel's *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* edited by Allen W. Wood and translated by H. B. Nisbet (Hegel 2003), and the 1977 Oxford University Press edition of his *Phenomenology of Spirit* also translated by Miller with foreword and analysis of the text by J. N. Findlay (Hegel 1977).

3.2 Introduction to Hegel Literature

From the latter half of the 20th century there has been what Frederick Beiser terms a "puzzling Hegel Renaissance" (2008). Beiser attributes this renewed interest to the rise of Marxism in the 1960s, leading to increased investigation into the work of his forbear (2008, 1). The most puzzling part for Beiser is that "as Marx's star fell, Hegel's only rose" (2008, 2) and he puts this down to the fact that "scholars began to ignore or underplay that aspect of Hegel's philosophy that [had previously been] placed center stage: metaphysics" (2008, 3 - edited).

According to Charles Taylor, the central concept of Hegel's metaphysics was his idea of self-positing Spirit: "What held every part of the system together, what made it into a unified whole, was the idea of an absolute Spirit that posits itself in and through history and nature" (Beiser 2008, 2). Yet "since the early 1960s, many scholars of Hegel's social and political thought claimed that it could be understood without his metaphysics", choosing instead to focus on his "critique of liberalism, his conception of freedom, and his theory of the state, all of which seemed to have point and meaning independent of the rest of his system" (Beiser 2008, 3). This introduces the possibility of both systematic and non-systematic approaches to the study of Hegel. This research takes a systematic approach to Hegel's theories, incorporating his concept of Spirit, to be introduced more thoroughly later in the chapter.

The delayed embrace of Hegel's work can be understood when one considers him an early Modernist thinker writing on the cusp of the Age of Enlightenment. Andrzej Gasiorek believes that "instability […] is at the heart of modernism in all its forms" (Gasiorek 2015, x – edited), and it is instability that Hegel provides. Hegel's Absolute is not in fact 'absolute' (McGowan 2016), and this would have been a cause for contention among his contemporaries who were seeking concrete knowledge, not contradiction. In McGowan's mind, "Thought moves in order to

discover a new contradiction that will prove more resistant to resolution than the previous one" (2016, 51), and this is exactly what Hegel's dialectical model provides.

An alternative explanation for the recent rise in Hegel scholarship comes from Todd McGowan. McGowan notes that nearly two centuries had to pass before "someone was able to penetrate the predominant character of Hegel's thought and make proper sense of what he was saying" (2016, 44). According to McGowan, that someone was Slavoj Žižek:

> Slavoj Žižek has spent a great deal of time in his books devoted to Hegel to correcting the misreading and cutting through the confusion. One might even say that Žižek's own philosophical project is linked to the reclaiming of the Hegelian legacy and to establish a new understanding of Hegel's principal ideas. (McGowan 2016, 44)

Žižek's own brief discussion of musical theatre will be addressed later in the section.

3.1.1 Approaches to Hegel

There are two schools of thought as to the best way to approach Hegel's work. Harry Brod in *Hegel's Political Philosophy: A Systematic Reading of the* Philosophy of Right (2013) argues for a systematic approach. Brod's approach is systematic in that it does not read the *Philosophy of Right* in isolation from Hegel's other works. Brod notes that this approach is both "controversial and unpopular" in that many scholars believe it possible for Hegel's political arguments to be "accurately reconstructed [...] without substantive recourse to other parts of his system", most specifically his *Logic* (2013, 5 – edited). Despite this, Brod argues for the validation of his systematic approach in that "if a systematic reading were to replace non-systematic accounts, then this systematic reading should improve upon, not detract from, the many advances to our

knowledge of the *Philosophy of Right* that non-systematic readings have offered us already" (2013, 6).

Paul Redding, on the other hand, argues that systematic readings of Hegel can be achieved through hermeneutics. According to Redding, Hegel was able to develop Kant's work on morality by "putting hermeneutic ideas together with Kant's Copernican philosophy, transcendental idealism" (1996, 1). Utilising the "systematic *links* between [the *Philosophy of Right*] and the *Logic*" (1996, 17 – edited), Redding believes:

> it is the hermeneutic reading of the *Logic* which allows us to understand the systematic connections between it and the *Philosophy of Right* and to appreciate Hegel's profound relevance for many of the most recent debates found in social and moral philosophy. (1996, 17)

Other systematic reviews include Goldstein (2006) and Brooks (2007). This research takes a systematic approach to Hegel's theories as I argue that elements of the *Philosophy of Right* can be used to demonstrate how musicals can be considered vehicles for Hegelian Spirit. However, this does not mean that a complete understanding of Hegel's entire body of work, including his *Philosophy of Nature* and *Prospects for a Folk Religion* are required in order to utilise the approaches undertaken in this project. The musical theatre practitioner interested in delving further into Hegel's works will undoubtedly find much interest and value in doing so; however, they are not vital for this application.

In light of these renewed efforts in Hegel scholarship, Beiser says:

> Prima facie, it would seem that there is nowhere further that it can go; such has been the sheer volume of writings on Hegel that it would seem that no stone has been unturned and no corner unexplored. Indeed, repetition has

> become the order of the day: the same ground is gone over again and again, often with little variation. There are so many commentaries on Hegel's *Phenomenology,* so many studies of the *Philosophy of Right,* that there seems no point in doing another. If there were ever a case to be made for too many scholars chasing too few texts, it would seem to apply to Hegel's body of work (2008, 9).

However Beisier further suggests that, despite the large number of Hegel studies already undertaken, "there is still much to do; indeed, in some respects, work has been scarcely begun" (2008, 9). A survey of existing approaches to Hegel scholarship appears below, however one area that is currently untouched by Hegel scholars is the study of musical theatre. This research therefore takes the first steps towards filling this gap in the literature by applying Hegel's theories of Spirit and social reconciliation to the function and politicality of song in the musical.

3.1.2 Accessibility Studies and Commentaries

Accessibility studies are those texts aimed at increasing the accessibility of Hegel's often dense and confusing style. In Robert C. Solomon's words, his "In the Spirit of Hegel" is a "book about a book" – it is "not exactly a commentary", with his intention being to "re-do Hegel, to try to understand what is going on in this one great book, to recast and in many cases reformulate his arguments […] in our terms" (Solomon 1983, 1).

In the introduction to *Hegel's Philosophy of Freedom*, Paul Franco states: "My aim is not only to demonstrate the larger philosophical themes mentioned above but also to illuminate the details of Hegel's dense masterpiece and make it more accessible to the general student and teacher of political philosophy" (Franco 1999, xi). Dudley Knowles jokes in his own introduction that, if he could, he would preface his text with the slogan "You, too, can understand Hegel" (2002, xii).

Alan Patten also offers a "philosophical exploration of what [he calls] Hegel's 'idea of freedom'" through an examination of "what it is to be free (the 'concept' of freedom) and his account of the social and political contexts in which this freedom is developed, realized, and sustained (the 'actualization' of freedom" (1999, 3). Other accessibility studies of the *Philosophy of Right* include Pelczynski (1971; 1984), Taylor (1975), Ritter (1984), Peperzack (1987), Wood (1990), Inwood (2002), Pippin & Höffe (2004), Rose (2007), and James (2007) and studies of the *Phenomenology* include Pinkard (1996), Rockmore (1997), Russon (2004), Stewart *(1998)*, Stern (2002)*,* Verene (2007), and Westphal (2003). While it is not necessary to have a requisite understanding of Hegel's entire system before applying his theories to the musical, the musical theatre scholar/practitioner interested in furthering their understanding may wish to utilise these introductory texts before tackling Hegel's own writings.

3.1.3 Preface to the Phenomenology

The preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is held in great regard by Hegel scholars. According to Hermann Glockner: "[It is] the most important of all Hegel texts … Whoever has understood the preface to the Phenomenology has understood Hegel" (Glockner in Schacht 1972, 1). Indeed, it is so important that in 2005 Yirmiyahu Yovel contended the need for a new translation as he believed the existing translations were "not sufficiently accurate for the magnifying glass that must be used in a close reading and commentary" (Yovel 2005, x).

Hegel describes the Preface to the *Phenomenology* as his explication of "knowing as it comes into being" (Hegel in Henry S. Harris 1997, 30). Richard Schachte describes Hegel's argument thus: "since the Truth or the essential nature of things consists in a network of logically-related concepts, it can only be grasped accurately and completely through a philosophical mode of thought which is rigorously rational and logical, and systematic as well" (Schacht 1972, 2). The

purpose of the Preface is therefore to outline this process, in order to bring us to an understanding of "the situation as *he* [Hegel] enters the picture" (Schacht 1972, 2).

The problem, as noted by Rockmore, is that the "preface was composed several months after the book was delivered to the printer" and therefore "can be read with greatest profit after reading the work it presents" (Rockmore 1997, 6). This may explain the need for commentaries including Kaufmann (1977), Marx (1988), Peperzak (1987), Rosen (2000), Yovel (2005), and Lucero-Montano (2007). However, and "in contrast to the prevailing opinion", Werner Marx argues that the Preface "largely constitutes a supplement to the Introduction, and thus was not meant to be merely a preface to the system that follows" (Marx 1988, xii).

3.1.4 Applications of Hegel

While Hegel's theories are generally discussed within the areas of Metaphysics and Epistemology, it is important to show, for the applications of this research, that they can also be employed in less-traditional fields.

For example, Edith Wyschogrod contends that Hegel's *Phenomenology* provides a "model of transactional self of great use in the context of man-made mass death" within the context of "death-events" such as Hiroshima and Auschwitz (Wyschogrod 1985, xii). Georges Bataille also uses the Phenomenology as a lens through which to view the "sacred horror" of personal sacrifice: "the richest and the most agonizing experience, which does not limit itself to dismemberment but which, on the contrary, opens itself, like a theatre curtain, onto a realm beyond this world, where the rising light of day transfigures all things and destroys their limited meaning" (Bataille 1990, 21).

Michael Quante specifically addresses Hegel's concept of action in his 2004 monograph. Quante is interested in the specific conditions by which something becomes an action and his study is primarily focussed on the discussion of §§105-125 of the *Philosophy of Right* (2004, 3). Hegel states that "Only with the expression of the moral will do we come to *action*" (Hegel in Quante 2004, 7) and Quante argues that §§105-125 can be understood by uncovering the "consistency of the logical structure and argumentation […] as dealing with action-theoretic problems" (2004, 3 – edited). Other studies on action and agency include Speight (2001) and Laitinen and Sandis (2010).

Hegel's thoughts on the French Revolution have been discussed in depth in the literature. Although "neither Rousseau, nor the Revolution, nor anyone else, nor any occurrence, is identified in any way" in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Robert Wokler argues that "there is every reason to believe [that] Hegel had in mind both the political philosophy of Rousseau and the French Revolution" (Wokler 1998, 33). Steven W. Smith argues that, "for most social and political theorists, it was the French (and only later the Russian) Revolution that became the model by which to measure revolution" (S. B. Smith 1989, 233), and that Hegel's contribution to our understanding of the Revolution was his "attempt ultimately to domesticate the revolution by regarding it as a 'moment' but only a moment in the collective *Bildung* of humanity" (S. B. Smith 1989, 235). Hegel's concept of *Bildung* is a key term in this thesis, to be discussed and introduced later in the chapter. Other texts on Hegel and the French Revolution include Ritter (1984), Comay (2011), and Harris (1977).

Scholars have also devoted attention to Hegel's description of the Ashanti tribe of modern-day Ghana. In "Hegel at the Court of Ashanti", Robert Bernasconi examines Hegel's exploration of Africa in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History* despite excluding it from his "dialectic of world history" (Bernasconi 1998, 41). Amongst this discussion, Herbert Marcuse argues that "Hegel's basic concepts are hostile to the tendencies that have led into Fascist theory and practice" (Marcuse 2000, vii).

Other applications of Hegel's theories include feminist interpretations (Mills 1996; Gauthier 1997; Hutchings and Pulkkinen 2010; Ring 1991; Söderbäck 2010; Butler 1987), Susan Buck-Morss' discussion of the 1791 Haitian Revolution (2011), Daniel J. Cook's study of language in Hegel (1973), and Robert B. Brandom's exploration of semantic pragmatism (1999).

More relevant to this research, Žižek uses the *Phenomenology* in his discussion of what he terms "kolkhoz musicals", a sub-genre "which thrived from the mid-1930s to the early 1950s, with Liubov Orlova their greatest star, a kind of Soviet counterpart to Ginger Rogers" (Žižek 2006, 294). Žižek also describes how Disney, around the same time, presented Pluto's trial in *Pluto's Judgment Day* (1935) as a "musical number, with a series of ironic references to popular songs" (Žižek 2006, 295). Žižek describes the "link between musical and [the political] show-trial" (Žižek 2006, 295), further supporting the argument that musicals are inherently political, but he does not take his process further to investigate the inherent politicality of song.

This is not an exhaustive exploration of the literature related to Hegel, but it does demonstrate both the ability to apply Hegel to fields outside the areas of his initial exploration and his ongoing influence on contemporary scholarship.

3.1.5 Historicity

The Philosophy of Right is steeped in its own history in that Hegel frequently references previous historical periods in the development of his argument. In the words of R. R. Williams:

> Hegel is a modern thinker who is at the same time a critic of modernity and its liberal versus communitarian alternatives. He pursues the development of a

> social and historical conception of reason and freedom that raises issues concerning the normativity and positivity of right (R. R. Williams 2001, 2)[8].

Adriaan Peperzak believes that "few scholars pay sufficient attention to the historical context in which Hegel's thought matured and the elements of the philosophical and non-philosophical culture absorbed during his education and later readings" (2001, 2). Garry Browning addresses Hegel's "historical assimilation" in order to "review Hegel's self-conception of his own political philosophy" (1999, 2). Fred Dallmyr appropriates Hans-Georg Gadamer's term *Wirkungsgeschichte* to describe how the study of Hegel's work requires the "implication of both text and interpretation in a historical nexus of understandings and preunderstandings, a nexus from which neither text nor interpretation can fully extricate itself and that alone grants access to a work of the past" (2002, 12). Peperzak also argues for a systematic reading of the *Philosophy of Right*, bridging two approaches already discussed. Other historical studies include Kelly (1969), Avineri (1972), Pippin (1981), Toews (1985), Marcuse (2000), and Reidel (2011).

This historical understanding of Hegel's theories is vital for this research not only to track the development of Freedom throughout history, but also to note that social norms have changed since Hegel's time, a criticism of his work that will be addressed in the section on Responses to/Criticism of Hegel.

3.1.6 Legal Studies

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[8] Williams has also written on recognition and the other in *Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other* (1992) and *Hegel's Ethics of Recognition* (1997).

Not surprisingly, Hegel's political theory has drawn attention from the area of legal studies. Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson attribute the recent rise in Hegel scholarship to both the increasingly democratised world and a simultaneous "crisis of confidence concerning the law's objectivity as well as fractious debate and stiffening polarization concerning the proper function and legitimacy of law" (1991, ix). Tunick also notes Hegel's contemporary relevance, "because of what he has to teach us about our [legal and political] practices" (1992, vii). Other legal studies include Salter (2003).

3.1.7 Kant, Hegel, and Marx

While there is much discussion of Hegel's impact and influence on Marxism (Hook 1958; Plamenatz 1963; McLellan 1969; G. A. Cohen 1978; Pelczynski 1984, et al.), there is also retrospective consideration of Kant's influence on Hegel and even Edward Gans' bridging work between Hegel and Marx (Hoffheimer 1995). Ido Geiger discusses the different perspectives of Kant and Hegel's theories of moral motivation, noting that Hegel considers Kant's conception of the categorical imperative to be "radically alien" as it can "never become our second nature and so determine our immediate response to a situation at hand" (2007, 4). Hegel argues instead for "acculturated" moral motivation through the social and familial impact of *Bildung* (Geiger 2007, 4). Other comparative studies include Walsh (1998).

3.1.8 Theological Studies

Whether Hegel was a Christian thinker is an ongoing argument (Singer 1983, 105–8) and Shanks believes this to be the case in *Hegel's Political Theology* (1991). Shanks is specifically interested in the potential for Christianity to be "corrupted into kitsch" and calls upon Hegel because he knows of "no other thinker who seems to me to come so close to the heart of the matter in this regard" (1991, 4). Shanks is specifically interested in how the figure of Christ can be used to

represent humanity, and believes this can be achieved through Hegel's conception of the "infinite value of the individual as such" (Hegel in Shanks 1991, 4). Other theological studies include Plant (1999).

3.1.9 Summation

It has been identified that, while there is much existing literature devoted separately to the function of song in the musical and the works of Hegel, none combine both of these areas into an integrated theory of the politicality of song in the musical. This research takes the first steps towards doing so. However, before diving into the case studies, we must first undertake a more thorough survey of Hegel's social theory and his *Phenomenology of Spirit* in order to equip the reader for the discussion ahead.

3.3 Hegel's Social Theories

This remainder of this chapter will introduce Hegel's theories of social reconciliation from the *Philosophy of Right* and his concept of Spirit from the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. It will provide a broad outline of these theories as well as their content to be used later in the thesis as a lens through which to examine the case studies. The politicality of the musical has already been established and these theories will therefore be used to demonstrate the politicality of song within this framework, a function that, as we have seen, is currently overlooked in the existing scholarship.

3.4 Phenomenology of Spirit

Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Phänomenologie des Geistes – 1977) is his examination of the human experience of consciousness. Hegel outlines four 'shapes' through which consciousness moves: consciousness or 'sense-certainty', self-consciousness or 'self-certainty', the understanding of truth and reason, and, the final stage, Spirit (Houlgate 2018). According to Pinkard, "It is a truism that Hegel took much of his program from Kant, but it has always been a matter of great dispute as to just what he took, how much he took, and how much he altered and added to the Kantian program" (Pinkard 1990, 831). One clear addition is his concept of Spirit, the main argument for the selection of Hegel for the purposes of this research.

Within Hegel's final shape of consciousness, Frank Ruda outlines three forms of Hegelian Spirit: "spirit immanently relating to itself, spirit relating to something outside of itself, and spirit relating to something outside of itself as (posited by) itself. Subjective, objective, and absolute spirit" (Ruda 2017, 102). Hegel also describes a fourth form of Spirit, 'world spirit', an "avant garde vis-à-vis the understanding of political freedom at that period of time" (Pinkard 1996, 336), and I will show later how both Captain Hammer and Penny are acting as Hegelian world-spirits in *Dr. Horrible*.

The world-spirit of Hegel's time was Napoleon, whom he famously described in a letter to Friedrich Niethammer: "I saw the Emperor – this world-soul – riding out of the city on reconnaissance. It is indeed a wonderful sensation to see such an individual, who, concentrated here at a single point, astride a horse, reaches out over the world and masters it… this extraordinary man, whom it is impossible not to admire" (Pinkard 2000, 228). In other words, a Hegelian world-spirit is a single individual who can be seen to be leading the social world towards a new understanding of itself, just as Penny does in *Dr. Horrible*.

According to Stephen Houlgate, "the task of the *Phenomenology* is to take ordinary consciousness – or those attached to ordinary consciousness – from its own perspective to the perspective of philosophy" (Houlgate 2018). Hegel in fact argues in the preface to the

Phenomenology that "non-philosophical consciousness has a *right* to be shown why it should move from its point of view to that of philosophy" (Houlgate 2018).

While Hegel's earlier shapes of consciousness are important and fascinating reading, they are not vital for the purposes of this research. The concepts of reason and Right will be covered later in the discussion of the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, so for now we must focus on the concept of Spirit in order to demonstrate how it will be applied to the case studies to show how musicals could be considered vehicles of Spirit.

According to Hegel: "Reason is Spirit when its certainty of being all reality has been raised to truth, and it is conscious of itself as its own world, and of the world as itself" (Hegel 1977, 263). More specifically, Pinkard describes Spirit as "a given community's reflection on its essential self-identity and its highest interests through the historical practices and institutions of art, religion, and philosophy" (holding a mirror up to society – Pinkard 1996, 221). Earlier we heard Husserl's theory that philosophers are the "representatives of the spirit of reason or the spiritual organ through which the community reaches an awareness of its true determination (its true self)" (Husserl in Staehler 2017, 98), and Hegel appears to agree while also including the practices of religion and art as socially reflective tools. Interesting though they may be, Hegel's discussions of religion and philosophy as modes of reflection are also not vital for the purposes of this research, therefore we must delve more deeply into Hegel's description of art as a vehicle for Spirit.

Hegel charts the process of history from "Natural religion [that] depicted the divine grounds of belief and action in terms of some parts of nature abstracted and made into symbols, [to] Egyptian religion [that] transformed that symbolic natural ground into something that mixed both nature and spirit together" (Pinkard 1996, 233 – edited). With this development we reach the realm of the "abstract work of art" (Hegel 1977, 427). Hegel argues that this next stage of artistic and human development allowed the ancient Greeks to represent to themselves "a

more nearly human set of gods as evolving and eventually triumphing over the nature-gods" in the form of statues (Pinkard 1996, 233).

However, while the Greek artists were putting their effort into casting their statues, they were not in fact "putting anything of [their] own into the work" as, while "Athena actually appears in the work, [the artist] is not constructing a work that is his understanding of how, for example, Athena is to be understood" (Pinkard 1996, 235 - edited): "The work of art is therefore an object that is independent of him, that depicts its truth without any contribution from him. Thus, the artist, although thinking of himself as an artist, still conceives of himself along the lines of being an artisan" (Pinkard 1996, 235).

This is an important, indeed vital, step in the way humans came to understand their relationship to the gods and the evolution of gods themselves. Ultimately, the ancient Greeks came to realise that "only through their activity can god be present", and "this change in self-understanding is part of the way in which the artist gradually comes to understand himself not just as an artisan but as an artist" (Pinkard 1996, 236).

In coming to this conclusion, Greek society realised that "statuary is an imperfect vehicle for this kind of understanding" of themselves, requiring instead "A form of art involving language [–] something like the hymn practiced by the cults of ancient Greek life [that] stepped into the space of logical possibilities created by the development of this kind of reflective practice" (Pinkard 1996, 236).

Enter the Minstrel. According to Hegel, "the Minstrel is the individual and actual Spirit from whom, as a subject of this world, it [the world] is produced and by whom it is borne" (Hegel 1977, 440). In Pinkard's terms, "the world of the gods is linked to the world of the humans through the singer (the minstrel)" (Pinkard 1996, 243):

> His ‘pathos’ is not the stupefying power of Nature but Mnemosyne, recollection and a gradually developed inwardness, the remembrance of essence the formerly was directly present. He is the organ that vanishes in its content; what counts is not his own self but his Muse, his universal song. (Hegel 1977, 441)

In other words, through the performance of ‘Epics’, the minstrel presents and reflects upon narrative tales of the gods and their deeds through song, but the story he tells obscures his individuality of self, just as an actor playing a role relinquishes their self through the performance; in Hegel’s words he is “lost in his performance” (Hegel 1977, 443). The result of this process is that “the extreme of universality, the world of the gods, is linked with individuality, with the Minstrel, through the middle term of [his] particularity” (Hegel 1977, 441 – edited). In Pinkard’s words, “An epic tells the story of how a determinate group of people with their own form of life have come to self-consciousness about who they are because of a conflict with some other group of people that forced them to develop that understanding of who they are” (Pinkard 1996, 241).

From the “conflict” of the Greek’s narrative epics came the “content” of Tragedy: “In regard to form, the language ceases to be narrative because it enters into the content, just as the content ceases to be one that is imaginatively presented” (Hegel 1977, 443–44). In this “higher language” of Tragedy (Hegel 1977, 443):

> The hero himself is the speaker, and the performance displays to the audience – who are also spectators – *self-conscious* human beings who *know* their rights and purposes, the power and the will of their specific nature and know how to *assert* them. [… In the Tragedy] these characters *exist* as actual human beings who impersonate the heroes and portray them, not in the form of a narrative, but in the actual speech of the actors themselves. (Hegel 1977, 444)

We can see from these stages of development that humanity has continually wrestled more involvement in its own reflection away from the natural gods into forms that increasingly allow it to view and interrogate its world as something 'unfamiliar'. According to Hegel:

> Quite generally, the familiar, just because it is familiar, is not cognitively understood. The commonest way in which we deceived ourselves or others about understanding is by assuming something as familiar, and accepting it on that account; with all its pros and cons, such knowing never gets anywhere, and it knows not why. Subject and object, God, Nature, Understanding, sensibility, and so on, are uncritically taken for granted as familiar, established as valid, and made into fixed points for starting and stopping. While these remain unmoved, the knowing activity goes back and forth between them, thus moving only on their surface. Apprehending and testing likewise consist in seeing whether everybody's impression of the matter coincides with what is asserted about these fixed points, whether it seems that way to him or not. (Hegel 1977, 18)

According to Pinkard, "Greek tragedy put the individual in the position of questioning whether his acting in terms of [his social roles and duties] without reflection on them was in itself a fitting reason for action" (Pinkard 1996, 248 – edited). Furthermore, "in becoming *self-conscious* in the form of art, Greek life could no longer simply accept the norms of Greek *Sittlichkeit* at face value, nor could it accept that what it had taken as divine was really so" (Pinkard 1996, 248). This realisation led to the development of Hegel's highest form of reflection-through-art, comedy:

> Greek comedy – like all genuine comedy – takes as its project the same concern with presenting truths about essential self-identity, but it does this by humorously mocking the "insubstantial" aspect of the various practices of a form of life in order to make what is genuinely true and essential come to the

> foreground of reflection. The major vehicle for such comedy is the humorous mocking and exposing of people's pretensions in order to bring out who they really are and what the society is really about. The fundamental core of comedy is thus the gap between people's *pretensions* about who they are and who they *really* are, between what people *say* they are doing and what they are *really* doing (Pinkard 1996, 248).

Hegel describes this action as the function of "masks". In his words, "The pretensions of universal essentiality are uncovered in the self; it shows itself to be entangled in an actual existence, and drops the mask just because it wants to be something genuine" (Hegel 1977, 450). This metaphor can also be applied to the earlier versions of civil society whose "pretensions" regarding their "actual existence" turned out to be nothing more than a mask. Furthermore, in comedy, "The self […] plays with the mask which it once put on in order to act its part; but it as quickly breaks out again from this illusory character and stands forth in its own nakedness and ordinariness, which it shows to be not distinct from the genuine self, the actor, or from the spectator" (Hegel 1977, 450 – edited).

To close with Pinkard:

> Greek comedy, particularly Aristophane's comedy, actually exposed to the Greeks what was truly going on in their form of life. […] The self-evident and serene assurance in the validity of Greek *Sittlichkeit* that had provided the authoritative reasons for belief and action had been thrown into question by Greek tragedy, and Greek philosophy could offer no satisfactory reassurance within Greek terms that those reasons were indeed authoritative reasons. (Pinkard 1996, 249)

This is the task of art as a vehicle for reflection, i.e. Spirit. Art provides one way in which we can represent/hold up a mirror to ourselves and challenge our "authoritative reasons [for our] belief and actions" and call them into question. In fact, the characters in each of this project's three case studies come to find that their own "authoritative reasons" for their actions are as empty as those of the Greeks, allowing us to reflect on and consider why they may have taken them to be authoritative for themselves in the first place, and, more importantly, what may be a higher authority for our own belief and actions in the future. This is Hegel's world history in action, the movement of freedom through the reflection of society, a process that has continued since the dawn of civil society and will exist far beyond the end of our own.

3.5 Elements of the Philosophy of Right

Hegel's *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* or *Natural Law and Political Science in Outline* (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts – 2003) is a philosophical exploration of his views on law and legislation, both the "laws of nature" and those "*laid down*, something *derived from* human beings" (2003, 13). Hegel defines the difference between laws of nature and laws of right thus: the former are "simply there and are valid as they stand," whereas, "with the laws of right, the Spirit of reflection comes into play and their very diversity draws attention to the fact that they are not absolute" (2003, 13).[9]

The *Philosophy of Right* outlines the conditions under which people can be at home in their social world, and Hegel's project stemmed from a specific problem that he saw in his own society. Hegel held that the people of his time, including fellow "philosophically reflective individuals" (Hardimon 1994, 130), were not "at home" in their social world (Hardimon 1994, 1). In

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[9] "The Absolute is not something that transcends existence; it is the whole of existence itself understood as a system in which each part is organically and inseparably related to every other" (Magee 2010, 19–20).

Hegel's view, his contemporaries, German Idealists[10] such as Fichte, Schelling, Jacobi, Schulze, Reinhold, and Schleiermacher, could not grasp that their world was already a home. Hegel viewed their social world as one in which it was possible to be at home but considered those around him to be subjectively alienated to this fact. In the *Philosophy of Right* Hegel outlines the conditions under which people can be at home in their social world and it is these same conditions that will be used later to demonstrate that the members of the case studies are not at home in their social worlds.

Some sections of the *Philosophy of Right* have been excluded from this discussion. Hegel's model is extremely comprehensive and touches on a number of issues that, while not directly relevant to these particular case studies, may, of course, relate to other shows. Nevertheless, the following discussion is intended to show that Hegel's theories can still make a valuable contribution to musical theatre scholarship despite these exclusions.

3.5.1 Definition of Right

According to Hegel, "Right is something *utterly sacred*, for the simple reason that it is the existence [*Dasein*] of the absolute concept, of self-conscious freedom" (2003, 59). On a more universal level, "*Right* is any existence [*Dasein*] in general which is the *existence* of the *free will*" (Hegel 2003, 58).

The German term *Rechtens*, covers a similar connotative sphere as the English term right, meaning "*what* is right or legal" (Hegel 2003, 26), with the added connotations of 'privilege,' 'advantage,' and 'prerogative'; therefore a 'right' is something to which a person is entitled. This

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[10] "Idealism is the metaphysical and epistemological doctrine that ideas or thoughts make up fundamental reality. Essentially, it is any philosophy which argues that the only thing actually knowable is consciousness (or the contents of consciousness), whereas we never can be sure that matter or anything in the outside world really exists" (Mastin 2008).

is in contrast to the German term *richtig* meaning to be right or correct, as in that maths problem is right/correct. *Recht* also has a directional connotation, as in to turn right or left, which is more appropriate for the concept of right moving in the historically 'right' direction, rather than simply being 'correct'.

3.5.2 The Free Will

According to Hegel, humans are willing beings, who, in contrast to animals, have a will:

> The distinction between thought and will is simply that between theoretical and practical attitudes. But they are not two separate faculties; on the contrary, the will is a particular way of thinking – thinking that translates itself into existence [*Dasein*], thinking as the drive to give itself existence (Hegel 2003, 35).

Hegel describes how animals act by instinct and drives, and how some people could be considered "anti-human, the merely animal, [that] consists in staying within the sphere of feeling, and being able to communicate only at that level" (Hegel 1977, 42 – edited).

Humans, although also instinctive, have the ability to desire change in the world and enact this desire. In Hegel's words, "the will contains the theoretical within itself" (Hegel 2003, 36). This theoretical capacity of the will is one of the distinguishing factors between humans and the animal world. However, the arbitrary nature of the will is unique in that "Whatever the will has decided to choose, it can likewise relinquish", i.e. we can change our minds (Hegel 2003, 50).

The will, for Hegel, develops through multiple stages. The subjective will is the will's self-conscious aspect, the will 'in itself' (*an sich*) as unrealised Aristotelian potentiality (Hegel 2003, 55). Glenn

Alexander Magee uses the example of an acorn: "the acorn is the oak tree merely *in-itself*" (2010, 120). The next stage of the developing will is the objective will, the will 'for itself' (*für sich*) that is only capable of realising itself through an other: "the will of a child, which is founded on trust and lacks subjective freedom, and the will of the slave, which does not yet know itself as free and is consequently a will with no will of its own" (Hegel 2003, 57). The ultimate goal of the will, then, is to "make its freedom into its object" (Hegel 2003, 57), to not only have its potentialities become manifest, but to do so *to* itself. Here the will is absolute, 'in-and-for-itself' (*anundfürsichsein*), as its potentialities have been realised, and it is aware of their realisation – its actuality is "known to it" (Magee 2010, 121) and therefore the will can be said to be 'with itself' (*bei sich*). Once a person has become 'with themselves' (*bei sich*), they may then enter and function as an individual within the social world. This definition is important as it will be shown later that some members of the case studies are yet to achieve Hegel's in-and-for-themselves will, continuing to function instead as Hegelian children.

Hegel argues that, by its nature, the arbitrary will creates a dialectic, placing conflict (a political force) at the forefront of human thought (2003, 50 – edited). This conflict occurs between our natural drives, such as hunger and the libido, and those capacities of the will that support freedom and right. However, in order to be 'right,' the natural drives must be tempered by reflection, i.e. they must be 'good': "the drives should become the rational system of the will's determination; to grasp them thus in terms of the concept is the content of the science of right" (Hegel 2003, 51). Hegel argues that this 'rational system' of thought can be developed through "education" or "*Bildung*" (2003, 52).

There is contention among scholars as to the correct translation of *Bildung*. The German term has multiple meanings, including education, culture, development, and formation (H. Nisbet in Hegel 2003, 483). For example, Huesca Ramón translates *Bildung* as 'culture' in his article "Hegel's Concept of the Free Will: Towards a Redefinition of an Old Question": "A child without culture would be pretty much just an animal" (2015, 314). For the purposes of this thesis I will use

the term *Bildung* as it incorporates all of the meanings mentioned above, but also due to its conventional use in Hegelian literature.

3.6 The Social World

The social world, according to Hegel, is comprised of three separate-yet-intrinsically-linked, institutional spheres (the family, civil society, and the state – to be developed further later), each larger than and encompassing the former. These three spheres mirror Aristotle's "communities" outlined earlier (Kenny 2019), but Hegel's conception goes into greater detail. For example, Hegel argues that, in order for its members to be 'at home' in the social world, the world itself must *be* a home. Hardimon describes Hegel's four conditions that enable people to be at home in the modern social world:

1. the social world is a home;
2. they grasp that the social world is a home;
3. they feel at home in the social world; and
4. they accept and affirm the social world (1992, 181)

I will argue in later chapters that the characters in the case studies are not at home in their social worlds as they do not meet one of more of these conditions and are all seeking social worlds in which they can be at home.

3.6.1 The Social World as Home

Hegel describes the social world as being a home as long as there is no distinctive way in which its members are alienated or 'split' from it: "alienation is a form of being *split* from the social

world, and being at home in the world is the circumstance of *not being split* from it" (Hardimon 1992, 182). Marx argued earlier that "When people have become aware of their loss, of their alienation, as a universal nonhuman situation, it will be possible for them to proceed to a radical transformation of their situation by a revolution" (Chambre and McLellan 2019). Marx's understanding of alienation appears more 'black and white' than Hegel's who outlines three objective *dimensions* along which people can be split from the social world, specifically *value*, *need*, and *cognition*.

Members of a community can be connected to the social world if the world's social institutions (the family, civil society, and the state) "express" or promote the personal social *values* of the members in their day-to-day operation, and allow the members to meet their own social *needs* through interaction with these institutions (Hardimon 1992, 183). In order to be a home, it is necessary that these basic social values and needs are not only those of the members of a community as community members, but they are also their own basic *individual* needs and values, i.e. their needs and values as individual members of the community (Hardimon 1992, 183).

In essence, basic social needs and values can be considered as a nexus between *individuality* and *community* (Hardimon 1992, 184). In Hegel's understanding, individuality involves:

1. having a set of separate and particular interests,
2. having the capacity to question one's social roles and institutions,
3. being able to pursue one's own separate and particular interests,
4. being able to assert one's individual rights, and
5. being able to act in accordance with individual conscience (Hardimon 1992, 184)

Community, on the other hand, "involves identifying with one's social roles and institutions [...] and participating in social arrangements characterized by shared transindividual ends (for example, the survival of one's family or nation)" (Hardimon 1992, 184 – edited).

Finally, the dimension of cognition requires that "in order to be at home in the social world, people must *understand* (*begreifen*) their basic social arrangements, and hence that in order to be a home, the social world must allow of comprehension" (Hardimon 1992, 185). I.e., in order for the social world to be a home, its institutions' operation, organisation, and values must be transparent to its members.

3.6.2 Grasping that the Social World is a Home

Members of a community may be alienated (split) from their social world along any one of the three previously discussed dimensions – value, need, and cognition. People can be either subjectively or objectively alienated from the social world, and it is possible to be *subjectively alienated* both when the social world either is or is not a home (Hardimon 1992, 190). I contend that the characters in all three case study musicals are alienated from their social worlds in some way and it is through the application of Hegel's theories that this split can be seen.

A person may be subjectively alienated if the social world is *not* a home and they are aware of (*grasp*) this fact, yet they can be similarly alienated if the social world *is* a home but they are unaware of its nature: "the social world can appear to be alien despite the fact that it is a home" (Hardimon 1992, 190). For example, if I am not welcome in a particular social circle and I am aware of this fact, I grasp my own subjective alienation. Similarly, if I *am* welcome in the same social circle but am yet to grasp this fact, I am also subjectively alienated. Objective alienation, on the other hand, occurs when the world is not a home (Hardimon 1994, 120), as will be demonstrated in my analysis of the people of *Urinetown*.

3.6.3 Feeling that the Social World is a Home

In order to feel at home in the social world, a person must feel that they are connected to its institutions as both an individual and as a member of the community: "It involves feeling that one 'fits into' the social world and feeling that one 'belongs' there" (Hardimon 1992, 182). This feeling at home in the social world is achieved if Hegel's first two conditions, that the social world is a home and people grasp this fact, are met.

3.6.4 Accepting and Affirming the Social World

The concept of evil presents a challenge to the acceptance and affirmation of the social world. Hegel's concept requires members of a community to accept their social world 'warts and all'. According to Hegel, 'evils' such as divorce and war are capable of being viewed in a rational light through which they can be accepted and affirmed (Hardimon 1992, 176). Evils occur when people's drives are not tempered by reflection, not given *formal universality*. Divorce can therefore be a product of untempered will, e.g. a husband not thinking of his wife: "Divorce is, in effect, the external, legal expression of an irreparable internal split" (Hardimon 1992, 177).

However, according to Hegel, evil doers are in fact alienating themselves from civil society, as their deeds form a barrier between themselves and true freedom. This will be seen in the discussion of both *Urinetown* and *Dr. Horrible*. As a villain's desires are only 'in themselves' (compared to the rational 'for themselves') their will has not yet achieved formal universality – they exist as potentialities, un-manifest in the social world: "it is only as *thinking* intelligence that the will is truly itself and free" (Hegel 2003, 53). The free will in and for itself is therefore also free in and for society – it maintains constant awareness of the universal and can do no intentional wrong, unlike the characters of *Urinetown* and *Dr. Horrible*.

Hegel outlines three kinds of wrong in the *Philosophy of Right*, namely unintentional wrong, deception, and coercion and crime.

Unintentional wrong exists as a "semblance of essence which posits itself as self-sufficient" (Hegel 2003, 116). In Hegel's first kind of wrong, only the right of a particular person is infringed, while universal right is respected (2003, 118). For example, if I were to borrow someone's pen to take a note and forget to return it, my original intention (to purely borrow the pen) was upheld in my mind as right and therefore the wrong against the owner is unintentional and particular to them (i.e. not universal).

Hegel's second kind of wrong is deception. In the case of deception, "I create a semblance [of right] in order to deceive another person" (Hegel 2003, 116 – edited):

> In deception, the particular will is not infringed, because the deceived person is given the illusion that he is receiving his right. Thus, the right which is required is posited as something subjective, a mere semblance, and this constitutes deception (Hegel 2003, 118).

According to Hegel, no punishment should be attached to civil or unintentional wrong "for in such cases I have willed nothing contrary to right. In the case of deception, however, penalties are introduced, because it is now a matter of infringements of right" (2003, 119).

In Hegel's third kind of wrong, the wrong is "both in itself and for me. But in this case, I will the wrong and do not employ even the semblance of right" (2003, 116). In suffering coercion, my will "may either experience *force* in general, or it may be forced to sacrifice or do something as a condition of retaining some possession or positive being" (Hegel 2003, 119).

However, Hegel believes that we are not entirely passive in our suffering of coercion. In fact, we must voluntarily agree to, and therefore accept the wrong, in order to be coerced:

> The free will in and for itself cannot be *coerced* [*gezwungen*], except in so far as it *fails to withdraw itself from the external dimension* in which it is caught up, or from its idea [*Vorstellung*] of the latter. Only he who *wills* to be *coerced* can be coerced into anything (2003, 119–20).

This discussion of coercion is most relevant to the people of *Urinetown* who are being coerced into an oppressive 'pay-to-pee' regime by Cladwell and the Urine Good Company/UGC. It will be seen, however, that Cladwell's action may in fact constitute unintentional wrong, rather than Hegelian crime, as his intention was to provide the universal need of access to water.

By Hegel's definition, any "force employed by an agent in such a way as to infringe the existence [*Dasein*] of freedom in its *concrete* sense – i.e. to infringe right as right – is *crime*" (2003, 121). In the event of crime, "the universal and infinite element in the predicate of 'mine', i.e. my *capacity for rights*" is negated (Hegel 2003, 122). In other words, the one committing crime against me does not consider me worthy of or entitled to any rights. Consequently, "this is the sphere of *penal law*" (Hegel 2003, 122).

On the topic punishment, Hegel believes that "The state is rather that higher instance which may even itself lay claim to the lives and property of individuals and require their sacrifice" (2003, 126), up to and including the "ultimate form of punishment" (capital punishment/the death sentence – Hegel 2003, 127). While capital punishment is becoming increasingly rare in the contemporary First World (and was already decreasing in Hegel's time – 2003, 127), it's discussion here is important, particularly in relation to the analysis of *Urinetown* later in the thesis.

In lawless societies, “punishment always takes the form of revenge” (Hegel 2003, 130), which is why, in civil society, Hegel calls for “a justice freed from subjective interest and subjective shape and from the contingency of power – that is, a *punitive* rather than an *avenging justice*” (2003, 131). Justice takes the form of a designated ‘judge’, who constitutes “a will which, as a particular and *subjective* will, also wills the universal as such” – i.e. makes judgements in the best interest of society as well as the individual person (Hegel 2003, 131). This ‘punitive judgement’ is not visible in either *Urinetown* or *Dr. Horrible* as Cladwell and Horrible consider themselves to be above the law/both judge and executioner.

Despite Hegel’s discussion of evil and wrong, his model of the social world is not broken by the inclusion of evils, but instead becomes more appealing. No one person is perfect just as no society is perfect, and Hegel’s theory reflects this, leading to the possibility of affirmation. Once it has been accepted that evils are a natural result of civil society, and that civil society is not broken by their presence, affirmation becomes possible (Hardimon 1992, 177).

Hegel’s term for being at home in the social world is *Versöhnung*, which translates into English as ‘reconciliation.’ According to Hardimon, “the English word *reconciliation* carries baggage that the German word does not” (1992, 174). This “baggage” stems from the similarities between the term reconciliation and other terms such as resignation and consolation. For example, if you find yourself in a situation to which you are not agreeable, it is still possible to resign yourself to that fact. There is already a German term for this form of “reconciliation as resignation”, *abfinden* (Hardimon 1992, 173). In contrast, “To be *versöhnt* [reconciled] with the world is to view it in a positive light” – “if *Versöhnung* is possible, resignation is unnecessary” (Hardimon 1992, 173).

Therefore “Reconciliation is the process of *overcoming splits*” (Hardimon 1992, 182), while also recognising that conflicts are a natural part of the social world due to the melting pot of individual wills and desires. The social world itself then becomes a dialectic; the concept of ‘being at home’ is not negated by the presence of evil, in the same way that evil is not negated

by the concept of ‘being at home’ – each is a necessary part of the other. The characters of *Company*, just like Hegel’s contemporaries, are unable to grasp that their social world is in fact a home despite its inherent evils, however the characters of *Urinetown* and *Dr. Horrible* are aware that their social worlds are not a home and are determined to do something about it, ultimately to their detriment.

Regardless of the appeal of Hegel’s model for the purposes of this research, his theories are not without their detractors with a number of philosophers subjecting elements of his ideology to detailed criticism ranging from indifference to outright rejection.

3.7 Responses to/Criticism of Hegel

At the outset, and as noted by Jon Stewart, it is important to recognise the difficulties in attempting to categorise thinkers as staunchly pro- or anti-Hegelian:

> there are enormous difficulties involved in cleanly classifying thinkers as Hegelians or Hegel critics. For example, Martensen anticipated many of Kierkegaard’s criticisms of Hegel, and yet he is classified as a Hegelian. Similarly, Poul Martin Møller was originally known as one of the main proponents of Hegelianism, which he distanced himself from only in the last two years of his life, and based on this fact alone he is classified as an anti-Hegelian. (Stewart 2003, 632)

Despite this difficulty, it is pertinent to address responses to the criticisms of Hegel and his works.

3.7.1 Phenomenology of Spirit

Søren Kierkegaard takes aim at Hegel's philosophical method in the *Phenomenology* in his *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Crumbs* (2009). According to Kierkegaard, for Hegel "truth is the continued world-historical process": "Only afterwards does one get to know whether or not one has been happy; and similarly the next generation gets to know what truth was in the preceding generation" (2009, 30). This reflective truth is correct. The previous discussion has already shown how society progressed its idea of freedom by reflecting on past historical iterations, yet Kiergaard's understanding of historical happiness is at odds with Hegel's theories as argued in the *Philosophy of Right*. We already know Hegel's conditions under which people can be at home in their social world, however, according to Hardimon, "even if the social world is a home, there is no guarantee that people will be happy":

> Hegel contends that if a social world is a home it will promote happiness. In order to be a home a modern social world must contain a social sphere – civil society – in which people can effectively pursue their own separate and particular projects and meet their material needs (PR, §§182-256). A well-ordered Hegelian social world will also include a system of public administration whose functions include the provision of welfare and the prevention of unemployment (PR, §242, R). […] Moreover, a well-ordered Hegelian social world will be organized around families within which people can find love, understanding, and support – essential emotional ingredients of happiness (PR, §§158, 161, 164). Thus, in Hegel's view, happiness is *a* goal of a well-ordered social world. (Hardimon 1994, 117)

Therefore, it is not entirely the case that "Only afterwards does one get to know whether or not one has been happy" in Hegelian society, as a civil society that is a home should support the happiness of its members. However, as will be seen later in relation to Bobby in *Urinetown*: "since happiness depends partly on factors beyond the control of any scheme of social institutions, it would be unreasonable to demand that the social world guarantee it" (Hardimon 1994, 118).

Kierkegaard also had "grave reservations about Hegelianism and its bombastic promises": "Hegel would have been the greatest thinker who ever lived, said Kierkegaard, if only he had regarded his system as a thought-experiment. Instead he took himself seriously as to have reached the truth, and so rendered himself comical" (McDonald 2017). Hegel famously wrote that his own Prussian state had achieved the "end of History" (2001, 121), however he also acknowledged that his social world was both "worthy of reconciliation *and* stood in need of reform" (Hardimon 1994, 26). This will be discussed further below in the relation to the issue of conservatism in the *Philosophy of Right*.

Poul Martin Møller takes a more theological approach to Hegel's scholarship, targeting his concept of Spirit. One of the key issues of the time was "whether or not Hegel espoused a theory of immortality, which would seem to be required if his philosophy is to count as genuinely Christian as he claims it" (Stewart 2015, 116). While those thinkers known as the Right Hegelians attempted to argue the Hegel's concept of immortality was implicit in his work, the Left Hegelians were unconcerned with the relevance of Hegel's subscription to any system of belief (Stewart 2015, 116). According to Stewart: "Møller argues that immortality is necessary for the production of art [and] in a sense follows Heiberg's line that sees art as a highly developed embodiment of the Absolute" (Stewart 2015, 116). This view is not in contrast to Hegel's concept of Spirit that shows how humanity's understanding of gods and the Absolute developed in a way that put human action at the forefront, distancing *Dasein* from the influence of the gods. While not directly relevant to the subject of this thesis, discussion regarding Hegel's religious standpoint is still ongoing, and a recent outline of positions can be found in Shannon (2017).

Jacques Derrida also takes issue with Hegel's model of Spirit, specifically in relation to his concept of the other. In the process of developing an independent will an individual who has not sought the negation of their own for-themselves (*für* sich) will must 'kill off'/negate the less-developed form of themselves in order to achieve in-and-for-itself (*an und für sich*) "being-for-

self" (Hegel 1977, 113–14). This phenomenon can also be seen in the movement of Spirit that negates its own previous/lesser forms. Derrida argues both that "there is a subtle, but total difference between a loss that yields a return of being and a loss that is *simply* a loss", and for the challenge of an "other that is not *spirit's* other" (Magnus 2001, 24). We already know that the experience of Hegel's past historical realms is not lost in their progress to higher forms, instead this knowledge is maintained and contrasted with higher modes of reflection through a dialectical movement. Regarding the issue of 'Spirit's other', Derrida himself notes that "what exceeds [Hegel's] system is a 'negativity that never takes place, that never presents itself, because in doing so it would start to work again'" (Derrida in Magnus 2001, 24). That being said there are those that continue to take issue with Hegel's dialectical method, to be discussed in the next section.

3.7.2 Dialectical Reasoning

While it should be noted that Hegel himself never used the terms thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, these are the terms commonly used in describing the triadic structure of his dialectical reasoning. Spencer and Krauze describe the process as:

THESIS

A thought is affirmed which on reflection proves itself unsatisfactory, incomplete, or contradictory…

ANTITHESIS

which propels the affirmation of its negation, the **anti**-thesis, which also on reflection proves inadequate…

SYNTHESIS

and so is again negated…

> In classical logic, this double negation ("A is not non-A") would simply reinstate the original thesis. The synthesis does not do this. It has "overcome and preserved" (or sublated) the stages of the thesis and antithesis to emerge as a higher rational unity.
>
> (L. Spencer and Krauze 2013, 86)

Each synthesis therefore becomes a new thesis, and this can also be understood as Todd McGowan's idea from earlier that "Thought moves in order to discover a new contradiction that will prove more resistant to resolution than the previous one" (2016, 51).

Much of the criticism of Hegel's dialectal reasoning is that his model is not purely formal (Solomon 1983, 21). Robert C. Solomon argues that "the transition from the first form to the second, or the transition from the first form of the *Phenomenology* all the way to the last, is not in any way a deductive necessity. The connections are anything but entailments, and the *Phenomenology* could always take another route and other starting points" (Solomon 1983, 230). Walter Kaufmann, on the other hand, argues that Hegel's stages in the *Phenomenology* move "in the way in which, to use a Hegelian image from the preface, bud, blossom and fruit succeed each other" (Kaufmann 1965, 148). The "necessity" for Solomon, therefore, is not so much a "'necessity' in the sense of 'logical necessity,'" but a "necessity within a context for some purpose" (Solomon 1983, 209).

Jon Stewart argues that "Hegel's dialectic in the *Phenomenology* is a transcendental account, insofar as it uncovers the necessary conditions for the possibility of specific actions, institutions, conceptions of subjectivity, and the truth-claims bound up with them" (Stewart 2000, 23). This has already been seen in the discussion of the *Philosophy of Right* where Hegel outlined the conditions under which the people of his time could be at home in their social world. While John F. Donovan argues that "Transcendental arguments do not commit us to metaphysical answers" (Donovan 861), Terry Pinkard contends that "Hegelian philosophy […] is not (at least primarily) concerned with proving the existence of things but with explaining how coherent thought about our basic categories could even be possible, given that some of them conflict with each other" (Pinkard 1988, 4).

Julie E. Maybee takes a similar stance to Pinkard, arguing that "Hegel wanted to develop a logic that not only preserved truth, but also determined how to construct truthful claims in the first place. A logic that defines concepts (semantics) as well as their relationships with one another (syntax) will show, Hegel thought, how concepts can be combined into meaningful forms" (Maybee 2016). In this way, "The logic of the *Phenomenology* is thus a *phenomeno*-logic, or a logic driven by logic – syntax and semantics – and by phenomenological considerations"

(Maybee 2016). According to Theodor W. Adorno, “Dialectics serves reconciliation” by dismantling the “logical character of compulsion” (Adorno 1970, 18), and it is this form that the dialectic takes for the purposes of this study.

For discussion of further criticism of Hegel’s dialectical reasoning see Rosen (1982).

3.7.3 *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*

Michael Hardimon identifies five “problems of Hegel’s project” in *Hegel’s Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliaton* (1994, vii), specifically the problem of foreignness; the problem of optimism; the problem of pessimism; the threat of conservation, ideology, and the suppression of individuality; and the worry about misguidedness. I take three further issues with Hegel’s philosophy, specifically in relation to the role of the wife/mother in the sphere of the family, the question of marriage equality, and the act of conscription into the armed forces. These problems will now be addressed.

3.7.3.1 The Problem of Foreignness

Hardimon argues that Hegel’s project may seem foreign to us as “the very idea of the ‘social world’ may seem alien” (1994, 16). To rectify this, Hardimon defines the social world as the “framework of the central institutions and practices of social and political life of society or a society of a certain type” (1994, 16):

> As I am using the expression, ‘the social world’ does not refer to social subspheres or subcultures – for example, the ‘world’ of punks, artists, factory workers, or lawyers. It refers instead to society, or a type of society, considered as a whole – without, however, carrying the implication that the institutions and

> practices of society must form some kind of highly interconnected whole; logically speaking, a social world need not form a 'system' or a 'totality'. (1994, 16)

According to Hardimon, the second moment of foreignness in relation to Hegel's social theory is that it requires "*taking a particular attitude* toward the social world or of *relating to* the social world in a particular way" (1994, 17). While we may exist in our social world, we may not take up a conscious stance towards it, especially if we are content in our world. In fact, Hardimon believes that "the more problematic one's relation to the social world, the more likely one is to be aware of having an attitude toward the social world" (1994, 18).

Hardimon's third argument for foreignness is the appearance of Hegel's theory as a 'social theodicy': "As traditionally conceived, theodicy seeks to justify the ways of God to man. Social theodicy seeks to justify the ways of society to its members" (1994, 20). Hardimon does not argue against Hegel's social theodicy but instead sees it as a response to the problems of alienation and social evil. In order to grasp that our social world is a home we must first engage with its systems and structures. In doing so we may notice that the social world contains evils such as divorce, war, and poverty, but in engaging with and taking an attitude towards the social world we can come to the understanding that it is a home even with the existence of evils:

> social theodicy addresses two problems we can recognise as real: the problem of alienation and the problem of coming to terms with the fact that the social world will inevitably exhibit defects and imperfections. Considered as *a* response to these problems, the enterprise of social theodicy becomes accessible. (Hardimon 1994, 21)

3.7.3.2 The Problem of Optimism

Hardimon's second problem with Hegel's project is that it may seem "wildly optimistic" (1994, 22):

> Hegel does not think that reconciliation is possible because he believes that everything is perfect. He maintains that reconciliation is possible because the basic features of the central institutions of the modern social world – the family, civil society, and the state – are acceptable and because these structures are realised to a significant degree. (Hardimon 1994, 22)

Hardimon sees Hegel's optimism as little different from common sense. If you live in a society where the "representative democracies with market economies coupled with welfare provisions" are "basically acceptable", then your social world matches Hegel's optimistic view (Hardimon 1994, 23). In this way, Hegel's model becomes little more than a "view against which one can clarify one's own position" that "puts us in a better position to determine how we are to relate to the social world" (Hardimon 1994, 23).

3.7.3.3 The Problem of Pessimism

Hardimon paradoxically discusses the possibility that Hegel's project may appear pessimistic at the same time that it is overly optimistic. Hardimon uses the term 'reconciliation' to represent Hegel's *Versöhnung*, and cautions that reconciliation can also be taken to mean 'resignation' (1994, 23):

> Hegel maintains that it is possible *both* to be genuinely reconciled *and* to recognize (i) that the fundamental features of the modern social world include divorce, poverty, and war, and (ii) that particular families, civil societies, and

> states will inevitably exhibit defects and imperfections. "The state is not a work of art," Hegel tells us, "it exists in the world, and hence in the sphere of arbitrariness [*Willkür*], contingency [*Zufalls*], and error [*Irrtums*]". (Hardimon 1994, 90)

Reconciliation requires taking a particular attitude towards the social world, and "although reconciliation *is* a positive attitude – a genuinely positive attitude – it is a positive attitude that contains within it a moment of negativity" (Hardimon 1994, 91).

3.7.3.4 The Threat of Conservation, Ideology, and the Suppression of Individuality

Hardimon divides his fourth problem with Hegel's project into three reasons: "that it may appear to be conservative" (1994, 24), that "it may appear ideological" (1994, 31), and that it "may appear to require the suppression or abandonment of individuality" (1994, 32).

Hardimon suggests that Hegel's project may "appear to be conservative" because it may seem to endorse the status quo merely because it is in place, exclude reform, and require the abandonment of criticism and opposition (1994, 24).

The appearance of Hegel endorsing the status quo is encapsulated in his famous *Doppelsatz* or 'double dictum' from the Preface of the *Philosophy of Right*: "What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational" (Hegel in Hardimon 1994, 24). Hardimon believes that Hegel is not simply claiming that "everything that exists is rational and suggests that it is rational simply because it exists" (1994, 25), but instead that Hegel's social world is worthy of reconciliation as it is.

For this reason, Hegel's project may appear to exclude reform. If the social world is worthy of reconciliation it must be perfect with no room for improvement, Hegel's "end of History" (2001, 121). However, Hardimon does not consider this to be the case. According to Hardimon, "Hegel

thought his social world was worthy of reconciliation *and* stood in need of reform" (1994, 26). While it is possible for the social world to be worthy of reconciliation, there can always be room for improvement on the path to the Idea of freedom, an issue I will discuss presently in relation to Hegel's thoughts on women in the social world.

A further reason for Hegel's project appearing conservative is its apparent exclusion of criticism and opposition. In Hegel's words:

> As a philosophical composition, [the *Philosophy of Right*] must distance itself as far as possible from the obligation to construct a *state as it ought to be*; such instruction as it may contain cannot be aimed at instructing the state on how it ought to be, but rather as showing how the state, as an ethical universe, should be recognized. (Hegel in Hardimon 1994, 27 – edited)

That being said, Hegel's model "can in principle be used as the basis for rational criticism of existing institutions" and "also provides a set of standards on the basis of which defective social institutions can be criticized" (Hardimon 1994, 28). It is this application that informs the methodology of this project.

Hardimon's second reason for his fourth problem with Hegel's project is that "it may appear ideological" (1994, 31). This is also one of Marx's issues with Hegel. Marx argues that a social world can be a home "only if the fact that it is a home is *transparent*, that is, such that it can be understood *without* the aid of theory. In his view, if one needs theory to be at home, the social world one inhabits is not a home" (Hardimon 1994, 31). Hegel argues instead that the social world "can genuinely be a home *and* be in need of theory" (Hardimon 1994, 31) in the same way that laws are continually developed and remade in order to uphold the highest level of right.

Hardimon's third reason for his fourth problem with Hegel's framework is that it "may appear to require the suppression or abandonment of individuality" (1994, 32). This is surely false. Hegel's reconciliation is a "form of unity that *preserves* difference" and a "process of reconciliation is a process of *reconciliation* only if it preserves the individuality of the people it reconciles" lest it descend into accomodationism (Hardimon 1994, 36).

3.7.3.5 The Worry about Misguidedness

Hardimon provides two different "versions" of his "fifth and final problem" (1994, 37). The first version's first reason derives from the positivist viewpoint that Hegel's "attempt to provide philosophical guidance concerning what is worthwhile, what one should do, and how one should live" is misguided because "normative and evaluative claims fall outside the realm of rational discussion and evaluation" (Hardimon 1994, 37). The second reason relates to Hegel's idea of taking a particular attitude towards the social world as the positivists also believe that "*attitudes* fall outside the realm of rational discussion and evaluation" (Hardimon 1994, 37).

Hardimon's second version of the worry about misguidedness derives from postmodernism:

> Postmodernists such as Foucault, Lyotard, and Derrida deny that wholeness, unity, and harmony are ideals worth striving for. From their point of view, division, opposition, and conflict are not 'evils' or 'forms of negativity' to be overcome but rather expressions of 'otherness' (that which is other than or different from the self)[11] to be acknowledged, cultivated, and affirmed (Hardimon 1994, 39).

[11] For more information on Hegel's 'other' see R. R. Williams (1992; 1997)

However Hardimon notes that "'Concrete unity' as Hegel understands it is not unity *without* difference but instead unity *in* difference" (1994, 40). Just like Hegel's concept of reconciliation, "The sort of unity Hegel calls concrete is meant to be a 'higher unity', one that preserves and embraces division, conflict, and otherness" (Hardimon 1994, 40).

3.7.3.6 The Problems of Feminism, Marriage Equality, and Conscription

One additional issue not mentioned by Hardimon is that of feminism. Hegel's work has had great impact on the development of feminist philosophy (Stone 2004, 301), and Kimberly Hutchings, Tuija Pulkkinen, and Alison Stone specifically note his influence on the work of Simone de Beauvoir, Luce Irigaray, and Judith Butler (Hutchings and Pulkkinen 2010, 5; Stone 2004, 301). Yet Hegel's representation of women in the *Philosophy of Right* is still in relation to men and specifically to the "natural relation of sexual desire" (Pinkard 1996, 142). In Hegel's words:

> Women may well be educated, but they are not made for the higher sciences, for philosophy and certain artistic productions which require a universal element. Women may have insights [*Einfälle*], taste, and delicacy, but they do not possess the ideal. The difference between man and woman is the difference between animal and plant; the animal is closer in character to man, the plant to woman, for the latter is a more peaceful [process of] unfolding whose principal is the more indeterminate unity of feeling [*Empfindung*]. When women are in charge of government, the state is in danger, for their actions are based not on the demands of universality but on contingent inclination and opinion. The education of women takes place imperceptibly, as if through the atmosphere of representational thought, more through living than through the acquisition of knowledge [*Kenntnissen*], whereas man attains his position only through the attainment of thought and numerous technical exertions. (Hegel 2003, 207)

Much of the discussion of Hegel's representation of women focusses on his use of the Antigone allegory to outline male and female roles in the family. In the chapter of the *Phenomenology* entitled "The Ethical Order", Hegel briefly outlines the roles of the family:

> Women were considered to hold the family as a unit of feeling together, whereas the men were to participate in the self-conscious life of public affairs. The *natural* difference of the sexes is taken as determining the *social* differences of their roles. (Pinkard 1996, 142)

The 'free individuality' available to men is not available to women as it can "*only* be attained within the public sphere, and not, so it would seem, within the family" (Pinkard 1996, 142):

> Women […] who would be confined to the family by the Greek understanding of the way things had to be between the sexes, could not have the possibility, so it would seem, to develop themselves as "free individualities" at all. (Pinkard 1996, 143 – edited)

The only way for a woman in Greek society to gain this recognition is through her brother (hence Antigone): "she must find some basis of recognition from someone to whom she stands in a *natural* relation but *from whom* such recognition would *count*" (Pinkard 1996, 143):

> Since each can be recognised by the other, the sister can therefore stand in relation to her brother as a free individual, something she cannot do in relation to her sister, for her sister would suffer under the same restrictions as she does. The sister is thus able to achieve selfhood in the process of mutual recognition between her and her brother, and thus the harmony of Greek life seems not to be threatened. (Pinkard 1996, 143)

Despite this, in his discussion of marriage, Hegel does argue against arranged marriages organised by “those peoples who hold the female sex in little respect”:

> Among those peoples who hold the female sex in little respect, the parents arrange marriages arbitrarily, without consulting the individuals concerned; the latter accept this arrangement, since the particularity of feeling [*Empfindung*] makes no claims for itself as yet. The girl’s only concern is to find a husband, and the man’s to find a wife. Under other circumstances, considerations of wealth [*des Vermogens*], connections, or political ends may determine the outcome. This may have very harsh effects, inasmuch as marriage is made a means to other ends. (Hegel 2003, 202)

Therefore, Hegel is clearly aware of the risk of ‘holding the female sex in little respect’ but does not seem to take this into consideration in his discussion of women’s role in society.

Two further issues with Hegel’s philosophy concern the questions of marriage equality and conscription. Although not a concern in Hegel’s time, the issue of same-sex marriage is at the forefront of the movement of Spirit in our own. Conscription was also a valid form of recruitment to the armed forces in Hegel’s time (Hegel 2003, 305), although I contend that this is a negative form of freedom, according to Hegel’s definition, compared to the positive freedom of our own society that firstly relies on military reservists prior to conscription and secondly allows for conscientious objection. Hegel believes that the Germanic Realm of his time had reached the “end of history” as Spirit had perfected itself in the constitutional monarchy, however this discussion, and other developments since, have shown that there continues to be “next and higher” stages of the development of Spirit still to come (Hegel 2003, 373), many of which, like Hegel, we are most likely unable to foresee.

Hegel uses the process of history to outline the progress that has been made up to his time in the development of the idea of freedom. Taking Hegel's lead, this project continues this development by taking a post-Hegelian stance on the reading of women and marriage equality in Hegel's work in order to more accurately reflect the contemporary concept of freedom.

3.7.3.7 Summation

We have now identified an appropriate theoretical framework that is capable of situating characters within a political social world while also being capable of expressing the politicality of song in the musical, and the politicality of the genre itself. What remains is to apply these theories to the case studies, the purpose of the next chapter.

4 Case Studies

> The theatre was created to tell people the truth about life and the social situation (Stella Adler 2000, 30)

Having outlined the five major existing categories of song function:

1. When Emotion Becomes Too Great for Speech, You Sing
2. Fosse's 'I Am', 'I Want', and 'New' Songs
3. Integration Theory
4. Coherence Theory, and
5. Situations Where Songs Reveal the Subtext of the Scene

We can reasonably conclude that these theories of song function are predominantly inward looking and sited almost entirely in the dramatic function of song. Whilst cogent and valid, I contend that these existing theories fail to recognise the inherent politicality of song in the musical, limiting our ability to understand both the complexities of the drama unfolding within the show but also how we can connect and examine the characters' journeys and experiences in comparison with those in our own world. This section will therefore examine the songs "So They Say" from *Dr. Horrible's Sing-Along Blog*, "Sorry-Grateful" from *Company*, and the "Act One Finale" from *Urinetown* through the lens of these existing theories before asking how Hegel's theories can expand the universe of our current understanding of song function.

4.1 "So They Say" from *Dr. Horrible's Sing-Along Blog*

"So They Say" appears at the start of Act III of *Dr. Horrible*, the final act of the show. Acts I and II told of Dr. Horrible's failed attempts at joining the Evil League of Evil. Due to this, Bad Horse, the

leader of the League, has warned Horrible that "now assassination is just the only way" (Whedon et al. 2011, 41), requiring Horrible to commit a murder in order to gain entrance to the League. Horrible's arch-nemesis, Captain Hammer, has been thwarting his attempts throughout the show, but has now also started dating Horrible's love interest, Penny, much to Horrible's dismay. At the end of Act II, Horrible decided he would target Captain Hammer for his "assassination" in order to gain entry to the Evil League of Evil and is currently in his lab converting his freeze-ray gun into a death ray. "So They Say" is sung from the perspective of different members of the show's society, including moving men, newsreaders, and superhero fans.

4.1.1 When Emotion Becomes Too Great for Speech, You Sing

The first lyric we hear in "So They Say" is sung by two guys "unloading equipment from a truck":

GUY

So they say Captain Hammer's become a crusader
Political – he's cleaning up the streets

OTHER GUY

About time

(Whedon et al. 2011, 52)

According to Larry A. Brown, "When characters reach a point in the drama where they can't help but explode with feelings of love or success or simply the joy of life, music serves to amplify these emotions to a level above mere words" (L. A. Brown 2007). This does not appear to be the case for the 'guys' of *Dr. Horrible* as it is doubtful that they "can't help but explode with feelings of love or success" whilst "unloading equipment from a truck" (Whedon et al. 2011, 52). Julian Woolford seems to provide a better explanation: "characters can sing only the most rapturous

emotions, or the most mundane banalities, but as long as it is consistent with the theatrical language of the piece, then the audience will accept it" (2012, 251). Moving is a distinctly mundane experience, one that does not immediately conjure the idea of song, but one that is 'singable' according to Woolford's conception. Composer and lyricist Jason Robert Brown, on the other hand, has concerns regarding issues that are "too small" to sing about: "if they were singing about things like that, you wouldn't buy it as an audience member. […] Singing ultimately magnifies everything you're feeling; when you sing it, it becomes epic" (Brown in Bryer and Davison 2008, 34). Brown argues that song turns everyday moments into "epic" ones and moving cannot easily be considered an "epic" moment. In fact, a moving guy breaking into epic song would more likely elicit laughter than acceptance from an audience due to the pure absurdity of the situation. However, as argued by Woolford, "as long as it is consistent with the theatrical language of the piece, then the audience will accept it" (2012, 251), and the guys' singing appears to be "consistent" as their timbre is not as polished as a trained singer, using more of a speech quality than the traditionally 'sung' sound of musical theatre, that seems appropriate for both blue-collar workers in a moving truck and the conversational nature of their lyric. This may explain why, even though they are singing while moving equipment, the audience "accept it".

The next group we meet "on the street, addressing camera as though they're being interviewed" is Captain Hammer's Groupies (Whedon et al. 2011, 52). The groupies are singing about Captain Hammer and Penny's relationship:

HAMMER GROUPIE 1

So they say it's real love

ALL GROUPIES

So romantic

HAMMER GROUPIE 2

(turns to show t-shirt back)

He signed this

(Whedon et al. 2011, 52–54)

And then later:

HAMMER GROUPIE 3

So they say he saved her life

HAMMER GROUPIE 1

They say she works with the homeless

And doesn't eat meat

ALL GROUPIES

We have a problem with her

HAMMER GROUPIE 2

(holding up something laminated)

This is his hair

(Whedon et al. 2011, 55)

The groupies' singing conforms with Larry A. Brown's 'explosion' argument from above (2007). The groupies first appear to not be able to "help but explode with feelings of love" for Captain Hammer and his new girlfriend ("So romantic") but then later in the song they sing that they have a "problem with her". They appear jealous of Captain Hammer saving Penny's life and employ sarcasm to falsely commend her work with the homeless and vegetarianism ("They say she works with the homeless / And doesn't eat meat"). This reason for singing conforms with

lyricist Sheldon Harnick's statement that some of his best work, especially his love songs, "have come out of anger" (Harnick in Bryer and Davison 2008, 78). Anger is yet another form of heightened emotion that could explain the groupies' reason for singing beyond simple "feelings of love or success", but not an emotion that can explain Penny's reason for singing.

Penny, the romantic interest of the piece, is in the lobby of the new homeless shelter she has been able to open with Captain Hammer's help. She sings:

PENNY

So they say we'll have blankets and beds

We can open by Monday

Thanks to you

He takes her close, shaking his head, "No"…

HAMMER

Thanks to me

(Whedon et al. 2011, 54)

Penny's singing also conforms with Brown's argument re. 'exploding' with "feelings of love or success or simply the joy of life" (L. A. Brown 2007). Penny appears pleased that the homeless shelter is able to open "by Monday" thanks to Captain Hammer's help. Captain Hammer, on the other hand, appears to be singing for his own "feelings of love or success or simply the joy of life", but not in the same way as Penny. Penny seems grateful for Hammer's assistance, whereas Hammer appears to be grateful for himself ("Thanks to me"). Hammer's self-centeredness is a recurring issue in *Dr. Horrible*, to be discussed further later in the section.

Next, we hear the news anchors sing:

NEWSANCHORS

It's the perfect story

NEWSMAN

So they say

NEWSWOMAN

A hero leading the way

BOTH

Hammer's call to glory

NEWSWOMAN

Let's all be our best

NEWSMAN

Next up, who's gay?

(Whedon et al. 2011, 55)

The news anchors also appear to conform to Brown's singing for the "joy of life" (L. A. Brown 2007) as they are observing their town doing something good for its community and are encouraging the townsfolk to "be [their] best" in response to the positive actions of a few. They are singing of Hammer's "epic" actions in saving Penny and opening the homeless shelter, actions that may require the "epic" function of song to express them (Brown in Bryer and Davison 2008, 34).

Later in the song we hear Captain Hammer's perspective on the situation:

HAMMER

This is so nice

I just might sleep with the same girl twice

They say it's better the second time

They say you get to do the weird stuff

The groupies step into frame in the far BG.

BOTH GROUPIES

We do the weird stuff

(Whedon et al. 2011, 56)

Captain Hammer's verse does not appear to be a character singing with "feelings of love [in order to] amplify these emotions to a level above mere words" (L. A. Brown 2007), but he does appear to be singing of the "success" he has had with Penny. While this is not the "most rapturous emotions" (Woolford 2012, 251), nor the "epic" singing described by Jason Robert Brown (2008, 34) or even Harnick's "angry" singing (Harnick in Bryer and Davison 2008, 78), the lyric "This is so nice" implies that it may be "rapturous" enough, at least for him, to warrant song. Hammer is singing of what Lehman Engel considers a 'central' theme of the musical, "romance" (Engel 2006, 31), but his view is less "rapturous" than, for example, the lyrics of "I'm in Love with a Wonderful Guy" from *South Pacific*. Hammer sings of how "nice" his relationship with Penny is before instantly singing of their sexual relations and dreaming of what they might do in the future. This does not appear to be traditional musical theatre love, and Penny appears to be beginning to wonder whether it is what she is looking for, too.

We see Penny sitting in the laundromat and Joss Whedon's directions in the script may imply that she is now having feelings for Dr. Horrible: "Penny sits by herself. There are two frozen yogurts, but

Billy [Horrible's civilian persona] is conspicuously absent. […] Someone enters and she cranes hopefully for Billy, but it's not him" (Whedon et al. 2011, 56 – edited). She sings to herself:

PENNY

This is perfect for me

So they say

I guess it's pretty okay

After years of stormy

Sailing have I finally found the bay

(Whedon et al. 2011, 56)

It is clear, even at this point, that there are limitations to Brown's 'Emotional Song' theory. Although a common element of musical theatre, there appears to be an over-reliance on emotional agency in the extant theories of song function that cannot be inferred as universally applicable. This may explain Woolford and Spencer's extensions to the existing set of emotional possibilities. Penny's "I guess it's pretty okay" lyric speaks more to Woolford's 'mundane banality' theory, or David Spencer's "new-age variation" (2005, 69) that argues "When things get a little too tense to talk about, you sing" (2005, 69). While providing valuable and interesting variants to the potential expressions of heightened emotion in musical theatre song Woolford and Spencer's theories are still limited by their reliance on emotional context.

Stephen Citron argues that songs are "moments that 'sing' better than they 'speak'" (1997, 171). Penny is reflecting on her relationship, a common reason for song in a musical, but for the News Anchors, Moving Guys, and Groupies there does not appear to be any particular benefit to their material being sung. Lyricist Lynn Ahrens argues that "You look for characters with deep emotions, and you look for dramatic circumstances in the story" (2008, 11). This may be the case for Penny, but not so much for the other characters. Yes, there are changes occurring in their social world, but for them they are not particularly "dramatic". Furthermore, David Spencer's

argument that “High points of the story, emotion, and character development, in most cases, define the placement of songs within a score” (2005, 43) also does not appear relevant as, except for Penny, this is not a high point of the story, emotion, or character development.

Cohen and Rosenhaus concur with Spencer’s ‘emotional high-point’ approach but also provide an alternative explanation, that sometimes “the best place for a song is shortly after a highpoint, when a character reacts to what has just happened” (2006, 191). This may be a better explanation for the function of “So They Say” in *Dr. Horrible’s Sing-Along Blog*. The song comes at the start of Act III of the show, immediately after Horrible closed Act II with a Godzilla-like Captain-Hammer-crushing dream sequence, and, although the characters are unaffected by Horrible’s imaginary crime, they are still reacting to Penny and Hammer’s success of opening the homeless shelter.

Right at the end of the song we hear from Dr. Horrible for the first time in the act in a split screen duet with Penny:

PENNY	DR. HORRIBLE
There's no happy ending	There's no happy ending
So they say	So they say
Should I stop pretending	Not for me anyway
Or is this a brand new day	Stop pretending
	Take the chance to build a brand new day

(Whedon et al. 2011, 56)

Penny repeats her concern regarding her relationship with Hammer and wonders whether Billy might be a better option. Horrible, on the other hand, appears to be singing from a place of sadness. His "Not for me anyway" lyric implies that he has already given up on the potential of a relationship with Penny and decides instead to "build a brand new day" by killing Captain Hammer and entering the Evil League of Evil. The theories discussed above all mention "epic" or "rapturous" emotions, but Woolford also contends that "emotional pitch" does not always have to be positive: "Characters sing for many reasons – and emotional pitch is the most common. However, do not treat emotional pitch as synonymous with romantic emotions. Characters are just as likely to sing because they are joyful, hurt or furious" (Woolford 2012, 251).

What these existing theories tell us about song function in the musical is that songs signal the "structural high points" (A. Cohen and Rosenhaus 2006, 191) of a show and usually occur at moments of "heightened" emotion, either the "most rapturous" or the "most mundane banalities" (Woolford 2012, 251), or immediately after a high point to allow the characters to pause and reflect. These theories are valuable in helping us understand the function of song in the musical but there is more that can be learned about musical theatre song, more that we can know. The previous discussion does not provide a robust nor all-encompassing reason for why these characters are singing, or, more importantly, what they are signing about. Therefore, we need to look elsewhere. Let us then examine the next major existing theory, Fosse's 'I Am', 'I Want', and 'New' songs.

4.1.2 Fosse's 'I Am', 'I Want', and 'New' songs

Aaron Frankel outlines Fosse's three kinds of "tool" songs in the musical: "*I Am* or *I Want* songs, otherwise they are *New* songs" (2000, 95). From Frankel's description, "So They Say" does not appear to be an "I Am" song. The difficulty of this theory with having multiple perspectives within the one song has already been discussed in the introduction. Here we have multiple characters, with the only two "questioning" or "affirming" anything being Penny and Dr. Horrible – Penny is questioning her relationship choices while Horrible is affirming his decision to "build a brand new day" in order to enter the Evil League of Evil. It is possible, then, that "So They Say" constitutes what Fosse terms a 'New Song', as "*New* songs defy categorizing more precisely because they are designed to meet needs which are novel; this is also a large aspect of *special material*" (Frankel 2000, 96). Frankel provides no further description of New Songs/special material beyond how they "fill a need different from *I Am* or *I* Want. A unique – or new – action is behind each one" (Frankel 2000, 96)[12].

Frankel's description of the 'I Want' song also appears unable to describe the function of "So They Say". According to Frankel, "The *I Want* has a greater innate thrust than the *I Am* to *turn character out*, to relate him more deeply or more quickly to others and to the world" (Frankel 2000, 95–96). "So They Say" has no real "innate thrust" as it does not take any of the characters anywhere in the drama. It does, to use Frankel's description, "turn character out" in that it relates the characters to each other's situations but not directly – none of the groups we hear from interact with each other during the number, instead we hear from them all independently. Furthermore, none of the characters appear to ask Frankel's exemplary questions throughout the number: "I tried," "I won't," "can't we?" and so on" (Frankel 2000, 95–96). While a common

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[12] He does, however, apply these categories to the songs of *Fiddler in the Roof*, *Hello, Dolly!*, *Hair*, and *The Fantasticks* (1960) (Frankel 2000, 96–98).

theory in the discipline, Fosse's categories raise more questions than they answer when applied to a song such as "So They Say", nor does it explain the politicality of the number. Therefore, we must assess whether integration theory is capable of solving our problem.

4.1.3 Integration Theory (Songs Progress the Drama)

Integration theory describes musicals where "all elements of [the] show – plot, character, song, dance, orchestration, and setting – […] blend together into a unity, a seamless whole" (McMillin 2006, 1 – edited). Composer Stephen Flaherty believes that "In the contemporary musical, the music carries the drama. The music is as important as the book settings, and oftentimes the music is the book scene" (Flaherty in Bryer and Davison 2008, 14). Jason Robert Brown agrees that "Pop songs by their nature are about establishing a mood, sustaining it, and finishing with it. Theater songs are about the opposite; good theater songs go from one end of an idea to a different place" (Brown in Frank 2000). Stephen Sondheim also concurs: "that's what the song's supposed to accomplish – the season change" (Sondheim 1978, 17). Sondheim also considers songs capable of performing a book function, referring to them as "tunes in the service of telling a story" (Sondheim in Bryer and Davison 2008, 194). Therefore, according to proponents of integration theory, "the music carries the drama" – the songs "go from one end of an idea to a different place" in order to "accomplish […] the season change". In short, they exist "in the service of telling a story".

The 'story' of "So They Say" appears to be occurring through the thoughts and reflections of the members of the community on the situations happening around them. The moving guys feel it's "About time" that Captain Hammer started "cleaning up the streets", the groupies "have a problem with" Penny, and the news anchors are reflecting on the "perfect story" of the new homeless shelter. The "season change" of the number therefore focusses more on the lead characters, Penny, Captain Hammer, and Dr. Horrible.

Penny's 'season changes' are two-fold. Firstly, between Acts II and III the homeless shelter appears to have been built and is ready to open "by Monday". Penny's major goal of the show has been achieved. But Penny's second change is related to her desire for a relationship. She has been dating Captain Hammer since the thwarting of Dr. Horrible's heist but is starting to have second thoughts, wondering if 'Billy' would be a better option. Penny sings that "This is perfect for me / So they say" but wonders if "After years of stormy / Sailing have I finally found the bay" with Billy (Whedon et al. 2011, 56). This is the drama being progressed through song, as described by integration theory. Penny's story has been taken from one place to another – it has moved forward *through* song, fulfilling the function of song according to integration theory. But there is still more to know about Penny's situation (how she got there and why she is questioning her decision) that we cannot glean from pure integration theory. There is more to know, but we need a different lens in order to see these details, and I contend that Hegel's social and political theories may be able to achieve this, as will be discussed.

Hammer's season change is not as large as Penny's, nor as mature. Hammer sings that his relationship with Penny is "so nice" that he might even consider sleeping with "the same girl twice" (Whedon et al. 2011, 56). This is not a colossal change in Hammer's story, especially not within the arc of the show, and seems to be included more for comedic value than plot-progression. However, it is still a form of movement-through-song in line with integration theory. Hammer's story has progressed in that he may consider staying with Penny longer than his previous one-night-stands. But again, there is still more to know about his story than integration theory can tell us. I will suggest these details later in the chapter.

The final "season change" of the number occurs when Penny and Dr. Horrible sing, in harmony, "There's no happy ending / So they say" (Whedon et al. 2011, 56). They both sing that they should "stop pretending" but what is it that they feel they are faking? Penny appears to be "pretending" that her relationship with Captain Hammer is a healthy one, wondering if she

should start a “brand new day” with Billy (Whedon et al. 2011, 56). Dr. Horrible, on the other hand, seems to be wondering whether he is “pretending” to be a real villain in that, in terms of what we have already seen, he is yet to successfully commit any crime or kill anyone at all. At the end of Act II we saw him make the decision to kill Captain Hammer in order to join the Evil League of Evil and now he sings his decision to “Take the chance to build a brand new day” (Whedon et al. 2011, 56) before taping over the word ‘Stun’ on his stun ray with the word ‘Death’.

Integration theory appears to provide an at least somewhat valid explanation for the way “the music carries the drama” in *Dr. Horrible*, how the songs “go from one end of an idea to a different place” in order to “accomplish […] the season change”. Integration theory provides us with an understanding of the function of song within the world of the musical but does not give us a model with which to understand how the songs can convey their ‘beyond-world’ meaning outside the show. Musicals exist beyond the world of the stage and it is my contention that Hegel’s theories may be one way in which we can draw out and examine this function both within the world of the show and in the real world from which it derives.

4.1.4 Coherence theory (Songs Pause the Drama)

Scott McMillin argues for what he terms ‘Two Orders of Time’ in the musical, specifically ‘book’ time and ‘lyric’ time: “The book represents the plot or the action” (2006, 6) while lyric time is steeped in repetition. McMillin’s “second order of time” may be the most complete description of the function of “So They Say” currently discussed. As opposed to the “progressive time” of the book, “So They Say” appears to pause the drama in order to allow the characters to “give a second account of themselves” (McMillin 2006, 324), to reflect on their situations and what is happening in the world around them. The moving guys pause the progression of the story to reflect that it is “About time“ that Captain Hammer is “cleaning up the streets” (Whedon et al.

2011, 52). The groupies similarly reflect on how they have a "problem" with Penny because she "works with the homeless / And doesn't eat meat" (Whedon et al. 2011, 55) on top of the fact that she is dating their collective crush. The news anchors are reflecting on the "perfect story" of Captain Hammer "leading the way" for the rest of society, while Penny reflects on how the homeless shelter has come together thanks to Hammer's help.

Penny and Captain Hammer are also reflecting on the nature of their relationship, as we have seen. Hammer is wondering whether he "just might sleep with the same girl twice" (Whedon et al. 2011, 56), while Penny, on the other hand, is wondering if Billy may be the calm in her "stormy / Sailing" (Whedon et al. 2011, 56), but she never learns that this charming boy she thinks might be 'the one' is in fact the alter-ego of Dr. Horrible. Horrible, unaware of Penny's considerations, reflects on how there appears to be "no happy ending […] Not for [him] anyway", wondering if he too should "Stop pretending [and] Take the chance to build a brand new day" by killing Captain Hammer (Whedon et al. 2011, 56).

As has been discussed, McMillin's "doubling of character" appears to be the most valid of the currently examined explanations for the function of song in "So They Say". However, it could be argued that, in order to progress, a character must first pause to take stock of their situation. Coherence therefore becomes integration, the pause before the progress. However, I contend that Hegel's theories can extend and expand upon the existing theories by revealing the political impetus for a character's actions, beyond purely emotional reasons. This approach will be examined in more detail below.

4.1.5 Songs Reveal the Subtext of the Scene

Drawn from the cited theories of song function used throughout the thesis, "characters may also sing because the music may reveal the subtext of the scene" (Woolford 2012, 252). According to

Cohen and Rosenhaus, "composers can [also] create subtext by using music to contradict the lyrics" (2006, 137). Peter Fitzpatrick agrees with this contradictory function: "Sometimes it's about saying things that prose can't say; sometimes it's articulate subtext. Sometimes it can play in ironic counterpoint to the line of action, and suggest other layers of thought and emotion" (Fitzpatrick 2016).

Subtext is context hidden 'under' the dramatic surface, "other layers of thought and emotion" that the characters may not actually be saying. This does not appear to be the case for the moving guys, groupies, and news anchors as they are openly discussing how they feel. Penny, Hammer, and Horrible, however, are revealing their inner dialogues to us through song. Penny is not verbalising her thoughts about her relationship with Captain Hammer to anyone else, but through her singing we are being 'let in' on her thought process. Captain Hammer, similarly, appears to be ruminating to himself about his own perspective on their relationship, yet we are being made privy to these thoughts, again through song. Finally, Dr. Horrible is not voicing his plans to murder Captain Hammer out loud, we only know of his scheme due to our voyeuristic perspective on his song.

These expressions do not appear to function as an "ironic counterpoint to the line of action", as described by Peter Fitzpatrick (2016), nor do they use "music to contradict the lyrics" (A. Cohen and Rosenhaus 2006, 137). They do, however, provide the characters with the "formality of expression" described by McMillin (2006, 20) that may allow them to express these 'inner' emotions that may not otherwise be able to be expressed out loud.

4.1.6 Hegelian Analysis

All of these existing theories appear to provide at least somewhat valid explanations for the function of song in the musical. Even if they do not directly relate to "So They Say" they have

applications elsewhere in the genre. These existing theories describe the basic function of song in the musical but lack detail and cannot be applied across all sub-genres of the form. It has also already been established that politics is a primary function of American musical theatre, however this politicality is not currently applied to song analysis when discussing the musical.

By using only these existing theories to examine musical theatre song we are simplifying song's ability to communicate large amounts of information about the political nature of the character's situation that can help us not only better understand the drama unfolding within the show, but also connect the characters' journeys and experiences to those in our own world. Therefore, our potential understanding of song function in the musical is limited by these existing theories, and I contend that alternative sociological and anthropological ways of looking can expand upon and reveal the political detail within these existing frameworks.

Hegel's concept of Right was introduced in Chapter 3 and this theory is one of the ways we can understand what musical theatre song can tell us beyond these existing theories. Right, according to Hegel, "is any existence [*Dasein*] in general which is the *existence* of the *free will*" (Hegel 2003, 58), and this is a tool with which we can better understand the social and political situation of the moving guys. The guys' "unloading equipment from a truck" (Whedon et al. 2011, 52) has been discussed in relation to the existing theories of song function but not yet been considered through a Hegelian lens. The first moving guy sings: "So they say Captain Hammer's become a crusader / Political – he's cleaning up the streets" (Whedon et al. 2011, 52). From this lyric it appears that the moving guys are aware of the politicality of Captain Hammer's actions – his "cleaning up the streets" implies that he is upholding right, supporting freedom much like the function of the police in Hegel's model.

Hegel says little about the police in his discussion of the *Philosophy of Right*, other than their function in the "actualization and preservation of the universal […] as *an external order and*

arrangement for the protection and security of the masses of particular ends and interests which have their subsistence [*Bestehen*] in this universal" (2003, 269–70 – edited).

Despite this, Hegel notes that, by charging the police to actualise and preserve the universal, the possibility of hyper-reflection comes into play:

> when reflection is highly developed, the police may tend to draw everything it can into its sphere of influence, for it is possible to discover some potentially harmful aspect in everything. On such occasions, the police may proceed very pedantically and disrupt the ordinary life of individuals. (Hegel 2003, 261)

Hegel offers no solution to this dilemma, believing that "no objective boundary line can be drawn here" (2003, 261). However, Hegel does imply that police should be provided in civil society as "civil society must protect its members and defend their rights, just as the individual [*der Einzelne*] owes a duty to the rights of civil society" (2003, 263).

The moving guys appear to have recognised Captain Hammer to be functioning as what Hegel terms the "actualization and preservation of the universal[,] *an external order and arrangement* for the protection and security of the masses of particular ends and interests which have their subsistence [*Bestehen*] in this universal" (2003, 269–70 – edited). Moreover, the casual nature of their sung conversation could also imply that this is broader society's opinion as well. From a Hegelian perspective, this brief lyric implies that the guys appear to be concerned about the broader social impact of Hammer's actions, an idea that could be considered Hegelian universality/*Bildung*. Furthermore, it appears that they understand the difference between right and wrong and can see when one is being championed over the other.

Hegel outlines three kinds of wrong in the *Philosophy of Right* – unintentional wrong, deception, and coercion and crime. In Hegel's first kind of wrong, unintentional wrong, only the right of a

particular person is infringed, while universal right is respected (2003, 118). In the case of deception, "I create a semblance [of right] in order to deceive another person" (Hegel 2003, 116 – edited): "In deception, the particular will is not infringed, because the deceived person is given the illusion that he is receiving his right" (Hegel 2003, 118). Finally, by Hegel's definition, any "force employed by an agent in such a way as to infringe the existence [*Dasein*] of freedom in its *concrete* sense – i.e. to infringe right as right – is *crime*" (2003, 121). In the event of crime, "the universal and infinite element in the predicate of 'mine', i.e. my *capacity for rights*" is negated – the one committing crime against me (e.g. *Dr. Horrible*) does not consider me worthy of or entitled to any rights (Hegel 2003, 122).

The moving guys appear to understand the politicality of right and wrong in Hammer's actions, however the groupies appear to be more concerned with the politics of the family. The first groupie sings "So they say it's real love" (Whedon et al. 2011, 53–54), presumably in reference to Hammer and Penny's relationship. Externally, Hammer and Penny's relationship appears to the groupies to be "real love". We have only seen snippets of their time together during "I Cannot Believe My Eyes" earlier in the show, but, even then, Hammer appeared at all times to be more interested in himself, and his abilities, than Penny. We have witnessed him hiding his disgust at shaking the hand of a homeless person and doing superhumanly fast circles in a pedal boat just to impress her. From the outside, Hammer and Penny's relationship may appear "so romantic" to the groupies, but, from a Hegelian perspective, there are a few issues with their relationship.

Hegel begins describing his sphere of the family by outlining the concept of love:

> Love means in general the consciousness of my unity with another, so that I am not isolated on my own [*für mich*], but gain my self-consciousness only through the renunciation of my independent existence [*meines Fürsichseins*] and through knowing myself as the unity of myself with another and of the other with me (Hegel 2003, 199).

This is where the first cracks start appearing. Hammer does not appear to have renounced his "independent existence" in their relationship – he still sees himself as 'himself', not as himself *with* Penny. Furthermore, marriage is a vital stage in the formation of the family and Hegel describes how marriage "contains *first* the moment of *natural* vitality; and since it is a substantial relationship, this involves life in its totality, namely as the actuality of the *species* [*Gattung*][13] and its process" (Hegel 2003, 200), i.e. it is grounded in sexual attraction and intended for procreation. This appears to be a more likely description of Hammer and Penny's relationship, and the same for the groupies' desire.

Hammer and the groupies' positions on marriage/relationships results in what Hegel terms alienation for Penny. According to Hegel: "alienation is a form of being *split* from the social world, and being at home in the world is the circumstance of *not being split* from it" (Hardimon 1992, 182). In Hegel's view, there are three objective *dimensions* along which people can be split from the social world, specifically *value*, *need*, and *cognition*.

Members of a community can be connected to the social world if the world's social institutions (the family, civil society, and the state) "express" or promote the personal social *values* of the members in their day-to-day operation, and allow the members to meet their own social *needs* through interaction with the institutions (Hardimon 1992, 183). In essence, basic social needs and values can be considered a nexus between *individuality* and *community* (Hardimon 1992, 184). In Hegel's understanding, individuality involves: "having a set of separate and particular interests, having the capacity to question one's social roles and institutions, being able to pursue

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[13] H. B. Nisbet includes a note regarding Hegel's use of the term *Gattung* as it can simultaneously retain both the etymological definition of genus as well as meaning mating and copulation, as with the term *Begattung* (H. B. Nisbet in Hegel 2003, 200).

one's own separate and particular interests, being able to assert one's individual rights, and being able to act in accordance with individual conscience" (Hardimon 1992, 184).

Community, on the other hand, "involves identifying with one's social roles and institutions […] and participating in social arrangements characterized by shared transindividual ends (for example, the survival of one's family or nation)" (Hardimon 1992, 184 – edited).

Hegel's intended meaning of the term 'cognition' in relation to the three dimensions along which people can be split from the social world is prone to misrepresentation if not confusion. In Hegel's definition, people can be either subjectively or objectively alienated from their social world and it is possible to be subjectively alienated both when the social world either is or is not a home (Hardimon 1992, 190). A person may be subjectively alienated if the social world is not a home and they are aware of (grasp) this fact, yet they can be similarly alienated if the social world is a home but they are unaware of its nature: "the social world can appear to be alien despite the fact that it is a home" (Hardimon 1992, 190). Objective alienation, on the other hand, occurs when the world is not a home (Hardimon 1994, 120). The latter is applicable to the character of Penny. Subjective alienation therefore occurs when the individual; knowingly or unknowingly, isolates themselves from the social world whereas, in the case of objective alienation, the social world is socially isolating for the individual.

Penny appears to be objectively alienated on two fronts, both by Captain Hammer and the groupies. Captain Hammer is objectively alienating her by not conforming to her values and needs, but also by knowing that their relationship is not a home for her. Meanwhile, Penny thinks that their sphere is a home but is yet to grasp that Hammer has different ideas. Therefore, she is both subjectively and objectively alienated at the same time.

The groupies, on the other hand, are objectively alienating Penny from her relationship:

HAMMER GROUPIE 1

They say she works with the homeless

And doesn't eat meat

ALL GROUPIES

We have a problem with her

(Whedon et al. 2011, 55)

From a Hegelian perspective, the groupies appear to value their dream of forming a sphere of the family with Captain Hammer and see Penny as a barrier alienating them from this desire. In their fascination with Hammer, the groupies "have a problem with" and distrust Penny's actions rather than seeing them as increasing the positive freedom in their society. However, by continuing her relationship with Captain Hammer, Penny is also objectively alienating the groupies by not allowing them to form their own familial sphere with him.

Hegel describes marriage as a "mutual and *undivided* surrender" (2003, 207), the 'to the exclusion of all others' of our contemporary marriage vows. However, by giving yourself to someone with "*undivided* surrender", you must, in doing so, inhibit the will of others, effectively infringing their personal freedom. According to Hegel, through marriage, two persons mutually "consent to *constitute a single person* and to give up their natural and individual personalities within this union. In this respect, their union is a self-limitation, but since they attain their substantial self-consciousness within it, it is in fact their liberation" (Hegel 2003, 201). Marriage therefore infringes the wills of both partners, in that they must not determine their own will without the consideration of their other half, but also limits the wills of others who the two partners exclude themselves from.

In observing the groupies, we are reminded of the arbitrary nature of the will and the importance of *Bildung*. Hegel writes that the purpose of *Bildung* is to "break the child's self-will in

order to eradicate the merely sensuous and natural" (2003, 211), but this is clearly yet to occur with the groupies. Through education, the groupies could have been moved beyond their purely primal attraction to Hammer to a place where, like other members of the society around them, they could view Hammer as a representation of their inner essence, an exemplar they take to be authoritative for themselves. *Bildung*, like Spirit, is a progressive concept, so, while the groupies are not yet in a place where they can look up to Captain Hammer rather than simply desire him, it would not be impossible for them to reach that place at some time and with some effort.

Returning to the news anchors, immediately before the number we saw them "trade banter" while discussing the opening of the new homeless shelter, and Hegel can help us understand more about their topics of discussion – the hero and public monuments:

FEMALE ANCHOR

Looks like we're learning what a true hero is.

MALE ANCHOR

The mayor himself will be on hand to dedicate the new homeless shelter and unveil the statue of Captain Hammer.

FEMALE ANCHOR

It's a good day to be homeless.

MALE ANCHOR

(laughing)

It certainly is.

(Whedon et al. 2011, 52)

Hegel says on heroes:

> Within the state, heroes are no longer possible: they occur only in the absence of civilization. The end they pursue is rightful, necessary, and political, and they put it into effect as a cause [*Sache*] of their own. The heroes who founded states and introduced marriage and agriculture did not do this as their recognized right, and these actions still appear as [a product of] their particular will. But as the higher right of the Idea against the state of nature, this coercion employed by heroes is a rightful coercion, for goodness alone can have little effect when confronted with the force of nature (Hegel 2003, 120–21).

While this is not an uncivil society, Captain Hammer appears to be acting as a Hegelian world-spirit, what Pinkard terms an "avant garde vis-à-vis the understanding of political freedom at that period of time" (Pinkard 1996, 336). The world-spirit of Hegel's time was Napoleon: "I saw the Emperor – this world-soul – riding out of the city on reconnaissance. It is indeed a wonderful sensation to see such an individual, who, concentrated here at a single point, astride a horse, reaches out over the world and masters it… this extraordinary man, whom it is impossible not to admire" (Hegel in Pinkard 2000, 228). Hammer has a 'cause' of his own, but it is not the same righteous goal envisioned by Penny – his goal is more focused on his "*natural* vitality" (Hegel 2003, 200), to be discussed further below. The concept of Spirit was introduced in Chapter 3, but for now we can briefly dwell on the idea of monuments/statues of gods, specifically, in this case, a statue of Captain Hammer.

Hegel describes the development of art through the historical practice of religion. In the movement from 'Natural religion', "where divinity took on animal and plant forms" (Pinkard 1996, 235) to the Greek realm, Pinkard extrapolates Hegel's observation that Greek art:

> would not be a *representation* of the divine through symbols, which would leave it to the beholder to infer the characteristics of the divine on the basis of the representation. Rather, it would actually *present* the divine fully before one. One would behold the divine in the work (for example, a statue of Apollo) without having to make any further inferences. […] The divine is an immediate object of religious consciousness, something directly apprehended without any further knowledge being necessary (Pinkard 1996, 234 – edited).

Pinkard goes on to say that the Greek artist creates "something out of natural material that expresses the 'inner essence' of the community (what for it is authoritative) but is not itself simply a piece of nature" (Pinkard 1996, 234). We know that the movement of Spirit is society reflecting on what it takes to be "authoritative for itself" (Pinkard 1996, 241), and in this case the townsfolk are representing that authority to themselves through the statue of Captain Hammer, whom they consider to be an authoritative figure to which they should aspire:

> The statue is not a *representation* of the god; it is the presence of the god itself that is beheld by the members of the cult by virtue of the presence of the statue to them. The god is present in the statue, and we intuit him (or her) in seeing the statue (Pinkard 1996, 235).

By unveiling a statue of Captain Hammer in the foyer of the new homeless shelter, the members of the society can not only 'behold' him, be in his "presence", but also remind themselves of their "inner essence", what they take to be "authoritative" for themselves, and reflect on this essence through the function of Spirit. And it seems, through their raising of a statue of Captain Hammer (instead of Dr. Horrible), that their perceived essence is one that upholds right for all, and one that they desire to present to themselves in perpetuity. Although we are aware that Hammer is infringing Penny's right to a sphere of the family, he is, at the same time, provisioning

right for many of the alienated members of their society, similar to Cladwell's limiting access to free urination while preserving the townsfolk's lives. Furthermore, he is also upholding universal right for the community by restricting Horrible's evil actions (two wrongs do, in this case, appear to make a right). The community sees themselves as rightful and present Hammer to themselves as a public demonstration of this self-understanding/perception by "presencing" (Malpas 2006, 11) him before them in the form of a statue:

> By representing the gods as human-like, the Greeks were able to articulate a different conception of themselves than would have been possible in natural religion. They were able to gain a more determinate (although still abstract) form of self-knowledge in thinking of the divine as human in shape (Pinkard 1996, 235).

While the community appears to perceive their own essence as one that upholds right for all through their raising of a statue, later in the song the news anchors return, singing:

NEWSANCHORS

It's the perfect story

NEWSMAN

So they say

NEWSWOMAN

A hero leading the way

BOTH

Hammer's call to glory

NEWSWOMAN

Let's all be our best

NEWSMAN

Next up – Who's gay?

(Whedon et al. 2011, 55)

Civil societies should be guided by leaders, vehicles of Spirit, encouraging them towards greater levels of freedom, higher forms of Spirit. This is Hammer's "call to glory", improving accessibility to right for all and "leading the way" for greater freedom in their community. The Newswoman even sings "Let's all be our best", encouraging her listeners to do more for their fellow citizens, in the same way as Captain Hammer. However, while championing universal right and endorsing Hammer's actions, the Newsman then immediately limits the positive freedom of some members of society by publicly asking "Who's gay?". Hegel's positive freedom allows one to determine their own will within the boundaries of the social world as long as it does not limit or restrict the will of others (protecting them from 'arbitrary freedom' – Wood in Hegel 2003, xiii). In Hegel's words, "The implementation of my end therefore has this identity of my will and the will of others within it – it has a *positive* reference to the will of others" (Hegel 2003, 139), i.e. I consider others in the determination of my own will. However, this form of sensationalism, publicly revealing the private sexuality of an individual by a trusted source, exposes and undermines the will of the un-named person in question. In a society of positive freedom any member should be able to seek their own, personal will and desires without the question and examination of others unless it affects/restricts the freedom of those around them (which sexuality does not). So, while the community is making headway on Painter and Jeffrey's large-scale formal freedom (2009), it clearly still has a way to go on other fronts.

Penny's alienation from her relationship appears to be confirmed by Captain Hammer's disinterest in the formation of a familial sphere when he sings:

This is so nice
I just might sleep with the same girl twice
They say it's better the second time
They say you get to do the weird stuff
(Whedon et al. 2011, 56)

Hegel argues that marriage "contains *first* the moment of *natural* vitality" (Hegel 2003, 200), i.e. it is grounded in sexual attraction and intended for procreation. However, Hegel says later that, through marriage, two persons mutually "consent to *constitute a single person* and to give up their natural and individual personalities within this union. In this respect, their union is a self-limitation, but since they attain their substantial self-consciousness within it, it is in fact their liberation" (Hegel 2003, 201). Captain Hammer is objectively alienating Penny by not 'limiting' himself and wanting to maintain his 'natural and individual personality' within their relationship. He also appears disinterested in the sphere of the family, singing that he "just might sleep with the same girl twice". Hammer has no interest in forming a sphere of the family with anyone, including Penny, instead being more interested in his own "*natural* vitality". Marriage, in Hegel's mind, is a union in which, although initially grounded in sexual attraction, the natural drives are "made subordinate" to the state of being in love, compared to "*concubinage*", that is "chiefly concerned with the satisfaction of the natural drive" (2003, 203). Hammer does not appear to be making his drives "subordinate" in his relationship with Penny, which may also explain his lack of interest in sleeping with a girl more than once. He is therefore treating Penny more like a 'concubine' while Penny is seeking something more substantial. The groupies, on the other hand, appear less interested in forming a "subordinate" sphere of the family with Hammer as they are happy to respond to his desire to "do the weird stuff" ('We do the weird stuff' – Whedon et al. 2011, 56).

Another way of considering the interaction of the groupies with Captain Hammer is through the lens of toxic fan culture (Hills 2018). Matt Hills describes how toxic fans can be understood in "Bourdieusian ways […] as the outcome of disrupted, destabilised doxa, where dominant groups reactively fight to maintain their now-questioned dominance in a dramatically reconfigured field (whilst previously dominated groups are given a greater voice in just such a field)" (Hills 2018, 107–8). Bourdieusian *doxa* describes what "goes without saying because it comes without saying" (Bourdieu 1977, 16:167), and, in the case of Captain Hammer, what goes without saying is his centrality and control over all of his relationships. He has been calling all the shots in his relationships, including with Penny, but now the groupies are shifting that balance, if only slightly.

For example, we see Captain Hammer reclining comfortably in a room in the homeless shelter, singing his "They say you get to do the weird stuff" lyric while workers walk back and forth behind him holding clipboards and carrying chairs. Hammer appears to have done very little to organise the opening of the shelter – he merely wanted to impress Penny while everyone else does everything around him. However, Hammer does not have all the power here. We have seen the groupies 'popping up' throughout Act 3, the first and second times on a busy street corner, presumably outside or near the homeless shelter, as if they were aware of Hammer's whereabouts. All of a sudden, in an interior shot of the shelter, they lean into frame from the left-hand side of the screen to deliver their "We do the weird stuff" lyric in response to Hammer's "weird stuff" comment, somehow miraculously inside the shelter in the background of the same room as Hammer. Hammer responds with a look of concern/surprise, his eyes trying desperately to ignore the intrusion.

From a Hegelian perspective, Hammer has previously been alienating the groupies, limiting their access to his sphere of the family. However, presumably through their combined efforts, they have been collecting personal items – his dry-cleaning bill, a lock of his hair – and have now been able to track him to the homeless shelter. The "previously dominated" groupies are now infringing Hammer's personal sphere/space, limiting his physical freedom of movement (in that

he is seemingly unable to go anywhere without being followed). Furthermore, they are actively trying to force their way into his sphere of the family with Penny, undermining both Hammer and Penny's exclusivity. We already know that, according to Hegel, "Love means in general the consciousness of my unity with another, so that I am not isolated on my own [*für mich*]" (Hegel 2003, 199), and Hammer's reaction to the groupies may in fact imply that he does consider his relationship with Penny to be exclusive, despite his suggestion that he may not want to "sleep with the same girl twice".

There is another perspective to be taken on the appearance of the groupies, that of editing. As *Dr. Horrible* is a filmed, Internet musical, the groupies' appearance in the background of Hammer's shot could have been artificially inserted in post-production, even jutting in from the side of the screen. Despite this possibility, there is no editing within "So They Say" that could not have been reproduced on stage, albeit requiring coordinated lighting and scenographic transitions to identify the different locations used throughout the number. The editing used during the number is designed to draw the audience's focus to the different character perspectives, but, as will be shown during the "Act One Finale" of *Urinetown*, this can still be achieved on the stage as can be seen in "One Day More" from *Les Misérables*. Nevertheless, this potential for filmic editing may still be the case for other songs in *Dr. Horrible*, or even other filmed musicals, and future studies may wish to consider what, if any, impact editing has on the function of song in filmed/movie musicals.

Returning to Penny, while she originally appeared unperturbed by Hammer's egotism in relation to the homeless shelter ('"Thanks to me"' – Whedon et al. 2011, 54), she now appears to be grasping what Hegel would term her alienation from her own relationship:

> This is perfect for me
>
> So they say
>
> I guess it's pretty okay

After years of stormy

Sailing have I finally found the bay

(Whedon et al. 2011, 56)

From a Hegelian perspective, Penny appears to be becoming aware of her objective alienation from her relationship with Captain Hammer, causing her to become subjectively alienated as well. Penny appears to value the sphere of the family and is saddened by her alienation from Captain Hammer, resigning herself to the fact that she may never find her Aristophanic 'other-half'[14]:

There's no happy ending

So they say

Should I stop pretending

Or is this a brand new day

(Whedon et al. 2011, 56)

Penny is the true world-spirit of the show, the "avant garde vis-à-vis the understanding of political freedom at that period of time" (Pinkard 1996, 336) with a "cause [*Sache*] of [her] own (Hegel 2003, 120–21 – [her] added). But her cause is a universal one, not the selfish cause of Captain Hammer. Penny is wondering whether a relationship with Billy might be her "brand new day", a way to start over and form the sphere of the family she so desires. In a utilitarian way, if Penny had shown interest in Dr. Horrible as the show's spirit/if he had not been so focussed on his plan of entering the Evil League of Evil, she may have been able to provide positive freedom to more than just the homeless, indeed the whole society. By focussing her attention and attempting to

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[14] In fact, none of the main characters in these case studies achieve the heterosexual closure that is the broad norm of stage musicals as Robert only decides that he wants to marry at the end of *Company* and Horrible and Hope's partners both die in the early stages of their relationship.

instil the concept of Spirit in Dr. Horrible, Penny would have preserved universal freedom for all members of their society, not simply the homeless. While there are known problems with a utilitarian approach to freedom and justice (Sandel 2010, 33), Penny could have achieved both her desires, a sphere of the family and increased freedom in their society, if she had focused her attention on Billy/Dr. Horrible from the start rather than Captain Hammer.

But, in advancing freedom for the greater community, Penny has restricted her own positive freedom in her ability to seek a sphere of the family. Though her work with the homeless shelter progressed freedom and is being noticed by the community, it has been at the expense of her own desires. We know from "Penny's Song" that she "grew up lost and lonely / Thinking love was a fairytale" (Whedon et al. 2011, 43) and we have seen that she now seems to be having feelings for Billy ("she cranes hopefully for Billy, but it's not him" – Whedon et al. 2011, 56). Her disinterested "I guess it's pretty okay" and "have I finally found the bay" lyrics may also imply that she is beginning to understand that Captain Hammer is in their relationship for himself and not for her. This poses the interesting dilemma that asks, if one devotes their time to the service of others is it at the detriment of their own desires? This is one way that we could look at how musical theatre song can have an effect outside the theatre, as, in the words of McMillin, "that is where the most successful songs are meant to go" (2006, 37).

Meanwhile, back in his lab, Horrible has decided that there is no chance for him and Penny, due to the perceived success of her relationship with Captain Hammer:

> There's no happy ending
> So they say
> Not for me anyway
> Stop pretending
> Take the chance to build a brand new day
> (Whedon et al. 2011, 56)

This is the first time Penny and Horrible have sung the same lyrics together in homophony ("There's no happy ending / So they say") and I have argued elsewhere that this compositional device implies agreement/emotional consonance between characters (Nisbet 2014, 253). This idea is reinforced when their duality of circumstance is highlighted through the polyphonic setting of their "Or is this a brand new day" / "Take the chance to build a brand new day" lyrics. Penny is seeking a "brand new day" where she may be able to form a sphere of the family with Billy, whereas Horrible's "brand new day" involves his entrance to the Evil League of Evil and the subjugation of all humanity. They both desire a brand new day, but, through the dramatic irony of their conflicting desires, we can see that their wills are incompatible.

In "So They Say", the largest ensemble number of the show, we have witnessed a number of characters utilising McMillin's "doubling" of character to provide them with a "formality of expression unavailable to them in the book" (McMillin 2006, 20). This "formality" allowed them to reflect on their current situations, the process of Hegelian Spirit. And, through this reflection, it became apparent that their circumstances are inherently political, from the question of freedom in society to the politics of the family and relationships. Furthermore, this reflection occurred through song. While the existing theories hold merit for explaining the function of song in the musical, they overlook the deeper politicality of the characters' situations, detail that can be exposed through the application of a Hegelian lens. There is, therefore, a greater depth and breadth of analytical possibility afforded by the Hegelian perspective to illuminate issues and elements that are absent in the existing approaches to song analysis, cogent and informative as they may be. I therefore contend that Hegel's theories can reveal this deeper, political drama occurring within the musical, providing us with an opportunity to reflect on both what the musical can tell us about our own lives and question how the character's views and opinions agree with, contrast, or challenge our current understanding of what we take for granted in our own social world.

4.2"Sorry-Grateful" from *Company*

Company is a musical specifically focused on the political question of marriage and relationships, Hegel's sphere of the family. The show's content is inherently political, but it is yet to be seen how the songs contribute to that politicality.

Through the process of this research it has proven more challenging to apply Hegel's theory to a concept musical than to an integrated musical, mainly due to the nature of the form. Right, as we have seen, is progressive, as are the books of most musicals that have a narrative/storyline. Concept musicals employ different structuring devices from book musicals that are not necessarily linear and progressive, resulting in songs that appear more like vignettes, focussed on simple/singular concepts. This can mean that, individually, there can be less to say/interpret from a standalone number than a song connected to a dramatic arc/that is part of an extended storyline. It is important to demonstrate, however, that Hegel's theories can still be applied to concept musicals despite this difficulty, as it has already been shown that this is a limitation of some of the existing theories of song function. Although each song in *Company* may not relate to the specific politicality of marriage, each song does, in some way, express the politicality of the character's situation or position in their society. One example is the song "Sorry-Grateful".

4.2.1 When Emotion Becomes Too Great for Speech, You Sing

In the scene immediately prior to "Sorry-Grateful", Robert asks his friends if they are sorry they got married. Harry responds by singing:

> You're always sorry,
>
> You're always grateful,
>
> You're always wondering what might have been.

Then she walks in.

And still you're sorry,

And still you're grateful,

And still you wonder and still you doubt.

And she goes out.

(Sondheim 2010, 175)

As Brown has previously argued, "When characters reach a point in the drama where they can't help but explode with feelings of love or success or simply the joy of life, music serves to amplify these emotions to a level above mere words" (L. A. Brown 2007). This does not appear to be the case for "Sorry-Grateful". Yes, the characters are singing about emotions (that they are sorry, grateful, etc.), but musically the oscillating stepwise melody does not appear to embody 'exploding' with feelings or 'amplified' emotions. In fact, Harry's singing is distinctly conversational in character, indifferent, even contradictory:

Everything's different,

Nothing's changed,

Only maybe slightly

Rearranged.

(Sondheim 2010, 175)

The lack of 'heightened' emotion in "Sorry-Grateful" appears to place it more in line with Julian Woolford's argument that "characters can sing only the most rapturous emotions, or the most mundane banalities, but as long as it is consistent with the theatrical language of the piece, then the audience will accept it" (2012, 251). Harry's lyric appears to conform with Woolford's "mundane banalities" but his reflection is far from mundane – these are deep, complicated thoughts that are unable to be explored purely from an emotional perspective.

Later in the song Harry introduces the compound and contradictory emotions of "sorry-grateful" and "regretful-happy". While still emotional, Larry's lyrics may be an example of David Spencer's "new-age variation" (2005, 69) of the heightened emotion rule. In Spencer's formulation, "When things get a little too tense to talk about, you sing" (2005, 69). This theory was created in response to works by Stephen Sondheim (such as *Company*) that focus on "uncertainty and self-exploration" (Kenrick 2008, 326):

> You're sorry-grateful,
>
> Regretful-happy.
>
> Why look for answers where none occur?
>
> You always are what you always were,
>
> Which has nothing to do with,
>
> All to do with her.
>
> (Sondheim 2010, 175)

Finally, Larry sings of similarly contradictory emotions where:

> Good things get better,
>
> Bad get worse.
>
> Wait – I think I meant that in reverse.
>
> (Sondheim 2010, 175)

Reiterating Jason Robert Brown's argument that "Singing ultimately magnifies everything you're feeling; when you sing it, it becomes epic" (Brown in Bryer and Davison 2008, 34), this may be a better, although indirect, understanding of the husbands' responses. While the compositional style of the song does not in any way sound "epic", the simple fact that Harry is singing about his feelings make it an 'epic' in terms of the Greek epics discussed in Hegel's conception of art.

According to Pinkard, "An epic tells the story of how a determinate group of people with their own form of life have come to self-consciousness about who they are because of a conflict with some other group of people that forced them to develop that understanding of who they are" (Pinkard 1996, 241). "Sorry-Grateful", therefore, may be an epic in terms of its describing Harry's "conflict" with an other (in this case his wife), but, while this is a distinctly emotional conflict, it is also a political one.

4.2.2 Fosse's 'I Am', 'I Want', and 'New' songs

"Sorry-Grateful" appears to be am 'I Am' song in terms of Fosse's three "tool" songs (2000, 95). According to Frankel, an 'I Am' song "may assert itself in several ways: to define an attitude, to take a stand, to apply the past or to change the future. The action may question or affirm, yield or persist – but the character commits himself in some way" (2000, 95). This is a valid description of the number, despite the lack of specificity. Harry and Larry are both 'defining an attitude' towards marriage and 'questioning and affirming' their understanding of the institution, and there is none of the 'reaching' or 'striving' of the 'I Want', nor is it "designed to meet needs which are novel" like a 'New' song (Frankel 2000, 96). On the surface it simply appears that they are both sorry and grateful for getting married but there is far more to the politicality of this statement, as will be seen in the Hegelian analysis below.

4.2.3 Integration Theory (Songs Progress the Drama)

Jason Robert Brown argues that "Pop songs by their nature are about establishing a mood, sustaining it, and finishing with it. Theater songs are about the opposite; good theater songs go from one end of an idea to a different place" (Brown in Frank 2000). Stephen Sondheim agrees that "that's what the song's supposed to accomplish – the season change" (Sondheim 1978, 17). "Sorry-Grateful" successfully achieves this "season change", although it is quite a subtle

movement compared to the stark action of, for example/to use another Sondheim lyric, "Some People" from *Gypsy* (1959).

There is an issue with this theory, though, when applied to concept musicals. Composer Stephen Flaherty argues that "In the contemporary musical, the music carries the drama" (Flaherty in Bryer and Davison 2008, 14), yet there is no linear drama/plot to be carried in *Company*. Sondheim's understanding of the song function in *Gypsy* ("tunes in the service of telling a story" – Bryer and Davison 2008, 194) may be more appropriate here.

David Spencer describes the function of song as outlining:

> the place where dramatic tension begins and the place where it ends. This is frequently the span of the song, and marks the territory to be absorbed into song, because it tracks the central event of the scene. (In scenes that don't precisely comply with those markers, or have different needs – say, a set piece for your star, or the establishment of dramatic themes that will inform the action or the evening – an alternate approach may be to take stock of all the things you want the audience pay attention to, focus on, and understand in a particular light. The overriding topic idea that acts as an umbrella to the others will tend to give your song its proper emphasis). (D. Spencer 2005, 70)

While this description seems intended for more traditional book musicals, it and many of the other descriptions of integration theory can still be applied to *Company*. Despite having no distinct 'plot', the songs in *Company* still often achieve Sondheim's "season change", demarking "the place where dramatic tension begins and the place where it ends" within that scene. Although the scenes in *Company* do not play a role in progressing the linear drama as they would in a non-concept musical, they still play a similar function to their role in book musicals, despite on a smaller scale. *Company*'s plot could be argued as the progress of

Bobby's understanding of/relation to the concept and realities of marriage even though he does not undertake a physical journey in the process (Sondheim describes it as 'the story of what happens inside Robert' – 2010, 166). Therefore, the show's songs, while not taking the characters on physical/chronological journeys, do take them on psychological ones. "Being Alive", the show's finale number, is another example of this.

"Being Alive" was the third finale number written for *Company* (Sondheim 2010, 195) and the one that stayed. During the song Robert discusses the overall positive nature of personal relationships/marriage from his own perspective. The start of the song is sung "bitterly", according to Sondheim – "what starts as a complaint becomes a prayer" (Sondheim 2010, 193), and ultimately we come to learn that "marriage is wonderful" (Sondheim 2010, 196) and that Robert has warmed to the idea with the support of his friends:

> Somebody need me too much,
> Somebody know me too well,
> Somebody pull me up short
> And put me through hell
> And give me support
> For being alive.
> Make me alive.
> Make me alive.
>
> Make me confused,
> Mock me with praise,
> Let me be used,
> Vary my days.
> But alone is alone, not alive.

Somebody crowd me with love,

Somebody force me to care,

Somebody let me come through,

I'll always be there

As frightened as you,

To help us survive

Being alive, being alive,

Being alive!

(Sondheim 2010, 195)

Although integration theory does, regardless of appearances, seem capable of explaining the function of songs in *Company* despite its lack of linear plot, this theory still lacks the specificity as to *how* the songs are dramatic/political and the reason for achieving this "season change" (if there even is one).

4.2.4 Coherence theory (Songs Pause the Drama)

McMillin's description of how musical time 'interrupts' plot time "for the sake of a new dimension of characterization" (McMillin 2005, 324) appears more relevant to *Company* than the afore-mentioned theories due to its innate lack of plot. Indeed, songs cannot interrupt a show's plot if there is no linear plot to interrupt in the first place. In addition, McMillin's idea of characters giving a "second account of themselves" seems an appropriate description for many of the songs in *Company* where characters are asked to/take the opportunity to reflect on their own understanding of the concept of marriage.

During "Sorry-Grateful" the husbands take a "second account" of their own understanding of marriage. This "doubling of character" into "musical performance breaks the illusion of realism

which attends the libretto–scenes" – in the case of *Company* the short interjections written by George Furth. But, as with the earlier theories, McMillin's theory does not reveal nor discuss the implicit politicality of the husbands' opinions and views on their marriages.

4.2.5 Songs Reveal the Subtext of the Scene

Subtext has been described as context hidden under the dramatic surface of a song, and this is evident in a song like "Light My Candle" from *RENT* where Mimi's candle metaphor could imply either falling in love or the cooking of heroin. The subtext of "Sorry-Grateful", though, is more 'surface text' as the husbands sings of normally unspoken feelings directly with no use of metaphor.

Harry's first response to Robert's question "Harry, you ever sorry you got married?" is "You're always sorry / You're always grateful / You're always wondering what might have been / Then she walks in" (Sondheim 2010, 175). This is not Cohen and Rosenhaus' description of "composers [creating] subtext by using music to contradict the lyrics" (2006, 137) but closer to Peter Fitzpatrick's description that: "Sometimes it's about saying things that prose can't say; sometimes it's articulate subtext. Sometimes it can play in ironic counterpoint to the line of action, and suggest other layers of thought and emotion" (Fitzpatrick 2016). Just as the puppets of *Avenue Q* create a "distance" that, according to playwright Craig Wright, allows them to be, "In a weird way, […] freer to be the most straightforward and honest one onstage" (Stuart Miller 2003), so it seems that the movement from speech to song allows the husbands to be more "straightforward and honest" than they could be in prose.

Sub-textual love songs were a common trait of Golden Age musicals (1943-1959 – Kantor and Maslon 2004, 195). Examples such as "I've Never Been in Love Before" from *Guys and Dolls* (1950), "If I Loved You" from *Carousel* (1945), and "People Will Say We're in Love" from

Oklahoma! are all songs where characters sing about being in love without directly expressing these emotions. The husbands in "Sorry-Grateful", on the other hand, are singing directly about their own emotional responses to their marriages. In fact, the subtext of "Sorry-Grateful" has been brought directly into the foreground, explicitly expressing the traditionally unspoken difficulties of marriage.

This interpretation could be argued as an affront to marriage, attacking the institution and its virtues. However, we already know that Hegel's social world allows for the inclusion of evils/restrictions of the self, which, as will be discussed, may be a better explanation of the function of "Sorry-Grateful" in *Company*.

4.2.6 Hegelian Analysis

As we know, Harry responds to Robert's question as to whether his friends are sorry they got married by singing:

> You're always sorry,
> You're always grateful,
> You're always wondering what might have been.
> Then she walks in.
>
> And still you're sorry,
> And still you're grateful,
> And still you wonder and still you doubt.
> And she goes out.
> (Sondheim 2010, 175)

From a Hegelian perspective, and similar to Penny's wondering if Billy might be a better option for her in *Dr. Horrible*, Harry appears sorry that he has excluded himself from relationships with others ("You're always wondering what might have been") but seems simultaneously grateful that he has found his Aristophanic 'other-half'.

According to Kohn, married couples knowingly exclude themselves from others, and, in doing so, the rights of others to them: "To choose one place, one career, one lover, one way to spend a Sunday, is to exclude countless other possibilities, and this inevitably brings curiosity and regret" (Kohn 2000). But in this "curiosity and regret" is also a political situation – by choosing one partner over another Harry has made a political choice, both by aligning himself with a particular familial sphere, but also by demonstrating power over the arbitrary nature of his will. "Sorry-Grateful" therefore becomes a meditation on the will's arbitrary nature in relation to marriage/the family. Harry consciously chose (willed) to marry Sarah, but keeps "wondering what might have been". According to Hegel, "whatever the will has decided to choose, it can likewise relinquish" (Hegel 2003, 50), meaning that Harry is not wrong in considering the contingent possibilities of his will, as long as he does not cause an "irreparable internal split" (Hardimon 1992, 177) by violating his decision to know himself as the "unity of [himself] with another and of the other with [him]" (Hegel 2003, 199 – edited), i.e. by cheating. However, this "consciousness of […] unity with another", in Hegel's words, is also political in that it requires the "renunciation of my independent existence [*meines Fürsichseins*]" (Hegel 2003, 199 – edited), i.e. by putting the power in someone else's (in this case his wife's) hands. These are challenging and distinctly political concepts being explored through song, and revealed by Hegel's theories, that can teach us not only about the character's situations within the world of the show but also about the choices we make in our own social world.

Harry then sings a contradictory quatrain:

> Everything's different,

> Nothing's changed,
>
> Only maybe slightly
>
> Rearranged.
>
> (Sondheim 2010, 175)

Confusing as it sounds this is exactly the case from a Hegelian perspective. According to Hegel, "When a marriage takes place, a *new family* is constituted" (Hegel 2003, 209). Harry previously belonged to a sphere of the family and has now formed and entered another sphere through the act of marriage. Therefore, he remains a member of a sphere of the family even though he has left his previous one. Everything truly is "different" in that he is not a member of his previous familial sphere, but also "nothing's changed" as the sphere of the family still exists for him, it has just been "slightly rearranged". His two familial spheres could therefore be considered the thesis and antithesis of the Hegelian dialectic – both different but able to maintain their differences whilst being synthesised into the concept of 'family'.

Harry's paradoxical lyrics continue with the lines: "You always are what you always were, / Which has nothing to do with, / All to do with her" (Sondheim 2010, 175).

According to Hegel, contemporary marriage is grounded in the feeling of love and love has multiple moments:

> The first moment in love is that I do not wish to be an independent person in my own right [*für mich*] and that, if I were, I would feel deficient and incomplete. The second moment is that I find myself in another person, that I gain recognition in this person [*daß ich in ihr gelte*], who in turn gains recognition in me (2003, 199).

Harry himself has not changed through the process of being married to Sarah, but his own individuality is reinforced through her recognition of him, and also through his recognition of her. Harry is still 'what he always was' but, through the process of marriage, has found himself reflected "in another person", strengthening and affirming his understanding of his independent self. This is another dialectical movement where the two individuals in a marriage become stronger together whilst still recognising and retaining their differences. The politicality of marriage is exemplified through this Hegelian reading of Sondheim's lyrics, a possibility not currently available with the existing theories of song function.

David, on the other hand, sings of how, in his own marriage, he is "still alone" (Sondheim 2010, 175). According to Sondheim, "*Company* says very clearly that to be emotionally committed to somebody is very difficult, but to be alone is impossible" (Sondheim in Secrest 1998, 191). This difficulty is what Sondheim terms 'ambivalence':

> Ambivalence is a basic quality that everybody has but that not everybody likes to admit, because they're assumed of one-half of the ambivalence. They're feeling a little annoyed, but they feel guilty that they're feeling annoyed because they love you so much. (Sondheim in Citron 2001, 166)

According to Stephen Citron, "marriage is no cure for personal loneliness" (2001, 166), and this may be a case of subjective Hegelian alienation. For Hegel, "Love means in general the consciousness of my unity with another, so that I am not isolated on my own [für mich]" (Hegel 2003, 199). David should not be isolated from his marriage if his sphere of the family aligns with his values, needs, and his understanding of his own situation. Presumably his marriage is meeting his values and needs as he only comments on his feelings of loneliness. Therefore, while David's marriage may be a home, he may not have grasped this fact, may not be conscious of his "unity with another", resulting in in his feeling subjectively alienated and "alone".

David continues, singing:

> You don't live for her,
> You do live with her,
> You're scared she's starting to drift away–
> And scared she'll stay.
> (Sondheim 2010, 175)

David sings that he lives "with" Jenny but not "for" her. Living with Jenny in the familial home makes sense in Hegelian terms, but the concept of living "for" another is more confusing. Hegel argues that "consciousness simultaneously *distinguishes* itself from something, and at the same time *relates* itself to it, or, as it is said, this something exists *for* consciousness":

> we distinguish this being-for-another from *being-in-itself*; whatever is related to knowledge or knowing is also distinguished from it, and posited as existing outside of this relationship. (Hegel 1977, 52)

In Hegelian terms David is correct. He does not simply live "for" Jenny's consciousness, as an '*object*' in Hegelian terms, but also has the knowledge of his existence as an individual "outside of this relationship", as a Hegelian '*Notion*' (Hegel 1977, 53). This is the fallacious belief that one loses their independence through the act of marriage, a recurring concern of the characters in *Company*. Hegel argues that, through marriage, two persons mutually "consent to *constitute a single person* and to give up their natural and individual personalities within this union. In this respect, their union is a self-limitation, but since they attain their substantial self-consciousness within it, it is in fact their liberation" (Hegel 2003, 201). It is their "liberation" in the fact that they "attain their substantial self-consciousness" in their recognition by another. David therefore achieves being 'in and for himself' through his recognition by another, i.e. his wife. Through this

process he becomes "certain of [his] presence in the world" (Hegel 1977, 146) and his ability to affect it, thus his liberation.

Near the end of the number Larry sings: "Good things get better, / Bad get worse. / Wait – I think I meant that in reverse" (Sondheim 2010, 175). Presumably Larry's "reverse" meaning is that bad things get better but good get worse. While this does not sound appealing on the surface, it does align with Hegel's understanding of marriage. Through marriage I am no longer "isolated on my own [für mich]" (Hegel 2003, 199), a bad thing that got better. However, I must also limit my own will in order to not infringe the will of my partner, a good thing that could be said to have become 'worse'. This, and the other constantly-contrasting lines of the song, are examples of what Stephen Banfield refers to as the "dialectic" of the show with its "continual interlocking somersaults and athletic reversals of terms and values" (Banfield 1993, 163), resulting in a sphere of the family that can not only recognise and retain its differences, but become stronger in the process.

Hegel's concept requires members of a community to accept their social world 'warts and all'. According to Hegel, 'evils' such as divorce and war are capable of being viewed in a rational light through which they can be accepted and affirmed (Hardimon 1992, 176), and this could also be the case for the challenges of marriage discussed above. Evils occur when people's drives are not tempered by reflection, not given *formal universality*, and marital dissonance could therefore also be a product of an untempered will, e.g. a husband not thinking of his wife, or vice-versa. However, these 'evils' of marriage can also be accepted and affirmed through the application of Hegel's theories and this understanding can be taken into our own social world and used by audiences in their day-to-day lives. Yes, the institution of marriage imposes limitations on both parties, but it also supports and formalises their freedom, and that is not a bad thing.

4.3 “Act One Finale” from *Urinetown*

Act I finales in musicals are traditionally highly political ‘cliffhanger’ moments and this is no less the case in *Urinetown*. The additional power of such numbers is that they can represent multiple political/character perspectives simultaneously, often through the use of polyphony, allowing the audience to synthesise numerous storylines from a diverse group of characters in a single song. This potential can be witnessed in songs such as “One Day More” from *Les Misérables* and also the “Act One Finale” of *Urinetown*.

4.3.1 When Emotion Becomes Too Great for Speech, You Sing

After opening the public toilets and allowing everyone to “pee for free” (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 52), Bobby expresses the *Urinetown* residents’ new-found freedom, singing:

> Free!
> People are free!
> How can a fee
> Enslave us?
> See
> How we can be
> Free from the chains
> He gave us!
> We’re suffering now
> Such lives of sorrow!
> Don’t give us tomorrow,
> Just give us today!

(Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 50–51)

This is clearly a case of heightened emotion communicated through song. The townsfolk have been fighting Cladwell's draconian laws throughout Act I and have only just succeeded in gaining free access to the public amenities. The emotion being expressed by the townsfolk is one of joy, however Cladwell counters their celebration with a bout of anger:

> But what of tomorrow, Mister Strong?!
> Think of tomorrow, Mister Strong!
> Our resources are as fragile
> As a newborn baby's skull!
> With your actions you would gut the child
> And leave a lifeless hull!
> Could it be you're so shortsighted,
> So insensitive, so dull?
> Think of tomorrow, Mister Strong!
> (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 52)

Cladwell appears to be expressing anger towards Bobby and the townsfolk and this is consistent with Sheldon Harnick's statement that some of his best songs "have come out of anger" (Harnick in Bryer and Davison 2008, 78). This situation is also consistent with Stephen Citron's concept of "moments that 'sing' better than they 'speak'":

> Often these moments are obvious, sometimes a whole scene cries out to be turned into singing and thereby develop the characters. At other times a tender exchange will patently call for a love song, but more often the song-clues are buried in the text. They are generally easy to dig out if you know where to look and approach the libretto with imagination (1997, 171).

Bobby is ‘crying out’ the townsfolk’s new-found freedom while Cladwell “cries out” in anger at their defiance and the choice to move this moment to song is the work of Kotis and Hollman’s imaginations. Furthermore, The “Act One Finale” also occurs at one of Cohen and Rosenhaus’s “emotional and structural high points” (2006, 191), the finale of Act I.

Bobby and the townsfolk are celebrating with a communal expression of joy, but it is not only Cladwell that is angry about their uprising – his views are shared by other members of the community:

CLADWELL AND CO.

You are wrong, Mister Strong,

You and your socialistic throng!

If the people pee for free, they’ll push

The system to the brink!

If today there’s spillage, tell us how

Tomorrow will not stink!

CLADWELL

If it’s you and me, now, Mister Strong,

Which one of us will blink?

I say it’s you, Mister Strong,

For on the subject of tomorrow–

CLADWELL AND CO.

You are wrong!

(Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 52–53)

Another emotion expressed during the "Act One Finale" is fear. Hope sings:

> Bobby, think!
>
> You're standing on the brink!
>
> You'll be arrested soon,
>
> Perhaps as soon as noon,
>
> And I could never bear
>
> To see you taken where
>
> The guilty peeers meet
>
> The toilet judgement seat!
>
> (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 53–54)

Bobby then responds to Hope's fear with his own emotion, hope:

> You said
>
> To follow your heart.
>
> Here's where my heart leads.
>
> Now I'll do my part
>
> To banish all needs.
>
> You made me to see,
>
> Fantastic'lly clear.
>
> When people pee free,
>
> We've nothing to fear.
>
> (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 54)

To this point in the "Act One Finale" we have experienced the characters expressing emotions ranging from joy to anger and fear to hope. Later in the number, the poor sing of their own collective fear:

> Bobby, help!
> He'll turn our brains to kelp!
> No matter what we do,
> We're in a real bad stew!
> Those cops look awful mean,
> Like none we've ever seen!
> When Cladwell gives the cue,
> Our revolution's through!
> (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 55–56)

The "Act One Finale" appears to support the heightened emotion theory of song function in the musical. Just like the different members of society discussing Captain Hammer's achievements in "So They Say" from *Dr. Horrible*, the "Act One Finale" presents multiple emotional perspectives simultaneously. However, as has been discussed previously, while it is clear song is capable of expressing emotions in the musical, we require an alternate philosophical theory in order to be able to examine the politicality of these emotions and the characters' situations.

4.3.2 Fosse's 'I Am', 'I Want', and 'New' songs

Early in the show, during "Urinetown", the townsfolk sang of how "You, our humble audience, / You have come to see / What it's like when / People can't pee free" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 12). They existed in Fosse's 'I/We Want' state, desiring freedom for their collective bladders. In the "Act One Finale" they have now achieved this freedom, placing them in a clear 'I Am/We

Are' "free" state ("Free! / People are free! / How can a fee / Enslave us?" – Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 50). Cladwell, on the other hand, has moved from a different 'I Am' state (I am an industry mogul in "Mr. Cladwell") to an 'I Want' state ("But what of tomorrow, Mister Strong?! / Think of tomorrow, Mister Strong!" – Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 52).

During "Mr. Cladwell", earlier in Act I, Cladwell sang of how he was "the man / With the plan" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 23–24). In fact, Cladwell and his offsiders even sang of what they are *not*:

McQUEEN

We're not greedy, as some make us seem.

We need funds for our big research team.

DR. BILLEAUX

Men in labcoats and test tubes with steam!

CLADWELL AND McQUEEN

What it shows,

No one knows,

But, hey, still we can dream!

(Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 25)

Furthermore, Cladwell's employees appeared quite enamoured of him earlier in the show:

CHORUS

Mister Cladwell,

You're so godly,

Oddly perfect and right!

MEN

You are continental, yet unpretentious!

WOMEN

Fancy-free, yet so conscientious!

MEN

Wise but trendy, tough as a mountain!

CHORUS

Goodness flows from you like a fountain!

You're Mister, you're Mister

CLADWELL

Cladwell!

CHORUS

Cladwell!

(Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 26)

Now, during the "Act One Finale", the poor have moved from their 'We Want' freedom state from the start of the show to 'We Are' free ('Free! / People are Free!' – Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 50). Cladwell and Co., on the other hand, have moved to a 'We Are' angry/concerned state ("But what of tomorrow, Mister Strong?! / Think of tomorrow, Mister Strong!" – Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 52).

Bobby and the poor may be excited about their new-found freedom but Hope is in an 'I Am' state, scared for Bobby's life ("Bobby, think! / You're standing on the brink! / You'll be arrested soon, / Perhaps as soon as noon!" – Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 53). Then, after Cladwell's threats, the poor enter the same scared state as Hope:

> Bobby, help!
> He'll turn our brains to kelp!
> No matter what we do,
> We're in a real bad stew!
> Those cops look awful mean,
> Like none we've ever seen!
> When Cladwell gives the cue,
> Our revolution's through!
> (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 55–56)

Finally, at the end of the number, Bobby and the poor return to a 'We Are' state, defiant against Cladwell and the UGC, singing:

> From ev'ry
> Hill,
> Ev'ry steeple,
> Ring out the anthem
> Of the people
> Making a
> New way,
> Breaking the
> Clouds of gray
> To sing of today!

(Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 58)

For recall, according to Frankel, Fosse's 'I Am' state allows characters to "define an attitude, to take a stand, to apply the past or to change the future. The action may question or affirm, yield or persist – but the character commits himself in some way" (2000, 95) and that is exactly what is happening here for both Cladwell and the poor. The poor, and the other characters in the number, are 'defining an attitude' to their current situation, 'taking a stand' against those who oppose them, and looking to "change the future", albeit with vastly different opinions as to how this should be done.

Viewed this way, Fosse's tool song theory is quite similar to emotion theory in that a 'scared' character could also be considered to be in an 'I Am' scared state. However, as has been discussed, while these theories achieve what they describe, they do not provide a framework for exploring the depth of politicality in the characters' situations.

4.3.3 Integration Theory (Songs Progress the Drama)

Composer Stephen Flaherty believes that "In the contemporary musical, the music carries the drama. The music is as important as the book settings, and oftentimes the music is the book scene" (Flaherty in Bryer and Davison 2008, 14). However, in the case of the "Act One Finale" of *Urinetown*, little 'carrying' of the drama occurs.

Bobby sings:

Free!

People are free!

How can a fee

Enslave us?

See

How we can be

Free from the chains

He gave us!

We're suffering now

Such lives of sorrow!

Don't give us tomorrow,

Just give us today!

(Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 50–51)

This is not a song that, in the words of Jason Robert Brown, goes "from one end of an idea to a different place" (Brown in Frank 2000). Similarly it does not accomplish the "season change" described by Stephen Sondheim (Sondheim 1978, 17). Bobby is simply singing of/expressing his excitement that the poor are now free from Cladwell's schemes. The poor then repeat this same lyric, celebrating the "idea" of freedom but not taking it "to a different place" – they are simply acknowledging that they *are* in a different place.

Cladwell, on the other hand, *does* take their idea of freedom "from one end […] to a different place" (Brown in Frank 2000):

So you want happy, Mister Strong?

Did you say happy, Mister Strong?

If they pee today, I'm sure they'll be

As happy as a pup!

With no rules and no more fees to pay,

Things would be looking up!

But too bad the water that we share

Could fit inside a cup!

What of tomorrow, Mister Strong?

(Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 52)

Bobby's limited vision of the future is a recurring issue in *Urinetown* (to be discussed further later in the Hegelian analysis) and becomes clear when Cladwell begins to question his narrow viewpoint. This is an example of taking a song "from one end of an idea to a different place" (Brown in Frank 2000), the "season change" described above.

The poor's sunny celebration is overthrown by Cladwell's pragmatism, resulting in their own "season change". After originally agreeing with Bobby's plans they now fear for their lives:

Bobby, help!

He'll turn our brains to kelp!

No matter what we do,

We're in a real bad stew!

Those cops look awful mean,

Like none we've ever seen!

When Cladwell gives the cue,

Our revolution's through!

(Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 55–56)

The impressionable poor then change their tune (both literally and metaphorically) once again, 'singing of today' at Bobby's encouragement:

From ev'ry

Hill,

Ev'ry steeple,

Ring out the anthem

Of the people

Making a

New way,

Breaking the

Clouds of gray

To sing of today!

(Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 58)

Here we see Sondheim's "season change" represented in the meteorological content of the lyric. Earlier in the show, during "Look at the Sky", Bobby sang:

Off in the distance there's a beautiful horizon–

Gleaming and radiant, it's what I'll keep my eyes on–

As the world turns to face the sun and start another day,

It suddenly

Occurs to me

That maybe we can find another way.

Look at the sky,

Full of hope and promise.

It's a shining ideal.

How I reel

When I look at the sky

(Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 41)

Then, the poor took the sun as their "Standard of the people", marching forward towards a "beautiful horizon" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 43). Now they sing of "clouds of gray" as a

metaphor for Cladwell's impositions. This is a literal "season change" that occurs during the "Act One Finale", and one that supports the arguments of integration theory.

4.3.4 Coherence theory (Songs Pause the Drama)

Considering the "season change" described in the "Act One Finale" it is hard to imagine how a song that progresses the drama can also pause it, but McMillin's theory is also relevant here.

During the "Act One Finale" Cladwell and his stoolies take a "second account of themselves" (McMillin 2005, 324) by restating their conviction that Bobby and his tactics are wrong:

CLADWELL AND CO.

You are wrong, Mister Strong,
You and your socialistic throng!
If the people pee for free, they'll push
The system to the brink!
If today there's spillage, tell us how
Tomorrow will not stink!

CLADWELL

If it's you and me, now, Mister Strong,
Which one of us will blink?

I say it's you, Mister Strong,
For on the subject of tomorrow–

CLADWELL AND CO.

You are wrong!

(Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 52–53)

Hope, on the other hand, stands by her conviction that Bobby should abandon the revolution lest he be sent to Urinetown[15]:

Give up now!

We'll find a way somehow

To help the people pee

Without a hefty fee.

But if you must persist

Being an anarchist,

My father's men will see

You're sent away from me!

You'll get

Urinetown!

Bobby, you'll get

Urinetown!

Of you'll go to

Urinetown!

Urinetown!

Urinetown!

(Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 54–55)

---

[15] We learn later in the show that being 'sent to Urinetown' means being thrown off the roof of the UGC building to your death (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 86).

It is becoming apparent from this discussion that there is no single 'hard and fast' rule when it comes to song function. Some songs (or parts of songs) progress the drama while others pause and reflect. Musical theatre songs are also not black and white in their function and can deal with multiple perspectives and situations within a single number. Nevertheless, it is my contention that, while there appears to be no singular explanation for the dramatic function of song in the musical, that musical theatre song is consistently related to politics, one way or another. From the personal, informal politics of battling with one's own will to the formal politics of society, song in the musical provides characters with an opportunity to express a "second account of themselves" (McMillin 2005, 324), specifically in relation to the politicality of their situation, accounts that we, the audience, can identify with and synthesise into our own social world.

4.3.5 Songs Reveal the Subtext of the Scene

There appears to be little subtext in the lyric content of the "Act One Finale". Bobby's "Free! People are free!" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 50) is surface drama/content, as is Cladwell's "You are wrong, Mister Strong" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 52). It could be argued that Hope's concerns regarding Bobby's actions and the revolution are unspoken but this is difficult to assert as she sings them directly to him during the number. They may have previously been unspoken but are now being expressed openly: "Bobby, think! / You're standing on the brink! / You'll be arrested soon, / Perhaps as soon as noon, / And I could never bear / To see you taken where / The guilty peeers meet / The toilet judgement seat!" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 53–54).

Therefore, Woolford's contention that "characters may also sing because the music may reveal the subtext of the scene" (Woolford 2012, 252) seems the least relevant theory for these specific case studies but that does not repudiate its relevance for other songs/shows. That being said,

subtext theory still lacks the political specificity required for our current purposes, details of which will be explored below.

4.3.6 Hegelian Analysis

By the end of Act I of *Urinetown* we have, firstly, witnessed the townsfolk grasp their objective and subjective alienation thanks to the movement of Hegelian Spirit through Bobby. Secondly, we have also seen the evil side of Cladwell, who, much like Dr, Horrible with his robberies and freeze/death ray, enacts wrong against the townsfolk by infringing their wills, denying them what Hegel refers to as any "semblance of right" (Hegel 2003, 116).

The drama reaches a peak in the final number of the act that employs a previously discussed structural technique common in musicals of layering multiple character perspectives on top of each other, through song, in order to highlight their contrasting positions to the audience.

After opening the public toilets and allowing everyone to "pee for free" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 52), Bobby expresses the townsfolk's new-found freedom, singing:

> Free!
> People are free!
> How can a fee
> Enslave us?
> See
> How we can be
> Free from the chains
> He gave us!
> We're suffering now

Such lives of sorrow!

Don't give us tomorrow,

Just give us today!"

(Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 50–51)

The people are free and can now pee to their bladders' content. They have moved from the Hegelian 'for themselves', acting as Hegelian children unable to fulfill their desires without the aid of an other, to the 'in and for themselves', capable of peeing whenever they desire, but still at a public urinal (private toilets have presumably been banned). But also, and more importantly, they now grasp this fact ('Free! / People are free! / How can a fee / Enslave us?' – Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 50).

However, Bobby and the poor do not realise that their freedom is still negative, and that they are still alienated/their world is not a home. We see the poor "push eagerly toward the Amenity's entrance" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 48), avoiding the order of their previous "line" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 14). According to Hegel, positive freedom is the freedom to will and determine oneself in the presence of external obstacles (such as an orderly line), protected from the "arbitrary freedom" of eager pushing (Wood in Hegel 2003, xiii). Negative freedom, on the other hand, is the absence of any obstacles, the situation in which the poor now find themselves. Although they have gained their own, particular freedom, Bobby and the townsfolk are focused on 'living for today,' without thinking of or planning for the future/the universal, i.e. not using their *Bildung* ("Don't give us tomorrow, / Just give us today!"). The poor then reiterate Bobby's entire lyric from above, highlighting their child-like status once again and returning him to a Hegelian father-figure with power over their arbitrary wills (Hegel 2003, 211).

Bobby asks/sings "How can a fee / Enslave us?" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 50). Earlier in the show, Mr. McQueen, one of Cladwell's cronies, sang about how taxing the townsfolk supports the UGC's "big research team" during the song "Mr. Cladwell": "All those coins that we take

from the throng / End up here where those coins all belong" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 25). Cladwell agreed, singing: "charging fees / As we please / Is our right – it's not wrong!" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 25). But is the charging of taxes a right? Hegel believes so, if it is a means through which the state can further the universal for the good of all ("In furthering my end, I further the universal, and this in turn furthers my end" – 2003, 222). In Hegelian civil society it is illegal for an individual to not pay tax (Hegel 2003, 221), but this is clearly not civil society. McQueen explains that he does not know what Cladwell's "big research team" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 25) actually does ("What it shows / No one knows" – Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 25), however it could be argued that the UGC, misguided as they may be, actually do have the community's best interests in mind and are actively working to seek a solution to the 20-year drought (this paradox can also be seen in Captain Hammer's selfish intentions benefiting broader society in *Dr. Horrible*).

Bobby's arguments for rising against Cladwell and the UGC are what he sees as their "black, immoral profit-making schemes" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 41). Bobby believes the UGC "keep filling moneybags with hopeless lives and dreams" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 41), the hopes and dreams of the townsfolk who seek their own personal freedom uninhibited by Cladwell's harsh laws and punishments. But Bobby is ignoring the other potential side of the argument. We already know from "Mr. Cladwell" that the UGC needs "funds for [their] big research team" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 25 – edited), however at this point in the drama even the UGC have no idea "what it [actually] shows" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 25 – edited). At the end of the show we learn that some of the poor's money was used by Cladwell to commission a "study of water consumption" just before he died/was sent to Urinetown (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 98). We learn from this that the UGC were, at least in some way, actively attempting to preserve the universal need of water for all, and this is acceptable according to Hegel's understanding of taxation. According to Hegel, individuals benefit from the income earned through work that then benefits them again through the payment of taxes utilised in their interest: "In furthering my end, I further the universal, and this is turn furthers my end" (Hegel 2003, 222). But Cladwell is limiting the

townsfolk's freedom by commodifying the universal need for urination, even if it is a form of taxation intended to fund the UGC's goal of preserving their limited water supply. Cladwell's 'pee fee' is therefore limiting the poor's ends, rather than furthering them, making his actions a Hegelian wrong.

But there is also another issue at play here. Bobby and the townsfolk clearly do not understand the laws and judiciary processes of the town and therefore cannot abide by them. This is a Hegelian "injustice [*Unrecht*]": "To hang the laws at such a height that no citizen could read them, as Dionysius the Tyrant did", so that the "knowledge [*Kenntnis*] of the laws currently in force is accessible only to those who have made them an object of scholarly study" (Hegel 2003, 246–47), or, in the case of *Urinetown*, those within Cladwell's inner circle. This is not only an injustice against the townsfolk but is also contributing to their alienation. Hardimon states that "The social world is a home if it guarantees connection along the dimensions of value, need, and cognition" (Hardimon 1992, 183), and these connections are not being met.

In order to be connected to the social world, the world's social institutions (the family, civil society, and the state) must "express" or promote the personal social *values* of the members in their day-to-day operation, and allow its members to meet their own social *needs* through interaction with the institutions (Hardimon 1992, 183). We already know that, in Hegel's understanding, this involves each individual: "having a set of separate and particular interests, having the capacity to question one's social roles and institutions, being able to pursue one's own separate and particular interests, being able to assert one's individual rights, and being able to act in accordance with individual conscience" (Hardimon 1992, 184).

While the townsfolk may have their own "set of separate and particular interests", we are not privy to them due to their focused attention on peeing for free, nor do they appear able to "pursue" them as they are constantly scrambling for spare change in order to be able to pee. Furthermore, they do not have the "capacity to question [their] social roles and institutions" nor

"assert [their] individual rights", due to the lack of procedural transparency in their social world. Finally, they are unable to "act in accordance with individual conscience" as their only chance is to band together in rebellion in order to overthrow Cladwell and the UGC.

In order for the townsfolk to be at home in their social world, the UGC must "express" their personal social values in its day-to-day operation (Hardimon 1992, 183), but, while it may not be "expressing" them, we now know that it does appear to have been supporting them. We already know of the UGC's "big research team" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 25) and Cladwell's "study of water consumption" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 98), and this brings us to Hegel's final dimension, that of cognition. The dimension of cognition requires that "in order to be at home in the social world, people must *understand* (*begreifen*) their basic social arrangements, and hence that in order to be a home, the social world must allow of comprehension" (Hardimon 1992, 185). This is the major problem with the social world of *Urinetown*. The townsfolk are alienated/not at home in their social world because they are not aware of, nor able to understand Cladwell and the UGC's reasoning for their actions. Cladwell does attempt to explain their actions to the townsfolk ('If the people pee for free, they'll push / The system to the brink!' – Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 52), but the UGC's actual reasoning/research is kept from the poor, causing them to revolt. Although in some way the UGC was attempting to preserve positive freedom for all members of the community it did not "allow [the townsfolk] comprehension" of their plans and procedures, alienating them from their social world/not making it a world in which they could be at home.

Bobby sings "We're suffering now / Such lives of sorrow! / Don't give us tomorrow, / Just give us today!" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 50–51), but, according to Hegel, a social world does not need to ensure happiness in order to be a home:

> Hegel contends that if a social world is a home it will promote happiness. In order to be a home a modern social world must contain a social sphere – civil

> society – in which people can effectively pursue their own separate and particular projects and meet their material needs (PR, §§182-256). A well-ordered Hegelian social world will also include a system of public administration whose functions include the provision of welfare and the prevention of unemployment (PR, §242, R). […] Moreover, a well-ordered Hegelian social world will be organized around families within which people can find love, understanding, and support – essential emotional ingredients of happiness (PR, §§158, 161, 164). Thus, in Hegel's view, happiness is *a* goal of a well-ordered social world. (Hardimon 1994, 117)

Kierkegaard argues against Hegel's concept of Spirit that "Only afterwards does one get to know whether or not one has been happy" (2009, 30). According to Hegel, a civil society that is a home should support the happiness of its members ("in Hegel's view, happiness is a goal of a well-ordered social world" – Hardimon 1994, 117). However, "since happiness depends partly on factors beyond the control of any scheme of social institutions, it would be unreasonable to demand that the social world guarantee it" (Hardimon 1994, 118).

A person's happiness cannot be assured by a social world that is a home but Cladwell believes their world has bigger concerns, countering Bobby's argument and highlighting the lack of *Bildung* in the poor's thought process:

> But what of tomorrow, Mister Strong?!
> Think of tomorrow, Mister Strong!
> Our resources are as fragile
> As a newborn baby's skull!
> With your actions you would gut the child
> And leave a lifeless hull!
> Could it be you're so shortsighted,

So insensitive, so dull?

Think of tomorrow, Mister Strong!

(Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 52)

This is the first time we have seen anything resembling *Bildung* from Cladwell himself. Previously, Cladwell had been infringing the poor's wills and treating them like animals during "Don't Be the Bunny" ("People are animals, Hope dear" – Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 47), but, only now that their wills have been freed, does he start counselling against their negative freedom. His water-preserving laws may have been harsh, but they resembled something closer to positive Hegelian freedom than the environment the poor have now created. He may not have been right, and may have been committing wrong in the process, but the wrong for him may have been unintentional, in Hegelian terms, as ultimately his attention was focused on preservation of the universal (Hegel 2003, 116).

For Hegel, unintentional wrong "negates only the particular will, while universal right is respected" (2003, 118). He uses the example of a rose: "If I say that a rose is not red, I nevertheless recognise that it has a colour. I therefore do not deny the genus, but only the particular colour, i.e. red" (Hegel 2003, 118). In the case of Cladwell, he is recognising that the poor have needs (such as water and urination) but denying them cognition of the functions of their social world. Prior to the "Act One Finale"/the revolution, Cladwell was providing positive freedom, to an extent, by allowing the poor to satisfy their needs within the structures of their society. However, those structures were simultaneously alienating the poor by not reflecting their values/allowing of cognition. According to Hegel, "Each person wills what is right, and each is supposed to receive only what is right; their wrong consists [*besteht*] solely in considering that what they will is right" (2003, 118). Cladwell's wrong was unintentional by considering that what he willed against the poor was right, but now the poor are inflicting unintentional wrong upon themselves by believing that a society with no social structures/subsisting on negative freedom is right.

Cladwell then calls the poor a "socialistic throng!" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 52), accusing them of all wanting the same as everyone else. Hegel believes that equality extends to the fact that "everyone ought to have property" (2003, 80–81) but argues that "it is false to maintain that justice requires everyone's property to be equal; for it requires only that everyone should have property" (2003, 81). The poor are therefore not socialists, but simply those who have become aware of their own alienation and are in search of a social world that is a home.

Hope steps in, appearing to counsel Bobby against his desire to "banish all needs" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 54). Bobby's cause is a noble one, but, according to Hegel, humans have a tendency to manufacture 'luxuries' from needs (Hegel 2003, 231): "every comfort in turn reveals its less comfortable side, and the resulting inventions are endless" (Hegel 2003, 229). Hegel speaks of universal needs "such as food, drink, clothing, etc." (2003, 227), but if Bobby were to "banish all needs" there would be no need for food, water, or clothing, an impossible task.

Earlier in the act Hope told him to follow his heart, and Bobby now sings that this is "where [his] heart leads" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 54), to a place where "When people pee free, / [They've] nothing to fear" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 54 – edited). What we learn from this is that Bobby believes that free urination is the poor's only need, disregarding all other universal needs in the process. According to Hegel the system of needs is administered by the state through the spheres of the family and the 'estates' (Hegel 2003, 234). As a "*mediating* organ", the estates "share the mediating function of the organised power of the executive" (Hegel 2003, 342). Hegel's estates are not Marxist classes and it is important to take a moment to outline exactly what Hegel means by his estates. "While the family is the primary basis of the state, the estates are the second" (Hegel 2003, 234), and people engage with the system of needs through their membership of one of Hegel's estates. Hegel outlines three different types of estates, those that are *substantial*, *formal*, or *universal*:

- A *substantial* or immediate estate "has its resources in the natural products of the *soil* which it cultivates" (Hegel 2003, 235), i.e. agriculture.
- The reflecting or *formal* estate gives "*form* to natural products [–] What it produces and enjoys, it owes chiefly to *itself* and to its own activity" (Hegel 2003, 236 – edited). These are estates of "trade and industry" (Hegel 2003, 237), i.e. manufacturing.
- Finally, the U*niversal* estate "has *the universal interests* of society as its business" (Hegel 2003, 237), i.e. civil service.

The Estates are also designed so that they "do not present themselves as a *crowd* or *aggregate*, unorganized in their opinions and volition, and do not become a massive power in opposition to the organic state" (Hegel 2003, 342), as is the case here in *Urinetown*. Hegel's estates are structured to ensure the "power of the sovereign does not appear as an isolated *extreme*" but also that the "particular interests of communities, corporations, and individuals [*Individuen*] do not become isolated either" (alienated – Hegel 2003, 342). It appears that the poor's needs have become "isolated" from Cladwell and the Legislature, and Hegel's model allows them to voice their dissatisfaction through the election of deputies (2003, 355).

In Hegel's words, "deputies are elected to deliberate on matters of *universal* concern", and "the aim of such elections is to appoint individuals who are credited by those who elect them with a better understanding of such matters than they themselves possess" (2003, 349). In order to gain the support of civil society these deputies must have "proved their worth *in practice*" by demonstrating their "disposition, skill, and knowledge [*Kenntnis*] of the institutions and interests of the state and civil society which they have acquired through the *actual* conduct of business in *positions of authority* or *political office*" (2003, 349). Cladwell speaks for the UGC and could be seen to already possess this understanding of the "interests of the state and civil society" through his management of the water crisis. Bobby, on the other hand, has no such understanding, nor has he 'demonstrated' the required 'disposition, skill, or knowledge' required for the task. Once again, we are presented with a conundrum of right and wrong as intended by the author's

"mindset of despair [in writing a show] that offers no solutions or hope" (Kotis in Lukowski 2013 – edited). Cladwell, the perceived villain of the piece, is repeatedly shown to have a more highly developed *Bildung* than our 'hero', and better reasoning for his actions. This is the fascinating political dilemma of both *Urinetown* and *Dr. Horrible*, that is only revealed through the application of Hegel's theories.

Hope tries to dissuade Bobby from his rebellion during a duet passage where Bobby sings: "Your words were like seeds, / At first they seemed mild. / They grew into deeds. / This riot's our child!" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 54). Bobby's wording tells us more than he knows. Glenn Alexander Magee uses the example of an acorn to define the in-itself will of a child: "the acorn is the oak tree merely *in-itself*" (2010, 120). Bobby's ideas for the revolution are currently in-themselves, i.e. not tempered by *Bildung*. This is made clear by his lyric "This riot's our child!" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 54). Hegel argues that children need to be exposed to the discipline of their parents in order to instill *Bildung* and an awareness of the universal (2003, 211) and this does not appear to have occurred in *Urinetown*. It is true that the rebellion was created by Hope and Bobby, much like a child, but it's energy must be tempered by an other who has already made their will universal through the process of *Bildung*, an other that is not currently present for Bobby or Hope.

Bobby and Hope then turn to face each other, torn between their conflicting sides. Hope declares that she cannot fight against her father, and Bobby replies, arguing that he "can't not fight against him" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 63). Bobby then kidnaps Hope, throwing the whole town into confusion. Bobby's kidnapping of Hope could be considered an unintentional wrong in Hegel's eyes: "if the wrong is in my opinion right – the wrong is unintentional" (Hegel 2003, 116). Bobby sees himself as being on the 'right' side of history by leading the rebellion and may therefore consider kidnapping Hope, forcing her to join him on the 'right' side, as the equivalent of a white lie – a wrong, but only a very small one, and in her best interest. However, with unintentional wrong, only the right of a particular person is infringed, while universal right is respected. This is not the case with kidnapping. By Hegel's definition, any "force employed by

an agent in such a way as to infringe the existence [*Dasein*] of freedom in its *concrete* sense – i.e. to infringe right as right – is *crime*" (2003, 121). Not only has Bobby infringed Hope's concrete freedom by kidnapping her, she is then forced to spend the first part of Act II tied to a chair in the rebels' hideout. Bobby may be the perceived hero of Urinetown, but, through a Hegelian lens, many of his actions are far from heroic.

At the end of the number, Lockstock tells the audience to "Enjoy intermission, and see you – shortly!" (Kotis and Hollmann 2003, 60). Lockstock's direct address to the audience is a common political act in the theatre, unsettling the audience by thwarting the convention of the 'fourth wall'. Act I of *Urinetown* has shown the development of Spirit through Bobby's realisation that the poor are alienated from their social world by Cladwell and the UGC, and he has now freed their wills, becoming their new Hegelian father figure and leader in the process. The drama of *Urinetown* is clearly more complicated than simple emotion too great for words, or Fosse's generic categories. Integration theory can explain how the songs progress the drama, but not with the same depth and clarity as Hegel, nor can it address the politicality of the character's situations. These songs clearly progress and do not pause the drama, excluding McMillin's cohesion theory, and there is more than simply subtext going on in each scene.

4.3.7 Summation

The major arguments from this chapter include the importance of *Bildung* in reasoned decision-making and the distinction between positive and negative Hegelian freedom. These were issues of vital importance for the social worlds of the case study shows and ones than can be identified and utilised by audiences in our own civil society. But what remains for our task is to examine how Hegel's theories can synthesise these existing theoretical frameworks into a model that can both demonstrate the politicality of song and its potential effect on our own world. That is the purpose of the next chapter.

5 Synthesising Existing Theories

PERCHIK

Hodel, there's a question... A certain question I wish to discuss with you.

HODEL

Yes?

PERCHIK

It's a political question.

HODEL

What is it?

PERCHIK

The question of marriage.

HODEL

Is this a political question?

PERCHIK

Well, yes. Yes, everything's political.

(Stein in Jewison 1971)

Having outlined the inherent politicality of the musical, I have established a coherent proposition that explored the existing theories of song function and applied a Hegelian framework to musical theatre song in order to examine song's involvement in this political nature. This politicality of song is overlooked in the existing theories of song function. Having demonstrated the above with case studies, reassessing the extent to which the existing theories of song function could conform to this inherent politicality will be informative. Notwithstanding that such discussion is evidentially conjectural, positing how, and to the extent which, existing theories of song function can be potentially further elaborated provides the basis for further investigation.

5.1 When Your Situation Becomes Political, You Sing

As has been demonstrated, the principle that when emotion becomes too great for speech, you sing, is widely perceived to have credence. In the words of Larry Brown, "When characters reach a point in the drama where they can't help but explode with feelings of love or success or simply the joy of life, music serves to amplify these emotions to a level above mere words" (L. A. Brown 2007). With the new information gleaned from the previous chapters, this statement could be reconceptualised as 'When characters reach a political moment in the drama, music serves to amplify their emotions to a level above mere words'. From the discussion in the case studies this appears to be a more sustainable description of the phenomenon than purely emotional impetus.

To explore this further, lyricist Sheldon Harnick has said that his song "Boston Beguine" from the revue *New Faces of 1952* (1952) came "out of anger" (Harnick in Bryer and Davison 2008, 78). In the number, original performer Alice Ghostly sang:

> Tropical nights, Orchids in bloom, sultry perfume,
> Intrigues and dangers, with passionate strangers,
> I've seen it all, as I recall.
>
> I met him in Boston, in the native quarter;
> He was from Harvard, just across the border.
> It was a magical night, with romance ev'rywhere.
> There was something in the air,
> There always is in Boston!
>
> We went to the Casbah, that's an Irish bar there,

The underground hideout of the D.A.R. there

Something inside of me said, "Watch your heart mad'moiselle"

And it might be just as well to watch your purse in Boston.

We danced in a trance, and I dreamed of romance,

Till the strings of my heart seemed to be knotted

And even the palms seemed to be potted.

The Boston Beguine was casting its spell

And I was drunk with love and cheap muscatel.

We walked to the Common, that's a pretty park there;

As I remember, it was pretty dark there.

In this exotic locale, by a silver lagoon,

Underneath a voodoo moon, we fell asleep in Boston!

That was the story of my one romance there!

Our dream of adventure didn't stand a chance there!

How could we hope to enjoy all the pleasures ahead

When the books we should have read

Were all suppressed in Boston!

Exotic Boston, land of the free,

Home of the brave, home of the Red Sox,

Home of the bean, and home

Of the Boston Beguine.

(Harnick 1952)

Harnick wrote the “Boston Beguine” in response to “an article in the newspaper about an attempt on the part of the church to suppress a certain book”:

> That’s why the song ends as it does, with this boy and girl, who have no experience; if they had been able to read the proper books, they would have known what to do when they were alone together – but those books were suppressed, so their affair was hopeless (Harnick in Bryer and Davison 2008, 79).

“Immoral” books have been ‘Banned in Boston’ by the Watch and Ward Society since the late 1800s (Laine 2017, 18), and the banning of books is a distinctly political act. Harnick was “angry” about another proposed suppression (Harnick in Bryer and Davison 2008, 79) and created the song in response to it. But Harnick does not acknowledge or discuss the politicality of either act. Instead, through our re-envisioned version of emotion theory, Harnick could have justified the “Boston Beguine” as a ‘song that came out of anger at the suppression of literature by the Watch and Ward Society’, a political statement about a political act.

Julian Woolford argues that “characters can sing only the most rapturous emotions, or the most mundane banalities, but as long as it is consistent with the theatrical language of the piece, then the audience will accept it” (2012, 251). The theatrical language of the musical, as argued throughout this research, is one of politicality/emotions being expressed in response to political situations. Therefore, as with Harnick, it is possible to reconsider Woolford’s argument as ‘characters can sing of the most rapturous political situations, or the most mundane banalities, but as long as it is consistent with the political language of the piece, then the audience will accept it’. This interpretation allows for both the ‘highs’ and ‘lows’ of, for example, marriage, from the excesses of “I’m in Love with a Wonderful Guy” from *South Pacific* to the mundanity of a partner leaving for work (“Barcelona” from *Company*). Ultimately, the characters are singing about political situations, whether they view them that way or not. It is understandable, if not expected for Harnick to have emotional reactions to political situations, but we do not have to

consider emotion as the catalyst for song, when it can be argued that it is the politicality of the situation that underpins the movement from speech into song.

Jason Robert Brown's concern is of issues that are "too small" to sing about: "if they were singing about things like that, you wouldn't buy it as an audience member. […] Singing ultimately magnifies everything you're feeling; when you sing it, it becomes epic" (Brown in Bryer and Davison 2008, 34). Brown is referring to a proposal he received to develop a successful Off-Broadway play "about people In various rooms in a hotel and all of their crises" into a musical, a task he did not feel capable of achieving (Brown in Bryer and Davison 2008, 34). *Company* has similar content to the play as described by Brown, and its musical development was successfully realised by Sondheim, but it is possible Brown's understanding of how singing "magnifies" feeling is not robust in all dramatic situations. Musical theatre song does 'magnify', but it magnifies the character/performer – it draws our attention to them, asking us to listen to their story. They may express emotions, but they do not have to be 'big' or 'magnified', as discussed in relation to both *Company* and *Dr. Horrible's Sing-Along Blog*. Therefore, from this perspective, a more helpful phrasing of Brown's theory may be that 'singing ultimately magnifies everything you're experiencing, drawing the audience's attention to the politicality of your situation; when you sing it, it becomes the stuff of Ancient Greek epics' (discussed earlier in relation to "Sorry-Grateful").

Lyricist Lynn Ahrens has suggested that, when determining song placement/'song-spotting', "You look for characters with deep emotions, and you look for dramatic circumstances in the story" (Bryer and Davison 2008, 11). David Spencer agrees: "High points of the story, emotion, and character development, in most cases, define the placement of songs within a score" (2005, 43). These "high points of the story"/moments of "character development", as examined in this research, are political high points, moments of political challenge that encourage characters to break into song. This is similar to Cohen and Rosenhaus's "important emotional and structural high points". In their words, "there should be a song at each of these high points,

unless you decide that certain moments would be more effective without a song – for instance, if you decide that the best place for a song is shortly after a highpoint, when a character reacts to what has just happened" (2006, 191). We have heard of characters reacting to "what has just happened" in "So They Say" from *Dr. Horrible* and have explored how these events are distinctly political. Other examples from *Company* and *Urinetown* include the "deep emotions" of "Sorry-Grateful" and the "dramatic circumstances" of the "Act One Finale". Therefore, with this new knowledge, it is possible to reconsider the song-spotting theories as looking for 'political moments in the story (either high or low points) that allow for further character development'.

Finally, David Spencer proposed a "new-age variation" (2005, 69) to the rule in response to Sondheim's shows about "uncertainty and self-exploration" (Kenrick 2008, 326), specifically that "When things get a little too tense to talk about, you sing" (2005, 69) (as seen in the discussion of "Sorry-Grateful" and "The Road You Didn't Take"). Spencer goes on to argue, much like integration theory, that writers should look for "the place where dramatic tension *begins* and the place where it *ends*" (D. Spencer 2005, 70). Furthermore, he acknowledges that, for songs that "don't comply with those markers", "an alternate approach may be to take stock of all the things you want the audience to pay attention to, focus on, and understand in a particular light" (D. Spencer 2005, 70).

Spencer cites "God That's Good" from *Sweeney Todd* (1979) as an example:

> Overall ["God, That's Good"] really *is* about one thing: establishing the success Mrs. Lovett and Sweeney have had with the pie shop since he's begun his murder spree with her complicity. But look what it includes: Tobias's invitation to potential customers; Mrs. Lovett's tending to the customers as they swoon over the meat pies; the arrival of Sweeney's new barber chair for greater ease of corpse disposal; the *testing* of the barber chair by Todd and Lovett (D. Spencer 2005, 73).

While taking receipt of and installing a barber chair are not political acts in themselves, Toby's soliciting of and Lovett's attention to the customers are both political acts. Harrison and Boyd define politics as the "acquisition and maintenance of power" (2003, 6), and this may be a more effective description of what "God, That's Good" "really is about".

"God That's Good", from a political perspective, depicts a combination of raising the pie shop's profile by selling the freshest meat pies in London (using human flesh), simultaneously drawing in new customers that Sweeney can potentially dispose of, while also discouraging the Beggar Woman (Lucy Barker, Sweeney's supposedly-deceased wife) who may not only deter customers but may also recognise Sweeney (Benjamin Barker) and ruin Mrs. Lovett's plans. These actions ensure Sweeney and Lovett's "acquisition and maintenance of power" (2003, 6), the central politicality of the number. Therefore, to reconsider Spencer's arguments within our new framework, characters in musicals sing 'when the politicality of their situation gets a little too tense to talk about', or writers can use songs when they want the audience to 'pay attention to, focus on, or understand the politicality of the character's situation in a particular light'.

5.2 Fosse's 'I Am', 'I Want', and 'New' Songs

Fosse's 'I Am', 'I Want', and 'New' songs have already been applied to the chosen case studies although the politicality of this theory is yet to be examined. As we know, Fosse describes three kinds of "tool" songs in the musical: "*I Am* or *I Want* songs, otherwise they are *New* songs" (Frankel 2000, 95).

Frankel takes *My Fair Lady* (1956) as his case study with which to examine Fosse's theories but simply designates each song's type with no further explanation. For example, he claims there are seven 'I Am' songs in the show, one of which is "Why Can't the English?".

In “Why Can’t the English?” Higgins sings:

HIGGINS

Look at her, a pris’ner of the gutters;

Condemned by ev’ry syllable she utters.

By right she should be taken out and hung,

For the cold-blooded murder of the English tongue!

LIZA

A-o-o-o-w!

HIGGINS

Aooow! Heavens, what a noise!

This is what the British population,

Calls an element’ry education.

PICKERING

Come, sir, I think you picked a poor example.

HIGGINS

Did I?

Hear them down in Soho Square,

Dropping aitches everywhere.

Speaking English anyway they like.

(To Cockney)

You sir, did you go to school?

COCKNEY

Whatya tike me fer, a fool?

HIGGINS

No one taught him "take" instead of "tike" […]

Why can't the English teach their children how to speak?

This verbal class distinction by now should be antique.

If you spoke as she does, sir, instead of the way you do,

Why, you might be selling flowers, too.

(Loewe and Lerner 1969, 14–23)

Frankel considers "Why Can't the English?" to be an 'I Am' song, presumably in terms of Higgins being offended by Liza's accent/the state of the British education system ('I Am' offended). But it could just as easily be argued that the number is an 'I Want' song ('I Want' to see improvement in the English language/for people to speak the language properly). Either explanation seems appropriate, but one factor Frankel and Fosse both overlook is the song's inherent politicality.

In the first line of the song Higgins immediately alienates Liza by declaring her a "pris'ner of the gutters; / Condemned by ev'ry syllable she utters" and suggests that "by right" she should be "taken out and hung". Higgins appears to be dehumanising Liza, comparing her to an animal that should be put out of its misery, simply for speaking a language differently (we heard about Cladwell treating humans like animals earlier in the discussion of *Urinetown*). Higgins

acknowledges the politics of class at play here (the "verbal class distinction") declaring that Liza is not worthy of any higher role in life than selling flowers on the street. Ultimately, the whole story of *My Fair Lady* is one of class – politicality presented on the stage.

In contrast to 'I Am' songs: "In the *I Want*, the character's *need* is to reach. It also takes several forms: to yearn, to crave, to pursue, to seize – to desire so strongly that, again, the character acts upon it in some way" (Frankel 2000, 95–96).

Frankel takes "On the Street Where You Live" as one of his 'I Want' examples:

> I have often walked
> Down this street before;
> But the pavement always stayed beneath my feet before
> All at once am I
> Sev'ral stories high,
> Knowing I'm on the street where you live.
>
> Are there lilac trees
> In the heart of town?
> Can you hear a lark in any other part of town?
> Does enchantment pour
> Out of ev'ry door?
> No, it's just on the street where you live.
>
> And oh, the towering feeling
> Just to know somehow you are near!
> The overpowering feeling
> That any second you may suddenly appear!

People stop and stare.

They don't bother me,

For there's nowhere else on earth that I would rather be.

Let the time go by;

I won't care if I

Can be here on the street where you live.

(Loewe and Lerner 1969, 120–27)

The issue once again with Frankel's categorisation, as with "Why Can't the English?", is that, while Frankel claims "On the Street Where You Live" is an 'I Want' song, it could just as easily be considered an 'I Am' song. Freddy even sings "All at once am I" (a reversal of 'I Am') and proceeds to express that 'He Is' experiencing "towering" and "overpowering" feelings. Frankel acknowledges this issue in Fosse's conception, arguing that "If a song idea seems to be both *I Want* and *I Am*, ego and biology are after all aspects of each other – what I want often reveals what I am" (Frankel 2000, 96), weakening Fosse's distinctions.

I contend that Fosse and Frankel both overlook the politicality of Freddy's song. Freddy sings of the "overpowering feeling" he is experiencing because, at any second, Eliza may "suddenly appear". Eliza appears to be exerting power over Freddy, but it is a positive power, the power of a partner who cannot stop thinking about their other half. This is, once again, Harrison and Boyd's "acquisition and maintenance of power" (2003, 6) but on a positive rather than negative level. Freddy appears to be experiencing Hegel's concept of positive freedom in that he is allowed to seek his own particular interests and desires (in this case Eliza) within the structures of his social world. Furthermore, Freddy's lyric gestures towards his own desire to form a sphere of the family with Eliza, a political act that would confirm his own individuality and affirm his place in the social world.

Finally, Frankel describes ‘New’ songs: “*New* songs defy categorizing more precisely because they are designed to meet needs which are novel; this is also a large aspect of *special material*” (Frankel 2000, 96). According to Frankel there are five New numbers in *My Fair Lady*:

> “Street Entertainers”, as establishing opening.
> “Poor Professor Higgins”, a time-telescoping, enlarged segue.
> “The Rain in Spain”, a time-telescoping climax, celebrating a victory.
> “The Ascot Gavotte”, an establishing production number which segues.
> “The Embassy Waltz”, the same, which develops to the climax of Act I.
> (Frankel 2000, 96)

While the two instrumental dance numbers (the “Street Entertainers”, incorporated as part of the “Overture and Opening Scene” in the vocal score, and the “Embassy Waltz” at the end of Act I) could be argued as political moments that reveal the equivalent politicality of the protagonist’s social situation in non-vocal musical settings, they lie outside the scope of this research that is focussed solely on the politicality of song as a vocal expression of the text in musicals.

“The Servants’ Chorus” (described by Frankel as “Poor Professor Higgins”), is indeed a “time-telescoping, enlarged segue” between “Just You Wait” and “The Rain in Spain”, but there is also a political element to the servants’ lyrics. The servants sing: “Quit, Professor Higgins! / Quit, Professor Higgins! / Hear our plea, or pay day we will quit, Professor Higgins!” (Loewe and Lerner 1969, 88–89). The servants’ lyric implies that Higgins’ work ethic and hours do not comply with their own values, an important element of feeling at home in your social world. According to Hardimon, “An institution ‘expresses’ a value if it promotes that value and if that value must be invoked to explain its normal operation” (Hardimon 1992, 183), and this appears to have been the case in the past, but now the servants are threatening to quit over Higgins’ extended work hours (“Nine P. M., Ten P. M. / On through midnight ev’ry night. / One A. M., Two A. M., / Three…” – Loewe and Lerner 1969, 86–87). Hardimon states that “The social world is a home if it

guarantees connection along the dimensions of value, need, and cognition" (Hardimon 1992, 183), and this does not seem to be the case for the servants, hence their politically-charged threats to quit. However, it could also be argued that Higgins knows that the servants are unlikely to quit due to the cultural hegemony of their class-based social world, another example of Harrison and Boyd's "acquisition and maintenance of power" (2003, 6).

Frankel describes "The Rain in Spain" as "a time-telescoping climax, celebrating a victory", but, while the lyric contains no overtly political content, Higgins, Colonel Pickering and Eliza are still celebrating Higgins' political victory. Higgins has successfully transformed Eliza's social class (Hegel's estates) through elocution lessons, elevating her from a lower-class flower seller to the status of a noble. This social mobility is itself a political act overlooked in Fosse's conception.

Finally, during the "Ascot Gavotte", what Frankel describes as "an establishing production number which segues", the crowd sings:

> Ev'ry duke and earl and peer is here;
> Ev'ryone who should be here is here.
> What a smashing, positively dashing spectacle
> The Ascot op'ning day.
> (Loewe and Lerner 1969, 109–10)

The politicality of this situation is clear. The races are populated by dukes and earls, members of the British upper class, and "e'vryone who should be here is here" (implying there are others who should not, indeed cannot, be present). And this politicality is only heightened by Eliza's presence, a member of the lower class who has worked her way up/into the races, unlike those who remain excluded.

From this analysis, it appears possible for Fosse/Frankel's theory to be subsumed into a political framework. Therefore, Fosse's 'I Am' songs become a character singing 'I am/we are in a political situation', or, in the case of 'I Want' songs, 'I want to enter or leave a political situation'. Even songs unable to be applied to Fosse's two main categories (e.g. 'New' songs such as "Why Can't the English?" and the "Ascot Gavotte") can be interpolated for their extra-musical influences based on this assumed politicality. While Fosse's categories remain valuable and highly utilised concepts in the discipline they can be reinforced by the application of a political, and in this case Hegelian, framework.

5.3 Integration Theory (Songs Progress the Political Drama)

Integrated musicals are described as those where "all elements of [the] show – plot, character, song, dance, orchestration, and setting – […] blend together into a unity, a seamless whole" (McMillin 2006, 1 – edited). In the words of Gerald Bordman, "book, lyrics and music combined to form an integral whole" (Bordman in Jones 2011, 10). Within this framework, the songs must therefore influence this 'seamless/integral' whole, a function currently viewed as dramatic by exponents of the theory. However, from the examples in the case studies, this theory could be reconsidered to further represent when 'all elements of the show – plot, character, song, dance, orchestration, and setting – blend together into a unity that expresses the politicality of the characters' situations'. While this thesis focuses only on the politicality of song, this could also be argued as the case for dance, as exemplified by the fight choreography of *West Side Story* or the famous "In a collective, murderous, rage ALL defiantly tap dance" direction from *Thoroughly Modern Millie* (2002) (Morris and Scanlan 2002, 67).

One of the most famous cases of integration in the musical is the 'bench scene' from *Carousel*. It "begins with Julie Jordan […] talking to her friend Carrie about boys and ends with her talking to Billy Bigelow, the carousel barker, about love" (McMillin 2006, 134).

According to Kati Donovan:

> Throughout the famous musical bench scene (Act I, Scene 1) Billy and Julie move seamlessly between spoken or sung text and musical response. The musical responses articulate the characters' psychological interiority; that which cannot be put into words emerges in soaring musical lines and modulating chords. (Donovan 2012)

Early in the scene Carrie sings "You're a queer one, Julie Jordan" (Rodgers and Hammerstein II 1987, 36–37). While it could be argued that such a statement does not entirely represent "that which cannot be put into words", what is more important here is the politicality of the situation. Carrie is alienating Julie by not only reminding her that she is unmarried/not even engaged (as Carrie is to Mister Snow) but also by teasing her for not wanting to talk about boys:

CARRIE

> You are quieter and deeper than a well,
> And you never tell me nothin!'!

JULIE

> There's nothin' that I keer t' choose t' tell!

(Rodgers and Hammerstein II 1987, 37)

Later in the scene, while talking to Billy, Julie states that she is "never goin' to marry" as she wants to be "keerful" of her "character":

JULIE

(sings)

I'm never goin' to marry.

If I was goin' to marry

I wouldn't hev' t' be such a stickler.

But I'm never goin' to marry.

And a girl who don't marry

Has got t' be much more pertickler!

(Rodgers and Hammerstein II 1987, 53)

Billy then asks "How do you know what you'd do if you loved me? Or how you'd feel or anything?" (Rodgers and Hammerstein II 1987, 54). Julie sings her response:

When I worked in the mill weavin' at the loom,

I'd gaze absent-minded at the roof,

And half the time the shuttle 'd tangled in the threads

And the warp 'd get mixed with the woof

If I loved you.

(Rodgers and Hammerstein II 1987, 55–56)

This is, interestingly/intentionally, almost a direct paraphrase of the lyric Carrie sang earlier when describing how Julie acts at work:

When we work at the mill, weavin' at the loom,

Y' gaze absent-minded at the roof,

And half the time yer shuttle gets twisted in the threads

Till y' can't tell the warp from the woof.

(Rodgers and Hammerstein II 1987, 38–39)

We already know that marriage and relationships fall into Hegel's political spheres (in this case the sphere of the family) but there is another form of politicality at play here. Clark and Gerrig describe dramatic irony as "the presence of two audiences – one in on the secret, the other not" (Clark and Gerrig in Clift 1999, 528), and this is a perfect description of the politicality occurring in this scene. Julie is describing to Billy how she actually is in love with him without explicitly stating so, but the audience is aware of her feelings as indirectly described by Carrie. This is a distinctly political moment for Julie, as she is exerting power over Billy by withholding information, an act that Hegel would consider wrong.

According to Hegel, unintentional wrong exists when only the right of a particular person is infringed, while universal right is respected (2003, 118). In the case of deception, however, "I create a semblance [of right] in order to deceive another person" (Hegel 2003, 116 – edited):

> In deception, the particular will is not infringed, because the deceived person is given the illusion that he is receiving his right. Thus, the right which is required is posited as something subjective, a mere semblance, and this constitutes deception. (Hegel 2003, 118)

Julie is creating a "semblance" of right for Billy, knowingly deceiving him with knowledge she is "in on" while he is not.

McMillin describes the function of the bench scene as "raising subtext to expressiveness through song" (McMillin 2006, 135). Matthew Lockitt, on the other hand, comes closer to our political understanding of the scene, despite not mentioning politicality:

> each element, the spoken word, the sung word, the reiterated musical segments, and the non-verbal physical interactions function to advance both the character's understanding of each other and their situation, as well as the

> audience's comprehension of the relationships and conflicts that inform the drama. (Lockitt 2014, 33)

Lockitt argues that McMillin's theory "simplifies the complexity of what is occurring in these moments of transition" (Lockitt 2014, 33), however Lockitt's own conception simplifies the political complexity of what is occurring. This is not to say that either theory is incapable of explaining the function of the bench scene, but that a political lens can reveal further political complexity occurring in the drama. Therefore, Lockitt's description could be reframed as 'each element functions to advance both the character's political understanding of each other and their situation, as well as the audience's comprehension of the political relationships and conflicts that inform the drama'.

5.4 Coherence Theory (Songs Pause the Political Drama)

McMillin argues that the "alternation" between scene and song is "what gives the musical its lift, its energy, its elation" (McMillin 2006, 33). Specifically, however, he argues that book scenes progress the drama and songs pause the drama for reflection (McMillin 2005, 324). McMillin terms this 'coherence' ("things stick together, different things, without losing their difference" – 2006, 209) and uses "Can't Help Lovin' Dat Man" from *Show Boat* as one of his case studies.

McMillin describes "Can't Help Lovin' Dat Man" as "one of the best diegetic [musical theatre] numbers":

> The term *diegetic*, borrowed from film criticism, is coming to be used for numbers that are called for by the book. It is meant to cover the backstage musicals [McMillin uses such examples as *A Chorus Line* (1975), *Cabaret*, and

> *Follies* (1971) plus any other occasions on which characters deliberately perform numbers for other characters (McMillin 2006, 103).

Another way of describing this phenomenon is those moments when the characters are *aware* that they, or others, are singing. This is the less common state in musical theatre where characters are usually unaware that they/others are singing.

McMillin describes how "this tune is first sung by Julie, a black woman who is passing for white in order to keep her starring role in the showboat troupe […] because her [white] friend Magnolia, who has just fallen for a man herself, has heard Julie sing this tune before and thinks it worth hearing again" (McMillin 2006, 105). The only problem is that the black chef, Queenie, has heard this song before and knows that it is only familiar to "black folks" (McMillin 2006, 105).

Oscar Hammerstein II's lyrics for the number are as follows:

> Oh listen, sister, I love my mister man
> And I can't tell yo why.
> Dere ain't no reason why I should love dat man.
> It mus' be sumpin' dat de angels done plan.
>
> Fish got to swim and birds got to fly,
> I got to love one man till I die.
> Can't help lovin' dat man of mine.
>
> Tell me he's lazy, tell me he's slow.
> Tell me I'm crazy, maybe I know.
> Can't help lovin' dat man of mine.

When he goes away

Dat's a rainy day,

And when he comes back dat day is fine!

De sun will shine!

He kin come home as late as kin be,

Home widout him ain't no home to me!

Can't help lovin' dat man of mine!

(Oscar Hammerstein II in Walters 1987, 195–98)

There are a number of political issues at play here. Julie sings "I got to love one man till I die", but, while traditionally romantic, this is not actually the case. Although Hegel describes divorce as an evil (Hardimon 1992, 176) it is a function of civil society that is capable of being viewed in a rational light through which it can be accepted and affirmed. This light may be Hegel's own argument that the will is arbitrary: "whatever the will has decided to choose, it can likewise relinquish" (Hegel 2003, 50). This is similar to the discussion of "Sorry-Grateful" where Harry consciously chose (willed) to marry Sarah but kept "wondering what might have been" (Sondheim 2010, 175). Julie certainly does not "got to love one man till [she dies]" as she can choose/will to end her marriage if she so desires.

Further to this, Julie sings that, when her man goes away "Dat's a rainy day" (implying that she is sad), and "when he comes back dat day is fine! / De sun will shine!", implying she will be happy. Moreover, she sings that "He kin come home as late as kin be, / Home widout him ain't no home to me!". There are two problems with Julie's thought process here that can be seen through a political/Hegelian lens. Firstly, we know from the discussion of *Company*, that, in Hegel's view, a civil society that is a home should support the happiness of its members, but "even if the social world is a home, there is no guarantee that people will be happy" (Hardimon 1994, 117). However, "since happiness depends partly on factors beyond the control of any scheme of

social institutions, it would be unreasonable to demand that the social world guarantee it" (Hardimon 1994, 118). Therefore Julie is deceiving herself if she believes that having her man around will make her happy as, ultimately, "whether people are unhappy is partly up to them" (Hardimon 1994, 118).

Secondly, it could be argued that Julie is limiting her own positive freedom by allowing her man to "come home as late as kin be". While there is no background context to the lyric it could be assumed that she is waiting around the house for her man to come home, limiting her own ability to go out and undertake her own activities. However, while hanging around the house, she also believes that "Home widout him ain't no home to me!", which we know to be false. Even if Julie had not formed a familial sphere with her man, she would still be a member of her previous sphere of the family (discussed earlier in relation to *Company*), implying that she would, in fact, still have a home in her social world without him. That being said, Zick Rubin argues that "the association between love and marriage gives it a unique status as a link between the individual and the structure of society" (Rubin 1970, 265), an idea with which Hegel agrees. According to Hegel, "children love their parents less than their parents love them, for the children are increasingly independent and gain in strength, thereby leaving the parents behind them" (Hegel 2003, 213) resulting in what Hegel terms the "ethical dissolution" of the family (Hegel 2003, 214). Therefore, if Julie has in fact achieved the independence to 'leave her parents behind her' she could currently be alienated from a sphere of the family and in search of a new one with her man. However, as has been discussed, she cannot rely on him for her own happiness once she has formed her new sphere.

Returning to McMillin's description:

> this song is carefully joined to the plot, but it still functions as the addition of another order of time, lyric time. It dovetails neatly with the book dialogue calling for it, but it does the job most songs do in musicals, which is to provide

> moments of lyric elaboration and suspension for song-and-dance performance to become the center of the show. A pause is a pause even when the characters in the book hear it as a pause. (McMillin 2006, 105)

McMillin argues that “Can’t Help Lovin’ Dat Man” “does the job most songs do in musicals, which is to provide moments of lyric elaboration and suspension for song-and-dance performance to become the center of the show”. I now argue, after examining the previous case studies and McMillin’s own example, that songs in the musical ‘provide moments of lyric elaboration and suspension for political expression to become the center of the show’.

5.5 Songs Reveal the Politicality of the Scene

Within the limits of constructs considered so far, the remaining theory of song function proposes that “characters may also sing because the music may reveal the subtext of the scene” (Woolford 2012, 252). Woolford also uses the example of “If I Loved You”, that I have already argued exposes the politicality of Julie’s subtext.

According to Cohen and Rosenhaus, “composers can [also] create subtext by using music to contradict the lyrics” (2006, 137). Cohen and Rosenhaus take “The Road You Didn’t Take” from *Follies* as their example. During the number, politician/philanthropist “Benjamin Stone asserts that he has put any regrets about his life behind him – but this is contradicted by a sharp, syncopated dissonance in the accompaniment” (2006, 137):

> You're either a poet
> Or you're a lover,
> Or you're the famous
> Benjamin Stone.

You take one road,

You try one door,

There isn't time for any more.

One's life consists of either/or.

One has regrets

Which one forgets,

And as the years go on.

The road you didn't take

Hardly comes to mind,

Does it?

The door you didn't try,

Where could it have led? […]

You take your road,

The decades fly,

The yearnings fade, the longings die.

You learn to bid them all goodbye.

And oh, the peace,

The blessed peace...

At last you come to know:

The roads you never take

Go through rocky ground,

Don't they?

The choices that you make

Aren't all that grim.

The worlds you never see

Still will be around,

Won't they?

The Ben I'll never be,

Who remembers him?

(Sondheim 2010, 211–17)

Sondheim confirms Cohen and Rosenhaus's assertion, specifically referring to the song's subtext: "A recurrent dissonant note in the music contradicts the blitheness of what Ben is saying, which makes this song a classroom example of subtextual writing" (Sondheim 2010, 217). Maria Vos describes this as the "show's preoccupation with regret" (Vos 2018), while *Dr. Horrible* writer Joss Whedon recounts his reaction to the song: "the notion that every choice you make means that other possibilities are eliminated forever – as a kid, I found that terrifying. As an adult, I still find it scary" (Whedon in Adams 2009, 92).

While there is no immediately clear external political drama occurring in "The Road You Didn't Take", the song appears to describe the internal political drama of life. Benjamin sings "You take one road, / You try one door, / There isn't time for any more. / One's life consists of either/or" (Sondheim 2010, 211). This is not the Hegelian dialectic where two opposites are synthesised into a unified "solution" (*aufheben*) (Croce 1996), this is Hegelian negation:

> Drives or inclinations are primarily a content of the will, and only reflection stands above them; but these drives [*Triebe*] themselves become impelling [*treibend*], press upon each other, and conflict with each other, and all of them wish to be satisfied. If, then, I put all the others aside and commit myself to only one of them, I find myself in a destructive limitation, for by my very act I have relinquished my universality, which is a system of all drives. But it is of just as little help merely to subordinate certain drives [to others] – the course of action to which the understanding usually resorts – because no yardstick by

> which they might be arranged in order is available here; the demand for such an order therefore usually ends in tedious platitudes. (Hegel 2003, 50)

Throughout his life Benjamin has had drives that "wish to be satisfied". In choosing one path over another he has "put all the others aside and [committed himself] to only one of them", and, by this very "act", "relinquished [his] universality, resulting in his use of "tedious platitudes" ("the road you didn't take", etc.).

I would contend that Hegelian universality is the opposite of the idea that left is left and right is right, as, to another person, or if I turn around, my perception of right and left has changed/is no longer fixed – it has become universal. This has two implications, firstly the reminder that there is always more than one perspective on things that should be considered in decision making, but also that, by choosing a singular path, as in the case of Benjamin, he has fixed his singular perspective at that time, negating all other possible alternatives. Hegel describes this as the "arbitrariness" of the will, "the will as *contradiction*" (Hegel 2003, 48), and within this contradiction lies an internal political dilemma. By choosing one path over another and determining himself in one singular direction, Ben is exerting power over his own will, irreversibly changing his future. But, at the same time, and in contrast to his desire to "bid them all goodbye", he is still left with the regret of what could have been, what lay down those other roads.

In his collected lyrics, Sondheim notes that: "A little later, it is Sally's turn to lie" when she sings "In Buddy's Eyes", the song that comes immediately after "The Road You Didn't Take" (Sondheim 2010, 217). Sondheim's statement, therefore, implies that, during the previous number, it was Benjamin's turn to lie. According to Hegel, in the case of deception, "I create a semblance [of right] in order to deceive another person" (Hegel 2003, 116 – edited), and this certainly seems to be the case for Benjamin in *Follies*. Benjamin's stoic presentation was intended to demonstrate

his determination regarding his past decisions, but it was, by opening up to Sally through song, that the true politicality of his situation was revealed.

5.6 Reconciliation and Synthesis

Adorno states that "Dialectics serves reconciliation" (Adorno 1970, 18) and Hardimon describes reconciliation as the "process of *overcoming splits*" (Hardimon 1992, 182). The previous chapters have outlined the splits to be found between the existing theories of song function and offered Hegel's political theories as a way of overcoming them. But it is important to remember that reconciliation does not mean resignation (There is already a German term for this, *abfinden* – Hardimon 1992, 173). In contrast, "To be *versöhnt* [reconciled with something] is to view it in a positive light" – "if *Versöhnung* is possible, resignation is unnecessary" (Hardimon 1992, 173).

Moreover, in relation to Hegel's social world, the concept of 'being at home' is not negated by the presence of evil, in the same way that evil is not negated by the concept of 'being at home' – each can be synthesised into a necessary part of the other. This becomes an appealing model as the existing theories of song function are capable of being readily synthesised into a political/Hegelian framework whilst retaining their own unique individuality and distinctions. Politicality therefore does not become a replacement for these existing theories but a way in which to synthesise their differences, resulting in a more robust network of theories capable of being applied across a variety of sub-genres of the musical, a function not possible within the current frameworks.

6 The Musical as Spirit

> "Theatre, at its best, is always dangerous". And, I would add, it's also political. How can [we] discuss *Assassins* or *Cabaret* without talking about politics? How can we discuss *Les Misérables* or *Carousel* or *Ragtime* without talking about social issues? And why would [we] want to? Any good musical – or play or movie or novel, for that matter – is about important issues, either on the surface or more subtextually, and there's no reason to pretend otherwise. Instead of shying away from this fact, we should celebrate it. Musical theatre isn't some ancient, dusty, irrelevant invalid; it's a thriving, vigorous art from that gives us an exciting forum in which to talk about our world and try to figure things out. After all, why bother doing *Carousel* or *Camelot* if its issues don't speak to our times as well as to its own? (Scott Miller 2001, vii – edited)

6.1 Identifying the Problem

It is my contention that Hegel's theories can allow us to access not only a new relationship between the musical and politics and culture but also a new dimension of human Spirit. The Greek *politikos* ("of, for, or relating to citizens") reminds us that the essence of politics is what happens between people, and the case studies have demonstrated that there is a discernible link between the interactions witnessed in the micro-politics of the musical and the macro-politics of broader society.

Although musicals are intimate emotional experiences, when they deal with political issues they become works of art capable of "holding up a mirror to society" (Ellis-Petersen 2017), a function

that has occurred throughout the genre's history. With these political works, each production thereby provides a unique moment in the history of human Spirit through a specific theatrical event. Furthermore, the formal and structural elements of the musical, and specifically the function of song, offer unique opportunities for reflection on both ourselves and our society, what Hardimon describes as a "view against which one can clarify one's own position" that "puts us in a better position to determine how we are to relate to the social world" (Hardimon 1994, 23).

At the start of this research I began by introducing the inherent politicality of the musical theatre as a genre, through another quote from Scott Miller. This was followed by discussion of the received wisdom regarding song function in the musical. From there it was determined that song has been, to this point, commonly assumed by historians, practitioners, and scholars as being able to function in five main ways: when emotion becomes too great for speech you sing; that songs could be defined as 'I Am', 'I Want', or 'New' material; that they could pause or progress the drama; or that they could reveal the subtext of the scene. The gap that has been identified is that, while we know musicals to be political, the politicality of song as distilled through the lens of Hegelian ontology can be seen to reveal layers of subtext (both conscious and subliminal) that provides the potential for recipients to interpret, or re-interpret, the function and meaning of song as being capable of moving beyond the purely functional requirements of plot, and the established conventions of moving drama forward through the inclusion of music. This gap in our understanding was the catalyst for this research.

6.2 Proposed Solution to the Problem

In considering the theoretical relevance between the issues outlined in *Urinetown*, *Company*, and *Dr. Horrible's Sing-Along Blog*, and Hegel's theories of social reconciliation and Spirit, I have asserted that, while some musicals do not overtly support Hegelian ontology, the characters in

all three case study musicals were in dramatic and political contexts, desiring a social world in which they could be at home, in the same way that Hegel described both his contemporaries and the social world of his time. Through the application of Hegel's theories I have argued that song in the musical can not only express the politicality of a character's situation, but also frame their experience through a political lens that provides a more thorough and detailed understanding of their actions and desires while also allowing us to connect them to our own desire to be at home in our social world.

Moreover, through the examination of three case studies, each chosen for their own specific politicality, I have shown that, while the existing theories are not invalid, they can be synthesised into a Hegelian framework capable of revealing their inherent politicality whilst building upon their unique and individual strengths.

It is evident from the position taken in this thesis that, beyond mere dramatic propulsion, the songs in these three case study musicals have a clear political imperative and function, and this was made possible through the application of the Hegelian theory. *Urinetown* explored the politicality of members of a society fighting against an apparently alienating state/government through song, *Company* examined the informal politicality of marriage and relationships through song, and *Dr. Horrible* considered the politicality of right and wrong and the presence of heroes in civil society through the function of song.

Company proved more challenging to assess than *Urinetown* or *Dr. Horrible* as it does not have a progressive, linear plot. This is a limitation of the existing theories of song function that prove more difficult to apply to non-book musicals, as discussed. This issue exposes the constraints of dramatically focused theories, and I have argued that Hegel's theories can demonstrate the politicality of musical theatre song without this need for internal dramatic context.

Furthermore, and beyond the scope of pure song function, the possibly of social impact is revealed by understanding the political function of song in the musical through Hegel's theories. Therefore, it is also my contention that musical theatre functions as a vehicle for Hegelian Spirit, allowing society to reflect upon itself and what it takes to be authoritative for its customs, practices, and beliefs, just as the ancient Greeks used art to understand what was "truly going on in their form of life" (Pinkard 1996, 249).

In the words of Kamala Sankaram:

> Music has the ability to touch us deeply, and music used in the service of storytelling can transport us into different places and times, even allowing us to assume the perspectives of people very different than we are. […] We see a similar effect of story on our shared sense of culture. The stories we tell each other as a society give us a sense of cultural identity. They teach us about social norms and about who we are as a people: what our value systems are and how we fit into the world. (Sankaram 2019)

This research has shown that there is a far deeper level of politicality present in the structure of these musicals than the traditional 'boy-meets-girl' trope, but that there is also the potential for these theories to be applied to other musicals in order to reveal their own inherent politicality. All three of these musicals have political structures operating on multiple levels, from formal to informal politics, simultaneously across multiple storylines and locations, mirroring and representing the political complexities of our own social world.

Ultimately, this new knowledge leads to the idea that songs in musicals are presented to us as moments of reflection, artworks to ponder, much like a statue situated in a public space. Just as Thomas Adajian argues that "artworks are typically made to be appreciated" (Adajian in Lopes 2014, 204), I am arguing that songs in musicals are artworks "typically made to be appreciated"

within larger artworks that are "typically made to be appreciated". Works of theatre are artworks created and situated within a cultural "web of practices, roles, and frameworks that comprise an informally organized institution, [i.e.] the artworld" (Davies 2006, 38) and songs function within this framework as invitations for moments of reflection, a function that Scott Miller believes should be celebrated (Scott Miller 2001, vii).

It is my contention, then, that songs in musicals bring characters forward, presenting them before us for appreciation, much like the statues described in Hegel's Greek realm. In crafting a statue, the Greek artist created "something […] that expresses the 'inner essence' of the community (what for it is authoritative)" (Pinkard 1996, 234). I argue that songs in musicals are moments of expression within a larger artefact of appreciation that ask us to reflect on the political context of the character's situation in order to consider how it compares to what we take to be authoritative for ourselves in our own social world. Just as Pinkard wrote that "The statue is […] the presence of the god itself that is beheld by the members of the cult by virtue of the presence of the statue to them" (Pinkard 1996, 235), I argue that songs in musicals are similarly moments of Hegelian Spirit that we witness "by virtue of our presence" before them. Pinkard describes Hegel's cult as the "practice in which the people reflect on the absolute principles of their lives" (Pinkard 1996, 238 – edited) and I contend that audiences attending a musical take on the form of this 'cult' and collectively witness song as an "immediate object of [reflection], something directly apprehended without any further knowledge being necessary" (Pinkard 1996, 234 – edited). This function elevates the musical from mere popular entertainment to an important, valuable, and indeed vital artform that, as described by Scott Miller, provides us with an "exciting forum in which to talk about our world and try to figure things out".

If musicals, then, are moments of Spirit, they should be able to reflect both the world history of civil society (as Hegel's model does), as well as being able to look to the future, to higher forms of Spirit. *Company* and *Oklahoma!* have already been discussed as important moments in the political history of the genre, but recent revivals of both shows have demonstrated their

continuing influence on the social worlds from which they originated. By "looking anew at what was there all along [in] *Oklahoma!*", director Daniel Fish's 2019 revival production has shone a new mirror on contemporary American life three-quarters of a century after the show's original premiere, with a renewed focus on gun violence and the treatment of the "Other" (Rich 2019). A second production, directed by Bill Rauch and "timed for the 75th anniversary of the musical's Broadway opening" (Collins-Hughes 2018), switched up the main romantic storyline of the show to focus on a same-sex rather than heterosexual relationship:

> Within that faithful framework, altering genders and sexual orientations makes the musical's familiar elements — including Agnes de Mille's dark dream ballet, where Laurey is stalked by a new kind of dread — reverberate in surprising ways, even as the show makes an organic case for the notion that love is love.
>
> When Will asks for monogamy from the habitually available Andy, for example, it carries a different charge than when, in other productions, Will asks the same of Annie. Yet an Aunt Eller who is a transgender woman played by a transgender woman, as she is in Mr. Rauch's staging, is still, after all, Laurey's dear Aunt Eller. (Collins-Hughes 2018)

In a similar vein, Marianne Elliott's 2018 revival of *Company* offered the "opportunity to further expand the musical's ambitions" (Gilbert 2016) through the presentation of a female Bobbie alongside the same-sex couple of Jamie and Paul. *Company*'s original production was political in its representation of the "shift in the national psyche that [...] distinguished sexuality from marriage, questioning the institution itself" (Gilbert 2016), and both Rauch and Elliott's new productions shine a "mirror" (Ellis-Petersen 2017) on a society that is continuing to question the institution of marriage at time when, as of 2017, twenty eight countries around the world had already legalised same-sex marriage (Perper 2017).

David Foster Wallace describes the 'fun' of enjoying works of art such as literature as "'being part of some kind of exchange between consciousnesses' [–] the sense of being part of Spirit, or the revelation of a shared cultural world" (Wallace in Staehler 2017, 100). As Curly says to Laurey in *Oklahoma!*, "Country a-changin', got to change with it!" (Hammerstein in Collins-Hughes 2018), and musicals are one way in which society can represent to itself how it could change. In the words of Millie Taylor and Dominic Symonds, "musical theatre questions and explores the dynamics of our lives" (M. Taylor and Symonds 2014, 2), and it is by participating in this "sense of being part of Spirit", "being part of some kind of exchange between consciousnesses" that society can demonstrate to itself how it could achieve higher forms of Spirit, higher forms of freedom, and even suggest ways in which to do so.

6.3 Limitations of the Project and Recommendations for Future Research

This research has, as its constraints, the limitation of the discussion of the function of both music and dance in the musical. Music is clearly an imperative element of the musical, but, while a musicological analysis of the compositional and musical approaches to the musical through Hegel's theory would provide further elucidation, such a study was beyond the scope of this exegesis. I will suggest studies into this area presently. Furthermore, these case studies are only three examples of Hegel's theory applied to the musical, and there are thousands more shows out there just as worthy of study.

Questions that may be prompted by this study include how does the inclusion of dialogue contribute to the politicality of the musical? Furthermore, how does the inclusion of music contribute to the politicality of the musical? Do harmonic and melodic choices have a political effect on the audience? And what of the questions of form, polyphony, style, and timbre? Similarly, how does the inclusion of dance contribute to the musical's politicality? Dance is another prominent element of the form well worthy of examination. The musical theatre is also a

collaborative artform – how does its collaborative nature add to its politicality? And what of cut songs? Were songs cut from shows because they did not function as well politically as their replacements? And can Hegel's theory explain the reasoning behind cut songs? There are a number of well-known cut songs/different endings to *Company* and the reasons for their exclusion warrant further investigation. Movie musicals also open up a further field of discussion – how is the politicality of song reflected on film? And how does the modality of film as distilled through the lens of the director or changes in censorship mandates over time as only two of myriad considerations allow for/work with this politicality alongside the politics of film studios themselves and the rules and regulations pertaining to what can be filmed at various times across the decades? Furthermore, what of famous moments in musicals where characters do not sing, such as Maria after Tony's death at the end of *West Side* Story or the titular character of *Jerry Springer: The Opera* (2003)? What can Hegel tell us about them? Finally, are there any of Hegel's other theories not examined in this study that could be valuable for or applicable to our understanding of the musical? This study lays the groundwork for future research that can address some of these questions in an effort to continue to develop our understanding of the musical and its conventions.

6.4 Applications of the Project

Scholarly applications of this study include the new ability to understand the function of song in the musical both independently and within the show's dramatic structures. This is particularly valuable for concept musicals that lack this internal dramatic drive, as has already been noted. Practically, performers and directors with a working knowledge of Hegel's theories/the political nature of song will be able to find new ways of understanding and engaging with musical theatre works, again both within the world of the show and in terms of how they engage with our own social world. Finally, creatives/composers may find this study useful in providing a

framework for developing new works, especially in relation to the function of song and its ability to reveal the politicality of characters' situations within the drama.

Finally, the musical is able to function as a political artform and this study has demonstrated how this understanding of the genre can also be applied to the function of song. It is therefore my contention that musicals are vehicles of Hegelian Spirit that can and have played a vital role in our ability to reflect upon ourselves and what we take for granted in our own civil society, and that this mode of reflection is achieved through the performance of song. And all this is possible while remaining, in the words of Scott Miller, "a heck of a lot of fun" (2007, 5).

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Appendices

1 Post-1930 Musicals that Address Issues of Formal Politics

1.1 Post-1930 Musicals that Address the Politicality of World War II

Show	Productions	Writers
Follow the Girls	1944 Broadway 1945 West End	Music and lyrics: Dan Shapiro, Milton Pascal, and Phil Charig Book: Guy Bolton, Eddie Davis and Fred Thompson
Glad to See You	1944 Philadelphia tryout 1945 Boston tryout	Music and lyrics: Jule Styne and Sammy Cahn
Jackpot	1944 Broadway	Music: Vernon Duke Lyrics: Howard Dietz Book: Guy Bolton, Sidney Sheldon, and Ben Roberts
On the Town	1944 Broadway 1949 Film 1963 West End 1971 Broadway revival 1998 Broadway revival 2007 English National Opera 2008 Encores! concert 2014 Broadway revival	Music: Leonard Bernstein Book and lyrics: Betty Comden and Adolph Green
G. I. Carmen	1945 Heidelberg, Germany 1945 Mannheim, Germany 1945 Wiesbaden, Germany 1945 Kassel, Germany	Music: Georges Bizet Libretto: Ludovic Halévy and Henri Meilhac

	1945 Geissen, Germany 1945 Erbach, Germany 1945 Berlin, Germany 1945 Bremen, Germany 1945 Bremerhaven, Germany 1945 Brussels, Belgium 1945 Antwerp, Belgium 1945 Paris, France 1945 Calas, France 1945 Marseilles, France 1945 Livorno, Italy 1945 Rome, Italy 1945 Tarvisio, Italy 1945 Gorizia, Italy 1946 Nuremberg, Germany	
Call Me Mister	1946 Broadway 1951 Film	Words and music: Harold Rome
South Pacific	1949 Broadway 1950 US tour 1951 West End 1958 Film 1988 West End revival 2001 West End revival 2001 Film 2007 UK tour 2008 Broadway revival 2009 US tour	Music: Richard Rodgers Lyrics: Oscar Hammerstein II Book: Oscar Hammerstein II and Joshua Logan

The Sound of Music	1959 Broadway 1961 West End 1965 Film 1981 West End revival 1998 Broadway revival 2006 West End revival 2009–11 UK Tour 2013 US television 2015 UK television 2015–16 US Tour 2015–16 UK Tour 2015–16 Australian Tour	Music: Richard Rodgers Lyrics: Oscar Hammerstein II Book: Howard Lindsay and Russel Crouse
Cabaret	1966 Broadway 1968 London 1986 London revival 1987 Broadway revival 1993 London revival 1998 Broadway revival 2006 London revival 2012 London revival 2014 Broadway revival	Music: John Kander Lyrics: Fred Ebb Book: Joe Masteroff
Lovely Ladies, Kind Gentlemen	1970 Broadway	Music and lyrics: Stan Freeman and Franklin Underwood Book: John Patrick
Over Here!	1974 Broadway	Music and lyrics: Richard M. Sherman and Robert B. Sherman Book: Will Holt

The Grand Tour	1979 Broadway	Music and lyrics: Jerry Herman Book: Michael Stewart and Mark Bramble
Trixie True, Teen Detective	1980 Off-Broadway	Book, music and lyrics: Kelly Hamilton
Yank!	2005 New York Musical Theatre Festival 2007 Gallery Players, Brooklyn 2008 Divisionary Theatre, San Diego 2010 York Theater Company, New York City 2017 Hope Mill Theatre, Manchester 2017 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 2017 Charing Cross Theatre, London (transfer of Manchester production) 2019 Brisbane, Australia	Music: Joseph Zellnik Book and Lyrics: David Zellnik
The Boys are Coming Home / One Step Forward	2007 Goodman Theatre, Chicago	Music and lyrics: Leslie Arden Book: Berni Stapleton
Allegiance	2012 San Diego 2015 Broadway	Music and lyrics: Jay Kuo Book: Marc Acito, Jay Kuo, and Lorenzo Thione
Bandstand	2015 Paper Mill Playhouse 2017 Broadway	Music: Richard Oberacker Book and lyrics: Richard Oberacker and

		Robert Taylor
Last Days of Summer	2018 Kansas City, Missouri	Music: Jason Howland Book and lyrics: Steve Kluger

1.2 Post-1930 Musicals that Address the Politicality of Race, Civil Rights, Culture, & Immigration

Show	Productions	Writers
The King and I	1951 Broadway 1953 West End 1954 US tour 1956 Film 1973 West End revival 1977 Broadway revival 1979 West End revival 1981 US tour 1985 Broadway revival 1996 Broadway revival 1999 Film 2000 West End revival 2004 US tour 2011 UK tour 2015 Broadway revival 2016 US tour 2018 West End revival	Music: Richard Rodgers Book and lyrics: Oscar Hammerstein II
West Side Story	1957 Washington, D.C. tryout 1957 Philadelphia tryout 1957 Broadway	Music: Leonard Bernstein Lyrics: Stephen Sondheim Book: Arthur Laurents

	1958 West End 1959 US tour 1960 Broadway revival 1961 Film 1964 Broadway revival 1974 West End revival 1980 Broadway revival 1984 West End revival 1985 US tour 1995 US tour 1998 West End revival 2009 Broadway revival 2010 US tour 2019 Broadway revival 2020 Film	
Flower Drum Song	1958 Broadway 1960 West End 1961 film adaptation 2002 Broadway revival	Music: Richard Rodgers Lyrics: Oscar Hammerstein II Book: Oscar Hammerstein II, Joseph Fields, David Henry Hwang (2002 revival)
Kwamina	1961 Broadway	Music and lyrics: Richard Adler Book: Robert Alan Aurthur
The Real Ambassadors	1962 Monterey Jazz Festival	Music: Dave and Iola Brubeck, Louis Armstrong
Fiddler on the Roof	1964 Broadway 1967 West End 1971 Film 1976 Broadway revival	Music: Jerry Bock Lyrics: Sheldon Harnick Book: Joseph Stein

	1981 Broadway revival 1983 West End revival 1990 Broadway revival 1994 West End revival 2003 UK tour 2004 Broadway revival 2007 West End revival 2008 UK tour 2009 US Tour 2015 Broadway revival 2018 US Tour 2018 Off-Broadway revival 2019 West End revival	
Jerico-Jim Crow	1964 Off-Broadway	Music and lyrics: Various Book: William Hairston and Langston Hughes
Hallelujah, Baby!	1967 Broadway	Music: Jule Styne Lyrics: Adolph Green and Betty Comden Book: Arthur Laurents
Purlie	1970 Broadway 1972 Broadway revival 1981 US Television 2004 London fringe festival 2005 Encores!	Music: Gary Geld Lyrics: Peter Udell Book: Ossie Davis, Philip Rose, and Peter Udell
Ain't Supposed to Die a Natural	1971 Broadway	Book, music, and lyrics: Melvin Van Peebles

Death		
Don't Bother Me, I Can't Cope	1971 Washington, D. C. 1972 Broadway 1972 Mark Taper Forum, Los Angeles	Music and lyrics: Micki Grant
The Wiz	1974 Baltimore 1975 Broadway 1978 Film 1984 Broadway Revival 1984 West End 1995 Apollo Theater Live Revival 2006 San Diego 2006 the Netherlands 2009 City Center Encores! 2015 Live Television	Music: Charlie Smalls, Timothy Graphenreed, Harold Wheeler, George Faison, and Luther Vandross Lyrics: Charlie Smalls, Zachary Walzer, and Luther Vandross Book: William F. Brown
Bubbling Brown Sugar	1976 Broadway 1976 West End	Music and lyrics: Various Book: Loften Mitchell
Ain't Misbehavin'	1978 New York cabaret 1978 Broadway 1979 West End 1982 US television 1988 Broadway revival 1992 European tour 1995 US National tour 1995 West End revival 2008 US National tour	Music: Fats Waller Lyrics: Various Artists Book: Murray Horwitz and Richard Maltby Jr.
Dreamgirls	1981 Broadway	Music: Henry Krieger

	1983 US Tour 1985 International Tour 1987 Broadway revival 1997 US Tour 2001 Broadway concert 2006 Feature film 2009 US Tour 2016 West End	Book and lyrics: Tom Eyen
The First	1981 Broadway	Music: Robert Brush Lyrics: Martin Charnin Book: Joel Siegel
The Golden Land / Amerike the Golden Land	1982 Concert version, New York 1985 Off-Broadway 1996 Winnipeg Jewish Theater 2000 Montreal 2012 New York 2017 New York (as Amerike the Golden Land)	Book, music, and Yiddish lyrics: Moishe Rosenfeld and Zalmen Mlotek
Grind	1985 Broadway	Music: Larry Grossman Lyrics: Ellen Fitzhugh Book: Fay Kanin
Uptown… It's Hot!	1986 Broadway	Creation, direction, and choreography: Maurice Hines
On Second Avenue	1987 Off-Broadway 2005 Off-Broadway	Book, music, and Yiddish lyrics: Various
Once on This Island	1990 Broadway 1994 UK/Europe	Music: Stephen Flaherty Book and lyrics: Lynn Ahrens

	1995 West End 2009 UK revival 2017 Broadway revival 2019 National Tour	
Bring in 'da Noise, Bring in 'da Funk	1995 Off Broadway 1996 Broadway	Music: Daryl Waters, Zane Mark, and Ann Duquesnay Lyrics: Reg E. Gaines, George C. Wolfe, and Ann Duquesnay Book: Reg E. Gaines
Ragtime	1996 Toronto 1998 Broadway 2003 West End 2009 Kennedy Center 2009 Broadway revival 2012 London revival 2013 Avery Fisher Hall concert 2016 Ellis Island concert 2016 London revival 2018 Norwegian production 2019 Australian production	Music: Stephen Flaherty Lyrics: Lynn Ahrens Book: Terrence McNally
Parade	1998 Broadway 2000 US Tour 2007 West End 2011 West End	Music and lyrics: Jason Robert Brown Book: Alfred Uhry
Making Tracks	1999 Off-Broadway 2000 Washington	Music: Woody Pak Lyrics: Brian Yorkey

		Book: Welly Yang
By the Hand of the Father	2000 Los Angeles 2001 Los Angeles 2001 Chicago 2001 Seattle 2002 Calgary, Canada 2002 Alberta, Canada 2002 Austin, Texas 2002 Los Angeles 2003 Arizona State 2003 Miami 2003 Los Angeles 2003 Merced Playhouse 2004 Washington, D.C. 2004 California 2004 Santa Rosa 2004 Arizona 2005 National Ensemble Theatre Festival 2006 Brownsville 2006 Austin	Music: Alejandro Escovedo Stories: Theresa Chavez, Oscar Garza, Eric Gutierrez and Rose Portillo
Selena Forever	2000 US tour 2001 Los Angeles	Music: Fernando Rivas Book and lyrics: Edward Gallardo
The Immigrant	2004 Off-Broadway	Music: Steven M. Alper Lyrics: Sarah Knapp Book: Mark Harelik

Hairspray	2002 Seattle 2002 Broadway 2003 US Tour 2004 Toronto 2006 Las Vegas 2007 Film 2008 Buenos Aires 2008 West End 2009 Rio de Janeiro 2010 UK Tour 2010 Melbourne 2010 Brazilian Tour 2011 Hollywood Bowl 2012 Merzig 2013 UK Tour 2015 UK Tour 2015 St. Louis 2016 Brisbane 2016 Live Television 2017 UK Tour 2017 Tel Aviv	Music: Marc Shaiman Lyrics: Scott Wittman and Marc Shaiman Book: Mark O'Donnell and Thomas Meehan
Memphis	2002 Mountain View 2003 Beverly 2008 San Diego 2009 Seattle 2009 Broadway 2011 First National Tour	Music: David Bryan Lyrics: David Bryan and Joe DiPietro Book: Joe DiPietro

	2014 West End 2015 Tokyo 2015 Philadelphia 2017 Melbourne, Australia 2018 Houston	
A Stoop on Orchard Street	2002 Nashville, Tennessee 2003 Off-Broadway 2004 North America tour 2004 New York	Book, music, and lyrics: Jay Kholos
Caroline, or Change	2003 Off-Broadway 2004 Broadway 2006 London 2009 Guthrie Theater 2012 Berkeley Street Theatre 2017 Chichester Festival Theatre 2018 Hampstead Theatre 2018 West End	Music: Jeanine Tesori Book and lyrics: Tony Kushner
The Color Purple	2005 Broadway 2007 Chicago 2007 First US Tour 2010 Second US Tour 2011 Vienna 2012 Third US Tour 2013 Off West End 2015 Broadway revival 2017 US Tour 2018 South Africa	Music and lyrics: Brenda Russell, Allee Willis, and Stephen Bray Book: Marsha Norman

	2018 The Netherlands 2019 Canada 2019 Brazil	
Dessa Rose	2005 Off Broadway 2014 West End	Music: Stephen Flaherty Book and lyrics: Lynn Ahrens
In the Heights	2005 Waterford 2007 Off-Broadway 2008 Broadway 2009 US Tour 2011 Manila 2011 Non-Equity Tour 2013 Panama City 2014 São Paulo 2014 Off-West End 2014 Tokyo 2015 Melbourne 2015 West End 2015 Vancouver 2015 Seoul 2016 Lima 2016 Lohne 2017 Washington, D.C. 2018 Nyborg 2018 Sydney 2020 Film	Music and lyrics: Lin-Manuel Miranda Book: Quiara Alegría Hudes
White Noise: A Cautionary	2006 New York Musical Theatre Festival	Music and lyrics: Robert Morris, Steven Morris, and Joe Shane

Musical	2009 New Orleans 2011 Chicago Royal George Theatre	
The Scottsboro Boys	2010 Off-Broadway 2010 Minneapolis 2010 Broadway 2013 Off-West End, London 2014 West End 2018 Arlington, Virginia	Music: John Kander Lyrics: Fred Ebb Book: David Thompson
Stagger Lee	2015 Dallas Theater Center	Music and lyrics: Will Power and Justin Ellington Book: Will Power
Can I Get a Witness? The Gospel of James Baldwin	2016 New York	Music: Meshell Ndegeocello
Miss You Like Hell	2016 San Diego 2018 Off-Broadway 2019 Boston	Music: Erin McKeown Lyrics: Quiara Alegría Hudes and Erin McKeown Book: Quiara Alegría Hudes
Shuffle Along, or, the Making of the Musical Sensation of 1921 and All That Followed	2016 Broadway	Music and lyrics: Eubie Blake and Noble Sissle Book: George C. Wolfe, Flournoy Miller, and Aubrey Lyles

1.3 Post-1930 Musicals that Address the Politicality of LGBT, AIDS, and Sexuality

Show	Productions	Writers
Boy Meets Boy	1975 Off-Broadway 2012 London	Music and lyrics: Bill Solly Book: Bill Solly and Donald Ward
I Love My Wife	1977 Broadway 1977 West End	Music: Cy Coleman Book and lyrics: Michael Stewart
The Best Little Whorehouse in Texas	1978 Broadway 1980 US Tour 1981 West End 1982 Broadway 1982 Film 2001 US Tour 2011 London Fringe Revival	Music and lyrics: Carol Hall Book: Larry L. King and Peter Masterson
In Trousers	1979 Off-Broadway 1981 Off-Broadway revival 1985 Off-Broadway revival	Book, music, and lyrics: William Finn
March of the Falsettos	1981 Off-Broadway 1987 West End	Book, music, and lyrics: William Finn
La Cage aux Folles	1983 Boston tryout 1983 Broadway 1984 US Tour 1984 US Tour 1986 West End 1987 US Tour 1993 US Tour 2004 Broadway	Music and lyrics: Jerry Herman Book: Harvey Fierstein

	2008 West End 2010 Broadway 2011 US Tour 2017 UK Tour	
The Wizard of A.I.D.S.: Aware Individuals Deserving Survival	1987 Chicago	Creation: AIDS Educational Theatre
Elegies for Angels, Punks and Raging Queens	1989 Off-Off Broadway 1993 West End 2001 New York City Concert 2014 New York City 2015 West End 2019 Off West End	Music: Janet Hood Book and lyrics: Bill Russell
Falsettoland	1990 Off-Broadway	Music and lyrics: William Finn Book: James Lapine
Nick & Nora	1991 Broadway	Music: Charles Strouse Lyrics: Richard Maltby, Jr. Book: Arthur Laurents
Falsettos	1992 Broadway 1993 US Tour 2016 Broadway revival 2019 US Tour 2019 Off-West End	Music and lyrics: William Finn Book: William Finn and James Lapine
Rent	1993 Workshop 1996 Off-Broadway 1996 Broadway	Book, music, and lyrics: Jonathan Larson

	1996 Angel Tour 1997 Benny Tour 1997 Collins Tour 1998 West End 2001 UK Tour 2001 West End 2005 International Tour 2005 Film adaptation 2007 West End 2008 Live stage filming 2009 Mark Tour 2010 Hollywood Bowl 2011 Off-Broadway 2016 UK Tour 2019 Live television	
The Last Session	1997 Off-Broadway 1998 Los Angeles 2012 London	Music: Steve Schalchlin Lyrics: Steve Schalchlin, John Bettis, and Marie Cain Book: Jim Brochu
Hedwig and the Angry Inch	1998 Off-Broadway 2000 West End 2001 Film adaptation 2002 Vienna 2004 St. Louis 2004 West End 2005 UK Tour 2007 Nashville	Music and lyrics: Stephen Trask Book: John Cameron Mitchell

	2010 Brazilian Tour 2014 Broadway 2016 First US Tour 2016 Stockholm 2016 Istanbul 2017 Frankfurt 2019 Christchurch, NZ	
Naked Boys Singing!	1999 Off-Broadway 2007 Film	Book: Robert Schrock
Bare: A Pop Opera	2000 Los Angeles 2004 Off-Broadway 2008 Houston 2008 Seattle 2008 Indianapolis 2009 Denver 2009 Toronto 2010 Sydney 2011 Minneapolis 2011 St. Louis 2011 Albany 2012 Manila 2012 Liverpool 2012 Belgium 2013 Los Angeles revival 2016 Buenos Aires 2014 Barcelona 2019 London	Music: Damon Intrabartolo Lyrics: Jon Hartmere Book: Jon Hartmere and Damon Intrabartolo

	2019 New York 2019 Hawaii 2019 Michigan	
A Man of No Importance	2002 Lincoln Center 2008 Toronto 2009 London 2013 Salisbury	Music: Stephen Flaherty Lyrics: Lynn Ahrens Book: Terrence McNally
Zanna, Don't!	2003 Off-Broadway 2009 London 2013 New Zealand 2018 Fort Lauderdale	Music: Tim Acito Book and lyrics: Tim Acito and Alexander Dinelaris
The Opposite of Sex	2004 San Francisco 2006 Massachusetts	Music and lyrics: Douglas J. Cohen Book: Douglas J. Cohen and Robert Jess Roth
The Break Up Notebook: The Lesbian Musical	2005 Santa Monica 2007 San Diego	Music and lyrics: Lori Scarlett and David Manning Book: Patricia Cotter
Surviving the Nian	2007 Boston	Music and lyrics: Melissa Li Book: Melissa Li and Abe Rybeck
Saved	2008 Off-Broadway 2010 Kansas City	Music and lyrics: Michael Friedman Book: John Dempsey and Rinne Groff
Through a Glass, Darkly	2008 Twin Cities Gay Men's Chorus	Music and lyrics: Michael Shaieb
The Kid	2010 Off-Broadway	Music: Andy Monroe Lyrics: Jack Lechner Book: Michael Zam
Bare: The Musical	2012 Off-Broadway	Music: Damon Intrabartolo

	2013 Off-West End 2013 Los Angeles 2014 Youngstown 2014 Barcelona 2014 San Diego 2015 Cardiff 2015 Medicine Hat 2016 Cork 2016 Buenos Aires 2016 Chicago 2016 Seoul 2016 Sydney 2017 Brighton 2018 Amsterdam 2018 Melbourne 2018 Brisbane 2018 São Paulo 2019 London	Additional music: Lynne Shankel Book and lyrics: Jon Hartmere
Kinky Boots	2012 Chicago 2013 Broadway 2014 1st US Tour 2014 Seoul 2015 Toronto 2015 West End 2016 Australian Tour 2016 Tokyo 2017 Hamburg	Music and lyrics: Cyndi Lauper Book: Harvey Fierstein

	2017 Manila 2018 2nd US Tour 2018 1st UK Tour 2019 Dutch Tour 2020 Buenos Aires	
Far From Heaven	2012 Williamstown 2013 Off-Broadway	Music: Scott Frankel Lyrics: Michael Korie Book: Richard Greenberg
Letter to Harvey Milk	2012 New York Musical Theatre Festival	Music: Laura I. Kramer Lyrics: Ellen M. Schwartz Book: Jerry James
Fun Home	2013 Off-Broadway 2015 Broadway 2016 US National Tour 2018 Off-West End 2020 Melbourne	Music: Jeanine Tesori Book and lyrics: Lisa Kron
The Prom	2016 Atlanta 2018 Broadway 2020 Film	Music: Matthew Sklar Lyrics: Chad Beguelin Book: Bob Martin and Chad Beguelin
The Civility of Albert Cashier	2017 Chicago	Music: Joe Stevens and Keaton Wooden Lyrics: Joe Stevens, Keaton Wooden, and Paul Deratany Book: Jay Paul Deratany
Everybody's Talking About	2017 Sheffield 2017 West End	Music: Dan Gillespie Sells Book and lyrics: Tom MacRae

Jamie	2020 UK Tour	
The View UpStairs	2017 Off-Broadway 2018 Sydney 2019 London	Book, music, and lyrics: Max Vernon
Jagged Little Pill	2018 Cambridge 2019 Broadway	Music: Alanis Morissette and Glen Ballard Lyrics: Alanis Morissette Book: Diablo Cody
Tootsie	2018 Chicago 2019 Broadway	Music and lyrics: David Yazbek Book: Robert Horn

1.4 Post-1930 Musicals that Address the Politicality of the Great Depression

Show	Productions	Writers
Face the Music	1932 Broadway 1933 Broadway	Music and lyrics: Irving Berlin Book: Moss Hart
42nd Street	1933 Film 1980 Broadway 1984 West End 1985 San Francisco 1996 South Korea 2000-2001 (revival) The Netherlands 2001 Broadway revival 2007 UK Tour 2007–2008 Asian Tour 2012 UK Tour 2015–2016 US Tour	Music: Harry Warren Lyrics: Al Dubin and Johnny Mercer ("There's a Sunny Side to Every Situation") Book: Michael Stewart and Mark Bramble

	2016–2017 Paris 2017 West End revival	
Let 'Em Eat Cake	1933 Broadway 1994 BBC concert 2009 Opera North	Music: George Gershwin Lyrics: Ira Gershwin Book: George S. Kaufman
I'd Rather Be Right	1937 Broadway 2011 Revival	Music: Richard Rodgers Lyrics: Lorenz Hart Book: Moss Hart and George S. Kaufman
I Can Get It for You Wholesale	1962 Broadway	Music and lyrics: Harold Rome Book: Jerome Weidman
Flora the Red Menace	1965 Broadway 1987 Off-Broadway 2019 Melbourne	Music: John Kander Lyrics: Fred Ebb Book: George Abbott and Robert Russell, revised by David Thompson
Mame	1966 Broadway 1969 West End 1974 Film 1983 Broadway revival	Music and lyrics: Jerry Herman Book: Jerome Lawrence and Robert Edwin Lee
Legs Diamond	1988 Broadway	Music and lyrics: Peter Allen Book: Harvey Fierstein and Charles Suppon
Romance in Hard Times	1989 Off-Broadway 2014 Barrington Stage Company	Book, music, and lyrics: William Finn
Bonnie & Clyde	2009 La Jolla Playhouse 2010 Sarasota	Music: Frank Wildhorn Lyrics: Don Black

	2011 Tokyo 2011 Broadway 2013 Seoul 2014 St. Louis 2016 Prague 2017 Off West End	Book: Ivan Menchell
Minsky's	2009 Los Angeles	Music: Charles Strouse Lyrics: Susan Birkenhead Book: Bob Martin

1.5 Post-1930 Musicals that Address the Politicality of Tammany Hall

Show	**Productions**	**Writers**
Fiorello!	1959 Broadway 1962 Broadway 1994 Broadway concert 2013 Broadway concert	Music: Jerry Bock Lyrics: Sheldon Harnick Book: Jerome Weidman and George Abbott
Tenderloin	1960 Broadway 2000 Broadway concert	Music: Jerry Bock Lyrics: Sheldon Harnick Book: George Abbott and Jerome Weidman
Jimmy	1969 Broadway	Music: Bill Jacob Lyrics: Patti Jacob Book: Melville Shavelson
Rags *	1986 Broadway 1999 New Jersey 2017 Connecticut 2019 Manchester	Music: Charles Strouse Lyrics: Stephen Schwartz Book: Joseph Stein and David Thompson (revisions)

*Also a show about immigration

1.6 Post-1930 Musicals that Address the Politicality of the Vietnam War

Show	Writers	Productions
Promenade	1965 New York City 1969 Off-Broadway 1983 Off-Broadway	Music: Al Carmines Book and lyrics: María Irene Fornés
Viet Rock	1966 La MaMa Experimental Theatre Club 1966 Yale Repertory Theatre 1966 Off-Broadway	Music: Marianne de Pury Book: Megan Terry
Hair	1967 Off-Broadway 1968 Broadway 1968 West End 1977 Broadway revival 1979 Film version 1993 West End revival 2009 Broadway revival 2010 West End revival	Music: Galt MacDermot Book and lyrics: Gerome Ragni and James Rado
More Than You Deserve	1973 The Public Theater	Music and lyrics: Jim Steinman Book: Michael Weller
The Lieutenant	1975 Broadway	Book, music, and lyrics: Gene Curty, Nitra Scharfman, and Chuck Strand
Miss Saigon	1989 West End 1991 Broadway 1992 First US Tour 1992 Japan	Music: Claude-Michel Schönberg Lyrics: Alain Boublil and Richard Maltby, Jr. Book: Alain Boublil and Claude-Michel

	2001 First UK Tour 2002 Second US Tour 2004 Second UK Tour 2014 West End revival 2016 Japan revival 2017 Broadway revival 2017 International Tour	Schönberg
John & Jen	1995 Off-Broadway 2015 Off-Broadway	Music: Andrew Lippa Lyrics: Tom Greenwald Book: Andrew Lippa and Tom Greenwald
Movin' Out	2002 Broadway 2004 North American Tour 2006 West End	Music and lyrics: Billy Joel
Dogfight	2012 Off-Broadway 2014 Off-West End 2015 Sydney 2015 Netherlands 2017 Germany 2018 Austria 2019 Norway	Music and lyrics: Benj Pasek and Justin Paul Book: Peter Duchan

1.7 Post-1930 Musicals that Address the Politicality of Terrorism

Show	Productions	Writers
Little Fish	2003 Off-Broadway 2007 California 2009 London	Book, music, and lyrics: Michael John LaChiusa

Perez Hilton Saves the Universe (or at least the greater Los Angeles area): the Musical!	2008 New York International Fringe Festival	Music: Zachary Redler Lyrics: Randy Blair Book: Randy Blair and Timothy Michael Drucker
Ordinary Days	2008 Off-West End 2009 Off-Broadway 2011 Off-West End 2012 Australia 2015 Paris 2015 Barcelona 2016 Israel 2016 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 2016 Scotland 2016 Wellington, NZ 2017 Off-West End 2018 Buenos Aires 2019 Off-Broadway 2019 Off-West End	Music and lyrics: Adam Gwon
Venice	2010 Kansas City Rep 2010 Los Angeles 2013 The Public Theater	Music: Matt Sax Lyrics: Matt Sax and Eric Rosen Book: Eric Rosen
Come From Away	2013 Sheridan College 2015 San Diego 2015 Seattle 2016 Washington, D.C. 2016 Toronto	Book, music, and lyrics: Irene Sankoff and David Hein

	2017 Broadway 2018 North American Tour 2019 West End 2019 Australia	

1.8 Post-1930 Musicals that Address the Politicality of Political Figures

Show	**Productions**	**Writers**
Of Thee I Sing	1931 Broadway 1933 Broadway revival 1952 Broadway revival 1972 Television 2006 City Center Encores!	Music: George Gershwin Lyrics: Ira Gershwin Book: George S. Kaufman and Morrie Ryskind
Doonesbury	1983 Broadway	Music: Elizabeth Swados Book and lyrics: Garry Trudeau
Rap Master Ronnie	1984 Off-Broadway 1984 Music video 1985 Los Angeles 1988 Made-for-TV movie (as Rap Master Ronnie: A Report Card)	Music: Elizabeth Swados Book and lyrics: Garry Trudeau
Assassins	1990 Off-Broadway 1992 West End 1994 St. Louis 2004 Broadway 2014 West End revival 2017 Encores! Off-Center 2018 Sydney 2020 Off-Broadway	Music and lyrics: Stephen Sondheim Book: John Weidman

First Lady Suite	1993 Off-Broadway	Book, music, and lyrics: Michael John LaChiusa
Zombies from the Beyond	1995 Off-Broadway	Book, music, and lyrics: James Valcq
JFK: A Musical Drama	1997 Dublin 1998 New York City	Music: Will Holt Book and lyrics: Will Holt and Tom Sawyer
Newsical	2004 Off-Broadway 2009 Off-Broadway 2011 Off-Broadway	Book, music, and lyrics: Rick Crom
Keating!	2005–06 Australian tour 2006–08 Australian tour 2010 Theatre Royal, Hobart	Book, music, and lyrics: Casey Bennetto
Clinton: The Musical	2012 Edinburgh Festival Fringe 2013 Off-West End 2014 New York Musical Theatre Festival 2015 Off-Broadway 2016 Perth	Music and lyrics: Paul Hodge Book: Paul Hodge and Michael Hodge
Here Lies Love	2013 The Public Theatre 2014 The Public Theatre 2014 London 2017 Seattle	Music: David Byrne, Fatboy Slim Lyrics: David Byrne
First Daughter Suite	2015 Off-Broadway	Book, music, and lyrics: Michael John LaChiusa
Hamilton	2013 Vassar College 2015 Off-Broadway	Book, music, and lyrics: Lin-Manuel Miranda

	2015 Broadway 2016 Chicago 2017 First US Tour 2017 West End 2018 Second US Tour 2019 Puerto Rico 2019 Third US Tour 2020 Australian Tour	

1.9 Post-1930 Musicals that Address the Politicality of Homelessness

Show	Productions	Writers
Subways are for Sleeping	1961 Broadway	Music: Jule Styne Book and lyrics: Betty Comden and Adolph Green
Runaways	1978 Off-Broadway 1978 Broadway 2016 Encores! Off-Center	Book, music, and lyrics: Elizabeth Swados
Brooklyn	2004 Broadway 2006 United States tour	Book, music, and lyrics: Mark Schoenfeld and Barri McPherson

1.10 Post-1930 Musicals that Address the Politicality of Prohibition

Show	Productions	Writers
The New Yorkers	1930 Broadway 1996 Lincolnshire, IL 2017 City Center Encores!	Music and lyrics: Cole Porter Book: Herbert Fields
Pardon My English	1933 Broadway 2004 Encores!	Music: George Gershwin Lyrics: Ira Gershwin

	2009 Dresden	Book: Herbert Fields and Morrie Ryskind
Billion Dollar Baby	1945 Broadway	Music: Morton Gould Book and lyrics: Betty Comden and Adolph Green
Nice Work if You Can Get It	2012 Broadway 2014 US tour 2015 Melbourne 2018 UK, London	Music: George Gershwin Lyrics: Ira Gershwin Book: Joe DiPietro

1.11 Post-1930 Musicals that Address the Politicality of the Iraq War

Show	Productions	Writers
American Idiot	2009 Berkeley 2010 Broadway 2011 First US Tour 2012 First UK and Ireland Tour 2012 Second US Tour 2013 Third US Tour 2015 West End 2016 Second UK Tour 2017 Australian Tour 2019 Third UK Tour	Music: Green Day Lyrics: Billie Joe Armstrong Book: Billie Joe Armstrong and Michael Mayer
Baghdaddy	2015 Off-Off-Broadway 2017 Off-Broadway	Music: Marshall Paillet Lyrics: A.D. Penedo Book: Marshall Paillet and A.D. Penedo

1.12 Post-1930 Musicals that Address the Politicality of Cold War

Show	Productions	Writers

Silk Stockings	1955 Broadway	Music and lyrics: Cole Porter Book: George S. Kaufman, Leueen MacGrath, and Abe Burrows
Mr. President	1962 Broadway	Music and lyrics: Irving Berlin Book: Howard Lindsay and Russel Crouse

2 Email Communications with Greg Kotis and Mark Hollman

2.1 Email Received from Greg Kotis on 30 Jan 2020

Hi, Ian - Most of your questions, I think, will be better addressed by Mark, but I'll offer my 2 cents.

1. To what extent would you consider Urinetown to be an homage to Brechtian epic theatre?

Brecht is a clear, albeit indirect influence on Urinetown. I worked for years with a Chicago-based company called "The Neo-Futurists" who were deeply influenced by Brecht. My attempt to deconstruct the play through Lockstock and Little Sally comes mostly from the experience I had with The Neo-Futurists. Mark picked up on this Brechtian element and leaned toward a Weillian sound for the score.

2. In the introduction to the Urinetown libretto, Mark notes that "it became increasingly less practical to toe the line" when composing in a Weill/Brechtian style. Would you elaborate on this decision briefly for me?

For Mark.

3. To what extent, if any, is the Brechtian influence in Urinetown directly applicable to politicism expressed in the songs?

Urinetown is a fable of sorts about people grappling with oppression and societal collapse. Heroes rise to organize and resist, villains react, people act in concert, all of which has a raw political feel to it. The songs illustrate the emotional element to these political actions and reactions.

4. Song in the epic theatre is traditionally reflective - in developing Urinetown did you write, or consider writing, any numbers in the style of a Greek chorus and, if not, why?

I don't remember considering a Greek choral element. The ensemble is very much a part of the world of the play, living through the story as opposed to a distance from it. Even Lockstock and Little Sally are invested in the story and its outcome as they live through it.

Good luck!

gk
(Kotis 2020)

2.2 Email Received from Mark Hollmann on 30 Jan 2020

Hi, Ian,

I have added my answers below.

All best,

Mark

On Wednesday, January 29, 2020, 11:51:41 AM EST, Greg Kotis <greg.kotis@gmail.com> wrote:

Hi, Ian - Most of your questions, I think, will be better addressed by Mark, but I'll offer my 2 cents.

1. To what extent would you consider Urinetown to be an homage to Brechtian epic theatre?

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2. In the introduction to the Urinetown libretto, Mark notes that "it became increasingly less practical to toe the line" when composing in a Weill/Brechtian style. Would you elaborate on this decision briefly for me?

For Mark.

Mark: I was not all that familiar with the Weill/Brecht style at the time of the writing of URINETOWN. As a teenager I had seen a production of THE THREEPENNY OPERA, and then in my late 20s I served as an assistant musical director and pianist for a production of it. So THREEPENNY, and the Jim Morrison / Doors rendition of "The Alabama Song," constituted my exposure to Weill/Brecht, and therefore when I was writing the music for URINETOWN I just didn't know enough to write a whole score in the Weill/Brecht style.

3. To what extent, if any, is the Brechtian influence in Urinetown directly applicable to politicism expressed in the songs?

Urinetown is a fable of sorts about people grappling with oppression and societal collapse. Heroes rise to organize and resist, villains react, people act in concert, all of which has a raw political feel to it. The songs illustrate the emotional element to these political actions and reactions.

4. Song in the epic theatre is traditionally reflective - in developing Urinetown did you write, or consider writing, any numbers in the style of a Greek chorus and, if not, why?

I don't remember considering a Greek choral element. The ensemble is very much a part of the world of the play, living through the story as opposed to a distance from it. Even Lockstock and Little Sally are invested in the story and its outcome as they live through it.

Mark: I don't remember considering it either.

Good luck!

gk

(Hollmann 2020)