

Violent Political Extremism and the Socio-Political Dynamics of Affect

Debra Ann Smith

Bachelor of Arts (Hons)

PhD Thesis Politics Program, School of Social Sciences
Monash University
February 2015

The innocent in gaols
Beat on their bars together.
A hunger-striker's father
Stands in the graveyard dumb.
The police widow in veils
Faints at the funeral home.

History says, don't hope
On this side of the grave.
But then, once in a lifetime
The longed-for tidal wave
Of justice can rise up,
And hope and history rhyme.

So hope for a great sea-change
On the far side of revenge.
Believe that further shore
Is reachable from here.
Believe in miracle
And cures and healing wells.

Seamus Heaney

The Cure at Troy: A Version of Sophocles' Philoctetes

CONTENTS

Abstract	i
Acknowledgements	vi
Preface	viii
Chapter 1	1
Introduction: Locating Emotion within Terrorism Studies	1
The Overly Emotional Subject	3
The Under Emotional Subject	7
Emotions as Mediating Factors	9
The Dawn of Critical Terrorism Studies: A Place for Emotion?	15
Framework of this Dissertation	17
Chapter 2	21
Terrorism and Emotion: Mapping the Terrain	21
Introduction	21
Defining Terrorism	22
What is an Emotion?	26
<i>Emotions are referential</i>	26
<i>Emotions include value judgments</i>	28
<i>Emotions are both cognitive and physiological</i>	30
<i>Emotions can be misleading</i>	32
<i>Emotions mobilise action</i>	34
<i>Emotions are social as well as individual phenomena</i>	38
A Note on a Theory of Emotion: Passionate Reason?	42
How to talk about Emotions and Terrorism	43
Chapter 3	46
Methodology: A Field of Emotion	46
Introduction	46

Establishing a Claim to Knowledge	48
Identifying and Recruiting Participants	55
Analysis	59
Ethical Considerations	61
Conclusion	62
Chapter 4.....	63
Emotional Fissures and the Social Milieu	63
Introduction	63
Emotional Bonds and Society.....	65
<i>Loyalty</i>	67
<i>Anger</i>	73
<i>Shame</i>	76
<i>Fear</i>	81
Moving away from the Mainstream: Exclusivist Group Bonds	86
Conclusion	97
Chapter 5.....	98
Passionate Belief: Ideology and Emotion	98
Introduction	98
Ideology within Terrorism Studies	101
Because it Feels Right: Emotion, Beliefs and Credibility	107
<i>Emotions As Evidence</i>	108
<i>Emotions and Credibility</i>	113
Because it Feels Good: Ideology, Hope and Pride	120
Conclusion	126
Chapter 6.....	129
Feeling Moved: Emotion and Violent Action	129
Introduction	129
Emotion, Action and Violence	130

Emotions and Expressive Action.....	137
Emotions and Instrumental Action	144
Conclusion	152
Chapter 7.....	154
Conclusion: Emotions Matter	154
Appendix A: Example of Coding	161
References	168
Interviews.....	168
Bibliography.....	168

ABSTRACT

This dissertation argues that understanding violent political extremism requires an understanding of how emotion contributes to the many decisions that lead to a violent political act. It demonstrates how emotion underpins the creation of exclusivist identity groups that sit in opposition to the status quo, how they contribute to the development of beliefs that allow for violent ideologies to appear credible, and how they shape a morality that legitimises violence as a political tactic.

Drawing on interviews conducted with former members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), and supplemented with interviews conducted with people who have been involved in, supported, or have worked with people convicted of violence in the name of Islam, this dissertation demonstrates how emotion operates both across and within the social, ideological, and motivational realms of human interaction in ways that help determine political action. It takes a step back from a ‘process model’ approach to understanding violent political behaviour, instead working from the assumption that the decision to engage in political violence is not a linear one. Rather, it involves complex interactions within different parts of a person’s life that culminate in a readiness to use violence as a political tactic.

Using extracts from the interviews, six characteristics of emotion are established; their referential nature, their connection to value judgments, their cognitive and physiological components, their ability to be misleading, their mobilising potential, and their social embeddedness. This provides a foundation for demonstrating how violent political extremists experience their emotions politically, and in ways that are often incompatible with dominant norms and expectations. This, it is argued, contributes to a rupture in the extremist’s relationship with broader society and the subsequent development of an alternative morality that releases them from seeing conventional rules and laws as valid or legitimate, thereby establishing the moral basis on which new standards of behaviour become defensible.

By making this argument, this dissertation confronts a persistent problem in Terrorism Studies regarding the nature and influence of emotion on terrorist behaviour. Emotions inevitably inform and underpin the many relationships, beliefs, and actions that lead to violent political

activism. This thesis demonstrates how this knowledge can be integrated into theories of political violence without resorting to pathologising terrorist behaviour as irrational.

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution. I affirm that to the best of my knowledge the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Signed:

Under the Copyright Act 1968, this thesis must be used only under the normal conditions of scholarly fair dealing. In particular no results or conclusions should be extracted from it, nor should it be copied or closely paraphrased in whole or in part without the written consent of the author. Proper written acknowledgement should be made for any assistance obtained from this thesis.

I certify that I have made all reasonable efforts to secure copyright permissions for third-party content included in this thesis and have not knowingly added copyright content to my work without the owner's permission.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The research contained in this thesis was made possible through the goodwill and candidness of the participants who shared their stories.

I would like to express my warm gratitude to those former members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army who gave generously of their time and allowed themselves to be questioned and probed on the topic of their emotions. I am continuously mindful of their generosity of spirit when faced with the intrusions of a stranger. *Le buíochas agus meas.*

My sincere thanks also go to those participants from the Salafist community in the UK who took the time to meet with me and contribute to this research. Without exception each person was forgiving of my ignorance, generous in sharing their insights, and helpful in a variety of unanticipated ways. Heartfelt thanks also go to the former member of the *Jamaah Islamiyah* who showed great patience and goodwill when faced with my many questions about his life and decisions. As with other participants, I was humbled by the candidness and generous spirit demonstrated throughout our meetings.

A very special thanks to Bill Kelly, Bob Lambert, Gabrielle Williams, and Jason Striegher, who helped to facilitate this research through a variety of invaluable introductions. Thank you also to Joe Ilardi for generous access to the Canadian interviews that have contributed greatly to this dissertation.

Throughout the writing of this thesis I have been buoyed by the support of terrific colleagues at the Global Terrorism Research Centre at Monash University. They have provided me with encouragement, thoughtful feedback, and a collegial environment throughout this undertaking. In particular, I would like to thank Pete Lentini and Greg Barton for their support and guidance. To Andrew Zammit, Shandon Harris-Hogan, Kate Barrelle, Muhammad Iqbal, Virginie Andre, and Bruce McFarlane, I am indebted to you all for cheering me on. To Kate and Andrew, the emails we exchanged while I was away on fieldwork kept my feet on the ground and helped me work through my doubts and anxieties. Without question this allowed me to stay focused on the task at hand. Thankyou.

Sue Stevenson has been an enormous help in dealing with the many administrative issues that have arisen throughout this project. In particular, her assistance through the process of intermission was invaluable.

The quality of guidance that I have received at the hands of my two wonderful supervisors cannot be understated. To Jim and Michael, I am extraordinarily grateful for both the intellectual and personal support you have provided me with throughout this journey. More than anyone you know the complexity of issues that have at times impeded on this project. At each bump in the road you have wisely advised me. For this I am indebted to you both.

Throughout this project I have been fortunate enough to have unwavering family support. In particular, my parents Margaret and Ken have been extraordinary in their generosity, belief and encouragement. To my brother Andy and to Noel, I cannot thank you enough for the stability, love, and care you have provided.

My other 'family' in this journey have been my friends. I thank Samantha Balaton-Chrimes, Dewi Braun, Anna Eriksson, Christina Kirtley and Kerrie Morgan for absolutely everything they have done for me. In particular, their resolute friendship when things were tough and their willingness to be everything from sounding boards, to computer technicians, proof readers, swim buddies, secret squirrels, chefs, and baristas. I feel privileged to have such amazing people around me.

Finally, to my remarkable daughter Dana, I say thanks for putting up with all the things that come with having a busy mum. If everyone had your sense of humour, warm spirit, and resilient character, the world would truly be a better place.

PREFACE

This dissertation is a study of violent political extremism. It differs from most research on the topic because it enters into the personal world of the violent political actor and looks at ways in which their emotional life has helped to build identities, beliefs, and motivations that have led to violent acts. However, it does not concentrate exclusively on these acts, although they remain an ever present shadow, reminding us that violence is the mark of criminality and the main factor in the perpetuation of wider, civilian fear. Rather, this dissertation views the violent political actor within a biographical framework, concentrating on the emotional experiences and understandings which have influenced the many decisions leading to involvement in a terrorist group. Yet individual experiences of emotion cannot be viewed in isolation from their broader social context. The pathway to violent political extremism is a social one; it involves the development of a group identity tightly bound by a shared ideological framework that is marked by its exclusivist nature and its willingness to accept violence against civilians as a legitimate political tactic. A group identity may evolve through personal contact as a sense of self develops and strengthens in relationship to belonging to a particular collective. However, it may just as easily arise in the context of online activity as new technologies enable this same process to take place in relative physical isolation.

Within this process emotions clearly matter. They are central to the way people understand and relate to each other and to the strengthening or undermining of social bonds. Emotions contribute to the development of beliefs that can either consolidate or erode relationships between individuals, groups, and societies, to the point that violence is viewed as a legitimate political tactic. Emotions affect the judgments someone makes about their past, present, or future, and towards those they see as either facilitating or blocking their chances for a rewarding life. They contribute to the construction of morality and therefore to decisions about what kind of behaviour is considered permissible, or even necessary. Emotions help people to tap into the energy they need to act, and influence the way they think about what is fair or unjust. At times a person may crave emotional equilibrium, while on other occasions they may seek the thrill of an adrenalin rush. The comfort of emotional stability can be laid waste in the wake of a devastating event, or be tossed aside for participation in a joyous one. In short, we all live within complex emotional landscapes. While some people are experts at calmly negotiating the terrain, others struggle with the intricacies of emotional life. Nevertheless, even the most stoic can be thrust into emotional circumstances that are so disruptive they present challenges. It is therefore difficult to imagine how the social sciences

in general, and the study of violent political extremism in particular, would not be enhanced and enriched by considering the role of emotion. Human agency is unrecognisable if devoid of any concept of emotion. Whether guided by strong moral imperatives or detached, cynical calculation, experiences of emotion contribute to the quality and nature of social relationships, the beliefs one holds about the world, and the motivations that lead a person to act, including violently, in pursuit of a political ideal.

While there is little doubt about the importance of emotions to participating in violent political extremism, or of their power in shaping collective action, there is equally little doubt as to the lack of focused attention they have been paid in theories aimed at understanding terrorists' actions within the realm of psychological normality. Notable exceptions include Moghaddam (2005, 2006) Stern (2003) and Fattah and Fierke's (2009) emphasis on the role of humiliation within religious terrorism, Cottee and Hayward's (2011) exploration of the existential benefits of engaging in terrorism, and Matsumoto *et al* (2012) focus on emotions expressed in the speeches of leaders. Reasons for the relative dearth of information about how emotion contributes to violent political extremism may include real problems surrounding both methodology and the obvious difficulties in accessing and interviewing subjects. Another possible explanation lies in the way emotions are traditionally viewed as enigmatic, unquantifiable reactions, and therefore of little analytical usefulness.

However, the relatively scant attention paid to emotion within Terrorism Studies may also be interpreted as a side-effect of debates surrounding pathology or normality within terrorists' psychology. That is to say, in the largely successful attempt to establish that terrorists are driven by rational political beliefs rather than psychopathological tendencies, emotions may have been inadvertently relegated to the category of the 'irrational'. As Jack Barbalet (2002, p. 1) has noted in relation to emotion in social analysis, "[t]he conventional opposition between emotion and reason typically leads sensible people to reject emotion and to regard it as an inappropriate category of analysis, unless in accounting for psychological and behavioural *pathology*, in which case the emotions are held to predominate" (emphasis added).

The limited understanding of emotion drawn on within explanations of terrorist violence leaves it undervalued as a complex, dynamic aspect of violent political extremism. While all areas within the social sciences have trouble articulating emotion (Bondi, Davidson, & Smith, 2007, p. 1), the problems of identifying, analysing and communicating the affective elements of violent political

extremism are arguably even more difficult. Researchers within Terrorism Studies must be prepared to develop relationships with the perpetrators of political violence that allow for thoughtful and open discussion about the emotional environment in which the person made the decisions to join the violent group. This involves privileging empathy over judgment, which leaves the researcher vulnerable to the accusation that she/he is taking a “fateful step towards [...] making an effort to understand their motives, something that might lead to somehow ‘justifying’ what is unjustifiable” (Zulaika & Douglass, 2008, p. 32).

As long as Terrorism Studies views our subjective emotional experiences as somehow opposed to - rather than an intrinsic element of – the rational world of facts and reality, it risks ignoring a vital piece of the puzzle needed to explain why a person embraces violence as a form of political expression. This is not to negate or downplay the importance of understanding the role of more objective concerns such as social conditions, political and economic grievances, or the often simultaneously fragmenting and binding effects of globalisation. On the contrary, it is important to explore how these objective factors include an emotive dimension.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: LOCATING EMOTION WITHIN TERRORISM STUDIES

Understanding the relationship between emotion and human behaviour has long fascinated those who endeavour to develop a broader understanding of human nature. The great classical philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Hobbes, and Hume all had identifiable theories of emotion. Furthermore, all understood that, for better or worse, emotion played a role within the sphere of politics. More recently, the role of emotion in politics has become an area of heightened interest for contemporary scholars as they explore affect as both a means of knowledge, and as contributing to the maintenance or upheaval of political institutions (Crawford, 2000; Fattah & Fierke, 2009; Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000; Mercer, 2005).

This interest and inquiry into emotion has not yet seriously permeated the field of Terrorism Studies. This is especially curious given that the concept of terrorism is predicated on the belief that emotion, or more particularly the manipulation of emotions such as ‘terror’, can be used as a political tool. While scholarship in the field of terrorism reflects an implicit acceptance that emotion is directly implicated in violent political behaviour, Terrorism Studies has not critically engaged in this re-invigorated theorising. In some ways emotion seems to occupy an uneasy place in the study of violent political extremism, often informing basic ideas and concepts yet largely ignored because of its supposed association with irrationality. It appears as if emotion is ‘the elephant in the room’ of Terrorism Studies – ever present yet rarely seriously acknowledged.

This is more understandable when viewed from the context in which Terrorism Studies has arisen as a discipline. Studies of terrorism have tended to approach analysis from a perspective designed to delegitimise the actions of terrorists and reify the perspective and objectives of state security (Brannan, Esler, & Strindberg, 2001, p. 4; Burke, 2008; Gunning, 2007, pp. 368-371). Anthony Burke suggests that this is predominantly due to the fact that,

... Terrorism Studies is not dominated institutionally by universities so much as by think tanks, policy institutes, intelligence agencies, militaries, media organisations, and the ideological activity of political parties and ministers.

The traditions of critical scholarship possible in the university here yield to a more immediate and pragmatic concern with effectiveness. Even as it asserts ontological certainty, the knowledge of terrorists and terrorism produced in such institutions is thoroughly engaged (Burke, 2008, p. 37).

This largely pragmatic, state-centric approach to studying terrorism has drawn heavily on an artificial divide between the *internal* realm of the mind and the *external* realm of facts and knowledge. Research into such objective facts as the structure of terrorist cells, financing and training methods, weaponry, membership, and recruiting, as well as quantifying deaths and injuries, have tended to dominate research.¹ When research into the ‘mind of the terrorist’ has been undertaken it has tended to treat the terrorist as a flawed, anti-social or psychopathological deviant whose oppositional dispositions must not be given consideration by states (Rasch, 1979, p. 79; Silke, 1998, p. 62). In effect, Terrorism Studies may have inadvertently fallen into the trap of viewing subjective emotional experiences as somehow opposed to - rather than an intrinsic element of – the rational world of facts and reality. Consequently, ‘internal’ passions and emotions have been relegated to the less concrete explanatory realm of ‘feelings’ (Solomon, 1976, pp. 59-61).

Furthermore, the state-centric focus of such research tends to begin at the point when a person or group is already radicalised to the point of committing to violence (Horgan, 2005b, pp. 44-45; Toros, 2008, pp. 284-286). However, terrorism is an exceptionally complex process in which people from a variety of backgrounds and with various personality traits become radicalised, often through quite distinct routes and by carrying out an array of roles within an organisation (Horgan, 2005b, p. 51). The violent act represents only a limited, albeit highly public, component of the trajectory towards violent political extremism (Horgan, 2005b, pp. 44-45; Toros, 2008, pp. 284-286).

Conceptualising terrorist acts as the extreme and rare outcome of complex radicalising processes implies that violent political extremism is embedded within a variety of reciprocal relationships, both in the immediate sense such as between the various acrimonious actors involved, but also in the longer-term sense such as between dynamic historical, political, sociological and cultural conditions (Taylor & Horgan, 2006, p. 586). This has been an implicit theme in the earlier writings of terrorism scholars such as Ehud Sprinzak (1991), and is a more explicit theme of later

¹ For reviews on the influential research conducted within terrorism studies see, (Burnett & Whyte, 2005; Horgan, 2003; Ranstorp, 2006; Schmid & Jongman, 1988; Silke, 2004a).

scholars such as John Horgan (2005b). It is the emotional quality of these reciprocal relationships that is the subject of inquiry here. With this in mind, an examination of the role of emotion in the processes of embracing violent political extremism as a tactic needs to engage in both personal and transpersonal emotions such as those relating to individual, as well as collective experience and memory.

Where emotions have entered into the analysis of violent political extremism it is possible to identify three general styles of dealing with them. I refer to these styles-for reasons that are elaborated below- as, the ‘overly emotional subject’ approach, the ‘under-emotional subject’ approach, and the ‘emotions as mediating factors’ approach. This is not to suggest that all scholarship in the field fits neatly into these boxes, but rather that these categories represent a limited but useful way of conceptualising how emotions have been used within the field of terrorism scholarship.

THE OVERLY EMOTIONAL SUBJECT

Early psychological attempts to explain terrorist behaviour tended to frame their theories in terms of abnormal psychology, usually expressed as a form of antisocial personality disorder (Cooper, 1977, 1978; Lasch, 1979; Pearce, 1977; Taylor, 1988). This perspective tended to understand terrorism within a broadly psychodynamic model that downplayed the wider social and political contexts in which terrorist acts take place (Ruby, 2002, p. 16). When the wider context was considered it was through a focus on how family dynamics have interacted with the unconscious forces of the individual to produce the emotionally volatile personality required for a terrorist mindset (e.g. Ferracuti, 1983; Ferracuti & Bruno, 1981; Post, 1990; Post, 2007).

Certainly, common sense might suggest that individuals who purposefully bring about the deaths of innocent people are in some way ‘mad’ and at the very least ‘antisocial’. However, this understanding is problematised when considered from the point of view of the societies from which the violent political extremists originate. For example, a Catholic from Northern Ireland who joins the IRA, or a Palestinian youth who joins Hamas, may enjoy considerable popular support for their decision from within their respective communities. From the perspective of those joining the group as well as representatives of the group’s wider community their behaviour may be considered as a

positive social commitment, one which expresses love, compassion, courage and loyalty, in that they are perceived as willing to serve their community in the most selfless manner (Miller, 2006, p. 127; Moghaddam, 2006, p. 83; Victoroff, 2005, p. 13). In this sense, the community of support from which a violent political extremist emerges may view the terrorist in ways that are similar to the manner that other citizens may view conventional military personnel or police. This suggests it is inaccurate to conclude that someone who commits an act of sub-state political violence is antisocial by considering only the perspective of those who are targeted by the violence (Victoroff, 2005, p. 13).

A further problem with the notion that the ranks of terrorist organisations are occupied by emotionally damaged individuals who suffer from clinically defined antisocial disorders is that this theory fails to hold up to empirical scrutiny. In one of the most cited studies questioning the supposition of terrorist abnormality, the German psychiatrist Wilfried Rasch examined eleven captured terrorists, including Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof (whom previous studies had suggested suffered from serious emotional disorders) to conclude that “nothing was found which could justify their classification as psychotics, neurotics, fanatics or psychopaths”, nor could they be classified as paranoid or emotionally unbalanced (Rasch, 1979, pp. 79-85). Interestingly, the previous studies suggesting abnormality had been based completely on secondary sources in contrast to Rasch’s face to face evaluations – a feature which Silke (1998, p. 62) argues characterises most studies that suggest terrorist psychopathology. Later studies involving members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) came to similar conclusions and by the late 1980s the psychopathological model for understanding terrorism had been largely discredited (Heskin, 1984; Lyons & Harbinson, 1986, pp. 193-198).

Since this period, research on the psychology of terrorism has been almost unanimous in its conclusion that mental illness and abnormality are not critical factors in terrorist behaviour. The most significant scholarly reviews of the ‘psychological anomaly’ perspective on terrorism are those of Andrew Silke (1998, 2003, 2004c), Charles Ruby (2002), Jeff Victoroff (2005) and Randy Borum (2004). While acknowledging that some studies have found emotional disorders among a small sample of terrorists, Silke concluded that, “...the research supporting terrorist abnormality has been sparse and of questionable validity. In contrast, the research suggesting terrorist normality has been both more plentiful, and in general, of much greater scientific validity” (Silke, 1998, p. 62). Similarly, a review of the literature on psychological theories conducted by Ruby concluded that, “terrorists are not dysfunctional or pathological; rather [...] terrorism is basically another form of

politically motivated violence that is perpetrated by rational, lucid people who have valid motives” (Ruby, 2002, p. 15).²

Nevertheless, in response to the failure to identify any major psychopathology amongst violent political extremists, a trend has emerged which asserts that they possess certain pathological traits without necessarily possessing a clinical disorder (Silke, 1998, p. 51). One influential proponent of the view that terrorists have pathological traits is Professor of Psychiatry at George Washington University, Jerrold Post (1984, 1987, 1990, 2005, 2007). Although Post does not take issue with the proposition that violent political extremists reason logically, he suggests that the typical extremist’s reasoning process is characterised by a distinctive ‘psycho-logic’ in which emotions such as hatred are ‘bred to the bone’ (Post, 2005, p. 25; 2007, pp. 8, 15-38).

Defending this renewed interest in a refined version of the psychopathological model, some theorists of terrorism hold that the nature of contemporary violent political extremism is radically different to what it was in the past (Kernberg, 2003, p. 959; Laqueur, 2001, p. 80; also see, Neumann, 2009) and as a result previous research into terrorist behaviour is now largely redundant (Silke, 2004c, pp. 195-196). While this perspective may accept that old style terrorist groups such as the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), Irish Republican Army (IRA) or the Italian Red Brigade had rational political grievances, even if the tactics used to achieve their goals were abhorrent, the ‘new breed’ of extremists are constructed as religious fanatics engaged in an irrational and Manichean fight against all things civilised. In the wake of the Cold War, Samuel Huntington’s much debated *Clash of Civilizations* thesis helped invigorate the idea that emotion and passion remained a threat to ‘rational’ political organisation when he suggested that Judeo-Christian civilization differed from non-Western civilizations partly by the extent to which the former had successfully banished emotion from political institutions and agency (Huntington, 1996, pp. 174-182). This theory achieved a new saliency in the wake of 9/11 when Huntingtonesque themes were quickly appropriated to explain why Muslims in particular were prone to such outrageous acts of violence. Similarly, the worldwide protests amongst Muslim communities in response to the release of *The Innocence of Muslims*, a distasteful and offensive online video, revitalised questions over ‘Muslim Rage’, a concept which Fallows (2012) argues, helps to “advance the narrative of the

² It should be noted that Ruby is referring to the validity of the thought process rather than making a moral judgement concerning the validity of using violence as a political tactic.

unreasonable, hypersensitive Muslim”.³ From this perspective, political emotions are culturally relative and those ‘civilizations’ that have not managed properly to banish emotion from the public realm represent the greatest threat to the security of the West (Qureshi & Sells, 2003, p. 5). Therefore, Laqueur (2003, pp. 20-27) argues that the basic psychological explanations of violent political extremism must be recalibrated to account for ‘fanaticism’; a term that evokes notions of overly emotional individuals.

Importantly, this view fails to take into account more recent scholarship that focuses specifically on the supposedly ‘unique’ cases of Islamic terrorism. For example, Sageman (2004), Pape (2005) and Hassan (2006), have all undertaken extensive empirical research into Islamic suicide bombings based on substantial primary and secondary sources and drawn conclusions that are consistent with previous findings of extremists’ normality. Indeed Sageman (2006, p. vii), a forensic psychiatrist, analysed the personal biographies of 172 individuals identified as being involved in terrorist incidents since and including the September 11 attacks and found that jihadists were generally ‘transitional individuals’ from middle class backgrounds, often well educated, particularly in scientific-related subjects, and frequently economic or educational migrants. What he did not find was any form of emotional abnormality beyond the anguish that arises from the sense of being excluded from mainstream society.⁴

In short, the literature on terrorism that interprets terrorist psychology from a broadly ‘psychopathological’ perspective understands emotion as a pathological bias that distorts rationality in ways that make an individual vulnerable to violent forms of political expression. As such, those who have sought to ground terrorist behaviour in broadly psychopathological traits (as opposed to mental illness) have tended to draw unproblematically on the passions to emphasise the role of ‘negative’ emotions such as anger, frustration, aggression, humiliation and hatred. An alternative viewpoint, which has originated largely as a corrective to earlier views of psycho-abnormality, has been the rational actor perspective.

³The term “Muslim Rage” was popularised in an essay by historian Bernard Lewis (1990) and is also influential in Huntington’s thesis.

⁴ Although Sageman notes that one possible exception to this may be the late al-qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri who showed signs of pathological narcissism.

THE UNDER EMOTIONAL SUBJECT

Scholars such as Crenshaw (1986, 2000), Rasch (1979), and Bandura (1990) have been especially prominent in arguing that we need to view terrorist behaviour as more psychologically normal than abnormal. Indeed, it has been widely noted that violent extremist groups regularly exclude emotionally disturbed individuals on the grounds that such people pose an unacceptable security risk to the group itself (Bjorgo, 2006, p. 7).

The ability to make rational judgments concerning the security of the group is a clue as to terrorism's status as a form of strategically rational behaviour based on the learned belief that violence can achieve political goals. In contrast to the position of those who seek to explain violent political extremism as an action aimed at appeasing an individual emotional need to act out violently, Crenshaw (1988) argues that terrorism is a form of learned behaviour whereby the individual typically passes through a process in which they embrace gradually the instrumental value of violence (also see, Bandura, 1973; Bandura, 1990; Borum, 2004, p. 13).

Crenshaw (1988, p. 12) concedes that violent political extremists do not perceive the world in the same way that members of governments or civil society do, however, what is important is that the terrorist's particular perceptions of the world frame how they react to government policies and as such influence their choice of violence as a tactic. In other words, while "the actions of terrorist organisations are based on a subjective interpretation of the world rather than objective reality", the variables from which their belief systems are formed include their particular political and social environments, as well as the internal dynamics of their clandestine groups (Crenshaw, 1988, p. 12). Their actions may seem irrational or delusional to society in general, but the violent political extremist may nevertheless be acting rationally in the context of their convictions, which arise within a particular social, political, cultural and historical environment. For Crenshaw, terrorist violence is therefore to be viewed as a politically instrumental act.

This interpretation of terrorist behaviour asserts that terrorists use violence because it is a relatively low cost, practical strategy by which subordinate groups can maximise their power and influence to achieve their political goals. Indeed, research suggests there is little doubt that terrorists see themselves as soldiers in a 'just war' (Horgan, 2005a, pp. 87-90). In his research into suicide terrorism, Pape (2003, 2005) suggests that, contrary to popular belief, a person who engages in a

suicide attack is not irrational but perceives him/herself to be part of a larger campaign by organised groups to achieve specific and legitimate political goals. Pape cites an impressive number of case studies that include attacks by Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) to argue that “perhaps the most striking aspect of recent suicide terrorist campaigns is that they are associated with gains for the terrorists’ political cause about half the time” (Pape, 2003, p. 351). Similarly, some scholars have suggested that the invasion of Iraq undertaken in the name of the War on Terror, but widely perceived within the Arab world as a quasi-imperial military expedition, can be interpreted as an indirect gain to Osama bin Laden because of the widespread sympathy for the al-Qaeda cause that was generated amongst Muslim communities as a result (Bergen & Cruickshand, 2007; Burke, 2004; Gerges, 2005, p. 270; Mazetti, 2006, p. 1).

While acknowledging there is a strategic rationale in terrorist behaviour, the degree to which this can be attributed to purely means-ends calculative thinking is more problematic. Crenshaw (2000) has observed that the professed goals of many violent political extremists are often so unlikely to be achieved as a result of their action that it is difficult to support a purely rationalist theory of terrorism. Furthermore, the rational choice model fails to explain why, out of hundreds of thousands of people in similar socio-political positions, very few actually make the decision to engage in terrorist action.

Houghton (2006, pp. 269, 274) has suggested that the model of the violent political extremist as a rational political actor is more of an economic interpretation than a psychological one. From this perspective an extremist is driven by strategic logic and choice rather than innate psychic urges. As such, this position tends to valorise the role of rational agency in terrorist behaviour and downplay any emotional drives. While the rational choice model arguably provides an important corrective to the psychopathological approach in the sense that it provides a way of conceptualising terrorists as motivated by conditions external to the self, its tendency to obscure any consideration of deeper emotional drivers that may influence a person’s decision to engage in terrorism means that it remains in many ways a deeply unsatisfactory theory of violent political behaviour.

EMOTIONS AS MEDIATING FACTORS

In an attempt to overcome some of the limitations of the psychopathological and rational choice models, more nuanced accounts of violent political behaviour have begun to be developed. These accounts tend to view violent acts as the cumulative result of a long brutalising process in which the normal, psychologically healthy person increasingly comes to view violent political extremism as a meaningful option available for political expression (for example see, Horgan, 2005a). Process models emphasise how individual psychology combines with social contexts and acknowledge the role of emotions, particularly frustration, anger, and humiliation, in driving a person incrementally towards an embrace of violence. Humiliation has figured significantly in the work of scholars such as Stern (2003), Krueger and Malečková (2003), Gerges (2005, 2006), and Fattah and Fierke (2009). Of similar value within this perspective are examinations of a terrorist ontology that draws on notions of pride as well as in-group compassion and love (Abrahms, 2008).

One constructive interpretation of the process model that places significant emphasis on the role of emotion has been put forward by the research psychologist Fathali Moghaddam (2005, 2006). Emphasising the idea of terrorism as the outcome of a series of psychological processes, Moghaddam conceptualises a developmental process in which would-be extremists proceed through a number of stages that offer progressively fewer solutions and result in corresponding emotional responses to his/her particular political grievances, until violence looms as the only conceivable option.

In the first stage, Moghaddam (2006, pp. 45-58) emphasises how emotions such as frustration and disappointment with existing political systems can combine with crisis over personal identity in a way that begins the process of developing a subjective sense of injustice. At this stage people perceive themselves, or a group of people with whom they empathise, as victims of a systemic form of discrimination that limits opportunities in life. The majority of these people will stay at this level, developing strategies to cope with their situation such as stronger religious faith or a community of support, while others may slide into depression, be distracted by other matters, or simply give up hope of changing these circumstances. However, others will be motivated actively to seek out solutions for the systemic problems they perceive as impacting negatively on either themselves or those with whom they sympathise, and in so doing progress to the next evolutionary

stage of this process (Horgan, 2005a, p. 81; Moghaddam, 2005, 2006; Taylor & Horgan, 2006, p. 586).

At the second stage, Moghaddam (2006, pp. 59-70) suggests that feelings of vulnerability, fear and threat can combine with a sense of shame and growing anger at the failure to secure the desired social and political conditions. These feelings can lead some people to progress further up the 'staircase' towards violent political extremism.

Individuals who reach the third stage in Moghaddam's (2006, pp. 71-81) model continue to perceive severe injustices but experience intensified feelings of anger and the evolution of feelings of hatred which leave them increasingly isolated from mainstream society. Similarly, Wieviorka (2004, p. 285) has demonstrated how the persistence of social inequities, including the exclusion of some groups from participating in society, has meant that cultural 'difference' has become increasingly important as an identity marker. This gives rise to feelings of resentment towards those whom they perceive as impeding their opportunities. As such, a person may seek out a group of similarly frustrated individuals with which they feel a bond or may become more susceptible to the influence of a charismatic leader who validates their frustration while identifying an 'enemy' onto which to project their anger (Crenshaw, 2000, p. 409; Moghaddam, 2006, pp. 76-77). In this way, anger, frustration and resentment become channeled into thoughts of revenge.

The fourth stage of Moghaddam's (2006, pp. 83-96) model is distinguishable by loyalty towards in-group membership and hostility towards out-group members. There is a gradual engagement with the morality of terrorist organisations as individuals are socialised to see violence as not only a justified strategy, but the only strategy left available. Moreover, the person may be so immersed in the group into which they have gravitated that they see very few options for disengaging (also see, Horgan, 2005a, p. 91). At this point, the would-be terrorist experiences stronger emotions of love and solidarity towards their in-group, while simultaneously experiencing heightened resentment and hate towards the out-group. Indeed, emotions play a pivotal role in developing the bifurcated view of the world necessary for a person to commit an act of terrorism.

Recruitment into a terrorist organisation takes place during the fifth stage of Moghaddam's trajectory where a person is socialised more strongly into the traditions, methods and goals of the organisation before progressing to the final stage of the process – committing a terrorist act. Having started at the beginning of the terrorist process where “they share feelings of frustration, injustice

and shame with vast populations, potential terrorists now find themselves engaged in the extremist morality of isolated, secretive organisations dedicated to changing the world by whatever means available to them” (Moghaddam, 2005, p. 165).

Within process models the role of emotion is also obvious with respect to the notion of ‘triggering events’ – incidents that trip an individual from being a passive yet angry observer into an active and motivated terrorist. Using the events of Bloody Sunday on 30 January 1972 in Northern Ireland as an example, Horgan points out how triggering events build “a sense of communal identification with the victimised, and an often unwavering, confident dedication to the preservation and importance of the memory of the particular event itself” (Horgan, 2005a, p. 87). The deaths of 14 unarmed demonstrators, shot by a parachute regiment of the British Army, had a catalysing impact on the Republican community and boosted significantly intramural emotional bonds and attachment to the provisional IRA as a defender of Irish welfare and rights.

While the idea of emotions as contributing to the psychological process of becoming, and staying, a violent political extremist are visible in process models, the complexity of emotion has not been theoretically explored in any depth. Process models emphasise how violent political extremists are socialised into making sense of what they do through a system of ideological formation that overwhelmingly takes place when an alienated individual begins to socialise extensively with similarly marginalised and angry individuals (Taylor & Horgan, 2006, p. 595). Among the key psychological factors in understanding whether, how and which individuals in a given environment will enter into the process of becoming a terrorist are issues concerning motivation and vulnerability. Motivations for violent political involvement may include a complex mix of issues related to the themes of perceived social injustice (Ross, 1993, p. 326), the search for identity (Crenshaw, 1986, p. 391), or a quest for personal belonging (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). These themes also relate to one’s potential openness to vulnerability, although this should not be confused with the existence of a defective ‘terrorist personality’. Rather, an ‘openness to vulnerability’ includes taking into account all the social, political, historical and psychological factors that may combine in such a way as to leave a person with an increased likelihood of seeing violence as a legitimate form of political action (Horgan, 2005a, pp. 101-104).

Conceptualising violent political extremism as a psychological process that results in a particular type of behaviour offers a way of analysing and understanding violent behaviour within a wider political, ideological and temporal framework. As such, it establishes a clear and prominent

position for socio-psychological scholarship beyond the debate over terrorist [ab]normality, providing a space within a broader multidisciplinary approach for understanding the role of emotion. By conceptualising terrorism as the final act in an incremental process of radicalisation it is possible to examine how experiences of the social world are given subjective meaning through emotion. Furthermore, it becomes feasible to consider how emotion can then work ostensibly to legitimise violence as a form of political agency (Fattah & Fierke, 2009, pp. 81-83). Nevertheless, the process model approach tends to view emotions as by-products of different social and political experiences, and therefore reduce them to mere ‘reactions’ rather than viewing them as an important component of understanding and interpreting the world.

Furthermore, some interpretations and applications of process theories within counter-terrorism strategies have led to an emotional backlash within communities that feel that they are now ‘suspect’ and on a trajectory towards violent political extremism simply by dint of their identity markers, social position, or legal opposition to government policy (Bartlett & Birdwell, 2010, pp. 8-10). As one member of the Salafist community in Brixton explains in reference to the Prevent⁵ strategy in the UK,

[...] just because I want to protest against the war in Iraq, or because my wife wears a head scarf, or because I believe that Sharia law can one day be implemented in the UK, does not mean that I’m on some sort of pathway which inevitably leads to terrorism. But we know we are going to be monitored [...]. What they don’t understand is, if you treat people with suspicion then people will resent it (‘Aariz’, British Salafist).

Indeed, the difficulties associated with the implementation of Prevent draw attention to the importance of understanding the complex emotional environment in which people live, including the nuanced and at times ambivalent emotional relationships that need to be negotiated, particularly if someone stands in opposition to the *status quo*. The following longer exchange with an ex-member of the *Jamaah Islamiyah* network living in Australia reveals how becoming emotionally detached from mainstream society, becoming a ‘stranger’ in his words, can fulfil a particular longing. ‘Khalid’ draws a link between counterterrorism policies that seek to create divisions between more mainstream versions of Islam and those that are considered more radical, and an unintended strengthening of the extremist position. At this stage of the interview ‘Khalid’ is discussing his relationship with Riduan Isamuddin, better known by the *nom de guerre*, Hambali,

⁵ ‘Prevent’, along with ‘Pursue’, ‘Protect’ and ‘Prepare’ form the cornerstone of CONTEST II, the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy.

‘Khalid’: I see him on internet relay chat, he used to get onto the chat channels, which was not often, but he used the nickname غريب which is Arabic for ‘a stranger’, and there’s a hadith, or a few hadiths but they’re basically from the same one hadith, is that Islam began as something strange, and will end as something strange. It’s actually one of the signs of the coming of the day of judgment, is that everything will become really strange, - Islam began as something strange, it will end as something strange, and good tidings to the strangers. So those who appear to be strange...

Debra: Are welcome, okay?

‘Khalid’: Yes, so he used the – he saw himself as a stranger in a world that he just didn’t feel part of, and I think this is the many – I feel that, of late I’ve begun to feel – not that I’m going to do anything Jason [Australian Federal Policeman who will hear the recording], but I do – I’m sort of distancing myself from – I just find that I can’t be part of this society, I just don’t get it.

Debra: Do you feel in a bubble?

‘Khalid’: Yeah, I feel isolated, I just don’t get it, a barbeque is not going to do it for me, a beer is not going to do it for me anymore, wine, I mean this is what’s advertised on television all the time, I say well that’s not going to do it for me, I just don’t get it. So I can understand [...but] from the western viewpoint I think, they would see that somebody who is acting as a stranger, they would have to feel isolated, they wouldn’t feel comfortable, but it’s not true. I think there is comfort in knowing that you are a stranger, I think there is comfort in it, and I think it’s – that’s why I really don’t agree with a lot of the government policies on how to deal with extremism, by basically isolating certain factions within the Islamic community, trying to create rifts, because they’re not actually controlling the rise of radicalism or fundamentalist, or extremism, or whatever, but actually they’re giving strength to the strangers, and I think the strangers are probably – ‘here give it to me, do it’ (‘Khalid’, Jamaah Islamiyah).

Without understanding the risks of inadvertently further alienating, angering or frustrating the very people with whom stronger relationships need to be sought, some western counterterrorism policies may work to exacerbate the problem. For some people on the blunt receiving end of Prevent policy outcomes, existing loyalty to the UK may be undermined by feelings of suspicion and alienation. ‘Muhammad’, a quietly charismatic Islamist who accepts that his beliefs would be considered radical by many in the UK, explained to me his reaction to the scrutiny he was experiencing as a result of what he argued was the misinformed Prevent strategy. The following is an extract from my field notes diary about our conversation once the tape recorder had been turned off.

He told me briefly, and without detail, that he was imprisoned and tortured for opposing the Western supported/tolerated authoritative regime in his [birth] country and how he escaped to Britain because he didn't believe that violence could achieve anything. He then spoke of a deep and abiding obligation and loyalty to his new home. But soon his brows furrowed and his fists clenched and this calm and profoundly polite man seemed transformed by a barely suppressed rage as he then spoke of how if he wasn't a Muslim he would be respected for not pursuing a violent agenda, but here [in the UK] he is now labeled a 'terrorist' [...]. He was pacing, nodding, tapping the side of his head and no longer holding my gaze as he had been up until then. He would look and then look away, agitated until he abruptly stopped pacing and, looking directly at me said, 'I know how they can do what they do'. There was quiet for about 20 seconds as neither of us spoke then 'Muhammad' notably changed, the calmness was back, his shoulders straight and strong, and he smiled widely and warmly. 'It's good research you're doing', he announced, 'yeah, violence definitely appeals to the emotions' (Smith, Fieldnote Diary Entry 9/11/2009).

A focus on the role of emotions may help to contribute to an understanding of how anger, frustration and humiliation, or even of love and compassion, can help frame an individual's psychological process of rationalising violence. Interviews with terrorists and examinations of terrorist biographies suggest that feelings of anger, humiliation and frustration figure significantly in the process leading towards terrorist behaviour. However, terrorists also strongly express emotions such as love (of country and countrymen, or of Allah and the Ummah), compassion (for those they perceive as suffering under the existing system), courage in choosing to place themselves at risk, or even a desire for excitement and fulfillment. As della Porta (2013, p. 41) has noted, involvement in a clandestine political group involves the experience and expression of both positive and negative emotions (also see, Sageman, 2008, p. 87). While emotions such as anger, humiliation or frustration may contribute to some people seeking out a pathway for political action, so may the desire for thrills and excitement motivate others. While love and compassion may be a necessary element for some to be able morally to justify or frame a terrorist act, for others the need to feel as if their strongly held emotional beliefs can be achieved may be more important. This provides a challenge to popular perceptions of terrorists as either cold, ruthless killers devoid of all emotion, or as emotionally driven madmen devoid of rationality. Instead, it works from the assumption that violent political extremists, like the majority of people, are simultaneously emotive and rational political actors. As such, both the strategically rational *and* the emotional drivers of violent political extremism need to be the subject of inquiry.

In April 2008, a new journal was launched with the name of *Critical Studies on Terrorism*. The ‘Critical’ is significant because it signals a dissatisfaction with the current state of Terrorism Studies (Breen Smyth, Gunning, Jackson, Kassimeris, & Robinson, 2008a, p. 2). It also evokes comparison to a type of theorising which emerged from the *Institut für Sozialforschung* during the 1930s, and is most often associated with the ‘Frankfurt School’. This group of intellectuals, the most prominent of whom included Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Walter Benjamin and Erich Fromm, defined their critical approach to theorising as in opposition to ‘traditional’ approaches with the specific practical purpose of seeking human emancipation (Horkheimer, 1982, p. 244).

While the editors of *Critical Studies on Terrorism* make clear that they conceive of such a critical approach as more diverse in its analytical, ontological, and normative approaches than that necessarily expressed by the Frankfurt School (Breen Smyth *et al.*, 2008a, p. 147), it is apparent that the wider project of establishing a Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) shares some similarities with this approach. Both, for example, assert the need for multidisciplinary research which aims at confronting key social issues, both are critical of how mainstream understandings of social phenomena are often jaundiced by unacknowledged political agendas and ideologies, and both place great importance on the historical, political and social context in which a problem arises (Gunning, 2007, pp. 373, 389).

However, it remains to be seen whether CTS can develop theoretical tools useful for analysing emotion in the context of sub-state political violence. Certainly it appears to offer more possibilities than the more traditional approaches that currently dominate research in this area. For example, Jeroen Gunning (2007, pp. 363-364), an advocate of the CTS program, believes that a critically constituted Terrorism Studies encourages scholars to conceptualise security in broader terms than those of the state, extending it to the wider notion of human security, inclusive of individual, community, state, regional, and global dimensions. This in turn directs attention towards social justice issues such as inequality, structural violence and discrimination, in which states may benefit from reinforcing the *status quo*, but which may also be contributing factors to terrorism. It also draws attention to, and encourages research within, the wider historical contexts in which violent political extremism has evolved, shedding light on wider social movements of oppositional

politics from which terrorism may arise. Furthermore, the critical approach enables scholars to analyse the impact of terrorism discourses, including how they may contribute to the justification of state policies, particularly militaristic ones, or the discrediting of oppositional voices. Instead, it provides space for questioning existing social structures and conditions, the possibilities for social and political transformations, and for re-conceptualising the role of state *and* non-state actors in terms of both causes and solutions to the problem of violent political extremism (Gunning, 2007, pp. 376-378).

However, most importantly in relation to this project which focuses on the role of emotion in terrorist behaviour, is that the critical approach to Terrorism Studies reconstitutes the perpetrators of violence as broad subjects of social inquiry rather than as narrow threats to the state (Gunning, 2007; Sluka, 2008; Toros, 2008). From this standpoint, primary research, in the form of interviews which allow the ‘terrorists’ to explain their motives from their own perspective and to talk about their particular emotional experiences, becomes methodologically important to terrorism scholarship (Sluka, 2008, pp. 181-182). Nevertheless, critical theory, particularly as expressed within the Frankfurt School, has focused almost exclusively on rationality as both a problem and a solution in relationships of domination. Still, Theodor Adorno himself recognised the importance of emotion when he stated that “once the last trace of emotion has been eradicated, nothing remains of thought but absolute tautology” (Adorno, 1978, p. 123). In this sense, critical theory appears to understand emotion as a vital element of critical, rational thought. With modern neuroscience providing evidence of rational thought’s reliance on the emotions⁶, its role in developing and applying critical theory is even more apparent.

Therefore, this dissertation will use a broadly ‘critical’ approach to begin developing a way of theorising the relationship between emotion and acts of violent political extremism. Applying the normative ideals of critical theory, the principal aim of this research project is to generate new insights that will improve the capacity of policy makers to develop more humanistic and effective strategies for countering violent extremism.

⁶ For the most influential depiction of this argument see (Damasio, 2006)

FRAMEWORK OF THIS DISSERTATION

Two central themes structure this study. First, the relationship between human emotion and violence, and second, how examining this may help to illuminate our understanding of violent political extremism. The principal question framing this project is; *what role does emotion play in influencing the trajectory toward violent political extremism?* Other questions that this project addresses include; what role does emotion play in the strengthening or weakening of social bonds (Chapter Four), what is the relationship between emotions and beliefs (Chapter Five), and how do emotions contribute to violent political action (Chapter Six).

Chapter Two is dedicated to achieving conceptual clarity and to providing a framework for examining emotions as they relate to terrorist violence. I provide working definitions for terms such as ‘terrorism’ and ‘violent political extremism’, and set out six characteristics of emotions that help to illuminate their role in political behaviour. Terms such as ‘terrorism’ and ‘violent political extremism’ are contested and reflect the particular interests of those defining the terms. They also provide me with a conundrum because this project emphasises the importance of viewing those who have engaged in violent political extremism holistically, yet the label of ‘terrorist’ or ‘violent political extremist’ immediately defines the person solely by their act of violence. Such a label, argues Toros (2008:281) “denies individuals their pasts and the possibility of a future [...] taints and engulfs all actions of the individual whether they are terrorist acts or not, and reduces human beings to a single, two-dimensional identity marker – a label”. Furthermore, ascribing such epithets has historically been a way of routinely invalidating the claims of oppositional groups and their supporters, dismissing their anger, mystifying their sense of oppression, and deflecting attention away from how existing injustices may contribute to the development of particular mindsets that justify the use of violence (Kapitan & Schulte, 2002, pp. 177-181; Rasch, 1979, p. 79). So while it is important to provide some definitional clarity, it is acknowledged that the definitions offered here reflect the particular purpose and interests of this dissertation and, rather than resolving the vigorous debates surrounding the labeling of someone as a ‘violent political extremist’ or a ‘terrorist’, it serves to further complicate them.

Chapter Two also introduces the idea of three ‘emotional arenas’ important to understanding and analysing violent political extremism. I draw attention to how emotions operate within the social arena providing a link between social structures and social actors, in the ideological arena

contributing to the development of beliefs, and in the motivational arena influencing action. I propose that a consideration of emotion as operating both within and across these three arenas makes visible their relationship to violent political extremism. In this sense, this dissertation takes a step back from a ‘process model’ approach to understanding terrorist behaviour. Instead it works from the assumption that the decision to engage in violent political behaviour is not necessarily a linear one. Rather, it may involve a multifaceted fusion of changes and intensities that take place within different parts of a person’s life.

Chapter Three outlines the methodology used in gathering and analysing the primary data informing this project. I describe the reasoning behind the decision to conduct fieldwork amongst convicted members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and for supplementing this with primary interviews conducted with a small group of people who have either engaged in jihadist activities within the Western context, supported the use of violence against Westerners in Muslim countries, or worked closely with those who have. Some of the limitations of this research are discussed, along with the particular challenges of researching emotion. The process of conducting qualitative, semi-structured interviews in which interviewees were encouraged to talk about their lives, experiences and understandings of their own behaviour is described. This chapter also outlines the methodological assumptions that underpin this research, the approach to analysis, and ethical considerations of the project.

Chapter Four is the first of the analytical chapters presented. It begins by drawing from Social Movement Theory in order to show how personal emotional experiences are embedded within, and reactions to, broader emotional structures. It shows how individuals and groups can develop oppositional emotions in relation to the accepted norm, and how these provide the initial point of departure necessary for developing exclusivist identities characterised by increasing social and moral distance from mainstream society, along with an increased openness towards more radical ideologies. Following this, I narrow the focus to explore alternative identity constructions to show how emotion contributes to the upholding of rigidly defined social groups based on a sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’. The dehumanisation of the ‘Other’ is presented as primarily an emotional process in which each group provokes and deepens the disdain necessary for creating moral distance, thereby heightening the conditions in which acts of violence are more likely to occur. This chapter makes extensive use of the extremists’ own words to describe their emotions, including how their emotions relate to their journey towards accepting violence as a political tactic.

Chapter Five continues the analytical process by considering how violent ideologies are imbued with emotion. It reveals how vengeful ideologies provide a sense of validation and comfort by successfully explaining systemic negative emotional experiences in terms of victimhood and oppression, while simultaneously providing a clear pathway for action. I suggest that the appeal of violent ideologies is partly an emotional one and that rationalisations for violence can only take hold if there is a pre-existing emotional vulnerability. This chapter reveals how emotions contribute to the construction of belief and to perceptions of credibility. It then considers why a political agenda that incorporates violence may be more appealing to some people than one that does not, by focusing on how engaging with the ideology may fulfil broader emotional needs. Again, this chapter relies heavily on the violent political extremists' own words.

Chapter Six looks more closely at the role of emotion in motivating a person to act violently. It builds on the explanations provided in Chapters Four and Five, and marries them with the final decision to act violently. It contends that emotion plays a role in developing a moral framework in which violence is seen as not only acceptable, but at times as a moral imperative. This chapter considers violent acts as on a continuum ranging from a means of expression to a form of instrumental behaviour. Within this continuum emotions continue to play a role in decisions to act. As with the other two analytical chapters, this chapter also uses the violent political extremists' own words to demonstrate their understanding about their own emotional drivers. However, because it is only members of the PIRA who have committed and been convicted for perpetrating a violent act (as opposed to planning to undertake such an act) I draw only on their experiences for this chapter. Importantly, it is only within the realm of action that a person becomes a so-called 'terrorist' and only if the action they choose is violent.

This dissertation consists of both textual analysis of relevant literature on the subjects of emotion and terrorism, as well as in-depth interviews with fifteen former members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, nine people involved in jihadist circles within a Western context, and five people working closely with men convicted of jihadist violence. In producing this analysis, I hope not only to make an original contribution to the study of contemporary violent political extremism and its symbiotic nexus with the society in which it occurs, but also to encourage a fresh agenda for further empirical and theoretical research within the field of Terrorism Studies. Nevertheless, no new insight, theoretical perspective, or set of empirical data alone can offer a comprehensive model for understanding the phenomenon of political violence. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that this project is part of a continuous dialogue around the social,

psychological and political drivers of violent political extremism. To argue that emotions should be given serious attention in the study of violent extremism is not to argue that this focus should be more prominent than other areas of study. It is instead to argue that emotions cannot be ignored or dismissed in the search for 'rational' explanations, as has often been the case, and that they must be taken into account when developing policies aimed at countering violent extremism. In this sense, this dissertation aims to build on and contribute further to existing theories by focusing on certain chosen themes, critiquing existing perspectives and tentatively proposing alternative viewpoints. Nevertheless, underlying this project is the understanding that terrorism is a complex phenomenon that cannot be reduced to one mono-causal explanation.

CHAPTER 2

TERRORISM AND EMOTION: MAPPING THE TERRAIN

The more we ourselves are susceptible to such emotional reactions as anxiety, anger, ambition, envy, jealousy, love, enthusiasm, pride, vengefulness, loyalty, devotion, and appetites of all sorts, and to the 'irrational' conduct which grows out of them, the more readily we can empathise with them. Even when such emotions are found in a degree of intensity of which the observer himself is completely incapable, he can still have a significant degree of emotional understanding of their meaning and can interpret intellectually their influence on the course of action.

*Max Weber
Economy and Society*

INTRODUCTION

This chapter begins the process of developing a way of conceptualising and analysing the relationship between emotion and acts of terrorism or violent political extremism. However, before examining this relationship it is important to understand what we mean when we talk about both 'terrorism' 'violent political extremism' and 'emotion'. Historically, there has been no universal agreement among scholars over any of these terms, largely because they are complex phenomena not reducible to simplistic classification or description. In the case of terrorism, the aphorism that 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter' points to the subjective interests that often underpin and complicate any agreement over a definition (Kapitan & Schulte, 2002). Meanwhile, in relation to emotion, Goldie (2002, pp. 12-13) points to the difficulty in reaching a collective consensus, suggesting that when we talk about an emotion we are discussing a "complex, episodic, dynamic, and structured" set of perceptions, thoughts and physiological experiences rather than an homogenous phenomenon. Nevertheless, drawing on previous work within each of these distinctive fields of inquiry allows us to identify several consistent and relevant characteristics and traits that provide the basis for preliminary discussion and upon which this dissertation will build.

DEFINING TERRORISM

In the opening chapter to her book *What Terrorists Want*, Louise Richardson (2006b, p. 3) notes that the only universally agreed upon characteristic of the term ‘terrorism’ is that it is pejorative. However, this has not always been the case. The Jacobins first used the term subjectively to describe and justify their own activities in the French Revolution. It was with pride and righteous fervour that the Jacobins viewed themselves as terrorising the existing regime and extending that sense of terror to intimidate anyone who supported it (Truman, 2003, p. 2).

Yet as the word made its way into the English lexicon, it began to be used more as a derogatory label than a description of a political tactic. In one of the first usages of the term in English, Sir Edmund Burke refers to the Jacobin terrorists as ‘fanatics’, ‘murderers’, ‘thieves’ and ‘oppressors’ who were driven by a crude political ideology (Truman, 2003, p. 3). Thus, the wider political context of the Jacobin’s violence was downplayed in favour of emphasising the horror of their deeds. While from a normative perspective this is arguably appropriate, one of the consequences has been that the terms ‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorist’ have become so value-laden that they have become political tools in themselves (Kapitan & Schulte, 2002, pp. 180-181). Applying the terms to a particular group or individual has become an effective way to invalidate their oppositional stance and avoid examining the basis of their political grievances. Indeed, according to Rasch (1979, pp. 180-181), applying the label of ‘terrorist’ is an intentional part of the psychological warfare by which “the offenders, their goals and their ideas, are disqualified”. As one PIRA member observed,

...I don't think the word terrorist is appropriate at all. I understand people trying to explain what we did like this, because if you can explain it in those terms then you can avoid a lot of in-depth analysis or need for a political change ('Frank', PIRA).

In response to an understanding that the term ‘terrorist’ is both derogatory and a form of dismissal, some in the PIRA re-appropriated the label in an attempt to draw attention back towards the political context and to undermine the stigma of being called a terrorist. As one member stated,

[The English] ruled Ireland with a mailed fist, literally. A grasp of iron and nobody stepped out of line. And it's only natural that people are going to breed at some stage someone who says, 'I am not going to take that'. Now, what does that make him? Does that make him a rabble rouser? Does that make him a trouble maker? It ought to. I mean, obviously if he stands back and hits back it makes him a combatant. And it makes him, therefore, eventually, a rabble rouser and a murderer and a terrorist. *And if that's what*

a terrorist is, I want to be a terrorist (Emphasis added. Quoted in White, 1993, p. 64).

Alternatively, others attempted to attach the label to their enemy in order to draw attention to what they saw as illegitimate uses of violence against them and their communities.

We were called terrorists, but the British were the terrorists. What was Bloody Sunday but an act of terrorism? The British murdered 14 innocent civilians who were all unarmed. So to me, they are terrorists and what we do is a response to that terrorism ('Seán', PIRA).

It is within this context that new terms to describe terrorism have emerged. Words like 'radical' and 'extremist' are increasingly used to describe those who engage in terrorist acts, with the corresponding 'radicalisation' and 'extremism' being used to describe the process (Pressman, 2009, p. 4). One problem with this is that it makes no mention of any act of violence, thereby melding extremism and radicalisation into the problem of terrorism, implying that they are largely the same thing. While it may be true that a person who perpetrates an act of terrorism is both extreme and radical, it does not follow that all those who are radical or extreme will inevitably commit acts of violence. As Bartlett and Miller contend, "[t]o be a radical is to reject the *status quo*, but not necessarily in a violent or even problematic manner. Some radicals conduct, support, or often encourage terrorism, whilst many others do no such thing, and actively and often effectively agitate against it" (Bartlett & Miller, 2011, p. 2). For this reason the word 'terrorism' is at times used interchangeably with 'violent political extremism'. Regardless of the term used, 'extremist' and 'radical' remain value laden and are largely pejorative, and along with many other terms such as 'guerrilla', 'rebel', or 'militants', do not necessarily avoid the difficulties associated with labelling (Hoffman, 1998, pp. 28-34).

It is still necessary, however, for any academic inquiry exploring the phenomenon of 'violent political extremism' or 'terrorism' to develop a workable definition suitable for the particular project being undertaken. The definition employed here will inevitably reflect the interests and concerns of this project. It is not meant to resolve the complex and spirited debates surrounding the development of a universally accepted definition of terrorism or violent political extremism.⁷ To be sure, any attempt to enforce a single definition to encompass a strategy or tactic employed by a diverse range of actors for differing social and political reasons would probably be

⁷ For those interested in engaging in these debates more fully see, (Kennedy, 1999) as a good starting point.

futile (Hoffman, 1998, p. 34; Horgan & Boyle, 2008, pp. 55-56; Sedgwick, 2010). Rather, the definition developed here draws critically from several perspectives to provide an emotion-centred explanation that has analytical utility for examining contemporary manifestations of violent political extremism within this project.

Most attempts to define terrorism or violent political extremism include the idea that it consists of violent acts, or the threat of violent acts, perpetrated against civilian or non-combatant targets, with the aim of inspiring fear in the wider population. Most definitions also note that the violence is intended to promote some kind of political goal (Jenkins, 2003, p. 27). Therefore, at the most general level, terrorism is a tactic that uses violence or the threat of violence to manipulate the emotional landscape of constituencies in order to challenge or strengthen existing power structures. In this sense, terrorism can be something perpetrated by state and non-state entities alike. However, the particular focus of this discussion is on sub-state political violence and therefore it is necessary to refine this definition further.

Sub-state terrorism is not only intended to manipulate the emotions of the target - those who are directly or indirectly terrorised – but also the constituencies with which the terrorists identify. In this case, violence is intended as a show of power designed to inspire and mobilise those who may previously have believed themselves to be relatively powerless (Falk, 2003, p. 56). Unlike state terrorism, which aims only to consolidate existing power relations, sub-state terrorism endeavours to challenge them, or at least send a strong message of dissent. Therefore, inherent in sub-state terrorism is the message that existing power structures are unfair, and that a particular group of people are victimised as a result.

It is unsurprising, then, that the theme that resonates most consistently throughout the rhetoric of sub-state terrorist groups is that of revenge for past injustices. This holds true whether referring to ‘old style’ groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) or ‘new style’ groups such as al Qaeda (Richardson, 2006: 88). Witness the following statements, the first by Bobby Sands and the second from Osama bin Laden,

I am a political prisoner because I am a casualty of a perennial war that is being fought between the oppressed Irish people and an alien, oppressive, unwanted regime that refuses to withdraw from our land. I believe and stand by the God-given right of the Irish nation to sovereign independence, and the right of any Irishman or woman to assert this right in armed revolution (Sands, 1981).

The events of 22nd Jumada al-Thani, or Aylul [September 11] are merely a response to the continuous injustice inflicted upon our sons in Palestine, Iraq, Somalia, southern Sudan, and other places, like Kashmir. The matter concerns the entire umma. People need to wake up from their sleep and try to find a solution to this catastrophe that is threatening all of humanity. Those who condemn these operations [9/11] have viewed the event in isolation and have failed to connect it to previous events or the reasons behind it (Bin Laden, 2001).

What is demonstrated by the above quotes is that those who are willing to accept terrorism as a political strategy either share or are willing instrumentally to use a powerful sense of resentment to construct a ‘moral basis’ for violent revenge based on a particular understanding of the law of Talion.⁸ *Lex Talion*, according to Blok (2001, p. 96) is a “form of negative reciprocity, retribution means the culprit is to suffer what he has done.” Douglas and Zulaika (1990, p. 225) take this a step further when they suggest that underlying the terrorist act is the belief that “[t]o kill someone for an offence is an act of *justice*” albeit retributive justice (emphasis added). This was dramatically evident when a young man with hands still dripping with the blood of a young British soldier whom he had attempted to decapitate in the middle of a London street yelled to onlookers that, “Your people will never be safe. The only reason we have done this is because Muslims are dying by British soldiers every day. We must fight them as they fight us. *An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth*” (Rayner, 2013). The importance of revenge was also clear when Franz Fanon (1971, p. 69) argued in relation to the use of terrorism by the *Front de Liberation National* (FLN), “the violence of the colonial regime and the counter-violence of the native balance each other”. While revenge in itself is not an emotion, the desire and justification for revenge, along with the corresponding identification of injustice, the foes seen as responsible, the bonds amongst comrades, the construction of moral distance necessary to see others as non-humans to be eliminated, and the motivations to act, all have significant emotional components. Unpacking some of the characteristics of emotion illuminate why this is so.

⁸ *Lex taliionis*, or the law of retaliation, is a term derived from Genesis 9:6, “Whoever sheds a man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed”. *Lex taliionis* brings personal vengeance within the realm of lawfulness by prescribing that a punishment is legitimate if it is equal to the offense committed. An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth (Exodus 21:24), is the most commonly expressed version of the law of Talion. See, (Frijda, 1994, pp. 263-289).

WHAT IS AN EMOTION?

We all have an intuitive understanding of emotions – we feel them, therefore we know what they are. Most people can list a variety of emotions such as anger, joy, fear, love, shame or compassion. They may also be able intuitively to categorise emotions in terms of dispositions (an angry person), experiences (fear of the dark), and states (being in love). However, to have any analytical usefulness we need to have more than simply an intuitive understanding of emotion. In the following section I suggest six characteristics of emotion - referential, value judgment, cognitive and physiological, misleading, mobilising, social – and explore their relevance to political analysis. This is not meant to imply that these are the only characteristics or traits of emotion which are identifiable. Nor is it meant to provide a single claim, defensible against any opposing positions, about the nature of emotion. Simply put, the six characteristics presented here are the ones I judge to be most relevant to the broader goals of understanding violent political extremism based on the data collected for this thesis. They therefore inform the central understanding of emotion that permeates the research undertaken and presented in later chapters.

EMOTIONS ARE REFERENTIAL

Emotions are often thought of as personal – as something that takes place ‘within’ us. This line of thought has long historical roots in both Western and non-Western traditions. For example, Islamic, Jewish, Chinese and Aztec traditions have all drawn on the idea that the passions were located in the liver, while Descartes proclaimed that passion arose from “the agitation with which the spirits move the little gland which is in the middle of the brain” (Gross, 2006, p. 1). In this understanding, passion (from the Latin “passio” which means to be acted upon or to suffer) is something that happens to us.

However, Spinoza, suggested that an individual’s passions are constituted less as an internal malady and more in term of reference to the external world.⁹ In other words, we feel emotion *at* something or in *response* to something. If I love, there is an object (real or perceived) at which this love is directed. If I fear, it is because I am afraid of *something* (a spider, or of being alone). In this sense, emotions are not merely somatic reactions or reflexes, but responses to perceptions and

⁹ Spinoza’s account of emotion is expressed most fully in the *Ethics*, particularly Part III.

appraisals of our environment. For Spinoza, the emotional responses we experience as a result of these perceptions include responses to the social world, including social relationships, social institutions and social status (Cadena-Roa, 2002, pp. 203-204).

Taking the idea of emotions as socially referential one step further, Spinoza suggests that they are constituted specifically in reference to perceptions of power. For Spinoza, those things that we perceive as empowering us bring about joy, while those things which we perceive as disempowering bring about sadness. As Deleuze (2001, pp. 27-28) explains, Spinoza's basic emotions of joy and sadness are affects which reveal changes in a person's ability, or perceived ability, to think and act freely. All other emotions, Spinoza argues, are complex derivatives of joy or sadness which arise in reference to perceptions of power. This hints at an understanding of emotion that, at the very least, has an overtly political dimension but which also involves the appraisal of situations in which the person experiences their emotion.

Understanding the referential nature of emotions and its relationship to perceptions of power provides a lens through which to examine the appeal of radical political activism in which a person appraises the situations in which they experience their emotion. As one former member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) explained,

...there was no equal status, you were second class citizens, and some people would say 'no we were third class citizen'... a lot of people felt they were not worthy to get jobs...you weren't good enough to match up...and that's where the anger and the frustration came to the fore because people then began to challenge it and say 'this is no longer good enough' ('Coilm', PIRA).

For this PIRA member, his anger and frustration at being treated as a second or third class citizen has developed in reference to how he sees others in his environment. For this member, Irish Catholics in Belfast were unfairly treated in relation to their Protestant contemporaries. When asked why this was so he explained,

...it's just a matter of it's inbuilt into the society... you notice [...] that it's harder for Catholics to get a job and housing...From the inception of the state [...] you had the prime jobs in the shipyards and the rope works and then later in the aircraft factories [...] and practically ALL of it was given over to the Unionist and Loyalist communities, and Nationalists were excluded from that ('Coilm', PIRA).

Clearly this member's emotional responses are not simply inexplicable internal afflictions, but rather comprehensible reactions which have arisen in response to his assessment of the external

social circumstances in which he finds himself. If he had found himself in an environment in which he perceived everyone to be in his own difficult circumstances he may have responded more with sadness. However, the fact that he has assessed his situation in relation to a privileged or more powerful other has imbued his emotional responses with a sense of injustice, or the belief that his situation is fundamentally the result of a discriminatory social environment. According to this member of the PIRA he was not, “judged on the value of [his] contribution, or the level of his education”, but on the “basis of where [he] came from” [...] “what football he played or, you know, what religion you are” ('Coilm', PIRA). This points to the fact that emotions are not only referential, but also contain value judgments.

EMOTIONS INCLUDE VALUE JUDGMENTS

As we have seen above, the referential nature of emotion connects it to the social world. However, emotion is not referential only in the sense that it is directed at an object. Emotion also implies a value judgment. That is, an emotion embodies a way of seeing the world, or a set of beliefs (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 27). For example, in order for the PIRA member above to feel angry it was necessary for him to believe he had been treated unfairly.¹⁰ Aristotle conceived of anger as pain on account of an injustice, combined with the desire for revenge (Fortenbaugh, 1975, p. 12). From Aristotle’s perspective, it is impossible for a person to experience the emotion of anger without first judging oneself, those with whom one empathise, or even an object to which one is attached, as having been unfairly treated. Indeed, the aforementioned member was quick to explain that he personally had not suffered as badly as others in his community,

It was harder to get adequate housing and decent housing [...] although we personally were not in that situation, you know, small family with only three kids in the house, we were always comfortable enough...('Coilm', PIRA).

He even pointed out that, “the Loyalist communities, the Protestant communities at working class level some of them suffered, you know, deprivation as well” ('Coilm', PIRA). But for this PIRA member, the “only difference was when they went to get a job, in conjunction with the

¹⁰ This notion of anger arising from the sense of being slighted is explored by Aristotle in *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civil Discourse* in which he posits that anger arises when one senses that they have been done wrong, and that this wrong doing implies a lack of respect. (Aristotle, 1991). For a discussion on this point see (Gross, 2006). For a discussion of the way Aristotle understood emotions as cognitive experiences see (Fortenbaugh, 1975, pp. 9-16).

number of Catholic kids, the Protestant kids were goin' to get the jobs first. And that's historic" ('Coilm', PIRA).

The referential and judgmental characteristics of emotion are also evident in another PIRA member's assessment of the circumstances leading up to him joining the organisation,

We used to go to mass on Sunday morning in Clonard and my father took us around to see Bombay Street and it was burned to the ground. So that was my first introduction to the conflict as such, and obviously you are trying to work things out in your own mind, but I remember afterwards that I had a feeling of a sense of injustice that these people had been burned out of their houses for no reason that I was aware of. I mean, these were people that I knew, some of 'em, and they were good people, so in my mind there was no bigger picture that justified what had happened, it was just wrong, ya know, 'cos I knew all those people hadn't done anything wrong to deserve having all their houses burnt to the ground. And, so of course, when people you know are attacked, for no reason you are aware of, you get angry because it isn't just, it shouldn't happen ('Padraig', PIRA).

Rather than being irrational or pathological, this reaction seems perfectly reasonable under the circumstances. Nevertheless, it is important to note that to feel an emotion, it is not necessary that the particular perception or judgment about one's circumstances be accurate. Nussbaum (2001, p. 28) suggests, "[w]hat distinguishes fear from hope, fear from grief, love from hate – is not so much the identity of the object, which might not change, but the way in which the object is seen". In other words, if I judge a person or circumstance to be disrespectful, then I might respond with the emotion of anger. Similarly, if I judge the same person or circumstance to be threatening I might respond with fear.

This understanding presents a challenge to traditional ideas of emotion as a kind of 'animal impulse' that is totally disconnected from our reasoning. As Fortenbaugh has noted, "[b]y construing thought or belief as the efficient cause of emotion, Aristotle showed that emotional response is intelligent behaviour open to reasoned persuasion" (Fortenbaugh, 1975, p. 9). More recently emotion theory has tended to go beyond seeing thoughts or beliefs as merely the cause of emotion to include the role of emotion in constituting beliefs and influencing the way we think (Fielder & Bless, 2000; Frijda, Manstead, & Bem, 2000, pp. 1-4). That is to say, emotion is part of the reasoning process and therefore cannot be plausibly omitted when trying to understand how people make particular choices or judgments, including the choice to engage in violence as a form of political expression or agency. In this sense, emotions are not just something we feel inside ourselves but reflect evaluations of the empirical world (Cadena-Roa, 2002, pp. 203-204).

So far it has been suggested that in order to be present emotion requires a combination of different enabling conditions. Emotion needs an object to which it refers, and a judgment or belief about that object. It is this referential and judgmental quality that differentiates emotion from moods and feelings that are often thought of as the same thing as emotion. For example, a mood such as melancholia is characterised by a diffuse state of mind that lacks a direct referential object or belief (Cadena-Roa, 2002, pp. 203-204; Goldie, 2002, pp. 16-28). Similarly, emotion is different from feelings that are best understood as the physical sensations associated with emotion. Our feelings are identifiable in terms of the 'boiling blood' associated with anger, or the tears associated with sadness.¹¹ In this sense, feelings also lack intentionality and judgment towards an object (Cadena-Roa, 2002, pp. 203-204; Goldie, 2002, pp. 50-83). However, this does not imply that emotions are totally removed from the body – existing only as a construct in the social world. In fact, a third characteristic of emotions is their very existence in cognitive and physiological terms.

EMOTIONS ARE BOTH COGNITIVE AND PHYSIOLOGICAL

While it may be amusing to think that the passions were once believed to be situated in the liver, modern neuroscience has in fact located areas in the brain that react to emotion. William James envisaged emotion in terms of a "stream of consciousness" that possessed both a *cognitive* aspect and a *feeling* aspect (Barbalet, 2004, p. 342). When we experience an emotion physically we can be said to be *feeling* the emotion. For example, in his well-known theory of 'somatic markers' Damasio (2000, p. 42; 2006) investigated how some brain damaged individuals were perfectly capable of abstract reasoning yet experienced great difficulty when attempting to make social or moral decisions. For Damasio (2000, p. 42; 2006 especially chapter 7-9), it was the failure to experience somatically marked emotional responses to their reasoning that impaired decision making abilities. Even without this scientific attestation of the physiological aspect of emotions, most of us have experienced the blushing and rise in temperature associated with embarrassment or the pounding of the heart that accompanies fear.

It is important to recognise this biological aspect of emotion because it draws attention to the fact that emotions have a universal aspect to them that cannot be understood purely in constructionist terms (Svašek, 2005, p. 12). Clarke (2003, p. 147) suggests there is a particular

¹¹ To explore how this is also demonstrated in Aristotle's musings on the emotions see (Fortenbaugh, 1975, pp. 12-16)

reluctance to recognise the biological dimensions of emotion due to the terrible ways in which biological reductionism, eugenics and Social Darwinism have been used to suppress peoples in the past, leaving social researchers wary of engaging in any biological examinations. The effect, he argues, has been that “thoughts, feelings and emotions become disembodied altogether, everything is social, and it is as if we no longer feel hunger, the urge to protect ourselves from the elements, or show fear” (Clarke, 2003, p. 147). While the cognitive elements of emotion reflect learnt values and social expectations arising from cultivating aspects of social life such as culture and religion, the biological element reminds us that emotions like sadness, joy, anger or shame are experienced by *all* people, regardless of the constructions that otherwise define their social and cultural environments (Cadena-Roa, 2002, pp. 203-204). As emotion is felt it becomes recognised, thereby bringing it into consciousness and the realm of cognition (Goldie, 2002, pp. 62-67). Recognising this association was relevant to undertaking interviews about emotion because at times participants would struggle to identify or verbalise the emotion they experienced. By recalling the physical sensation they were able to connect this to the emotion they were trying to explain.

However, the point here is that emotion cannot be reduced to *only* these things that are conditioned within our biology. Indeed, if we accept that emotion is characterised by its referential and judgmental quality, then it logically follows that emotion has a complicated cognitive structure that is part of a wider narrative regarding our relationship to our social world (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 2). This is not to say that all emotion is experienced with the same degree of cognition (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001, p. 13). On the contrary, little cognition is required to feel fear if you are suddenly confronted by an armed robber, whereas the fear that permeated the United States in the days, months and even years following the attacks of September 11th 2001 has drawn deeply on complex processes of thought and understanding. It is this cognitive, complex process of emotion construction that Goodwin *et al* (2001) have argued is most pertinent to the study of politics and, I would add, to understanding violent political extremism, which is ultimately a political act, albeit a violent one.

This can be understood in terms of differentiating between ‘emotion’ as a lasting and complex state of being, and an ‘emotional episode’ which is more fleeting. Here I am concerned with the former understanding of emotion as enduring, complex and embedded in a broader, sustained series of experiences and events (Goldie, 2002, pp. 11-12). In this sense, emotion is viewed as contributing to a potentially enabling, but also constraining, force in political action in the same way that the more typical foci of terrorism analysis - such as social structure or individual

psychology - are viewed. Emotions are therefore epistemologically important mental phenomena to be considered in the study of terrorism. If we accept that emotions are, at least in part, formed cognitively in response to judgments and in reference to others, we need to consider how these judgments can stimulate positive, emotionally driven agency rather than negative, emotionally driven violence. However, it is also necessary to recognise that what emotional responses tell us can at times be ambiguous.

EMOTIONS CAN BE MISLEADING

Now that the cognitive and physiological dimensions of emotion have been established, it is possible to explore how emotion can be misleading. The most obvious examples of disingenuous emotions are those connected to phobias, panic and affective disorders such as obsessive-compulsive disorder (Salmela, 2005, p. 212). However, this is not the sort of deception that we are concerned with in an examination of the emotional processes of terrorists, who show no greater propensities for such disorders than the general population (Ruby, 2002; Silke, 1998; Victoroff, 2005). Of more importance to this examination is that even those without any form of affective disorder are vulnerable to the sometimes misleading nature of emotion.

Ronald De Sousa (1987, p. 12) illustrates this when relaying the story of a person who responds angrily to the news of her best friend's homosexuality, yet on further reflection considers her response to be in conflict with her wider values and beliefs. As a result, she experiences other emotions such as guilt or shame. In this instance, the guilt and shame may be a more accurate reflection of the woman's values and judgments than her initial anger, which had been arrived at without the same degree of cognition. In other words, the emotion we experience in a particular situation might be in direct conflict with our other cognitions (Cadena-Roa, 2002, p. 204). Similarly, one PIRA member demonstrated this misleading character of emotion when he said,

When my Ma confronted me about it [whether he had joined the PIRA] I was angry with her, really yelling, you know, like, 'what's it to do with you' and stuff, but when I calmed down I realised that the reason I responded like that was because I was feeling pretty guilty about what I might be going to put her through. I mean, you are told in no uncertain terms that if you join you'll end up dead or in jail. Either way, that was going to cause her some pain ('Liam', PIRA).

However, the misleading nature of emotion is not something limited to more spontaneous emotional responses. It is possible to experience misleading emotions, even with a high degree of

cognition. For example, if we are taught to perceive something as dangerous that is not so, for example a harmless spider, our fear at being confronted with that spider would be misplaced, even though our cognitive processes are accurate (Goldie, 2002, p. 28). Take for example this poignant admission from a PIRA member,

Looking back now I realise that I didn't hate him [the man he killed] but I did hate what he symbolised, you know, the uniform, the guns, the tanks, the barbed wire, I hated all that because it was a symbol of the absolute oppression of the British. At the time I just despised everyone who wore that uniform because I associated it with the suffering in my community and with the oppression of the Irish people... Since then I've got to know about him as a man, with a wife, and two wee little ones. He was a British soldier, but he was just over here doing a job, you know, for all I know he didn't want to be over here at all. I walk by the flat where he was killed once every few weeks and I say a prayer for his family you know. I'm not proud [of what I did] ('Ruari', PIRA).

It is likely that everyone experiences inaccurate or deceptive emotions at times simply because emotions respond to judgments and beliefs about external conditions which are prone to being imperfect. That is to say, the beliefs and judgments that become the foundation on which an emotion is formed may at times be erroneous and therefore the emotion may be misplaced, unreasonable or deceptive (De Sousa, 1980, p. 28). Because the meaning of emotion is learnt, including how to respond emotionally to the social world, it is possible to learn incorrectly, as the previous example of the harmless spider demonstrates. As Nussbaum (2001, p. 1) has noted, included in the content of emotion might be judgments that are either true or false, therefore emotion can help to channel either appropriate or inappropriate responses. Important though, is the idea that even misleading emotion is not necessarily a kind of blind excitement that prevents us from seeing the world rationally by distorting reason. Rather, emotion and reason, to borrow Marlene Sokolon's (2006) metaphor, work as if in a symphony, each playing a part in order to arrive at particular responses. It is this connection between the experience of emotion and our responses that forms the fifth characteristic of emotion presented here; that emotions are intimately connected to action.

EMOTIONS MOBILISE ACTION

The association between emotion and action is apparent in the Latin origin of the word ‘emotion’, which is *movere*, meaning to move. It is widely recognised that emotion helps to mobilise action, as people act and react to emotional experiences. Take for example this PIRA member discussing his decision to join the organisation,

When I think back to when I decided to become an active Republican what I'd seen was oppression and injustice, and I thought, that's exactly what I needed to do, I need to sign up to this organisation who see themselves as people who were physically opposed to this by violent means. It's like, well, you can't just sit around feeling angry, I mean jeez, you'd go mad. You have to actually get out and do something, and whether that is rioting or whether that is throwing some stones, or even joining the 'RA [IRA]. It feels better to be doing something than nothing ('Eamon', PIRA).

Emotion guides our attention towards activities that necessitate some kind of action, making us want to respond (Parkinson, Fischer, & Manstead, 2005, p. 16). The sort of action associated with emotion is often assumed to be rash, spontaneous and pathological. This perspective is evident in classic texts like Gustave LeBon's (1960 [1895]) *The Crowd* in which normal, reasonable individuals are transformed into angry mobs through the experience of collective emotion. Indeed, it is within the area of collective action that political theorists have tended to explore the emotions most, creating a kind of dualism between rational individuals and irrational, emotive groups (Jeff Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2000, pp. 66-69). Of equal importance is the idea that this sort of political action takes place outside normal institutional constraints, suggesting that non-institutionalised forms of political action draw heavily on emotion rather than cognition for their momentum.

In a break from this focus on collective emotion, Alan Davies (1980, p. 293) has noted that individuals search for sites of political participation when they experience something that draws so deeply on their emotions that it initiates a forceful response. Davies' focus was on applying the insights of psychology to understanding the realm of emotion as it influenced individual political agency within political institutions, and as such it signals an important break from the traditional focus on collective emotion and non-institutionalised political action. However, his observations hold for individuals (as opposed to only groups) participating in non-institutionalised forms of political agency as well.

Of importance here is the fact that the experiences which elicit the emotional responses that drive a person towards political engagement are becoming increasingly complex as individuals become more sensitive to events taking place outside their own spatially and temporally defined environments.¹² This includes forms of political agency that have arisen or strengthened in response to globalisation, including those that have harnessed the power of religion and culture as organising principles for political resistance. Indeed, globalisation has blurred the connection between religion, culture, and territory to allow for the emergence of particularly politicised forms of religious identity, the very appeal of which lies in the universalist yearning of people who feel excluded from or who do not necessarily identify with any specific place or nation.¹³ While the modern nation state has tended to serve as a vehicle for containing and expressing political emotions, political emotions are now effectively decoupled from the state and instead connected to a variety of politicised identities (Berezin, 2001, pp. 86-87). However, even when largely operating within territorially defined spaces, violent political extremism necessitates the development of a politicised identity that stands in opposition to the state. Politicised identities are necessary for a participant to perceive themselves as acting on behalf of a broader community, for support within communities for terrorist activities, and for recruitment into the ranks of terrorist organisations (Schwartz, Dunkel, & Waterman, 2009, p. 539). ‘Mick’ demonstrates the link between a political identity, emotion, and action when he states that,

I see myself as a Republican. It’s who I am as well as what I believe in. As a Republican I couldn’t sit back impassively while my community was treated like second class citizens. I’m not the sort of person who can just ignore stuff and not get angry when I see an injustice. As I see it, it was incumbent upon me to act in defence of, of people and communities that were suffering under the existing regime. You can be a Republican or you can be an active Republican. For me I had to be active because, as I said, I’m the sort of person that gets really angry at injustices and I was young and fit and didn’t have any responsibilities at the time and so I could take on that role and so I did (‘Mick’, PIRA).

‘Tariq’, a Canadian Salafist draws on a globalised political identity, however he still makes a connection between this, emotion, and the desire to act when he says,

So this is the environment I was in at the time. [...] It would trigger, trigger emotions. [...] We can talk about problems and...so I became very emotional. I remember seeing Al Qaeda training video on the Internet,

¹² This is expressed clearly in Zygmunt Bauman’s extension of his idea of ‘liquid modernity’ (Bauman, 2000) to include ‘liquid fear’ (Bauman, 2006).

¹³ This theme runs throughout several important texts on the rise of global religious fundamentalisms. For example see, (Juergensmeyer, 2001; Kinnvall, 2004; Roy, 2004; Ruthven, 2004).

seeing Osama...I cried. [...] I felt this great great emotion and this anger and I didn't know how to deal with [it]. I didn't know what...again no knowledge and emotion and the strong faith, it's like a strong soup. I didn't have any understanding of this so I'm getting exposed to these views, the unscholarly understanding with this emotion and I started becoming very, very angry [...]. You feel like you don't belong. You feel like you're in a strange world. You shouldn't be here. These people they're *kufars*, they're disbelievers. They're nobody, they're insignificant, you know. We're Muslims, we're the bests [...] I'd say, yeah, within 6 months. I was in the library at Salahadin watching Al Qaeda videos thinking yeah these are the people fighting in Afghanistan [...] We used to go together in the library and we used to watch these videos [...] holding AK47 with the Quran, with the Quran playing in the background. And showing videos of people suffering and then showing them training like military [...] So you think this is what I must do to save the day.
(‘Tariq’, Canadian Salafist).

While the meaning of ‘globalisation’ remains highly contested, and it undoubtedly means different things to different people, one comparatively non-controversial aspect of globalising processes as far as scholarship is concerned has been the development of fresh arenas within which new political relationships can be formed. This development provides novel challenges for understanding the relationship between emotion and political action as we are now faced with the emergence of innovative political, cultural, economic and psychological structures all of which have a simultaneously local and global dimension. At the level of foreign policy, for example, the complicating consequences of this development have been spelled out in the manner in which diasporic communities can now become both politically energised and inspired to network globally against policy initiatives implemented by the governments of their adopted lands (Brighton, 2007). This is not to say that their emotional bonds remain solely with their nations of origin. Rather, emotional attachment is complicated by multiple loyalties that extend beyond nations and that vary in intensity from issue to issue and, naturally, person to person.

Although differing in focus and conclusions, the understandings of emotion exemplified by Le Bon (1960) and Davies (1980) both draw links between emotion and the motivation to act. Emotion is understood as mobilising the energy for engagement and action. This suggests a sequence in which emotion allows us to learn or understand something about an object and then to act accordingly. For example, in Aristotle’s understanding anger arises from the knowledge that we, or someone we care for, has been unjustly slighted, and leads to the desire for ‘returning pain’ or revenge (Fortenbaugh, 1975, p. 15). This desire for ‘returning pain’ is evident in this PIRA member’s recollection of how he felt towards the British Army’s presence in the North of Ireland,

[A]nd so I says, that's the place for me [the PIRA], that's what I want to do, I want to hurt, and I want to get them down on to that boat, march them down to the docks and then get 'em on that boat and make 'em go ('Eamon', PIRA).

Similarly, 'Coilm' clearly expresses the desire for 'returning pain' when he recounts how during a forced wash in the H-Blocks he witnessed a sexual assault on a young boy of about 17 years old,

[T]here was forced washes [...] He wasn't using the deck scrubber he was using his hand [...] he used the opportunity of scrubbin' somebody all naked in the bath and used the opportunity to, you know, sexually, physically, like abuse him [...] well, if that happens to ya, ya know, its ah, you know, you're goin' to ah, feel it, ya really gonna, it takes it one level, I mean we all got battered, you got battered when you go to the RC, you got battered when, some of us like me do, end up in the hospital, you come out of the other side but if someone just holds ya and fuckin' sexually abuses you what do you do, you know, your, your reaction is to kill them on the spot, you know that's the only way of getting a sense of getting rid of that ('Coilm', PIRA).

Aristotle's use of the word desire is important when considering the relationship between emotion and action because it does not suggest that the emotion - action sequence is behaviourally *compelling* as much as it suggests it is behaviourally *inclining* (also see, Barbalet, 1998, pp. 26-28). While 'Coilm's' response to this disturbing account of brutality certainly appears to suggest a compulsion to respond, this speaks more to the strength of the inclination than to any inability to control his reaction. Neither 'Coilm' nor the young boy ultimately 'killed them on the spot', despite a seemingly overwhelming desire to do so.

The actions stimulated by emotion are intended to alter the relationship between the person experiencing the emotion and their current social environment (Parkinson *et al.*, 2005, p. 16). At an interpersonal level our emotions may incline us to move away from a person who is acting in an undesirable way (such as the inclination to run from a threatening person), or they may prompt us to come closer to a person who is behaving appealingly. These same inclinations may work at a broader, group or cultural level (Parkinson *et al.*, 2005, p. 17). For example, deep intergroup prejudice may invoke particular emotions such as fear or hatred when confronted with members of the other group or, in the case of Northern Ireland, the fear of violence can prompt both Protestants and Catholics to choose different bus stops, walking routes, residential areas, or any other negotiation of space, in order to minimise the perceived threat (Lysaght, 2005).

This understanding of the emotion-action dimension suggests a sequence in which emotion allows us to learn or understand something about an object or situation and then to act accordingly. This leaves a space for the role of cognition in calibrating or controlling the emotion – action sequence. This is particularly important with regard to the study of emotion in terrorist behaviour because it helps to direct attention away from rigid preconceptions surrounding personal psychopathology in which terrorists are viewed as psychologically *compelled* to perpetrate acts of violence and instead focuses on how emotion may make a person more *inclined* to pursue a violent agenda. Another important characteristic of emotion that deflects attention from any notion of individual psychopathology is the idea of emotions as highly social occurrences. It is the social nature of emotion that forms the sixth and final characteristic of emotion presented here.

EMOTIONS ARE SOCIAL AS WELL AS INDIVIDUAL PHENOMENA

So far the understanding of emotion presented here has concentrated largely, although not exclusively, on the personal experience of emotion. However, emotions also operate within broader contexts. Emotions are ubiquitous in public life to the point that we ascribe them to the character of institutions, nations, or processes, thereby enabling us to speak about the greed of financial markets, the humiliation of Arab nations, or the arrogance of foreign policy (Hoggett, 2009, p. 1). Explosive news stories also often involve the idea of particular groups of people collectively experiencing intense emotions (Parkinson *et al.*, 2005, p. 115). Whether these stories are reporting on the collective anger over the film *Innocence of Muslims*, the shared grief following the death of Princess Diana, the communal fear and outrage in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, the triumphant destruction of the Berlin Wall, or the climate of hope that characterised the election of President Obama in 2008, the idea that large groups of people can experience particular emotions as a collective is commonplace. It is possible then, that certain emotions may come to characterise groups of people who share a social identity or social position within broader society (Hoggett, 2009, p. 1). How a particular group shares in emotional experiences may be influenced by perceptions of group membership. For example, the grief and anger intensely experienced in many members of the Republican and Nationalist communities of Northern Ireland leading up to and following the death of Bobby Sands is in stark contrast to the fear of repercussions or indifference experienced by many in the Unionist or Loyalist communities (CAB/128/70/17, 30 April, 1981, p. 7). While an estimated 100,000 people from the Nationalist and Republican communities took to the streets in an outpouring of grief and solidarity at Sands' funeral in Belfast, in the British House

of Commons, of which Sands was an elected member at the time, his death was announced without even the customary expression of sympathy or recognition of his family's loss (Thomas, p. C1).

At a personal and interpersonal level we respond with a complex array of emotions to various events, people, objects, and experiences. Yet as individuals we all belong to a variety of identity groups based on factors as diverse as gender, religion, ethnicity, sexuality, and social status, to particular political affiliations, professions, education alumni, sporting teams, families, or any other group with which we may identify. As a general rule, we are affected personally by the things that happen to those in 'our' in-group (Parkinson *et al.*, 2005, p. 11),

Well when internment came in it was pretty well a law that applied to Catholics. I mean, officially it could be applied to anyone but in reality it was applied to us Catholics and it was so obvious. I mean, when the law came in, out of over 300 people interned only 2 of 'em was Protestants. I mean, of course you feel an affinity with them because you know it could be you and of course soon enough it was me and I was interned probably because I was a Catholic lad, so there you go. I hadn't even done anything at that stage ('Liam', PIRA).

Additionally, because groups are by their very nature defined in reference to other distinct groups (for example, Catholic rather than Protestant, straight rather than gay, St Kilda rather than Carlton supporters, or even smokers rather than non-smokers), what happens to corresponding out-groups can also elicit emotional responses (Parkinson *et al.*, 2005, p. 11). For example, the following quote by a PIRA member demonstrates how he took pleasure at creating difficulties for the British Soldiers,

You know you could throw some stones or do some rioting and it would piss them off and that gave us all a good laugh and a bit of satisfaction I guess ('Ruari', PIRA).

What these examples suggest is that many of the characteristics of emotion that have been discussed at an individual level may co-ordinate or generalise out to the broader category of groups. In other words, it becomes possible to talk about group appraisals that may result in collective joy, rage, shame or excitement. The consistent recognition or expression of group emotions implies a shared perspective and as such they are an integral aspect of political solidarity and efforts at social change. A vital role for those seeking to effect political change is to help solidify and at times intensify and broaden collective emotional responses in order both to communicate displeasure at the existing system and to gather the momentum and energy necessary for driving political change (Flam, 2005, p. 24).

As well as existing on a personal and interpersonal level, we have seen how emotion exists in relation to the group context, as particular loyalties or aversions contribute to the collective experience of emotion. Taking this analysis one level further identifies emotion as embedded within the norms, values, institutions and social structures in which we all live. For Georg Simmel (1950 [1908]), faithfulness and gratitude played a substantial role in binding us together in social relations that enabled the creation of permanent institutions. Similarly, in the *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Max Weber (2003 [1904/5]) explores how anxiety, stemming from uncertainty as to whether one was predestined to be saved or damned, helped to define the emerging capitalist economic system, while in *Politics as vocation*, he argued that the three legitimate forms of domination (traditional, charismatic, and legal) are determined by “highly robust motives of fear and hope” (Weber, 1946 [1918], p. 78).

Even more broadly, social theorists have identified emotion with entire epochs. The kind of enduring configuration of emotion that gives expression to a period or generation was referred to by Williams (1977, p. 131) as ‘structures of feeling’. For instance, Norbert Elias (1982, p. 292) has argued that a key characteristic of modernity is the reification of shame, Zygmunt Bauman (2006) has associated late-modernity with fear, and Ulrich Beck (1992) as linked late modernity with both fear and anxiety. Taking a more overtly political approach, Hochschild (1983, p. 163) has argued that ‘legitimate anger’ has been appropriated by the powerful as an instrument of maintaining the *status quo*, while French theorist Dominique Moïsi (Moïsi, 2009) has developed a ‘geopolitics of emotion’, arguing that hope characterises the Asian world, fear the Western world, and humiliation the Arab-Islamic world. Furthermore, we also now have a ‘happiness’ index to rate countries along with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the Human Development Index (HDI) (N.E.F, 2012).

A theme that ties these understandings of emotion together is that individual emotional responses take place within a wider emotional environment in which ‘structures of feeling’ and ‘abiding affects’ are expressions of economic, social, political and institutional forces (Clarke, Hoggett, & Thompson, 2006, p. 11). One “function of the political state is to legitimate some emotions and differentially encourage, contain and dissuade others” (Barbalet, 2006, p. 32; also see, Bense, 2008, p. xi). Possibly the most well-known expression of this concept has been in Niccolò Machiavelli’s *The Prince* when in response to the question of whether it is better for a prince to be loved or feared he counselled “that one would like to be both...but...it is far better to be feared than loved if you cannot be both...nonetheless...[a prince should] make himself feared in such a way that, if he is not loved, at least he escapes being hated” (Machiavelli, 1986 [1532], pp. 96-97).

The following member of the PIRA tries to explain the 'emotional climate' of living in Northern Ireland as a child by saying,

I mean, when we travelled out of the North [...] especially down to Dublin or over to Donegal, the moment you were driving back across the border there was always this sense of a darker experience coming back [...] every time we crossed, even coming back from football matches, you know, there was a presence on the border. There was always a presence on that Brit border, you know, with that RUC, B Specials and armed people, you know, and dark, black sort a gear and all tilled [sic] up to the hilt with military apparatus [...] and there's always this thing that you're moving back into something that is confined, the atmosphere, it felt thick and heavy and oppressive. It's hard to explain, but the North just felt different, it's like you are entering into a place that is defined by all these negative experiences, of sadness, and injustice, of hate and suspicion. And that feeling hangs over you like a cloud, weighing on you ('Coilm', PIRA).

What these examples suggest is that any exploration of how emotion is implicated in violent political extremism needs to take account of the way in which emotions operate at a variety of levels in society, all contributing to how an individual experiences, understands, and responds to their own particular circumstances. In other words, different social relations and norms may influence or generate different kinds of emotion, depending on one's position in society and with whom one is interacting. Emphasising the role of emotion in social relationships offers up possibilities of exploring how an individual's emotions are developed within broader, more dynamic emotional processes (von Scheve & von Luede, 2005, p. 306). In this sense, an individual's emotional life is deeply influenced by, but also influences, the existing emotional social structures. As Flam (2005, p. 24) has argued in respect to social movements, contentious politics gains energy and momentum from the construction of subversive counter-emotions to challenge the existing emotional structures of society. Retaining this level of analysis seems particularly suited to a study of the emotional aspect of terrorist behaviour because it prioritises the role of an individual's experiences and perception of their wider social milieu when considering how individual emotions might become activated and sustained within particular group and societal emotional relationships. However, keeping in mind how emotions are, at least in part, responses made in reference to particular people, events, or conditions, including value judgments, takes them out of the realm of being culturally relative and reconnects them to collective experiences and cultural expression.

The above discussion touches on a variety of ways to understand emotion. Research into ‘what emotions are’ is complex, contested, and controversial, in the same way that research into terrorism is. The approach taken throughout this dissertation reflects two important propositions. Firstly, that emotion is intertwined with reason, rather than diametrically opposed to it, and secondly, that emotions are a source of knowledge.

The ubiquitous yet erroneous belief that emotion works only to distort rationality, and therefore to distort reason, in decision-making processes does nothing to further our understanding of why people do what they do, including engaging in violent political extremism. This is particularly the case now that terrorist rationality is a widely accepted fact within Terrorism Studies. Indeed, when asking why people do what they do we tend to be looking for *reasons* for their behaviour so the customary dichotomy between reason and emotion contributes to ensuring that emotion is largely absent from serious inquiries into behaviour. “If no sharp distinction between emotion and reason can be drawn, then no sharp distinction can be drawn between *acting emotionally* and *acting rationally*” (Zhu & Thagard, 2002, p. 32 , emphasis in original). Even if one takes the normative position that we should not let emotion contribute to our decision-making, the reality is that it does and therefore it should not be routinely excluded as an area of examination.

To illustrate the point that the absence of emotion is not a guarantee of rationality, neuroscientist Anthony Damasio described a patient with an inability to ‘feel’ emotions (in other words he could not experience somatic markers) who was asked to decide between two possible appointment dates. The patient became stuck in a “tiresome cost-benefit analysis, an endless outlining of fruitless comparison of options and possible consequences” which only ended when he was told after 30 minutes which date would be more convenient (Damasio, 2006, p. 193). If emotions are irrational it should follow that a person without emotion would be more rational. Cognition would be unspoiled by the madness of the passions. However, how ‘rational’ is it to spend so much time contemplating a relatively unimportant decision without coming to a satisfactory answer? Damasio points out that without the ability to care about a particular outcome or to experience preferences, in short, to experience emotions, even the most banal decisions are impossible. It may therefore be more accurate to consider ‘passionate reason’ rather than binaries such as cognition/emotion, reasonable/emotional, or irrational/emotional (Hoggett, 2009, pp. 175-

178). While it is certainly possible for emotion to contribute to flawed decisions or behaviour by unduly influencing outcomes, it is equally true that reason is flawed when emotion is not present at all.

Related to the acceptance that emotion and reason are intertwined are questions about how emotion is related to knowledge. According to Damasio (2006, pp. xvii-xviii, xxv, 197, 245, 262), emotion contributes to the development of knowledge by directing attention towards particular information, increasing or decreasing the saliency of evidence or propositions, influencing memory, and guiding and constituting intuition (also see, Clore & Gasper, 2000; Fielder & Bless, 2000; Frijda *et al.*, 2000; Frijda & Mesquita, 2000; Mercer, 2010). In other words, our emotions communicate or ‘tell us things’ about the world and therefore may contribute to the development of epistemological positions. The experience of emotion blends with thoughts and cognitions in order to provide evidence about social reality. Feeling sad or happy can be construed as evidence that something is bad or good, feeling scared can be interpreted as evidence of a threat, hope or anger can contribute to the belief that a particular political position is preferable. As Hoggett (2009, p. 177) summarises, “[t]o say that the passions are the basis for our irrationality is to deny them their intelligence.” Therefore, this dissertation acknowledges the ‘intelligence’ of our emotions while remaining cautious about how we use and respond to them.

HOW TO TALK ABOUT EMOTIONS AND TERRORISM

There are three main arenas in which emotions operate which are of particular interest to understanding, and therefore countering, violent political extremism. According to Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta’s (2001, pp. 5-6) observations on social movements more generally, emotions can be seen as operating within and influencing cultural contexts, the framing of ideas, and readiness for action. Similarly, Gamson (1992, pp. 53-76) uses the categories of identity and solidarity, consciousness, and micro-mobilisation. I use the related idea of emotions operating within the social, ideological, and motivational arenas.

The role of emotion within the social arena is connected to the development of rigidly defined social groups based on a sense of exclusive identity and moral differentiation. This is because emotions are fundamental in social relationships, to self-identification – to thinking about

who ‘we’ are or who the ‘other’ is. In order for dissident groups to emerge, there needs to be a degree of shared emotional stress within a particular section of the community. Within the literature on terrorism this may roughly equate with the concept of *preconditions* in which pre-existing structural and individual factors provide an environment in which a vulnerability to violent extremism may be heightened (for example see, Vidino, 2011, p. 404). But to create disparate and seemingly incompatible emotional enclaves is not in itself enough to radicalise someone to the point of violence. It is also necessary to link these emotional experiences with a set of beliefs that helps explain them in terms of injustice.

A second arena in which it is possible to examine the relationship between violent political extremism and emotion is that of belief or ideology. Within Terrorism Studies, ideology generally refers to the “set of ideas which provide an individual with a new outlook and explanation for the world around him” (Vidino, 2011, p. 405). The appeal of violent ideologies lies in their ability to explain systemic negative emotional experiences within a narrative which provides both a sense of validation and a pathway to action. This provides an opening in which these emotional strains can be explained in terms of a particular social identity, injustice, victimhood and oppression. Nevertheless, if a person is socially disconnected from broader society and emotionally connected to a group guided by a violent extremist ideology they are not necessarily or inevitably *violent* political extremists. And so the third arena in which it is possible to examine the role of emotion is that of the motivation or impetus to act.

Emotions provide us with the energy to act when something pulls intensely on our emotions, initiating a vigorous response. Leaders within extremist groups recognise the importance of emotion in mobilising political action and therefore draw on descriptions and accounts of injustice in an attempt to provoke or escalate the kind of outrage and anger that can trigger an active response (Matsumoto *et al.*, 2012, p. 85; Wright-Neville & Smith, 2009). Validating emotional experiences within a narrative that feels authentic provides a sense of righteousness that can transcend any other logic. It then becomes possible to direct emotions instrumentally in order to justify political action, including violent action.

Within the social, ideological and motivational arenas of the subjects interviewed for this dissertation the six characteristics of emotion (referential, value judgment, cognitive and physiological, misleading, mobilising, social) can be recognised as contributing to the development of an epistemological stance in which violence is seen as a legitimate form of political behaviour.

These three arenas will be expanded upon in later chapters, using the words of violent extremists themselves as keys to the interpretation of the emotions at play in their becoming involved in violent political behaviour.

This chapter has provided a framework for examining emotions as they relate to violent political extremism. It has provided definitions of key terms and a framework for talking about emotions as they relate to violent political extremism. In the next chapter, an outline of the methodology used to collect primary data is provided.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY: A FIELD OF EMOTION

To presume that thinking would profit from the decline of the emotions through increasing objectivity, or that it would remain indifferent to such, is itself an expression of the process of dumbing down.

*Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia*

INTRODUCTION

One of the most persistent critiques of Terrorism Studies has centred on its failure to produce empirical research grounded in primary resources, particularly interviews with perpetrators of political violence (Brannan *et al.*, 2001; Breen Smyth, 2009; Hoffman, 1992; Horgan, 2012; Lum, Kennedy, & Sherley, 2006; Neumann & Kleinmann, 2013; Schmid & Jongman, 1988; Silke, 2001, 2004a, 2004b; Toros, 2008; White, 2000). The dearth of interview data is generally ascribed to the difficulties associated with identification of and access to suitable participants for interviewing, participant concerns over the use of data in a way opposed to their particular interests, concerns over researcher's safety, the protection of sources, the possible seizure of data by state authorities, and suspicion surrounding the researcher's motives in undertaking fieldwork in communities that are viewed as 'suspect' (Breen Smyth, 2009, p. 194; Horgan, 2012).

Given the security concerns and largely state-centric approaches that have tended to dominate Terrorism Studies, it is unsurprising that listening to the perspectives and voices of those who perpetrate the violence has tended to be marginalised (Breen Smyth, 2009, p. 197; Burke, 2008, p. 37; Gunning, 2007, pp. 368-371). As Brannan *et al* point out,

[...] *not* talking to terrorists seems to have become established as a source of scholarly credibility. Based on the notion that the perpetrators of 'terrorist' activities gain legitimacy as well as a propaganda outlet if researchers engage with them in dialogue and allow them to make their own cases, Terrorism Studies seems to have virtually placed a premium on *avoiding* first-hand contact with the subjects of their research [emphasis in original] (Brannan *et al.*, 2001, p. 7).

Nevertheless, there is a growing body of research that recognises that rich insights into why people choose to engage in violent political extremism can come from speaking directly with those who have made the decisions to do so (Brannan *et al.*, 2001, p. 8; Breen Smyth, 2009, p. 213). More recently, the field of Terrorism Studies has also begun to include research that places the question of ‘why’ alongside that of ‘how’ in order to expand and consolidate existing knowledge (Breen Smyth, 2009, p. 198). Consequently, there has been a renewed interest in the terrorist subject (Silke, 2004a; Toros, 2008; Zulaika & Douglass, 2008). Reflecting trends within the broader social sciences, Terrorism Studies has recognised the need to develop methodologies that enable researchers to talk to the subjects of their inquiry. With this acknowledgement come new deliberations over the kinds of methodologies that can be successfully drawn upon. According to Ruane (2008, pp. 149-150), “Unstructured interviewing is a good idea when one is pursuing an exploratory piece of research, [...] trying to understand a respondent’s unique experiences or perspective”. However, unstructured interviewing tends to take place when the researcher is participating in the daily lives of their subjects, leaving the interview to take place as a kind of “naturally occurring conversation” (Davies, 2008, p. 105).

Clearly this is problematic for someone working within the area of Terrorism Studies in which ‘participating in the daily life’ of a terrorist group is both unlikely and arguably unethical. Horgan (2012, p. 196) appropriately warns of the dangers of ‘talking’ or ‘schmoozing’ with terrorists in lieu of employing more rigorous methodological modes of inquiry, suggesting that while the former approach may present a more “accessible and exciting account” it is the latter that is necessary for promoting useful insights into violent political extremism.

Furthermore, the aim of this study is to treat the terrorist subject within a biographical framework in which they are viewed as ordinary human beings, albeit who have committed rather extraordinary acts. Nevertheless, extant literature on terrorism tends to focus on the highly visible moment in which an act of political violence is committed (Horgan, 2005b, pp. 44-45; Toros, 2008, pp. 284-286). Yet the perpetrator has a history and a complexity that precedes before and extends beyond this moment and which, if the process of how they eventually reached the point of violence is to be attained, needs to be taken into account. Therefore, the methodology adopted for this project favoured qualitative, semi-structured interviews, based on a narrative approach in which interviewees were encouraged to talk about their lives, experiences and understandings.

Semi-structured interviews are particularly suited to violent political actors when the information sought is a detailed, rich account of the experiences of “becoming involved, remaining involved and ultimately disengaging from terrorist groups”(Horgan, 2012, p. 206). Horgan (2012, p. 206) notes that the competent interviewer will seek out information about emotions, but warns of the consequences for the participant who may not be accustomed to this sort of inquiry. The issue of inadvertently distressing a participant due to the highly personalised and reflective nature of the topic was of great ethical concern to me when considering suitable participants. Furthermore, the ability to discuss emotions in a meaningful way provided a challenge and subsequently influenced the style of interview technique that was employed. How these issues were managed is dealt with in detail below.

ESTABLISHING A CLAIM TO KNOWLEDGE

A project that seeks to explore what Neuman *et al* (2007) have called the ‘affect effect’ invites many challenges concerning the nature of knowledge. Choosing or developing a methodology indicates assumptions on which claims to knowledge rest (Gubrium & Holstein, 1997, p. vii). For example, the choice of qualitative research methods reflects a belief that useful data can be obtained through developing a relationship between the researcher and those being studied; that reality is, in part, socially constructed; and that those being studied have the capacity to reflect on and give meaning to their experiences (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. 8). It also implicitly rejects an emphasis on direct causal relationships between variables and therefore the focus is shifted towards understanding the way that experiences contribute to the creation of behavioural processes and choice. In this study, qualitative research methodologies were needed to develop an understanding of the personal and social role of emotion in influencing a person’s choice to commit to violent political activism. This in itself was problematic for several reasons.

Resistance to the idea that human emotions can be the subject of serious social inquiry is widespread. Attitudes towards research in the area reflect traditional assumptions of a divide between external, knowable facts, and internal, subjective ‘feelings’. As such, research into emotion is seen as “the antithesis of the detached scientific mind and its quest for objectivity” (Bendelow & Williams, 1998, p. xii). The major source of this resistance lies in “the implicit behaviourism absorbed by many sociologists, the notion that emotions are by their nature vague references to

unobservable inner states” (Calhoun, 2001, p. 46). In other words, there is nervousness around the idea that any social inquiry into emotion relies on subjective interpretation rather than objective measurement. Arguably, however, the same critique could be directed at many well established political concepts and field of inquiry such as power, ideology, security, or class, all of which have developed within spheres of contested knowledge based on interpretation (Calhoun, 2001, pp. 46-47). So while specific emotions are undoubtedly less measurable than such things as voting patterns or gendered income distribution, they need not be thought of as so indistinguishable or inaccessible as to be beyond the reach of social inquiry. Nonetheless, claims to completely objective and value-free research are problematic as we all bring our subjective histories to our research thereby informing the types of questions we ask and our subsequent interpretation of data (Breen Smyth, 2009, p. 195). Rather than ignore these complexities, the critical approach employed in this study requires that they be acknowledged and scrutinised.

Along with a certain resistance to the idea that emotions can be the subject of serious inquiry, concern centred on the relationships between gender, emotions and violence. While violence is generally associated with masculinity, and in some cases extreme hyper-masculinity (for example see, Scheff, 2006), emotion is more often associated with notions of femininity (Fischer, 2000: ix). Within the realm of terrorism, associations with masculinity are apparent in mass media reports where male perpetrators are generally not referred to by their gender, while female perpetrators are, thereby constructing them as “interlopers in an utterly male domain”(Nacos, 2005, p. 435). Therefore, within an already dichotomous realm, interviewing terrorists about their emotional experiences appeared to be pushing these socially perceived boundaries even further as the supposedly hyper-masculine were being asked to engage in a ‘highly feminised’ pursuit. Whether one agrees or not with the reality of these stereotypes, it was possible that male participants might feel constrained by the existence of such socially ingrained assumptions.

Furthermore, and rather paradoxically, explanations of terrorism have periodically drawn on notions of a de-politicised actor who is framed as ‘emotionally unbalanced’ and therefore subject to psychologically abnormal urges (Ruby, 2002; Silke, 1998, 2004b; Victoroff, 2005, p. 12). From this perspective, perpetrators of political violence are constructed as highly emotional and therefore irrational. Again, regardless of the inaccuracy of this perspective, it was possible that participants were aware of such assumptions and would therefore be suspicious of any attempts to engage with a discussion of emotion in the belief that it may be used to pathologise them.

Two strategies were employed in an attempt to deal with these issues. In relation to fears of being pathologised, I chose to spend the first part of each interview openly discussing the subject. Rather than just reassuring the participant that this was not the goal of the research, time was spent asking if they were aware of the stereo-type and if it had any personal effect on them. Participants were generally well aware of being variously portrayed as ‘nuts’, ‘fanatics’ or ‘psychopaths’ or more generally ‘mad’ and ‘irrational’. They were also generally aware of the connection between irrationality and emotion. However, most were also quick to point out that they were also labelled ‘cold’ and ‘ruthless’ and that in fact they were just ‘normal’. The following exchange is indicative of those that took place between the researcher and the participants,

Debra: Are you aware of some of the labels that have been used to describe you?

‘Ruari’: Yeah, well there has always been that sort of thing, to discredit us I mean [...] Like, these are mindless people who plant bombs and kill children and so all that, that was used, that was very heavily used [...]. They still use that.

Debra: The research I am doing is looking at emotions, but it is looking from the perspective of them being normal things, that everybody experiences, not from the perspective that they are somehow totally irrational.

‘Ruari’: Well, the opposite is said as well you know. That we’re cold and calculating, like killing machines, no emotions at all. But, we are very normal people. I mean [...] there are certain things that affected me, that really made me sit back and try and kinda figure out why I was here. And that was through things that I seen or heard or been involved with. I mean, we’re all human (‘Ruari’, PIRA).

It is this insistence on normality and the complexities of being human that sets the tone for the rest of the interviews. From the outset, I had decided that successfully talking about emotion and emotional experiences would require a different approach to interviewing than that which may be suitable for obtaining opinions or facts.

In particular, I committed to approaching the interviews in a highly interpersonal style in which the traditional question and answer format was forgone in favour of a more conversational manner in which personal experiences were sometimes mutually disclosed. For example, I would sometimes disclose my nervousness and feelings of intrusiveness in asking personal questions of the participant, or share a personal story of my own in which I revealed particular emotional experiences or conflicts. At other times I was openly empathetic when being told of an experience that was particularly distressing or significant to the participant. On one occasion I cried briefly,

along with the participant, when an especially harrowing recollection was shared. In this sense, embedded in the methodological approach was a preparedness to not only interpret, but also feel the “finer shades of anger, pity, or whatever the host population specializes in” (Beatty, 2005, p. 2; Jewkes, 2011, p. 64). This emphasis on shared disclosures and empathy helped to create an environment in which emotions could be discussed as ‘normal’ human experiences, thereby undermining concerns over psychopathology (Gubrium & Holstein, 1997, pp. 57-67) however, it also meant that managing my own emotions became an important methodological necessity.

The extensive use of a field diary to record and reflect on my own emotional experiences, both immediately after finishing an interview and in the days and weeks that followed, was an invaluable way of achieving this. Rather than just recording times, dates, locations, participants and other objective ‘facts’ related to the interviews, the field diary I kept was also a journal that I wrote using the ‘stream of consciousness’ approach as a way of recording reactions, thoughts and feelings that could then be re-read and reflected on more consciously. If I was feeling particularly disturbed or restless about the experiences of fieldwork I ‘debriefed’ by email with my supervisors who provided perspective, advice and encouragement. For more personal matters that did not require discussion of the interviews *per se*, I communicated with trusted friends, one of whom was a forensic psychologist. These techniques ensured that my own emotions were not ignored or repressed, but rather acknowledged and examined. It is unusual for researchers to disclose the emotional experiences of doing fieldwork (Beatty, 2005; Ellis, 2009; Garot, 2004; Jewkes, 2011). However, as Jewkes (2011, p. 72) has argued, if we ignore the reality of our emotional responses we are not only being disingenuous but we are also missing the, “opportunity to enrich the analysis. If we can succeed in retaining epistemological and theoretical rigor while at the same time “confessing” to feelings of emotional investment do we not produce more interesting and honest knowledge?” (Jewkes, 2011, p. 72). By adopting an inquisitive and reflective stance towards my own emotional experiences of fieldwork I confronted the reality of the process in a way that was honest, open to scrutiny, and, most importantly, underscored the commitment that emotions are not beyond the reach of social inquiry.

The interviews were guided by a semi-structured format and at times resembled the more traditional question/answer approach. The highly interpersonal style recommended by Gubrium and Holstein (1997), however, allowed for movement within this framework, giving space to explore the feelings that arose in the context of the interviews. Even though great emphasis was placed on building rapport, interviews were always undertaken in an environment that maintained and

acknowledged that I was an ‘outsider’¹⁴ undertaking research. For example, with the exception of two interviews, all were conducted in an office setting, albeit sitting in relaxed style chairs rather than separated by a desk. In the case of the two exceptions, one interview was conducted in the lobby of a hotel, in an area which provided privacy but was regularly interrupted by a waiter bringing coffee. The other interview was conducted in the kitchen of an apartment due to pre-existing health issues of the participant.

Maintaining the position of ‘outsider’ is arguably an important ethical position when conducting interviews with people who have operated outside the boundaries of the law. Disclosing information that may be shared as an ‘insider’ (such as accounts of crimes committed but not prosecuted, or information that may compromise either the researcher or the participant’s safety or legal standing) is an unacceptable risk to all parties. In this sense, there appears to be a tension between having an ‘outsider’ status and developing the connectedness to mutually share emotional experiences. Nevertheless, the ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ status is fluid and complex and operates differently across a variety of realms (Jewkes, 2011, p. 67). While arguably I was, and would always be an outsider to all my interview participants in the sense of not having shared their experiences (I have not grown up in Northern Ireland, I am not a Muslim or a Catholic, I have not participated in violence of any kind, I have not had the horrendous experience of imprisonment, I am not even male), within the realm of emotion we all have the potential to be ‘insiders’ if we are prepared to connect at the level of human feelings. While I have not experienced my emotions in the same emotional environment that my interview participants had, I was in ‘insider’ in the sense of also having experienced emotions that are universal to all humans (Svašek, 2005).

Rather than assume that male participants would not or could not talk about their emotions due to their masculinity, I paid attention to developing ways to help the participants to access and identify their emotions. To help with finding a language in which to talk of emotions, which are often hard to identify as well as being complex mixtures of several competing threads, a list of emotions was placed beside the participants so they could use it to prompt a choice of words when trying to explain a particular experience. The list was as follows;

Angry, Ashamed, Compassionate, Contemptuous, Disrespectful, Disgusted,
Distressed, Envious, Empathetic, Fearful, Frustrated, Guilty, Humiliated,

¹⁴ For a fuller discussion of the insider/outsider distinction, particularly as it relates to research in violently divided societies, see (Hermann, 2001).

Hateful, Hopeless, Jealous, Joyful, Loving, Proud, Remorseful, Resentful, Sad, Sympathetic, Scared.

However, this list proved not to be necessary as no participant chose to refer to it and many were quite articulate about their emotions. As one participant noted with good humour,

[B]eing in prison and having that time to sit and reflect, I mean it gives you time to think about these things. You know, you had to understand the emotional things about yourself, and how to regulate them if you wanted survive in there ('Padraig', PIRA).

A different technique that proved useful when I felt that the participant was struggling to identify a particular emotion was to ask 'could you feel it inside you?' Often this resulted in the participant identifying a place (such as 'my gut') or an urge (such as to hit out). I would then ask prompting questions such as; what do you think made you feel like hitting them? Sometimes this led to an easy identification such as, "I was just really pissed off, really angry you know" ('Eamon', PIRA) or at times to a more tentative response such as, "I don't know, I just felt like I couldn't stand it for one more day, you know, like a pressure was building up and if I didn't do something I would explode" ('Liam', PIRA). At times, the researcher also spoke of her struggle to understand the personal experience of friends who had suffered under the Pinochet regime in Chile. Sometimes this led to a form of identification with the person being discussed. In this way, some participants were able indirectly to gain access and give voice to their own emotions by drawing on personal experiences to explain what it may have been like for the researcher's friend. For example, one participant explained what it would have been like being imprisoned in Chile by saying,

[H]e would have been scared for sure, but maybe he was also defiant you know, I mean, for me, I learned to control my fear, and for sure you wouldn't show any sign of it, but you control it by being angry instead, you know, not so much openly angry 'cos you can't do that in prison, but by being quietly angry and using that to plan and motivate you in your cause ('Cian', PIRA).

Being prepared to reveal some personal experiences if necessary, or to honestly admit vulnerability and uncertainty, contributed to the building of relationships of trust through mutual disclosure which Gubrium and Holstein (1997, pp. 57-67) suggest is necessary for sharing and understanding deep emotional experiences.

In this regard, identifying, analysing and communicating the emotional elements leading to violent political extremism may actually require researchers within Terrorism Studies to develop empathetic relationships with the perpetrators of political violence. This is controversial because

admitting empathy into the method of inquiry challenges the ideal of the detached, objective, scientific researcher. Furthermore, in the field of Terrorism Studies it is tantamount to a breach of allegiance. Such an approach has historically left the researcher open to accusations that she/he is sympathising with the actions of terrorists or acting as a mouthpiece for terrorist propaganda (Brannan *et al.*, 2001, p. 7). Yet empathy is crucial to creating an environment in which sharing and understanding profound emotional experiences is possible (Gubrium & Holstein, 1997, pp. 57-67). It is unrealistic and profoundly arrogant to expect people to reveal very personal and emotional aspects of their lives when faced with an antagonistic or even detached interviewer. As one participant in my interviews stated, “[some] researchers approach you as if they were looking for a tail and a wee set of horns. You know what it is that they think already and so you just give them the line, you know, the official line, but you don’t give ‘em anything of yourself, why would you?” (‘Ruari’, PIRA).

The resistance to developing empathetic relationships with the participants of violent political extremism is reinforced by the aforementioned tendency to focus on the violent act rather than seeing the perpetrator more holistically. It is worth restating, then, that in order for the motivations of perpetrators to be understood, a broader historical approach is important. (Horgan, 2005b, pp. 44-45; Toros, 2008, pp. 284-286; White, 2000, p. 96). Such an approach reconstitutes the perpetrators of violence as *human* subjects of social inquiry, rather than as *de-humanised* threats to be eliminated or contained (Brannan *et al.*, 2001, p. 4; Toros, 2008, p. 281). From this standpoint, primary research in the form of interviews that allow the violent political extremist to explain their motives and to talk about particular emotional experiences becomes methodologically important to terrorism scholarship. Equally important, however, is to take a view of emotion that extends beyond the realm of an internal malady and instead connects emotional experiences with broader emotional environments. In other words, it is important to understand that individual emotional experiences take place within broader ‘structures of feeling’ (Williams, 1977). For example, the fear of crime may be ‘felt’ as an individual response but may also be embedded within an environment in which crime is increasingly (and possibly incorrectly) presented as a growing social problem. Without this environment the individual experience of fear may not exist or may be lessened.

Further concerns surrounded how accurate the information arising from the interviews could be. This included questions about how willing or able the participant would be to face confronting, unpleasant emotional experiences, whether the participant would be able to recall accurately the emotional experiences of the past, or whether they might be disingenuous in relating them in order

to further a private agenda. These are all challenges that cannot easily be overcome or dismissed. Rather than focusing on the idea of accessing some indelible and static ‘truth’, the approach taken here accepts that how the participant chooses to relate their experiences, how they interpret them, what they choose to tell me and what they choose to exclude or avoid, all contribute important information and insight into the participant and particularly into the meaning they place on their experiences.

IDENTIFYING AND RECRUITING PARTICIPANTS

Qualitative research tends to work with a relatively small number of cases due to a tendency to privilege detail over latitude (Silverman, 2005, p. 9). In the area of Terrorism Studies, Horgan (2012, p. 207) notes that criticism of interviews undertaken with small groups of participants stem from misunderstandings around the central purpose of exploratory research and about the usefulness of generalising beyond the arena of immediate study. The purpose of this study is not to develop a causal theory of motivations for terrorism but rather to develop insights into how a series of decisions that ultimately led to the involvement in a terrorist organisation may have been influenced by emotional experiences.

In choosing a group of people to participate in this study issues surrounding access to those who had personally engaged in sub-state political violence, ability and willingness to speak about emotions, my own personal safety, and unacknowledged agendas for participation were all considered. The first group chosen was ex-Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) members. The logic of this choice lay firstly in the fact that many ex-PIRA members are now in their late 40s to early 60s, have been disengaged from direct violence since the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, are actively participating in furthering the peace process and community cohesion, and were accessible via ex-prisoner organisations such as Coiste na n-Iarchimí, or political organisations such as Sinn Féin. Furthermore, cultural and language difficulties were minimised due to familiarity between Anglo and Celtic traditions.

I hoped that the substantial amount of time since being imprisoned and disengaging from violence, along with personal maturity and a subsequent commitment to pursuing political change

through democratic processes, indicated an ability and willingness to reflect thoughtfully on the personal and social conditions that influenced their choices to engage in violent political activism. An unanticipated benefit from this cohort of people was that several had become parents and had children who were the age they had been when they became politically active. This allowed for thoughtful and insightful discussion about youthful behaviour and for reflection on their own mindset at a similar age. It also allowed for discussion about the changing social environments for their children as opposed to their own childhood and for strategies that they have used in order to minimise their own children becoming involved in organisations such as the Real or Continuity IRAs.

Prior to leaving for fieldwork I had two telephone conversations with a Republican ex-prisoner about my desire to discuss emotional experiences leading up to and including engaging in violence and asked if he could help identify ten potential participants who may be willing to collaborate in such a project. During the first phone call I emphasised that I was not pursuing any information with regard to operational matters but raised concerns about inadvertently traumatising participants due to the reflective and personal nature of the topic. This man, himself an ex-Republican prisoner and participant in the 'blanket protest' and the 1981 hunger strike, asked several questions about the style and length of interviews, the sort of topics to be discussed, why I was pursuing this type of research, how it was funded and what it would be used for. I answered these questions openly and admitted that as a PhD student I had an Australian government funded scholarship but that the funding was not tied to providing outcomes or reports on my research beyond the administrative requirements of the university. He then indicated a willingness to participate personally in the project and suggested that he was well positioned to identify those who would be suited to this style of research. It was agreed that this man would make some preliminary inquiries amongst ex-prisoners on my behalf. He also helped to facilitate accommodation for six weeks in the Falls Road area of Belfast.

Even in the early stages of identifying and approaching potential participants a process that emphasised 'collaborator' in preference to 'subject' of inquiry was taken in an effort to begin establishing a dynamic that would later be conducive to the 'mutual disclosure' style of interview which Douglas (in Gubrium & Holstein, 1997, p. 66) identifies as integral when exploring emotional experiences and understandings. Before conducting any formal interviews I participated in some social activities in West Belfast, such as a fundraising event to raise money for the legal defence of two Basque men facing extradition to Spain on terrorism related charges; some trivia nights run in 'Republican pubs'; eating at 'Cultúrlann', an Irish cultural arts centre located in the

Falls Road; attending a 'gig' to see an ex-Republican prisoner perform protest songs; and an historical night of celebration which included a re-enactment of Republican interactions with the Black and Tans. Sometimes these occasions provided an opportunity for Republicans informally to explain some of their history in a social setting or to ask questions about my own background. During these events it was important to participate but also not to 'go native', thinking that somehow you were accepted into or part of the community. While these opportunities for interaction no doubt contributed to a sense of familiarity conducive to more open discussion during the formal interviews, it would be naïve of any researcher to assume that their role as a researcher is not ever-present. I respected their privacy by remaining on the periphery of social events, avoiding situations where drinking was rife, and thanking them as a guest would for their hospitality before leaving.

One indication of the success of the 'collaborator' approach was the extended length of the interviews. While interviews of one hour length were initially negotiated, the average length of each interview was two hours and four minutes. After one hour the researcher noted the time aloud and asked the participant if they would like to stop. Only one interview finished at this point, several broke for cups of coffee or tea, while often the participant noted that there was still more to cover, and suggested continuing on. Furthermore, with the exception of three interviews, follow-up discussions, both recorded and not recorded, were engaged in over a period of several weeks. Five extra participants were recruited into the interviews facilitated by those who had already participated. Another indication of the effectiveness of the 'collaborator' approach for discussing emotions was that several participants hugged the researcher at the end of the interview, exchanged email addresses or phone numbers, and offered to do follow up interviews if any clarification was required. One participant even expressed his relief at being able to talk about some of the more personal things he experienced as an active Republican and said he found the interview quite cathartic.

A drawback of this approach, however, was an increased difficulty in negotiating appropriate personal boundaries, particularly as a female researcher. The first interview I was to carry out was abandoned when it became apparent that the potential participant had a tendency to overstep the personal boundaries that I felt comfortable with. Rather than shy away from this experience I expressed my firm conviction that this was inappropriate. I was prepared for the possibility that this may lead to a close down of access to participants however I was assured by those organising access that I had their support and from then on I had no difficulties. Rather than

leading to a blocking of access, standing firm on this point likely increased my ethical credentials amongst those organising access to participants.

The subsequent fifteen interviews conducted with convicted PIRA members form the basis of the themes discussed in this dissertation. However, I was keen to extend the parameters of the project to include a sample of people who had committed to contemporary jihadist political violence within a Western, Liberal Democratic context. Accessing these participants proved more difficult for a variety of reasons. Funding for further travel was unavailable and there is only a very small pool of research participants to draw from within Australia. At the point of writing there have only been twenty-three men convicted of terrorism offences in Australia, and all remain embedded within the criminal justice system, either as prisoners, on parole, or lodging appeals to their convictions. I was unable to get Ethics Approval to pursue interviews with this group due to the legal implication of talking to anyone still within the criminal justice system.

There was one exception to this and a series of three interviews, each of approximately two hours, were conducted with one person who had been convicted of an offence that would fit the contemporary legal parameters of a terrorism offence, although at the time of his conviction this category did not exist. He served a period in jail and had subsequently been released. This interview was facilitated by the Australian Federal Police and as part of the terms I was required to provide a recording of the interview to the AFP. This was all discussed openly with the participant who agreed to the terms. As in the case of the PIRA interviews, it was made clear that I had no interest in discussing operational issues, which was the main area of interest to the police, and the interviews were focused around the emotional environment in which the participant grew up, his understanding of his emotional state during different periods of his life, and the emotional experiences of joining and belonging to the particular jihadist organisation with which he was associated.

In this sense, the methodological approach mirrored that of the interviews with PIRA members and I continue to communicate with the participant about a variety of unrelated topics, such as family life, ongoing personal challenges and achievements, and particular writing projects. While the series of interviews with this participant were rich with emotional data I am limited in drawing generalisations regarding jihadism from them and instead have used them to complement the themes derived from the PIRA interviews.

In addition to this, five interviews were carried out with people who work closely with those convicted on terrorism related charges in the UK. These people, (four men and one woman) came from the Salafist community within the UK and while their views may be considered radical or extreme, they are all working to ensure that violence is not used within the UK.

In order to acquire more primary data from which to draw out the emotional experiences of jihadists I had access to recordings and transcripts of 482 wire-taps collected during a joint operation between ASIO, the Australian Federal Police, Victorian police and New South Wales police which led to the arrest of thirteen people in Melbourne and nine in Sydney (codenamed Operation Pendennis). Access to this data was a result of research undertaken on the Monash Radicalisation Project during employment at the Global Terrorism Research Centre (GTReC) at Monash University. Of these wiretaps, the vast majority were of limited use to the particular emotional focus of this project.

Also as a result of the Monash Radicalisation Project I was provided access to seven interviews conducted with people who have been convicted of terrorism offences in Canada. These interviews were not conducted by me and therefore are not consistent with the methodology outlined above in which talking about emotion is the focus. However, these interviews include reflections by the participants on their own particular emotional experiences and provide a reference point through which existing themes can be either supported or problematised. As in the case of the participant that was arrested in Australia I am limited in drawing generalisations regarding violent jihadism from these. Instead they also are used in a way that complements the themes derived from the PIRA interviews.

ANALYSIS

All semi-structured interviews that I conducted, I also recorded and transcribed. Interviews not conducted by me were provided in both a transcribed and recorded version. In each case, pseudonyms were created in order to comply with Ethics Committee requirements of anonymity. These pseudonyms are expressed as names in inverted commas such as 'Kevin' or 'Khalid'. For the same reason no biographical information is provided for participants except in the broadest terms. Personally conducted interviews were collated with field notes written immediately after each

interview and with substantial personal journal entries that included private reflections and observations about the interview. Field notes included a record of the time and place of each interview, descriptions of the participant and of the physical environment in which the interview took place, initial assessment of how the interview proceeded and observations surrounding important themes. Keeping a personal journal of the interviews provided an important form of ‘debrief’ where I was able to express and record my own reactions and emotional responses and to reflect upon them.

The data gathered through the interviews conducted personally were analysed in a qualitative manner, drawing on grounded theory methodology (see Glaser, 1992; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Grounded theory is particularly suited to research in which no *a priori* hypothesis informs the study or is required to be tested (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 2). Following grounded theory, I was not setting out to find anything specific (such as testing Scheff’s (2000) hypothesis that anger and unacknowledged shame is the basis of violence) but looking instead for very general themes that were significant to the area of choosing violence as a political tactic. When using grounded theory the researcher sets out to try and understand what participants see as being the most significant or influential factors in their behaviour. While existing literature, theory, and knowledge will undoubtedly influence the types of questions asked, the idea is to put aside as much as possible any predetermined ideas so as data is not ‘forced’ to fit existing theories. The interviews that were not conducted by me were analysed at a later stage and therefore the themes I had developed during the analysis of earlier interviews influenced analysis. In this sense they do not fit the method of analysis favoured by grounded theory and therefore are used to reinforce or problematise existing analysis rather than as a fresh source of analytical material from which new themes were developed.

When all the interviews were transcribed I colour-coded each according to very general relationships to the three categories of the ‘social’, ideological’ or ‘motivational’ arena, and further to reflect ‘push factors’ or ‘pull factors’ within each arena. Push factors refer to those negative social circumstances which lead to a disaffection or distancing from broader society. Pull factors refers to those factors which represented a positive or attractive appeal within the more exclusivist radical group. For example, within the social arena, push factors may include discussions around unemployment or social exclusion, while pull factors may include deliberations around camaraderie or community protection. Similarly, within the ideological arena push factors included the difficulty in participating within existing democratic discourses and issues around credibility, while pull factors encompassed issues surrounding the resonance or salience of the extremist message. Within

the motivational arena, push factors encompassed issues such as frustrated attempts at political activism, while pull factors included the urge to act or to make change. Following this, each interview was also coded in relation to particular emotions such as anger, love, empathy and so forth. As a result, certain themes began to emerge in each interview that could then be compared and contrasted with others. Finally, extensive quotes that illustrated each theme were collated and subsequently used to ground the analysis firmly within the data while retaining the richness and depth of the original interviews.

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

A project that deals with people who have committed or supported illegal, violent acts raises many ethical concerns regarding the protection of the interview participant's rights and confidentiality. Ethical guidance was provided and overseen by the Standing Committee on Ethics for Research Involving Humans (SCERH) of Monash University. As a result of SCERH guidance I was to warn all participants that if they disclosed knowledge of an illegal act to me I was required to report this to law enforcement. This did not include acts for which they had already been convicted. This warning was provided in a written statement that interview participants were provided with and could keep. Furthermore, a laminated card stressing the legal implication of disclosing information about future attacks was read to the participant and then placed in their view for the duration of the interview. I asked each participant directly if they understood the implications of revealing information that might incriminate them. If the participant expressed any concern over this I was required to not proceed with the interview.

Initially I was concerned that this warning would have a negative impact on the ability to develop empathy within the interview environment because it reinforced an unequal power dynamic. However, in each case the participant found the requirement amusing and many commented good-naturedly that I must think they 'were idiots' not to know what information they could discuss. Rather than being an impediment to developing empathy, this process provided an opportunity to express my embarrassment and explain my obligations to the SCERH. In this sense, the power dynamic appeared to even out as I was made vulnerable by admitting my embarrassment and many participants expressed sympathy at my having to go through the process of reading the laminated card. While I do not question the seriousness of the implications on the participant of admitting a

criminal act, or of the SCERH requirement to acknowledge this, it was unforeseen that this could enhance the interview process rather than undermine it. Also included in the written statement was a request to tape each interview along with an explanation of how the data would be stored and an assurance that each participant would be de-identified. Contact details for making complaints about the conduct of the interview were also provided. During the course of this research, the confidentiality of participants who agreed to participate has been given the highest priority.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, qualitative data arises in the context of personal interaction and therefore, along with the analysis, contains subjective influences (Davies, 2008, pp. 2-27). The analysis presented here has inductively evolved from the data but the prompting questions that informed the interviews are grounded within existing themes within the literature on terrorism. To an extent, the development of new insights into any phenomenon needs to begin with a distancing from established understandings in order to allow for the evolution of new perspectives with the hope that they may illuminate previously unanticipated or ignored connections and complexities. By focusing attention more directly on emotion as one of the factors that influence decisions that have led to involvement in violent political extremism, I hope to contribute to the strengthening of overall research in the area of Terrorism Studies.

CHAPTER 4

EMOTIONAL FISSURES AND THE SOCIAL MILIEU

Our present ego feeling is only a shrunken residue of a much more inclusive, indeed, all-encompassing feeling which corresponded to a more intimate bond between the ego and the world about it.

*Sigmund Freud (1930/1985: 255)
Civilization and its Discontents*

Human beings make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.

*Karl Marx (1852/1978)
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*

INTRODUCTION

This chapter looks more closely at the role of emotion in helping to connect or disconnect people from different social groups and subsequently how group membership works to frame collective emotional experiences. We all live within a variety of social groups and may define ourselves to a greater or lesser degree through our membership to these (Tajfel & Turner, 1986a). For example, we might identify ourselves according to place of birth or cultural heritage, by religion or political affiliation, by social position, vocation, family role, sexuality, and a variety of other options. We may also differ in relation to the degree to which we identify with or reject particular groups, or the way we see other groups with which we do not personally identify (Hogg, 1992; Tajfel & Turner, 1986b; J. C. Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). The variety of group memberships a person has and the saliency of those connections or attachments can influence the way a person both experiences and expresses emotion (Parkinson *et al.*, 2005, p. 87).

In particular, the first part of this chapter draws from Social Movement Theory to consider how emotions can develop that either help people to gravitate towards a sense of commitment and loyalty to society or, conversely, push them away with the result of freeing them from these same loyalties and commitments. It suggests that social norms and rules of behaviour (such as not committing acts of violent political extremism) are in part sustained by ensuring emotional reactions and responses that inspire conformity and commitment to the *status quo* (Elster, 2004, p. 156). However, politically experiencing emotions that do not resonate with the *status quo* may also release people from viewing these norms and rules of behaviour as valid or legitimate, thereby becoming the basis on which alternative standards of behaviour become seemingly defensible. In other words, this chapter considers how the experience of emotions can either affirm or undermine the strength of community bonds and individual commitments to upholding the rule of law.

Emotion is not typically thought of as a characteristic of social environments, but rather as an individual phenomenon, largely detached from wider social, cultural and political structures (Frijda, 1986; Leach & Tiedens, 2004, pp. 1-13). However, at the heart of social structures, such as the family, religion, or economic and political systems, lie enduring patterns of relationships between diverse groups of people and institutions. Put in this way, it immediately becomes obvious that an emotional component must be a characteristic of these patterns of relationships. For example, the institution of marriage may evoke different collective emotional responses from individuals or groups committed to gay rights than it would for those who are deeply committed to a traditional, religious interpretation of marriage as exclusively associated with the bond between a man and a woman. Similarly, manifestations of class envy, national pride, ethnic hatred, civic loyalty, or any other mix of emotion and social position, suggest that emotions play a role in the upholding or undermining of social structures and the institutions that represent them (Kalb & Tak, 2008). This may be largely because the interplay between social structures and more subjective emotional experiences contributes to differing perspectives amongst individuals, groups, or societies regarding legitimacy, fairness, loyalty, obligation, and social expectations, thereby connecting emotions to the realm of social norms and morality. As Turner (2007, p. 1) states, “emotions are used to forge social bonds, to create and sustain commitments to social structures and cultures, and to tear socio-cultural creations down. Just about every dimension of society is thus held together or ripped apart by emotional arousal”.

After considering the role of emotion in drawing people towards, or driving them away from, a sense of identification and commitment to the social norms and moral obligations of the

status quo this chapter then tightens the focus to look more closely at alternative, more exclusive identity groups with which people may forge strong emotional attachments and within which alternative moral frameworks may develop. Ideally people form a variety of emotional connections to various different layers of social life. In other words, a person may be emotionally connected to their nation or political and social environment, to their immediate community, and to their family and friends (Parkinson *et al.*, 2005). Within these levels they may also be socially connected to specific groups or people. However, a common thread which binds violent political activists of all creeds is that the emotional ties within the extremist group are intensified at the expense of those outside of it and that within the group an alternative moral framework exists in which violence is seen as a legitimate political tactic (Bartlett & Miller, 2011, pp. 13-14; McCauley & Moskaleiko, 2008, p. 18).

EMOTIONAL BONDS AND SOCIETY

Flam (2005, p. 19) argues that it is important to identify the emotions that uphold social structures in order to understand how groups that oppose existing social conditions work to construct subversive counter-emotion as the basis of challenging the *status quo*. She calls attention to what she has termed the normal distribution of ‘cementing’ emotions in society, arguing that these form the foundations of enduring patterns of relationships between people of shared and differing levels of power and status. Conversely, however, subversive counter-emotions work to undermine these foundations. This in itself is not necessarily problematic, and indeed can be seen at times to be highly positive, creating the emotional momentum to bring about positive social change. For example, the Civil Rights Movement and the Women’s Movement are both examples of how the development of so-called subversive emotions, such as righteous anger at the existing social structures, reject and challenge expectations of loyalty, thereby helping to create the momentum for social change. However, in the case of violent political groups, subversive counter-emotions can gain an intensity that severs a sense of loyalty so severely that it completely undermines any commitment to the norms and values of broader society.

Loyalty plays a dominant role in connecting people to society. Grodzins (1956, pp. 5-6) suggests that, “society – social structure of every sort – rests upon loyalties: upon attitudes and actions directed at supporting groups, ideas, and institutions. Loyalties sustain and are sustained by

mutual rights and duties, common beliefs, and reciprocal obligations – all essential ingredients of social life”. However, loyalty operates on a variety of different levels, leaving us to negotiate a range of sometimes competing sites of allegiance (Connor, 2007, p. 130). This is only problematic if there are fundamental conflicts between differing sites of loyalty. For example, it is possible to have a sense of loyalty to both friends and family, to the community, and more broadly to the larger social and political environment. However, at times these loyalties may seem incompatible, leaving a person with a sense of having to choose loyalty to one particular section of their lives over another.

Loyalty is not the only emotion that works to keep people attached to society. According to Flam’s (2005, pp. 19-24) work on social movements, loyalty emerges alongside a complex mix of anger, shame and fear, and all play a role in binding people to their broader society or, conversely, beginning the process of pushing them away. For example, fear of jeopardising one’s life chances, such as losing a job or being unable to pay the mortgage, helps to bind people together in a way that supports capitalist social institutions. Similarly, fear of being socially ostracised may contribute to conformity and obedience to social mores. Within repressive regimes, these fears may be coupled with more intense fears concerning physical well-being and personal freedom. Anger, on the other hand, arises when people perceive themselves or those with whom they identify as being treated unfairly or when others are viewed as having failed to meet some deeply held social obligation (Hegtvedt & Markovsky, 1995). Anger is also a powerful motivator of social change and therefore those who have an interest in maintaining the *status quo* also have an interest in controlling or repressing anger. As such, the appropriation of anger can be an important aspect of social control. Shame, on the other hand, operates as a self-sanctioning emotion when we perceive ourselves as failing to live up either to our own or to societal expectations. As such, being able to trigger a shame response can also be an effective tool of compliance and obedience, contributing to the upholding of social norms and, more broadly, social order (Flam, 2005, p. 22).

Of particular importance to the analysis presented here is the process by which those who have become involved in violent political extremism have not internalised these ‘cementing’ emotions in a way that maintains an emotional commitment to their broader social environment, and therefore a sense of compliance with, rather than an undermining of, the existing social and political structures, norm and obligations. In order to explore this more fully, each of the four emotions that Flam identified is looked at in more detail within the context of those who have committed to a violent political agenda. Participants spent time reflecting on and recounting

memories from their childhood and youth, which they saw as emblematic of their journey towards violent political extremism. It was common for these memories to be connected to an emerging awareness of social responsibility, obligation and expectation that went outside the confines of family. As such, the memories recalled tended to correspond with periods of growing independence such as starting school or socialising independently from the family. The stories clustered around themes of injustice, however, the intensity of the memories tended to hinge more on disillusionment or, to be more precise, awareness that one's social expectations would not be or could not hope to be met.

LOYALTY

Loyalty is, amongst other things, an emotional connection that is felt towards other people, groups, institutions, places or causes (Connor, 2007, p. 132). As such, it is inextricably tied to a sense of belonging. National loyalty refers to the connection felt towards a particular nation, but the idea of loyalty is applied to a variety of relationships, ranging from the personal and familial, to sports teams, political institutions, religious doctrines, gender, race, ethnic and class groups, locations, and causes among other possibilities (Connor, 2007, pp. 2, 73). Social institutions play a direct role in building national loyalty through providing physical, psychological and existential security through controlled use of the law and military, the provision of education, housing and income paths, social recognition and representation (Berezin, 2002, p. 38; Connor, 2007, p. 79; Flam, 2005, p. 31; Grodzins, 1956, pp. 5-6). A claim of legitimacy is not enough to ensure national loyalty and obedience to the state if an individual or a collective group does not experience the sense of security and opportunity that it is seen as being the obligation of the state to provide. This becomes even more problematic when the experiences of security and loyalty are seen to be provided or withheld depending upon an identity marker, which is not seen as relevant, whether that be ethnicity, religion, class, gender or an array of other indicators of difference connected with status (Kemper, 2001, p. 66).

In this sense, the history of Northern Ireland provided a challenge to the British government in developing loyalty amongst Irish Catholics. Northern Ireland became a separate legal entity as a result of being partitioned under the *Government of Ireland Act, 1920*. While it is not the intent of this dissertation to re-examine the history of Northern Ireland it suffices to say that partitioning effectively divided the 32 counties of the island into two parts: an independent Irish Republic

comprising 26 counties with a majority Catholic population; and a devolved government within the UK comprised of the other 6 counties (4 of which were predominantly Protestant), which became known as Northern Ireland (Rose, 1971). The Northern Ireland state perceived itself as a Protestant state and systematically established policies that marginalised Catholics (Moloney, 2002, p. 42). As such, the history of Northern Ireland is undeniably characterised by discriminatory policies and extensive enmity towards its Catholic population (Moloney, 2002, pp. 42-45).

Even though the members of the PIRA interviewed were largely from the second or third generation born into an already established Northern Ireland state, they did not express a sense of national identity that demonstrated affective ties to Britain, or more largely, the UK.¹⁵ As one participant noted,

I have never ever felt British, I have always felt Irish and my family has been involved in Irish culture, I played Gaelic football, and my sisters went to Irish dancing and stuff like that...Well, it's not like my family ever told me specifically that I wasn't British, or that I had to reject Britishness, or that I made a decision, I just grew up being Irish, I wasn't hostile or anything, I just didn't have a sense of it being relevant. I lived in Ireland and I was Irish, easy! ('Padraig', PIRA).

When invited to discuss this further in relation to a growing political awareness, the participant went on to say,

I mean, as I say, I didn't feel part of the state. I remember actually it was one of my Protestant friends again being around that age of 8, 9 or 10, having an argument about what's the capital of Ireland and I said "It's Dublin". He said, "no it's not. Dublin isn't the capital of Ireland". I mean, at that stage I don't even think I would have been particularly conscious that the North was partitioned because we looked to the South, our founding was with the rest of Ireland, Dublin as far as we were concerned was the capital. To go to Dublin for the day it was to go to the capital....um, well, if someone had've said go to London we would have said "what do we want to go to London for?" I mean, it was complete detachment, innocent, you know, not a thought out position, or a political statement. It just wasn't relevant to me in any way ('Padraig', PIRA).

In a similar vein, the following exchange with the same PIRA member highlights how another childhood dispute is framed in terms of the broader issue of feeling alienated from the state based on being Catholic,

¹⁵ The 2011 Northern Ireland Census revealed that 87% of people who 'felt' British *and* Northern Irish had been brought up in Protestant denominations. A similar percentage of Catholics (86%), however, regarded themselves as Irish and Northern Irish only (NISRA, 2013).

'Padraig': [T]he Queen didn't mean anything, the royal family didn't mean anything. I remember having an argument again with a wee Protestant friend about who was the richest, the Queen or the Pope.

Debra: [laughing] Oh, clearly the Pope.

'Padraig': [laughing] Yeah, so all of those sort of things, but it's nothing but a kids argument. But it sort of reinforces there was a difference there, a different outlook, all of that sort of stuff. No affinity to the state and no affinity to Britain, I didn't feel a part of the royal family or the monarchy or anything like that. Bear in mind too, I mean Catholics were almost excluded totally from the likes of the police force, the higher ranks of the civil service, the visual representatives of the state and all at that time. During the 50s and 60s all the heavy industry of ship building, the metal foundries almost exclusively were Protestant work forces you know, so you just didn't feel a part of it. That's how I would have felt at the time, not so much in opposition, just not a part of it, not me ('Padraig', PIRA).

Clearly a sense of loyalty to the ruling state was not developing. While there was not necessarily a sense of hostility, there was more an ambivalence towards 'Britishness' in terms of the self.¹⁶ This ambivalence is, at times, observable among those who became involved in jihadist activities within the Western context,

So I don't really feel that I – I don't belong anywhere, I just don't feel that sense of belonging, I really don't, I've been here thirty odd years and I still feel alienated, I really do. I just – I don't know, I'd rather be somewhere else [...] you know Hambali?¹⁷ [...] he used the nickname which is Arabic for a stranger [...] he saw himself as a stranger in a world that he just didn't feel part of [...], I feel that [...], I'm sort of distancing myself from – I just find that I can't be part of this society, I just don't get it ('Khalid', Jamaah Islamiyah).

Another PIRA participant expressed his sense of dislocation from British rule as a young man by saying,

...you knew the City Hall didn't belong to you, you knew even the police didn't belong to you [...] everything was foreign to ya, around ya, ya felt like you were in a wee ghetto. But you were happy; you played football, chasing pretty girls and all those really normal things to do with growing up ('Ruari', PIRA).

¹⁶ Furthermore a 2004 study commissioned by the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister found that even at the age of 3, Protestant children in Belfast were twice as likely to identify the Union Jack as 'their own flag', than Catholic children, while Catholic children were twice as likely to dislike the police. See, (Connolly & Healy, 2004, p. 4).

¹⁷ Hambali is the *nom de guerre* of Riduan Isamuddin, former military leader in the Indonesian terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiya (JI), believed to be currently held in Guantanamo Bay.

However, as he got a little older the participant describes an incident in which the sense of not belonging becomes more frustrating and acrimonious because of the deliberate misuse of his name in favour of the more generic Catholic identifier of ‘Paddy’,

[T]he military come in and there's a honeymoon period and my Ma is out there making ‘em tea and the next thing is they're starting searching us. So you were going to school in the morning and you'd be stopped by the military and thrown against the wall and, “Paddy” they'd call ya, and I'd say, “my name's ‘Ruari’ ”, “alright Paddy” [they'd say]. Fuck! (‘Ruari’, PIRA).

In a similar vein, some Muslims living within Western democracies express a sense of frustration and increasing social disconnection in response to particular experiences of discrimination. As one woman from the Salafist community in the UK explained,

Since 9/11 and then the London bombing, people look at me with suspicion. I found myself trying to smile more in public and be extra polite just so people wouldn't think all Muslims were a threat. It's exhausting really, but it doesn't really make a difference I don't think. I've had my scarf pulled off my head and thrown to the ground, been called a ‘terrorist lover’ and even spat on. Would you want to engage with people like that? I prefer to mix with other Muslims (‘Nawar’, British Salafist).

‘John’, however, shows how loyalty can be mediated vicariously through the experiences of others with whom one has a relationship. In response to a question about whether he considered it legitimate to attack Canada, ‘John’ was quick to say he would be against it. However, he went on to explain that,

Aahh, my friend, my friend Ahmed, he was born in Iraq. In the nineties he had American fighters fly over his house, bomb his house, father, mother, three sisters, dead. How do you think he feels? Here's a kid just growing up. Do you think he has love for the country that's way overseas, that has no, in my opinion again, my opinion, has no right to be in that space [...]. How do you think his ideology is? Think, again, from your point of view, someone comes to your land and does something to you, don't you want to make him go back to his land? If you had the capabilities? Yes, I'd understand. If the capabilities were there, and you had a force, an army, then I would understand (‘John’, Canadian Salafist).

‘John’ is expressing how loyalty is not only conditional, based on an expectations of particular rights and obligations to citizens, but that what foreign countries do (in this case the USA) in a foreign land (in this case Iraq) can influence how loyal one feels towards one's own state. While “John’ did not believe an attack on Canadian soil was legitimate, he did respond that he felt it was acceptable for Canadian nationals to “go over and defend themselves in Afghanistan or

Yemen” and that he would “encourage that” even though his brother was a member of the Canadian military ('John', Canadian Salafist).

A PIRA member, who as a child had hoped to become a British Merchant Marine, talked about his sense of not being valued by the state,

The state [...] was a state designed by the Unionist and British. They carved it up to suit the political needs of only one section of the community. Every single facet of life within those six counties was geared towards one section of the community and the community that I was brought up in, the Catholic, Nationalist, Republic, you can call it what you like, we were second class citizens. I didn't realise that [at the time] and I say that openly and honestly [...] Maybe I didn't have to understand fully, it was enough to feel it ('Eamon', PIRA).

'Eamon's' observation that it was enough to 'feel' rather than understand or know that he wasn't a valued member of the nation equates to what is commonly known as a 'gut feeling'. His evaluation may not be an objective one, but, as the next chapter will show, it will contribute to the development of his personal belief system and to the way he makes judgments about the credibility of opposing political narratives. The failure to embed a sense of loyalty within the social structures of a society risks laying the foundations for developing mistrust based on hurt, anger or fear (Connor, 2007, p. 43). Without the 'cementing' process, in part provided by a sense of loyalty, the preconditions for significant social upheaval are strengthened (Flam, 2005, p. 25). This is largely because loyalty is, in part, an emotional connection which helps to construct a person's social identity, offering a sense of belonging and identification (Connor, 2007, p. 132). The reasons behind a sense of 'not belonging' are often complex and may or may not have their roots in obvious political failures of the state. However, a perception that the state is either rejecting or excluding you from the security and opportunity it is expected to provide can transform a sense of ambivalence into hostility, as the above examples show.

Furthermore, a perception of threat and the subsequent development of hostility works to create emotional distance between the two opposing groups while simultaneously increasing the emotional saliency within the group which perceives itself to be under threat (Castano, Leidner, & Slawuta, 2008, p. 264),

I mean, my world was a war zone and you had to be on a side and so my side was my community, my family, my friends. To me there was no way to be neutral, you were loyal to those people you knew, who went to the same school or football club, or whose house you went to or you saw at church on Sunday. I mean, I think that the rioting and all that took place during that

August in 1969 was the beginning of my awareness that you were on one side or the other, up until then I had mostly Protestant friends actually ('Padraig', PIRA).

'Padraig's' words indicate that he felt he needed to choose a side, or a group, to be loyal to and that there was an underlying conflict which did not allow him to negotiate differing levels or layers of loyalty amongst competing options. For 'Padraig', being loyal to his community ostensibly meant that he could not be loyal to those he perceived as outside of his group. Similarly, a Salafist from Brixton explained to me that,

We are Muslim first, but we are also British. The problem is that now it is becoming harder to be both. There is pressure on Muslims, particularly those who dress or look different, or believe in the principle of Sharī'ah, to choose British values over any others. There is a tension there, a tension that places us in conflict because as a Muslim this is who I am, it is integral to me and while I feel I can live here and, well, for example, I pay car insurance even though this is in conflict to my beliefs, I understand I have to pay it because here it is the law, but increasingly this is not enough, to obey the laws, now you also are under pressure to believe that this is the only way or the best way and that no other way is valid, and this I can't do, so instead we feel like we have to choose between two things like being Muslim or being British ('Fareed', British Salafist).

In a sense, both 'Padraig' and 'Fareed's' words demonstrate how the emotional bonds to broader society can be eroded, while the emotional connections to a more exclusivist group can become stronger in the face of perceived threat, a theme that will be explored more fully later in the chapter. For now, however, it is important to note that when a sense of loyalty is established it helps to guide behaviour, framing a set of moral obligations and responsibilities. In cases where people feel a sense of loyalty to the state they generally feel an obligation not to attack it or its citizens. However, when multiple layers of loyalty seemingly cannot be arrived at, and loyalty is almost exclusively associated with a particular group, then the logic of this group correspondingly prescribes behaviour, and the moral obligations and responsibilities are limited to within it, rather than extended more broadly (Castano *et al.*, 2008, p. 262). Take for example the way this PIRA member justifies being able to commit acts of violence,

I didn't feel any loyalty to the Brits, none at all. I mean, what did they do for us except make our lives more difficult? We were subjected to constant searches, to guns in our faces and barbed wire and checkpoints around our homes. I mean, how the hell can you feel anything but resentment of that? [...] No, my loyalty was to my community, and I was going to protect it. If some of 'em [the British] had to die in order for them to get the message that we didn't want 'em here, then so be it ('Mick', PIRA).

A similar theme is expressed by Mohammad Sidique Khan, one of the suicide bombers who carried out the attacks on the London public transport system on the 7th July 2005, when he stated that,

Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world, and your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you will be our targets, and until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment, and torture of my people we will not stop this fight.¹⁸

While Khan was born and had lived in the UK all his life, he no longer identified himself with fellow Britons, experiencing instead a deeply rooted sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’. In Khan’s case, his emotional attachment to fellow ‘Muslim brothers and sisters’ overwhelmed his emotional attachments to the UK more broadly. So while loyalty is an emotion which binds people together, these bonds also have the possibility of excluding others. Indeed, the differing individuals, groups, causes and institutions to which someone is loyal must inevitably be balanced by alternative possibilities to which the person could be loyal but is not (Hirschman, 1970, p. 82). Still, it is possible to choose some loyalties over others without necessarily developing a deep sense of hostility; this is what most of us do every day. Nevertheless, particularly under conditions of perceived threat, the tendency for loyalties to develop which are more exclusivist and hostile to others is increased, forming the foundation for ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ dynamics, largely because loyalties are associated with identities and as such mark our memberships and belonging as well as associated social roles (Connor, 2007, p. 49).

ANGER

Anger can be understood as a ‘sanctioning emotion’ in the sense that it arises as an objection to a slight or it signals that a perceived injustice has occurred. A growing amount of literature points to how anger is predominantly appropriated as a ‘top down’ emotion (Hochschild, 1983; Kemper, 1978). That is not to say, of course, that only people with power or status get angry. Rather, it is to say that the display of anger is more likely to attract negative sanctions when shown by those with less power and status. As Holmes (2004, p. 127) notes, “it is oppressed groups in particular who have been encouraged to repress their anger”. The most recognisable example of this may be the

¹⁸ Taken from the suicide video of Mohammed Sidiq. The video and a transcript are available from the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) website, <http://www.memritv.org/> (accessed 20 September 2007).

traditional association of demonstrative anger by men as opposed to anger suppression by women (Hochschild, 1983, p. 127). However, it may also apply to the relationships between boss and employee (Hearn, 1993), parent and child, colonial power and native, or any other social relationship in which there is an imbalance between the power or status of one in relation to another. Bottom-up anger occurs when those with less power perceive their status to have been unjustly reduced or withdrawn by the more powerful other and the negative sanctions directed towards the display of 'bottom-up' anger are part of the strategy for maintaining the *status quo* (Cropanzano, Stein, & Nadisic, 2011, p. 165; Holmes, 2004, p. 127; Kemper, 2001, p. 66). The control of social anger is essential for political and social order, but in controlling anger there is arguably a risk of suppressing essential dialogues about injustice, which inevitably contain an element of anger (Lyman, 2004).

It is self-evident that those who joined the PIRA felt anger at the situation in which they saw themselves. Indeed, anger, along with hate and humiliation, are arguably the emotions most commonly attributed to those engaging in terrorist violence (for example see, Moghaddam, 2005). However, for now the focus is on anger as it is embedded in social structures and as it relates to either strengthening or threatening social bonds. The following examples illustrate the way in which PIRA members experience their anger socially rather than subjectively, although this in no way suggests that the subjective experience of anger is neither present nor unimportant. Rather, these quotes demonstrate how the subjective experience of anger is mediated by social forces,

In prison you're not allowed to express anger in any form, that's part of the control mechanism. In a sense living in Belfast with the Brits all around, and remember that there were 27,000 British troops, plus the RUC, plus the UDR on top of that, so you're talking about an armed contingent of about 40,000 for a population of less than a million and a half people, well, it's the same sort of control mechanism. If you were a Catholic in Belfast then you weren't supposed to be angry. That didn't mean we weren't. It just meant that we was illegitimate because of it, and so if we chose to show it we were goin' to get in trouble ('Cian', PIRA).

For 'Cian', choosing to express anger equates with moving outside of the socially prescribed behaviour associated with his status and role as a Catholic in Belfast and into the area of negatively sanctioned or proscribed behaviour. Another member, when relating his experience of being one of only a few Catholics working in a majority Protestant workplace talked about being invisible,

[T]hey would just talk as if you weren't there, they would just talk about things and talk about your community [...] about attacks on the RUC and they could be outraged and self-righteous and, well it does, I mean, it makes you angry [...] but it's all about the hierarchy, they can feel suffering we

obviously can't, or they have the right to feel angry but we obviously don't. It's not like they even have to tell you, you just know because you matter so little they don't even have to worry that you hear them talking that stuff ('Liam', PIRA).

What 'Liam' is effectively expressing is an implicit understanding, embedded in the structure of society, about which group has the socially sanctioned right to express anger. He is conscious that both the representatives of the Protestant community as well as himself are angry at the existing social conditions, but also that his position means that his anger is in defiance of the accepted social norms. When asked what he 'did' with his anger, 'Liam' replied,

Well ya just kept quiet didn't ya. Anyway, there was other ways of getting it out like throwing a few stones on the way home or something like that ('Liam', PIRA).

Rather than displaying an irrational and uncontrollable rage, these members of the PIRA demonstrate both an understanding of, and an ability to control, their anger. 'Liam' makes a rational decision to suppress his anger when its expression may compromise his employment. He also easily identifies an alternative avenue for acting out in which he does not put himself at high risk of negative social sanctions yet that provides him with the 'release' of defying those norms which violate his deeply held values of fairness.

The sense that expressions of anger are the prerogative of the powerful and that displays of anger attract negative social sanctions may lead to anger suppression, thereby maintaining a sense of social order. However, as 'Liam' and 'Cian's' reflections demonstrate, this does not mean that anger is not present. The experience of anger can work emotionally to distance people from the established political institutions, although this is by no means automatic. People go out and angrily protest against particular government policies or practices regularly, particularly within western democracies where this is defended as a legitimate form of political expression, without disconnecting from society more broadly. However, what seems particularly pertinent to creating distance from the *status quo* is the perception that you are not 'allowed' to express anger based on your social position or identity. For 'Liam' and 'Cian', it was the fact that they were Catholics under the rule of the British in Northern Ireland that provided the context for feeling that they could not express their anger without attracting negative sanctions that were heftier than those for their Protestant counterparts.

This theme also permeated the interviews of people within the Salafist community in the UK who often saw themselves as attracting more suspicion for displaying their anger in an accepted way, such as protesting against the war in Iraq, than either non-Muslims or those who did not ‘look’ like Muslims – for example, who did not wear the *hijab* or *jellabiya*. As ‘Aariz’ pointed out in Chapter One (p. 12-13 *supra*), process theories of terrorism enable legitimate expressions of political anger within the Muslim communities of the UK to be interpreted as part of an ‘inevitable trajectory’ towards committing a violent act. However, he went further in connecting his identity as a Salafist Muslim with a sense of negative sanctions for expressing anger when he stated that,

In England, and probably in the west more generally, there is a tendency to see some Muslims as OK and others as a threat. For example, there is a sense that being a Sufi is the ‘right’ sort of Muslim but being a Salafist is threatening. So as a Salafist if I go and protest, or if I am angry over some of the foreign policy decisions that are made here, then I am more of a threat than if a non-Muslim is angry over the same things, or if a ‘good’ Muslim is angry over them (‘Aariz’, British Salafist).

The idea that expressions of anger are seen as legitimate or not based on particular identity markers, such as being Salafist or Catholic or anything else, may or may not be objectively accurate. However, the perception that group membership contributes to determining whether it is legitimate to express anger is particularly relevant to understanding why some people find their anger reinforcing an oppositional stance to broader society. The implicit assumption arrived at is that being angry means you are pushed away and seen as a threat rather than having your voice listened to and taken into consideration. As such, the shared experience of supposedly illegitimate anger connected to identity can help to bind people within these more exclusivist identity groups while simultaneously isolating them from broader society.

SHAME

The idea that shame is a dominant social emotion is most famously expounded in Elias’ (1982) seminal work on *The Civilizing Process*, in which he observes how the increasing importance of manners since the 17th century coincided with escalating shame and embarrassment over bodily functions, such as defecation or sexual intercourse, previously performed in public but now strictly contained within the private realm. For Elias, shame over violating tightly held social conventions ensures that people are automatically socialised into upholding certain social rules, ensuring that shame acts to promote solidarity in social relations.

Flam concentrates on two aspects of shame in relation to social structure. Firstly, drawing on Simmel, she identifies shame as an emotion experienced when we fail to live up to either our own or others internalised societal standards (Flam, 2005, p. 22). Secondly, following Kemper, she suggests that shame reifies systems of domination by upholding systems of classification which ensure those with less power are obligated to think of themselves as inferior or naturally flawed in terms of intelligence, skills, appearance and morals amongst other things (Flam, 2005, p. 22). As one member reflected on his surroundings growing up,

...it's oppressive, obviously you feel that, well, a lot of people felt they were not worthy to get jobs, you know, you weren't worthy enough to feel that, you know, you weren't good enough to match up ('Coilm', PIRA).

The kind of shame that Flam refers to with regard to the upholding of social order appears to depend on the acceptance of social norms as broadly valid. 'Coilm's' comments suggest that there was a sense of shame internalised within some people in the Catholic community in which they sensed that their lack of employment was a result of some internal flaw. However, in explaining the difference between the period of relative peace leading up to the 'Troubles' and the civil unrest that characterised the period from the late 1960s until the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, 'Coilm' pointed out that,

[T]here was a change happening for my generation that didn't happen for the previous generation [...] and it meant then that people [...] coming into the 50s and the 60s had this opportunity of third level education. And with education you change the way you think about yourself. We watched what was happening with Martin Luther King over in the United States and we saw, just like the Blacks in the Civil Rights Movement, that we were equal and as worthy as anyone else and that it was a structural kind of discrimination that was to blame for our conditions [...] But you still don't get, no, you still don't get the opportunity for the jobs [...] Catholics are twice as much, are twice as likely to be unemployed. You're expected not to get above yourself you know ('Coilm', PIRA).

'Coilm' explained that,

[i]t is in the State's interest to keep people feeling like they're not worthy, it's inbuilt, like socially ingrained ('Coilm', PIRA).¹⁹

¹⁹ Ed Moloney(2002, p. 45), in his book *A Secret History of the IRA* suggests that it was the introduction of The Eleven Plus exams by a well-meaning Labour Party swept into office after the Second World War that was one of the main catalysts for the Troubles. The opening up of social mobility within British society collided with unionist privilege in Northern Ireland resulting in a more highly educated Catholic population with correspondingly higher economic, social and political expectations that were then stymied by discriminatory policies and practices.

Shame is an emotion that operates through taking on the point of view of others, thereby ensuring a type of conformism (Barbalet, 2001, p. 103; Cooley, 1964 [1922]; Scheff, 1988). As long as the societal myth of natural inferiority is believed then it is unlikely that any challenge to the *status quo* will gain momentum. However, once one realises that the other person's point of view is not valid, shame is stripped of its power to ensure conformity and, as 'Coilm' explains can unleash a counter-reaction,

that's where the anger and the frustration came to the fore because people then began to challenge it and say 'this is no longer good enough' [...] They still think they can humiliate the Irish [...] There's a, there's a pride about being Irish and about the contributions the Irish people have made over the centuries, abroad and at home, and the resistance that they've put up, you know [...] and well, pride comes from resistance ('Coilm', PIRA).

'Coilm' demonstrates the distinction between shame and humiliation. Once the other's point of view is no longer considered credible then the same criticisms or circumstances are viewed as humiliation, an emotion that does not take on the viewpoint of the other. For 'Coilm', higher levels of education were associated with the ability to think more highly of yourself, thereby rejecting any sense of inferiority and the subsequent shame that emanates from this. Instead, by rejecting the validity of what he viewed as a social norm, he interpreted the conditions of the Catholics in Northern Ireland as an attempt to humiliate, provoking an angry and frustrated response.

In another exploration of shame, 'Ruari' relates the story of watching his mother being humiliated by British soldiers when he was 13 years old,

I remember the first time them coming into the house and um, [...] my ma was in bed, she was all half naked or in a wee thing, and she was all baring the shoulders and things and my sisters went in, there was five or six soldiers, [my sisters were] holding the blanket up so she could put her shawl on and they just ripped it off and said 'you Irish fuckin' bitch'. My sisters, like that was their mother, I mean, I, they could'a said, [sighing], bastards. But I think, um, it's terrible that they called that to my mother, that there's all that name calling and they're all sitting there with my wee sisters. And my dad and I, what can we do huh, we have to sit there and do nothing, can't protect 'em or stand up for them like you should because we was being held downstairs and just had to listen to the whole thing. [...] Even now, every time I say that the hairs go up on the back of my neck because I remember ('Ruari', PIRA).

When asked if the inability to help his mother and sisters in that situation left him with a sense of shame he responded with,

They [the British soldiers] were there to put us down [...] aye, at the end of the day we didn't see it as our problem, we saw it as they're the problem. They're the ones who should be ashamed. They're in the country, they need to get out ('Ruari', PIRA).

'Ruari' did not acknowledge that his experiences were connected with a personal sense of shame, though it is hinted at through his acknowledgement that he 'should' be able to help his sisters. Rather, the immediate response was to draw attention to the role of the British soldiers as the ones who abrogated the expected standards of social behaviour, and therefore as the ones who should feel ashamed. When describing an incident that took place closer to the time 'Ruari' joined the PIRA his rejection of the authority of the British is more strongly articulated and, rather than express shame in a similarly disempowering circumstance, he expresses anger at what he sees as an attempt to humiliate him,

[When] you grow up in that estate you get, aye aye, let's go and play some football, and you see soldiers and you just get used to it - you never accept it. It's like strip searching in prison, you know, it's repeated and routine, so you go through with it, but you're still naked in front of some hellish fuckin' guard. So what I'm trying to say is you still don't accept it but it's a routine you go through, being put up against a wall and searched and spoken to like you are shit, its humiliating and that's what it is meant to be, and you know that's what it's meant to be. In a way you don't give 'em the pleasure of knowing you're humiliated, especially if there is some wee girl you like watching it all happen. Instead you give 'em some cheek or you resist, that's better. No, there was no way I was going to be fuckin' humiliated, I just felt more justified in fighting for the Republicans ('Ruari', PIRA).

The idea that a relationship exists between humiliation and the propensity to commit acts of violence, particularly in relation to Islamic terrorism is well established (Cook & Alison, 2007, p. 4; Fattah & Fierke, 2009; Moghaddam, 2006; Moisi, 2009, pp. 56-89; Speckhard, 2005). The following exchange is between a Canadian Salafist and his interviewer who are discussing the use of the internet as a site of radicalisation,

Jl: How did it make you feel while you were watching these?

'Tariq': It makes you...it's all kind of emotions. Anger, sadness, you have a feeling of wanting to do something. It takes you on an emotional roller coaster so to speak.

Jl: Anything else on the Internet? For example, images and video of Muslims suffering for example?

'Tariq': Yeah, yeah. I can't remember the name particularly. There was a bunch of video going around. People dying, dead bodies, mass graves. It just...I remember one website was reading a letter of a woman who is in jail in

Palestine and the letter got out. She killed herself in jail. She started banging her head off the wall until she died because she was mass raped by the Israeli soldiers.

Jl: Is this Fatima's letter?

'Tariq': Yeah. So, okay, you're aware of it. Yeah. Exactly. So stuff like that.

Jl: How did it make you feel when you read that?

'Tariq': You cry. You cry. You're just angry. You just...how could this happen? But again you don't understand the big picture of things. God's justice will serve her regardless of what they did.

Jl: Did you wanna seek vengeance on her behalf?

'Tariq': Yeah! You feel that. You feel like you wanna do something. You wanna go and right away you hate Jews. You hate a whole entire people.

Jl: Can I ask you did you feel shame or humiliation? Because of your own inaction, did you feel like that you should be doing something because you felt shame and humiliation, especially when you read something like Fatima's letter?

'Tariq': Yeah, yeah. You read this thing and you're like what am I doing? Just here, relaxing. It pumps you up to do something, to do some action ('Tariq', Canadian Salafist).

While shame may play a role in strengthening social bonds by ensuring a particular standard of behaviour is upheld, this can only be realised when there is an acceptance of the validity of the social norms within which one is expected to operate. Shame tends to focus on the self and relies on the belief that it is in some way deserved (Klein, 1991, p. 117). Humiliation, on the other hand, is distinguishable from shame to the degree that it focuses on the harm done by others and judges that harm as undeserved (Gilbert, 1997, p. 133; Klein, 1991, p. 117). Humiliation is more likely to alienate individuals and groups from the rest of society than experiences of shame. As the above examples suggest, experiences of humiliation, or even the perception that either yourself or those with whom you identify are being humiliated, turn the focus away from the self and towards the behaviours and practices of others. For this reason, humiliation has become a powerful tool for radicalisation, provoking estrangement from society, along with a judgment surrounding the immorality of others and motivation to bring about change.

FEAR

When fear emanates from and has consequences for society it can be viewed as more than just a personal infliction. Thucydides (1982 [1866], p. 44), and Machiavelli (1986 [1532], p. 131), recognised the role of fear in political motivation, while Hobbes (1991[1651], p. 188) argued that fear is central to both the origin of civil society as well as its means of preservation. It has also become common to talk about ‘the politics of fear’, a term that refers to the ability to appropriate fear in order to achieve particular policy outcomes (Altheide, 2006; Massumi, 1993; Mythen & Walklate, 2006; Robin, 2004; Sparks, 2003). The kind of fear referred to in these instances is more than just personal (such as a fear of heights or flying), because it arises in the context of struggles and conflicts within and between societies and is particularly related to a sense of apprehension over harm that may be inflicted on collective well-being (Robin, 2004, p. 2).

Fear is also the final macro-emotion to which Flam (2005, pp. 23-25) draws attention in relation to social movements. Drawing on Weber, Flam argues that fear is an intrinsic feature in all unequal power relations because whenever there is a situation of inequality, the more powerful group is in a position to influence the life chances of the less powerful. From this perspective, fear works to encourage social order through engendering a degree of compliance and conformity to social norms. For example, fear of punishment may encourage people not to break the law, or fear of being unemployed may encourage people to get to work on time and be productive. However, a key tactic within social movements is to magnify fear of the existing power structures in order to motivate collective groups of people to challenge them. Therefore, a union movement may emphasise workplace insecurity, as happened in response to the introduction of ‘Work Choices’ under the Howard government in Australia 2005, in order to mobilise people in response. Similarly, the fear of social exclusion may contribute to minority groups mobilising in order to gain equal status and rights.

This suggests that while some degree of socially embedded fear can be useful in maintaining the *status quo* there is a balance, particularly within liberal democratic states, in which the fear of repercussions can be countered by the fear of not changing the present situation, which is viewed as unfavourable. One former PIRA member expresses how fear operated to ensure conformity when talking about his childhood in Belfast,

[w]ell all my Protestant friends were great but they'd use certain words, words that say things, like derogatory things at times, and at that age you're

scared to be different I guess, so you stay silent, don't draw attention to yourself and wait till something else gets your attention ('Ruari', PIRA).

Certainly experiencing a fear of being different, particularly when young, is in no way unique to a future member of a violent political organisation. On the contrary, it is the normality of this experience that demonstrates how fear operates to uphold group bonds. Nevertheless, in this example it is apparent that 'Ruari's fear of being different is connected to his identity as a Catholic amongst his Protestant friends. Later in this interview 'Ruari' touches on the theme of fear again, and once more connects it to his Catholic identity, this time in relation to his father's fear that he would have no prospects for decent work when he left school,

[My] da said, 'ah, don't be doing the English and the Maths, be doin' the woodwork, concentrate on the woodwork 'cos you're going to Canada', because, you know, we all felt the lack of opportunities for Catholics and the inequality like my da says [...] But my mum says, 'oh my son's not goin' to go nowhere', and my dad's like, 'he's not goin' to go through what we went through' ('Ruari', PIRA).

Within Northern Ireland, inter-subjective fear is also apparent in the way that people negotiate public space in a way that reflects their broader identity as either Catholics or Protestants (Lysaght, 2005). For example, another PIRA member reflected on his childhood saying,

You had to know which was a Catholic area or a Protestant area because if you walked up the wrong street it could mean you weren't safe. I mean, you never wandered into the Shankill if you was a Catholic unless you had a death wish, just like they [Protestants] wouldn't feel safe coming to the Lower Falls. Even in the mixed areas you had to know which side of the road to walk [on] or which houses to avoid. [...] I don't really know how to explain it. It was just a normal part of growing up that you learnt stuff like which streets you could use and which ones to avoid or which bus stops to get off and which ones you wouldn't [...] It's like a built in radar ('Ciarán', PIRA).

The sort of diffuse fear over exclusion or employment prospects is different to more immediate fears over physical harm, but the fact that the fears discussed above are perceived as being connected to the participant's identities as Catholics provides an insight into the way fear is understood by these men who ultimately committed to acts of political violence. The following example shows how a vague sense of fear, unconnected to any political perception, develops into something intrinsically connected to identity,

Well, umm, well, it's kinda hard to explain [what growing up in Belfast was like] but it's a bit like a sense that the air is thick, like everything is heavy and at the same time kind of jumpy and anxious ('Padraig', PIRA).

But when recalling the events of August 1969, when most of the houses in Bombay Street were burned to the ground by rioting Loyalists, 'Padraig' explicitly connects the experience of fear to a threat to his community,

[...] the adults at the time sort of speaking in hushed tones about what was happening, with concern on their faces....You know, you'd just feel these things as a child rather than know all the politics...there was tension and worry and concern and stuff like that. So while we didn't really know much concrete stuff, we were aware just by the atmosphere of fear that something was wrong and was kinda threatening us and our community ('Padraig', PIRA).

In a similar vein, this participant explained how his parent's fear about the welfare of their teenage children was also imbued with a sense of panic related to the fact that they were Catholic,

You know, my older brothers and sisters, and I remember they used to go to a dance and all the rest. My parents were just waiting, just waiting for them to come home and if they weren't home there was a certain panic [that] would arise. I am sure that parents do that all the time but this was about being us, being Catholic and all, not about a car crash or stuff like that, but a fear that they had been lifted or shot by a stray bullet or stuff like that. Being young you sort of don't talk about it, you just get on with it, or you think you are getting on with it ('Liam', PIRA).

As they became older, the connection between fear, identity, and oppression became more overt in the eyes of PIRA members. For example, the following recollections describe incidents that took place in the year or so prior to each particular participant joining the PIRA. The first two examples refer to the policy of internment without trial, while the third example refers to the experience of being raided,

You couldn't be sure what would happen to you once internment began. You could just be goin' about ya business and you'd be lifted off the street and there was stories and all about what happened during the interrogations. I mean I heard of this fella, he was the brother of a friend of mine ya see, and I heard terrible stories about what they did to him in interrogations and his poor family, getting threatened and abused an' all, and in that August, 1971 it was, they were all Catholics that were getting lifted and it didn't matter if you were involved in anything or not you just had to live with the fear that you'd be lifted and end up in the Crum [Crumlin Road Prison]. In the end I was lifted. I got released [...] I still remember the bloody dread of what might happen in Girdwood ('Seán', PIRA).

7000 Catholic families fled their homes, 7,000 *Catholic* families, not 7000 *Protestant* families. Why do you think that was? [...] It was because the Catholics knew they were the ones who were in the firing line. The Protestants, they had active paramilitary groups at the time as well, but they

didn't have to fear being lifted. That was something for the Nationalist and Republic communities to worry about, ya know ('Ciarán', PIRA).

[...] the soldiers kicked ya door in at 4 in the morning and that's just, that's shocking, it's just traumatising, but they do it because that's the trained role they do [...] that's shock, at 4 o'clock in the morning, it's your worst fear, and it kept you in fear you know, whether it happens again or whether it doesn't it's all the same because once you know it can happen then there's always the fear that it might. That's part of what it means being a Republican ('Ruari', PIRA).

The following extended quote taken from an interview with 'Padraig' captures the complexity of experiencing fear, particularly when it is connected to group membership or identity. It demonstrates how fear is not always easily recognisable, how it can evoke a sense of guilt when it is experienced passively, and how it can be a strong motivation for action. In the case of 'Padraig's' parents, fear led to a difficult decision to move houses, but for Padraig it evoked a sense of obligation to defend. In other words, the following quote demonstrates both the 'flight' and 'fight' responses so commonly recognised as responses to intense fear,

Padraig: Then one night I was going somewhere and my mother had driven me and when we got back to the house, the house was surrounded by the British army, armed cars and RUC Landrovers and stuff and it transpired that there had been a shooting.

What had happened was [...] there was a knock at the door and my father answered, standing at the door was some lads and my father said 'what's happening'. My family didn't do anything suspicious but they were asking to speak to me so he says 'what do you want him for' and they said 'I just want to talk to him'. My father says 'well what do you want to talk to him about'. He says 'it's not me it's this guy over here, the guy sitting on the motor bike'. My father said 'what does he want to talk to him about' and at that the guy started banging down the path with a hand gun and started firing it, so my father dived to the side and he wasn't hit, my sister who is a year older than me came walking out of the living room and a bullet just narrowly missed her. The upshot was that we upped and left that house the next day.

Debra: Who were the people, the person, were they kids that you used to hang around with or?

'Padraig': They were Loyalists. No they were older than the ones I hung around with. At that time I would have been about 14, the guy who called at the door was, my father reckoned, about 19 or 20. But they came specifically.

Debra: So the idea was to come and commit a sectarian killing?

Padraig': Yeah, yep. So, and that, as I say the next morning we just up and left the house, we moved in with my grandmother who lived just up the road [...] I think my parents felt guilty that they hadn't moved out before and the difficulty is, and I know you may say that it's only a house and what have you, but my father as I say was a small time builder. He had bought this old ramshackle house and spent a fortune renovating it and doing it up, it was the family home and you know, they were attached to it, it's not easy on them [...] but obviously when that happened that was the final straw.

I suppose as I was getting older I was more aware politically of what was going on, even in the Clonard area and as I says [...] like you think of politics in an institutional way, it just didn't exist and what was needed wasn't any sort of long, drawn out political process to get from A to Z. What was needed was more immediate, it was about defending the areas from what was happening at that time, it was a day to day thing. I mean, if you looked for some long term political process at that stage your house'd be burned down or your community attacked before you even figured out what to do. So in that sense, it didn't seem logical to just leave your area undefended in pursuit of more lofty, long-term goals, you were just in the moment and something had to be done ('Padraig', PIRA).

The relationship between what would generally be viewed as an unacceptable level of everyday fear, along with the sense that this is experienced unequally within society according to a particular identity marker, in this case 'Catholic', 'Nationalist' or 'Republican', reinforces a sense of social and moral distance between one section of society and another. It also imbues the *status quo* with a strong sense of illegitimacy from the perspective of those who perceive themselves as being afraid. Of course, this works in the opposite direction. We are more accustomed to talking about 'terrorists' - such as those whose words and stories are set out above - as the instigators of fear, as 'terrorising' the broader community with their acts of violence. From the perspective of the broader community it is the fear evoked by their violence that contributes to their illegitimacy as political actors. Either way, when fear becomes pervasive within the context of everyday life it can be appropriated as a tool of identity formation in which the feared and the fearful become increasingly polarised.

In 1979, Arlie Russell Hochschild (1979) coined the term 'feeling rules' to describe how social norms provide a framework for interpreting what feelings are (or are not) appropriate within given social settings. From this perspective we are socialised into understanding the appropriate expression of emotion such as grief and sadness at a funeral, joyfulness at a wedding, or anger at an injustice (Hochschild, 1979, p. 552). However, 'feeling rules' reflect patterns of social connection

and membership, meaning that people may experience emotions differently depending on their attachment to an assortment of different social groups. For example, it is generally considered appropriate to feel shock, distress and anger at an event like 9/11 yet in reality some people felt ambivalent or even a degree of satisfaction at seeing these events unfold. Similarly, the emotions of PIRA members did not reflect those of broader society. They did not experience loyalty, anger, fear, or shame in a way that strengthened their commitment to the values and norms of British rule, but rather in a way that served emotionally and morally to distance them, contributing to the development of an oppositional stance.

MOVING AWAY FROM THE MAINSTREAM: EXCLUSIVIST GROUP BONDS

The above discussion begins the process of considering how the emotionally tense and complex environment in which the interview participants lived contributed to a sense of distance between themselves and broader society. In short, they did not experience their emotions in a socially assumed manner. As Jaggar notes,

People [...] may feel satisfaction rather than embarrassment when their leaders make a fool of themselves. They may feel resentment rather than gratitude for welfare payments and hand-me-downs. They may be attracted to forbidden modes of sexual expression. They may feel revulsion for socially sanctioned ways of treating children or animals. In other words, the hegemony that our society exercises over people's emotional constitution is not total (Jaggar, 1989, p. 166).

Jaggar goes on to suggest that the social status of subordinate groups makes it almost impossible for them to experience the “conventionally prescribed emotions” (Jaggar, 1989, p. 166). If this is an individual experience, it may lead to confusion, self-doubt, or personal existential crisis. However, when these emotions are shared by others, particularly others who share some salient common identity, then dissident emotions may become validating and a source of alternate communal bonds and alternate moral perspectives.

The examples provided above were not the result of a negative emotional experience or episode as much as a sense that the particular experiences they were having were routine and habitual, indeed familiar aspects of everyday life connected to their identity, as the following exchange with the interviewer reveals,

Máirtín: But, you know, we were resigned in so far as that was what we expected from the British, that was what we expected from the courts, we expected to be tortured when we went into Castlereagh and we expected to be brutalised when we went in the H blocks. [...]

Debra: How did that leave you feeling about your existing circumstances?

Máirtín: Umm, I mean, I guess contempt maybe, I'm not sure whether that's the right word though. I keep going back to the word injustice, and I know that isn't a feeling as such, but it does include a whole lot of feelings all at once. I mean, of course it is easy to feel contempt towards people who consistently cause injustices to not only you, but to your whole community. I mean if it was just to me of course I'd be angry, but when you realise it's systematic against your whole community, well that brings up more complicated feelings I think. The thing is, I think you feel as if you only have two choices. Either you accept the world around you or you don't. For me, I just felt as if I couldn't accept it. I just didn't feel at peace with the way things were, always having this sense that you are a second class citizen in your own country. And by that I mean, not just that I felt that way, but that we all felt that way. And even worse, was that somehow you were expected not to. It's hard to explain Debra, I mean when you ask about stuff that isn't just the obvious political stuff about representation or education or jobs. I find it difficult to explain what it actually feels like in terms of living with this sense of injustice churning away in ya guts day after day. Sometimes you can ignore it I guess, but if I really think about it I suspect that many of my decisions, many of the judgments I made were influenced by that everyday sense of injustice. That feeling of injustice if you like.

Debra: And what things do you associate most with the feeling of injustice?

Máirtín: Obviously you feel angry and frustrated as well, maybe contempt for the way things are, and even sad and hopeless I guess. [...] Injustice and all the feeling associated with it, that would have been the biggest motivation in everything that I have done, why I was involved in the Republican Movement and why I protested in prison. When you get involved in doing something then the feelings are more useful, they motivate you and you kind of go beyond them in a way, to something more positive and constructive, like bringing about change ('Máirtín', PIRA).

In a sense, what Máirtín is describing is the way in which citizenship extends beyond the concept of legal membership and includes cultural and symbolic modes of belonging, which are connected to group rights and a sense of moral obligation. In other words, citizenship is problematic without the feeling of national belonging (Berezin, 2001, p. 84). In her work on German and Italian left and right wing radicals operating during the periods of 1965-75, della Porta (1995, pp. 177-179) demonstrated how the perceived abrogation of the state's duties to its citizens led to the

transfer of affective bonds away from broader society and towards movements of protest and dissent. In essence, della Porta suggests that the momentum for developing alternative sites of affective ties begins when the state is perceived to be working in opposition to the needs of a particular section of the community (also see, Kalb & Tak, 2008). However, for this to take place, as della Porta suggests, there needs to be an alternative group to which emotional connections can be formed, and in the case of extremist groups these alternative emotional connections may be extremely salient.

For 'Máirtín', the feelings he experienced as a result of perceived injustices were a foundational motivation for participating in a politically violent group. However, there is nothing specific about his emotions that would make violence the only possible choice. As mentioned in chapter two, emotions can be seen as behaviourally inclining rather than compelling. However, when 'Máirtín's' circumstances motivated him to become politically active the people he came into contact with who reflected his own particular emotional experiences happened to accept violence as a legitimate political tactic. As 'Máirtín' moved away from the mainstream, he found alternative groups to which he made emotional connections. While this began as a broad, loosely defined group such as Catholics, it later became 'Republican' and ultimately the PIRA,

Growing up in the North you find a lot of people share your sense of injustice. Some talk about it more politically, or are more overt in what they say, and others just take it on as a normal part of life. But it unites you, you know, just like you are united behind a football team [...] You may not have anything else in common so much but you are Catholics and you are discriminated against and so you have that in common.

As I got a bit older I found I wanted to hang around with people who were angry like me, who wanted to defy the Brits when they went to search you, or to mouth off at them in the street. Not everyone wanted to do that, some others even if they didn't like it preferred not to risk any trouble or whatever, and others wanted to be defiant and so I hung around with them. But even that wasn't enough for some of us. To give a bit of cheek or to throw some stones, being a bit of a lad I suppose. There were others who felt a strong need to defend the community, to understand more about why we were in this situation and to change it. I just felt more at ease with people who were coming at things from the same perspective I guess [...] ('Máirtín', PIRA).

Similarly, 'Tadhg' explains,

Those people who share your frustration and who kinda automatically just understand your anger and, I don't know, the kinda deep resentment at how things are, they are the people you feel comfortable with. Maybe you can

get along well enough with others I guess, but you feel comfortable, with those who feel the same way ('Tadhg', PIRA).

'John', on the other hand, evokes the sports metaphor to explain why he prefers to be in a group of people with the same ideological position as him by saying,

You know, it's like if you go to a pub, and you like one soccer team. Are you gonna go to the pub next door where they talk about a different soccer team? No. You're gonna go to that place where you feel comfortable and you feel okay to talk about that team. Because, if you go to this team, they're gonna be like 'oh, you know that players no good', you know, 'they're all wrong, they're just a terrible team', But you go over here, and they're like, 'that teams the best' ('John', Canadian Salafist).

'Tariq' explains in very simple terms the emotional appeal of an alternative identity group when he says that,

When you feel down and somebody reaches out to you, you...most of the time you'll accept that because you have that need. We have that need; humans have needs. We need attention. We have this yearning right? So when everybody pushes you away and somebody comes and 'oh, yeah, oh, come with us.' You tend to accept right, and [if] that happens to be somebody who is on the path [to] extremism so you might just start to believe that [...]'('Tariq', Canadian Salafist).

However it is expressed, the point is that the process of bonding with a group is partly determined by pre-existing emotional needs which arise in a particular social or individual context. The ensuing exchange with 'Khalid' explores why he found one particular group of people at his Mosque, who happened to be involved with the JI, more appealing than the other. The political agenda of each group was not the premiere issue for 'Khalid', but rather the feeling of belonging that encircled him,

'Khalid': So basically the two separate factions who had at, like I said, at one stage been one, they were basically doing the same sort of thing, so teaching the same sort of things, but the other group, [...] I think they were more concerned with enjoying their lives in Australia, more so than the group I was with [...] By all means enjoy yourself but within limits, don't go buy a brand new Aston Martin or whatever [...]

Debra: But was there also a sense that – because with your sort of very disjointed background which you weren't really able to develop close bonds with groups of people, did that group offer that sort of sense of security and family more than what a group would that is a little bit more free and easy.

‘Khalid’: Yeah, that’s a very good point actually, I never thought about it before but now that you mention it, yes it makes perfect sense, yeah I’d say that’s the truth. I was accepted very readily into that group, and no qualms about who I was or whatever, it was mutual respect, I feel that there was respect there. The other people were – I mean there was respect but they’re more distant, they seem to be more concerned with their lives.

The process of developing emotional bonds based on the belonging (or not) to a particular group draws strength from the idea that specific social groups can have collective characteristics and duties (Parkinson *et al.*, 2005, pp. 115-116). In particular, the idea that one particular group is threatening to impact on the security and freedom of another group may evoke feelings of anger, hate, despair, anxiety, or any other emotion directed at an entire category of people. We have witnessed this in the reactions towards Muslims following 9/11 and other terrorist attacks. Similarly, these emotions have been felt by Catholics in Northern Ireland and by other minority groups who feel unfairly treated by a more powerful group in society. For Parkinson *et al* (2005, p. 116), understanding intergroup emotions, or those emotions which are both felt collectively and are directed towards a collective requires “abandoning the notion that emotions are experienced by individuals because of things that have been done to them or by them as *individuals*. Rather, under certain conditions at least, emotions are experienced by individuals because of things that have been done to them or by them as members of *social groups*” (emphasis in original).

An awareness or perception of discrimination, unfair treatment, lower status, or threat, can work to create emotional distance between the two opposing groups while simultaneously increasing the emotional saliency within the group that perceives itself to be under threat (Castano *et al.*, 2008, p. 264). The following exchange with ‘Coilm’ reveals this process as he recalls the period of Bobby Sands death. ‘Coilm’ played a pivotal role in the second hunger strike and had been to see Bobby in the hospital wing not long before his death,

‘Coilm’: And then it was just, what do you do? How are ya? Fuck, what you have to say is how ya feelin’. I mean he could hardly see me, he didn't see who it was coming in the door. And ah, he had laboured breath, you know, sunken cheeks and eyes and everything. It was just a horrendous fuckin’ picture altogether. And ah, just sitting at the bed side and chatting about ‘how's everybody down the wing’, and ‘what about the women’. We talked about them, and the lads down the wing and that was it you know, just, it was short, just, if it was 15 minutes I'm exaggerating, if it was. Going in his door and leaving again. And you just felt that you were causing him, you know, discomfort by continuing talking. Even the medic that was at the doorway was ah, in whispered tones as if speaking

loud...it was just better to just leave him. After a period of time I just left and um, you want, you love to see him but, you know.

Debra: Was that the last time you saw him before he died?

‘Coilm’: Yeah, yep. [...] I mean, first of all when we heard the news there was just total sense of, although you were waiting for it and you were waiting for days and days and days, and you knew nothing was going to happen within those last days, nothing was goin’ to happen, you’re just waiting and waiting and waiting. And when it happened it was just this awful sense of loss, right, and I think it was probably the first day and all the protesters didn't do nothin’, not one thing. Once I wrote the ads [advisories] I didn't do one thing, I didn't write to anybody else, I didn't talk to someone out the window, I just had a total and absolute numb day, you know. It was just like frozen in time, and the screws comin’ up were all jittery and they were all...

Debra: Did you say jittery?

‘Coilm’: Not jittery in the sense of nervous, but, you know, chirpy. A couple of screws came up with the grub and stuff like that and opening the doors and “ah, good morning” they were, some of them were happy.

Debra: Was that a deliberate tactic?

‘Coilm’: Oh yeah, yeah, yeah. And you're saying to guys, “everybody just keep a lid on it, don't anybody be doing anything because it'll just make it worse”. [...] A couple of guys had to be um, almost physically restrained from um disappearing a screw off the front of the wing, just under the cell. But you knew rightly they were chirpy, and a few about the place were making remarks and yeah, celebrating it, you know.

Debra: What affect did that have on you and the rest of the blokes on the wing?

‘Coilm’: Well, as I say, that first day was horrendous and we were in shock even though obviously we knew it was going to happen. But when the screws behave like that it just brings you back to reality. You see the profound disrespect for us and for what we are feeling, for our loss, and it hardens you. It, I mean, it makes you draw closer together. It is like we are two different species almost. There is no connection, no human connection, it is just obvious that they was on a totally different planet.

A salient group identity is made easier when people have similar emotional experiences and responses (Robinson, Smith-Lovin, & Wisecup, 2006, p. 193). ‘Coilm’ felt closer to his fellow Republican inmates who were also mourning Bobby’s death than to guards who were ‘chirpy’. The extent to which a person feels part of a particular group rests partially on the way they see their own emotional reactions reflected in the reactions of others. A group identity can provide a shared frame

of reference through which events can be interpreted and responded to. The divisional stance, the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ if you will, is deeply rooted in the shared emotional experiences people have as a result of living their particular identity. As we will see in the next chapter, this is more significant than just a sense of social and moral distancing from the mainstream in favour of a more cohesive, exclusivist identity. Rather, these shared emotional experiences provide the basis for a shared epistemological position on which the adoption or rejection of particular ideologies rest. Judgments about which particular ideologies ‘feel’ authentic or true are developed, in part, by using these shared emotional experiences as evidence or knowledge about how the world is, how it needs to be changed, and how this should be achieved.

A reciprocal relationship in which emotion and identity intertwine to meld and shape each other can lead to a highly politicised reading of emotional experiences. A recurring theme in the discussion above was that many negative emotional experiences arose from belonging to a particular social group, whether that is Catholic, Republican, Muslim, or Islamist. The consolidation between shared emotional experiences and identity validates the emotional experience as identity gives the experience of emotion purpose and meaning. According to Flam (2005, pp. 24-31), in lieu of an embedded sense of loyalty towards the *status quo*, distrust and contempt may develop. Anger may be re-appropriated as a legitimate expression of rights, shame may be countered through the construction of pride and honour, and fear can be circumvented by promoting positive emotions such as joy, hope and new forms of loyalty. According to ‘Mick’,

‘Mick’: When I joined [the PIRA] I was definitely apprehensive. Not at first, but soon enough you are told that if you join you’ll probably end up in jail, or maybe even dead. And for me personally, I wasn’t mindlessly happy or naive. I knew I was leaving certain comforts and safeties behind.

Debra: Did you feel alone then?

‘Mick’: To a certain extent yeah, there is a certain extent of feeling alone, even though you are now part of something new. I made the point earlier that it wasn’t sort of following the herd type of thing, you know, your mates joined so I’ll join too. I made a conscious decision to go alone and not with another friend [...] In a sense it was quite lonely but you are also mixing with people who feel the same frustration and anger that you do and who want to do something about it. So you leave something behind and you begin a secretive life and that has some impact, on your family and that because you have to lie about what you’re doing and where you’re going and so it means that you are distancing yourself from them and all. But on the other hand you have new people around you who reinforce that you are angry for a purpose if that makes sense. Umm, it’s not mindless anger or mindless disrespect for the existing system. You

have purpose and you know that purpose is beyond just you personally but is for something bigger, because you are on the side of fairness and justice and morality. And so while I can't deny I was scared at times you can get beyond it by looking at the bigger picture, about what you were trying to achieve and to have that sense of purpose, to have goals and directions even if they were short term it made it better, you felt like you were able to achieve something and so everything didn't seem as hopeless.

Debra: So are you saying that when you joined you felt better than before you joined?

'Mick': Yeah, what I'm saying is that there is a difference from being a pissed off kid who sees what is happening but does nothing and being a pissed off kid who stands up to defend the community and does something about resisting the situation. You're still pissed off but you're also involving yourself in changing your situation. You're a pissed off Republican and so your anger has a purpose ('Mick', PIRA).

In a similar vein, 'Padraig' explains how his feelings of despair and fear when first arriving at the Maze prison and being taken down to the non-conforming prisoners' wing (the blanket protest) were transformed by the positive sense of belonging that overwhelmed him when he was warmly welcomed. In this extended quote I questioned 'Padraig' how this 'positivity' could be maintained given that the men spent extended periods of time, sometimes years, living naked in a cell with excrement smeared on the walls. While at other periods in the interview 'Padraig' pointed out that many men were deeply troubled and traumatised by the experience of jail and have continuing difficulties with alcoholism, gambling and depression, he does show how a sense of belonging to an 'us' which stood in opposition to a 'them' (in this case the prison guards) helped him to survive in prison,

'Padraig' I mean the first day that I came down onto the Blanket and I was brought down onto the wing and everything was quiet. You're apprehensive, you're expecting to get a beating, you're naked, taken into the cell, cell 26 was actually a double cell. I think it was designed for people who were orderlies on the wing, these were the guys who maintained the wing for the food so this was the bottom of the wing and they would be out first and get the food round...but the screws used it to, well, it was where most of the beatings happened. So I was taken in there, roughed up a bit, nothing out of the ordinary, you'd feel very much alone, apprehensive in your cell, you'd think *Jeezus*, and then when I came out and started to walk up the wing I heard somebody shout '*fear nua ar an sciathán*', new man on the wing.

Debra: You spoke Irish at that time?

‘Padraig’: You, well, I always had a bit of Irish tutoring. I mean all hell just broke loose. People up and shouting and banging their doors, it was just like walking into a wall of noise, but I mean the thing I have compared it to, imagine going out as a sportsman in a team in one of the big finals and you’ve just come out of the big tunnels and there is 80,000 - 100,000 people there, you know the noise just erupted. The hair stood up on the back of my neck. From being sort of thin and lonely and being afraid and apprehensive, you know, all of a sudden your spirits are lifted and you feel as though, well not only that you are a part of something, but that you are welcome, and that you are not so alone, you are in a community again.

Debra: Did this surprise you?

‘Padraig’: You know when you came out you were thinking they’d all be cowered [sic] in their cells and then in an instant you realise the morale is high and you know that there is defiance and spirit there and that, really, you keep battling on against the same things you were battling on the outside. You know you’re right, everything is reinforced, and keeping hold of the knowledge that you are right, that your fight is an admirable one on behalf of others. That existed right through the whole period of the Blanket. It’s just something that you don’t experience much in life, that sort of camaraderie.

Debra: But it couldn’t have always been like that. I mean, how do you keep that? I can’t even begin to imagine what that period was like for you. I mean, you must have times when you are just so down, when there is crap on the walls and you know you’re naked and cold, it’s not just for a week, it’s for an extended period of time and you don’t even know if it will end. How do you maintain positivity, I mean how do you just get through each day?

‘Padraig’: Well I think it is you just take it a day at a time really, I mean you don’t, it was very hard to sort of envisage yourself living in these conditions you know, for a year or two years and I mean we just braved on [...] People on visits bringing news back and there was a lot of activity in the wing, you know, we had classes and I mean at night people would get up and tell a book, and some people were absolutely amazing at the recall that they had of books, and you know everybody. You see, once the screws left the wings at night, usually about 8pm, our wing would be very quiet, some people would get up and put their mattresses beside the door and sit and listen and I mean, like in the movie [Hunger] you know. And we had Irish classes and we had discussions and quizzes and all that sort of stuff was going on in there to help pass the time. Every night after the screws would go there’d be a wing meeting, anybody who had a visit, you’d tell if you had a visit, you’d all share your experience so others who didn’t get a visit could kinda enjoy it vicariously. And then you’d be asked about it, and about going back and forward to the visiting area. I always sort of laughed about it afterwards, like, did you get any bad manners? Did you get the shit kicked out a ya? Obviously it wasn’t

funny, but it kinda helped to make it seem like an achievement, like running the gauntlet and winning if ya know what I mean. You know, the thing about it is that we knew how much it actually upset the screws. You know, that was one of the things that was great, because, you know, they hated us talking Irish because they couldn't understand us, you know they'd be derogatory and insulting us and so on, saying to us that we were 'talking in Leprechaun language' and all of that stuff. It just made us pleased that they found it so annoying ('Padraig', PIRA).

A politicised group provides a site in which subverted emotional stances can be developed, expressed, validated, strengthened and legitimised. Jasper (1998, pp. 417-418) explains this by drawing attention to what he refers to as 'reciprocal' and 'shared' emotions. Reciprocal emotions refer to those affective bonds such as love and pride which arise from the friendship, solidarity and loyalty within the group. They are generated and strengthened by the pleasures of belonging (also see, Goodwin, 1997). Reciprocal emotions help to frame 'shared' emotions which are defined as those that are consciously held by the group but are directed at those outside of it. For example, the group may nurture and encourage anger, contempt or hate towards outsiders, or outrage and disdain over government policies. In other words, they create alternative 'feeling rules' around emotional responses. As such, reciprocal and shared emotions work to reinforce and strengthen each other. Shared anger and contempt at the prison guards therefore reinforces the reciprocal emotions of loyalty and affection between members of the group. It is the process of seeing your emotional responses reflected in the responses of others that helps to reinforce them. Similarly, within the context of shared emotions it is easier to create a new emotional culture precisely because you are fond of or feel warm towards members of your group you are more likely to adopt their feelings. Emotions, therefore, become a strong source of 'glue' within the exclusivist group.

In the cases examined above there was a degree of emotional dissidence experienced which encouraged participants to disengage or disconnect from the moral obligations and expectations of the *status quo* and instead to seek out alternative social bonds which came with an alternate set of moral obligations and expectations. At times group identity will form in response to a perception of being stigmatised or treated unjustly, as demonstrated in the cases above. In these cases, one way of managing belonging to an identity group that is perceived as vilified or scorned is to re-invent it in a way that glorifies its roots and goals, imbuing it with a sense of righteousness and pride (Schwalbe & Mason-Schrock, 1996, p. 141). People want to shape and maintain an identity that makes them feel good (or at least better) about themselves, both individually and collectively (Field, Copp, & Kleinman, 2006, p. 166). One of the roles of dissident groups is to effectively challenge the norms

around what are the acceptable or appropriate emotions both to feel and display under particular conditions (Goodwin *et al.*, 2001, p. 9; Jasper, 1998, p. 407). This is particularly the case in relation to movements that are fighting against perceived stigmatisation or discrimination. Just as thousands of consciousness-raising groups in the 1960s encouraged women to reject the feelings of guilt and resentment they had in relation to their husbands, fathers, employers and a patriarchal system in general (Hochschild, 1975, p. 298; Jasper, 1998, p. 407; Taylor & Whittier, 1995), so extremist groups offer an opportunity to reject any guilt a person may have about their anger at the *status quo*. Furthermore, supposedly ‘negative’ emotions such as anger, resentment, or contempt are transformed into positives. They are encouraged and reframed as righteous, predictable, and reasonable, and even become a requirement of belonging to the group. As Hochschild (1975, p. 298) notes, the dissident group or movement “make 'bad' feelings okay, and they make them useful”.

Furthermore, the emotional connection to alternative groups is likely to be greater when a particular identity marker “attracts either strong moral opposition or ardent public support” (Field *et al.*, 2006, p. 164). The implication of this is that the greater the moral opposition or support for the particular identity, the stronger the bonds within the group are likely to be. In the case of terrorism, the simplistic polarisation into categories such as ‘good’ and ‘evil’ likely strengthens the bonds of those within the groups by both providing evidence of moral condemnation while simultaneously pushing those within the broader community of support to identify more strongly with the extremists, increasing popular support within those sections of the community who share some degree of identification with them.

Importantly, the more salient the emotional bonding between individuals and their group identity, the more influence the emotional norms of the group has over how members react and respond to particular events. In other words, the shared emotional bonds within the group help to define what to get angry about, who to feel contemptuous towards, or who to admire, what should be done, and so forth. Furthermore, the group norms provide evidence for the level of emotional response that is appropriate. When emotions are shared with others and responded to with validation they can form the basis for a subculture in which norms, values, and beliefs can be redefined in a way that systematically opposes those that are prevalent in broader society (Jaggar, 1989, p. 166). In this sense, the emotional experiences connected to identity represent an “alternative political logic” (Berezin, 2001, p. 97) and, I would add, an alternative moral logic as well.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has considered how emotions are, in part, socially constructed. Because of this they bear the marks of their environment, reflecting cultural norms and expectations and guiding us about how, what, and when we ‘should’ feel. Within society, these cultural norms and expectations tend both to reflect and to serve the interests of dominant groups, and when a sub-section of the society distances itself, it begins with a degree of shared emotional dissidence, of not feeling one’s own emotional responses are reflected in those of the *status quo*. Moving away from the dominant groups is made more likely if it is possible to undermine the expectations around emotional responses while simultaneously creating new norms and expectations based on a salient identity marker. These subversive counter-emotions may provide a form of ‘felt’ knowledge through which anger, fear, contempt or any other emotion brings into consciousness a belief that the prevailing social conditions are unjust, coercive, cruel, discriminatory or immoral. Thus, argues Jaggard, (1989, p. 167) “conventionally inexplicable emotions, [...] may lead us to make subversive observations that challenge dominant conceptions of the *status quo*.”

The identities that develop as affective ties are strengthened within the group and simultaneously weakened outside of it, draw strongly on a meta-narrative or ideology, both in order to make sense of the developing identity as well as to help shape it. To some extent, the appeal of violent ideologies lies in their ability to explain systemic negative emotional experiences within a narrative that provides a sense of validation, hope for a better future, and a plan of action to bring about the changes necessary for achieving it. They offer an alternative moral framework in which emotional strains can be explained in terms of a particular social identity, injustice, victimhood or oppression. But they also offer a way of escaping the negative implications of this by empowering people with hope to change the contexts of their lives. While this chapter has explored how emotions contribute to structuring the social milieu in which the actors find themselves, laying the foundations for a clear division between ‘us’ and ‘them’, the next chapter looks more closely at the role of emotion in the development and appeal of violent ideologies.

CHAPTER 5

PASSIONATE BELIEF: IDEOLOGY AND EMOTION

There can be no knowledge without emotion. We may be aware of a truth, yet until we have felt its force, it is not ours. To the cognition of the brain must be added the experience of the soul.

Arnold Bennett (1954)

The journals of Arnold Bennett, entry on March 18, 1897.

We believe easily what we hope and what we fear

Swedish Proverb

INTRODUCTION

The construction of the kinds of subversive counter-emotions connected to a particular identity that have been outlined in the previous chapter may also enable individuals to perceive the world differently than those whose emotional stance broadly reflects that of the *status quo*. These emotions are notable because they are incompatible with prevailing expectations, experiences and beliefs, and as such they nurture the seeds of rebellion. For some people, their emotional dissidence may provide a kind of nascent political warning that something is wrong with the way their world is constructed. Thus, subversive counter-emotions may prime individuals to accept rebellious ideological positions that directly challenge the dominant socio-political stance.

Although emotions are usually understood as responses flowing *from* our beliefs, this chapter reveals how emotions also contribute to the *development of* beliefs that inform our ideological positions and strengthen their credibility. It demonstrates how a political agenda that incorporates violence can be more appealing to some people than one that does not by focusing on how engaging with the ideology helps to make sense of emotions, and how repetition of emotions

that are interpreted through a particular ideological lens subsequently strengthens and brings further conviction to that ideology.

Implicit in any ideological stance are new 'feeling rules' that arise in the context of alternative interpretations of social and political phenomena (Hochschild, 1979, pp. 566-568). For example, if a person views the injustice they experience as the result of their own personal or collective failings they may respond with shame. If they view the same acts as the result of systemic discrimination then they may respond with anger or outrage. It follows that when a person adopts a particular ideological stance, they also adopt a new set of rules for their emotional reactions. We have seen in the previous chapter that participants have defied the dominant ideological position in part by defying the 'feeling rules' that it implies. Asserting an alternative ideology involves asserting the legitimacy of alternative emotional experiences and responses.

Ideology performs a variety of tasks. Firstly, it provides a way of explaining political phenomena. For example, why some people have power while others may not, how the economy should be organised in order to achieve the greatest good, or why conflicts are taking place and so forth. Secondly, ideologies provide an evaluative framework for adherents to decide what is moral or immoral, right or wrong, good or bad (Ball & Dagger, 2004, pp. 1-2). Thirdly, ideologies provide their adherents with a sense of individual and collective identity. They provide a framework for understanding who we are and how we fit into the world (Ball & Dagger, 2004, pp. 1-2; Cash, 1989). Neo-Nazis, for example, may see themselves as members of a superior race, while communists may see themselves as defenders of the working class. Finally, ideologies provide adherents with a rudimentary plan of political action, they sketch out what has to be done in order to transform society into the idealised vision one imagines possible (Ball & Dagger, 2004; Cash, 1989).

This way of understanding ideology is not inconsistent with the approach taken in this thesis. However, the approach taken here shifts the focus more directly towards explaining how adopting a particular ideology is both shaped by, and shapes, an adherent's emotional life. Ways of conceptualising ideologies that privilege rationalist explanations tend to assume that any ideological stance is arrived at as a result of thought and reasoning, with emotion contributing only through the provision of 'heat' to the rational pursuit of interests (Cash, 1989, p. 704; Eagleton, 1991, pp. 4, 221; Hochschild, 1979, p. 566). From this perspective emotion is not used as evidence, or as a source of belief or knowledge, but more as a lever of intensity. While it is no doubt correct that emotions do

work as levers of intensity, it is also clear that people do use emotions as a source of knowledge and evidence (Clare & Gasper, 2000; Fielder & Bless, 2000; Frijda *et al.*, 2000; Frijda & Mesquita, 2000; Goldie, 2004; Mercer, 2010; Solomon, 2004). For example, the fear or anxiety a person may feel when faced with a person from another culture may be interpreted as evidence that that person is threatening. As discussed earlier in Chapter Two, these emotions may be appropriate or inappropriate, but nevertheless they may both contribute to and reinforce a particular set of beliefs.

Because people use emotion as evidence, Mercer (2010, pp. 1-2) has suggested that exploring the concept of 'emotional beliefs' is as important as focusing on specific emotions to understanding the role of affect within political behaviour. Mercer (2010, pp. 2-6) posits that an emotional belief is one in which emotion both constitutes and strengthens a conviction, providing certainty that transcends proof. Understanding the commitments that people may have to different ideological positions, including violent ones, must take into account the way that emotion can reinforce and give certainty to particular ideological positions. In the case of counter-terrorism strategies that attempt to challenge the appeal of violent ideologies this is particularly pertinent because credibility is judged as much by what 'feels true' as by any objective interpretation of the facts. Similarly, the political programs outlined by differing ideologies may be attractive as much for how they make someone feel as any likelihood or possibility that they can bring about the desired social change.

While there may be good normative reasons for questioning the influence of emotion, particularly intense emotion, in establishing beliefs or making decisions, this should not be confused with assuming that emotions can be eliminated or ignored. The reality is that we all depend and draw on our emotions when establishing our beliefs and attitudes about the world, and therefore they need to be central to our search for understandings about why people do what they do, including adopting, accepting, or responding to a particular ideology that calls for the use of violence. Indeed, accepting the role of emotion in establishing knowledge and beliefs does not mean that the influence of emotion should be accepted uncritically, but rather that it should be viewed as a constitutive element in analysing the development of knowledge and beliefs. Before examining more closely the role of emotion in developing and sustaining a particular ideological position, this chapter briefly considers how Terrorism Studies engages with the concept of ideology.

Within the study of politics, ideologies have been seen as potent political forces, capable of inspiring people to extreme acts, both appalling and admirable (Jost & Amodio, 2012, p. 55) . They have also long attracted the attention of terrorism scholars, being central to the concept of group typologies such a ‘nationalist’, ‘jihadist’, ‘left-wing’, ‘right-wing’ and so forth. Furthermore, ideologies have often been the focus of counter-terrorism strategies as attempts at modifying or undermining the violent ideology are seen as an important component of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) policies.

Violent political extremism is often viewed as primarily the outcome of a violent ideology (for example see, Gunaratna, 2005, pp. 9-10). So much so that an unspoken assumption underlying much of the literature and policy surrounding terrorism is that particular aspects of a specific ideology sufficiently explain its intransigence and violent tendencies (Bosi & della Porta, 2012, p. 366). The logical outcome of the assumption that a particular ideology is primarily responsible for the perpetration of violent acts is that countering violent extremism equates with countering the violent extremist ideology, usually expressed in terms of counter-narratives (Borum, 2011, pp. 1-2). According to Richardson,

[w]e need to engage in a vigorous campaign of public diplomacy to make our case to the populations that produce terrorists. [...] We need to exploit new media technologies to engage in [...] a strategic communications program to address systematically the arguments against us and to counter the avenues through which extremists win recruits (Richardson, 2006a, p. 10).

Countering violent extremism via ‘strategic communication’ was also the subject of a recent report by the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC)(Chowdhury Fink & Barclay, 2013). The report was a result of a study undertaken to examine how the counterterrorism narrative of the UN is received. The position of the CGCC report seems to understand that the violent ideological narrative has an emotional dimension and therefore emotional appeal needs to be present in any counter-narrative. It states that the UN has a “good story to tell”, and that doing so effectively requires moving beyond just communicating information and facts, towards understanding the values, attitudes and beliefs of its audience (Chowdhury Fink & Barclay, 2013, pp. iii, 13). According to this report, groups such as al Qaeda excel at strategic communication with

the concerning result of turning “passive observers into active participants in violent extremism” (Chowdhury Fink & Barclay, 2013, p. iii).

However, the idea that there is an instrumental link between violent ideological narratives and the perpetration of violent acts is far from uncontested within the realm of Terrorism Studies. Horgan (quoted in, Knefel, 2013) is particularly blunt when he states that, "Nobody watches YouTube or reads *Inspire* and becomes a terrorist. It's absurd to think so". Horgan's comments were part of a debate on the topic of a causal relationship between violent ideologies and violent acts that erupted following the 2013 bombings at the Boston Marathon. The debate was sparked (rather surprisingly) by an article in *Rolling Stones* magazine entitled, 'Everything You've Been Told About Radicalization Is Wrong'(Knefel, 2013). In this article, terrorism scholar Jamie Bartlett was quoted as saying, "that many young home-grown al-Qaeda terrorists are not attracted by religion or ideology alone – often their knowledge of Islamist theology is wafer-thin and superficial – but also the glamour and excitement that al-Qaeda type groups purports to offer” (Bartlett quoted in, Knefel, 2013). Likewise, Horgan was quoted as saying that, while there are ideological reasons why someone may come involved in terrorism, “[h]idden behind these bigger reasons, there are also hosts of littler reasons – personal fantasy, seeking adventure, camaraderie, purpose, identity [...] These lures can be very powerful, especially when you don't necessarily have a lot else going on in your life, but terrorists rarely talk about them."

In response to critiques by Berger (2013) and Gartenstein-Ross (2013), Bartlett, (2013) suggested that the debate was in some senses caught in a tautology because when someone commits an act of violence in the name of a particular ideology, then of course the ideology is associated with violence. However, the degree to which the particular ideology was itself a major factor that led to the violence is more complicated and problematic. Bartlett pointed to his substantive fieldwork comparing violent and non-violent radicals in which many radical individuals came into contact with violent ideologies but did not believe that a violent response was required, let alone become motivated to undertake such an act (Bartlett & Miller, 2011, pp. 98-99). This result also held in relation to violent jihadist videos such as those showing beheadings. Bartlett does not dismiss the influence such material can have, but places the risk in the realm of ‘emotional pull’ rather than the ideological message contained. The appeal of violence “was there all along, rather than the culmination of a radical journey. The thrill of human action, the glamour of violence, the narcissism was vital” (Bartlett, 2013). For Bartlett, like Horgan, ideology plays a role in justifying violence rather than inspiring it.

None of this suggests that ideology is an irrelevant area of inquiry within Terrorism Studies, or that it is insignificant in any decision to engage in violent political extremism. On the contrary, ideology can play an important role in the decision to engage in violence, even if it is a *post-hoc* justification of a pre-existing desire. Ideology provides a moral framework within which one can operate, whether from the perspective of the violent extremist or the perspective of those opposing them. It also provides a framework for understanding and interpreting the world, including understanding and interpreting the many emotions one experiences in response to particular social and political circumstances. Terrorism Studies, however, may benefit from focusing less on the content of the message, which may or may not be objectively factual, and most certainly will be subjectively contested, and more on how it makes a person, or group of people, feel, whether that be in possession of a certain truth, thrilled, superior, altruistic, secure, or any other emotional experience arising in response to an ideology. This is particularly the case as the professed ideology of a group may or may not equate with the initial beliefs of individual members and while leaders may have quite sophisticated understandings of their particular ideology, followers may or may not have this, nor particularly care (Drake, 1998, p. 55; Sageman, 2008, p. 157). While useful for providing a *post-hoc* justification for the support of violence, the reasons behind a commitment to this form of action would appear to be more complex. For instance, the following PIRA member admitted that when he was first imprisoned for rioting against the presence of British troops that he had,

...absolutely no commitment to the armed struggle, wouldn't even have known then what it would entail or what it was all about. To be completely honest I didn't know the difference between the Provos and the Stickies and hadn't even thought about whether the use of violence was justified. I learnt about that after I joined the Provos [...] I dare anyone to say at that age [he was 17] that they would have understood the ideology, or even thought about it. It was really as simple as wanting to get into a bit of mischief and, I guess, in a way it was about not wanting to comply or accept what was happening around me. Defiance or a bit of pride I guess is what you'd call it ('Eamon', PIRA).

Similarly, 'Keiran' noted that,

...it wasn't Republicanism that mobilised me, it was about lashing out against the British Army and the RUC. In time I came to understand that Republicanism provided answers, historical evidence about why that was justified, but initially it was just an instinct ('Keiran', PIRA).

In a comparable vein, Ilardi (2013, p. 723) has noted that some of the Canadian men he interviewed about support for violent jihadist ideology “were driven by the *idea* of jihad, its

trappings and how it made them *feel*” more than any well thought out commitment to the scholarly Islamic arguments or concern about grievances within the Muslim world (emphasis in original). The following quotes come from the Ilardi interviews, to which I had access in full.

No one ever taught me that obligation [violent jihad]... it was important to me because I always had this idea of being this war hero since I was a kid ... it was my desire to be a famous war hero Muslim. And that had nothing to do with my obligation to Islam, that was just my desire (quoted in, Ilardi, 2013, p. 723).

Another stated that,

I think I was just enamored with [the Taliban’s] weapons ... It was cool that these guys had all this gear ...they were the coolest people to see. They were larger than life ... and that they were involved in a much bigger thing. I had a bit of that through the TJ [Tableeghi Jamaat], the largest missionary group in the world ... but I felt [the Taliban] belonged to something bigger because they had guns (quoted in, Ilardi, 2013, p. 723).

Looking beyond the message of any particular ideology and more at how it comes to be perceived as a credible source of information or meets particular emotional yearnings highlights how any process of ‘systemically addressing’ the arguments against ‘us’ is fraught with difficulties. The understanding of ideology as something that can be addressed predominantly via systematic argument, as Richardson suggests, is misleading, or at least incomplete. It ‘flattens out’ ideology into a single dimension, ignoring the multiple layers of moral evaluation, identity securing, and action guiding components in which emotions are operating. These areas are only loosely joined to the world of systematic arguments and therefore remain largely unaffected by arguments putting forth an alternative ideological point of view. If we accept that ideologies are, in part, built on and responding to strongly held emotional beliefs then they are unlikely to be swayed purely via reasoned argument. For any of us who have attempted to ‘reason’ with a ‘9/11 Truther’, or who have sat and listened to an Irish Republican talk about their cause, or even entered into a debate over something as innocuous as homework in primary schooling years, it should be clear that beliefs contain strong emotional investments and can be highly resistant to change based on rational argument and factual evidence.

That is not to say that reasoned argument cannot play a role. As we have seen in Chapter Two, emotions can develop in response to information that is false, and therefore correcting that information may result in the correction of a belief built of emotional evidence gleaned from experience that informs and strengthens a particular ideological position. For example, if one

believes someone is intentionally trying to harm them, based on subjective interpretation of past interactions, this belief may change in response to hearing the wider context that the other was operating in. Indeed, the idea of modifying ideological beliefs based on more knowledge of context arguably sits at the heart of restorative justice processes such as those underway in Northern Ireland since the Good Friday Agreement. However, there are potential problems with an over-reliance on reasoned argument. Firstly, reasoned argument that fails to acknowledge that some beliefs are built on information that arises from emotional experiences that are a legitimate source of accurate knowledge will be destined to be dismissed by those whose emotional experiences are denied as lacking credibility. Secondly, emotions can become habituated and therefore cannot be quickly ‘unlearned’ (Jaggar, 1989, p. 170). In the case of counter-narratives that intend to influence ideology without increased personal interaction between oppositional groups, it may be better to direct them towards undermining the (emotional) belief that violence can bring about the desired political and social change rather than attempting to convince people that their particular ideological vision is flawed. In other words, the fact that people hold radical ideological positions is less important than either the belief in the utility of violence or the desire to use violence as an expressive act, as will be discussed in the next chapter. As one man who previously belonged to a group that advocated the use of violence, but is now working within the area of disengagement from violent extremism, noted in relation to his personal position,

[L]ook, at the end of the day, I don’t agree with everything the RCMP, the Toronto police, the government of Canada stands for. But in general [what] our religion tells is to cooperate for justice [...] we can’t in any way become vigilante... ('Nahid', Canadian Salafist).

Radical ideological positions draw on evidence that people develop about their social and political circumstances. Some of that evidence has a strong emotional component and therefore denying the truth of those emotional responses or ‘gut feelings’ by tactics such as restating the benefits and opportunities of the *status quo* is unlikely to resonate with the audience. It is extremely difficult to deny what is perceived as evidence drawn from one’s experiences (Frijda & Mesquita, 2000, p. 69). Furthermore, if the reasons people are adopting a particular ideology are more to do with the emotional benefits it brings about, rather than content analysis, then systematically addressing the argument is irrelevant.

One way to unpack the role of ideology within the realm of violent political extremism, is to treat it as another political site in which emotion constitutes an important part of the reasoning

behind why a person, or group of people, believe that a particular ideology resonates with their life experiences and explains what action needs to be taken as a consequence. In this sense, the dual experience of being emotionally out of kilter with the *status quo* and yet experiencing shared emotional responses based on a sense of alienation, hostility, or resistance may provide a form of *evidence* that an alternative ideological position is credible, or at least that the dominant one is not (Benski & Langman, 2013, pp. 529-530).

The usual way of conceptualising the relationship between emotions and beliefs is to view beliefs as the major influence on the experience of emotions (for example see, Elster, 1999, p. 270; Nussbaum, 2001, pp. 1, 19-24). That is to say, emotions arise *in response* to particular beliefs and evaluations about the world and the social relationships that take place within it. From this understanding, I believe I should be treated fairly, I evaluate that I have not been, and I therefore feel anger or distress, or any other particular emotional response. In this appraisal approach to emotion, “[i]n goes loss, and out comes grief” (Frijda, 1988, p. 349).

The role of emotion within ideology that is drawn upon below suggests that emotion contributes to the *development* of belief as well as existing as a *response* to beliefs already formed (see, Clore & Gasper, 2000; Frijda *et al.*, 2000, pp. 1-9; Frijda & Mesquita, 2000; Goldie, 2004, pp. 94-95; Mercer, 2010, pp. 6-7; Solomon, 2004, pp. 77-78). Indeed, Spinoza defined emotions as “states that make the mind more inclined to think one thing rather than another” (quoted in, Frijda *et al.*, 2000, p. 1). That is to say, emotion is an important aspect of an ideological belief system because it contributes to determining beliefs, influences the salience of those beliefs, and, importantly in the case of Terrorism Studies, ensures that they are resistant to change or modification. The rest of this chapter explores in more detail how emotion operates in the realm of ideology by drawing on interview participants’ own words and placing them within a theoretical framework.

Within the traditional western philosophical tradition, emotions have tended to be viewed as actually or potentially subverting the development of knowledge.²⁰ This position became cemented in positivist epistemologies in which values and emotions were viewed as variables that must be eliminated in the pursuit of accurate information. While there have been challenges within the study of epistemologies to positivist assumptions, particularly within feminist scholarship (for example see, Flax, 1983; Jaggar, 1989; Schott, 1988), it is in the area of beliefs that the role of emotion as a form of knowledge is particularly scrutinised.

Within philosophy, beliefs have tended to be distinguished from knowledge on the bases of claims of proven validity. Knowledge is what we can *prove* is true and belief is what we *think* is true. However, within psychology the difference between knowledge and belief is considered less an issue of a justifiable proposition and more an issue of psychological reality. In other words, what we believe to be true is just as important as what we know to be true (Frijda *et al.*, 2000, p. 4). For example, the decision to engage in political violence is related as much, if not more, to believing it can bring about the desired change, make you feel better, or alter the power relationship between groups, than knowing it will.

Mercer (2010, p. 3) suggests that because a belief is a proposition that one thinks is *probably* true it assumes a degree of uncertainty. The risk inherent in a belief imbues it with a heightened emotional component, one has to take a risk and therefore one may become more emotionally invested in the outcome. In other words, we don't 'believe' the world is round, we know it; however, we may 'believe' that democracy is the finest form of government. The belief in the inherent qualities of democracy is an emotional belief, as is the belief in the superiority of sharia law or the potential of Republicanism. For this reason, beliefs can acquire an intensity that other forms of knowledge do not need. It is possible to believe something so strongly that you are certain it is true, however this captures the intensity of passion rather than the objectivity of knowledge (Mercer, 2010, p. 14). In this sense, beliefs are a form of subjective, rather than objective, knowledge. However, the risk inherent in beliefs imbues them with an emotional intensity that connects them more firmly to the inclination to act.

²⁰ Although Susan Bordo (1987, pp. 114-118) draws attention to notable exceptions such as David Hume, Friedrich Nietzsche, John Dewey and William James.

EMOTIONS AS EVIDENCE

In the previous chapter we have seen how those who had become involved in violent political extremism had experienced their emotions in a way that disconnected them from broader society. This different way of experiencing their emotions was interpreted as *prima facie* evidence that their social and political circumstances were unjust and therefore needed to be changed. In other words, our emotions ‘tell us things’ that form the basis of our beliefs, they are a channel through which it is possible to know the social world (Leach & Tiedens, 2004, p. 3). Just as the evocation to ‘follow your heart’ draws a connection between the emotions and some kind of inexplicable truth that goes beyond reason, emotions are intuitively used as evidence that transcends the need for explanation. This is significant because it suggests that emotions are an integral part of the epistemological stance a person takes (Brun & Kuenzle, 2008; Goldie, 2004; Jaggar, 1989; Solomon, 2004; Thagard, 2008). Some members of the PIRA considered themselves epistemologically privileged in their view of Northern Ireland because they saw their experience of suffering as providing knowledge that others were simply unable to access. For example, ‘Kevin’ told me that,

I don’t expect people who live in the South, or in England, or anywhere else for that matter, to fully understand what this conflict was all about because they didn’t suffer the way we did in the North. We was subjected to incredible violence and attacks in our community. I mean, it’s almost a cliché to say that we [the PIRA] formed as a defence against these attacks. Time has passed, and of course the question of partition and the extraordinary brutality of the British soldiers are all part of the bigger picture, and part of the Republican argument, but at the time I was thinking more in terms of defending my community and I reckon anyone who was living there understood this. For people in the South, maybe they sympathised or whatever, maybe some of ‘em didn’t care, but maybe it’s just another story in the paper or on the news or whatever. I mean, unless you were there you couldn’t really know what it was like (‘Kevin’, PIRA).

Similarly, ‘Coilm’ almost religiously explains the public outrage and surge of support for the PIRA within the Catholic population of Northern Ireland following the death of Bobby Sands, and nine other hunger strikers successively, by making reference to Sands’ ability to communicate the experience of suffering,

Bobby made the most heartfelt and selfless sacrifice. He subjected himself to the most horrendous and agonising death. But more than that, he did it in a way that communicated to masses of people what suffering was. He was dignified, [...] and his suffering spoke a language that went beyond words. And on May 5th, for a moment, we all had a glimpse of the truth Debra, we all saw the circumstances we were in, stripped of rhetoric, stripped of politics, and just as raw, human suffering. And that truth, it led to a massive

political demonstration and a new understanding of the meaning of Republicanism²¹ ('Coilm', PIRA).

Stated simply, the relationship between emotional experiences and beliefs is an intimate one. The experience of suffering, or of watching another suffer, provokes intense emotions that in turn attest to the injustice of, in this case, British rule. People use emotion as evidence or knowledge, and it therefore can become the basis of firmly held beliefs (Clore & Gasper, 2000; Frijda *et al.*, 2000; Frijda & Mesquita, 2000; Goldie, 2004; Jaggar, 1989; Mercer, 2010). Beliefs can be said to share characteristics similar to those of emotions that were outlined in Chapter Two. Beliefs are also formed in reference to something, in other words we believe something *about* a particular thing. They may also represent value judgments such as believing what is right or wrong, moral or immoral, acceptable or unacceptable. Beliefs may also be both cognitive and physiological in the sense that they draw on both thoughts and bodily reactions in order to be formed. For example we may believe that eating dirt is unhealthy both because of our knowledge about the characteristics of dirt and our physical responses if we put it in our mouth. Like emotions, beliefs can also be misleading if they are formed in response to information that is incorrect, they can mobilise action by triggering emotions that stimulate behaviour, and they have a social dimension that influences and is influenced by them.

The interwoven relationship between emotions and beliefs may be grounded in the experience of the narrative form (De Sousa, 2004, p. 63). That is to say, the simultaneously inward and outward dimensions of emotions as both internal states and external evaluations are given meaning through our attempts to make sense of them via language. For example, if I feel angry I can just note that I am angry, maybe find it curious or interesting, and then just accept it without further exploration. Alternatively, I may attempt to understand my anger through constructing a narrative as to why I feel this way. This narrative will most likely link my particular beliefs, perceptions and experiences to my emotional state, thereby ensuring that my beliefs are informed, molded, underwritten and energised by emotion.

Ideology is the narrative form of expressing political beliefs. It represents a set of opinions about how the world is, how it should be, and, importantly, how it can be in the future. According to Cash (1989, p. 706), ideology “operates by constructing a political order and by subjecting

²¹ May 5th, 1981, the day Bobby Sands succumbed to death by starvation.

individual human beings to cathected [emotionally invested] positions within this order". The importance of Cash's observation is that it draws attention to the emotional component of ideology while simultaneously connecting it to evaluations of power. To some extent, the appeal of an ideology lies in its ability to provide a viable explanation and sense of validation about one's own particular experiences. 'Coilm' explained his introduction to Republican ideology as the result of a search to make sense of what he saw happening around him,

I didn't intend to get involved in the armed struggle, I was away studying at the time. But with what I saw taking place I felt I couldn't ignore it. [I remember] becoming aware that it was as raw and as bad as it was. There was just upheaval. Um, I had come home on holidays and there was all this agitation and marching. It had exploded in 1969 and so it was like a baptism of fire that I was involved [in]. And primarily, well obviously we weren't in the civil rights campaign, but it was just in defending the area. And we got slaughtered, you know. So many people killed, wounded, streets were razed to the ground, properties destroyed, um, businesses destroyed and um for me that was it. That was the turning point for me and the realisation and the want to learn more as to why this had happened and as to why did the state react so violently to a passive, peaceful demonstration that's made up of students, trade union activists, you know, teachers, lawyers, right across the board ('Coilm', PIRA).

Since the establishment of Northern Ireland, the ideological position of the state has been notably anti-Catholic, with its first prime minister, James Craig, famously describing Stormont as "a Protestant Parliament for a Protestant State" (quoted in, Moloney, 2002, p. 42). The history of the Northern Irish state was characterised by discriminatory policies and widespread hostility towards Catholics, which reflected this ideological stance (Moloney, 2002, pp. 42-45). It is therefore unsurprising that mainstream British or Unionist ideology did not resonate strongly amongst the Catholic population, and that some within that population reacted with emotional intensity to the position they saw themselves as subjected to within this ideological frame. 'Liam' noted that he was drawn to Republicanism because,

[...] it's a whole combination of stuff you know, an accumulation of all your experiences which is forcing you to think about the situation you are in. And all these experiences just accumulate and you know in your gut that something's not right, that there is something fundamentally wrong with the way things are. And then you look to the outside world, you look to the civil rights movement in America and you see that other people have the same experiences as you, you feel connected to their plight because it reflects the things you have experienced yourself and so you look for something which explains it all and offers an alternative, one that recognises that you are right and, I guess, the moral one, the aggrieved party, the aggrieved community, in all that's going on ('Liam', PIRA).

‘Coilm’, in response to the same question about why he was drawn to Republicanism also answered by drawing on his experiences, connecting them to an intuitive or ‘gut’ feeling about his social and political environment, and using this as evidence that the existing ideological position lacked credibility,

I’m not comfortable with injustices, definitely not. [...] there has to be a justice system with accountability that will reflect the type of society and all the aspects of the type of society that you need and you desire. And even though we supposedly lived in a liberal democracy we didn’t sense that this is what living in a liberal democracy should feel like. We didn’t feel free, we didn’t trust in the government or in the police force, we certainly didn’t feel protected by them. We didn’t feel any loyalty to the British or any pride in our political systems. We didn’t have a sense that they belonged to us, all the systems of politics and such. And so the reason we are fighting for this is for liberty and equality and justice, to make it a key aspect of our everyday life. To feel as if the ideas and the reality are the same (‘Coilm’, PIRA).

To feel as if the ideas and reality are the same is, for this member, both the underlying attraction of Republicanism and what is missing from his existing political environment. It is not so much that he knows, in any objective way, that Republicanism will provide the positive feelings he associates with it, but he does believe it. Furthermore, the fact that he associates his negative emotions with the existing system is proof to him that it lacks credibility. It is not that Republicans had any argument *per se* with an ideology that supported the values of freedom and democracy, quite the opposite. In their opinion, freedom and democracy were both absent and worth fighting for,

It’s hypocritical because on the one hand they [the British] espouse the liberal ideals of freedom, equality and justice, but in reality they were sending us to jail via the Diplock courts, gerrymandering in favour of the Unionists, and ruling by coercion not consent. Republicanism is essentially democratic, but it has been operating in an artificial environment, in which a majority has arbitrarily become a minority in their own land. That minority has constantly been subjected to special powers which have overridden the normal processes of the rule of law. The way I see it, and this is really the main reason why I joined the Provos, is that the special circumstances present in the North could only be redressed via force. Legal and democratic means were simply not available. Force was the only way the British could be compelled to relinquish its (*sic*) hold over the North, so Ireland could be unified, and the Irish people could be free and truly democratic (‘Keiran’, PIRA).

In a sense, ‘Keiran’s’ comment illustrates the subjective element of ideologies. They reflect not only beliefs about the value of particular concepts such as ‘freedom’, but evaluations about whether these values are present or not in particular circumstances. Furthermore, values such as

‘freedom’ may mean different things to different people or groups. When Gerry Adams (1986) published his book outlining the meaning of modern Republicanism, he chose to call it *The Politics of Irish Freedom*, while Margaret Thatcher referred to the IRA as the “enemies of civilization and freedom” and those who survived the Brighton hotel bombing, including herself, as rededicating “themselves to the cause of freedom” (Thatcher, 1988). For Republicans, freedom was associated with the end of British rule and a unified Ireland, but for the British government freedom from what they saw as terrorist violence was fundamental to the values of the state.

If freedom was simply a political concept, devoid of any emotional elements, then it would be harder to use it in such opposing ways. However, ideologies are, in part, a contest over the political mobilisation of emotions (Freeden, 2013, p. 1). According to Lakoff (2008, pp. 93-103), our brains are wired to connect negative or positive emotional experiences to moral narratives in order for us to make decisions about what actions are ethical or not, and ideologies are, above all, moral narratives (Drake, 1998, p. 53). Because protesting or challenging the *status quo* is directed at those aspects of society that are particularly disliked, negative emotions play a prominent role in the ideological framing of the current or present situation (Jasper, 1998, p. 414). Similarly, because the idealised future proposed by a particular ideology must be seen to resolve those things that are disliked, positive emotions play the most important role in the ideological framing of the future. It is not hard to imagine that a concept such as freedom is associated with positive emotions such as joy, happiness or pride, while the opposite of freedom, oppression, may be associated with negative emotions such as fear, anxiety, anger, resentment or hate. In the so-called battle of ideologies, the ability to tie the more positive emotions with the political agenda outlined, or even the group which represents that agenda, and the more negative emotions with the opposing ideology, is significant in gaining popular support,

[...] let’s be honest, it isn’t hard to get support for the Republican agenda when the people look around and see barbed wire fences around ‘em and guns pointing at their heads. Do you really think that people don’t feel oppressed by that, that they look at a tank and go ‘gee, I’m so happy about that, I feel so good about my kids playing in the street with that around’. I mean, even if they didn’t agree with us, if they didn’t agree with our tactics I mean, they are still going to be pretty sympathetic to what we are trying to achieve, to the bigger political agenda and all, because they want to feel free to go about their lives without all the anxiety and fear that comes from living under an occupation like that (‘Ciarán’, PIRA).

‘Ciaran’ aptly identifies how the emotional experiences people have meld with thoughts and cognitions in order to provide evidence about social reality; *feeling* oppressed, *feeling* excluded, or

feeling discriminated against is evidence that one *is* oppressed, excluded or discriminated against. Similarly, feeling pride at the sight of the tricolour flag and anxiety at the sight of the Union Jack becomes evidence that the tricolour represents freedom and the Union Jack represents oppression. This suggests that ideologies are situated at the intersection of emotion and cognition rather than being simply top-down forms of rational persuasion or crude forms of emotional manipulation (Fielder & Bless, 2000, p. 144; Mercer, 2010, p. 2). As Goodwin *et al* (2001, p. 15) have suggested, “cognitions typically come bundled with emotions, and are meaningful or powerful to people for precisely this reason.”

When using emotions as a form of knowledge, there is also a tendency to turn how we feel about a particular actor into an attribute (Frijda *et al.*, 2000, p. 6; Mercer, 2010, p. 15). The connection between feelings and attributes is expressed by ‘Liam’ when he states that,

When I heard Thatcher making that speech about the Hunger Strikes, you know that one where she goes on about criminalisation²² it was umm, I can hardly explain except to say I felt absolutely furious, she was trying to dismiss us, to disregard everything we were bringing attention to, to the political fight, to the injustice and inequality. All of it was just dismissed, she tried to make us feel like it was nothing. She was so arrogant. I mean, the arrogance of the British was just unbelievable (‘Liam’, PIRA).

‘Liam’ felt dismissed and therefore the British were dismissive of alternative political views, or arrogant, as he put it. Similarly, ‘Kevin’ said that ‘The North felt so oppressive, just walking around the street felt oppressive’(‘Kevin’, PIRA). He later states that the “Brits were so oppressive and heavy-handed”. Connecting subjective or inter-subjective emotional experiences to attributes has implications for making judgments about credibility. For example, if I don’t *feel* I can trust the British then the British become untrustworthy.

EMOTIONS AND CREDIBILITY

According to Horgan, (2009, p. 149) “the effectiveness of any counter-narrative will rely heavily on the credibility and relevant expertise of the communicator”. The perceived credibility of the person, organisation, or broader social group that is trying to influence political behaviour is fundamental to their ability to be persuasive. In a study that focused on corporate brands, Maathuis *et al* (2004, p.

²² Probably referring to the press conference in Saudi Arabia in 1981 when Margaret Thatcher stated in relation to the IRA that “crime is crime is crime. It is not political, it is crime and there can be no question of granting political status”

343) found that in order to enhance credibility it was more important to tie positive emotional experiences to the sender of the message than it was to explain the content of the message itself. This provides a challenge to those who seek to influence the political behaviour of violent political extremists because, as we have seen in Chapter Four, they already associate more negative emotional experiences to the *status quo*, and more positive ones to the exclusivist group. As such, the messages of the *status quo* are more likely to be seen as lacking in credibility as compared to those emanating from within the tight identity group.

In the following discussion, ‘Mick’ relates the story of an ex-PIRA prisoner who has recently had his conviction overturned. In relating this story ‘Mick’ demonstrates the emotional component of credibility when he connects ‘instinctive’ knowledge based on his experiences with a judgment that the British were not credible,

‘Mick’: Well, you see Charlie fell into that category when he was arrested, but he was only 16 at the time. First of all he should have had access to a solicitor or his parents or an appropriate adult. He signed a statement and when his case came to trial his barrister actually intimidated - maybe that's the wrong word- certainly persuaded him to plead guilty for three years because if he didn't, I mean, then he would have to face the case in court, then he would get 15 - 20 years [...] It was only recently that he was pardoned or whatever, and the whole irony about Charlie's case is that Charlie was in Bristol at the time he was alleged to have committed these crimes, so there was demonstrable proof that not only was he not guilty, but he was totally innocent. I mean, this has all just come out now, I mean you were down at the press conference weren't you?

Debra: Yep

‘Mick’: So what I'm trying to say is that there is proof now, undeniable facts that are recognised by both sides but back then, when all this stuff was happening with the Diplock courts, and we all faced them, we may not 've had that proof but we knew instinctively, by what we saw going on around us and by what we experienced, that there was no credibility in the system. No, it was just another tooth in the British government's armoury. It was all part and parcel of a system that tried to avoid being confronted with its own hypocrisies. You had the brutality with the RUC interrogations and then there was the corruption of the judicial process, and then in the H blocks they try and criminalise the Republican struggle ('Mick', PIRA).

Similarly, ‘Coilm’ explains that,

[...] if you do not have support for a system from the population, if the population don't have a sense that they can trust the system, that the system is credible and that it delivers what it promises, then you ain't going

anywhere, you're gonna end up on the same [...] you come back on it and you defend against it without analysis, you don't need the analysis in a way. It becomes almost a physical thing - that defence against the organs of State. You know the Republican analysis but you don't need it to know what they are saying is correct because you see it, you experience and feel it in your everyday life, you know? ('Coilm', PIRA).

The Republican analysis, as 'Coilm' puts it, is correct because it *feels* credible. It is so obvious and so natural that it isn't even necessary to analyse it. In other words, a particular ideology will not resonate unless it *feels* right (Field *et al.*, 2006, p. 168). At this point in 'Coilm's' life, examples of British values of freedom and democracy would be unlikely to change that visceral sense that the existing system was not credible, and therefore would be unlikely to alter his sense that Republicanism is the credible ideology which explains both the political circumstances of his community and, consequently, the action required to change it. 'Eamon' described knowing "instantly that Republicanism was the truth because it hits you like a brick when you come across something that explains everything you see around you and all your experiences" ('Eamon', PIRA). Similarly, a Canadian convert describes his experience of discovering Salafism as, "[the] truth hits you like a brick, and I wasn't [previously] feeling that brick" ('John', Canadian Salafist). Indeed, the idea that strong belief involves some sort of visceral response to the message is not unusual. We talk about 'seeing the light', 'feeling the truth', and 'gut instinct' in a way that connects somatic emotional responses to the idea of truth or credibility.

Indeed, emotion contributes to, or can undermine, the sense of authenticity that an ideology needs in order for it to be perceived as credible. No ideology will have appeal if it constructs itself in a way that is incongruous with someone's emotional experiences. It quite simply will not ring true; it will not 'feel' right. Haidt (2012, pp. 3-72) suggests this is because it is our intuitions and preferences that tend to drive our reasoning. In other words, we have our emotional stance and we develop our reasoning in order to provide validity (also see, Achen & Bartels, 2006; Lehrer, 2009, pp. 195-201). As such, when presented with an ideology that tends both to explain and to validate our emotional position within the world it is more appealing, and feels more authentic, than one that does not. Whether or not the particular ideology promotes the use of violence may be less important than the fact that it provides a meaningful interpretation of one's experiences of the world, a moral framework in which to understand them, and an emotionally satisfying way in which to bring about change. When 'Nahid' was asked if he saw the violent political extremist group he joined (*Takfir Wal-Hijra*) as a violent group he answered "No, but I saw them as being an angry group. They all have very similar stories to me..." ('Nahid', Canadian Salafist).

When 'Nahid' reflected on why he was drawn to an extreme group that promoted the idea of violent jihad he talked about his movement through various religious groups. A theme connecting each group was that they appeared hypocritical and therefore lacked credibility. He was experiencing an extended period of feeling bad about himself because of his struggles with drugs, alcohol and gambling. In his words he "had a life problem. I was escaping the reality of life through gambling [...] I'm not being responsible, and I don't have any direction or vision" ('Nahid', Canadian Salafist). When he sought help for his drinking within the Christian community he describes the frustration of not getting definitive answers with some people saying that Jesus drank wine and others saying it was grape juice. When he was first introduced to Islam he was told definitively that he could not drink and that as part of the brotherhood, the "community's gonna support you." He was about \$35,000 in debt and was told that "it's not a big deal for the community to help me not have that debt anymore and start fresh". A few months later, during the period of Ramadan, the President of the Mosque, "made an inspiring speech about how they have money to help people who are destitute in the community and people who are in debt. And it sounded like he was speaking to me." Yet when he approached the man and asked "does that include me?" he was told that he was "under investigation for becoming a Muslim for money". In describing the impact, this man said that "it broke my heart. That was actually where the bitterness started that led me to *Takfir Wal-Hijra*." When he met someone who had "memorised the entire Qur'an [...] I didn't question him because he was an Arab." He was told that "look, you see these people here, they're far away from religion" and finally he felt that he had "met someone who is being honest [...] He saw them, as stated above, as an angry group of people who had all similar experiences to himself ('Nahid', Canadian Salafist). In 'Nahid's words, "You can radicalise anybody [...] it's how you filter and process the information that comes to you and decide whether or not it's authentic" [...] you question the authority of a person because the closer they are to the government the more questionable their integrity will be" ('Nahid', Canadian Salafist).

'Nahid' is correct when he identifies our emotions as 'information filters' (see, Clore & Gasper, 2000; Groenendyk, 2011; Leith & Baumeister, 1996; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Nahl, 2007; Pfister & Böhm, 2008). If we were robots rather than humans then we could arguably take in all the available information and analyse it to come to the 'correct' position. As mere humans, however, the amount of information we have available to us at all times is overwhelming and therefore our emotions act as 'filters' to reduce the pieces of information which call for our fuller attention. Hey, "look here!" they say, for better or for worse. Emotions act as "spotlights" in order to focus attention (Peters, 2006, p. 458). We may be drawn to a piece of information that confirms our

outrage, or be influenced to engage with particular information by others whom we admire (Lehrer, 2009, pp. 198-199). Similarly, we may choose not to engage with an alternative point of view because it stirs up a negative emotional response. “When you accept a particular narrative, you ignore or hide realities that contradict it” (Lakoff, 2008, p. 37). ‘John’, an aboriginal Canadian convert to Islam explains why he trusts the relationships he has on the internet as a source of information rather than the mainstream news services or information supplied by the government by saying,

I have friends who live in Yemen, who live in other countries and they tell me totally different views and I believe their views over the government any day. Because the government lied to me in my country about the residential schools ²³with 75,000 kids that were killed in these schools [...] I believe the people that I call, I have friends I call in Saudi, Afghanistan, Yeman. [...] I look for the truth, I don't look for falseness [...] I'm tired of that. I grew up with that. In my lifetime, being an aboriginal, being told that it's all my parents' fault, that they're alcoholics. In reality, it was solely based on the government and the Churches, and how they ran those residential schools was the reason for our aboriginal downfall. So I wasn't going to accept no falseness anymore [...] and that's why via the internet, salfimedia.com is a big one [...] That one, that's my main source for my knowledge. And you know that, they want shariah in Australia, they want shariah in the UK. Those brothers are not afraid to reach out. Their website has been tapped by unknown government sources more times than any other website in the history of mankind ('John', Canadian Salafist).

John's distrust of the government based on his personal history helps him identify with those who run salafist.com, whom he also sees as victims of the government. It also connects him to those who live in countries struggling with the perils of foreign intervention by the West. For John, the shared scepticism and mistrust of the government combine to create a sense that information from these sources must be more credible or legitimate than the information he can access through mainstream sources. He therefore chooses to engage in these sources and they become his main foundation of knowledge. Like 'Nahid' above, 'John believes that the closer the source of information is to the government, the more doubtful its integrity. As Nielsen (2012), has argued, for some individuals, the distance between particular extreme clerics or groups and governments is

²³ Refers to a network of residential boarding schools for Aboriginal peoples of Canada funded by the government but mostly administered by the Catholic Church between the 1870s until 1996. Children sent to these schools were removed from their parents and wider cultural influences and often exposed to sexual and/or physical abuse. The residential boarding schools were the subject of a national apology on June 11, 2008.

interpreted as a source of authenticity and legitimacy because it demonstrates that they cannot be co-opted by the powerful and corrupt. “Feelings – of trust or distrust, like or dislike, approval or disapproval, love or hate, pride or humiliation – influence the selection and interpretation of evidence and figure into assessments of credibility” (Mercer, 2010, p. 16). As ‘Eamon’ puts it, “I didn’t give a shit what they [the representatives of the state] said, I just listened to what we were told in the ASU [Active Service Unit] because I could trust them” (‘Eamon’, PIRA).

‘Colim, on the other hand, suggested that the emotions of the British made them blind to the logic of the Republican argument, saying,

[T]he British or pro Unionist, are so arrogant and proud that they are incapable of listening to another point of view. They are ignorant; they have a lack of understanding of the historical development of conflict and struggle because they don’t bother to get informed. So in that sense there is a, a, absence of understanding, there’s an absence of analysis, there’s an absence of knowledge, and that’s being polite about it. By-and-large governments, governments will propagate the line they want to and ignore those who oppose them because it makes them uncomfortable to be confronted with their own hypocrisies (‘Coilm’, PIRA).

Certainly there is a tendency to view emotion as contributing only to the beliefs and decisions of the political masses rather than the ruling elites (Barbalet, 2006, pp. 31-32). Yet, emotions influence both individuals and collectives, those subjected to rule and those who do the ruling, to evaluate what is important and therefore what demands attention (Jasper, 1998, pp. 404-405; Kane, 2001, p. 265). However, emotions also influence the way we perceive information (see, Isen & Patrick, 1983; Isen & Shalcker, 1982; Raghunathan & Tuan Pham, 1999). If we are angry then we may be dismissive of an alternative point of view, or more likely to interpret it as aggressive or derogatory. As ‘Fareed’ explained to me, the problem of extremism in Brixton can be boiled down to “If you read the Qur’an with an angry heart, you see a vengeful and angry God. But if you read the Qur’an with a loving heart you see a loving God”(‘Fareed’, British Salafist).

Other people were impressed by what they saw as gaining access to knowledge that others had not yet discovered or been privy to. ‘Tadhg’ remembered, “feeling like you were getting access to the real story, the real history and all the significance that goes with that” when he joined the PIRA (‘Tadhg’, PIRA) while ‘Eamon’ indicated that he “knew very little about the politics and stuff before getting involved seriously. I was impressed to hear the analysis and to talk politics with the other guys in a more informed way. I felt like I was getting to understand how things really were and that because of that I had an obligation to act on that knowledge” (‘Eamon’, PIRA). In a similar

vein, the following Canadian radical explains the appeal of jihadist ideology by reference to how he felt it provided him with knowledge that others did not have,

In hindsight the ideas weren't in [and] of themselves that compelling. What was appealing to me at the time about them was that other people didn't seem to have access to them (quoted in, Ilardi, 2013, p. 724).

In this sense, ideology is fulfilling a deep emotional need, such as the need to feel special. To an extent, the credibility of an ideology depends on someone feeling the intended emotion of those sending the message. If the idea is to make someone feel ashamed, guilty or fearful about the use of violence as a political tactic then the credibility of the message largely depends on the success of the sender in evoking shame or guilt as opposed to say, incredulity or anger. 'Máirtín' demonstrates the way that hunger strikers responded to the message from Margaret Thatcher that they were not supported in their protest,

I give the example of here during the Hunger Strike. Maggie Thatcher had also said that we had no support, prisoners had no support and the IRA had no support, and the idea was to make us feel hopeless and disillusioned. To make us feel like we was isolated and alone in prison, without support from the broader community. If she could make us feel like that then maybe we would be broken. And then when Bobby Sands stood for Parliament in Fermanagh and South Tyrone it blew that out of the water. Now, we always knew we had support, she [Margaret Thatcher] was completely wrong, she had no credibility in our community anyway. But it had never been tested at the ballot box, you know, we knew who we could go to meet in a house, to keep our weapons, or to give us money or whatever, so we knew that support was there. It had just never been quantified in an election. Bobby Sands' election blew that argument out of the water, so there clearly was support. What did the Brits do after that? They changed the laws so that no prisoner could stand in an election again. You know, instead of saying, 'right, we accept that there is widespread support for your position or your goals, or for change', they just change the goal posts instead, making sure they maintain their privileges and putting us right back in square one, with no options. It's frustrating and unjust and it shows the lack of credibility in their position. I mean, it just confirms that if the rules are going to change every time you get a win when you play by them, what's the point of even playing by them at all? ('Máirtín', PIRA).

As Chapter Four has demonstrated, the emotional responses of those who were disconnected from the broader society represented a subversion or distortion from what was assumed or intended. 'Máirtín' did not feel hopeless or disillusioned but rather that Margaret Thatcher was simply not a credible source of information. The heightened loyalty to the group along with the subsequent reduced loyalty to the mainstream helps to ensure distrust of those outside of the group and trust of those others within it (Jasper, 1998, p. 407). 'Padraig' recounts sitting in a conference with some

leaders from Hamas as part of his peace promoting work following the Good Friday Agreement and observing the unintended emotional response of Hamas leaders to a ‘lecture’ from Western diplomats,

I was at a conference with some leadership of Hamas from Gaza with a number of diplomats from the West and, you know, they were effectively being lectured to by these diplomats about what democracy is, and I mean, I could sense the frustration from the people of Hamas, given that they had just won a democratic election, and yet they were being lectured like little school kids by these people who assumed the moral high ground and wouldn’t think for a moment about how the other side might react to such hypocrisy. It’s like they assume that they would react with wonderment or something, like ‘Oh, so that’s how it is’ but instead it was obvious to anyone who cared to observe that they were completely frustrated, humiliated at being treated like that. I mean, it wouldn’t even enter their [the Western diplomats] minds I don’t think, that this isn’t respectful dialogue, it is just assuming you can disregard the protests of any group you don’t agree with. They had no credibility at all, it was a joke (‘Padraig’, PIRA).

The above discussion highlights how emotion acts as a form of subjective knowledge that influences the development and formation of systems of beliefs, including judgments about credibility. However, this is not the only influence emotions have on whether someone adopts a particular ideological position, including one that promotes and legitimises the use of violence. According to Sageman’s (2008, p. 157), study of al Qaeda inspired networks, “terrorists in Western Europe and North America were not intellectuals or ideologues, much less religious scholars. It was not about how they think, but how they feel.” And in some cases, a commitment to the ideology made them ‘feel good’.

BECAUSE IT FEELS GOOD: IDEOLOGY, HOPE AND PRIDE

Ideologies encourage people to imagine a future that is better than the present. “To hope is to believe that something positive, which does not presently apply to one's life, could still materialise, and so we yearn for it” (Lazarus, 1999, p. 653). Some of the appeal of a particular ideology is in the idea of feeling hope, of being able to imagine a more positive future. In the previous chapter we heard ‘Mick’ describe how ‘looking at the bigger picture’ gave him a sense of purpose and hope when everything around him seemed hopeless. He talked of how being ‘pissed off with a purpose’ was better than being angry in a more diffuse way. ‘Seán’ also expressed how coming into contact with Republican ideology helped to transform his emotions into a more positive experience,

At that time the goal we focused on was to get the Brits out. It wasn't really deeper than that for me. The message we got was everything depended on getting the Brits out, that life would be better when they were gone. And, um, it made sense because when you looked around you saw their uniforms and guns, and um, and armed vehicles and fences you know? And it was all associated with them and it was so depressing, um, and remember that they had been here since I was about 9 or 10 years old, so it was normal for me to see soldiers in the street and be searched and all, so you just figured things would be better with them gone. Even the RUC, you know, we saw it as the Brits' influence. And at some stage we expected that all the Brits would have jumped onto their lorries, driven down to the docks onto their boats sailed away back to England [laughing]. And when that happened we talked about how we would be celebrating in the streets! I mean, the *craic* was amazing around that time as we all talked about the possibilities ('Seán', PIRA).

The central ideological goal of the PIRA, to force the British to withdraw from the North and to reunite the 32 counties, had an uplifting affect for Seán and many others. 'Frank' recounted how, in the period of his life before going to prison, "we were thinking about the future, talking about it. We were excited for what we could bring about, you know, change history" ('Frank', PIRA). Even the act of talking about the possibility of a united Ireland was energising and provided a respite to the dullness and depression of some young men's everyday life. 'Kevin' recalled that he, "... felt a kind of euphoria thinking about the changes we would bring about. We were motivated and energised just by the thought of it" ('Kevin', PIRA) while 'Mick' remembered, "enjoying having a sense of purpose" ('Mick', PIRA).

'Cian' also described how physical force Republicanism²⁴ gave him purpose and direction that he saw as helping to ameliorate the pain of everyday life,

[P]eople assume I came back with somewhat of an adrenaline rush or whatever, that I wanted to get involved in what was happening in the struggle for the kicks or the excitement of it and it really wasn't like that. Not for me anyway. For me it was all about really just being a witness to it. Then at some point you know you have to ask yourself the question, do you remain a witness or an observer or is there something that I can do and then there are other questions that follow that. What can I do? Am I capable of doing this or that? I really do think you have to go through this process of you know, clear examination of what you're capable of doing, what is bearable if you're just staying on the side. For me, remaining a witness to all these injustices and the brutality of it wasn't something I could

²⁴ 'Physical force' Republicanism is a term that interviewees often used to distinguish themselves from those who accepted Republican ideals and values but did not, however, extend this to include the use of violence.

live with and be comfortable with myself. I mean, I don't want to overstate it but what you saw every day of the life here was, it was intolerable, even excruciating and I was angry. I mean, at times anger takes over, sometimes it is anger that takes over and you have to decide what to do with that. The IRA gave me direction on what to do with that anger and it put it in historical context in which I was only one of generations of people who had to struggle against these things. There is a certain satisfaction in that, in putting those feelings into context and connecting them with a political agenda which you hope will bring about change. So it is more than that, I suppose I was even more determined and driven when I had a purpose and a role to play in bringing about change, not just being a witness to it all ('Cian', PIRA).

Hope and purpose are so strongly connected because deeply embedded in hope is the belief that things actually can change. Flam (Flam, 2005, pp. 33-34) argues that hope is not an emotion that brings about violent political action. From her perspective when a group or movement define the state as an opponent they assess the degree to which the state is open or closed to negotiation. If the state is seen as intransigent then hatred of the state defines the 'feeling rules' of the movement and violence becomes the tactic of choice. It is only if the movement views the state as open to change that hope remains a dominant emotion. In these cases, argues Flam, direct violence will be avoided in favour of alternative political protest. However, ideologies provide political strategies for how change can come about, and for how the future will look when change is finally realised. According to Hoffman, (1999, p. 340) "all terrorists exist and function in *hope* of reaching this ultimate inevitable, and triumphant end" (emphasis added). Ideologies provide hope, even if that hope is embedded in the idea that hurting your opponent will force them to change. The ideology embodies a promise that, if the prescribed action is forthcoming, will be fulfilled.

Hope is generally seen as a positive, 'feel good', type of emotion, yet it often comes into play when things are dire or uncertain. Under such circumstances despair, fear or anxiety may be just as likely or appropriate emotional responses, yet belief in an ideology that promises to change the circumstances one is in can transform these responses into something more positive and energising. It may be that acting violently and eliciting a response reinforces a belief that one still has a degree of influence over a situation and thereby encourages a degree of hope. 'Padraig' explains how physical force Republicanism provided him with hope that helped to sustain his energy when things got tough,

I mean, you can never really achieve much in anything if you're not prepared to stand your ground and follow your convictions. I mean, all the great people of the world, like Nelson Mandela for example, they had to maintain their convictions, they had to have faith and hope that things could

get better, even when things got tough or people were telling them they were wrong or could never win. In the end, if you believe in something you've got to stand by that, even if you don't see how you can possibly achieve your goals [...] The only thing worse would be to question whether those things like equality and justice and whatever are worth fighting for at all. I wouldn't want to live in a world where those things weren't important and worth fighting for. If I gave up on those beliefs, umm, if I lost hope that we could achieve them, then it would be unbearable to be honest, totally despairing. No, I mean, um, Republicanism encourages you to keep trying, to keep believing in the righteousness of the cause. I could never give up that belief, it would be like surrendering to all that is wrong here ('Padraig', PIRA).

Lazarus (1999, p. 674) suggests that we search for hope because without hope we are destined to despair. From this perspective it is possible to see ideology as performing a 'coping' role. It can become a way of managing negative emotions and transforming them into something more positive and uplifting. Along with providing a vision of a better future ideologies manage to perform this role by offering a coherent narrative in which a person's experiences can be explained in a way that re-directs blame away from *individual* flaws or failures towards *systemic* flaws and failures. Because ideologies focus on entire groups, (Workers, Catholics, Muslims, Women, Blacks, Gays etc.) they encourage shared politicised identities in which oppression or discrimination can be explained in terms of a victimised identity. Ideology can provide a way of re-socialising people, in part by transforming adverse or self-defeating emotions such as shame, guilt, helplessness or despair, into forceful and motivating emotions that attribute blame (Flam, 2005, p. 24). By identifying a social ill, explaining it in terms of victimhood, attributing blame, and providing an agenda to transform society into a better place, ideologies may also provide a way of transforming despair into hope. 'Coilm' recalled that at the end of the second hunger strike, after the death of ten men,

[...] most political pundits were saying Maggie Thatcher will rue the day that they allowed these people to go to death, they will rue the day, this is the watershed, this will change Irish politics and Irish society and it's true. So in a sense at the time you're feeling, Jesus, just hammered into the wall, coming out of the other end, you know, there's a sense of, obviously a sense of anger, of incredible bitterness and, to be honest for a while it was totally despairing. But, there was also this sense of purpose and drive coming out that we were going to move on from here. Bobby had been elected to Parliament so we knew we [had] plenty of support, we were examining our political strategy but we was still totally committed, even more committed to Republicanism and it kept us focused and positive when many people thought we would be cowering defeated and beaten ('Coilm', PIRA).

Ilardi also found that the edifying and enriching effect of ideology was a large part of its appeal. He observed that,

[...] these men's transition from typical Muslim to Muslim radical had an uplifting effect, serving to instill feelings of confidence, if not outright superiority. These feelings were in stark contrast with those typically experienced by these men prior to their immersion in the world of radical Islam. The appeal of an ideology which replaced feelings of inferiority with superiority, or which provided clarity of purpose where previously there was only purposelessness, for some men, seemed irresistible (Ilardi, 2013, p. 719).

In these cases the appeal of the ideology tended to lie in the transformative affect it had on a participant's personal sense of being valued or having a purpose. It was able to tap into a pre-existing emotional need and transform it into something more satisfying. There is joy in imagining a better future, a society in which you feel valued or in which you have a contribution to make (Goodwin *et al.*, 2001, p. 13). How that society looks may not be appealing for many, or even most, but for these men it represented something better than what they currently had. Jasper (2011, p. 291) notes in relation to social movements more broadly that the desire for a better, more fulfilling life often comes from a "moral vision or ideology which suggests that the world should be different from the way it is." While the content of the ideology, including its propensity to accept violence as a political tactic, is not irrelevant, it may not always be the sole or even most influential reason why people are drawn to a violent political group. 'Frank' recollected how he,

"... knew they [the PIRA] advocated the use of violence but for me that was no more unusual than any soldiers using violence. I mean, if you join the army, any army I mean, not just the Republican Army, then you know that you may be called on to use violence, it doesn't mean that you want to be violent. If that was the case, then it is the case for everyone who joins an army, whether that be the IRA or whether that is joining the British Army. For me it just seemed inevitable that violence was part of the struggle. Violence was a part of our lives, it was normal, and the use of violence to defend yourself has always been acceptable. It wasn't a great moral leap that I had to make or anything ('Frank', PIRA).

'Nahid' also explains how the violent aspect of a particular ideology arises out of a more personal quest involving a sense of pride or feeling good about yourself. He relates a story about the men he attempts to help since renouncing violence as a political tactic. They come from,

[...] a life of extremities [...] What is important is they have this guilt [...] what happens in the beginning is they have this zeal, they wanna make amends for the life they were living [...] they start to pray and fast. Maybe some people build them up, they pride them up. 'Oh, you're a good Muslim. Wow. Look at you, you're praying and fasting!' And he starts to puff his

chest out and then he starts getting deeper and deeper [...] and he, like all Muslims get upset when you hear about what is happening in Palestine, and what's happening in the Middle East, what's happening around the world. So they get emotional. And what happens is [...] when they're emotional they start to look at the religion to justify their [...] emotion. Instead of looking objectively inside the religion to see how to deal with the emotion they're already in that state looking to justify why they feel that way and how they can get that and releases that feeling of anger. [...] So his solution becomes taking victory [by] inflicting pain ('Nahid', Canadian Salafist).

In a similar expression of self-respect and pride, 'Cian' explained that, "...from the moment we stood up to fight it all changed and people really did get a sense of their own respect that they hadn't had the experience of when they were just taking it" ('Cian', PIRA). In some cases adopting a particular ideological stance and becoming involved in a group that advocates social change can provide a heightened sense of status. By providing a coherent narrative around who or what is to blame, by emphasising flaws and erasing strengths, an ideology provides an opportunity to devalue the other. The flip side is that it can make the person or group doing the blaming feel superior.

'Ruari' recalled how joining the 'RA, "gave me an important role to play in the community because people depended on you to defend the area ('Ruari', PIRA). 'Tadhg' remembered a priest in Clonard "had praised a young man of the area for defending the church" during the riots of August 1969 and thinking that "I was full of admiration for him being singled out and praised like that and I remember thinking that one day that could be me doing that" ('Tadhg', PIRA). 'Padraig also recognised the appeal to status that belonging to the PIRA provided, even if he did not see himself in that category,

You see some glamour attached to it when you are young and you haven't been involved in warfare, and I mean there is a whole sort of thing, and I wouldn't apply this in my case, but you know it is a step up the social ladder for some people, you know if you're seen to be in the IRA or similar, I mean the IRA effectively controlled all of the areas and when I say controlled I don't mean it in a negative sense, they defended the areas, the people supported them, people's doors were open, they fed us, they kept our weapons, all of that sort of stuff ('Padraig', PIRA).

In a different expression of status, this Canadian Salafist admitted that,

[...] there was some perverse pleasure I was gaining from championing something that other people didn't seem to have access to. More for the sake of being unique and better and different than others (quoted in, Ilardi, 2013, p. 724).

Similarly, 'Nahid' recalled his feelings of superiority when he adopted his extreme ideological position by describing his view as,

Oh well I pray and most people don't pray. I don't drink, I don't do drugs, you know, I threw away all my CDs of music, I don't use television anymore, and I do this and that, so I'm better than everyone ('Nahid', Canadian Salafist).

The above examples suggest that in order to understand why people adopt a particular ideological stance it is necessary to go beyond simply an interpretation and assessment of the ideological message to include an analysis of how the particular ideology has the ability to influence what people feel about themselves within their particular social and political circumstances. The use of violence may or may not be the driver behind a particular person adopting a violent ideology. The appeal may rest, in part, on its ability to engender or justify a sense of pride, status or hope (for example see, Anspach, 1979; Britt & Heise, 2000; Scheff, 1988, 2000; H. F. Stein, 1975). Britt and Heise (2000, pp. 253, 256-257) have argued that people or groups who perceive themselves to be stigmatised have a higher receptiveness to discourses that promote a positive self-image and that ameliorates their stigma through explaining it in terms of victimisation at the hands of a more powerful other. Similarly, Bell (1992, p. xvi) describes how many people participated in the civil rights movement in order to reassert a sense of dignity and pride, regardless of whether they felt it was possible to achieve equality, while Kruglanski *et al* (2009, p. 403) have argued that the main motivation amongst suicide bombers is a 'quest for significance' in which a personal need to overcome traumas and humiliations facilitates the appeal of a violent ideology that promises personal greatness. The ideology may help develop or reinforce pride in one's self and one's identity group while simultaneously providing a strong message to outsiders as to who they are dealing with.

CONCLUSION

Developing an ideological stance in relation to the world is not merely a submissive process of absorbing information. PIRA members did not commit violence in the name of their cause simply because they happened to be exposed to violent Republican ideology. Likewise, those who commit to violent jihad are unlikely to have done so purely as a result of viewing jihadist videos or reading Inspire magazine. To place too much emphasis on the content of any particular ideology is to reduce it to a top-down processes in which vulnerable individuals are duped by the skilled rhetoric

of leaders to support or perform unconscionable acts. Such an approach undermines the agency of individuals who have made a choice to commit these acts. Taking on a particular ideology is a process of selecting and interpreting a variety of different and contradictory sources. This evaluative process requires not only thinking, but feeling as we draw on both personal experience and outside information in order to make sense of the world (Jasper, 2011, p. 286). Which sources of information are selected and how they are interpreted is greatly influenced by emotional beliefs and attitudes that are deeply rooted in broader social, political, and psychological environments and experiences (Jaggar, 1989, p. 160).

Individual ideological commitment is fundamentally an outcome of intuitive reasoning that guides an individual's attention selectively, influencing and shaping their perspectives just as these perspectives also influence and shape emotional responses (Haidt, 2001; 2012, pp. 27-51; Jaggar, 1989, pp. 160-161). 'Coilm's' recollections touch on how his involvement in the PIRA, including his attitudes and beliefs, are intimately entwined with his emotional experiences. Discussing the decision to support the second hunger strike he observed that,

I mean hundreds of us had been through it all together for the previous years, all the brutality and the, and the, deprivation. But before that, before the protest, before even prison, ahh, all the anger, the frustrations of life here, all the emotions over years and years, you know? It all builds up, it changes how you think about things. And all the politics of it, you articulate it, you read about it, but you understand better than anybody because you lived it ('Coilm', PIRA).

In other words, our perceptions of what is fair or just, what actions are justified or not, or what is true and credible cannot be neatly separated off from what we intuitively feel. If asked to justify a particular ideology, then it is possible to draw on the message and argue for its validity, however its particular appeal will be deeply entrenched in the experiential evidence that has arisen from individual and group emotional contexts. Once this 'intuitive' or 'gut' knowledge is felt, then an individual will likely seek out or interpret information which confirms this instinct and pay less attention to evidence that undermines it.

By the time an opportunity for rational argument, by which we really mean persuasion towards our own point of view, may arise, in all likelihood emotions are already acting as a filter, influencing which people or 'facts' are valid and which are not. Implicit also in this understanding of ideology is that it is something 'other' people suffer from. 'Our' position is ideologically neutral,

and therefore need not be questioned. We may be so emotionally wedded to our own ideology that we may be just as deaf to 'reasoned argument' as 'they' are.

In short, emotions provide deeply personal, if subjective, evidence that both the existing ideological system is unfair and immoral, and that the implementation of an alternative ideology can provide a viable solution to existing social problems. The importance of emotions within this process lies in the visceral sense of authenticity they provide as evidence of the righteousness (or not) of a particular ideological position. This is a sobering thought for those within Terrorism Studies who seek to dissuade potential terrorist recruits via a 'program that systematically addresses the arguments against us'. In the next chapter the focus is turned towards how emotions contribute to the decision to use violence as a political tool. It draws together the arguments presented thus far to explore how violence is perceived as a legitimate, even moral act.

CHAPTER 6

FEELING MOVED: EMOTION AND VIOLENT ACTION

Every emotion is a strategy, a purposive attempt to structure our world in such a way as to maximize our sense of personal dignity and self-esteem

*Robert Solomon (1993, p. xviii)
The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life*

INTRODUCTION

Emotions bear a special relationship to developing a sense of morality, and subsequently of what actions can be perceived as legitimate or not. In short, morality is in part constituted, expressed and felt through our emotions (Giner-Sorolla, 2012, p. 3; also see, Haidt, 2001; Haidt, 2012, pp. 27-51; Lehrer, 2009, pp. 162-188). In this final analytical chapter, the relationship between an alternative moral context, emotions, and violent behaviour is explored. This chapter offers two fundamental ways to consider the relationship between emotions and violent political behaviour. The first is by exploring how emotions contribute to expressive action (emotions as ends). The second is how they contribute to instrumental action (emotions as means). However, both ways are embedded in the idea of an alternative moral framework in which the violent political actor does not view their behaviour as morally incomprehensible, but rather as a morally sanctioned, even necessary act. In this sense, this chapter continues to integrate concepts of individual agency with collective social experiences in order to draw attention to a link between an individual's decision to engage in violence and an environment in which the propensity to do so is heightened.

Cottee and Hayward have argued that violent political extremists may be viewed as “moral subjects” engaged in an identity project in which they are compelled to give meaning and substance

to their lives. Embracing the violent ideology is a way of “recasting themselves as righteous warriors” and doing so alters their self-perception to allow them genuinely to perceive themselves as moral agents fighting on behalf of an honourable cause (Cottee & Hayward, 2011, p. 976).

While Terrorism Studies has broadly accepted the idea of ‘terrorist normality’, it is more difficult to accept the idea of a ‘terrorist morality’. The agents of terrorism typically view the targeted group as responsible for some kind of gross moral violation, whether that be occupation of disputed territory, despoliation of culture or religion, or the unconscionable treatment of others (Barbalet, 2006, p. 47). Their violent actions are most often cast as a morally righteous response to these violations. Indeed, terrorists draw a sharp distinction between their violent actions and those of ‘criminals’ by pointing to the altruistic nature of their goals as they promote the agenda of the group to which they belong (Schwartz *et al.*, 2009, p. 539). It may be uncomfortable to think that PIRA members did not just blindly obey the commands of a few who had abandoned morality completely, or were entirely lacking morality themselves, but rather have pursued what they believe is a moral goal through what they understand as morally acceptable actions. Nevertheless, regardless of the perspective of others, members of the PIRA do perceive their violent actions to be moral within the context of their particular circumstances. Their emotions have been an important source of information that has provided evidence to support the development of their particular moral judgments. Emotions that contribute to moral frameworks, such as anger, shame, guilt, fear, love or compassion, can paradoxically become the basis of what is often understood (outside of the group) as morally problematic behaviour, such as the use of violence by non-state actors to achieve political ends.

EMOTION, ACTION AND VIOLENCE

The eighteenth-century philosopher David Hume (1969 [1739], p. 509) argued that reason was “perfectly inert”, incapable of either preventing or producing any action. For Hume, the motivation or impulse to act arose from the passions rather than from reason or any specific beliefs. While Hume was working within a context that viewed emotion and reason as opposing forces it is nevertheless possible to appreciate his proposition that thinking is, by itself, insufficient for rousing action. In this sense, reason, thoughts, or beliefs guide or frame action, but do not initiate or cause it. Regardless of how rational a person’s commitment to a particular ideology may be, they need an

emotional impulse before acting in its defence. “Emotions are prime candidates for turning a thinking being into an actor” (Frijda et al., 2000, p. 3; also see, Haidt, 2003). They create the energy to act.

In Chapter Two it was suggested that emotions mobilise action because people act and react to emotional experiences. Emotional responses may be an indication of the kinds of things we value, they may provoke inquiry as to why we feel a certain way (Gould, 2010, p. 33). For example, if I value fairness, then my emotional reaction to something I judge as unfair will likely be anger or sadness rather than amusement or happiness. If I have experienced unfairness then it is likely that I will also respond with empathy. Furthermore, what we value may not be cognitively accessible if we did not have such emotional responses. It is because I feel anger or sadness when faced with an injustice that I know that I value fairness.

Chapter Two also suggested that emotions are behaviourally inclining rather than behaviourally compelling and therefore the experience of emotion, even strong negative emotions such as rage, may make a person more inclined to engage in a particular action such as violence, either expressively or instrumentally, but it does not compel them to do so. The action tendencies of emotion typically reflect a *desire* to act rather than a need (Elster, 2004, p. 153). This is particularly important with regard to the study of emotion in terrorist behaviour because it helps to direct attention away from dogmatic explanations of terrorist acts as rooted in the personal psychopathology of the ‘overly emotional’ subject who is *compelled* to perpetrate acts of violence. Instead, it draws attention to how emotion may make a person more *inclined* to pursue a violent agenda.

The actions stimulated by emotion anticipate altering the dynamics of the relationship between an individual or collective and their environment (Elster, 2004, p. 153; Parkinson et al., 2005, p. 16; Summers Effler, 2010, p. 109). We are motivated by our emotions to act in order to bring about some kind of change. For example, in the above case of experiencing anger in response to an injustice, the anger is a motivator to change the dynamics in which the injustice is taking place. It is possible to act on this motivation or not (emotions as inclining rather than compelling), however, the anger still provides the impetus to act. At an interpersonal level our emotions may act like force-fields, repelling or attracting us to different people such as running away from a threatening person or drawing closer to a loving one. These same proclivities may work at a broader, group or cultural level as we have seen in Chapter Four.

These brief comments on emotion and action say nothing specific about *violent* action. In order to explore the relationship between emotions and violence it is useful to reintroduce the idea of a ‘terrorist morality’ into the discussion. As mentioned earlier, regardless of the perspective of others, members of the PIRA perceived their violent actions to be moral within the context of their particular circumstances. ‘Frank’s’ explanation for the use of violence as a political tactic is typical among the PIRA interview participants. He states that,

Using violence was not immoral, it was inevitable. We were in a situation where violence was not only acceptable, it was necessary, it was the only way we were going to achieve anything (‘Frank’, PIRA).

Similarly, ‘Ciaran’ was adamant that “the Brits broke all the rules. They acted without any regard for our welfare. They ignored all the accepted moral standards. We just responded to that” (‘Ciarán’, PIRA), while ‘Padraig’ laments that, “the problem is not that people are willing to fight [...] but that they have to fight [...] in the first place (‘Padraig’, PIRA).

Indeed, the theme that resonates most strongly throughout the PIRA interviews is the idea that there was a moral imperative to defend and protect your area, your people, or yourself from an adversary who consistently violated deeply held social norms and values. The problem with this explanation lies in the fact that people with no direct connection to the causes of oppression also become the victims of so-called defensive action. Similarly, the widespread fear that permeates a community when it witnesses violent attacks cannot be limited to any simple dichotomous view of perpetrators and victims. Those members of the community being defended are to a degree further victimised as they deal not only with a culture of violence but also with reprisal attacks and tough policing measures that arise as a result of so-called defensive violence. Nevertheless, without exception each participant explained their actions in terms of a ‘defensive response’ in which they were the righteous party in a protracted conflict in which they (or their identity group) were continually subjected to moral transgressions at the hands of a more powerful foe. It is the issue of power, or lack of it, that appears to underpin the moral righteousness of the defensive position adopted. As ‘Liam’ explains,

[T]here weren’t any other avenues for us, we didn’t have electoral representation or even the fair access to other ways. This whole place was gerrymandered and set up to suit the Brits so they could maintain power and you just have to look at Derry to see how hopeless it was to participate in democratic politics [...] It pisses me off when people scrutinise our actions but not the actions of the Brits. I mean they had all the power and so they had the responsibility to make change peacefully but instead they supported

all this discriminatory policies and structure and then act all morally superior when we defend ourselves ('Liam', PIRA).

'Mick' also refers to the responsibility of power and subsequently links it to what he views as evidence of the hypocrisy of the moral stance of the British government, stating,

There were many innocent victims of British bombing in the Second World War, such as Dresden, and now in Afghanistan and Iraq. How is that different than what happened here except that we made much more effort to limit that kind of stuff in our war? If the most powerful countries on earth with everything and all the people they have at their disposal can't find non-violent alternatives how could we? The hypocrisy is unbelievable ('Mick', PIRA).

The idea that they were the ones responding morally was deeply embedded in the way the men talked of their involvement in the PIRA. 'Tadhg' recalls that he "felt proud to be doing the right thing" ('Tadhg', PIRA), 'Ruari' that he, "always felt we had the moral high ground" ('Ruari', PIRA), 'Sean' that it was, "regrettable that we had to resort to violence, but not immoral" ('Seán', PIRA) and 'Liam' that, "I have no trouble sleeping at night. I did what I had to do and I believe to this day that it was moral" ('Liam', PIRA).

The interviews reveal that shame over violating the moral embargo on the use of violence by civilians in pursuit of a political goal was low or even non-existent, suggesting that participants did not hold this moral embargo to be valid. Given the findings in Chapter Four, that participants did not experience loyalty, anger, fear, or shame in a way that strengthened their commitment to society, but rather in a way that contributed to the development of an alternative moral logic, this is less surprising. Similarly, Chapter Five illuminated how someone can develop an alternative morality in which the use of violence as a political tactic is viewed as morally acceptable behaviour. While from a normative perspective it is possible (and arguably an imperative) to challenge this perception, it is also vital that we try and understand how this alternative moral position contributes to the choice to use violence.

Wikström *et al* (Bouhana & Wikström, 2008; Wikström, 2010; Wikström & Bouhana, 2011; Wikström, Oberwittler, Treiber, & Hardie, 2012; Wikström & Treiber, 2009) propose a 'situational' analysis that concentrates on how the interaction between an individual and their environment leads to violent action. While Wikström chooses to explore the idea of causal mechanisms in order to develop a predictive model of crime, which is not the approach taken here, the utility of the approach lies in the acknowledgement that a person's own moral perspective contributes to rules of behaviour that in turn shape their moral development and ultimately provide the grounds for their

moral actions. By referring to moral actions Wikström *et al* (2008, p. 38; 2009, p. 76) are clear that they do not use the word to describe virtuous behaviour, but rather, like Charles Ruby (2002, p. 15) in his review of the extant literature on psychological theories of terrorism, it is used to refer to the mental processes or rules that guide a person's action. In other words, rather than making an assessment or judgment about the virtues of the violent behaviour, the focus is on understanding the engaged perspective of the violent actor who behaves according to their own particular moral guidelines or principles. In this sense, focus is directed at explaining *why* people break existing moral rules rather than getting bogged down in discussions about the circumstances in which, if any, it is justified.

Wikström's Situational Action Theory (SAT) is based on the assumption that emotions contribute to the development of 'moral rules' that nurture an individual's perceptions and choices, thereby providing a moral context to their actions. SAT does not theorise how these moral rules come about. Indeed there are calls for research into this process (see, Bouhana & Wikström, 2008, p. 36). However, the previous two chapters go some way to shedding light on this matter. What SAT does do is recognise the importance of emotion in developing an individual's moral framework and then suggests that violent behaviour (referred to by the term 'moral action') will be guided by this regardless of whether it breaks the law. According to Wikström and Treiber,

When explaining acts of violence, the most important fact is not that they intend to bring about physical harm but that they are moral actions guided by rules about what it is right or wrong to do in particular circumstances. There is principally [sic] no difference in explaining the causal processes that make a person hit someone, lie to someone or steal someone's belongings. What differs are the *moral rules* that guide particular kinds of action [...]. What differentiates acts of violence from other moral actions is therefore not the basic processes which make people engage in violence [...] but the input [...] which guides the perception of violence as an action alternative [emphasis in original] (Wikström & Treiber, 2009, p. 78).

This 'input', according to Wikström and Treiber, takes the form of an engaged set of 'moral rules' which regulate the assessment of whether violence is an acceptable response, as well as what types and levels of violence are permitted. Using the example of the law as the most accepted set of moral rules surrounding the assessment of how and when violence is permissible, SAT theorises that alternative moral rules surround the use of violence that takes place outside of legal boundaries (Wikström & Treiber, 2009, p. 79).

Blok (2001, pp. 103-114), argues strongly that understanding violence has been hampered by the modern monopolisation of violence by the state. Precisely due to the stability of this ‘impersonal monopoly’, strong feelings have developed about the use of violence by others (Blok, 2001, p. 103). It is viewed as senseless, irrational, anomalous, disruptive and the antithesis of moral action. Yet moral rules guide people to act in particular ways by influencing them to see certain actions as honourable in response to particular circumstances. (Blok, 2001; Wikström & Treiber, 2009, p. 79). These moral rules can be both subjective (one’s own morality) as well as operating at a social level (moral contexts). What is socially permissible by law generally influences social acceptance, however, as we have seen in Chapter Four, when a group has developed exclusivist and alternate communal bonds then it is the group that will have more influence over the prescription of socially accepted moral behaviour. The emotional dissidence experienced by PIRA members encouraged them to disengage or disconnect from the moral obligations and expectations of the *status quo* and, within the context of the group, an alternative set of moral obligations and expectations took hold in which the rules around the use of violence were reinterpreted. In particular, the guiding rule that sanctioned the use of violence was that it was a *defensive* act.

Shared emotions molded a subculture in which morality was redefined in a way that overrode that of the mainstream as expressed in the idea of the law. When a person is motivated to act, whether they choose violence or not will crucially depend on the interplay between their own particular moral stance and whether or not violence is socially acceptable within the context of their most influential social group (Wikström & Treiber, 2009, p. 81). ‘Kevin’ explained that,

[...] if you didn’t experience the injustices that we did, um, if you didn’t see the indiscriminate use of violence and that sort of thing, then I guess you mightn’t understand why we thought that violence was acceptable. The thing is that, and I mean you know the saying that violence begets violence [...], but the thing is that violence was everywhere and at what point is it ok to fight back? The ‘RA provided the means and the agenda for fighting back. It is not that I or the ‘RA support violence in every circumstance. The point is that violence was the only option in these particular circumstances and I accept that and I don’t think you can judge it as wrong or immoral or whatever when you ignore the context that we were in (‘Kevin’, PIRA).

The interplay between personal morality and the moral context in which a person is embedded influences whether or not they will be likely to view violence as a legitimate form of action. Indeed, the above examples suggest that participants viewed their violent actions as virtuous rather than immoral, confirming consistent findings within terrorism literature (for example see,

Gearty, 2003; on the PIRA specifically see, Shanahan, 2009; more generally see, Ehud Sprinzak, 1991).

Within the literature on emotions, certain emotions have been classified as having a particular relationship to morality. Although there is debate over which particular emotions should be referred to as ‘moral’ emotions, in general they are classified in terms of “other-condemning” emotions such as contempt, anger and disgust, “self-conscious” emotions such as shame, embarrassment, pride, and guilt, “other-suffering” emotions such as compassion or empathy, and “other-praising” emotions such as gratitude or admiration (Haidt, 2003, p. 855). Emotions are considered ‘moral’ when they respond to moral violations and motivate moral behaviour (Haidt, 2003, p. 853). In other words they provide a link between what is perceived to be the broader interests of society and the actions that are motivated in order to bring this about. Moral emotions “may moderate the link between moral standards and moral decisions, and ultimately moral behaviour” (Price Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007, p. 346).

What is important in relation to the discussion of the ‘terrorist morality’ and its connection to action is that the moral emotions that are urging or priming them to act have arisen within the context of their particular life experiences, which have influenced their perceptions of right and wrong. The dissident emotions that have developed in the context of their everyday lives have acted like a “moral scanner that constantly provides both a cognitive judgment and a feeling tone of ease or unease in the moral evaluation of life’s moment-to-moment activities” (Kroll & Egan, 2004, p. 352). As such, the experience of moral emotions can motivate not only pro-social, moral actions, but also those actions that are seen more broadly as anti-social or immoral but which are experienced by the disaffected individual or group as precisely the opposite. As ‘Frank’ revealed, “You can ask me whether joining the ‘RA or using violence was morally justified, but what if I ask you a question. When is it morally justified to stand by and watch injustice? I have no doubt that I acted morally given the situation. The right thing to do was to defend our communities and our areas” (‘Frank’, PIRA).

In order to understand why political extremists commit their violent acts it is necessary to listen, rather than dismiss, what they have to say about the morality of their actions and attempt to comprehend the authenticity they assign it, regardless of whether it is assessed as objectively accurate or not. Katz (1988, p. 5), has argued this in relation to violent crime more broadly, and it is even more pertinent in the study of violent political behaviour. In order to explore this further in

relation to violent political extremism the rest of this chapter considers both expressive and instrumental action as an outcome of morally framed subversive counter-emotions.

EMOTIONS AND EXPRESSIVE ACTION

All forms of human behaviour or action consist of both instrumental and expressive features; while some forms of action may be more instrumental, others may be more expressive (Blok, 2001, pp. 107-108; De Haan & Vos, 2003, p. 46). While instrumental action usually refers to the function or purpose of a particular behaviour, expressive action refers more to the meaning a particular action is communicating. Within the continuum of instrumental and expressive action lies the meaning an actor ascribes to what he/she is doing, which may tend towards instrumental or expressive, depending on how the actor views the purpose of their behaviour. Brian Jenkins (1974, p. 4) oft repeated description of ‘terrorism as theatre’, nicely captures the expressive dimensions of terrorism, while Juergensmeyer’s (2001, pp. 124-128) idea of ‘performance violence’ also draws attention to the expressive rather than strategic aspects of political violence.

Cottee and Hayward (2011) arguably go one step further when they reconstitute the performance as an attempt to re-define the self rather than simply send a message to the on-looker. Drawing on Giddens (1991) influential concept of the self as a ‘project’ that responds to the relentless making and re-making of meaning, Cottee and Hayward suggest that the attraction of political violence is, in part, an existential one in which the experience or expression of emotion may be as much a part of the desired goal as any strategic consideration.²⁵ Similarly, a study of criminal behaviour by de Haan and Vos, (2003, pp. 47-48) has found that crime has a meaning for the perpetrator that extends beyond the goal of his or her actions and is best understood as the formation and maintenance of an identity such as ‘ruthless’ that arises out of a subversion of broader social norms and values. “They command respect, if not from others, then at least from each other” (De Haan & Vos, 2003, p. 48).

²⁵ It should be noted that Cottee and Hayward are not suggesting that the existential motives for terrorism are the only, or necessarily the most influential, reasons for engaging in violence. Rather, they suggest that they may be among the many motivational desires that are influential or significant (Cottee & Hayward, 2011, p. 966).

Expressive violence, rather than being ‘senseless’ has a discernible relationship to status and reputation (Blok, 2001; Cohen & Nisbett, 1994, 1997). People need a sense of identity that has a degree of recognition or repute. Under conditions of political threat or social insecurity there is a need to ‘make yourself respected’, lest one die a social death (Blok, 2001, p. 9; Cohen & Nisbett, 1994, p. 552; 1997, p. 1188). The assertion of honour, pride and status is implicit in all violence, not just political violence. It can be seen in the violence of a man against his wife as he attempts to assert his power over her, in the violence of a street thug who lashes out in response to being ‘dissed’, in the Nazi who desperately tries to construct himself as a ‘superior’ being, in the Mafiosi who view themselves as ‘men of honour’, and in the violent political extremist who responds to a sense of humiliation, political impotence, or siege. Destroying or hurting the perceived source of disrespect or friction may become the desired outcome (Wikström & Treiber, 2009, p. 86).

In Chapter Four, the subversive counter-emotions that arose amongst members of the PIRA were deeply embedded in the sense that they were not valued by the state. They talked of feeling like second class citizens, of being invisible, and of the moral violations they or their families or community experienced in everyday life. Examples such as the burning of Bombay Street or Bloody Sunday loom large alongside more banal experiences of humiliation or disrespect such as being subjected to bag searches, seeing British troops occupying the streets, or being called ‘Paddy’ or ‘taig’. While these experiences no doubt sowed the seeds of political dissent, they also left people with a particular desire to lash out. There was a degree of satisfaction in striking a blow and hurting those who were seen as responsible for their sorrows. “If pride for one’s group is a central goal, humbling one’s enemies is another” (Jasper, 2011, p. 290). ‘Cian’ explains that,

[...] when you don't resist all these controlling mechanisms, if you just go with them it can only be to the detriment to your health but the moment when, you know, you're standing up for your rights and fighting back, [...] I think that it really did have a big physical impact on me, just standing up [...] it was such a feeling of a power and euphoria at times to actually be involved with that struggle, it was a real adrenaline rush to be out there and active. It felt good to hit back or have a win. You can't just say that [but it's] a common experience. But I think you have to be able to stand up for your own rights in some way and, you know, any kind of well-ordered society allows that. But we were not living in an ordered society ('Cian', PIRA).

Similarly ‘Máirtín’, giving expression to Aristotle's concept of ‘returning pain’, stated that,

Yeah it felt good, bloody good, to hit back at them [the British] after what they had done to us and, um, to our community. I mean there was a strategy to all we were doing but, um, it's like you operate on two different levels. On one level you just want to just hurt ‘em, you just want to get revenge I

guess. But on the other level you have the bigger political strategy. You realise that it's a long war and that you have to be strategic about it ('Máirtín', PIRA).

With the exception of one, all members of the PIRA interviewed talked about an expressive element to their political behaviour. That is, they talked in a way that suggested that their violent actions produced emotionally rewarding experiences such as excitement, satisfaction, or pride. At times they demonstrated a desire to hide that pleasure, by immediately qualifying their responses, possibly due to awareness that expressing pleasure in undertaking violent behaviour would put them at risk of being negatively labelled. However, rather than expressing pleasure in the actual violence, participants were expressing pleasure in the *symbolism* of the violence, of what it meant in terms of their broader struggle. 'Keiran' acknowledged that,

[...] it would be a lie to say you didn't get a buzz when you were effective, but, well, you can't say that because it seems like, well it might seem like you are a fucking lunatic, a mad killer or something, but it isn't just, it isn't the act, it's what it means, if that makes sense. It isn't the act of being involved in a killing but that you have been effective on your mission, like any soldier, you know, you get a buzz out of being effective in your strategy and part of being effective is sometimes in killing a target. [...] For me there was no immediacy to it, no ch, ch, ch bang and then that's it, no immediate gratification, it was slower, more deliberate, it was a different type of work that I was involved in than some others. So while I never had that sense of immediate gratification there was always this sense of, you know, 'well done' and a great sense of camaraderie with all the people who were involved, 'cos it means, if one person fucked up everybody was fucked up. But, yeah, there was a great sense that we were doing something quite, even at the time, momentous, and I don't say that lightly. People were doing things which changed, can I say which changed history [...] There was definitely a sense of achievement in the operation as opposed to outcome, of performing your role and others performing theirs. It was a good feeling ('Keiran', PIRA).

While acting violently had a pleasurable component in the sense that it was connected to achievement or a sense of pride, in each case violence was still understood within the framework of either the moral transgressions of others or the moral actions of themselves. For example, 'Eamon' recalled that there was a certain excitement in being involved in the PIRA in comparison to his everyday life,

You found yourself doing stuff that was, um, well to be honest it was pretty thrilling. I mean, you learn how to use weapons, how to look after them, clean 'em and stuff, and fire them and, well as a young lad who was just kicking around the neighbourhood to be in a situation that you were focused on learning about this stuff, about how explosives worked or whatever, I mean it was just thrilling [...]. I remember the first time I fired a gun, going

out in a group to this training area and having a go, and it was like ‘whoa’. I mean probably any young lad would get a kick out of that but there was seriousness to it as well. We were learning these things in order to play a role in something bigger [...] so while I can’t deny the thrill of it all, shooting a gun and all that, I also remember feeling, um, it’s hard to explain, but I guess you feel good about yourself because you are working towards something important (‘Eamon’, PIRA).

‘Eamon seems to be suggesting that while shooting a gun was instantly gratifying, it was the connection between shooting the gun and the broader purpose of bringing about political change that had the more sustaining effect of making him ‘feel good about himself’. Along with the excitement of being involved in something that was thrilling, ‘Eamon’ felt pride in his actions because they were connected to a larger, morally righteous agenda. ‘Padraig’ also expressed feelings of pride that arose out of the simple act of resisting having his bag examined on the way to school,

So I mean, maybe you can say that I should have just opened it up straight away, but even then, maybe even more at that age, it’s an affront you know, an insult to be subjected to having your bag checked by a foreigner in your own country, ya know, it’s meant to be humiliating, about making sure you know who has the power. And it isn’t you, ya know. I mean, to just do it without resisting, even in a small way, it’s like saying it’s ok to treat people like this, like giving them permission to treat you like second-class citizens. I mean, to just do it without resisting is like saying that it’s ok to just stop school kids in the street and demand to know what’s in their bag. I mean, you just resented it, so it’s natural to just resist a bit rather than make it too easy. You want to send the message, you know, that it’s not ok and so showing some resistance is just part of life. I think I would have felt ashamed to not resist in all these small ways, like defiance was part of maintaining your pride. I mean, I was only about 14 (‘Padraig’, PIRA).

The association between pride and resistance was also evident in ‘Coilm’s’ observation (p. 80 *supra*) that “well, pride comes from resistance” and ‘Eamon’s’ comments (p. 107 *supra*) that his non-compliance was “[d]efiance or a bit of pride I guess”. When I asked ‘Coilm’ about the significance of him having a classic picture of Che Guevara with his clenched fist raised in the air (prominently displayed on his desk) he told me that to him, “it symbolises the pride you take in resisting oppression” (‘Coilm’, PIRA).

Pride is variously viewed as both a disdainful emotion (to get above yourself) and an admirable one (to take pride in your work). However, it is also closely associated with the theme of identity politics in which the transformation of marginalised identities from a source of shame into a source of pride is at the heart of political action (for example see, Britt & Heise, 2000; Gould, 2005;

A. Stein, 2001). 'Ciarán' explains how as a child he found pride in his identity by rioting, but also how it left him feeling good as a result,

There were massive fortifications being built up and down the length of West Belfast and there was rioting taking place every day. A lot of rioting, even for the kids. Recreational rioting just to get out of school, throw some stones and start a riot. Yeah, all of that. I mean there is, and I wouldn't deny it, there is a bit of excitement in all of that. I mean, it was probably the best you felt the whole day, you know, when you'd throw stones and it'd be exciting and defiant and you weren't just putting up with stuff but kinda asserting yourself in some small way, I mean, it wasn't serious stuff with guns or bombs but it was like you were doing your bit and you felt kinda proud that you were ('Ciarán', PIRA).

Similarly, 'Ruari', when asked if he participated in recreational rioting responded with, "Oh, yeah, yeah, that's how you got yourself some credit you know, that's how you show you're brave and get some recognition" ('Ruari', PIRA). The recurring theme of feeling good as a result of taking pride through acts of resistance supports Blok's (2001, p. 114) contention that expressive violence is connected to the violation and vindication of honour. 'Padraig' whose recollections of resisting having his bag checked by British soldiers as a 14 year old school boy goes on to declare that,

I mean it is my belief that when this state was set up, partitioned, if there had of been equality in this state, in terms of cultural symbolism and all that sorta stuff, and equality in opportunity, employment, housing, education and all of that, there would not have been an armed conflict. It was that institutionalised discrimination heaped on the denial of civil rights and then [the] abuse of human rights, and all taking place in the context of 800 years of British colonialism in Ireland and our traditional resistance to British rule, and you know, it was a recipe for conflict. The Irish are proud people and to resist oppression is a matter of honour ('Padraig', PIRA).

Cohen and Nisbett (1994, 1997) have demonstrated how the concept of honour permits violence as a tool to protect and restore social order, reputation, and status. Particularly in conditions of uncertainty, poor law enforcement, and economic or social vulnerability, violent retributions for violations of honour, dignity and respect arise as a defence against vulnerability, as a way of announcing that one is not an easy mark and for asserting status and power within a precarious hierarchy (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994, p. 552). For example, 'Tadhg' explained that, "[a]s a Republican I'm sending the message that I am proud to be an Irishman and that means that I will not be beaten into submission" ('Tadhg', PIRA).

The pride the participants experience through their acts of violence appears to be connected with the assertion of honour and dignity in addition to being connected to broader political goals.

Nevertheless, the liberating aspect of expressive violence is often present when participants reflected on their use of violence, although it was connected to the idea of participating in a broader, morally sanctioned movement. 'Mick' was very explicit about how using violence made him feel. He confided that,

I felt utterly alive when planning or executing an operation. All my senses were heightened, like you notice every noise, every sound as if it all has great significance. You feel scared but it is nothing compared to the anticipation. Remember that when you're on an operation it is the culmination of many things. You feel like you've been working towards it because it is action that's going to bring about change. It was only ever violence that was going to work in our situation and so when you are planning or doing an attack then you are fulfilling a purpose. You don't have time to think about it much during an operation, you are totally in the moment and when you're successful there is a sense of euphoria at pulling it off and the adrenalin is pumping and you feel on top of the world. We'd all meet at the pub later and the *craic* would be great, you'd be absolutely on a high ('Mick', PIRA).

While the pride in taking action that aimed at bringing about broader social and political change is evident, several men also admit that their actions have weighed heavily upon their conscience as they have gotten older. Some like 'Ruari' struggle with a sense of conflict over feeling proud of his role in the PIRA but not proud of killing a fellow human being (p. 33 *supra*). Similarly 'Sean' concedes that,

I still believe violence was necessary but I would not say that I was proud of being a part of taking someone's life. When you're young you don't think about it like that and you get caught up in the excitement of it all. But as you get older and have kids you reflect a bit more on things you've done and you come to realise that it is really regrettable that you were in those circumstances and, I don't know, I'm not ashamed of it, I feel like I did what I had to do, but it was regrettable that I had to do it, you know ('Seán', PIRA).

Even 'Mick' whose account vividly describes the euphoric experience of violence accepts that,

So much hangs on the fact that you are in the moment, that you are completely immersed in everything. When you get older and take a step back you kind of baulk at how exciting you found it all and although I remain proud of what I've done I'm not so proud of how easy it was to do it ('Mick', PIRA).

For all the men, the violence had a meaning that went beyond the act itself. Active participation within the terrorist group can provide a sense of fulfilment and self-realisation that comes from working towards something meaningful. 'Padraig' was within days of death when the 1981 hunger strike was called off after 10 men had died as a result of starvation. He recalled to me

the moment when he realised he would most likely be dead as a result of being accepted as a volunteer,

I got a letter from the leadership of the army and they basically addresses it to Volunteer 'Padraig', and the first thing I thought about that was when they actually say 'volunteer' in front of somebody's name it's usually only on a gravestone or in the obituary columns in the paper, so, you know, even though I had made the decision and I was clear in my mind what I was doing, when I read this it really rocked me back on my heels, Your stomach drops to the ground. You can't help but have a moment of fear go through you. And it said, basically, 'by your actions you're going to bringing the movement into direct confrontation with the British and if you follow through with it you will be dead within two months. If you have any second thoughts stand aside now and nothing less will be thought of ya'. So there it is [in] black and white in front of you, 'you're going to be dead in two months' [...]. There is a point too, about unless you're absolutely sure, I mean, how can you be absolutely sure? I'd never been there before, I can't be absolutely sure, I don't think anybody can be. You can be sure as you can be but the point is that physically as I got weaker, psychologically I became much stronger [...]. I mean, you question 'have I done things right in my life' and at that stage I was 23 years of age, but you think, well maybe I didn't treat that woman as well as I should have, did I treat my mum as well as I should have, you know my parents, all of those regrets that you have you know you didn't do right by people or whatever and, you know, in a way it's sort of like you're outside of your own body almost, or outside of your own intellect, and you're sayin', I mean, 'how did I end up in this situation?' Not with any sense of regret but almost with wonderment or curiosity or something. I had my whole life in front of me, I played sport, I enjoyed life, and now here I am, I'm going to be dead in a couple of weeks' time and yet I had no regrets about what I was doing. I just always felt that if you wanted to make change that you had to be in the [Irish Republican] Army, if you wanted to influence events you had to be in the Army. You know, that's, and that is where I saw myself ('Padraig', PIRA).

Amongst volunteers there was a defiant stance in which the perceived victimhood of their community could not be experienced passively. The emotions that supported and responded to a sense of oppression and injustice provided a platform for violent activity and were evident in the sense of liberation or catharsis that at times accompanied the violent act. However, while there is acknowledgement of the thrills, excitement and sense of pride and achievement that comes with participating in actions believed to be fundamental to bringing about political change, the violent act is not limited to being an expressive form of behaviour. Rather, expressive action operates on a continuum in which instrumental action is also influenced by emotions.

Emotion may be more visible within expressive acts of violence, however, they also contribute to developing and sustaining a mindset in which instrumental acts of violence are performed. One way of understanding the relationship between emotions and instrumental action is to view some emotions as diminishing the likelihood of action and of others as increasing it (Barbalet, 2006, p. 52). While the pleasure or relief of experiencing particular emotions can at times be a goal of action, emotions also suggest other goals such as protecting one's in-group or harming one's foes (Jasper, 2006, p. 19). Instrumental action is generally seen in terms of means/ends calculations with little space given to any emotional component. Yet, as we have seen, changing the norms or 'feeling rules' around emotions has the potential to change how people experience and understand politics, including which political tactics are seen as legitimate. Using violence is not necessarily easy, and doing so requires controlling or transforming those emotions that lead to an aversion for using violence, and bringing to the fore those that help to justify and condone it (Collins, 2008, p. 8; Grossman, 1996, pp. 3-4). The interviews reveal that this is not as simple as promoting hate, experiencing humiliation, or suppressing empathy, but requires negotiating through complex emotional landscapes in which clusters of often contradictory emotions need to be simultaneously controlled, managed or heightened in order both to arouse the energy needed to act and the commitment for the action to be violent.

Jasper (2011, p. 291; 2012, pp. 35-38) uses the term 'moral batteries' in order to draw attention to the importance of the interplay between emotions within the realm of strategic decision-making. He suggests that the tension created through the combination and interaction between emotions contributes to strategic decisions to act. For example, within the interviews participants often discussed their 'negative' emotions such as hate by placing it within the context of more 'positive' emotions such as loyalty or compassion,

When you ask me about hating the Brits and all I find it a bit wrong, a wee bit one dimensional if you don't mind me saying [...] For me there was a degree of hate I guess, but not in a personal way if that makes sense. I mean, you hate the repression and the inequity but that's only because you feel loyalty to your community. It only makes sense in that context and so when you ask me about hate it's like you want to paint me as a hateful person but I honestly don't see myself that way and I don't think that's how people who know me see me either. I didn't get involved because I hated, I got involved because I felt an obligation to defend people against attacks on the communities. Any hate or anger I felt was just a reaction to seeing those people hurt, it didn't define me, it is, I think, a normal response to the

situation we were in and or inability to change it through peaceful means ('Keiran', PIRA).

'Keiran's' loyalty to and solidarity with his community provides a context for any anger or hate that arose, and in turn, help to prepare him for the strategic choice of violence. Similarly, 'Danny' discusses how the violent disruption of communal grieving and solidarity provided the context for a surge of rage and hate that became a watershed moment for him, even though he was already a member of the PIRA,

When Michael Stone²⁶ threw grenades at Milltown [Cemetery], he killed three people and injured 50 or 60 more, it set off a couple of weeks of very bad violence. When I saw that something changed for me. I was always committed to our cause but that day, I don't know, maybe it was because we were grieving, you know, supporting each other, caring for each other, and then that happened and I felt such an anger, I, I have to say, and I can feel it again just talking about that day, it was like, like, complete fury and rage, absolute hatred. I didn't say a thing, I kept it under control, but it changed me, I was colder, more calculated after that day [...]. For others it might be Bloody Sunday or some other event, but for me it was that day when we were all together grieving and that happened [...]. It confirmed in me that we had to make it not worth their while to keep attacking us, that for every one of our people that were killed they could be sure that would come back to 'em double. Peaceful agitation was never going to work here, what was the point of that? ('Danny', PIRA).

Emotions are most often experienced in combinations, rather than as simple, one-dimensional occurrences. At times they may be hard to discern from each other, or seemingly incomprehensible without reference to their broader emotional context. The hate or anger that 'Danny' and 'Keiran' speak of is not enough to make them commit to physical force or violent Republicanism, it is the interplay and tension between their love for their communities, the hate and anger they feel at their political and social circumstances, and their frustration at being unable to change it that helps them arrive at violence as a strategic choice.

Taking a different approach than Jasper, Klusemann (2012), draws attention to the importance of micro-interactions between contending sides in order to create and maintain the emotional energy necessary to commit an act of violence. 'Seán' remembers the energy he created through provoking the British soldiers,

²⁶ Michael Stone was a loyalist volunteer in the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and was subsequently convicted for the attack being referred to which took place during funeral services for IRA members killed in Gibraltar. Three days after his attack, at the funeral of one of the victims, two non-uniformed British soldiers were dragged from their car and subsequently shot dead by the IRA.

Sometimes we just provoked 'em [the British soldiers] on the street to get a reaction. It all helped to feed the sense of defiance, and it even made ya feel happy ya know, 'coz it gave ya a laugh. It gets ya energy up when ya keep the feelings boiling up. I knew I could get energy by going out and throwing some stones or provoking someone ('Seán', PIRA).

'Padraig' also spoke of interactions with the prison guards as 'fuel on the fire' that provided a way of transforming his fear and worry into stronger loyalty to his fellow inmates and a heightened commitment to the armed struggle,

I think it was in 1980, towards the end of 1980, they came round and all we had in the cells was a piece of foam rubber and three blankets, a piss pot and a container with water and they came around one day and put chairs in, just cheap chairs, and I think it, well, we never really got to the bottom of why it happened, but we presumed it was to test us to see what would happen. They probably expected us to break the chairs up but what we did was they had metal grills on the windows and we discovered that if you bent the leg of the chair back and forward it would break the metal on the grill, so we broke the metal off the grills and the screws were absolutely livid, you know, they were disgusted. It was things like that and I remember that night in particular because the morale was just so high. [...] the more disgusted they were in us, the more defiant and good we felt. I mean, we took pleasure from it even though we knew what would be coming [a beating]. I loved that feeling of defiance, of being defiant no matter how grim things were. You could be sitting in your cell worrying or scared or feeling sorry for yourself but when you could stick it to the screws, push 'em to the limits, you forgot all that and morale would go up. Well, I mean we all got the crap beat out of us the next morning. Well that night they come round and opened the doors and took all the remnants of the chairs out so we couldn't do any more damage, they came round the next morning, and, um, I didn't hear them coming I was still sleeping because we had been up 'till all hours in the morning and I am a heavy sleeper at the best of times, so I only woke up when the door opened to bring round the breakfast and the screws saw me lying in bed and just came after me. They just kicked the shit out of me, ya know, lying there on the mattress. But, it didn't matter, as far as we were concerned we'd had a massive victory over them. Ahh, so I mean, there was that sense of defiance, there was that sense of all being in it together, of community and comradeship and of helping each out as much as possible. You just don't get that feeling in normal life and it just reinforces your commitment and so having those kinds of exchanges with the guards helps to strengthen your loyalty to each other and to the armed struggle. I admit that some people will be broken by that and some were, it wasn't for them. But for me it was just fuel on the fire and it kept me going ('Padraig', PIRA).

For Klusemann, who focuses on understanding the build-up of tension that leads to an outburst of mass violence perpetrated at close range by a large cohort of people, such as the violence in Rwanda, these interactions are largely negative and confrontational (Klusemann, 2012,

pp. 471-474). However, in the case of the PIRA interviewees, these interactions did not necessarily need to be either negative or confrontational. 'Ruari' recalls a kind of lighthearted and almost friendly 'banter' with some of the British soldiers, although he nevertheless interprets this lightheartedness within the personal moral framework he has developed,

[W]e used to banter with the English soldiers too, because some of them were friendly you know. They'd say, 'you see that girl with the red hair last night. What'd ya call her?' 'Fuckin none of your business'. 'Do ya have any big sisters?' 'Fuck off'. 'So what do ya drink'. 'I'm not goin' to tell ya'. So this sort of banter. It was a bit of fun. But in the end, this is the enemy, they're the enemy. And so the banter would be a bit of fun but umm, you'd be telling 'em to 'fuck off' and even though it was a bit of a joke and you'd even sort of enjoy it and kinda like 'em, the point is they was the enemy and when ya walked off ya would go 'what a bastard. He ain't got no right being here' ('Ruari', PIRA).

He also described to me, with a very mischievous demeanor, how running the gauntlet of Loyalist snipers could be used to get a kiss from a girl, before returning to how this contributed to an underlying fury at the social context he found himself in,

'Ruari': [W]e used to go up to this other place which is in another area and that's where all the dances were. So we used to slip up there, and I was telling, and people couldn't believe it, there's a place in the old Park Rd and you had to run across - we called in Sniper Rd, and the Loyalists used to set up sandbags and wait on us, and the girls used to be real frightened, so for us to get a kiss you'd run the girl across. It was like, "I'm frightened" oh "okay, give us your hand" and you'd go out there and say, "1,2,3 run", and you'd run. Sometimes you'd hear a crack.

Debra: So were you successful there 'Ruari'? (Joint laughing)

'Ruari': Aye, one in every four I'd get a kiss (joint laughing). "Thank-you, thank-you" and you'd get a wee kiss there and then you'd catch yourself [...]. I think we were 16 years of age and you shouldn't, that wouldn't happen now, but it shouldn't of happened then either. I make fun of it, and it was pretty fun and exciting, but you were always aware that it shouldn't have been like that and when I think back on my friends and who joined [the IRA] and who didn't I wonder why didn't so and so join and why did I join.

Debra: And why do you think that might have been?

'Ruari' Well, because there was this one friend who I thought would join for sure, real strong Republican family and always talking up about being related to James Connolly and me, my grandfather fought in the Somme in the British Army, and I was the quiet one. And he never joined and when I asked him about it he said he never really thought of it. But me,

well I think I always felt things more deeply. I didn't know the Irish politics or the history as much, we just learned the Tudors and that kinda stuff, British history in school, so when I saw the things going on I think I found it more shocking, I felt more offended maybe than some others. As I say, I feel injustices very strongly and that probably sustained me.

Debra: How so?

'Ruari': I remember that I used to hang on any news or stories of what the Brits had done, like when that wee boy was shot dead in his bed.²⁷ And that kind of builds ya up and builds ya up and if you're feeling flat you just hear some more stuff, some brutality, some injustice against the community, and you let yourself get angry about it because it keeps ya up, builds ya up ya know? [...] And so you use stuff that happens, the searches, or seeing the uniforms all around ya, or dodging the snipers, and ya use it to keep you fired up and committed, ready to take action, you know? ('Ruari', PIRA).

'Ruari' describes 'letting' himself get angry, which implies that he sees his anger as useful. I asked him if he felt sadness or grief at the death of the child, or that attending a dance may involve dodging a sniper's bullet, and he replied with,

Aye, of course. But you can't dwell on those sorts of feelings. You'd be finished, overwhelmed by it, you'd be useless. If ya think about his ma or da and what they'd be going through you'd be finished. I think you have to focus on the injustice, on the unfairness of it, on the bigger picture of how these things come about, why we are living in an environment where these things just keep happening. And when you do that, then aye, ya stay angry about it, it keeps the fire in ya belly, ya know? ('Ruari', PIRA).

Hochschild (1975, 1979, 1983), recognised the importance of managing emotions, along with the subsequent ability to generate the appropriate emotions necessary for achieving particular outcomes. She points to tell-tale signs in people's speech, such as using active verb forms, for example "I *made* myself have a good time...I *tried* to feel grateful" or passive verb forms such as, "I *let myself* finally feel sad" (Hochschild, 1979, p. 561) (Emphasis in original). Using the term 'emotion work' to refer to the act of "evoking or shaping, as well as suppressing, feelings in oneself", Hochschild suggests that 'emotion work' tends to take two forms; that of evoking a desired yet absent emotion, or that of suppressing an unwanted yet present one (Hochschild, 1979, p. 561). The ability to create and sustain the 'correct' emotions in order to direct energy towards the

²⁷ Probably referring to the death of 9 year old Patrick Rooney who was killed by stray bullets fired by the RUC as he sheltered in his bedroom in the Divis Flats Complex during the riots in West Belfast during August 1969.

goal of committing or enabling acts of violent extremism is central to instrumental acts of violence. In the interviews conducted with the PIRA, these two forms of emotion work are related to the maintenance of an active, rather than passive, stance towards violence as a political tactic. 'Rauri' suppresses the grief or sadness at his circumstances because it would 'finish' him but recognises that anger can put the 'fire in his belly' necessary to act.

'Kevin' shows how empathy can both be evoked and suppressed in order to reinforce a commitment to violence. While empathy would seem to be an emotion more likely to dissuade someone from undertaking violence, the selective use of empathy means it can also be drawn upon to support and strengthen a commitment to violence,

I remember, um, well there was this factory not far from here, Mackie's it was, and most of the people who worked there, the ones who got jobs, were Protestants, most from the Shankill actually. And so what happened is they all used to walk through our area and when there was tensions and troubles, when it was getting bad, I felt really sorry for the Catholic families that lived near Mackie's 'coz when the afternoon shift was over they would just harass 'em and so they'd be living in absolute fear and I felt really sorry for 'em because that coulda been me or my family in their shoes. So I would go and help defend the area and then of course in August [1969] it all just exploded and the rioting began and Bombay Street was burned [...] Whenever I had a moment of doubt, like sometimes in prison when you think 'what am I doing here' I remembered Mackie's and those workers who was harassing innocent families just going about their business and I feel it just as strong as I did when I was there. When I thought like that I knew that if I got out of prison I would do exactly the same again, with just as much commitment to the 'RA as I always had ('Kevin', PIRA).

When questioned about whether he felt empathy for the targets of his violence Kevin responded with,

Aye, I'm not a monster am I? I look back now and I feel sorry for the families of people who were killed or injured during that time. Of course I do. But the circumstances we were in were unique, and ya can't get away from that. All those people from Mackie's were working, they had jobs, and not by coincidence they were largely all Protestants. What you have to realise is that we didn't have jobs. All our loyalty was to our own community and, to be honest with ya, I would not have even stopped to think too much about them [Protestant victims] or even their families. If they were targeted then there was a reason for that. You have to keep those reasons, those commitments to the greater good, foremost in your mind. If you lose that ya can't do what you have to do ('Kevin', PIRA).

For 'Kevin, being able to 'do what you have to do' means that empathy is reserved for those to whom you are loyal. Believing that those who were targeted would have been done so for 'good

reason', or ruminating on the unfairness of discriminatory work place policies or the gloating of the workers, helps him avoid extending empathy to those who are killed or injured in the pursuit of his just cause. 'Eamon', on the other hand, expresses how he evoked past frustrations and anger in order to bolster his commitment to violence as a political tactic,

I mean ya could try and try and try and nothing would change, like banging ya head against a wall you know. And eventually ya just get frustrated with it and either ya give up and let 'em win or you commit to doing something. I'm more the type that does something. I hate that feeling of frustration at nothing changing [...]. And, I guess, once you've had that feeling it sits there just below the surface and just the smallest thing can make it bubble up and over. I think I channeled that frustration and I think you were encouraged to channel all your frustration and anger into the goal of getting the Brits out ('Eamon', PIRA).

When asked what sort of things helped to channel his frustration and anger into this goal he responded with,

Learning the real history of Ireland, the occupation and the way that we was turned into foreigners in our own land, learning about the real Irish history of rebellion and the constant defiance of British occupation. It's about totally immersing yourself in our history and our culture and in the role of the RA, the historic role it played as a defender of the Irish people, participating in the classes and the training, performing your duties, being loyal to your comrades, doing what was asked of ya ('Eamon', PIRA).

What 'Eamon' is describing is how he adopts the 'feeling rules' in order to manage and direct his emotions in a way compatible with the goals of physical force Republicanism. The Republican ideology and the rituals of belonging to a clandestine organisation all help to ensure that his emotions are appropriate to the strategies and goals of the movement.

'Emotion work' was also evident in relation to the need to refrain from expressing particular emotions if doing so threatened your own security or that of the group. 'Declan' described this process when he recalled how he changed after joining the PIRA,

I used to love going out and rioting, getting with some friends and throwing stones. It was a great way to let off steam and, to be honest with ya, I guess it was a bit of a romanticism, seeing yourself doing battle with the Brits, like Samson and Goliath. But when I joined the Army it was made quite clear to me that my job was to become invisible, to not draw attention to myself. You were told not to participate in riots or demonstrations because it might bring you to the attention of the enemy and put, not just yourself in danger, but other volunteers as well ('Declan', PIRA).

When asked if he noticed a change in his emotions when he joined the PIRA, the following exchange took place,

‘Declan’ Well, it’s a bit like growing up and having to take more responsibility in life. You’ve gotta be prepared to change and part of that is learning to control yourself and think bigger, you know? Scoring a small win against the Brits by resisting can be put aside when you know it’s in the best interest of your bigger goal - to stay under the radar, not bring attention to yourself so you can play your part in the bigger strategy. So I think, remembering back, that I learnt a bit about how to control how I felt, not just publically but with my family and friends, even my girlfriend because ya couldn’t be showing your anger or contempt. Well, you know, not more than the average person did anyway.

Debra So how do you do that? I mean, how do you control how you feel?

‘Declan’ Umm, well, I think it comes naturally when you understand the seriousness of what you’re committing to. I mean, it changes you. I remember when I joined that a lot of emphasis was put on how you’ve gotta change and take it seriously and, umm, well for me I think I got rid of a lot of the frustration I had before joining. I think when you’re involved in training and activities and meetings and all that comes with joining, and you have a much smaller, almost isolated group of people who know what you’re really doing and, um, well as I was telling you earlier, there was a fair bit of excitement in that life, and um, this might sound strange but for all the difficulties that come with joining the ‘RA, I think I was happier.

Debra Happier? Why was that do you think?

‘Declan’ Ah, well. Maybe happier is not the right word. Maybe content would be more accurate, calmer, you know? I think it’s the structure, the belonging and the sense of playing a part in something that was going to change things, and I mean we did, we paid a big price, but we did change things and from the moment I joined I think I had the sense of that, ya role in history, that was what it was all about, that I had a part to play in changing things and, I mean, for me it was a responsibility, to do my bit, and so, getting back to the emotions and stuff, I think that I kinda changed how I felt, that I wasn’t so resentful, I mean I was resentful about the situation here, but it wasn’t so on the surface, there was a mix of other things.

Debra Like what ‘Declan’, can you explain to me more about those other feelings?

‘Declan’ Well, I was loyal to the Army for one, I still am. You are responsible for others beside yourself. For me, that came first and putting that above everything else made everything else easier. And, I guess, well, I didn’t really think or reflect too much on how I felt about things, that wasn’t the kind of person I was, but when you join you are told a bit about how you

will feel if certain things happen and so you become a bit more aware of how you feel.

Debra Can you explain that, about how you are taught a bit about how you might feel?

‘Declan’ Like if you get arrested and interrogated, about feeling scared or disappointed in yourself, that its natural or normal, and about how you can’t let that get on top of ya ‘cos it’ll be used against you.

Debra So is it fair to say that having a sense of your emotions, of how they work or affect you, is an important part of your training?

‘Declan’ Well, I don’t wanna overstate it - you know it’s not like we were all around in some kind of group therapy or something (laughter). But, as I said earlier, I think it’s part of that process of growing up and when you join the ‘RA that’s accelerated I think, because of the responsibility you have to others beyond yourself (‘Declan’, PIRA).

‘Declan’ makes a good point about not ‘over-stating’ the degree to which emotion management is a conscious and deliberate act. Nevertheless, it is apparent that, at times, emotions are suppressed or evoked in ways that enable an individual to strengthen their commitment to a violent political agenda. Empathy towards the enemy must be avoided or reduced while empathy for the community on whose behalf you perceive yourself to be fighting may be inflated. Similarly, hatred towards the people or symbols of your perceived oppression can be inflamed while any anger or dissent within one’s own community can be downplayed or ignored. In short, affective solidarities and schisms can become activated and intensified though focusing on particular stories or events and downplaying others, by participating in certain activities and rituals and avoiding others, or by identifying with some people and refusing to do so with others.

CONCLUSION

The idea that there is a relationship between emotion and the motivation to act is well entrenched and non-controversial. Fear of a person may motivate you to move away from them, love may motivate you to embrace them, or anger may motivate you to strike them. This does not mean that these actions are automatic or inevitable, rather that these emotions may incline you to behave in a particular way over another. The decision to act one way or another will also be influenced by the

social context. A person may stand their ground when faced with a frightening opponent if they also feel concern and the desire to protect another person, or fear of being seen as 'soft' or emasculated by running away. Similarly, love may not lead to an embrace in social circumstance where physically expressing love is frowned upon or dangerous, or if a person is unsure as to the response it will receive from the object of their affection. Similarly, most of us do not strike out at people we are angry with because of entrenched social norms against doing so. Nevertheless, emotions signal a desire to change the existing dynamics of relationships and therefore motivate action directed at doing so.

This chapter has demonstrated the importance of understanding violent political action as the outcome of both emotional inclinations to act a particular way, and a moral and social context in which doing so is acceptable. The violent actions of PIRA members are an outcome of how they interpret and understand their particular social and political context, as well as their strong emotional responses to it. Their own particular perspective has been defined by a strong moral imperative to defend and protect Catholic enclaves that are viewed as under siege and threatened by a long history of British occupation defined by social discrimination and political inequities. This position has been developed and reinforced by a long and complicated history of emotional responses and judgment that in turn influences what political tactics, including the use of violence, are seen as legitimate moral actions.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION: EMOTIONS MATTER

Emotions are a part of human life, and therefore they matter. It is difficult to conceive of any social interaction in which some level of emotion is not a component. It is near impossible to imagine this in the case of conflict, including violent political extremism. Since the establishment of organised research into violent political extremism, emotion has posed some persistent problems. Are violent political extremists overwhelmed by their emotions or completely devoid of them? What connects an individual to particular violent collectives and disconnects them completely from other non-violent ones? Are terrorist ideologies simply expressions of overwhelming hate, as President George W. Bush mused, or are they a form of nihilism? Within this context Terrorism Studies has tended to flounder.

Violent political action is ultimately a strategy but the goals of that strategy cannot always be understood in terms of a list of political, economic, cultural or social demands. These demands grow out desires that have more obvious emotional components. The desire for justice, equality, security, autonomy, and meaning underpins many other demands, even if the form they take is irreconcilable with our own particular understandings of these concepts. Similarly, the moral drives that accompany political motives rest on an emotional component. While the moral framework of violent political extremists may seem a mystery within the targeted community, it may be largely understandable, even if the ensuing action is not condoned, within the communities from which the violent political actor emerges. While Terrorism Studies has engaged extensively in examinations of terrorist goals and strategies, the structure of terrorist cells, their financing, training and recruitment methods, use of technology and weaponry, along with quantifying membership, deaths and injuries, since the discrediting of psycho-abnormality theories of terrorism it has done so in a relatively 'emotion free' zone.

A central argument of this dissertation has been that emotions play an important role in shaping both the context and the individual mindset in which violence against the state and its citizens can be viewed as a legitimate political tactic. It therefore follows that emotions should be given serious attention in the study of violent extremism and how to counter it. It is also a

contention of this dissertation that the study of emotion must extend beyond the study of the individual to include the study of emotional environments and shared beliefs and knowledge that are more likely to encourage (or discourage) acts of violent political extremism. This is not to argue that emotions should be more prominent than other areas of study, but rather that they should not be invisible or dealt with in a cursory fashion that treats them as individually situated deviations from normality.

This dissertation has taken steps towards addressing the troubled space that emotions occupy within the study of violent political extremism. It is primarily an exploratory work aimed at developing an understanding of how emotions operate within different realms of the life of a person who has committed an act of violent political extremism. It is exploratory because there is no body of literature within Terrorism Studies that systematically examines this particular topic. It is also unique because of its empirical grounding. This research has taken place within a field that is woefully short of research based on interviews with their subjects of inquiry. To date there has been no project that has undertaken fieldwork interviews for the direct purpose of examining the role of emotion as a 'normal' rather than 'pathological' influence that has contributed to the mindset of a person who chooses to commit an act of political violence on behalf of an ideological cause. As such, it begins a much needed discussion into the topic. By undertaking an empirical research project that places the relationship between emotions and violent political extremism as central to inquiry this dissertation makes a unique and original contribution to the body of knowledge available about the processes of radicalisation and the circumstances in which this can result in violence. It offers up new insights into the role emotions have in guiding a person to feel more connected with and loyal to a violent political group than to broader society, into how beliefs develop that make a violent political ideology seem more legitimate and credible than a non-violent one, and into the role of emotion in developing a moral framework that legitimates violence as a political tactic. It therefore has theoretical implications for those who seek to study violent political extremism and practical implications for those who seek to combat it.

This dissertation began by providing an overview of the way Terrorism Studies has tended to treat emotions within research. It illuminated and clarified some of the unacknowledged assumptions about emotions implicit in much of the literature on violent political extremism. It revealed the often unconscious assumption that emotions are abnormal deviations from rationality and therefore explain either everything or nothing about why a person engages in political violence. Following from this, it further demonstrated that process theories of terrorism have to date offered

the most space for consideration of the role of emotion. Yet within this approach emotions are viewed solely as the internal by-products of different social and political experiences, and therefore tend to be treated as individual reactions, obscuring how they are also an important component of understanding, constructing, and interpreting the world. As such, this dissertation began by advocating a move away from process theories of violent political extremism towards ways in which the decisions that lead to engagement in a terrorist group are seen as less linear and procedural, and more ‘messy’, overlapping, and saturated with complications emanating from a variety of experiences and beliefs, all imbued with an emotional component.

In response to the lack of a theoretical framework that demonstrates the significance of emotions to the study of violent political extremism, this dissertation established some characteristics of emotions and used examples from interviews to demonstrate their relevance to violent political extremism. Doing so provides a way for both scholars of terrorism and counter-terrorism practitioners to understand how deeply emotions are embedded in the many evaluations and judgments a person makes about their circumstances, how emotions have both cognitive and physiological dimensions that impact on these evaluations and judgments, how emotions can be misleading while simultaneously providing a strong sense of credibility and legitimacy, how they can operate at not only individual but at group, community and society levels, and how they can mobilise action.

If we are to be able to talk about and research the role of emotion within violent political extremism it is necessary to begin the process of developing a framework and vocabulary in which to do so. This dissertation has demonstrated one way of doing this. This is not to suggest this is the only way to talk about emotions in violent political extremism, but it does at least demonstrate that it is possible to do so without falling into dogmatic traps that obscure either the intricacy and nuances of the relationship between emotions and violent political extremism, or how they operate both within and beyond the individual. As such, it offers up a space in which emotions can be examined along with a variety of other factors that influence a person to engage in political violence. It also offers a way for including emotions within existing areas of Terrorism Studies that have not as yet included an ‘emotional analysis’ within their areas of concern. In particular, providing a framework for talking about the relationship between emotion and sub-state political violence is useful for those seeking to deepen our understanding of the social connections and disconnections amongst violent political extremists, the role ideology may play in influencing a person to engage in violence against the state, why some people become involved in violent political extremism while

others in the same social and political circumstances do not, how a person may disengage from political violence, or how to better build resilience against violent political extremism within communities. At the very least it makes a case for the importance of considering emotions systematically alongside other factors that are examined as integral to acting on a violent political agenda.

The actions violent political extremists take can only ever make sense if looked at from their particular perspective and not from the perspective of those who are targeted. Demystifying their actions through a search for understanding is not the same as sanctioning violent acts. On the contrary, it is only through understanding the many individual and communal thoughts, feelings and beliefs that lead to the adoption of violence that effective strategies to reduce it can be further developed and refined. This thesis argued for scholars of terrorism to put aside concerns over being dismissed as ‘sympathetic to terrorists’ and instead actively view their subjects of inquiry as defined by more than just their violent acts. It went as far as to suggest that it is permissible to empathise with the people who are the object of inquiry while still remaining opposed to their choice of tactic. Retaining objectivity is an active process of recognising and evaluating one’s own reactions, not a failure to have them at all. I do not condone the violent actions of the members of the PIRA I interviewed, but hearing their stories certainly gave pause for me to reflect on what I may have done in similar circumstances. Perhaps nothing, perhaps my political action may have taken another form, but certainly the gap between ‘them’ as perpetrators of violence, and ‘me’ as a relative pacifist seemed decidedly less wide. Rather than being shocking, I find this comforting because it means the bridge to be built between those who advocate for the use of violence and those who reject it is not as wide as one might imagine.

Social, as opposed to physical, distance is partly an emotional construct based on fear and mistrust. It reflects a failure of the state to generate the kinds of emotions that affirm the saliency of community bonds. It is always only a very small proportion of people from any estranged community that choose to pursue their political agenda using violence. Yet, those few exist within a larger group that accepts violent tactics and an even larger group that understands and has some empathy with the violent minority. This dissertation argues that these are the emotionally disenfranchised, the ones whose position in society almost guarantees that they will, to varying degrees, experience emotional responses that belie convention. However, because these emotional responses are communal rather than individual, this thesis argues that they validate and strengthen a dissident social position. Together they indicate an alternative social group, in part defined by

common emotional responses that mark its difference from the mainstream. They also become a source of alternate communal bonds that influence beliefs about one's social and political circumstances, including what should be done about them.

The challenge for those who have an interest in countering terrorism is in developing ways that seek to avoid completely severing the emotional bonds that dissident groups have with the broader community. This is not the same as expecting those who view themselves or their identity group as different or even opposed to the *status quo* to fall into line – to feel the same way as everyone else (as the idea of only providing counter-terrorism funding to groups that adopt 'British values' suggests²⁸). Rather, it means seeking out ways to keep enough emotional attachment to the state that attacking it becomes problematised. That may be through community policing where the aim is to build relationships of trust between representatives of the state and so-called 'suspect' or 'at-risk' communities. Or by drawing police from a diverse range of identity groups that understand and can empathise with many of the frustrations and concerns of the different groups in which they police. It may be in having a political system in which representation mirrors the makeup of society or in having grassroots organisations that provide pathways for political dissent and influence. Berezin (2002, pp. 48-49) argues that the secure state is also the empathetic state, the one in which the 'community of feeling' is extended widely to embrace as many as possible, and where citizenship produces feelings of belonging. Without this, the emotional strains between particular groups and broader society provide a source of nascent dissident understanding that acts as fertile dirt for the seeds of the violent extremist narrative.

Central to the arguments of this dissertation is that the power of the violent extremist narrative lies in its ability to tap into emotional strains and offer a shared sense of empathy. The alternative ideological account recognises and validates the emotional experiences that a person has that are not reflected in broader society while providing a narrative of blame that is projected onto systemic processes or entities. Rebellious groups tap into emotional strain and use it as the basis for developing subversive counter-emotions that alter a person's stance in relation to broader society. By doing this, loyalty to the laws and rules of the state can be replaced with distrust and contempt, anger can be re-appropriated as a legitimate expression of rights, shame can be countered through

²⁸ Section 6.60 of PREVENT ties the funding of counter-terrorism projects directly to the adoption of 'British Values' (GBHO, 2011, pp. 34-35), arguably denying funding to those groups with the credibility necessary for early intervention amongst those who may adopt violence as a political tactic while risking further straining emotional ties to the state.

the construction of pride and honour, and fear can be circumvented by promoting joy, hope, and new forms of loyalty (Flam, 2005).

So far, attempts to counter the narratives of violent political extremist groups have tended to focus on correcting facts and systemically addressing political arguments. But it is important to note that a commitment to a violent extremist group is more than just a decision based on careful analysis of objective fact. This thesis has demonstrated how decisions to join a violent group are also based on many 'subjective facts'. That is to say, the information that is viewed as credible or that resonates with the reader or listener, will be in part determined by what 'feels right' because it validates and gives meaning to emotional experiences. Engaging with the violent ideology is appealing to some because it helps to make sense of their emotions in a way that the dominant ideology fails to do. Furthermore, the repetition and reinterpretation of emotions through the violent ideological lens subsequently strengthens and brings further conviction to that ideology. The violent political ideology tells you not only is it appropriate to feel angry, contemptuous, hateful, despairing, fearful, or any other way that you feel, but that it is expected. Furthermore, these emotional reactions are evidence of your moral righteousness, of your superior understanding, and therefore of your obligation to act, just as the feelings of belonging, solidarity, hope, pride, courage or honour that arise within the group are evidence of being on the right path. Countering the violent extremist ideology must go beyond engaging with the arguments, to include recognising and engaging with the emotions that underpin them.

This is made more complex by the fact that globalisation dilutes the emotional power of narratives centering on the nation state and opens up alternative spaces for emotional attachments. In this sense, extremist networks such as al Qaeda or *Jemaah Islamiah* are competing in the emotional market place and are winning some of the market share. Focusing on the need to accept or commit to so-called 'western values' is unlikely to resonate amongst the groups that governments are trying to influence. Therefore, the focus of the counter-narrative needs to be based on providing alternatives to violence and on addressing some of the emotional needs such as for thrills and excitement, or honour and status, rather than simply political argument. Given that this dissertation has established that credibility is central to making sure a message is both heard and viewed as legitimate, it stands to reason that the most effective site for countering the violent political extremist message is amongst those who have credibility within estranged communities. Blurring the line between extremists or radicals and *violent* political extremists or radicals risks exacerbating

existing problems while ignoring a valuable site for intervening and preventing the crucial step a person takes towards committing a violent act.

The violent political act becomes legitimised, and at times is viewed as a moral imperative, when a moral framework has developed that constructs it as so. This dissertation has revealed that a moral framework that legitimises violence can emerge when emotions cultivate particular perceptions and rules surrounding what it is right or wrong, honourable or shameful, to do in particular circumstances. It has shown how these rules are operating subjectively, but are also influenced by moral contexts. Those viewed as extreme or radical are the most likely to be able to influence the moral context because they are viewed as more trustworthy and believable than those who are not. They provide a bridge between the accepted set of moral rules as expressed in the law, and the alternative set of moral rules that develops within a framework of subversive counter-emotions. As such, relationships with those whose views are considered extreme or radical need to be nurtured and strengthened rather than undermined. They are in the unique position to be able to counter the emotional logic that underpins many of the expressive and instrumental justifications for violence.

Emotions inevitably inform and underpin the many relationships, beliefs, and actions that lead to political activism, including violent political extremism. The degree to which we can willfully choose which emotions influence us is undetermined, but this is not the same as saying that our actions are determined by our emotions. It may be inevitable that feelings of hate, shame, anger, pride, fear, envy and so forth are a part of our social and political landscapes. If we want to influence the impact they have on actions, particularly the propensity to violent political action, it is necessary to further our understanding of how emotions influence the decisions to engage in such behaviour.

APPENDIX A: EXAMPLE OF CODING

Interview Extract

DS: Were you even shocked when you got that ■ years, or first that you got guilty and then, part of the way you talk is just like you were resigned.

BELPS09: I mean I suppose disappointed more than shocked, I had been hopeful, and my legal team had been hopeful, that I would have been acquitted but I wasn't. At that particular time the average sentence for involvement was 10 - 12 years.

DS: So why do you think...

BELPS09: Well another thing that happened in my case was, and you tend to think there was a conspiracy there somewhere, but when I was convicted the judge found me guilty, he then asked for a report from my record in prison and at that time we had been involved in protests and stuff like that so the prosecution said I was a very uncooperative prisoner who has been involved in protests and blah blah blah. The judge said that this just confirmed his previously held opinion that "you are a dedicated terrorist" and I got ■ years, and that was it. Then I ended up in the H block. And actually I spoke to a lawyer there a couple of months ago about my case, he said that that the stuff about protesting in prison was irrelevant and should never have been mentioned in the court at all, it had absolutely nothing to do with the court case.

DS: No nothing to do with the case at hand at all.

BELPS09: But I mean, we at that time very much had a sense of not even recognising, I mean at one time all our prisoners refused to recognise the courts, and would go on to say that "we refuse to recognise the jurisdiction of the court", you know, blah blah blah, and then we changed tactics to say that the people who may have had a chance of winning their cases could fight them, anybody caught red handed basically refused to recognise the courts while others with a chance would attempt to participate in the proceedings, and then there was a time when we decided to fight all cases where possible. Some people still decided to plead guilty because they were under pressure, you know, like in the situation I explained to you about Charlie. But, you know, we were resigned in so far as that was what we expected from the British, that was what we expected from the courts, we expected to be tortured when we went into Castlereagh and we expected to be brutalised when we went in the H blocks. I mean...

DS: How did that leave you feeling about the existing system?

BELPS09: Umm, I mean, I guess contempt maybe, I'm not sure whether that's the right word though. I keep going back to the word injustice, and I know that isn't a feeling as such, but it does include a whole lot of feelings all at once. I mean, of course it is easy to feel contempt towards

people who consistently cause injustices to not only you, but to your whole community. I mean if it was just to me of course I'd be angry, but when you realise it's systematic against your whole community, well that brings up more complicated feelings I think. The thing is, I think you feel as if you only have two choices. Either you accept the world around you or you don't. For me, I just felt as if I couldn't accept it. I just didn't feel at peace with the way things were, always having this sense that you are a second class citizen in your own country. And by that I mean, not just that I felt that way, but that we all felt that way. And even worse, was that somehow you were expected not to. It's hard to explain Debra, I mean when you ask about stuff that isn't just the obvious political stuff about representation or education or jobs. I find it difficult to explain what it actually feels like in terms of living with this sense of injustice churning away in ya guts day after day. Sometimes you can ignore it I guess, but if I really think about it I suspect that many of my decisions, many of the judgments I made were influenced by that everyday sense of injustice. That feeling of injustice if you like.

DS: And what things do you associate most with the feeling of injustice?

BELPS09: Obviously you feel angry and frustrated as well, maybe contempt for the way things are, and even sad and hopeless I guess. I mean systematic injustice doesn't inspire you to feel admiration or loyalty does it? That would just be bizarre! Injustice and all the feeling associated with it, that would have been the biggest motivation in everything that I have done, why I was involved in the Republican Movement and why I protested in prison. When you get involved in doing something then the feelings are more useful, they motivate you and you kind of go beyond them in a way, to something more positive and constructive, like bringing about change.

DS: So injustice, that was, umm, like a feeling for you?

BELPS09: The sense of injustice of what happened here was what motivated me. What happened in prison, the fact that we were in prison first of all, because we believed that we shouldn't be in prison. Secondly, we believed that we were political prisoners and we were being treated as criminals and that was an injustice. The further injustice was that we were being brutalised and ill-treated while we were in there. So all of those things together.

Social (Push)

Some people still decided to plead guilty because they were under pressure, you know, like in the situation I explained to you about Charlie. But, you know, we were resigned in so far as that was what we expected from the British, that was what we expected from the courts, we expected to be tortured when we went into Castlereagh and we expected to be brutalised when we went in the H blocks. **INJUSTICE / RESIGNATION / HOPELESSNESS / DISTRUST / CONTEMPT / FRUSTRATION/ FEAR**

Umm, I mean, I guess contempt maybe, I'm not sure whether that's the right word though. I keep going back to the word injustice, and I know that isn't a feeling as such, but it does include a whole lot of feelings all at once. I mean, of course it is easy to feel contempt towards people who consistently cause injustices to not only you, but to your whole community. I mean if it was just to me of course I'd be angry, but when you realise it's systematic against your whole community, well that brings up more complicated feelings I think. The thing is, I think you feel as if you only have two choices. Either you accept the world around you or you don't. For me, I just felt as if I couldn't accept it. I just didn't feel at peace with the way things were, always having this sense that you are a second class citizen in your own country. And by that I mean, not just that I felt that way, but that we all felt that way. And even worse, was that somehow you were expected not to. It's hard to explain Debra, I mean when you ask about stuff that isn't just the obvious political stuff about representation or education or jobs. I find it difficult to explain what it actually feels like in terms of living with this sense of injustice churning away in ya guts day after day. Sometimes you can ignore it I guess, but if I really think about it I suspect that many of my decisions, many of the judgments I made were influenced by that everyday sense of injustice. That feeling of injustice if you like.
CONTEMPT / INJUSTICE / FRUSTRATION / ANXIETY / ANGER / HOSTILITY / DISTRESS / RESENTFUL

Obviously you feel angry and frustrated as well, maybe contempt for the way things are, and even sad and hopeless I guess. I mean systematic injustice doesn't inspire you to feel admiration or loyalty does it? **ANGER / FRUSTRATION / CONTEMPT / HOSTILITY**

Social (Pull)

at that time we had been involved in protests and stuff like that so the prosecution said I was a very uncooperative prisoner who has been involved in protests and blah blah blah. **SOLIDARITY**

at one time all our prisoners refused to recognise the courts, and would go on to say that "we refuse to recognise the jurisdiction of the court" **SOLIDARITY / PRIDE / IRREVERENCE**

and then we changed tactics to say that the people who may have had a chance of winning their cases could fight them, anybody caught red handed basically refused to recognise the courts while others with a chance would attempt to participate in the proceedings, and then there was a time when we decided to fight all cases where possible. **EMPATHY / SYMPATHY / SOLIDARITY / LOYALTY**

we were resigned in so far as that was what we expected from the British, that was what we expected from the courts, we expected to be tortured when we went into Castlereagh and we expected to be brutalised when we went in the H blocks. I mean... **SOLIDARITY / INJUSTICE / EMPATHY / SYMPATHY / SHARED DISTRESS / SHARED RESENTFULNESS**

I mean if it was just to me of course I'd be angry, but when you realise it's systematic against your whole community, well that brings up more complicated feelings I think. The thing is, I think you feel as if you only have two choices. Either you accept the world around you or you don't. For me, I just felt as if I couldn't accept it. I just didn't feel at peace with the way things were, always having this sense that you are a second class citizen in your own country. And by that I mean, not just that I felt that way, but that we all felt that way. And even worse, was that somehow you were expected not to. It's hard to explain Debra, I mean when you ask about stuff that isn't just the obvious political stuff about representation or education or jobs. I find it difficult to explain what it actually feels like in terms of living with this sense of injustice churning away in ya guts day after day. Sometimes you can ignore it I guess, but if I really think about it I suspect that many of my decisions, many of the judgments I made were influenced by that everyday sense of injustice. That feeling of injustice if you like. **EMPATHY / SOLIDARITY / LOYALTY / SHARED AND ROUTINE FRUSTRATION / SHARED AND ROUTINE ANXIETY**

And by that I mean, not just that I felt that way, but that we all felt that way. **LOYALTY / SOLIDARITY / EMPATHY / PRIDE**

why I was involved in the Republican Movement and why I protested in prison. When you get involved in doing something then the feelings are more useful, they motivate you and you kind of go beyond them in a way, to something more positive and constructive, like bringing about change. **PRIDE / HOPE / VALUE / WORTH**

Beliefs / Ideology (Push)

I mean I suppose disappointed more than shocked, I had been hopeful, and my legal team had been hopeful, that I would have been acquitted but I wasn't. **DISAPPOINTMENT / DASHED HOPE**

you tend to think there was a conspiracy there somewhere, **TRUST/ CREDIBILITY**

we had been involved in protests and stuff like that so the prosecution said I was a very uncooperative prisoner **FRUSTRATION**

The judge said that this just confirmed his previously held opinion that “you are a dedicated terrorist” **CREDIBILITY /DISTRUST**

I spoke to a lawyer there a couple of months ago about my case, he said that that the stuff about protesting in prison was irrelevant and should never have been mentioned in the court
CONTEMPT / RIGHTEOUSNESS

I mean at one time all our prisoners refused to recognise the courts, and would go on to say that “we refuse to recognise the jurisdiction of the court” **CREDIBILITY/DISTRUST**

Sometimes you can ignore it I guess, but if I really think about it I suspect that many of my decisions, many of the judgments I made were influenced by that everyday sense of injustice. That feeling of injustice if you like. **CREDIBILITY / INJUSTICE**

Obviously you feel angry and frustrated as well, maybe contempt for the way things are, and even sad and hopeless I guess. I mean systematic injustice doesn't inspire you to feel admiration or loyalty does it? That would just be bizarre! **ANGER / FRUSTRATION/ CONTEMPT / SADNESS / HOPELESSNESS / CREDIBILITY / INCREDULITY / MISTRUST / DISLOYALTY/ DISGUST**

What happened in prison, the fact that we were in prison first of all, because we believed that we shouldn't be in prison. Secondly, we believed that we were political prisoners and we were being treated as criminals and that was an injustice. The further injustice was that we were being brutalised and ill-treated while we were in there. So all of those things together **CREDIBILITY / DISTRUST / CONTEMPT**

Beliefs / Ideology (Pull)

What happened in prison, the fact that we were in prison first of all, because we believed that we shouldn't be in prison. Secondly, we believed that we were political prisoners and we were being treated as criminals and that was an injustice. The further injustice was that we were being brutalised and ill-treated while we were in there. So all of those things together **SHARED BELIEFS EXPERIENCES / SOLIDARITY / RIGHTEOUSNESS / HONOUR / RECTITUDE**

Motivation (Push)

so the prosecution said I was a very uncooperative prisoner who has been involved in protests and blah blah blah. **FRUSTRATION / IRREVERENCE**

The thing is, I think you feel as if you only have two choices. Either you accept the world around you or you don't. **FRUSTRATION / ANXIETY / RESENTMENT**

For me, I just felt as if I couldn't accept it. I just didn't feel at peace with the way things were, always having this sense that you are a second class citizen in your own country. And by that I mean, not just that I felt that way, but that we all felt that way. **FRUSTRATION / DISCOMFORT / RESENTMENT / ANXIETY / HUMILIATION / SOLIDARITY / EMPATHY**

many of my decisions, many of the judgments I made were influenced by that everyday sense of injustice. That feeling of injustice if you like. **RESIGNATION / ANGER / DISILLUSIONMENT / HOSTILITY**

Injustice and all the feeling associated with it, that would have been the biggest motivation in everything that I have done, why I was involved in the Republican Movement and why I protested in prison. **RIGHTOUS ANGER / DISTRESS**

The sense of injustice of what happened here was what motivated me. What happened in prison, the fact that we were in prison first of all, because we believed that we shouldn't be in prison. Secondly, we believed that we were political prisoners and we were being treated as criminals and that was an injustice. The further injustice was that we were being brutalised and ill-treated while we were in there. So all of those things together. **RIGHTEOUS ANGER / RESENTMENT / DISTRESS**

Motivation (Pull)

Injustice and all the feeling associated with it, that would have been the biggest motivation in everything that I have done, why I was involved in the Republican Movement and why I protested in prison. **PRIDE / ALTRUISM / EMPATHY / SYMPATHY**

The sense of injustice of what happened here was what motivated me. What happened in prison, the fact that we were in prison first of all, because we believed that we shouldn't be in prison. Secondly, we believed that we were political prisoners and we were being treated as criminals and that was an injustice. The further injustice was that we were being brutalised and ill-treated while we were in there. So all of those things together. **PRIDE / ALTRUISM / EMPATHY / SYMPATHY / SOLIDARITY / LOYALTY**

REFERENCES

INTERVIEWS

- 'Aariz' (British Salafist). [Anonomous interview with author 12/11/2009].
- 'Cian' (PIRA). [Anonomous interview with author 9/12/2009].
- 'Ciarán' (PIRA). [Anonomous interview with author 27/11/2009].
- 'Coilm' (PIRA). [Anonomous interview with author 23/11/2009].
- 'Danny' (PIRA). [Anonomous interview with author 5/12/2009].
- 'Declan' (PIRA). [Anonomous interview with author 25/11/2009].
- 'Eamon' (PIRA). [Anonomous interview with athor 16/12/2009].
- 'Fareed' (British Salafist). [Anonomous interview with athor 11/12/2009].
- 'Frank' (PIRA). [Anonomous interview with author 30/11/2009].
- 'John' (Canadian Salafist). [Anonomous Interview conducted by Joe Ilardi].
- 'Keiran' (PIRA). [Anonomous interview with author 16/12/2009].
- 'Kevin' (PIRA). [Anonomous interview with author 9/12/2009].
- 'Khalid' (Jamaah Islamiyah). [Anonomous interview with author 11/8/2010].
- 'Liam' (PIRA). [Anonomous interview with author 24/11/2009].
- 'Máirtín' (PIRA). [Anonomous interview with author].
- 'Mick' (PIRA). [Anonomous interview with author 1/12/2009].
- 'Nahid' (Canadian Salafist). [Anonomous Interview conducted by Joe Ilardi].
- 'Nawar' (British Salafist). [Anonomous Interview with author 9/11/2009].
- 'Padraig' (PIRA). [Anonomous interview with author 8/12/2009].
- 'Ruari' (PIRA). [Anonomous interview with author 7/12/2009].
- 'Seán' (PIRA). [Anonomous interview with author 17/12/2009].
- 'Tadhg' (PIRA). [Anonomous interview with author 26/11/2009].
- 'Tariq' (Canadian Salafist). [Anonomous Interview conducted by Joe Ilardi].

BIBIOGRAPHY

- Abrahms, M. (2008). What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy. *International Security*, 32(4), 78-105.
- Achen, C., & Bartels, L. (2006). *It Feels Like We're Thinking: The Rationalizing Voter and Electoral Democracy*. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia.
- Adams, G. (1986). *The Politics of Irish Freedom*. Dingle, Co. Kerry: Brandon Books.
- Adorno, T. (1978). *Moralia Minima: Reflections from a Damaged Life*. London: NLB.
- Altheide, D. L. (2006). Terrorism and the Politics of Fear. *Critical Methodologies*, 6(4), 415-439.
- Anspach, R. R. (1979). From stigma to identity politics: Political activism among the physically disabled and former mental patients. *Social Science and Medicine*, 13(A), 765-773.
- Aristotle. (1991). *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civil Discourse*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ball, T., & Dagger, R. (2004). The Concept of Ideology. In T. Ball & R. Dagger (Eds.), *Ideals and Ideologies: A Reader* (5 ed., pp. 1-2): Pearson Longman.
- Bandura, A. (1973). *Aggression: A Social Learning Analysis*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Bandura, A. (1990). Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement. In W. Reich (Ed.), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies and States of Minds*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Barbalet, J. M. (1998). *Emotion, Social Theory, Social Structure: A Macrosociological Approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Barbalet, J. M. (2001). *Emotion, Social Theory and Social Structure: A Macrosociological Approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Barbalet, J. M. (2002). *Emotions and Sociology*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Barbalet, J. M. (2004). William James: Pragmatism, Social Psychology and Emotion. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 7(3), 337-353.
- Barbalet, J. M. (2006). Emotions in Politics: From the Ballot Box to Suicide Terrorism. In S. Clarke, P. Hoggett & S. Thompson (Eds.), *Emotions, Politics and Society*. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bartlett, J. (2013). Decoupling radicalisation and terrorism. Retrieved from <http://www.demos.co.uk/blog/decouplingradicalisationandterrorism>
- Bartlett, J., & Birdwell, J. (2010). From Suspects to Citizens: Preventing Violent Extremism in a Big Society. Retrieved from http://www.demos.co.uk/files/From_Suspects_to_Citizens_-_web.pdf?1279732377
- Bartlett, J., & Miller, C. (2011). The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 24(1), 1-21.
- Bauman, Z. (2000). *Liquid Modernity*. Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press.
- Bauman, Z. (2006). *Liquid Fear*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. (1995). The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation. *Psychological Bulletin*, 117(3), 497-529.
- Beatty, A. (2005). Emotions in the field: What are we talking about? *Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute*, 11(1), 17-37.
- Beck, U. (1992). *Risk Society, Towards a New Modernity*. London: Sage Publications.
- Bell, D. (1992). *Faces at the Bottom of the Well*. New York: Basic Books.
- Bendelow, G., & Williams, S. (Eds.). (1998). *Emotions in Social Life: Critical Themes and Contemporary Issues*. London: Routledge.
- Bennett, A. (1954). *The journals of Arnold Bennett*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Bensel, R. F. (2008). *Passion and Preferences: William Jennings Bryan and the 1896 Democratic National Convention*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Benski, T., & Langman, L. (2013). The effects of affects: The place of emotions in the mobilizations of 2011. *Current Sociology* 61(4), 525-540.
- Berezin, M. (2001). Emotions and Political Identity. In J. Goodwin, J. M. Jasper & F. Polletta (Eds.), *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements* (Vol. University of Chicago Press, pp. 83-98). Chicago, London.
- Berezin, M. (2002). Secure States: towards a political sociology of emotions. In J. M. Barbalet (Ed.), *Emotions and Sociology* (pp. 33-52). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing and The Sociological Review.
- Bergen, P., & Cruickshand, P. (2007). Iraq War Fuelling Global Jihad Retrieved February 27, 2007, from <http://www.peterbergen.com>
- Berger, J. M. (2013). Myths of Radicalization Retrieved from http://news.intelwire.com/2013/05/myths-of-radicalization.html?utm_source=feedly&m=1
- Bin Laden, O. (2001). Speech Released 26th December, 2001. In B. Lawrence (Ed.), *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden*. London and New York: Verso.
- Bjorgo, T. (2006). Introduction. In T. Bjorgo (Ed.), *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Blok, A. (2001). *Honour and Violence*. Cambridge: Polity Press. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bondi, L., Davidson, J., & Smith, M. (2007). Introduction: Geography's Emotional Turn. In L. Bondi, J. Davidson & M. Smith (Eds.), *Emotional Geographies* (pp. 1-16). Hampshire, England and Burlington USA: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
- Bordo, S. (1987). *The Flight to Objectivity: Essays on Cartesianism and Culture*. Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press.
- Borum, R. (2004). *Psychology of Terrorism*. Tampa: University of South Florida.
- Borum, R. (2011). Rethinking Radicalization. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 4(4), 1-5.
- Bosi, L., & della Porta, D. (2012). Micro-Mobilization into Armed Groups: The ideological, instrumental and solidaristic paths. *Qualitative Sociology*, 35(4), 361-383

- Bouhana, N., & Wikström, P.-O. H. (2008). *Theorizing Terrorism: Terrorism As Moral Action*. London: Jill Dando Institute, University College of London.
- Brannan, D., Esler, P., & Strindberg, N. (2001). Talking to "Terrorists": Towards an Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 24(1), 3-24.
- Breen Smyth, M. (2009). Subjectivities, 'suspect communities', governments, and the ethics of research on 'terrorism'. In R. Jackson, Breen Smyth, Marie, Gunning, Jeroen (Ed.), *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New research Agenda* (pp. 194-215). New York and Oxon: Routledge.
- Breen Smyth, M., Gunning, J., Jackson, R., Kassimeris, G., & Robinson, P. (2008a). Critical Terrorism Studies - an introduction. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 1(1), 1-4.
- Brighton, S. (2007). British Muslims, Multiculturalism, and UK Foreign Policy: Integration and Cohesion Beyond the State. *International Affairs*, 83(1), 1-17.
- Britt, L., & Heise, D. (2000). From shame to pride in identity politics. In S. Stryker, T. J. Owens & R. White (Eds.), *Self, Identity, and Social Movements* (pp. 252-268). Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press.
- Brun, G., & Kuenzle, D. (2008). A New Role for Emotions in Epistemology? In G. Brun, U. Doğuoğlu & D. Kuenzle (Eds.), *Epistemology and Emotions*. Hampshire and Burlington Ashgate Publishing.
- Burke, A. (2008). The End of Terrorism Studies. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 1(1), 37-49.
- Burke, J. (2004). Think Again: al Qaeda. *Foreign Policy*(142 May/June 2004), 18-26.
- Burnett, J., & Whyte, D. (2005). Embedded expertise and the terrorism. *Journal for Crime, Conflict and Media*, 1(1), 1-18.
- CAB/128/70/17. (30 April, 1981). *Conclusion of meeting held at 10 Downing Street*. The National Archives: Retrieved from <http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/SearchUI/Details?uri=C11920307>.
- Cadena-Roa, J. (2002). Strategic Framing, Emotions, and Superbarrio-Mexico City's Masked Crusader. *Mobilization: An International Journal*, 7(2), 201-216.
- Calhoun, C. (2001). Putting Emotions in Their Place. In J. Goodwin, J. M. Jasper & F. Polletta (Eds.), *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements* (pp. 45-57). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Cash, J. D. (1989). Ideology and Affect: The Case of Northern Ireland. *Political Psychology*, 10(4), 703-724.
- Castano, E., Leidner, B., & Slawuta, P. (2008). Social Identification processes, group dynamics and the behaviour of combatants. *International Review of the Red Cross*, 90(870), 259-271.
- Chowdhury Fink, N., & Barclay, J. (2013). *Mastering the Narrative: Counterterrorism Strategic Communication and the United Nations: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC)*.
- Clarke, S. (2003). Psychoanalytic Sociology and the Interpretation of Emotions. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 33(2), 145-162.
- Clarke, S., Hoggett, P., & Thompson, S. (2006). The Study of Emotion: An Introduction. In S. Clarke, P. Hoggett & S. Thompson (Eds.), *Emotion, Politics and Society* (pp. 3-13). Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Clore, G., L., & Gasper, K. (2000). Some affective influences of belief. In N. Frijda, A. S. R. Manstead & S. Bem (Eds.), *Emotions and Beliefs: How Feeling Influence Thoughts* (pp. 10-44).
- Cohen, D., & Nisbett, R. E. (1994). Self-Protection and the Culture of Honor: Explaining Southern Violence. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 20(5), 551-567.
- Cohen, D., & Nisbett, R. E. (1997). Field Experiments Examining the Culture of Honor: The Role of Institutions in Perpetuation Norms About Violence. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 23(11), 1188-1199.
- Collins, R. (2008). *Violence: A Micro-sociological Theory*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Connolly, P., & Healy, J. (2004). *Children and the Conflict in Northern Ireland: The Experiences and Perspectives of 3-11 Year Olds*. Stormont, Belfast: OFMDFM Equality Directorate.
- Connor, J. (2007). *The Sociology of Loyalty*. New York: Springer.
- Cook, D., & Alison, O. (2007). *Understanding and Addressing Suicide Attacks*. London: Praeger Security International.
- Cooley, C. H. (1964 [1922]). *Human Nature and the Social Order*. New York: Schocken Books.

- Cooper, H. H. A. (1977). What is a terrorist: A psychology perspective. *Legal Medical Quarterly*, 1, 16-32.
- Cooper, H. H. A. (1978). Psychopath as terrorist: A psychological perspective. *Legal Medical Quarterly*, 2, 253-262.
- Cottee, S., & Hayward, K. (2011). Terrorist (E)motives: The Existential Attractions of Terrorism. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 34(12), 963-986.
- Crawford, N. (2000). The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships. *International Security*, 24(4), 116-156.
- Crenshaw, M. (1986). The Psychology of Political Terrorism. In M. G. Hermann (Ed.), *Political Psychology: Contemporary Problems and Issues*. London: Josey-Bass.
- Crenshaw, M. (1988). The Subjective Reality of the Terrorist: Ideological and Psychological Factors in Terrorism. In R. Slater & M. Stohl (Eds.), *Current Perspectives in International Terrorism*. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan.
- Crenshaw, M. (2000). The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century. *Political Psychology*, 21(2), 405-420.
- Cropanzano, R., Stein, J. H., & Nadisic, T. (2011). *Social Justice and the Experience of Emotions*. New York and Sussex: Routledge.
- Damasio, A. R. (2000). *The Feeling of What Happens: body, emotion and the making of consciousness*. London: Vintage.
- Damasio, A. R. (2006). *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain*. London: Vintage.
- Davies, A. (1980). *Skills, Outlooks and Passions: a psychoanalytic contribution to the study of politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Davies, C. A. (2008). *Reflexive Ethnography: A guide to Researching Selves and Others*. Oxon and New York: Routledge.
- De Haan, W., & Vos, J. (2003). A crying shame: The over-rationalized conception of man in the rational choice perspective. *Theoretical Criminology*, 7(1), 29-54.
- De Sousa, R. (1980). Self-Deceptive Emotions. In A. Rorty (Ed.), *Explaining Emotion*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- De Sousa, R. (1987). *The Rationality of Emotion*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- De Sousa, R. (2004). Emotions: What I Know, What I'd Like to Think I Know, and What I'd like to Think. In R. C. Solomon (Ed.), *Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotion* (pp. 61-75). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Deleuze, G. (2001). *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*. San Francisco, CA: City Lights Publishers.
- della Porta, D. (1995). *Social Movements, Political Violence and the State: a comparative analysis of Italy and Germany*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- della Porta, D. (2013). *Clandestine Political Violence*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Denzin, N., & Lincoln, Y. (Eds.). (2000). *Handbook of Qualitative Research* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Douglass, W. A., & Zulaika, J. (1990). On the interpretation of terrorist violence: ETA and the Basque political process. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 32, 238-257.
- Drake, C. J. M. (1998). The Role of Ideology in Terrorists' Target Selection. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 10(2), 53-85.
- Eagleton, T. (1991). *Ideology: an introduction*. London and New York: Verso.
- Elias, N. (1982). *The Civilizing Process* (Vol. 2). New York: Vintage.
- Ellis, C. (2009). *ReVision: Autoethnographic reflections on life and work*. Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press.
- Elster, J. (1999). *Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Elster, J. (2004). Emotion and Action. In R. C. Solomon (Ed.), *Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotion* (pp. 151-162). Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Falk, R. A. (2003). A Dual Reality: Terrorism Against the State and Terrorism by the State. In C. W. Kegley, Jr (Ed.), *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls* (pp. 53-59). Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.

- Fallows, J. (2012). An American Muslim on 'Muslim Rage'. *The Atlantic*. Retrieved from <http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/09/an-american-muslim-on-muslim-rage/262507/>
- Fanon, F. (1971). *The Wretched of the Earth*. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Limited.
- Fattah, K., & Fierke, K. (2009). A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of Humiliation and Political Violence in the Middle East. *European Journal of International Relations*, 25(1), 67-93.
- Ferracuti, F. (1983). *Psychiatric aspects of Italian left wing and right wing terrorists*. Paper presented at the 7th World Congress on Psychiatry, Vienna, Austria.
- Ferracuti, F., & Bruno, F. (1981). Psychiatric aspects of terrorism in Italy. In I. L. Barak-Glantz & C. R. Huff (Eds.), *The Mad, the Bad, and the Different: Essays in Honor of Simon Dinitz* (pp. 199-213). Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books.
- Field, J., Copp, M., & Kleinman, S. (2006). Symbolic Interactionism, Inequity, and Emotion. In J. E. Stets & J. H. Turner (Eds.), *Handbook of the Sociology of Emotion* (pp. 155-178). New York: Springer.
- Fielder, K., & Bless, H. (2000). The Formation of Beliefs at the Interface of Affect Cognitive Processes. In N. Frijda, A. S. R. Manstead & S. Bem (Eds.), *Emotions and Beliefs: How Feelings Influence Thoughts* (pp. 144-170). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Flam, H. (2005). Emotions' map: a research agenda. In H. Flam & D. King (Eds.), *Emotions and Social Movements* (pp. 19-40). New York: Routledge.
- Flax, J. (1983). Political Philosophy and the Patriarchal Unconscious: A Psychoanalytic Perspective on Epistemology and Metaphysics. In S. Harding & M. Hintikka (Eds.), *Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology and Philosophy of Science*. Dordrecht: Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
- Fortenbaugh, W. (1975). *Aristotle on Emotions*. London: Gerald Duckworth & Company Limited.
- Freedon, M. (2013). Editorial: emotions, ideology and politics. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 18(1), 1-10.
- Frijda, N. (1986). *The Emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Frijda, N. (1988). The Laws of Emotion. *American Psychologist*, 43(5), 349-358.
- Frijda, N. (1994). The Lex Talionis: On Vengeance. In S. H. M. Van Goozen, Van de Poll, N. E, and Sergeant, J. A, (Ed.), *Emotions: Essays on Emotion Theory* (pp. 263-289). Hillsdale, New Jersey and Hoe, UK: Lawrence Erlbaum Associated.
- Frijda, N., Manstead, A. S. R., & Bem, S. (2000). The influence of emotions on beliefs. In N. Frijda, A. S. R. Manstead & S. Bem (Eds.), *Emotions and Beliefs: How Feelings Influence Thoughts* (pp. 1-9). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Frijda, N., & Mesquita, B. (2000). Beliefs through Emotions. In N. Frijda, A. S. R. Manstead & S. Bem (Eds.), *Emotions and Beliefs: How Feelings Influence Thoughts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gamson, W. A. (1992). The Social Psychology of Collective Action. In A. D. Morris & C. McClurg Mueller (Eds.), *Frontiers of Social Movement Theory* (pp. 53-76). New York: Yale University Press.
- Garot, R. (2004). "You're Not a Stone": Emotional Sensitivity in a Bureaucratic Setting. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 33(6), 735-766.
- Gartenstein-Ross, D. (2013). Radicalization and Political Violence. Retrieved from <http://thewasat.wordpress.com/2013/05/08/radicalization-and-political-violence/>
- GBHO. (2011). *Prevent Strategy*. London: Great Britian Home Office.
- Gearty, C. (2003). Terrorism and morality. *European human rights law review*, 4, 377-383.
- Gerges, F. A. (2005). *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gerges, F. A. (2006). *Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy*. Orlando, FL: Harcourt.
- Giddens, A. (1991). *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gilbert, P. (1997). The evolution of social attractiveness and its role in shame, humiliation, guilt, and therapy. *Journal of Medical Psychology*, 70, 113-147.
- Giner-Sorolla, R. (2012). *Judging Passions: Moral Emotions in Persons and Groups*. London and New York: Psychology Press.
- Glaser, B. G. (1992). *Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis: Emergence vs. Forcing*. California: Sociology Press.

- Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (1967). *The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative research*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Goldie, P. (2002). *The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Goldie, P. (2004). Emotion, Feeling, and Knowledge of the World. In R. C. Solomon (Ed.), *Thinking about Feeling. Contemporary Philosophers of Emotion* (pp. 91-106). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Goodwin, J. (1997). The Libidinal Constitution of a High-Risk Social Movement: Affectual Ties and Solidarity in the Huk Rebellion, 1946 to 1954. *American Sociological Review* 62(1), 53-69.
- Goodwin, J., Jasper, J. M., & Polletta, F. (2000). The Return of the Repressed: The Fall and Rise of Emotions in Social Movement Theory. *Mobilization: An International Journal*, 5(1), 65-83.
- Goodwin, J., Jasper, J. M., & Polletta, F. (2001). Why Emotions Matter. In J. Goodwin, J. M. Jasper & F. Polletta (Eds.), *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Gould, D. (2005). The Shame of Gay Pride in Early Aids Activism. In V. Traub & D. Halperin (Eds.), *Gay Shame*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Gould, D. (2010). On Affect and Protest. In J. Staiger, A. Cvetkovich & A. Reynolds (Eds.), *Political Emotions* (pp. 18-44). New York and London: Routledge.
- Grodzins, M. (1956). *The loyal and the disloyal : social boundaries of patriotism and treason*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Groenendyk, E. (2011). Current Emotion Research in Political Science: How Emotions Help Democracy Overcome its Collective Action Problem. *Emotion Review*, 3(4), 455-463.
- Gross, D. (2006). *The Secret History of Emotion: From Aristotle's Rhetoric to Modern Brain Science*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Grossman, D. (1996). *On Killing*. Boston: Back Bay Books.
- Gubrium, J. F., & Holstein, J. A. (1997). *The New Language of Qualitative Method*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gunaratna, R. (2005). *Ideology in Terrorism an Counter-Terrorism: Lessons from combating Al Qaeda and Al Jemaah Al Islamiyah in Southeast Asia*. Swindon, UK: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom.
- Gunning, J. (2007). A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies? *Government and Opposition*, 42(3), 363-393.
- Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail. *Psychological Review*, 108(4), 814-834.
- Haidt, J. (2003). The Moral Emotions. In R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer & H. H. Goldsmith (Eds.), *Handbook of affective sciences* (pp. 852-870). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Haidt, J. (2012). *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Hassan, N. (2006). Suicide Terrorism. In L. Richardson (Ed.), *The Roots of Terrorism* (pp. 29-43). London and New York: Routledge.
- Heaney, S. (1991). *The Cure at Troy: A Version of Sophocles' Philoctetes* New York: The Noonday Press.
- Hearn, J. (1993). Emotive Subjects: organizational men, organizational masculinities and the (de)construction of "emotions". In S. Fineman (Ed.), *Emotion in Organizations*. London: Sage.
- Hegtvedt, K. A., & Markovsky, B. (1995). Justice and Injustice. In K. S. Cook, G. A. Fine & J. S. House (Eds.), *Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology* (pp. 257-280). Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.
- Hermann, T. (2001). The Impermeable Wall: The Study of Violent Conflicts by 'Insiders' and 'Outsiders'. In M. Smyth & G. Robinson (Eds.), *Researching in Divided Societies: Ethical and Methodological Issues* (pp. 77-91). New York and London: United Nations University Press/ Pluto Press.
- Heskin, K. (1984). The Psychology of Terrorism in Ireland. In Y. Alexander, O'Day, Alan (Ed.), *Terrorism in Ireland*. New York: St Martin's Press.
- Hirschman, A. (1970). *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Hobbes, T. (1991[1651]). *The Citizen: Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society Man and Citizen (De Homine and De Cive)*. Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1975). The sociology of feeling and emotion: Selected possibilities. In M. Millman & R. Moss Kanter (Eds.), *Another Voice*. Garden City NY: Anchor Books

- Hochschild, A. R. (1979). Emotion work, feeling rules, and social structure. *American Journal of Sociology*, 85, 551-575.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1983). *The Managed Heart: the commercialization of human feeling*. Berkley: University of California Press.
- Hoffman, B. (1992). Current research on terrorism and low-intensity conflict. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 15(1), 25-37.
- Hoffman, B. (1998). *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hoffman, B. (1999). The mind of the terrorist: Perspectives from Social Psychology. *Psychiatric Annals*, 29(6), 337-340.
- Hogg, M. A. (1992). *The social psychology of group cohesiveness: From attraction to social identity*. Hemel Hempstead, UK: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Hoggett, P. (2009). *Politics, Identity, and Emotion*. Boulder and London: Paradigm Publishers.
- Holmes, M. (2004). The Importance of being Angry: Anger in Political Life. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 7(2), 123-132.
- Horgan, J. (2003). The search for the terrorist personality. In A. Silke (Ed.), *Terrorist, victims, and society: Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequence* (pp. 3-27). London: John Wiley.
- Horgan, J. (2005a). *The Psychology of Terrorism*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Horgan, J. (2005b). The Social and Psychological Characteristics of Terrorism and Terrorists. . In T. Bjorgo (Ed.), *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities, and Ways Forward* (pp. 44-53). London and New York: Routledge.
- Horgan, J. (2009). *Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of disengagement from radical and extremist movements*. Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge.
- Horgan, J. (2012). Interviewing the terrorist: reflections on fieldwork and implications for psychological research. *Behavioral Sciences of terrorism and Political Aggression*, 4(3), 195-211.
- Horgan, J., & Boyle, M. J. (2008). A case against Critical Terrorism Studies. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 1(1), 51-64.
- Horkheimer, M. (1982). *Critical Theory: Selected Essays*. New York: Seabury Press.
- Houghton, D. (2006). Explaining the Origins of the Iran Hostage Crisis: A Cognitive Perspective. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 18(2), 258-279.
- Hume, D. (1969 [1739]). *A treatise of human nature*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Huntington, S. (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Ilardi, G. J. (2013). Interviews with Canadian Radicals. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 36(9), 713-738.
- Isen, A. M., & Patrick, R. (1983). The effect of positive feelings on risk taking: When the chips are down. *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance*, 31(2), 194-202.
- Isen, A. M., & Shalke, T. E. (1982). The effect of feeling state on evaluation of positive, neutral, and negative stimuli: When you "accentuate the positive," do you "eliminate the negative"? . *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 45(1), 58-63.
- Jaggar, A. M. (1989). Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology. *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*, 32(2), 151-176.
- Jasper, J. M. (1998). The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions in and around Social Movements. *Sociological Forum*, 13(3), 397-424.
- Jasper, J. M. (2006). Emotions and the Microfoundations of Politics. In S. Clarke, P. Hoggett & S. Thompson (Eds.), *Emotion, Politics and Society*. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Jasper, J. M. (2011). Emotions and Social Movements: Twenty Years of Theory and Research *Annual Review of Sociology*, 37, 285-303.
- Jasper, J. M. (2012). Choice Points, Emotional Batteries, and Other Ways to Find Strategic Agency at the Microlevel In G. M. Maney, J. Goodwin, R. Kutz-Flamenbaum & D. Rohlinger (Eds.), *Strategies for Social Change* (pp. 23-42). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Jenkins, B. (1974). *International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare*. Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation.

- Jenkins, P. (2003). *Images of terror: what we can and can't know about terrorism*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Jewkes, Y. (2011). Autoethnography and Emotion as Intellectual Resources : Doing Prison Research Differently. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 18(1), 63–75.
- Jost, J. T., & Amodio, D. M. (2012). Political ideology as motivated cognition: Behavioral and neuroscientific evidence. *Motivation and Emotion*, 36, 55-64.
- Juergensmeyer, M. (2001). *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press.
- Kalb, D., & Tak, H. (2008). The Dynamics of Trust and Mistrust in Poland: Floods, Emotions, Citizenship and the State. In M. Svasek (Ed.), *Postsocialism: Politics and Emotion in Central and Eastern Europe*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books.
- Kane, A. (2001). Finding Emotion in Social Movement Processes: Irish Land Movement Metaphors and Narratives. In J. Goodwin, J. M. Jasper & F. Polletta (Eds.), *Passionate Politics: Emotion and Social Movements* (pp. 251-266). Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
- Kapitan, T., & Schulte, E. (2002). The Rhetoric of Terrorism and its Consequences. *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, 30(1), 172-196.
- Katz, J. (1988). *Seductions of Crime Moral and Sensual Attractions in Doing evil*. New York: Basic Books.
- Kemper, T. (1978). Towards a sociology of emotions: some problems and some solutions. *The American Sociologist*, 13, 30-41.
- Kemper, T. (2001). A Structural Approach to Social Movement Emotions. In J. Goodwin, J. M. Jasper & F. Polletta (Eds.), *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Kennedy, R. (1999). Is one person's terrorist another's freedom fighter? Western and Islamic approaches to 'Just War' compared. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 11(1), 1-21.
- Kernberg, O. (2003). Sanctioned Social Violence: A Psychoanalytic View, Part II. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 84, 953-968.
- Kinnvall, C. (2004). Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security. *Political Psychology*, 25(5), 741-767.
- Klein, D. C. (1991). The humiliation dynamic: An overview. *The Journal of Primary Prevention*, 12(2), 93-122.
- Klusemann, S. (2012). Massacres as process: A micro-sociological theory of internal patterns of mass atrocities. *European Journal of Criminology*, 9(5), 468-480. doi: 10.1177/1477370812450825
- Knefel, J. (2013). Everything You've Been Told About Radicalization Is Wrong *Rolling Stones* Retrieved May 6th, 2013, from <http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/everything-youve-been-told-about-radicalization-is-wrong-20130506>
- Kroll, J., & Egan, E. (2004). Psychiatry, Moral Worry, and the Moral Emotions. *Journal of Psychiatric Practice*, 10(6), 352-360.
- Krueger, A. B., & Malečková, J. (2003). Education, Poverty and Terrorism. Is There a Causal Connection? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 17(4), 119-144.
- Kruglanski, A. W., Chen, X., Dechesne, M., Fishman, S., & Edward, O. (2009). Yes, No, and Maybe in the World of Terrorism Research: Reflections on the Commentaries *Political Psychology*, 30(3), 401-417.
- Lakoff, G. (2008). *The Political Brain: Why You Can't Understand 21st Century American Politics with an 18th Century Brain*. New York: Viking.
- Laqueur, W. (2001). Left, Right and Beyond: The Changing Face of Terror. In J. Hoge, Jr & G. Rose (Eds.), *How Dis This Happen? Terrorism and the New War*. Oxford: Public Affairs.
- Laqueur, W. (2003). *No end to war: Terrorism in the twenty-first century*. New York: Continuum.
- Lasch, C. (1979). *The Culture of Narcissism*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Lazarus, R. S. (1999). Hope: An Emotion and a Vital Coping Resource Against Despair. *Social Research*, 66(2), 653-678.
- Leach, C. W., & Tiedens, L. Z. (2004). A World of Emotion. In C. W. Leach & L. Z. Tiedens (Eds.), *The Social Life of Emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- LeBon, G. (1960 [1895]). *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*. New York: Viking Press.

- Lehrer, J. (2009). *The Decisive Moment: How the Brain Makes Up its Mind*. Melbourne: The Text Publishing House.
- Leith, K. F., & Baumeister, R. F. (1996). Why do bad moods increase self-defeating behaviour? Emotion, risk taking, and self regulation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 71(6), 1250-1267.
- Lerner, J., & Keltner, D. (2000). Beyond Valence: Toward a model of emotion-specific influences on judgement and choice. *Cognition and Emotion*, 14(4), 473-493.
- Lewis, B. (1990). The Roots of Muslim Rage. *The Atlantic Monthly*, 255.
- Lum, C., Kennedy, L. W., & Sherley, A. (2006). Are counter-terrorism strategies effective? The results of the Campbell Systematic Review on counter-terrorism evaluation research. *Journal of Experimental Criminology*, 2(4), 489-516.
- Lyman, P. (2004). The Domestication of Anger: The Use and Abuse of Anger in Politics. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 7(2), 133-147.
- Lyons, H., & Harbinson, H. (1986). A comparison of political and non-political murderers in Northern Ireland, 1974-1984. *Medicine, Science and the Law*, 26, 193-198.
- Lysaght, K. D. (2005). Catholics, Protestants and Office Workers from Town: The Experience and Negotiation of Fear in Northern Ireland. In K. Milton & M. Svasek (Eds.), *Mixed Emotions: Anthropological Studies of Feeling*. Oxford and New York: Berg.
- Maathuis, O., Rodenburg, J., & Sikkel, D. (2004). Credibility, Emotion or Reason? *Corporate Reputation Review*, 6(4), 333-345.
- Machiavelli, N. (1986 [1532]). *The Prince*. Middlesex: Penguin Books.
- Marcus, G. E., Neuman, R. W., & MacKuen, M. (2000). *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Massumi, B. (Ed.). (1993). *The Politics of Everyday Fear*. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.
- Matsumoto, D., Hysung, C. H., & Frank, M. (Writers). (2012). Emotions expressed in speeches by leaders of ideologically motivated groups predict aggression, *Behavioral Sciences of terrorism and Political Aggression*.
- Mazetti, M. (2006, September 24). Spy Agencies Say Iraq War Worsens Terrorism Threat, *The New York Times*.
- McCauley, C., & Moskaleiko, S. (2008). Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 20(3).
- Mercer, J. (2005). Rationality and Psychology in International Politics. *International Organizations*, 59(1), 77-106.
- Mercer, J. (2010). Emotional Beliefs. *International Organizations*, 64(1), 1-31.
- Miller, L. (2006). The Terrorist Mind: A Psychological and Political Analysis. *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology*, 50(2), 121-138.
- Moghaddam, F. (2005). The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration. *American Psychologist*, 60(2), 161-169.
- Moghaddam, F. (2006). *From the Terrorist's Point of View: What They Experience and Why They Come to Destroy* Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger Security International.
- Moisi, D. (2009). *The Geopolitics of emotion: How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope are Reshaping the World*. New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, Auckland: Doubleday.
- Moloney, E. (2002). *A Secret History of the IRA*. London: The Penguin Press.
- Mythen, G., & Walklate, S. (2006). Communicating the terrorist risk: Harnessing a culture of fear? *Crime Media Culture*, 2(2), 123-142.
- N.E.F. (2012). *The Happy Planet Index: a global index of sustainable well-being (Vol. 2012)*: New Economics Foundation.
- Nacos, B. (2005). The Portrayal of Female Terrorists in the Media: Similar Framing Patterns in the News Coverage of Women in Politics and in Terrorism. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 28(5), 435-451.
- Nahl, D. (2007). 'Introduction'. In D. Nahl (Ed.), *Information and Emotion: The Emergent Affective Paradigm in Information Behaviour Research and Theory*. New Jersey: Information Today Inc.

- Neuman, R. W., Marcus, G. E., Crigler, A. N., & MacKuen, M. (Eds.). (2007). *The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Neumann, P. (2009). *Old and New Terrorism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Neumann, P., & Kleinmann, S. (2013). How Rigorous Is Radicalization Research? *Democracy and Security*, 9(4), 360-382.
- Nielsen, R. (2012). *Jihadi Radicalization of Muslim Clerics*. Paper presented at the International Security Brown Bag Seminar, Belfer Center Library, Harvard University.
- NISRA. (2013). *Detailed Characteristics for Northern Ireland on Identity, Religion and Health*. Belfast: Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency Retrieved from http://www.nisra.gov.uk/Census/2011_results_detailed_characteristics.html.
- Nussbaum, M. C. (2001). *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pape, R. (2003). The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. *American Political Science Review*, 97(3), 343-361.
- Pape, R. (2005). *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. New York: Random House.
- Parkinson, B., Fischer, A. H., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2005). *Emotion in Social Relations*. New York, Hove: Psychology Press.
- Pearce, K. I. (1977). Police Negotiations. *Canadian Psychiatric Association Journal*, 22, 171-174.
- Peters, E. (2006). The Function of the Affects in the Construction of Preference. In S. Lichtenstein & P. Slovic (Eds.), *The Construction of Preference* (pp. 454-463). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pfister, H. R., & Böhm, G. (2008). The multiplicity of emotions: A framework of emotional functions in decision making. *Judgment and decision making*, 3(1), 5-17.
- Post, J. (1984). Notes on a Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behaviour. *Terrorism: An International Journal*, 7, 241-256.
- Post, J. (1987). It's Us Against Them: The Group Dynamics of Political Terrorism. *Terrorism* 10, 23-35.
- Post, J. (1990). Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product of Psychological Forces. In W. Reich (Ed.), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, States of Mind*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Post, J. (2005). The Socio-Cultural Underpinnings of Terrorist Psychology: When Hatred is Bred to the Bone. In T. Bjorgo (Ed.), *Root Causes of Terrorism*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Post, J. (2007). *The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from al Qaeda to the IRA*. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan.
- Pressman, D. E. (2009). *Risk assessment decisions for violent political extremism 2009-02*. Ottawa: Public Safety Canada Retrieved from <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/res/cor/rep/2009-02-rdv-eng.aspx>.
- Price Tangney, J., Stuewig, J., & Mashek, D. J. (2007). Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 58, 345-372.
- Raghunathan, R., & Tuan Pham, M. (1999). All negative moods are not equal: Motivational influences of anxiety and sadness on decision making. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 79(1), 56-77.
- Ranstorp, M. (Ed.). (2006). *Mapping Terrorism Research: state of the art, gaps and future directions*. London: Routledge.
- Rasch, W. (1979). Psychological Dimensions of Political Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany. *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry*, 2(1), 79-85.
- Rayner, G. (2013, 24 May, 2013). Killers paraded in the street, their hands red with blood, *The Age*, p. 17.
- Richardson, L. (2006a). The Roots of Terrorism: An Overview. In L. Richardson (Ed.), *The Roots of Terrorism* (pp. 1-13). New York and Oxon: Routledge.
- Richardson, L. (2006b). *What terrorists want: understanding the enemy, containing the threat*. New York: Random House.
- Robin, C. (2004). *Fear: The History of a Political Idea*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Robinson, D. T., Smith-Lovin, L., & Wisecup, A., K. (2006). Affect Control Theory. In J. E. Stets & J. H. Turner (Eds.), *Handbook of the Sociology of Emotion* (pp. 179-202). New York: Springer.

- Rose, R. (1971). *Governing without Consensus: an Irish Perspective*. London, Faber and Faber Ltd. : London, Faber and Faber Ltd. .
- Ross, J. (1993). Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism. *Journal of Peace Research*, 30(3), 317-329.
- Roy, O. (2004). *Globalised Islam: the search for a new Ummah*. London: Hurst.
- Ruane, J. M. (2008). *Essentials of Research Methods: A Guide to Social Science Research*. Malden, MA; Oxford and Carlton, Victoria: Blackwell Publishing.
- Ruby, C. (2002). Are Terrorist's Mentally Deranged? *Analysis of Social Issues and Public Policy*, 2(1), 15-26.
- Ruthven, M. (2004). *Fundamentalism: The Search for Meaning*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sageman, M. (2004). *Understanding Terror Networks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Sageman, M. (2008). *Leaderless Jihad: Terrorist Networks in the Twenty-First Century*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Salmela, M. (2005). What is Emotional Authenticity? *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 35(3), 209-230.
- Sands, B. (1981). Prison Diary. Retrieved from <http://www.bobbysandstrust.com/writings/prison-diary>
- Scheff, T. J. (1988). Shame and Conformity: the Deference-Emotion System. *American Sociological Review*, 53(3), 395-406.
- Scheff, T. J. (2000). *Bloody Revenge: Emotions, Nationalism and War*. Lincoln, NE: iUniverse.com Inc.
- Scheff, T. J. (2006). Hypermasculinity and Violence as a Social System Retrieved March 3, 2010, from <http://www.humiliationstudies.org/.../ScheffHypermasculinityandViolence.pdf>
- Schmid, A., & Jongman, A. (Eds.). (1988). *Political Terrorism*. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company.
- Schott, R. M. (1988). *Cognition and Eros: A Critique of the Kantian Paradigm*. Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon.
- Schwalbe, M. L., & Mason-Schrock, D. (1996). Identity work as group process. *Advances in Group Processes*, 13, 113-147.
- Schwartz, S. J., Dunkel, C. S., & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 32(6), 537-559.
- Sedgwick, M. (2010). The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22(4), 479-494.
- Shanahan, T. (2009). *The Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Morality of Terrorism*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Silke, A. (1998). Cheshire Cat Logic: The Recurring Theme of Terrorist Abnormality in Psychological Research. *Psychology, Crime and Law*, 4(1), 51-69.
- Silke, A. (2001). The devil you know: continuing problems with research in terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 13(4), 1-14.
- Silke, A. (2003). Becoming a terrorist. In A. Silke (Ed.), *Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequences*. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons Ltd.
- Silke, A. (2004a). An introduction to terrorism research. In A. Silke (Ed.), *Research on Terrorism: trends, achievements and failures* (pp. 186-213). London: Frank Cass.
- Silke, A. (2004b). The road less travelled: recent trends in terrorism research. In A. Silke (Ed.), *Research on Terrorism: trends, achievements and failures* (pp. 1-29). London: Frank Cass.
- Silke, A. (2004c). Courage in Dark Places: Reflections on Terrorist Psychology. *Social Research*, 71(1), 177-198.
- Silverman, D. (2005). *Doing Qualitative Research*. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore: Sage Publications.
- Simmel, G. (1950 [1908]). Faithfulness and Gratitude. In K. Wolff (Ed.), *The Sociology of Georg Simmel* (pp. 379-396). New York: The Free Press.
- Sluka, J. A. (2008). Terrorism and taboo: an anthropological perspective on political violence against civilians. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 1(2), 167-183.
- Smith, D. (Fieldnote Diary Entry 9/11/2009).

- Sokolon, M. K. (2006). *Political Emotions: Aristotle and the Symphony of Reason and Emotion*. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press.
- Solomon, R. C. (1976). *The Passions*. Garden City New York: Anchor Press, Doubleday.
- Solomon, R. C. (1993). *The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life*. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company Inc.
- Solomon, R. C. (2004). Emotions, Thoughts, and Feelings. Emotions as Engagements with the World. In R. C. Solomon (Ed.), *Thinking about Feeling. Contemporary Philosophers on Emotion* (pp. 76-88). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sparks, C. (2003). Liberalism, Terrorism and the Politics of Fear. *Politics*, 23(3), 200-206.
- Speckhard, A. (2005). Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and their Senders. In J. S. Purcell & J. D. Weintraub (Eds.), *Topics in Terrorism: Towards a Transatlantic Consensus on the Nature of the Threat* (Vol. 2, pp. 1-22). Washington: Atlantic Council.
- Sprinzak, E. (1991). The Process of Delegitimation: Towards a Linkage Theory of Political Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 3(1), 59-68.
- Sprinzak, E. (1991). The Process of Delegitimation: Towards a Linkage Theory of Political Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 3(1), 50-68.
- Stein, A. (2001). Revenge of the Shamed: The Christian Right's Emotional Culture War. In J. Goodwin, J. M. Jasper & F. Polletta (Eds.), *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Stein, H. F. (1975). Ethnicity, Identity, and Ideology. *School Reviews*, 83(2), 273-300.
- Stern, J. (2003). *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Summers Effler, E. (2010). *Laughing Saints and Righteous Heroes: emotional Rhythms in Social Movement Groups*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Svašek, M. (2005). Introduction: Emotions in Anthropology In K. Milton & M. Svašek (Eds.), *Mixed emotions: anthropological studies of feeling* (pp. 1-23). Oxford: Berg.
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986a). The social identity theory of intergroup behaviour. In S. Worchel & W. G. Austin (Eds.), *Psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 7-24). Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall.
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986b). An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict. In S. W. W. G. Austin (Ed.), *Psychology of intergroup relations* (2nd ed.). Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers.
- Taylor, M. (1988). *The Terrorist*. London: Brassey's.
- Taylor, M., & Horgan, J. (2006). A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of the Terrorist. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 18(4), 585-601.
- Taylor, V., & Whittier, N. (1995). Analytical approaches to social movement culture: The culture of the women's movement. In H. Johnston & B. Klandermans (Eds.), *Social Movements and Culture* (pp. 163-187). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Thagard, P. (2008). *Hot Thought: Mechanisms and Applications of Emotional Cognition*. Cambridge and London: The MIT Press.
- Thatcher, M. (1988). *Leader's Speech, Brighton, 1988*. Paper presented at the Conservative Party Conference, Brighton.
- Thomas, G.: May 5, 1981 Hansard (House of Commons) Retrieved from <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/sittings/1981/may/05>.
- Thucydides. (1982 [1866]). *The Peloponnesian War* (R. Crawley, Trans.). New York: Modern Library.
- Toros, H. (2008). Terrorists, scholars and ordinary people: confronting terrorism studies with field experiences. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 1(2), 279-292.
- Truman, J. S. (2003). *Communicating Terror: The Rhetorical Dimensions of Terrorism* California, London, New Delhi, Singapore: Sage Publications.
- Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). *Rediscovering the social group: A Self-Categorization Theory*. Oxford & New York: Blackwell.
- Turner, J. H. (2007). *Human Emotions: A Sociological Theory*. New York: Routledge.
- Victoroff, J. (2005). The Mind of a Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(1), 3-42.

- Vidino, L. (2011). The Buccinasco *Pentiti*: A Unique Case Study of Radicalization. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 23(3), 398-418.
- von Scheve, C., & von Luede, R. (2005). Emotion and Social Structures: Towards and Interdisciplinary Approach. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(1), 3-42.
- Weber, M. (1946 [1918]). Politics as Vocation. In H. H. Gerth & C. C. Wright Mills (Eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (pp. 77-128). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Weber, M. (1978 [1922]). The Definition of Sociology and Social Action. In G. Roth & C. Wittich (Eds.), *Economy and Society* (Vol. 1). Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Weber, M. (2003 [1904/5]). *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. New York: Dover Publications.
- White, R. (1993). *Provisional Irish Republicans*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- White, R., W. (2000). Issues in the study of political violence: understanding the motives of participants in small group political violence. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 12(1), 95-108.
- Wieviorka, M. (2004). The Making of Differences. *International Sociology*, 19(3), 281-297.
- Wikström, P.-O. H. (2010). Explaining Crime as Moral Actions. In S. Hitlin & S. Vaisey (Eds.), *Handbook of the Sociology of Morality* (pp. 211-239). New York, Heidelberg, London: Springer.
- Wikström, P.-O. H., & Bouhana, N. (2011). *Al Qa'ida-influenced radicalisation; A rapid evidence assessment guided by Situational Action Theory*. London: Department of Security and Crime Science, University College London Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/116724/occ97.pdf.
- Wikström, P.-O. H., Oberwittler, D., Treiber, K. H., & Hardie, B. (2012). *Breaking rules: The social and situational dynamics of young people's urban crime*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wikström, P.-O. H., & Treiber, K. H. (2009). Violence as Situational Action. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, 3(1), 75-96.
- Williams, R. (1977). *Marxism and Literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wright-Neville, D., & Smith, D. (2009). Political rage: terrorism and the politics of emotion. *Global Change, Peace and Security*, 21(1), 85-98.
- Zhu, J., & Thagard, P. (2002). Emotion and action. *Philosophical Psychology*, 15(1), 19-36.
- Zulaika, J., & Douglass, W. A. (2008). The terrorist subject: terrorism studies and the absent subjectivity. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 1(1), 27-36.