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COSMOPOLITANS AND PATRIOTS: AUSTRALIA'S CULTURAL DIVIDE AND ATTITUDES TO IMMIGRATION

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Opposition to immigration in Australia has continued to weaken. Causes include: a strong economy, restricted access to welfare for new immigrants, less rhetoric about multiculturalism, and general ignorance about the demographic consequences. However, a strong emphasis on border control probably helps. Reformers' protests about Australia's tough asylum-seekers policy have had little effect on attitudes to boatpeople, but may have increased public confidence in legal immigration. But the pattern of decreased concern about immigration is not uniform; people in the outer suburbs of Sydney and in regional New South Wales do not share it, nor do low-skilled workers. A curious finding is that people who vote green or belong to environmental groups are more in favour of immigration than others. This probably reflects in accentuated form the strong difference between members of the educated professional classes, with their cosmopolitan outlook, and people without university degrees and their more patriotic outlook.

INTRODUCTION

During the late 1970s and 1980s opposition to immigration in Australia grew. Commercial polls show that, by 1991, 73 per cent of respondents thought that the immigration intake was too large.¹ But by 1996 that opposition had begun to decline. At the same time the newly elected conservative Coalition Government, led by John Howard, made minor cuts to the intake. Though these cuts were vigorously criticised by immigration advocates they did not last long and, by 2000-01, the numbers were rising quite sharply. Despite this increase, in 2001 Australians were much less opposed to immigration than they had been before.² Commercial polls in 2001 and 2002 found that the proportion who thought the intake too large had fallen to 41 per cent. Similarly the survey conducted for the Australian Election Study (AES) series after the November 2001 election, found that just 34 per cent of voters thought the intake too large.³

Since the late 1990s asylum seekers, especially unauthorised boat arrivals, have been the focus of heated political debate, as has the policy of detaining illegal immigrants. In contrast, the question of regular immigration and the

population growth it fuels has dropped off the political agenda. The intake for permanent immigrants rose from 80,000 in 1999-2000 to 94,000 in 2000-01, while the program for 2005-06 now stands at around 148,000.⁴ Despite this dramatic rise there have been no commercial polls on immigration as a whole since 2002. (In April 2005, just before the 2005-06 program was announced, AC Nielsen asked voters if they favoured an increase of up to 20,000 skilled migrants over the next twelve months: 47 per cent supported this and 47 per cent opposed it.)⁵ But the most recent general survey data come from the 2004 AES, conducted just after the November 2004 election.

In 2002, I analysed opinion data on immigration both from commercial polls and the AES series and concluded that the decline in opposition immigration was probably due to a number of causes. The most important of these were the policy reforms introduced by the Howard Government. These restricted new migrants' access to welfare, refocused the program away from family reunion and towards skills, and cut back on rhetoric promoting multiculturalism. Changes in unemployment also played a role. It fell

from 8.1 per cent in March 1996 to 6.3 per cent in March 2001 (and in April 2005 was 5.1 per cent).⁶

But the data showed that, while many people had become less distressed by immigration, only a minority actively wanted population growth: 65 per cent wanted either to maintain or reduce the size of the population.⁷ However it was possible that most voters, and some politicians and opinion leaders, did not realise the demographic implications of the increase in immigration.⁸ With current total fertility rates (1.75), net migration of 90,000 per annum would add an extra six million people to the population by 2050,⁹ and net overseas migration has been well over 100,000 per annum since 1998.¹⁰ But these outcomes are not part of mainstream political debate and thus are not widely discussed in the media. Consequently they probably do not play much part in shaping public opinion. Indeed, as Freeman points out, accurate information on immigration and its demographic consequences is hard to uncover and there are opportunity costs in taking the time to discover it.¹¹

Since the mid 1970s it has been clear that questions to do with immigration and the cultural diversity it generates have been a key part of the shift in Australian politics away from its former emphasis on economic questions. In the past the left argued for state regulation of the economy and welfare spending while the right pushed for freer markets and lower taxes. Now cultural questions, often focused on the legitimacy of the nation state versus identity politics and internationalism, are salient, sometimes more salient than the old economic conflicts.¹²

The specific purpose of the article is to examine the 2004 AES data on voters and their attitudes to immigration, to see

how opinion has moved since 2001 and to discover who supports the current policy of immigration-fuelled population growth and who opposes it. It is not an attempt to map all of the new political terrain that the theme of a shift to cultural politics has thrown into relief, but rather to explore one part of that shift: attitudes to immigration. Immigration is, after all, a topic that sits uneasily within the old left/right framework but which throws the newer cultural divide into sharp relief.

THE TREND IN PUBLIC OPINION FROM 1990 TO 2004

Because they have been no recent commercial polls this article is restricted to data from the AES series. AES surveys of voters have been conducted after every Federal election from 1987 on, and after the 1999 referendum on the republic. Election candidates were also surveyed after each election, except 1998 (see appendix). The focus is on the most recent survey of voters¹³ conducted just after the last election on the 9 October 2004.

The first AES in 1987 did not have a general question on attitudes to immigration but every survey from 1990 on has included a question that takes the following format:

The statements below indicate some of the changes that have been happening in Australia over the years. For each one please say whether you think the change has gone too far, not gone far enough or is about right.

This preamble is followed by a list of changes (such as Aboriginal land rights and equal opportunities for women) and the respondent can choose one of five responses: gone much too far, gone too far, about right, not gone far enough, and not gone nearly far enough.¹⁴ For ease of interpretation these five categories have

been collapsed into three.

Table 1 shows that over the period 1990 to 2004, opposition to immigration in the AES series peaked in 1993¹⁵ and that, by 2001, it had dropped to a third. In 2004 it was just under 30 per cent.

Attitudes to immigration have been a marker of the cultural divide since the mid 1970s and the divide has especially affected the Labor Party. Labor Party strategists have to manage a split in the party's electoral base between socially conservative working-class voters and a smaller group of new-class professionals who tend to favour a cosmopolitan outlook on national and international affairs. But we now know that this difficulty is compounded by the fact that most Labor Party candidates in Federal elections are privately much more sympathetic to the values of the latter group than they or to those of most working-class people.¹⁶

Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the way in which the opinions of voters and candidates have changed on the immigration question between 1990 and 2001. They are restricted to voters who said that they gave their first preference in the House of Representatives to either the Labor Party or to one of the Coalition parties (the Liberal Party or the National Party), and to Candidates who stood for either the Labor Party or one of the Coalition parties.

Figures 1 and 2 show that voters have consistently been more likely to say that the number of migrants is too large than

are candidates and consistently less likely to say that it is too small. As far as party affiliation is concerned, they show only the distinction between the two main political groupings: Labor and the Coalition. Here we can see that the gap between Labor voters and Labor candidates on immigration is much wider than the gap between Coalition voters and Coalition Candidates. Indeed, in 2001, 23 per cent of Labor voters thought the number of migrants was too few compared to 83 per cent of Labor candidates. In 2004 the gap between Labor voters and candidates had narrowed a little, but was still very large.

Table 2 sets out attitudes to immigration by vote in 2004, in order to show the position of supporters of the minor parties. Its most interesting feature is the strong support for an increase in the intake shown by people who voted Greens.


Opposition to immigration-fuelled population growth among people who identify with environmental politics and, as Table 3 shows, with environmental organisations, is minuscule. (Members of Sustainable Population Australia are an exception to this trend.)¹⁷ One explanation for this retreat from national environmental sustainability is that organised environmentalists have now become more committed to what they see as international social justice rather than to the Australian environment. The conflict between preserving Australia's environment and honouring perceived commit-

Table 1: The number of migrants allowed into Australia has..., AES, 1990 to 2004, per

The number of migrants has:	1990	1993	1996	1998	1999	2001	2004
Gone too far and much too far	56.8	67.0	61.9	41.3	44.4	33.6	29.7
About right	33.2	23.5	29.8	43.5	41.4	44.7	46.9
Not gone far enough or nearly far enough	8.1	5.9	6.5	10.1	11.9	17.9	19.2
Missing	1.9	3.6	1.8	5	2.4	3.8	4.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total N	2037	3023	1797	1897	3431	2010	1769

Sources: see appendix.

Figure 1: Number of migrants has gone too far or much too far, 1990 to 2004, AES Candidates and voters, per cent



Source: Appendix. The 2004 data on Candidates' attitudes to immigration were provided to me by the Australian Social Science Data Archives prior to the full release of the file.

Note: There was no Candidates survey after the 1998 election. In 2001 no Labor candidate said the number of migrants had gone too far or much too far.

The question for Candidates in 2004 was different. It read: 'Do you think the number of migrants allowed into Australia should be increased or decreased?'

ments to asylum-seekers and economic immigrants has, for many environmentalists, been resolved in favour of the would-be immigrants.


The cosmopolitan, internationalist point of view has come to dominate organised environmental parties and groups.¹⁸ As Table 3 shows, people who are members of environmental groups are twice as likely to support an increase in immigration as are the sample as a whole, and 11 per cent less likely to say that the numbers are too high. One contributor to *Habitat*, the magazine of the Australian Conservation Foundation, puts it like this:

It is unfair for Australians ... to squander and overuse resources, while people in

developing nations suffer without even their basic needs. ... To reduce immigration from underdeveloped countries means to continue to keep those people in squalid, horrible conditions. The issue of the environment is global, and it is easier for us, in developed nations, to address the issue ...

... The more people who come here, to Australia, the better. With our ever increasing population, we will feel the pinch of environmental impact just that much stronger and get off our backsides and start living sustainably. ... [P]reventing those who sustain our over-consumption (for example, people in developing countries) from becoming our equals (by allowing them to live by our

Figure 2: Number of migrants has not gone far enough or nearly far enough, 1990 to 2004, AES Candidates and voters, per cent



Source and notes see Figure 1

laws) is ... unfair, or even more so — it's disrespectful, too, because we are using the idea of 'them' and 'us'. We are all in this together.¹⁹

Resistance to immigration-fuelled population growth is concentrated among people who say they would never consider joining such a group. The argument about population growth in Australia, such as it is, consists of environmental costs versus economic

gains for interest groups centred on the housing and development, together with rights for asylum seekers. But as Tables 2 and 3 show, most Greens voters and organised environmentalists do not support this environmental argument. Popular support for population control, whether it be for environmental or other reasons, lies elsewhere.

Table 4 shows attitudes to immigration in 2004 by the main occupational

Table 2: The number of migrants allowed into Australia has... , by vote in House of Representatives, AES 2004, per cent

The number of migrants has:	Liberal	National	Labor	Greens	Total
Gone too far and much too far	34.3	32.9	26.2	9.0	29.7
About right	50.3	57.5	42.6	45.1	46.9
Not gone far enough or nearly far enough	11.1	8.2	28.0	42.9	19.2
Missing	4.4	1.4	3.2	3.0	4.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total N	750	73	596	133	1769

Note: Sub totals exclude people who voted Australian Democrats (n=17), One Nation (n=11), Other

Table 3: The number of migrants allowed into Australia has... , by likelihood of joining an environmental movement, AES 2004, per cent

The number of migrants has:	I'm already a member	Not a member, but have considered joining	Not a member, and have not considered joining	Would never consider joining	Total
Gone too far and much too far	18.6	20.8	29.5	39.2	29.7
About right	38.9	45.0	52.4	43.1	46.9
Not gone far enough or nearly far enough	38.1	32.0	15.7	12.9	19.2
Missing	4.4	2.1	2.4	4.8	4.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total N	113	331	794	497	1769

Note: The question was: 'How likely are you to join any environmental groups or movements?' The response categories are those shown in this table.

Sub totals exclude 34 people who did not answer the question on joining an environmental movement.

groups. Occupation refers to the respondent's current occupation or former occupation for those who are unemployed or not in the labour force. (The occupations are grouped according to categories used by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.)²⁰

Table 4 shows that managers, administrators, professionals and associate professionals are less likely than the sample as a whole to believe that the intake is too large and (with the exception of the associate professionals) more likely to believe that it is not large

enough. This pro-immigration position is especially marked among people working in the social professions (teaching, media, the arts, social work, religion and related occupations). Blue-collar workers and people in elementary clerical, sales and service positions are, in contrast, more likely to think the intake too large and less likely to think it not large enough. This is especially true of people in lower-skilled occupations: intermediate production and transport; labouring; and elementary clerical work.

Table 4: The number of migrants allowed into Australia has... , by occupation, AES 2004, per cent

The number of migrants has:	Gone too far and much too far		Not gone far enough or nearly far enough		Missing	Total	Total N
	far	About right	enough	nearly far enough			
Managers and administrators	25.4	52.4	20.6	1.6	100.0	189	
Social professionals	14.8	48.8	35.2	1.2	100.0	162	
Other professionals	20.8	49.5	27.6	2.1	100.0	192	
Associate professionals	30.3	51.0	17.7	1.0	100.0	198	
Tradespersons & related workers	33.1	49.6	15.0	2.3	100.0	133	
Advanced & intermediate clerical, sales & service workers	31.2	47.8	18.2	2.9	100.0	314	
Intermediate production & transport workers	40.6	45.3	8.5	5.7	100.0	106	
Elementary clerical, sales & service workers	40.3	42.5	13.4	3.7	100.0	134	
Labourers & related workers	45.0	35.8	11.9	7.3	100.0	109	
Other, inad. described & missing	28.0	41.4	16.8	13.8	100.0	232	
Total	29.7	46.9	19.2	4.2	100.0	1769	

Table 5: The number of migrants allowed into Australia has... , by education, occupational group, and concern about unemployment, AES 2004, per cent

The number of migrants has:	University graduate	Non-graduate	Social professional	Low-skilled occupations*	Very worried about unemployment**
Gone too far and much too far	15.2	34.6	14.8	41.8	38.7
About right	46.8	47.6	48.8	41.3	37.9
Not gone far enough or nearly far enough	35.7	14.6	35.2	11.5	20.2
Missing	2.3	3.1	1.2	5.4	3.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total N	395	1245	162	349	253

Notes: * Low skilled occupations consist of intermediate production and transport, labouring, and elementary clerical work.

** The question was: 'How worried are you that in the next 12 months you or someone else in your household might be out of work and looking for a job for any reason?'

Many of the people in the first, pro-immigration grouping, are likely to be university graduates and Table 5 shows that support for immigration is indeed high among graduates (and much lower among non-graduates).

Table 5 also groups together the people who work in low-skilled occupation, and shows that they, together with those who are very worried about unemployment, are much more likely to be opposed to current levels of migration and much less likely to want an increase. Indeed people in low-skilled occupations are more than three times less likely to want an increase than graduates and people working in the social professions.

As far as low-skilled workers are concerned these findings suggest that opposition to immigration is concentrated among people less well placed to compete in a globalising job market, and thus suggest an economic explanation for attitudes to immigration. Though managers and administrators may also have an economic interest, in as much as high immigration promises more customers and lower wages for employers, Tables 4 and 5 do not provide any economic explanation for the support for larger intakes offered by social professionals and

graduates in general. Here it is more likely that other factors are influential, one of which may be a preference for cosmopolitanism over patriotic values.

Table 6 suggests that a strong attachment to Australia predisposes people to oppose immigration while a weaker attachment, together with a preference for internationalism, has the opposite effect.

If immigration enthusiasts and immigration sceptics can be differentiated by their values, can they also be differentiated by place of residence? Amongst the five mainland states opposition to immigration is highest in New South Wales (NSW) and lowest in Victoria, and even lower in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT). It also tends to be lower in inner-metropolitan areas. Table 7 shows this pattern in detail for NSW, Victoria and the ACT.

On some questions of cultural values it has become commonplace to talk of the south-eastern triangle of Australia, especially the Melbourne Sydney Canberra triangle. Table 7 shows that if we are discussing attitudes to immigration we should exclude Sydney, especially outer Sydney. Sydney has been the predominant destination for immigrants for some years. House prices and urban

congestion there have increased, and ethnic diversity has become concentrated

in a number of areas, especially in the Western suburbs. In March 2002 the NSW premier Bob Carr said that Australia's best prospects lay with 'a comparatively small but highly skilled workforce exporting environmental, education, health and other services while being a leader in bio and information technology'. He added that: 'Nobody who lives in the nation's biggest city thinks his or her quality of life is going to improve if immigration is ramped up markedly'.²¹ Perhaps the 20 per cent of inner Sydney residents who want an increase in immigration were not thinking of their own quality of life, but the data in Table 7 show that Carr was broadly correct; opposition to immigration is high in NSW, especially in outer Sydney and in regional areas.

CONCLUSION

Opposition to immigration in Australia has continued to weaken, and this pattern is consistent with the causes identified in 2002: a strong economy, restricted access to welfare for new immigrants, and less rhetoric about multiculturalism. However, a strong emphasis on selection and control have probably added to these factors.

In the latter half of 2001 the Government implemented vigorous border control policies in response to increasing number of undocumented asylum seekers, especially those arriving by boat. Well before the dramatic events of the *Tampa* and the Pacific solution²² commentators had observed that Australia has maintained an exceptional focus on immigration control.²³ While groups with vested interests in population

Table 6: The number of migrants allowed into Australia has... , by feelings about Australia and attitudes to migrant integration, AES 2004, per cent

The number of migrants has:	I'd rather be a citizen of Australia than of any other country...:		I am a citizen of the world as much as I am of Australia:			Migrants should try harder to be like other Australians:	
	Strongly agree	Other	Strongly agree and agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree and strongly disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly disagree
Gone too far and much too far	34.4	19.4	25.1	35.5	45.4	53.7	6.2
About right	48.0	45.5	47.5	51.8	37.6	34.0	25.8
Not gone far enough or nearly far enough	14.3	31.4	23.5	11.5	14.9	9.1	62.9
Missing	3.3	3.6	3.9	1.2	2.1	3.2	5.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total N	1210	525	1100	425	194	341	97

Notes: The questions asked were: 'How much do you agree with each of the following statements: ... I'd would rather be a citizen of Australia than of any other country in the world'; 'I regard myself as a citizen of the world as well as an Australian citizen'; and 'People who come to live in Australia should try harder to be like other Australians'. Respondents were offered five response categories ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. In the first instance most respondents strongly agreed, so the remainder have been grouped together under 'other'. In the second instance the respondents were more evenly spread across the five categories with a clear linear association between agreement with the statement and support for high migration. In the third instance the differences in attitudes to immigration were pronounced at the extremes of strongly agree and strongly disagree and close to the sample norm in the other three categories.

Table 7: The number of migrants allowed into Australia has... , by region, NSW, Victoria and the ACT, AES 2004, per cent

	Inner Sydney	Outer Sydney	Other NSW	Inner Melbourne	Outer Melbourne	Other Vic.	ACT	Total
Gone too far and much too far	33.3	37.5	42.8	13.1	26.0	22.8	14.3	29.7
About right	43.1	42.0	41.6	43.0	43.9	51.9	45.2	46.9
Not gone far enough or nearly far enough	19.5	13.4	13.8	41.1	22.5	18.5	40.5	19.2
Missing	4.0	7.1	1.9	2.8	7.5	6.8	0	4.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total N	174	112	269	107	173	162	42	1769

Note: Given the small numbers in the ACT it is not sensible to analyse them by region. But even though the overall numbers are small the difference between the percentage in the ACT saying, 'Gone too far and much too far', and that of the sample as whole is significant at the 0.05 level.

growth, as well as some international humanitarians, might prefer an open-door approach, the Governments that must manage public reactions know that the appearance of carefully managed selection and control are crucial. If the public is to believe that the primary focus of the immigration program is the national interest, rather than the interests of the migrants, the Government must be seen to be in control of selection.

In a curious fashion the tough response to boatpeople may also have contributed to more favourable attitudes towards immigration. Unlike the demographic consequences of immigration, allegations of racism and inhumane detention of asylum seekers have received saturation media coverage. While reformers agitating for a more open response may not have intended this, their efforts may have helped reassure voters that control is indeed being exercised. Reformers have made little headway in building greater acceptance of boatpeople. In November 2001, 61 per cent of voters thought that all boats carrying asylum seekers should be turned back. In November 2004, despite the virtual absence of boat people for the preceding three years, 53 per cent still held to this opinion.²⁴ But reformers' incessant emphasis on the harshness of the

asylum-seeker system underlines the theme of tough control and may have helped generate acceptance of legal immigration.

Economic interests also help explain part of the pattern of attitudes to immigration. Over time lower levels of unemployment have been associated with weaker opposition to new arrivals and, in 2004, people who were more worried about unemployment were more likely to oppose an increase than those who were more secure. But if economics were the full answer it would be clear that the left-wing position on immigration should be one of economic protection and the right-wing position should be that of open borders with the lower wages these would bring.

This does not happen. Opposition to immigration is higher among the supposedly right-wing parties (both voters and candidates) while a more open-borders approach is concentrated among the supposed left (the Labor Party). This pattern in itself is witness to the fact that, in an increasing number of instances, the terms *left* and *right* have become feeble analytical tools and that the left-right axis is now cross cut by another axis concerned with cultural values, particularly those that bear on the merits of the nation

state. Here we have cosmopolitan progressives at one pole and socially conservative patriots at the other.²⁵

There is a cluster of people at the cosmopolitan end of the cultural values axis, well educated and well resourced, who tend to support high migration while, at the opposite, traditional, patriotic end of this axis, there is a different group of people. Most people in this second group do not have university degrees or high skilled jobs. They feel a strong attachment to their country and are much more cautious in their approach to immigration. Some may indeed be moved by environmental values but, if they are, they are in a minority. The data from the 2004 AES suggest that experience of the negative effects of immigration in Sydney may be part of the explanation for their position but that attachment to

the nation and its people also underpin this state of mind.

The Howard Government has won many voters from the Labor Party by appealing to patriotic values while, at the same time, responding to pressure from business interests for a higher migrant intake. So far the electoral contradictions inherent in the Government's immigration policy have escaped the attention of most Coalition voters, and of most political commentators.

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The authors of the AES data files are not responsible for my interpretation of their data.

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All of the files were obtained from the Australian Social Science Data Archives (ASSDA) at the Australian National University: <http://assda.anu.edu.au>

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- ² See M. Goot, 'More "relaxed and comfortable": public opinion on immigration under Howard', *People and Place*, vol. 8, no. 3, 2000, pp. 46-60
- ³ See Betts, 2002, op. cit., p. 26. The AES series consists of large mailout questionnaires organised by scholars based at the Australian National University. See appendix.
- ⁴ Figures for general migration and humanitarian migration have been published separately since 1993. These data combine them. Sources: *Population Flows*, Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA), Canberra, March 2004, DIMIA's fact sheet 60 (Humanitarian migration) and Minister Vanstone's media release VPS 053/2005 dated 18/4/05 (both of the latter two accessed from www.immi.gov.au 20/4/05).
- ⁵ They also asked about attitudes to bringing in "guest" workers from overseas to address seasonal worker shortages ... in rural and regional areas such as fruit picking' and found that 49 per cent supported this idea. Sample 1415 voters interviewed by telephone. Some of the results were published in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, 16 March 2005. The data here were supplied by Euan Robertson, AC Nielsen, 19 April 2005.
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- ⁷ Betts, 2002, op. cit., p. 28
- ⁸ For data on ignorance of demography both among the general public and politicians see K. Betts, *The Great Divide: Immigration Politics in Australia*, Duffy and Snellgrove, Sydney, 1999, pp. 100-109, 213, 246, 318
- ⁹ Current ABS projections for 2002 to 2101 do not include current total fertility rates (1.755 in 2003) in their assumptions, nor do they publish a 'what if' series based on nil net migration that we could use for comparative purposes. (See *Projections of the Populations of Australia, States and Territories: 2002-2101*, Cat. no. 3222.0, ABS, Canberra, 2003). However the series published in 1998 is different. Here series I and G are based on a TFR of 1.75 and net overseas migration of either 90,000 per annum or nil respectively. In the former case Australia has a population of 26.4 million in 2051 and in the latter 19.5 million. See *Projections of the Populations of Australia, States and Territories: 1997-2051*, Cat. no. 3222.0, ABS, Canberra, 1998. Many demographers believe that fertility may fall below its current rate, but if current migration figures hold we will be well above net 90,000 p.a.
- ¹⁰ In calendar year 2003 net overseas migration was 123,400 (*Australia Demographic Statistics, June 2004*, Cat. no. 3101.0, ABS, Canberra December 2004).
- ¹¹ See G. Freeman, 'Modes of immigration politics in liberal democratic states', *International Migration Review*, vol. 29, no. 4, 1995, pp. 881-901.
- ¹² In 2002 Mark Latham claimed that 'Our economic values are converging while our social values are moving apart'. See 'It's the culture, stupid', *The Australian*, 2002, 12 February, p. 11.
- ¹³ The 2004 Candidates survey was not available at the time of writing. However Rachele Graham of the Australian Social Science Data Archives kindly provided data on Candidates' attitudes to immigration for Figures 1 and 2.
- ¹⁴ Since 1996 a second immigration question has been included: 'Do you think the number of immigrants allowed into Australia nowadays should be reduced or increased?' Because of the longer time series available I am using the question first introduced in 1990.
- ¹⁵ In the commercial polls there were two peaks: 73 per cent opposed in 1991 and 71 per cent opposed in September 1996. See Betts, 2002, op. cit., p. 25.
- ¹⁶ K. Betts, 'People and parliamentarians: the great divide', *People and Place*, vol. 12, no. 2, 2004, pp. 64-83
- ¹⁷ See Sustainable Population Australia at <www.population.org.au>.
- ¹⁸ See M. Krockenberger, 'Population? No problem', *Habitat* (Published by the Australian Conservation Foundation) vol. 33, no. 2, 2005, April, pp. 12-13. For an overview of responses to the question among the Democrats see J. Coulter, 'A biologist in the Senate', *People and Place*, vol. 4, no. 3, 1996, pp. 1-4 and, for a similar analysis of the Greens, see N. Sloan and W. Lines, 'Party of principle? The Greens and population policy', *People and Place*, vol. 11, no. 3, 2003, pp. 16-23. For recent conflict within the American Sierra Club on this question see Editorial, 'Climate of injustice', and A. Gosline, 'Where will they go when the sea rises?' *New Scientist*, vol. no. 2005, 7 May, pp. 5, 8-9. See also E. P. Kaufmann, *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 2004, p. 269. For an overview see K. Betts, 'Demographic and social research on the population and environment nexus in Australia: explaining the gap', *Population and Environment*, vol. 26, no. 2, 2004, pp. 157-172.
- ¹⁹ F. Gray, 'Letter: Population', *Habitat*, vol. 33, no. 2, 2005, April, p. 4
- ²⁰ See *Australian Standard of Classification of Occupations, Second Edition*, ABS, Canberra, Cat. no. 1220.0, 1997. Social professionals are those professionals working in education, social occupations, the arts, and miscellaneous; people in low-skilled occupations consist of intermediate production and transport workers, elementary clerical, sales and service workers, and labourers and related workers.
- ²¹ B. Carr, 'Small and well formed . . . let's leave it that way', *The Australian*, 2002, 18 March, p. 13

- ²² For details on these see K. Betts, 'Boatpeople and public opinion in Australia', *People and Place*, vol. 9, no. 4, 2001, pp. 34-48.
- ²³ See for example, K. Cronin, 'A culture of control: an overview of immigration policy-making', J. Jupp and M. Kabala (Eds), *The Politics of Australian Immigration*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1993; Joint Standing Committee on Migration, *Asylum, Border Control and Detention*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1994; M. Einfeld, 'Detention, justice and compassion', M. Crock (Ed.), *Protection of Punishment? The Detention of Asylum-Seekers in Australia*, The Federation Press, Sydney, 1993; V. Trioli, 'The unwelcome mat', *The Bulletin*, 14 December 1999, pp. 34-36; K. Betts, *Ideology and Immigration: Australia 1976 to 1987*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1988, pp. 35, 121, 130-132.
- ²⁴ See the AES voters' files for these years as described in the appendix.
- ²⁵ See Betts, 1999, op. cit., p. 93