units' comments (and which should also be directed at the ABS). He has relied on selected academic research to draw, in one instance at least, a conclusion that mathematically conflicts with his own tabled facts. And all of this is in addition to another of his criticisms which is quite at odds with what anyone would find to be intuitively right . He pooh-poohs what is really an innocuous comment that intercity commuting has made a contribution to the growth of the Gold Coast; this reflects a narrow perspective to say the least, especially given new commuting infrastructure. I accept as the author of a popular and best-selling book that my views should be legitimately the subject of vigorous debate. However on this occasion I think O'Connor's review would have benefited greatly from a telephone chat beforehand, just to check off a few of the facts.

THE UNITY PARTY AND THE MYTH OF THE ETHNIC VOTE

Ernest Healy

Some analysts have argued that if a major political party adopts a restrictive immigration policy it will lose votes among immigrants. In the November 2001 federal election the Coalition emphasised its border control policy which, since late August, has prevented boats carrying unvisaed asylum-seekers from entering the Australian migration zone. The Unity Party, a pro-immigration, pro-multiculturalism party, opposed this policy (as did the Greens and the Democrats). Did the Government's policy alienate migrant voters and did the Unity Party attract them? Western Sydney offers a test case. Many electorates in Western Sydney have high immigrant populations, especially Fowler. In every case, the Liberal Party vote rose. In the electorates where the Unity Party stood candidates in 2001, its vote fell. This was true even of booths within Fowler which have very high concentrations of recent immigrants.

The recent federal election provides an opportunity to re-examine the potential for ethnic political mobilisation in Australia. Although ethnicity has not played a prominent role in Australian politics historically,[1] the 1998 federal election was distinctive in that it saw the electoral involvement of the Unity Party which appealed not only to migrants in general, but also to specific ethnic minority interests. Although ostensibly advocating national cohesion, Unity pitted itself against what its leaders perceived to be the inherent racism of the Australian mainstream culture. Unity's policies were explicitly internationalist, pro-immigration, and identified the Australian national interest with multicul-turalism and the alleged need to defeat the emergence of racism as a political force. The key focus of Unity's counter-offensive against the politics of 'hate' was the Pauline Hanson One Nation Party which, although having had considerable success in the 1998 Queensland state election and a number of by-elections, only made its federal debut in 1998. In contrast to Unity, One Nation called for a substantial decrease in immigration numbers, opposed multiculturalism as the basis of Australian identity and advocated a protectionist approach to national economic development. One Nation appealed to a broad-based sense of disquiet within the Australian population concerning the perceived negative

economic and social impact of globalisation.

In 1998, One Nation attracted 1,007,439 votes for the Senate, or approximately nine per cent of the national vote. This meant that the party constituted a significant electoral challenge to the political and moral authority of globalisation advocates, whether cosmopolitan left-liberal humanitarians or free market advocates. By the mid-1990s, considerable integration between these two globalisation perspectives had developed, particularly in elite Labor circles. This intensified hostility to One Nation. The Unity policy platform mirrored this integration. However, in 1998 Unity only attracted 0.8 per cent of the vote for the Senate. Moreover, Unity's electoral appeal was highly specific. A booth by booth analysis by the present author of the 1998 Unity vote in the New South Wales federal electorate of Fowler, where Unity had its highest level of support amongst those seats where it ran candidates for the House of Representatives (10.6 per cent), revealed that Unity's relative success in Fowler depended upon high levels of support in only a small number of polling booths. These booths were located in or close to the Indo-Chinese enclave of Cabramatta. The Unity Party goal of gaining sufficient political leverage to shape the national agenda on issues of immigration and national cultural identity had clearly failed. The relatively high support for Unity in the electorate of Fowler was exceptional and appears to have been due to the ethnic enclave environment in which many Fowler residents lived, their linguistic and cultural isolation, and the disproportionate influence that ethnic power brokers were able to assert. Further, even within Fowler itself, those polling booths in neighbourhoods with a high proportion of Australian-born persons recorded relatively strong votes for One Nation, in some cases higher than the national average.[2]

Yet, despite the very limited basis of Unity Party appeal at the 1998 federal election, some commentators asserted that the overseas-born component of the Australian electorate was a political force that could be readily mobilised around an anti-'racist' perspective underpinned by policies favourable to an anti-nationalist, high immigration and multicultural agenda. Jeannette Money, for instance, writing shortly after the 1998 election, argued that the Labor and Coalition parties, knowing that migrants were a potentially powerful political force that could be mobilised against a Hansonite agenda, deliberately distanced themselves from One Nation and its agenda.[3] From this perspective, the relatively poor voter support for Unity reflected the decision of the major parties not to attempt to mobilise mainstream voters around race. Yet, even with this distancing, Money believes that the Coalition's tough line on immigration after 1996 prompted many ethnic voters to switch to Labor.[4] Since 1998, ethnic leaders have been keen to promote this idea. Alan Thornhill, writing for the Australian Federation of Ethnic Communities' Councils of Australia (FECCA), claimed that migrants would have 'real clout' in the up-coming 2001 federal election, particularly in marginal seats. He argued that the Government's firm stand on border control would alienate the ethnic vote. In his view:

> Migrants are particularly distrustful of politicians who take the risk of chasing votes by exploiting racism...Many migrants have been refugees themselves and know very well what today's asylum seekers are suffering.[5]

The 2001 federal election has provided a particularly good test of the credi-

bility of the arguments of those, like Money and Thornhill, who claim that migrants can be readily mobilised against political parties that are perceived to be exploiting mainstream anti-migrant prejudice or threatening the standing of migrants in Australia in some way.

The issue that dominated political commentary in the immediate lead up to the federal election on November 10 was the hard line that the Coalition Government had taken against illegal migrants who had been arriving by sea via Indonesia. In so doing, the Government was widely accused in the mass media of playing the populist 'race card' in an attempt to retain Government. Furthermore, in the final days of the 2001 parliamentary sitting, the Government passed a raft of legislation strengthening its powers to prevent the arrival of illegal migrants by sea and limiting the rights of legal appeal by asylum seekers in the Australian courts. This included limiting the role of the Federal Court in dealing with asylum appeals, as the Federal Court had been a source of judicial activism in its handling of such cases. Betts provides a detailed account of these developments elsewhere in this publication.[6]

One could not imagine a better scenario for testing Money's thesis. If it is correct, a populist 'racial' appeal by the Australian Government in the weeks immediately prior to a national election would be expected to lead to a significant electoral reaction by migrant voters, particularly amongst those who are recent arrivals. More particularly, one would expect that in those seats where Unity received a high vote in 1998, such as Fowler, such an appeal would receive an even greater level of support in the November 2001 election. Further, the fact that the Labor Party, after having initially obstructed the Coalition Government's legislative reforms to limit illegal arrivals, fell into line on the issue would give an even greater vote for Unity, Labor no longer being an avenue for a protest vote. The only alternative for a protest vote would be the Greens, which had adopted a pro-asylum seeker position, the Democrats or Unity in seats where it stood candidates.

The focus of the present paper is the group of firm Labor electorates situated in the South and South-West of the Sydney Metropolitan area which, like Fowler, have a high proportion of migrant voters. These electorates are distinct from those more marginal suburban seats where, some commentators believe, a new 'aspirational' class of upwardly-mobile voters is becoming influential (including Parramatta and Macarthur).

Table 1 illustrates the relevance of Fowler for testing Money's thesis. On each of the measures shown, Fowler ranked highest of all federal electorates in Australia.

Table 1: Selected measures for which the 2001 Federal Electorate of Fowler ranked highest

Proportion of persons	Per cent
Born overseas and Australian-born persons with overseas born parents	69.7
Born overseas, resident less than five years	9.5
Born in South East Asia	23.7
Born in non-English-speaking countries	49.2
Not fluent in English	19.1
Speaking language other than English at home	61.3

Source: Parliamentary Research Library, Research Paper 11, 2000-01, Tables 18a and 21a to 25a

THE 2001 ELECTION RESULTS

Contrary to Money's thesis, Unity's vote collapsed both for the Senate and the House of Representatives, including in its enclave stronghold in Fowler. Table 2 shows Unity's share of the Senate vote in NSW and Victoria for the 1998 and 2001 federal elections.

Table 3a compares the individual booth results in Fowler in 1998 and 2001 for the Unity Party, the One Nation Party, the Australian Labor Party and the Liberal-National Coalition parties. The data show a marked drop in support for Unity in each of the 32 booths.[7] Significantly, some of the most obvious declines in support occurred in booths where Unity's support in 1998 was the greatest, for example in Cabramatta, Canley Vale, Cabramatta High and Lansvale. Table 3b indicates that these booths were located in neighbourhoods where the proportion of persons who spoke either Chinese or Vietnamese in the home ranged from 40 to 64 per cent. Given the high profile of 'race' issues at the recent election, these results refute the thesis that migrants represent a substantial voter constituency that can be readily mobilised around such issues.

This does not mean that Unity has no electoral foundation. Since 1998, Unity has had some success in state and local politics where high local concentrations of Indo-Chinese minorities and the political dynamics of enclave life can be more easily translated into electoral success. Currently, Unity has eight councillors in seven Sydney municipal councils and one member of parliament in the New South Wales upper house. All are of Chinese or Vietnamese descent.

The broader view

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the incumbent federal Labor Government

Table 2: Unity Party Senate vote in the 1998 and 2001 federal elections

	1998 per cent	2001 per cent	1998 vote	2001 vote
New South Wales	1.64	0.48	61,607	18,575
Victoria	0.72	0.32	20,603	9,229

Source: Australian Electoral Commission, 2001

had promoted an internationalist, Asia-orientated perspective of Australian national development which was closely associated with the ascendancy of neo-liberal economic doctrine and the promotion of Australia as an open multi-cultural society. It had become clear by the time of the 1996 federal election, when Labor lost Government, that a significant component of the traditional Labor blue-collar constituency, particularly in the outer suburban mortgage belt, had become alienated by this vision. Various opinion polls since the mid-1990s have indicated a serious hiatus in values and aspirations between sections of the cosmopolitan, university-trained intelligentsia and broad sections of middle Australia, a division which has subsequently been analysed in detail by Katharine Betts.[8] Survey findings indicate a growing blue-collar dissatisfaction with the Labor Party's minority-orientated, multicultural characterisation of Australian society promoted by the party's policy elites and broader sections of the university-trained urban intelligentsia. For instance, a 1995 Morgan poll showed that a high proportion of low-income voters had lost confidence in Labor as a party that would look after its needs and a significant proportion indicated that they would vote Coalition in protest.[9] The result of the 1998 Queensland state election also revealed deep dissatisfaction amongst the 'battler' working class, Labor's 'natural' constituency.

The result of the Federal election in November 2001 involved a widespread drift in the primary vote against Labor. The Greens Party appears to have been the principal beneficiary of disenchanted Labor voters, particularly the university-trained intelligentsia who reside in the inner urban lifestyle areas of Melbourne and Sydney. A number of other minor-party and independent candidates also gained from Labor's reduced support.

However, this tendency is less marked in the traditional Labor seats which are the focus of this article. These include Reid, Fowler and Blaxland. In these seats, the Greens did not do so well. Table 4 below shows the extent of the swing against Labor in firm Labor-held seats in Sydney's South and South-West.

Notwithstanding, variations in the election result between electorates, there is a general pattern within the electorates shown in Table 4 whereby Labor received a reduced share of the primary vote, the Liberal Party increased its share and the share of some minor candidates also increased. The Greens vote is provided as an indication of this latter tendency. An increase in the informal vote was also widespread; perhaps this too is an indication of voter dis-illusionment. An important, underlying trend in these electorates is that, although a number of minor parties and candidates gained a proportion of the primary vote at Labor's expense, on a two-party preferred basis the Liberal Party gains over Labor. The two-party preferred result shows that there was a proportion of Labor voters who, while not casting their vote directly for the Liberal Party, voted for a non-Labor candidate, but structured their preferences in such a way as to ultimately benefit the Liberal Party. Table 4 puts the Fowler result in context and shows that the outcome in Fowler is consistent with the electoral tendencies of the broader region of which it is a part.

In Fowler, there was a small decline in the Labor primary vote, which was accompanied by a small increase in primary vote for the Liberal Party. The Greens gained a little more than two per cent of the primary vote and there was a significant upward swing in the informal vote. Although Fowler remained an extremely safe Labor seat, with nearly 72 per cent of the vote on a two party preferred basis, there was nevertheless more than four per cent swing to the Liberal Party.

This means that the Liberal Party, the party of populist 'race' politics, increased its vote in the electorate with the highest concentration of migrants in the nation, while the Unity Party failed to maintain its 1998 level of support, let alone mobilise migrants. As noted earlier, Tables 3a and b show that this outcome held true even in polling booths located near the highest concentrations of migrants in and around the Cabramatta enclave within Fowler. From the standpoint of Money's thesis, such an outcome is inexplicable.

It is not possible to ascertain the voter composition of the drift to the Liberal Party from the electoral data. The significant level of support for One Nation in 1998 in neighbourhoods in Fowler with relatively high proportions of Australian-born persons indicates a degree of dissatisfaction with Labor from this constituency. In the 2001 election, some of the support that had previously gone to One Nation may this time round have been transferred to Liberal Party on a two-party preferred basis. Significantly, the data suggest that the decline in support for Unity did not go to Labor. Are there any grounds for believing, as some commentators have suggested,[10] that some migrant voters may even have

Table 3a: Polling booth results for the federal electorate of Fowler 1998 and 2001 for Unity Party, One Nation Party, Labor Party and Coalition, House of Representatives, primary vote

Polling Booth (ranked on difference in Unity Party vote 1998-2001)	Per cent of primary vote											
	ALP			Coalition			One Nation Party			Unity Party		
	1998	2001	Differ-ence	1998	2001	Differ-ence	1998	2001	Differ-ence	1998	2001	Differ-ence
Cabramatta	61.3	63.5	2.2	5.9	7.8	1.9	1.2	0.7	-0.5	29.9	10.2	-19.7
Lansvale	56.4	57.9	1.5	12.0	11.2	-0.8	7.8	3.7	-4.1	21.1	7.3	-13.8
Cabramatta High	64.4	59.2	-5.2	7.6	11.6	4.0	3.9	1.3	-2.6	22.3	9.6	-12.7
Canley Vale	64.1	58.9	-5.2	8.2	9.3	1.1	3.2	1.0	-2.2	22.2	10.0	-12.2
Cabramatta East	65.5	57.5	-8.0	10.0	9.8	-0.2	3.9	1.5	-2.4	18.6	7.8	-10.8
Harrington St	59.1	51.7	-7.4	17.4	16.4	-1.0	5.7	3.2	-2.5	14.7	4.3	-10.4
Bonnyrigg	71.6	62.0	-9.6	8.1	8.9	0.8	3.4	1.6	-1.8	14.2	5.0	-9.2
Bonnyrigg Heights	62.9	55.3	-7.6	20.3	18.3	-2.0	3.3	2.4	-0.9	10.5	2.4	-8.1
St Johns Park	62.7	53.5	-9.2	16.7	17.2	0.5	5.0	1.4	-3.6	12.9	5.0	-7.9
Canley Heights/ Cambridge St	61.4	58.5	-2.9	14.2	13.6	-0.6	8.0	3.0	-5.0	13.6	5.9	-7.7
Cabramatta West	59.2	50.2	-9.0	15.6	13.6	-2.0	8.1	2.5	-5.6	13.9	6.5	-7.4
Busby	66.1	53.3	-12.8	14.8	18.6	3.8	8.5	5.4	-3.1	7.7	1.3	-6.4
Canley High	69.6	55.8	-13.8	11.3	16.7	5.4	5.5	3.6	-1.9	11.7	6.4	-5.3
Liverpool/ Liverpool Central	67.7	56.6	-11.1	15.2	14.9	-0.3	7.8	3.8	-4.0	6.5	1.2	-5.3
Warwick Farm	65.1	60.3	-4.8	13.2	12.3	-0.9	11.9	4.7	-7.2	7.6	2.3	-5.3
Bonnyrigg High	66.0	56.6	-9.4	13.7	11.0	-2.7	5.6	2.1	-3.5	12.2	7.3	-4.9
Hinchinbrook *	58.7	51.5	-7.2	24.5	26.7	2.2	6.2	3.3	-2.9	6.7	2.0	-4.7
Mount Pritchard	53.8	43.6	-10.2	24.1	24.1	0.0	9.5	4.2	-5.3	7.9	3.8	-4.1
Heckengerg	67.3	57.6	-9.7	16.1	18.4	2.3	9.2	2.9	-6.3	4.5	1.0	-3.5
Liverpool West/ Lunea North	56.6	43.9	-12.7	24.5	24.2	-0.3	10.6	4.9	-5.7	4.2	0.7	-3.5
Ashcroft	69.8	60.7	-9.1	14.0	13.7	-0.3	9.2	4.8	-4.4	4.5	1.2	-3.3
Green Valley *	59.2	50.9	-8.3	25.2	26.1	0.9	5.7	2.5	-3.2	6.1	2.8	-3.3
Wakeley/ Humphries Rd	62.1	49.6	-12.5	19.0	14.7	-4.3	5.8	2.6	-3.2	9.4	6.5	-2.9
Liverpool South	71.2	58.6	-12.6	15.2	15.9	0.7	5.3	3.4	-1.9	4.3	1.4	-2.9
Marsden Rd	55.3	50.3	-5.0	27.3	22.1	-5.2	9.5	4.9	-4.6	3.9	1.3	-2.6
Mount Pritchard East	61.1	52.9	-8.2	18.4	17.2	-1.2	11.6	4.7	-6.9	5.4	3.1	-2.3
Endensor Park	58.2	46.5	-11.7	26.5	22.1	-4.4	5.9	2.3	-3.6	5.8	3.8	-2.0
Lansvale East	53.1	44.8	-8.3	26.4	30.0	3.6	11.7	5.4	-6.3	4.6	2.6	-2.0
Sadleir	68.2	59.5	-8.7	12.2	12.7	0.5	12.6	5.6	-7.0	4.0	2.4	-1.6
Miller	68.0	58.2	-9.8	13.1	12.6	-0.5	12.7	6.1	-6.6	3.3	2.3	-1.0
Liverpool North	69.6	53.5	-16.1	18.9	15.5	-3.4	6.4	3.1	-3.3	2.5	1.6	-0.9
Cartwright	64.7	54.4	-10.3	15.7	17.4	1.7	10.5	5.5	-5.0	5.1	4.7	-0.4

* No longer in Fowler in 2001 but retained for purpose of comparability.
 Source: Australian Electoral Commission 2001

Table 3b: Polling booth results for the federal electorate of Fowler 1998 and 2001 for Unity Party, House of Representatives, two party preferred vote and ethnic characteristics of local population, 1996

Polling Booth (ranked on difference in Unity Party vote 1998-2001)	Differ-ence in Unity Party vote[a]	Both parents Aust.-born	Main language spoken at home			Two party preferred vote				
			English	Viet-namese	Chinese	ALP		Coalition		Coalition gain/ ALP loss
						1998	2001	1998	2001	
Cabramatta	-19.7	2.2	5.5	29.1	34.9	90.4	83.0	9.6	17.0	7.4
Lansvale	-13.8	17.8	31.0	23.3	16.2	79.6	75.7	20.4	24.3	3.9
Cabramatta High	-12.7	8.6	16.8	26.4	27.8	88.0	78.7	12.0	21.3	9.3
Canley Vale	-12.2	11.3	20.9	24.0	24.7	87.9	78.0	12.1	22.0	9.9
Cabramatta East	-10.8	8.2	16.1	20.8	19.9	84.9	79.2	15.1	20.8	5.7
Harrington St	-10.4	15.1	26.4	20.6	12.6	76.2	71.1	23.8	28.9	5.1
Bonnyrigg	-9.2	8.9	14.7	21.8	15.2	87.3	81.0	12.7	19.0	6.3
Bonnyrigg Heights	-8.1	11.3	23.0	11.9	9.8	75.6	70.5	24.4	29.5	5.1
St Johns Park	-7.9	14.8	24.8	13.8	11.0	77.0	71.7	23.0	28.3	5.3
Canley Heights/ Cambridge St	-7.7	21.3	36.5	20.3	11.5	78.3	73.1	21.7	26.9	5.2
Cabramatta West	-7.4	10.4	20.4	23.8	22.3	77.3	71.7	22.7	28.3	5.6
Busby	-6.4	33.8	51.4	4.3	4.3	78.6	67.6	21.4	32.4	11.0
Canley High	-5.3	15.2	31.7	20.9	17.0	84.7	76.0	15.3	24.0	8.7
Liverpool/ Liverpool Central	-5.3	23.5	42.5	0.0	2.4	78.0	73.7	22.1	26.3	4.2
Warwick Farm	-5.3	36.6	54.7	9.1	3.2	78.6	75.8	21.4	24.2	2.8
Bonnyrigg High	-4.9	18.1	34.2	13.0	10.5	80.3	77.2	19.7	22.8	3.1
Hinchinbrook *	-4.7	23.4	41.9	4.5	5.6	68.6	63.5	31.4	36.5	5.1
Mount Pritchard	-4.1	28.6	48.9	10.8	2.9	67.3	60.9	32.7	39.1	6.4
Heckengerg	-3.5	42.3	63.6	6.6	1.5	80.0	71.4	20.1	28.6	8.5
Liverpool West/ Lunea North	-3.5	30.0	51.0	3.0	2.4	66.2	59.8	33.8	40.2	6.4
Ashcroft	-3.3	39.0	57.9	6.8	3.0	80.5	75.9	19.5	24.1	4.6
Green Valley *	-3.3	23.2	42.6	4.3	3.4	68.8	63.0	31.2	37.0	5.8
Wakeley/ Humphries Rd	-2.9	15.4	31.4	6.4	9.3	75.2	69.9	24.8	30.1	5.3
Liverpool South	-2.9	17.2	32.3	2.5	4.3	79.2	74.0	20.8	26.0	5.2
Marsden Rd	-2.6	30.0	46.9	4.2	1.3	63.7	65.5	36.3	34.5	-1.8
Mount Pritchard East	-2.3	32.7	52.7	11.5	4.2	72.6	69.2	27.5	30.8	3.3
Endensor Park	-2.0	17.1	34.1	7.5	6.1	67.8	63.1	32.2	36.9	4.7
Lansvale East	-2.0	32.6	53.3	22.5	3.9	65.5	57.1	34.5	42.9	8.4
Sadleir	-1.6	43.8	66.0	6.1	1.4	79.3	75.9	20.7	24.1	3.4
Miller	-1.0	43.4	64.6	5.6	1.0	78.6	73.6	21.4	26.4	5.0
Liverpool North	-0.9	10.9	23.0	1.6	4.8	76.0	72.5	24.0	27.5	3.5
Cartwright	-0.4	47.2	70.1	3.8	1.1	76.8	69.1	23.2	30.9	7.7

* No longer in Fowler in 2001 but retained for purpose of comparability.
[a] See Table 3a.
Source: Australian Electoral Commission 2001 and 1996 Census (CDATA96)

supported the Coalition's tough line on border protection? Data in Tables 3a and 3b show that this is a possibility since in booths with the highest non-English speaking concentrations there is a swing to the Liberals on a two-party preferred basis.

The gulf between expectation and outcome

How could advocates of the migrant mobilisation thesis be so mistaken about the electoral behaviour of migrants in the Australian context? Perhaps an insight into this question can be gained from an examination of the historical circumstances in which the views of Unity Party leaders were formed. A key to understanding the gulf between Unity Party expectations and Australian electoral reality is to recognise that, although Unity

was ostensibly established to oppose Pauline Hanson's One Nation party, its agenda pre-dated the emergence of Hanson. The basis of Unity's platform was developed by two of Unity's founding members, academics Mary Kalantzis and Bill Cope, who began to develop their ideas about cultural pluralism in the favourable political environment of the Hawke/Keating Labor Governments of the late 1980s and early 1990s.

From the early 1980s, in an attempt to break with the collectivist ethos that had prevailed in Australia since federation, Prime Minister Bob Hawke energetically pursued a form of patronage and pressure group politics whereby the federal Government nurtured close relationships with a broad range of vested interest groups.[11] Reflecting policy developments under the Fraser Government in the late

Table 4: Votes and swing in Labor held electorates in South and West Sydney, House of Representatives, 2001 federal election, per cent

Electorate	Australian Labor Party			Liberal[a]			Green	Unity			Born in non-English-speaking countries
	Primary vote	TPP vote	Primary swing	Primary vote	Primary swing	TPP swing[b]	Primary swing	Primary vote	Primary swing	Informal swing	
Sydney	44.33	65.04	-8.58	30.10	4.28	4.72	8.32	na	-2.38	-0.08	19.1
Kingford Smith	47.69	58.90	-3.70	34.26	3.27	4.05	3.65	na	-3.65	0.96	30.5
Grayndler	49.15	71.29	-5.56	22.93	2.16	1.03	8.42	1.36	-3.14	1.45	34.9
Watson	56.15	67.31	-1.07	28.12	1.73	0.31	2.00	4.76	-0.51	2.41	43.3
Lowe *	44.77	53.81	8.64	41.96	8.72	0.89	2.42	2.27	-1.76	1.26	32.5
Barton	47.99	56.02	-1.71	37.73	2.76	3.77	1.35	1.84	-2.40	2.30	30.4
Banks	44.25	52.89	-0.34	35.79	1.97	1.97	1.32	0.99	-2.12	2.89	19.1
Blaxland	54.12	65.18	-6.41	25.92	3.79	6.53	1.07	2.12	-1.35	4.13	37.0
Reid	57.12	66.87	-0.96	22.48	1.18	5.30	1.28	4.77	-0.82	4.02	38.7
Fowler	**61.48**	**71.96**	**-0.82**	**17.85**	**1.65**	**4.03**	****2.13**	**5.26**	**-5.71**	**5.71**	**49.2**
Werriwa	50.52	58.51	-0.95	33.36	4.29	4.11	0.81	2.13	-0.05	3.05	22.6
Prospect	56.08	63.55	-0.51	27.30	1.63	3.22	2.94	1.35	-1.45	1.95	36.7
Chifley	56.30	65.29	-3.38	25.52	6.53	5.98	0.25	na	-1.38	3.14	23.6
Greenway	42.67	53.11	-3.34	36.94	5.68	6.44	0.77	na	-1.40	1.36	23.1

Source: Australian Electoral Commission, 2001 federal election results
Notes: TPP = Two Party Preferred; na = Unity did not stand a candidate in 2001
a   The TTP vote for the Liberal Party is the difference between 100 per cent and the Labor Party TPP vote.
b   The size of TPP loss from the Labor Party is equivalent to the Liberal Party TPP gain. For example, in the electorate of Sydney the TTP swing to Liberal is 4.72 and the TTP swing against Labur is -4.72.
*   Six candidates who ran in Lowe in 1998 did not do so in 2001. Because their collective proportion of the vote was previously substantial, both Labor and Liberal candidates in 2001 had a significant gain in their primary vote.
**   No Greens candidate in 1998

1970s, this approach institutionalised ethnic politics and cemented the Government's relationship with various ethnic minority leaders who were able to establish themselves as privileged mediators between their constituencies and Government — an approach that closely reflected political practice in the US.[12] As a result, by the late 1980s, a structural pluralism in policy formulation was being officially promoted by pro-immigration and multicultural advocates close to Government, many of whom saw their agenda as a necessary means for reforming the perceived isolationism and inherent xenophobia of Australian mainstream culture.[13]

This political environment helped shape the perspectives and expectations of Kalantzis and Cope. They were closely associated with Stephen Castles of the University of Wollongong whose work unambiguously posited immigration and minority identity politics as the basis for challenging and undermining the mainstream Australian identity and culture.[14] For Castles and his co-authors, advocacy of immigration and multiculturalism represented a politics of liberation from the exclusiveness of bounded national ideologies and western industrialism. By 1993, Kalantzis and Cope were playing a key role in a reformulation of multiculturalism which explicitly aligned multicultural policy with the promotion of economic globalisation and market flexibility. This perspective was essentially in line with the Labor Government's newly adopted 'productive diversity' policy which held that a culturally diverse work force facilitated global economic incorporation and competitiveness. This reformulation, as with the authors' earlier ideas of multiculturalism, was based on the perception that the inherited mainstream culture and identity was irredeemably racist and that migrants provided a progressive corrective.[15] As a result, the potential of migrants as a political force in achieving fundamental social reform tended to be idealised.

On regaining Government in 1996, the Coalition took measures to restrict immigration and shift the balance of the intake towards skilled migrants rather than family reunion. In addition, the agencies that had been established under previous Labor Governments for the promotion of multiculturalism and which were important vehicles for the advancement of ethnic elites, such as the Office of Multicultural Affairs, were virtually abolished.[16] For Kalantzis and Cope, this was a deeply disturbing rupture from the late 1980s and early 1990s, when it appeared that society was undergoing an unstoppable 'paradigm shift' in economy and culture and when every historical inheritance appeared to be up for grabs.

Against this background, the Unity Party initiative appears to be a largely rearguard action, an attempt to keep alive a radical cultural ideal that was always somewhat utopian. Unity leaders have not been able to come to grips with the desire of mainstream Australians, including many overseas-born Australians, to maintain a coherent national identity.

References

[1] It might be argued that Catholicism, though an appeal to Australians of Irish Catholic descent, has been a significant basis of political mobilisation, over the issue of military conscription during the First World War and during the Labor Party split in the 1950s concerning the level of communist influence within the trade union movement. On closer scrutiny, however, such claims do not stand up in any simple sense. Even a cursory examination of the anti-conscription campaign of Irish-born Catholic archbishop Mannix during the First World War shows that he could not depend upon an appeal to Irish nationalism among Australian Catholics, but appealed directly to a distinctively Australian democratic sentiment. Australian Catholics had

been largely assimilated to a secular Australian national ideal and Mannix was astute enough to recognise this. Similarly, the motives of the Catholic establishment aside, the anti-communist rhetoric of the Catholic Church during the 1950s was often couched in terms of a threat to democratic decency.

[2]   E. Healy, 'The Unity Party and the attempt to mobilise Australian support for Multiculturalism', *People and Place*, vol. 7, no. 1, 1999, pp. 51-62

[3]   J. Money, 'Xenophobia and xenophilia: Pauline Hanson and the counterbalancing of electoral incentives in Australia', *People and Place*, vol. 7, no. 3, 1999, pp. 7-19. Money's argument departs from that of the Unity Party in this respect. Unity argued that the major political parties had in fact assimilated aspects of Hanson's position

[4]   Money, op. cit., pp. 16-17

[5]   A. Thornhill, 'Multicultural Australia goes to the polls', *Ethnic Spotlight*, Issue 54, October 2001

[6]   K. Betts, 'Boatpeople and public opinion in Australia', *People and Place*, vol. 9, no. 4, 2001, pp. 34-48

[7]   The electoral boundary of Fowler was marginally altered between the 1998 and 2001 federal elections. As a result, several new booths were included in 2001 that were not part of Fowler in 1998. Similarly, two booths that were formerly in Fowler fell within neighbouring electorates in 2001. In Table 1, data is given for those booths that were in Fowler in 1998.

[8]   K. Betts, *The Great Divide*, Sydney, Duffy and Snellgrove, 1999

[9]   'Blue collar revolt', *The Bulletin*, 10 October 10, 1995, pp. 16-20.

[10]   S. Loane, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 12 November, 2001

[11]   A. Woods, in *The Australian*, 17 September, 1992

[12]   G. Freeman, and B. Birrell, 'Divergent paths of immigration politics in the United States and Australia', *Population and Development Review*, vol. 27 no. 3, Sept. 2001, pp. 525-551

[13]   See Office of Multicultural Affairs, *Towards a National Multicultural Agenda for a Multicultural Australia,* Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1988; Office of Multicultural Affairs, *Towards a National Multicultural Agenda for a Multicultural Australia — Goals and Principles*, Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1988; Office of Multicultural Affairs, *National Multicultural Agenda for a Multicultural Australia*, Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989.

[14]   S. Castles, M. Kalantzis, B. Cope and M. Morrissey, *Mistaken Identity*, Sydney, Pluto Press, 1988

[15]   M. Kalantzis, and B. Cope, 'Cultures of the workplace: towards a new agenda for productive enterprise', unpublished paper forwarded by the authors, 1993

[16]   Freeman and Birrell, op. cit., pp. 541-542