

PRIDE AND COMMITMENT: PATRIOTISM IN AUSTRALIA

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Today nationalism is blamed for many ills and positive forms of nationalism are not often discussed or promoted. But while patriotism is unfashionable, it may still have its attractions. This is especially likely to be true for those who are threatened by economic globalism, or other forms of 'non nationalism', and who feel a need to belong to a national community.

The Australian Election Survey (AES) carried out in March 1996 showed that men and women who expressed strong pride in Australia's history were more likely to vote for the Coalition, whereas those who did not were more likely to vote for the minor parties (the Australian Democrats and the Greens).¹ Political debate has for many years emphasised economic questions and, since the 1983 elections, this emphasis has been overwhelming. National feeling is usually taken for granted and, if it is indeed a low-level background sentiment shared by most voters, we would not expect it to surface as an election issue. But what if it is not spread around in even quantities? The 1996 elections suggest that it is reasonable to pose questions about how Australians feel about their country and whether some groups feel differently from others. This article examines the information collected by the AES with two aims: to discover the extent of patriotism in Australia and its links with nationalism, and to explore the degree to which patriotic feelings may vary between different social groups. (The distinction between patriotism and nationalism is slight but it will be discussed below.)

NATIONALISM AND ITS OPPOSITES

In the late twentieth century nationalism and internationalism represent strong currents, both of sentiment and policy. Since 1900, nationalism has helped produce much misery, including the slaughter of World War I and the atrocities of World War II. It continues to contribute to bitterness and death in places such as Bosnia, Chechnya and Rwanda to this day. Because of this, many observers would not rejoice to see national feeling play a stronger part in Australian politics.

But it is naive to imagine that nationalism is the sole cause of war and conflict. When human groups were organised in tribes, wars were tribal; when they were ranged in empires, wars were imperial. Tribes, theocracies, city states and empires are not more pacific than nations,² and those who seek to create a world without national borders might be sharply disappointed by the outcome of their work. They could produce, not a paradise of tolerance and freedom, but a festering melange of gangs and warlords where even heavily defended oases of peace

and civility might be unable to survive.³

Prejudice must be put to one side. We should consider nationalism and its obverse not as synonyms for bigotry and enlightenment, but as neutral concepts describing different approaches to the management of human affairs. If this is done we can see that there are not two concepts involved, but several. First, while 'nationalism' is the political expression of a sense of belonging to a particular group of people and a territory, this feeling may be based on more than one single set of principles. It is often based on a real (or imagined) history of common biological descent (or on some other relatively fixed attribute such as language, religion or race), but it need not be.⁴ To varying degrees in countries such as Australia, the United States, France, Sweden and Canada, national feeling depends not on hereditary characteristics alone but on shared political and civic ideals as well.⁵ This means that nationalism can be based on bloodlines, or on common ideals about citizenship, or on some combination of the two.

Nationalism and patriotism are similar concepts, but patriotism describes feelings and emotions, an identification with compatriots and the land, while nationalism may be used to describe the policies and ideas which build on these feelings.⁶ But despite this nuance, the terms are very similar. Here patriotism will be taken to mean love of country (both people and land), an emotion which expresses itself in feelings of pride and commitment. Nationalism involves an emotional identification with a country but builds on this feeling to include support for policies which protect or advance the interests of that country.

The group solidarity which patriotism and nationalism embody has its positive aspects. Shared goals and a concern for a common future can foster the links of mutual sympathy and trust which form the basis for free institutions⁷ and for mutual aid. Members of national groups may also care about the land which they claim as their home, attempting to nurture its natural capital and to create cities which are not only practical but beautiful. (Groups united by patriotism should want to work together to protect their fellow citizens and their environment: these feelings should promote an enthusiasm for projects to protect the national interest. The AES file can provide some answers to the question of the degree to which patriots actually do want to do these things.)

The opposite of nationalism is usually represented by the term 'internationalism' but this one-word antonym creates too simple a picture. What of economic globalism and the growing role of transnational corporations? What of cosmopolitanism? The distinctions between nationalisms and non-nationalisms warrant a deeper examination than is possible here.⁸ But as a brief guide we could say that internationalism refers to supra-national organisations or groupings of nations. These may be globally based, such as the United Nations and its subsidiary bodies (the World Health Organisation, UNESCO and so on), or they may have a more limited, regional ambit such as the European Union, the OECD, NAFTA and APEC. Supra-national organisations of these kinds are often concerned with trying to devise and enforce rules for the conduct of governments and other agencies operating beyond the borders of any one state. Internationalism can also apply to

organisations such as religions, professional associations, and non-government charitable and environmental groups, organisations which need have no firm roots in particular states but which bring people together for common purposes across national borders.

‘Economic globalism’ describes the rising tide of international commerce, especially the dominant role of international finance capital in what has now become a global financial market.⁹ (And as film, television and cognate industries attract more and more investment, the globalisation of culture becomes part of this phenomenon too.) Some attempts at organisation and control have arisen in response to these changes,¹⁰ but the current growth in the reach of the global market into national and personal affairs has largely been an unintended consequence of technological change and financial deregulation, rather than of explicit plans and goals.

In contrast to internationalism and economic globalism, cosmopolitanism is more a characteristic of individuals than it is of organisations or impersonal economic forces. It describes a certain personal rootlessness, a lack of attachment to any one nation; this may be nothing more than a habit of the mind or it may entail a series of sojourns in different nations. At its best cosmopolitanism designates an openness to new ideas and new experiences; at its worst it suggests a lack of commitment to other people and to the natural resources which support human groups.

The various forms of non-nationalism are often hard to distinguish from each other because debates which draw on them often draw on more than one variety. For example, in debates about free trade protagonists may argue that Australia must reduce its tariffs (and increase its exports) because the expansion of the global market place demands this, and integration into international organisations such as APEC and GATT require it. Further, parochialism must be abandoned because it impedes these changes, while a cosmopolitan view would promote them and thus should be embraced. Proponents may even declare that thinking of nations as the basic actors in trade agreements is obsolete; the world is being rearranged by transnational corporations which have no national affiliations and resistance is pointless.

Any close examination of debates of this kind reveals contradictions between different forms of non-nationalism (for example between economic globalism and universalistic altruism, or between internationalism and some forms of cosmopolitanism) but the non-nationalisms do have one common characteristic. They are all sceptical about the value of the boundaries on which group solidarity depends. Indeed some forms (globalism and cosmopolitanism) are actively hostile to these boundaries.

NATIONALISM AND NON-NATIONALISM IN AUSTRALIA

Australians, like all inhabitants of countries exposed to the renewed power of global capitalism, have been assailed by a decade and a half of changing economic and political circumstances accompanied by changing ideas about the relevance of the nation state. Some Australians have been better placed than others to endure the assault on boundaries or, perhaps, to profit from them. For example, new-class professionals and symbolic analysts¹¹

may feel equipped to compete in the global market place. They may also be attracted by the idea of international integration and charmed by cosmopolitanism. And in as much as they perceive multiculturalism as an ever-changing menu of cultural fragments, a smorgasbord of cuisines and lifestyles (rather than as rigid ethnic separatism), they are likely to be its champions. The forms of non-nationalism do not threaten them. Indeed they may even offer material rewards or at least some help in the struggle to assert social and intellectual status. In contrast, there are other people who are more vulnerable to the erosion of group boundaries and geographic borders and who sense that, without the protection of national solidarity, their situation would be perilous indeed. (The latter group, of course, is much larger than the former.)

Such a sense of vulnerability might lead a person to hold more tightly to patriotic symbols and to take a national rather than a non-national focus. Direct experience of exploitation by outsiders, or the fear that this may occur, provide other possible motives for patriotism and nationalism. In such cases the feelings and commitments may be defensive and reactionary; they occur only as a response to outside threats. But fear and vulnerability need not be the only cause of national or patriotic feeling; as with all cultural dispositions, education and example must play a part. In the past, education systems have sought to reinforce patriotism but, as new-class enthusiasms for non-nationalism have grown, school children and tertiary students are much less likely to come into contact with patriotic educators.

But nationalism can be more than fear and reaction. It can be positive. For example, nation-builders may want to enhance the welfare of their fellow citizens, both as a positive goal in its own right and to provide a local base for positive engagement with the world beyond. Positive nationalism may seek to protect and improve the situation of a country and the members of its national community while treating the needs of outsiders with all possible respect.¹²

With the growth of economic rationalism and contempt for national feelings (stigmatised as parochial)¹³ general conditions in the 1980s and 1990s have not favoured overt expressions of positive nationalism. Yet this was the spirit which animated the architects of Federation.¹⁴ It comes to the surface today in responses to natural disasters, in efforts to preserve rural communities struggling to survive in adverse economic circumstances, and in countless acts of decency and neighbourliness across the country. While the active thrust of economic policy and the drift of intellectual fashion have not favoured this spirit, many Australians still feel it. But how many of them profess it and who are they? Perhaps a majority still have a strong sense of involvement with their national community. But if this feeling is weak among the intelligentsia it will not often be expressed in the national media, academic conferences, or even in the national parliament. Of course, some intellectuals may see that, if they are to produce Australian literature, or films, or even television commercials, they do indeed have an interest in preserving the Australian nation.¹⁵ Business managers dependent on domestic markets could see this too. But it is also possible that their enthusiasm for non-nationalism may blind them to these interests,¹⁶ or that they believe that they have other options if national markets should fail them.

There are three hypotheses to be explored here.

- Patriotic feeling is widespread (if only because those who are threatened by non-nationalism outnumber those who are not).
- Patriotism is linked to support for nationalistic policies.
- Less well-educated people will be more patriotic than people with university degrees and professional qualifications.

Australian patriotism is, for present purposes, operationalised as a sense of pride in, and commitment to, Australia. If this is done the three hypotheses can be tested with data from the AES on these variables.¹⁷ We begin with the third hypothesis (and the question of pride), working back to the second and the first (and the question of commitment).

The survey asked a number of questions about pride in aspects of Australia: ‘How proud are you of Australia in each of the following?’ — very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not proud at all. There were nine items: ‘The way democracy works’, ‘Its political influence in the world’, ‘Australia’s economic achievements’, ‘Its social security system’, ‘Its scientific and technological achievements’, ‘Its history’, ‘Australia’s armed forces’, ‘Its achievements in sports’, and ‘Its achievements in the arts and sciences’. We divided the respondents into four groups according to the number of items of which they said they were ‘very proud’. The first group, labelled ‘strongly patriotic’, were ‘very proud’ of five or more aspects of Australia; the second, labelled ‘fairly patriotic’, were ‘very proud’ of three to four aspects; the third, ‘mildly patriotic’, were ‘very proud’ of one or two aspects; and the fourth, labelled ‘not patriotic’, were not ‘very proud’ of any aspect of Australia. The divisions were made in such a way as to sort the sample into four groups of approximately equal size; Table 1 shows that people with university degrees were much less likely than the rest of the sample to be located in the ‘strongly patriotic’ category. They were also more likely to be in the ‘not patriotic’ group. The data clearly support the third hypothesis.

Table 1: Patriotism as measured by the ‘pride’ variable by highest post-school qualification, percentages

	strongly patriotic	fairly patriotic	mildly patriotic	not patriotic	total
Degree (n = 340)	11	29	39	21	100
Diploma (n = 139)	19	35	27	18	100
Trade (n = 508)	23	31	32	14	100
None (n = 691)	23	35	27	15	100
Whole sample (n = 1,753)	20	32	31	16	100

Note: The analysis excludes 44 respondents to the AES who did not respond to any of

the questions on pride in Australia's achievements.

'Degree' includes postgraduates as well as undergraduates, 'diploma' includes undergraduate and associate diplomas, 'trade' includes trade and non-trade qualifications.

People who did not answer the question on qualifications (n = 75) are not shown separately.

Table 2 shows that people in professional occupations were almost as unlikely to be 'strongly patriotic' as the university educated and even more likely to be 'not patriotic'. (Of course there would be considerable overlap in the two categories.) Table 2 also demonstrates that plant and machine operators and labourers, people removed from the world of the university, are very much more likely to be 'strongly patriotic' than the sample as a whole. In addition, Table 3 shows that students (all aged 18 or more because the sample is restricted to voters) are unlikely to be strongly patriotic while people who are unemployed, retired or engaged in home duties are more likely to be 'strongly patriotic'.

Table 2: Patriotism as measured by the 'pride' variable by occupation, percentages

	strongly patriotic	fairly patriotic	mildly patriotic	not patriotic	total
Admin and managers (n = 193)	21	37	28	14	100
Professionals (n = 314)	13	31	33	23	100
Para-professionals (n = 163)	18	36	37	9	100
Trades (n = 219)	22	31	28	19	100
Intermediate clerks (n = 265)	22	31	30	17	100
Plant and machine operators (n = 88)	28	32	26	14	100
Elementary clerks (n = 199)	23	31	32	14	100
Labourers (n = 97)	29	29	30	12	100
Other (n = 215)	20	33	33	14	100
Whole sample (n = 1,753)	20	32	31	16	100

Note: 'Other' includes those who have never had a paid job (n = 23) and those who did not answer the question on occupation (n = 192).

The pattern set out in Table 3 also supports the third hypothesis. The unemployed are clearly not doing well in the present circumstances while people who have jobs are more likely to feel relaxed about the present tempo of change, with those who are more strongly connected to the work force (people in full-time jobs), the most relaxed of all. In contrast, retired people and those engaged in home duties are more attached to national symbols than the rest of the sample.

Table 3: Patriotism as measured by the ‘pride’ variable by labour-force status, percentages

	strongly patriotic	fairly patriotic	mildly patriotic	not patriotic	total
Works full time (n = 766)	17	35	30	18	100
Works part time (n = 166)	19	32	38	11	100
Looking for full-time work (n = 55)	27	16	46	11	100
Retired (n = 258)	28	26	31	16	100
At school or university (n = 51)	12	37	35	16	100
Keeping house (n = 230)	27	31	27	15	100
Other (n = 214)	19	36	32	14	100
Total sample (n = 1,753)	20	32	31	16	100

Note: ‘Other’ includes people who did not answer to question on labour force status (n = 66). People who are looking for part-time work (n = 13) are not shown separately.

The results so far support the theory that people who feel better able to cope with internationalisation and globalisation (and who are more sympathetic to the ideas of universal sharing and cosmopolitanism) will cling less tenaciously to the idea of the nation. But when the analysis is pushed a little further some complications appear. Table 4 on patriotism by religion shows that people with no religion are weakly represented among the strongly patriotic and over-represented among the non-patriotic which, if agnostics are more likely to be intellectuals, is what the third hypothesis would predict. But in their relative lack of pride in Australia’s achievements, agnostics are outdone by people of the Orthodox Christian faith. In contrast, the mainstream Christian faiths are well above the sample average. This suggests that an ethnic factor may be at work and that people who come from non-traditional stock are less involved in Australia’s national symbols. (This proposition draws some further support from the religious grouping ‘other’, a category which includes Buddhists, Muslims and Jews,

as well as small Christian sects, and which is closer to the agnostics and the Orthodox than it is to any of the other groups in Table 4.)

Table 4: Patriotism as measured by the 'pride' variable by religion, percentages					
	strongly patriotic	fairly patriotic	mildly patriotic	not patriotic	total
Roman Catholic (n = 488)	24	32	28	16	100
Church of England (n = 459)	23	33	32	12	100
Uniting/ Methodist (n = 194)	25	30	31	13	100
Orthodox (n = 56)	11	21	39	29	100
Presbyterian (n = 83)	22	43	29	6	100
Other (n = 152)	14	32	36	18	100
None (n = 271)	13	32	31	24	100
Total sample (n = 1,753)	20	32	31	16	100
Note: People who did not respond to the question on religion are not shown separately (n = 50).					

Table 5: Patriotism as measured by the 'pride' variable by origin (first and second generation), percentages					
	strongly patriotic	fairly patriotic	mildly patriotic	not patriotic	total
Australian born, both parents Aust.-born (n = 974)	22	33	32	14	100
Australian born, 1 parent Aust.-born, 1 ESB-born (n = 132)	21	37	30	13	100
Australian born, both parents ESB-born (n = 39)	18	49	18	15	100
Australian born, 1 parent Aust.-born, 1 NESB-born (n = 50)	14	32	42	12	100
Australian born, 1 parent Aust.-born, 1 NESB-born (n = 50)	12	30	35	24	100
Australian born, both parents NESB-born (n = 87)	14	36	30	21	100
Australian born, both parents NESB-born (n = 87)	19	36	33	13	100
Australian-born, both parents overseas-born (n = 132)	17	36	32	16	100

Australian-born, one parent overseas-born, one Australian-born (n = 182)	21	33	32	14	100
All Australian-born, second generation (n = 314)					
All Australian-born (n = 1,312)					
Overseas-born, both parents ESB-born (n = 165)	18	33	26	24	100
Overseas-born, both parents NESB-born (n = 181)	21	25	30	24	100
All overseas-born (n = 368)	19	29	29	23	100
Total sample (n = 1,753)	20	32	31	16	100

Note: ESB is English-speaking-background, NESB is non-English-speaking background.

People who did not respond to the question on their own birth place are not shown (n = 55), nor are those who did not respond to the question on one or both of their parents' birth place (n = 42). Very small groups are also not shown separately (Australian born, 1 parent ESB-born, 1 NESB-born [n = 6], overseas-born, 1 parent ESB-born and one NESB-born [n = 9], overseas-born, 1 or both parents Australian-born [n = 13]).

Table 5 shows that people born in Australia express more pride in Australia than people born overseas and that the Australian-born of Australian-born parents are the most 'patriotic' of all. Together with the data on religion, this suggests a fourth hypothesis, that the native born of native-born parents will be more patriotic than migrants and their Australian-born children (perhaps because people who have known no other country except Australia will be more strongly attached to Australia than those with other experiences and loyalties). But Table 5 also presents a mild puzzle. If we consider the first column only (the 'strongly patriotic' group), second-generation 'migrants', people born in Australia with at least one parent born overseas, are slightly less patriotic than first-generation migrants, people who were themselves born overseas. This puzzle can however be resolved when the effects of age are taken into account. Patriotism as measured by the 'pride' variable increases markedly with age, and the second generation is younger than the first (27 per cent are aged between 18 and 29 compared to nine per cent of the first generation). The first generation are, however, more likely to found in the 'not patriotic' column than are most of the second generation.

What of the second hypothesis? Are 'patriots' more likely to be nationalists? The first column of Table 6 shows the total percentage of the sample who strongly agreed with a number of questions regarding the national community and its natural environment, and then separates this group of 'nationalists' according to their position on the pride variable. Patriotism as measured by pride is associated with a desire to protect the welfare of compatriots and the natural environment, as well as with support for continuing tariffs, limiting imports and following our own interests. The difference, however, is not so much

between the ‘strongly patriotic’ and the rest, as between those who achieved any score at all for patriotism and those who did not (the people in the ‘not-patriotic’ column).

Table 6: People who ‘strongly agree’ on national questions by patriotism as measured by the ‘pride’ variable, percentages

People who ‘strongly agree’ that we should:	(whole sample) (n = 1,797)	By measures of patriotism				
		strongly patriotic	fairly patriotic	mildly patriotic	not patriotic	total
(a) redistribute income and wealth	(18)	27	31	29	13	100 (n = 305)
(b) increase spending on the environment	(19)	26	33	28	13	100 (n = 337)
(c) continue tariffs	(15)	34	36	22	8	100 (n = 492)
(d) limit imports	(28)	30	35	25	10	100 (n = 492)
(e) follow our own interests regardless	(11)	37	31	22	9	100 (n = 194)

Note: The full wording of the questions asked respondents to state whether they strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with each statement. People who did not respond to any of the questions on pride are excluded from the analysis and only those who ‘strongly agreed’ with the various statements are shown in Table 6.

The statements were:

- (a) Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary working people.
- (b) Increase government spending to protect the environment.
- (c) Australia should continue to use tariffs to protect its industry.
- (d) Australia should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy,
- (e) Australia should follow its own interests even if this leads to conflict with other nations.

The first four items in Table 6 represent positive nationalism, or at least a neutral form of nationalism which should offer little harm to non-nationals. The fifth item, ‘Australia should follow its own interests even if this leads to conflict with other nations’, has a more aggressive ring to it. Overall, few respondents strongly agreed with it (11 per cent of the total sample) but, among those who did, it too was more likely to find favor with patriots

than with non patriots.

The results in Table 6 reflect the fact that the test of patriotism employed so far has been severe. After all, even the ‘mildly patriotic’ have said that they were ‘very proud’ of one or two aspects of Australia. The ‘strongly patriotic’ are very proud of five or more. Moreover the sample has been divided in such a way that no more than 20 per cent can, in fact, display themselves as patriots of the first water. If all patriots are marshalled against the non-patriots, the second hypothesis is confirmed in Table 6 but the way in which the data have been arranged do not permit a test of the first hypothesis that patriotism is widespread.

Patriotism is not necessarily coterminous with pride; love of country at the least involves commitment as well. Indeed it is possible to imagine a sincere patriot who feels little pride in their country, one who believes that their nation has many failings (failings which he or she would dearly wish to remedy). The AES questionnaire includes a question which allows us to tap this dimension of commitment to (and identification with) Australia. It takes the form of the statement ‘I’d rather be a citizen of Australia than of any other country in the world’ — strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree.

Two thirds of the sample (66 per cent) strongly agreed with this statement. There were five options and the overwhelming majority took the first and strongest, offering clear support to the first hypothesis. Indeed while 83 per cent of the group labelled ‘strongly patriotic’ on the pride variable strongly agreed with this statement, so did 43 per cent of the ‘not-patriotic’ group. The question thus encompasses people who are committed to their country but who do it not see it through rose-coloured glasses. Nevertheless, the patterns of engagement with Australia that this question reveals are similar to those demonstrated by the pride variable. For example, Tables 7 and 8 show that the university-educated and the professionals are less enthusiastically identified with Australia than the rest of the sample (but, even so, well over half the university graduates strongly agree, as do 61 per cent of professionals).

Table 7: 'I'd rather be a citizen of Australia than of any other country in the world' by highest post-school qualification, percentages

	strongly agree	agree	neither agree nor disagree	disagree and strongly disagree	total
Degree (n = 338)	58	27	12	4	100
Diploma (n = 138)	59	30	7	4	100
Trade (n = 502)	68	20	10	2	100
None (n = 680)	71	19	7	2	100
Whole sample (n = 1,732)	66	22	9	3	100

Note: The analysis excludes 44 respondents to the AES who did not respond to any of the questions on pride in Australia's achievements, and 21 who did not respond to the

question on citizenship.

For explanations of the levels of qualification, see notes to Table 1.

Table 8: 'I'd rather be a citizen of Australia than of any other country in the world' by occupation, percentages

	strongly agree	agree	neither agree nor disagree	disagree and strongly disagree	total
Admin and managers (n = 190)	68	25	6	2	100
Professionals (n = 312)	61	26	10	3	100
Para-professionals (n = 163)	72	19	8	1	100
Trades (n = 216)	63	23	13	2	100
Intermediate clerks (n = 265)	65	22	10	3	100
Plant and machine operators (n = 86)	69	22	6	3	100
Elementary clerks (n = 196)	71	17	8	4	100
Labourers (n = 96)	75	16	6	3	100
Other (n = 215)	65	22	10	3	100
Whole sample (n = 1,732)	66	22	9	3	100

Note: The analysis excludes 44 respondents to the AES who did not respond to any of the questions on pride in Australia's achievements, and 21 who did not respond to the question on citizenship.

'Other' includes those who have never had a paid job (n = 23) and those who did not answer the question on occupation (n = 192).

Responses to the question on Australian citizenship by origin set out in Table 9 are in some ways also similar to the responses to the 'pride' variable shown in Table 5, except that here the difference between the Australian-born and the overseas-born is much more marked. The overseas-born as a group are very much less committed to Australia than the Australian-born, but this pattern cannot be explained by cultural alienation alone because first-generation immigrants from English-speaking-background (ESB) countries are less committed to Australia than immigrants from non-English-speaking-background (NESB) countries.

Table 9: 'I'd rather be a citizen of Australia than of any other country in the world' by origin (first and second generation), percentages

	strongly agree	agree	neither agree nor disagree	disagree and strongly disagree	total
Australian born, both parents Aust.-born (n = 965)	77	18	4	1	100
Australian born, 1 parent Aust.-born, 1 ESB-born (n = 130)	75	20	4	2	100
Australian born, both parents ESB-born (n = 38)	82	11	5	3	100
Australian born, 1 parent Aust.-born, 1 NESB-born (n = 50)	71	18	8	2	100
Australian born, both parents NESB-born (n = 87)	51	33	14	2	100
Australian-born, both parents overseas-born (n = 130)	60	26	11	3	100
Australian-born, one parent overseas-born, one Aust.-born (n = 179)	74	20	5	2	100
All Australian-born (n = 1,284)	75	19	5	1	100
Overseas-born, both parents ESB-born (n = 165)	29	36	26	9	100
Overseas-born, both parents NESB-born (n = 181)	44	28	20	8	100
All overseas-born (n = 355)	37	32	23	8	100
Total sample (n = 1,732)	66	22	9	3	100

Note: The analysis excludes 44 respondents to the AES who did not respond to any of the questions on pride in Australia's achievements, and 21 who did not respond to the question on citizenship.

For explanations for the origin groupings see notes to Table 5.

In contrast to Table 5, second generation 'migrants' in all cases show higher levels of commitment to Australia than the first generation. Indeed the Australian-born offspring of migrants from English-speaking-background countries show the highest level of commitment

in the whole sample.

If the two variables of pride and commitment are combined we can hazard a rough answer to the question ‘Where do the patriots live?’ Table 10 shows that we are more likely to find people who are both proud of Australia and committed to her in Tasmania, rural areas of the Eastern states, and in outer Sydney and outer Brisbane. In contrast, people who are less involved with their country of residence are to be found in Canberra, South Australia, inner Sydney and Perth. (In fact, Canberra has the lowest proportion of any subgroup who were ‘strongly patriotic’ on the pride variable, a mere 5.6 per cent.)

Table 10: Pride, commitment, and place of residence
1 Above the sample average on both the ‘pride’ variable and ‘I’d rather be a citizen of Australia...’
Tasmania
All of NSW (except inner Sydney)
Rural Queensland and outer Brisbane
Rural Victoria
2 Above the sample average on ‘pride’ but below it on ‘I’d rather be a citizen of Australia...’
Melbourne and provincial towns in Victoria
Rural Western Australia
3 Below the sample average on ‘pride’ but above it on ‘I’d rather be a citizen of Australia...’
Inner Brisbane and provincial towns in Queensland
4 Below the sample average on both the ‘pride’ variable and ‘I’d rather be a citizen of Australia...’
Perth
Inner Sydney
Canberra
All of South Australia
Note: Most states were divided into four geographic categories: inner metropolitan, outer metropolitan, provincial and rural. However there was no ‘provincial’ category for South and Western Australia and the numbers in the categories for Tasmania were too small to analyse separately. There were only seven respondents from the Northern Territory so it has been excluded from this analysis.

The problems of rural areas coping with low commodity prices and of those urban areas particularly stressed by immigration-fuelled population growth may explain these patterns, together with the locational distribution of university-educated professionals. South Australia has suffered from prolonged economic stagnation but, even though Adelaide has a reputation as a sophisticated and cosmopolitan city, few immigrants settle there, and housing prices are low. Canberra, at least prior to the 1996 election, was relatively isolated from the stresses generated by contemporary non-nationalisms and, as well as this, provides a point of geographic concentration for new-class professionals and administrators.

CONCLUSION

The analysis of the AES presented here supports the hypotheses that patriotism is widespread in Australia and that it is linked to support for nationalistic policies. It also supports the hypothesis that new-class intellectuals are less proud of, and less committed to, Australia than their compatriots. But the data also show that migrant origins matter. Many first-generation immigrants have low levels of commitment to Australia. This is especially true of those who come from English-speaking-background countries. (Because they are on the electoral roll, all would be naturalized citizens, with the possible exception of some British subjects who were on the electoral roll before 25 January 1984.) While these low levels of commitment are more likely to be explained by competing loyalties to other nations than by enthusiasm for the various forms of non-nationalism, non-nationalism may now be playing a part.

In 1989 the then Prime minister, Bob Hawke, launched the *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia*. He spoke in Sydney in front of a diverse audience from many different origins. Looking around him he said:

In all this diversity, one unifying theme is clear. For all the differences in our places of birth, our styles of clothes, our languages, our creeds, our colours, our races, there is one fundamental characteristic, one utterly vital value we share.

That is our commitment to Australia...18

His remarks may have been too sanguine.

All people, including new-class cosmopolitans, are dependent on human communities and natural resources, but the circumstances which make them aware of this dependence vary. However, when we consider the degree to which people sense this dependence and the degree to which they do not, we should bear in mind that more than one 'national community' may be involved. People may share a territory but their imagined communities may differ. This too can be a part of the erosion of mutual trust and social capital which we are experiencing as borders and boundaries blur. Nevertheless, a lack of enthusiasm for Australia is only the inclination of a minority; two thirds of the electorate are definite that they would rather belong to Australia than to any other country in the world.

References

- 1 K. Betts, 'Patriotism, immigration and the 1996 election', *People and Place*, vol. 4, no. 4, 1996, pp. 27-38
- 2 See D. Schnapper, 'Ethnies et nations', *Cahiers de recherche sociologique*, vol. 20, 1993, p. 160.
- 3 See M. Walzer, 'The distribution of membership', in P. Brown and H. Shue (Eds), *Boundaries: National Autonomy and Its Limits*, Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa, N.J., 1983, p. 9. See also H. Kane, *The Hour of Departure: Forces that Create Refugees and Migrants (Worldwatch Paper 125)*, Worldwatch Institute, Washington, 1995 and R. Kaplan, 'The coming anarchy', *The Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1994.
- 4 See N. Suyama 'Justifiable and unjustifiable canons of migrant selection — a view of Australian sovereignty', this issue, for an analysis which gives priority to biological descent.
- 5 For the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism see R. Birrell, *A Nation of Our Own: Citizenship and Nation-building in Federation Australia*, Longman, Melbourne, 1995, pp. 13-16, 19-20. See also Schnapper, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-163.
- 6 *The Penguin Macquarie Dictionary of Australian Politics*, Penguin Books Australia, Melbourne, 1988, p. 261
- 7 J. S. Mill quoted in D. Miller, 'In defence of nationality', in P. Gilbert and P. Gregory (Eds), *Nations, Cultures and Markets*, Avebury, Aldershot, 1994, p. 24
- 8 The following discussion owes much to conversations with Robert Birrell and Amanda Simmonds.
- 9 See V. Cable, 'The diminished nation-state: a study in the loss of economic power', *Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, vol. 124, no. 2, 1995, pp. 23-53.
- 10 See for example, the International Securities Markets Association, the International Standards organization, the Central Banks in the Bank of International Settlements and the International Telecommunications Unions. Cited in *ibid.*, p. 37.
- 11 For a discussion of these concepts and their relevance to nationalism, see C. Bean, 'Determinants of attitudes towards questions of border maintenance in Australia', *People and Place*, vol. 3, no. 3, 1995, pp. 32-40, K. Betts, 'Immigration and public opinion in Australia', *People and Place*, vol. 4, no. 3, 1996, pp. 9-20; and K. Betts, 'Patriotism, immigration and the 1996 election', *op. cit.*
- 12 See Reich, *The Work of Nations: A Blueprint for the Future*, Simon and Schuster,

London, 1991, pp. 305-314.

13 For examples, see K. Betts, *Ideology and Immigration: Australia 1976 to 1987*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1988, pp. 101-111, 114-119, 142-147, 165-167. For some more recent examples see Warren Mitchell as quoted in S. Williams, 'Man behind television's biggest bigot hits out at Hanson', *The Australian*, 11-12 January 1997, p. 3; P. Adams, 'Our bigotry has never been silenced', *The Australian: Weekend Review Section*, 12-13 October 1996, p. 2; Robert Hughes and Jill Ker Conway as quoted in L. Slattery, 'Hughes blasts 'uncaring' PM on race debate', *The Australian*, 27 November 1996, p. 3; J. Docker, 'Notions of the nation', *The Australian*, 5 December 1996, p. 11. See also A. Horner, 'The Patriot', *The Age*, Melbourne, 13 October 1984, p. 11.

14 See Birrell, 1995, op. cit.

15 Gellner argues that all members of modern nations are implicit nationalists. Through the education system, they have painfully acquired a national 'high culture' (as opposed to regional and peasant local cultures). This national high culture is necessary for them to find work within the modern nation; but it does not equip them to work outside it. If his argument hold, intellectuals should be keener nationalists than tradesmen. But an intellectual may acquire skills marketable abroad, despite some cultural handicap, and in the English-speaking world the differences between the various nations do not represent insurmountable barriers. Indeed Gellner emphasises that his theory applies to the average man. See E. Gellner, 'The importance of being modular', in J. A. Hall (Ed.), *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995. 'For the average person, the limits of his culture are the limits of his employability, social acceptability, effective participation and citizenship', pp. 44-5.

16 Phillip Adams, a father of the Australian film industry, newspaper columnist, and advertising man, is an interesting example. He excoriates Pauline Hanson for wishing to save Australia from being 'swamped by Asians' but prides himself on his role in defending Australian culture 'from the bombardment of American culture that was drowning our language, our idioms, our history, our sense of ourselves'. P. Adams, 'Fight ire with fire', *The Australian: Review Section*, 15-16 February 1997, p. 2

17 The study was conducted by R. Jones, I. McAllister and D. Gow. See Australian Election Study [computer file], Social Science Data Archives, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1996. It was a self-reported mail questionnaire, based on a random sample of people on the electoral role. The research instrument consisted of a substantial booklet of 27 pages, and of the 3000 posted out, only 1797 (60 per cent) came back. This is a very good response rate for research of this kind, but the sample is biased in favour of university-educated people. (They make up 19 per cent of respondents, as opposed to eight per cent of the general population aged 15 plus.) This bias detracts from our ability to generalise from the sample to the total population of voters but it does not invalidate comparisons of groups within the sample itself. It must

be noted that the original researchers bear no responsibility for the analysis and interpretation of their data in the present article.

18 R. J. Hawke, *Speech by the Prime Minister: Launch of the National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia*, Sydney, 26 July 1996, 1989

Back to [Back to Contents Vol. 5 No. 1](#)

Back to [People and Place Home Page](#)